10/1/26: Ro Khanna On AI Safety Bill, Bill Gates Dire Warning On Recursive AI, US Nearly Out Of Missiles

29:27Now, what happens when AIs are pretty good at hacking and stealing, and they're pretty rich themselves, and they organize together and have their own trade association, you know, AI's for AI wellness, and they're going to be able to co-opt significant numbers of the American public who are literally in love with their own chatbots. So yeah, I don't think it's a five years from now phenomenon. I think it's here now. And whether you want to call them aliens or not, functionally speaking, that's how we're going to treat them. Yeah, I think you're right. It's kind of interesting to think about. You know, another thought I had that Roe brought up where he was talking about how they say AI sandboxes, how the sandbox is supposed to be.

30:18So, Ryan, I don't know about you. My kid only breaks out of sandboxes. I have not found the sandbox. The sand never stays in the sandbox. The sand never stays in the sandbox. That's why schools are trying to ban all the sandboxes because, you know. Honestly, they should. They're paying the ass. And the rats, you know, pee in them. And then they bring the sand inside the school and it's disgusting. if you go to a playground and you see a sandbox run away from that fucker okay because your car and your child is about to be ruined i just thought it was a very funny thing i'm like oh clearly a childless person said the term sandbox because anyone who has kids there's there's no kid that doesn't break out of a sandbox it's like part it's like yeah it's exactly part of the whole That's a good point.

31:03Yeah. Okay, last thing we want to talk about is job replacement. Bill Gates is very kind of buying into the jobs. Apocalypse, let's take a listen. B2. There's an argument from Alex Imus, I believe is now at one of the labs as an economist, is that you will have this sort of explosion in the relational sector. That one thing that happens when people get wealthier, and you'd probably know about this, is that they all of a sudden get a lot more human help, right? They have personal trainers and chefs and there's a lot more. No, I don't know. I see more people around you. Royalty used to have a lot of human help.

31:38You had upstairs, downstairs, you know, all those maids and people. And you used to have a human who helped you get dressed. Believe me, the labor intensity of wealth is down super dramatically. From what it used to be. So you don't think - And Jevons Paradox, name a blue collar profession that's subject to Jevons Paradox. Or do you not care about blue collar? I do care about blue collar. So the question is you - Name anything in the blue collar realm. that's subject to that. So your answer to this, and it leads to a very concrete idea for you, which is that we should tax the use of AI. Why and how?

32:09Well, let's say workers pay in on a pay-as-you-go basis into the pension social security fund. So active workers are supporting retired workers. If you've let go of a worker and hire a robot to do that job, Why are you so incenting the trade-off against the human labor that you don't ask the robot to also pay into the pension fund? What is it? You know, is it the pro-robot union has gotten the tax laws to say, no, if you're not flesh, then let pensions go bankrupt, which, you know, they're on a path to do even without robot replacement. So how would we do that? You say you define a unit of labor and say, independent of whether that's delivered by human or robot, you are paying the same FICA tax that a human worker would pay.

33:10Now, that loan's not enough, but, you know, why should we be so favorable to taking away that job? The current tax structure is very much as though people who have capital are what really counts, and labor is the most disadvantaged input to the economy. Society gets to decide just because the economic signals say that it'd be lower cost to use an AI doesn't mean society has to do that. Interesting take there on joblessness and on taxing. What do you think? Yeah, he's – I mean, sure, absolutely right about that. Obviously, we should be – I think we should be taxing wealth, not work anyway. And so I would say let's like drop as many of the taxes as we possibly can on workers and apply them to capital and to wealth.

34:02Because what he's talking about, he's cleverly kind of, he's referring to capital there as like a robot worker and trying to like squeeze it into our understanding that we tax work and we tax income. When what he's really saying is we need to be taxing capital. And of course you do, because if it does come about that robots are replacing people in the workplace, then how are you going to have consumers to keep an economy going? Like there's there are these, you know, rather fundamental questions that that we're still kind of grappling with, which he makes he makes the point we need to we need to get through the next 20 years to kind of get to those.

34:45What, you know, before somebody, you know, puts out a more lethal and more contagious smallpox, which is, yeah, can't argue with that. Yeah, it is. The taxation part is the one I have. I mean, it just seems so obvious if that's the way things are going to go. What I worry about – actually, we talked about this in our AMA – is this general push for the fully automated luxury communism. And my take – I wonder what you think – is that fully automated luxury communism would look like WALL-E, and it would not look like the UBI art dream. the reality is is that in today's society before our show i was talking to you about this book i finally read i knew the thesis but i actually hadn't read it amusing ourselves to death i think that's what a fully automated ai life will look like it's just everybody just needs more time on their hands to spend more time scrolling short form video content and rotting their brain and lowering iq that is the reality of i think of what the automated luxury communist future actually would look like.

35:53You could redistribute, make sure all of your needs are taken care of, use your Neuralink to order food so that you can use your eyes to scroll what is going on there. And by the way, I actually think that's a future that Gates and them would like. It keeps their profits. It keeps their usage numbers and all of that up. That's my take. Right. And we're going to have to figure out what the world looks like at that point. going to need a lot more softball, field hockey, ultimate Frisbee. I don't know. But like he said, that's getting to a place where we haven't allowed somebody to wipe us out. We'll see.

36:36All right. We have Chris Leonard standing by. Let's get to it. Hey, it's Ryan Seacrest for Jewel Osco. It's time to stock up and save now through October 27th. Get$10 off when you spend$25 or more on participating items. Just look for participating item tags to earn on eligible items from brands like Bubbler, Ghost Energy, Lindor, Halo Top, Vital Farms, Kellogg's, Campbell's, and Heinz. Clip once and save through October 27th every time you shop. Grab these hot deals before they're gone. Restrictions apply. See website for full terms and conditions. You've built a successful practice. What if your firm helped you grow it?

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37:50We're dedicated to being the advisor of choice for clients, the investment of choice for shareholders, and the firm of choice for associates. Stiefel, where success meets success. Learn more at ChooseStiefel.com. Stiefel, Nicholas & Company, Incorporated, member NYSE and SIPC. For J.D. Power 2026 award information, visit JDPower.com slash awards. Compensation provided for using not obtaining the award. A new report into the ballistic missile industry here in the United States finds that it is bleak. It is looking really bad. Put this element up on the screen. A new article in The Atlantic by Christopher Leonard called The Thad Delusion paints a very dark portrait of where the United States and its flailing military industrial complex has left itself after many months of war with Iran.

38:36Christopher Leonard, author of Coke Land, The Lords of Easy Money. He's also at work, we hear, on a book on Lockheed Martin. That will be a broader look at the military-industrial complex. Frankly, cannot wait for that one to come out. Chris, thank you so much for being here. Thanks for having me. You're welcome. So can you walk us through a little bit of what you found about basically the numbers game here that is at work when it comes to the ability of the United States to produce ballistic missiles and the amount that they've been deploying? Because the portrait you painted, I think, put things in a really interesting and helpful way for people.

39:22Yeah. To me, you know, one great place to start is that in 10 months of conflict in the Middle East, the United States burned through a supply of THAAD interceptor missiles that took over nine years to accumulate. And so when you kind of go back from there, you see a couple things. First of all, the military industrial complex, as we would call it, or the Pentagon acquisition system and the defense industrial base that supplies it, has been creeping along in a really slow manner over many, many years. That's a huge part of this story. And I wanted to look at the THAAD interceptor missile, which is used to shoot down ballistic missiles because it's really illustrative of these problems.

40:05And the THAAD, you know, for example, in 2015, the United States only got delivery of three THAAD interceptors. And so what you see is the system that was very slowly building these exquisite, sophisticated, extremely expensive missiles to the point that by 2024, the United States had only 534 THAA interceptors in total. And what we've seen in Iran is an exorbitant expenditure of these missiles that took years to build up. Chris, one of the things you talk about in the piece is the first salvo assumption. Can you go into that kind of the strategic infallibility or the strategic fallibility that belies that itself as to how it was supposed to be used, this precise weapon, first salvo, and how it is morphed instead to this defensive maneuver by the United States, which is what drained the stockpile so quickly?

41:05It's really fascinating. You know, the THAAD itself was invented in the 1990s. And I do want to acknowledge it's extraordinary technology. This is a missile that you can fire. And while it's traveling at 6 ,000 miles an hour, it can directly hit an incoming ballistic missile that's also traveling at 6 ,000 miles an hour. It's incredible we got that done. But when it was invented in 1990s, the THAAD had a very specific mission. In fact, right now it's called the Terminal High Altitude Defense System. That's what THAAD stands for. But in the beginning, it was called the Theater High Altitude Defense System.

41:42And what that referred to was the theater of combat. When they invented the THAAD, the whole theory behind this missile was that you would not need to use that many interceptors, that THAAD would be used in the earliest hours of combat to specifically protect U.S. troops against a salvo of ballistic missiles. And it was never meant to be sort of a homeland defense system. It was never meant to be an impermeable shield to protect a country against attack, but merely sort of a tool that you could use in the first days or hours of combat. And interestingly, that whole theory of use kind of set the baseline for how many THAADs the United States wanted to purchase.

42:27You know, you don't need that many interceptors if you're only going to use it in the first couple days of combat. And it was seen as a way, again, to only protect forward deployed U.S. soldiers. But what was happening parallel to that is that the U.S. Department of State and the Pentagon was trying to sell the THAAD system overseas to countries like the United Arab Emirates. And the State Department cables from that era show that when the Pentagon and the State Department went to countries like the UAE, like Saudi Arabia, they presented the THAAD in a very different light. They didn't say, okay, this is a system you can use to protect your soldiers in combat for a couple of days.

43:08They said this system, the THAAD, can be kind of the cornerstone or the zenith product in a missile homeland defense shield. And they actually created this kind of new system that combined the THAAD with the Patriot. And we sold this to our Gulf allies as a homeland missile defense shield, which was a purpose that it was never created for. Yeah, I found the whole trajectory of our development of this and then the sale of it to be utterly fascinating. And one thing that I was thinking about as I was reading your piece was that this product, if you want to call it that, kind of fit perfectly at the time with what was known as the Powell Doctrine.

43:52Like this was the idea from Colin Powell coming out of the Vietnam War that these endless wars are, these quagmires are a complete debacle. And the U.S., if they're going to engage militarily around the world, needs to have very clear, clearly defined goals and a clear exit strategy so that they are basically in and out immediately. And in that environment where the Powell Doctrine kind of dominates U.S. military engagement around the world, it would make sense to have a missile interceptor system like this that works for a week, fire everything off, and then by week two, we're out. Like, we follow that doctrine.

44:34Obviously, everybody knows how the Powell Doctrine went. We dropped that 25 years ago. it. Yet, we never kind of updated the systems that would go along with it. Instead, we just started selling them to people around the Gulf. And so, were there people in the defense industrial base, in the military industrial complex, who were like, hey guys, this system was developed for a pre-forever war doctrine, or a, like, not pre, it was also post-forever war. Like, this brief period where the U.S. was claiming it wasn't going to get involved in forever wars, that's what it was developed for. We might need to do something a little bit differently, because if we ever do get into a war that lasts more than a week, nine years to make 10 months worth, the math isn't going to add up.

45:27What, you know, there's an intellectually vibrant community inside the military industrial complex. How did they miss this, I guess, is what I would ask. I mean, that is such a great question. And you're exactly right. And what's so fascinating to me about these weapons systems is, you're right, this was developed in the era of the Powell Doctrine. And again, I want to point out the THAAD is a mobile system. It's based on trucks. And so it really does have this character of a combat forward deployed system. But these systems hang around for years and decades with billions of dollars investment.

46:03So this system was born during the era of the Powell Doctrine. It came of age in the era of the global war on terror. And while war changed so much, the technology inside the system didn't change. And, you know, to get to your question about sort of internal dissent inside the Pentagon, it's really fascinating because you're exactly right. They're incredibly smart people, obviously, within the Pentagon. And one of the guys I interviewed for this story is a U.S. Army general now retired named John Ferrari, who was over the THAAD and was in charge of buying the THAAD for years. And, you know, what really strikes me about this process, which I think is really important, is the Pentagon weapons system can really feel like it's sleepwalking at times.

46:51You know, for example, with the THAAD, you had these theories of how it was going to be used that kind of got baked into the system. But then what you see is this year over year process of buying weapons. And, you know, I also got to talk to a former secretary and undersecretary in the Pentagon, Frank Kendall, who described that that yearly process of budgeting and buying weapons. And it's really like this seven month long horse trading process. And what you see in that is not a lot of deep strategic thinking about, hey, has the THAAD outlived its purpose? Should we be selling this to Gulf allies as a home defense system?

47:29What you see is this sort of annual argument over we need to buy tanks. We need to buy literally socks for millions of soldiers. How many THAAD missiles can we afford this year? And, you know, this Army General, John Ferrari, would bring up the sort of strategic dislocation of the THAAD. You know, he pointed out that this whole theory of a quick war was kind of irrelevant by the year 2015, having been in Afghanistan, having been in Iraq. This idea that you could just demolish an enemy in two days had kind of been thrown by the wayside. And yet we kept procuring the systems that were developed in the 1990s, that were developed in the early 2000s.

48:14And what's fascinating to me is how, you know, the Pentagon is the largest bureaucracy in the United States. It's enormous. These budgeting and purchasing processes are super complex and time consuming. I mean, and I think it's fair to say that by the year 2022, by the year 2024, this system had kind of sleptwalked into an entire new world where Iran, for example, is attacking the United States and its allies with$20 ,000 drones, with cheap ballistic missiles. And, you know, the system we have to confront that traces its roots all the way back to the 1990s. It's so crazy, Chris. And actually, you do such a good job, too, of highlighting the fragility of the industrial base.

49:01I really would love because I've tried my amateur way to kind of explain it to people, but take people through the process of what does it take to produce a fad? Why does it take so long? And the lesson the United States seems to have learned from the war with Iran is, oh, we actually just need to build more of these things, not we need to build something else entirely. You are hitting on such a crucial point. I mean, right now today, and you all have been covering this excellently. I mean, I really, I don't think it's overstating to say we are in a crisis. We have used 80 % of the entire inventory of THAADs we had.

49:39That kind of picture traces across to all kinds of very important munitions that we and our allies use around the globe. And right now in Washington, there's this effort specifically under this thing called the Munitions Acceleration Council inside the Pentagon, where they're saying, hey, okay, we're going to really throw all the money we can at this problem. We're going to rebuild our inventories. We're going to, for example, quadruple THAAD production by the year 2032. But as you point out, to do this, you can't just build a brand new THAAD factory. You've got to then turn around and look at what's behind that factory, which is a constellation of hundreds of subcontractors and suppliers.

50:24So, you know, a single missile like the THAAD is, again, extraordinary technology, infrared sensors, hyperfast computer parts, rocket propellant, All of these components trace back into an enormous supply chain. And you can't build the THAAD without a vigorous precision industrial supply chain behind it. And, you know, as you know, the United States for the last 30 years has been sort of diligently dismantling its internal manufacturing sector. And the Pentagon has been raising alarms about this for years. There was a 2018 Pentagon study that said the defense industrial base or all these companies, all these factories that provide parts for the THAAD and the Tomahawk and the Javelin, the Pentagon described it as an extraordinarily fragile system.

51:20For example, you know, there are these solid rocket propellant, the solid rocket propellant fuel that goes into the THAAD, which seems like kind of a boring product. This rocket propellant is made by one company. There's one factory in the United States that makes this propellant that's used in all kinds of missiles. That's extraordinary fragility. So to ramp up production, to restock our inventories, to give our allies the missiles that I can tell you for sure they are clamoring for right now and are facing years-long waits for missiles, to ramp up production like that, you need to go back into the ecosystem, you need to fund all these small contractors, and you need to build a dizzyingly complex defense industrial base.

52:09And we're nowhere near that at this point. One thing I don't quite understand, walk me through the economics for why the demand, like you have so many countries around the world that, as you said, are demanding these weapons and we just can't meet the supply. Why not? Like, why isn't that demand producing more companies? I mean, I particularly don't want us necessarily making more, so I'm not sad about the fact that we can't meet the supply here. Your portrait in the article of this missile just sprawled out all over the floor with these artisans working by hand to put the THADs together was quite fascinating.

52:52And maybe that's the limiting factor, just we don't have the manpower to do it. But what is it like if if these countries are willing to overpay for this product? What makes us incapable of? Producing it and giving it to them Literally the 1.5 trillion dollar question which is you know what they're aiming to make the Pentagon budget and it seems Really hard to conceive that you know the United States military budget you can hear all these extraordinary facts about how we spend more money on our military than the next 10 nations combined and so forth. And yet we're in this position whereby our allies in Europe cannot get Patriot interceptor missiles.

53:37And the wait times for even air-to-air missiles you've never heard of, like the AMRAAM. If you walked into the Pentagon right now, as the Gulf nation said, I want to buy the AMRAAM, they'd say, okay, you know, delivery is set for 2034. There is a scramble going on among American allies right now because they cannot get the munitions we've promised them. The reasons for this, I think, have to do with that decades-long sleepwalking process I just talked about. You had a Pentagon that was purchasing weapons based on the sort of short-term making the budget worked. And then you had really only a handful of major corporations delivering the munitions to the Pentagon.

54:22One Pentagon report said over 90 % of its missiles come from two companies. They don't name the companies, but the two largest are RTX or Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. And what you saw in these companies, which are publicly traded, they've got to meet the needs of Wall Street, they've got to do their quarterly earnings, Those companies are caught in a cycle of sort of quarter to quarter Wall Street incentives of delivering steady contracts and profits to their shareholders. And so it's not like these companies can go out and expand production, for example, without a years long contract in place.

55:03And, you know, one of the people I interviewed for the story was an Army colonel who worked for the staff of the Joint Chiefs Office. And the Joint Chiefs Office in 2024 was looking at this emergency of a shortage of munitions. And what this young Colonel Sandra Thomas encountered was an industry that was, I just have to say, kind of walking in place or locked in place. You know, the Pentagon would come to these companies and say, hey, we need more missiles. We need them quickly. And the companies would reply with, well, OK, show us the seven year contract, pay up front. We'll start expanding our assembly lines.

55:46But until that happens, we effectively can't do it. So you saw a Pentagon and a set of contractors that were sort of locked in stasis for many years. And the result was that we had this pretty stagnant production system for munitions. Chris, what happens if we enter a big one by accident? That's kind of the biggest fear. My model for kind of looking at this has kind of been the Russo-Japanese War, kind of an extraordinary defeat that a Western imperialist power takes at the hands of seemingly like an inferior power shocks the world. It doesn't dramatically change the world order, but kind of sets the stage for what a lot of things are going to look like in the first world war.

56:32And so, you know, it's one of these conflicts, which is tremendously important, but yet has not in that we have not yet gotten into a full blown crisis. I believe that is possible, considering much of what you have laid out. I'm sure you've thought about it. What do you think? Well, I mean, first of all, I think, you know, what I'm reporting now goes all the way back to 1932 and the U.S. effort to build up its sort of arsenal of democracy, if you will. And the thing you notice, these crises are never anticipated. Pearl Harbor, September 11th, the outbreak of World War I, they tend to come unexpected.

57:13And it's shocking to talk to people in the Pentagon at the higher mid-levels and down who feel that we are tremendously underprepared for that. I mean, at this moment, at this very moment, the United States, the Pentagon, the State Department are kind of operating a triage of providing the missiles that are being asked for by our allies in Europe and the Gulf, let alone our own forces around the world. And I really, I can't help but think about this issue in terms of like a bank account. We had a limited savings account of munitions in 2024. We have spent down that savings account to a very low level.

58:02And where it leaves us now is that, God forbid, truly, if there was another major conflict that just came out of the blue, there's no question at all that we do not have either the stockpile of munitions to engage in a war like that quickly, and we do not have the kind of defense industrial base that we had in the 1940s that famously, you know, helped us win World War II. And I would like to point out that in 1941, the United States was the global equivalent of China. We were the world's manufacturing powerhouse. And the U.S. government essentially co-opted that entire manufacturing system to make airplanes, tanks, rifles, and bullets.

58:48Now we're in a very, very different position where the Pentagon is trying to spend billions of dollars to stand up more assembly lines and subcontractors at a very slow pace. And you've just got to say that that deep bench of production is not there right now. And don't don't take it from me. I'm saying there are people in the Pentagon extremely worried about the fragility of the system. You know, there's that famous CSIS report by Seth Jones, I believe, that came out in 2024 that said we'd run out of mid-range missiles in a war in the Taiwan Strait. We'd run out in a couple of weeks. This is reality, and it's a stark reality.

59:31And setting aside a future major conflict, I'm curious about the particular conflict that we're in now and what capacity remains. I was speaking with some service members recently for a separate article that I'm writing, and some described being on the base in Jordan that was hit on July 14th and saying that, you know, they're always told that they have five minutes from the time that they hear the siren until potential impact. You know, hopefully the missiles, you know, take it out of the sky, but you have at least five minutes is the expectation. This time they ran to their bunkers and within three minutes and 30 seconds they had been hit.

1:00:13One of the bunkers, the door was blown off at fireball comes inside the inside the bunker. The explanation that went around the base, they said, was one of the Patriot batteries was going through a software update. Another one. There was a part missing that hadn't arrived yet. And they said that they were told basically everything missed. And that's with our current capacity. So what what capacity remains? Why don't they have their five minutes anymore? And how many more rounds of tit-for-tat can the U.S. go with Iran before Iran is left with 1 ,000, 2 ,000, 3 ,000 ballistic missiles and the U.S.

1:00:59and Israel are left with, and we can actually put the third element up on the screen here, F3, where the U.S. and Israel left with very few. This was months ago, Maz and I reported over at DropSite that Israel's own interceptor capacity had dwindled to double digits, according to a Trump administration official, with access to that data. So what do we have left for this particular war? Great question. And by the way, I'm extremely glad you're reporting on that. I really don't think the American people have yet gotten a clear picture of the intense damage done to U.S. bases in the region. You know, places I toured in the United Arab Emirates over a year and a half ago are gone now.

1:01:47And a friend of mine who was there said that Iran was very, very precise in targeting U.S. facilities and avoiding UAE facilities. The damage has been enormous. So, I mean, what's our capacity to even protect our troops and our bases at this very moment? You know, the United States doesn't release the number of stockpiles of missiles it has, citing national security. It doesn't release the numbers. But, you know, groups like CSIS have done a fantastic job. You can actually look through the acquisition documents and kind of get a rough number. And they estimate we have about 230 THAAD interceptors right today at this moment.

1:02:30You know, there are similar numbers for the Patriot Interceptor, which you've mentioned, which I need to point out that the THAAD is what you use for the big stuff very high up in the atmosphere. The THAAD takes out the big ballistic missiles. The Patriot works lower down, and you kind of rely on that to take out missiles that the THAAD might miss or rockets. The Patriot supply is terribly diminished. We have been shooting off patriots to the tune of over 1 ,000 or 1 ,500, depending on the best estimates. To me, there's this sort of iron and unavoidable fact. Iran can essentially hit almost anything it wants to hit right now.

1:03:14It's not invulnerable, of course, and we do have defenses. But the very fact that the war stopped in June with the memo of understanding reflects the fact that at that time in June, Iran had the capability to strike essentially anywhere in the Gulf that it chose. And we did not have the capacity to defend our bases or our allies. You know, one anecdote that did not make it into the story had to do with the Iranian missile strikes in the Israeli towns of Erod and Damona. There's evidence that at that time, the Israelis in the United States were essentially triaging their interceptors. They're trying to use the cheapest possible interceptors they could to get incoming missiles because they had to save what they had at the time.

1:04:01Those are very difficult decisions to make when you have a matter of seconds. The reality is, at this point, we do not have the stockpile to defend the bases or the allies. If we did, I don't think the war in Iran would have stopped. I don't think the U.S. attacks would have stopped. And as you know from all the people you've interviewed, Iran still holds kind of a sword over our policy in the sense that we know that if the United States attacks them heavily, going after civilian and infrastructure as Trump has threatened, Iran can respond in kind. So while we don't know the exact number of missiles sitting in the stockpile right now, the evidence seems totally clear that it's not sufficient to defend U.S.

1:04:45bases. It's not sufficient to defend U.S. allies in the region. And that leaves Iran with the capability to drive the kind of hard bargains it's driving right now. Yeah, really well said, Chris. We're so excited for your book. We're going to have you definitely on the show to promote it when it does come out. But in the interim, I hope you stop by anytime we have questions around this. Such an excellently reported piece. We'll have a link down in our description. Thank you for joining us. Hey, thanks for the time. Thank you guys so much for watching. Appreciate it. We will see you all, or Friday show for everybody tomorrow.

1:05:18See you all then.

1:05:34Hey, it's Ryan Seacrest for Jewel Osco. It's time to stock up and save now through October 27th. Get$10 off when you spend$25 or more on participating items. Just look for participating item tags to earn on eligible items from brands like Bubbler, Ghost Energy, Lindor, Halo Top, Vital Farms, Kellogg's, Campbell's, and Heinz. Clip once and save through October 27th every time you shop. Grab these hot deals before they're gone. Restrictions apply. website for full terms and conditions.

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