MBZ’s Warning to Netanyahu, Days Before Oct 7 - with Amit Segal and Nadav Eyal

0:00Amit Segal: Our subscribers fund ARK Media. They help allow us to cover Israel in the Jewish world honestly and without compromise. Join us at ARK Media dot org. And to our subscribers, thank you.

0:17Dan Senor: You are listening to an ARK Media podcast. Netanyahu is accountable and responsible, but we are now on the question of could it be prevented? So you say that the IDF and the Shin Bet had warned Netanyahu that a war is coming, but they weren't alarmed by their own warnings. Now, here's the thing. They warned that war is coming. But even though on the night of October 6th and 7th, they did nothing in order to prepare to a war in Gaza. And you're saying that they ignored their own warning, but a phone call from MBZ three weeks before would have woken them up. I think it's a very significant report.

0:58It's the first time that we've heard that the prime minister was warned personally by a head of state, no less, as to October 7. And it was a specific warning. The buck stops with him. There's no doubt about that, I think. But there's also a question of blame. Was the prime minister negligent in the way that he treated threats and strategic warnings? And this is a really new ballgame.

1:37Amit Segal: It's 4.30 p.m. on Wednesday, September 9th here in New York City. It's 11.30 p.m. on Wednesday, September 9th in Israel. Before today's episode, a quick housekeeping note. On Thursday, October 22nd, just five days ahead of the Israeli elections, Call Me Back will hold a live taping at the Stryker Center in New York City, where I'll sit down with Dan Shapiro, Dalia Scheinlin, and Brett Stevens to discuss what's at stake in Israel's 2026 election and what its results will mean for the U.S.-Israel relationship. Tickets have gone on sale, so if you want to join us, please follow the link in the episode description.

2:13Amit Segal: Now on to today's episode. Yesterday, after an 18-month-long investigation, Haaretz journalist Shlomi Eldar and Ruti Yuval reported that roughly 10 days before October 7th, in late September 2023, the president of the United Arab Emirates, MBZ, Mohammed bin Zayed, personally called Prime Minister Netanyahu and had a 45-minute conversation. According to three senior foreign officials and a close advisor to MBZ, who were briefed on the call. MBZ told Prime Minister Netanyahu directly that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was preparing a major operation against Israel, that Israel should quote-unquote be ready and warned that an attack would destabilize the region and blow up the Abraham Accords.

3:01Amit Segal: He himself had helped build. That's not the only warning we're now learning about from that window. The Times of Israel now notes that this call closely tracked another one by Egyptian Intelligence Chief Abbas Kamal, telling Netanyahu also about 10 days out before October 7th that Gazans were likely to do quote-unquote something unusual. And we already knew from reporting on this show in January that the head of the Shin Bet delivered what's called in Hebrew an official war warning to the Prime Minister in the summer of 2023, along with five separate intelligence letters about Israel's perceived weakness in the eyes of its enemies.

3:40Amit Segal: What's new and revealing here is the specificity and the name attached to it, a head of state on the phone saying to the prime minister, watch out for Sinwar. And according to Haaretz, Netanyahu did not brief his own security chiefs on that call. Netanyahu's office has responded already in a statement calling the report, quote, an absolute lie. Naftali Bennett, who's running in the elections, has already weighed in publicly on the other side. This lands at an extraordinary moment. Yesterday was the deadline for Israel's political parties to submit their final Knesset lists, their lists of candidates for the Knesset for the October 27th election.

4:22Amit Segal: Likud reportedly waited until the literal last hour to lock in Netanyahu's reserve slots. So this story isn't landing in a vacuum. It's landing seven weeks before Israelis vote in a campaign where Netanyahu is already polling behind and where Bennett and Eisencott are explicitly running on the issue of October 7th accountability and where the prime minister's strategy on this issue has been to make sure that question never gets a clean answer. So today we're asking a few things at once. Is this story true? Doesn't matter. And what does this mean politically 48 days before the most consequential election, as many call it, in Israel's history?

5:04Amit Segal: My conversation with Amit and Nadav right after this short message. This episode of Call Me Back is brought to you by the Jewish Communal Fund, JCF. The high holidays are a time to reflect on what matters most, including the impact we hope to make in the year ahead. For 54 years, JCF has helped individuals and families put their values into action through thoughtful philanthropy. As the nation's leading Jewish donor-advised fund, JCF empowers donors to give more strategically, maximize charitable tax savings and make a powerful difference with their giving. Through financial expertise, operational excellence, and highly personalized service, JCF makes it easier to support the causes and communities that matter most.

5:55Amit Segal: Learn more at jcfny.org or follow the link in the episode description. Jewish Communal Fund, strategic giving, powerful impact.

6:09Amit Segal: Amit Segel, Nadav Ayal, welcome back, guys. Thank you. Hi. Thanks for having us. As I said in the intro, this bombshell report by Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Duval, they broke the story on Tuesday. I think it's in the context of the rollout of a book they're publishing, making this stunning allegation that Netanyahu was warned by MBZ just a few days prior to October 7th, that something big was coming and that he kept it to himself. Now, I want to start by asking you both, how significant is this report and what impact did it have in Israel since its publication? I'll start with you, Nadav. I think it's a very significant report.

6:45It's the first time that we've heard that the prime minister was warned personally by a head of state, no less, as to October 7. And it was a specific warning, according to what was reported by Haaretz. Now, I want to be clear about this from the beginning, Dan. I have not verified this report. For me to sign my own credentials on this, I need to have at least double verification, the sort that we have in journalism, to say that it is true. It seems to be true by various reporting in Israel of other journalists that are saying that they've also had some sort of crisscrossing of this information.

7:28But is it significant? It's significant because the entire question as to October 7 is a question of responsibility and a question of blame. Now, the fact is that Prime Minister Netanyahu has been in office since 2009. He has manufactured the policy towards Gaza and Hamas. He is responsible, according to his own testimonies in the past, for Israel's security as the prime minister. The buck stops with him. There's no doubt about that, I think. But there's also a question of blame. Was the prime minister negligent in the way that he treated threats and strategic warnings? And this is a really new ballgame.

8:12The fact that we have now a story published by two very good journalists were saying that that he was personally warned by Mohammed bin Zayed, who is probably the wisest of the regional leaders in the Middle East. So this is how he is perceived, both, I think, in Washington, D.C. and in many other areas in the world.

8:36Dan Senor: Amit, what's your take? Okay, so due diligence, I really appreciate Houthi Uval. She was my professional grandmother. She was the editor-in-chief of my first editor-in-chief. Having said that, and I'll get immediately to the question of reliability, I personally don't think that this question or this report is very significant when it comes to the war. And I want to explain. There are two parallel channels. There was the information channel prior to October 7th, and there was what we call the conceptia prior to October 7th. And as we know from history, from Stalin 1941, that doesn't believe that Hitler is about to invade until it's too late.

9:19Dan Senor: And from Israel in 1973, that Golda Meir refuses to believe that the Egyptians and the Syrians are about to initiate the war until it's too late.

9:27Amit Segal: Despite warning after warning after warning that she got from the Jordanians.

9:32Dan Senor: And information and planes, you know, taking footage of the preparations of the Egyptians and Syrians alike. and the warning from King Hussein, which is very similar to the alleged MBZ Netanyahu phone call. There was no shortage of information. There was shortage of understanding of Hamas's abilities. And I want to explain it in 30 seconds. Israel knew Hamas almost from scratch, from so-called childhood. Hamas was a terrorist organization. And Israel treated Hamas as such until it was too late, refusing to understand that Hamas had become a monstrous Iranian army consisting of two commando divisions on our very southern border.

10:14Dan Senor: Thus, when the warning was that Hamas was about to do something monstrous, the conception was, OK, a very murderous terrorist attack. That's why on the night between October 6th and 7th, Dashin Bet decides to send a tequila squad, the most trained. It's like Fauda. Yeah, right. If you watch Fauda season five, you'll know what tequila is. Very trained fighters, because if you have 20 trained fighters, you can take, let's say, 40, 50 Hamas terrorists. Because till then, till October 7th, the largest scale terrorist attack against Israel included 25 terrorists. so the israeli mind prior to october 7th said okay so once count wars we're going to fight 50 60 terrorists no one envisioned 1200 2000 trained fighters from hamas so no matter even had mbz warned netanyahu that something monstrous was about to happen and if the egyptians had warned him before it wouldn't change the thing as long as you prepare for a terrorist attack and not a military invasion.

11:20Dan Senor: This is for the significance of the report. Now, as for the reliability, I have to say that I highly doubt this report, and I would like to explain. First of all, there are many, many mistakes in the report in Haaretz. There were many, many details that were refuted quite rapidly after the report. I'll give you an example. Anthony Blinken, which is not a member of Netanyahu's fan club, to say the least, has just published a tweet on X saying that the The report about him was false. And the report said that on October 9th, there was an offer by Hamas. Allegedly, they found a generous Hamas that offered to release the Bibas family, all the elderly hostages, in return for nominating a mediator for free.

12:04Dan Senor: All of a sudden, Hamas was willing to release.

12:07Amit Segal: My understanding is the deal was that Hamas would release all the hostages.

12:10Dan Senor: No matter. I mean, that all of a sudden there is a moderate Hamas. So I beg to differ. Anthony Blinken begged to differ. And President Herzog, also not a member of Netanyahu's Frank Lab, denied that MBZ talked to him, too, about the situation in Hamas generally and specifically about an imminent attack. What I'm trying to say is that we can't know whether there was a phone call or not. But all the details around it were done, at least in my opinion, in a very problematic journalistic fashion. And I highly doubt whether it happened if such a phone call took place. And I would like to remind you that Netanyahu went all the way.

12:48Dan Senor: He could have said, OK, MBZ called me on September 15th, but it was something general. No, Netanyahu denies the very existence of the phone call when it's quite easy to prove that such a phone call took place. Why? Because phone calls, as the report claims, are done when there is an assistant from the UAE embassy in Tel Aviv, in Australia, coming to the prime minister's office. So it's something you can track quite easily.

13:15Amit Segal: So I want to stay on this for a moment because this is an important detail. When the president of the UAE wants to speak to the prime minister of Israel, it's not like he just MBZ just picks up the phone and calls Bibi. It's that there's an official, a security official from the UAE embassy in Tel Aviv that literally comes to the prime minister's office. My understanding is they bring a dedicated encrypted phone for that specific conversation. So I think the point you're making, Amit, is that there's plenty to track here. Your point is for the prime minister's office to say none of this happened is a pretty brazen statement, given how quickly they could be proven wrong.

13:50Dan Senor: And more than this, now I take information from every journalist, be it, you know, pro-Israel, anti-Israel, leftists, right-wingers, etc. However, the entire story or the entire thesis behind Shlomi and Ruti's report is somehow confusing. because prior to October 7th, they claim that Netanyahu should have prepared. If you know that Hamas is about to attack you, you must strike before they strike you. On the other hand, on October 9th, their perception is that Israel should have ended the war and talked to Hamas. So there is no consistency whatsoever. So in my opinion, one, it's not as important as people think.

14:31Dan Senor: Second, it's not as reliable as people think. And third, it's quite confusing more than people think. All right.

14:36Amit Segal: So, Nadav, I know you're going to want to respond to a lot of what Amit said, and we will get to that. But I just want to get to the story itself. So 10 days prior to October 7th, according to the report, Netanyahu receives a phone call from MBZ, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. What does MBZ tell Netanyahu during this 45-minute call? And where was he getting his information from? So allegedly, according to the story, the leader of the UAE was telling Netanyahu that Sinoir, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, is planning something big, is planning an earthquake. And the expression used is an earthquake or something like an earthquake, and that this is imminent.

15:18And the reason that the UAE would know about this is described in the story as a senior Palestinian. This person is Mohammed Dahlan, a former Fatah official from Gaza, who still has great connections in Gaza and is living under the hospice of the UAE. Dakhlan and others who had contacts with Hamas heard from Sinwar himself. So Sinwar himself delivered a threat to Palestinian sources, and they delivered that directly and through another negotiator to Mohammed bin Zayed, saying that Israel is basically going to be attacked, And that sinwar is dedicated to a mysterious, enormous strike of sorts against Israel.

16:10And that sinwar himself, according to the story, is threatening the Israelis. And he wants this message to be passed to the Israelis that he is going to strike. And this is one of the key questions there. Why would sinwar want this message to be passed to the Israelis? And there is a lot of speculation as to that. But Ben Zayed sends a message to Israel through its defense officials. We're going to talk about that message. It's even more important, I think, than the MBZ conversation. And then, allegedly, according to our story, when he sees nothing happens, he turns into a direct phone call with the prime minister.

16:50Amit Segal: OK, Amit, I know you dispute that the phone call actually took place between MBZ and Netanyahu, but it doesn't sound like you're disputing that there was some information passed along before this alleged phone call. One way or the other, you're acknowledging there was some communication between the Emiratis and the prime minister. What's clear, though, whatever form that communication came in and whoever were the communicators, it sounds like Netanyahu did not disclose this information to his security chiefs, to the head of the Shin Bet, to the head of the Mossad, to the IDF chief of staff. So why do you think he did not disclose this information to them?

17:28Dan Senor: Because he saw it as another version of an information that Israel has already had, had already had. I'll explain. The information to the UAE arrived from a Palestinian mediator between Israel and Hamas. OK, Hamas wanted to shake the entire system because it was frustrated that the deal, the negotiations for a deal between Israel and Hamas about releasing two mentally ill Israelis and two bodies of Israeli soldiers from the Kassel-led operation in 2014, the negotiations failed. So the threat made by Hamas delivered by the mediator was interpreted in Israel and the Shin Bet and Netanyahu as an attempt to take over another hostage, an Israeli named Elizabeth Tsurkov that had been taken hostage in Iraq in 2023.

18:19Dan Senor: So the idea was that Hamas might take over Elizabeth Tsukov, thus having another asset. And that's why even there is another round of information and maybe there is a phone call from MBZ. So Netanyahu must have said to him, OK, look, we already know this information. Look, then if someone tells you your car makes some noises and you take it to fix it and the guy tells you, look, it's nothing. and then another one calls you, MBZ calls you and tells you, look, your car is in a problematic situation, you won't be too worried because you allegedly already took care of the problem. That's the entire environment in Israel in September 2020, to me.

19:02Amit Segal: Okay, so Nadav, I want to pick up on what Abit just said, because the information that MBZ presented to Netanyahu, whether it was via phone call or through other channels, that Sinwar is preparing, quote, an earthquake was similar to the information that, according to reporting the head of Shin Bet, Ronan Barr, presented two weeks earlier to Netanyahu. Similar warnings also, again, reportedly coming in from at the time from Egypt's intelligence chief Abbas Kamal. So it may be shocking that Netanyahu didn't share the MBZ call or the information that was passed along with his security chiefs. Do you think it would have had a material impact on their own assessment, given everything else that was already swirling around?

19:39Amit Segal: Like, do you honestly think that this would have been the kind of game changing piece of information in changing Israel's posture? I need to go to the time continuum here. It's very important. Okay. First of all, comes the information to the UAE. The UAE and others turn to the Shin Bet. The Israeli head of the Shin Bet conducts a phone call, an urgent phone call, with the prime minister, with the military secretary on the line, in which he says, Yach Yassin Huar is saying something extremely dramatic. And now it's me saying, it's not the reporting in Aretz. The Adif Deshimbet is telling Netanyahu, Sinwar is saying that he's going to do something that will empty the Israeli jails from Palestinian prisoners held there for security violations, offenses, murder, terror, etc.

20:32Empty the Israeli jails means that he is, for all intents and purposes, planning a very big operation, probably of kidnapping. and that's what Amit referred to, this conversation is not in doubt and it is new and it is part of the Haaretz reporting and nobody's doubting it. And it's confirmed as far as I know.

20:54Dan Senor: Yes, but Nadav, Nadav, Yaron Avraham reported it on Shalom 12 two years ago. The very same thing. Exactly the same thing. There was a threat from Yichas Noir to actually empty the Israeli prisons. Now, I'm not saying this because I'm playing politics of it. I'm trying to blame the prime minister or downplay on the Israeli defense apparatus because this was at the hands of both the prime minister and the defense apparatus. According to the AARED's reporting, this was later enhanced, and this is absolutely new, by that MBZ phone conversation. I should note now that the UAE is not denying that such a phone conversation happened.

21:29They're saying, we won't confirm or deny. It's not even a non-denial denial. After they said, we're not going to talk about the conversations of leaders. They did say at the end, a very, I think, meaningful sentence, that intelligence cooperation or exchange between Israel and the UAE continued through the war or something like that. The UAE could absolutely just say nothing like that happened and that would have killed the story. And they didn't. Now, to the question, was this meaningful? I'm going to surprise you, Dan. I do not think that after knowing what they knew, the security chiefs, the fact that MBZ also called the prime minister would have changed their minds or their assessment or the assessment of the prime minister himself.

22:21I don't think that this would have done this. I think, and I think this is a fair portrayal, that Netanyahu, if he would have said that to them, they would have gotten stressed, agitated, and maybe began a process. And in that, I completely disagree with Amit. Amit is basically saying this couldn't have been stopped. We couldn't have prevented it because we were so far down the rabbit hole of the concepcia, the mistake of our perception of Hamas in Gaza, that nothing would have helped. I think process would have helped. So if the prime minister would have said, for instance, look, I got another warning.

22:58Could you check again? I'm asking you to check again. This could have made a difference.

23:02Dan Senor: Can I try to convince you? I'll give you an example. Okay. In 1973, there was a reason why Golda Meir didn't call all the reservists to come to the front. Why? Because it had already happened twice in April and May 1973. And the cost for the Israeli economy was huge. So there was a thinking that it's just an attempt of Egypt and Syria to destroy Israel economy by making, you know, false flag attacks. On the other hand, the cost for the Israeli taxpayer in order to prepare and prevent a Hamas full-scale attack was 20 cent. Just call him, make a phone call to each and every military base around Gaza, say, wake the fuck up and be prepared at 5.30 before dawn.

23:49Dan Senor: And no one did it. Neither Netanyahu, nor the head of the Shin Bet, nor the IDF chief of staff, etc. What I'm trying to say that when you are deep in the rabbit hole, as you said, you just don't do the necessary things. And the fact that very smart people like Netanyahu, Bar, Halevi, Haliva, and every other person around refuse to do the simple thing, the simplest thing, actually represent the fact. And the fact says that no one envisioned or conceptualized such an attack. I agree completely. But the question is, could they have conceptualized if they had enough information? And just to give an example to the people listening in, what does it mean when the Israeli intelligence decides to investigate something?

24:35Because they get agitated because they get orders from above. You know, the prime minister is interested, right? Someone picks up the phone and says, you know, the prime minister wants more information about this. Immediately, this gets many, many people in many places in a huge apparatus beginning to, I'm translating literally from Hebrew, to open abilities, okay, to use certain abilities of the Israeli intelligence, electronic abilities mostly, and start directing them. It's all a question of priorities. And this could have absolutely happened the night before. And I do blame, for instance, the intelligence chiefs for not doing that after they knew what they knew in that night.

25:17I need to give another example. When the prime minister is warned in at least four different letters by the intelligence branch saying that the summer of 2023, that the enemies of Israel see this as a historic opportunity to possibly attack Israel. Netanyahu, as the prime minister, had one job to have a meeting about that. And then another meeting, another meeting, demanding answers from these intelligence chiefs. Maybe, like his supporters are saying, it was all political to stop the judicial overall. I don't know. But to start a process, and if he would have started a process, we might have not been in the same place.

25:56We might have known more.

25:57Dan Senor: Nadav, listen to what you are saying. You say that Netanyahu is responsible, and I agree he's accountable and responsible, but we are now on the question of could it be prevented? So you say that the IDF and the Shin Bet had warned Netanyahu that a war is coming, but they weren't alarmed by their own warning. So Netanyahu told them, look, believe yourself, a war is coming, they would have noticed. now now here's the thing they warned that war is coming but even though even though on the night of october 6th and 7th they did nothing in order to prepare to a war in gaza and you're saying that they ignored their own warning but a phone call from mbz three weeks before would have woken them up i i refuse to believe it i think we were deep in the concept here the press the idf the Shin Bet and first and foremost Netanyahu.

26:51Dan Senor: And that's why nothing would have shaken it. And history is full with examples and full with stories about, you know, eyes wide shot.

26:59Amit Segal: Okay. I want to ask you about a security meeting on October 1st, which was just a few days after this alleged call between Netanyahu and MBZ. And this was a security meeting in which the head of the Shin Bet recommended to the prime minister an operation targeting senior Hamas officials, including Sinoir. Again, this is October 1st. Now, that operation never took place. What can you tell us about this?

27:24Dan Senor: Okay, so I want to share with you a story about Nadav and myself. Somewhere in 2024, 2025, I got a phone call from a source. It was Thursday night, and they offered me amazing protocols showing that the head of the Shin Bet was blind to the danger from Gaza that a few days before he wrote in an official document, I think it was October 3rd or 4th, that the high holiday, the Jewish holidays ended are about to end peacefully in spite of the provocations from the Jewish and the Palestinian side alike. He was blind to the danger that he offered more economic measures in order to appease Hamas. And I knew because it was Thursday evening that it was an attempt to shut down, to intercept a story on the other side.

28:11Dan Senor: And I woke up on Friday morning to see Nadav's story about the very same, from the very same protocols. Everyone leaked what was convenient for them. What I'm trying to say is that the protocols between September 27th and October 6th are full with stupidity, misunderstanding, misreading of the entire situation, both from the side of Ronen Bar, Herzia Levi, and Benjamin Netanyahu. He got calls from the head of the Shin Bet to kill Ihe Sinwar, and he refused. Or the other way around, that Netanyahu insisted on doing something, and Ronen Bar thought that Ihe Sinwar is for love and peace. Those are half pictures.

28:50Dan Senor: And I think the full picture consists of what Nadab reported and I reported alike. Ronen Bar did think that nothing is going to happen in Gaza, and he did believe in the idea that economy will actually ease the tensions in the Gaza border, refusing to see the situation. And Benjamin Netanyahu held the very same positions. So I'm not going to get into the question who was 2 % more aware of the situation because they were far, far behind in understanding the monstrous way or the monstrous war that was about to erupt. So I just want to say that hearing what Amit is saying, the question is, why do we elect prime ministers?

29:30They're just sitting in a bunch with a bunch of other security officials in the room. They all think the same. And the prime minister is just everything happens around him, but nothing happens because of him. And I think that's the basic mistake about the power. And what is the power of the prime minister? And here's my answer to this. Netanyahu warned the security chiefs, warned them that he is in a process that might lead to normalization with Saudi Arabia. and this is recorded, he warned them again and again that he doesn't want the Gaza Strip to change. He doesn't want a new paradigm in the Gaza Strip.

30:10How do we know that? Because they were in their position for a year or two, all of these people. And he was in his position since 2009. This was his policy towards Gaza. Now, I'm not saying that he has full responsibility, you know, just himself for the failure. Of course, the Israeli entire defense system that we built for war and for intelligence, it failed miserably. And I published many of these stories. But let me say it this way. If the head of the Shin Bet calls you in July and he tells you, I am now issuing you a warning as to war, which is the highest thing that any security branch official can tell the prime minister, and he says that to him, The very least that the prime minister needs to do then is to start a process of checking.

30:55Now, it's true that they were completely mistaken. They didn't think it's going to come from Gaza. They didn't think it's going to happen in this kind of trajectory or in this date. But they thought something's going to happen.

31:06Dan Senor: Nadav, can you please tell me, OK, I understand that all of them misunderstood Hamas and Gaza. Could you please tell me, and I asked Yoav Galant, and he didn't have any answer. Was there a one additional soldier in the northern border prior to October 7th? Because you might agree with me that they conceptualized a war against Hezbollah or something like this. Was there any special forces brought to the northern border prior to October 7th? Let's say that they saw that Netanyahu ignored their warnings and they know that war is coming. If I were the IDF chief of staff, I would have insisted or I would have called more units to come to the northern border.

31:48Dan Senor: So even today, in 2026, I still believe that this warning was highly politicized. And proof number one, exhibit A, is the fact that they ignored their very own warning, both in the south and in the north. And that's why I refuse to accept the idea that they really meant it. I think that Netanyahu bears full responsibility as prime minister, but it's a different question because the perception now, according to which, I mean, the military apparatus had warned time and again against the war and Netanyahu ignored it and they pushed for fighting. And Netanyahu was an appeasant, ignores the mere fact that they were on the same page with Netanyahu.

32:31Dan Senor: They praised him for years for being very soft in operating power, that he was very moderate. And it's not that they wanted to destroy Gaza and Netanyahu because of the normalization, said, hold your horses. I wish there were more wild horses around, but there were none, neither in the prime minister's office, nor in the IDF chief of staff. Look, I am in the distinct, rare position, Amit, in which I can answer a question that even Joab Gallant didn't know how to answer you. So let me try and answer that. The IDF isn't such a huge army, and the way that it operates is according to intelligence all the time.

33:09If you really believe that four letters sent from the chiefs of intelligence in the summer saying that Israel's deterrence in the region is crashing, that Israeli enemies are seeing this as a historical opportunity. Right. If you believe that the head of the Sheinbet calling the prime minister and then going to the chairman of the opposition, by the way, saying, I'm warning from war. This is all because of the judicial overhaul and their attempt there. I think that you at least need to bring some hard proof beyond assuming their political affiliations. But let me answer about the because you're saying if they believe something is coming, why didn't they put the army under alert?

33:47So I think it's a wonderful question for the National State of Commission. And I'm not dodging your question. I really think that they are responsible. And I think that this is a really good question. And what is the answer? To the question, to the north, let me tell you something that people don't usually know. Israel's intelligence model for warning as to an attack, an ensuing attack in the south, failed. Hamas attacked and we knew nothing. Israel's warning model as to the north and Hezbollah didn't fade. The Israeli intelligence and army said Hezbollah is not planning an attack. It's not coordinated with Hamas.

34:27It wasn't coordinated with Hamas. And he joined the war a day later in a very kind of baffled way because he didn't know. And we know this. He didn't know about the timing. So they operated according to the intelligence that they had. Now, it's true that this entire time is rigged with all kinds of information coming. But here is the thing. Do you believe that the head of the Israeli system has power to change? If you just listen to what Netanyahu himself said after the second Lebanon war, a different government, he said, it's on me. It's on the prime minister, everything related to security. He is the commander in chief.

35:05This is how he sees it. And there it's really a question. But anything I say right now, it sounds like I am defending the security chiefs. No, no. And you're defending Netanyahu. No, no, I'm not defending. I am not defending the security chiefs. And I hope you're not defending Netanyahu.

35:20Dan Senor: You don't have to hope. You know, I'm not defending Netanyahu. All I'm trying to say is that the attempts to depict as if there was one side that warned and the other side that didn't. One side that was on watch and did everything. One side that neglected it. It's wrong. It's wrong when it's said on Channel 14 about the prime minister as the good guy. And it's wrong when it's said on other channels as on everyone else as the good guys and Netayahu is the bad guy. Here is the green fact. Metul and Kiryashwana were guarded on October 7th in the morning by two platoons against eight commando battalions of Hezbollah.

35:54Dan Senor: No one can convince me that you can warn against war and then do nothing in order to strengthen the protection on Metulam Kiyashuna, which were the main front, the northern front against Hezbollah. You can call, you know, some reservists, you can do some things. They did nothing. And I'll tell you why I still suspect that it mixed politics with security, because I have another example. And it's not a conspiracy. The governor of the Bank of Israel warned that the Israeli economy in 2023 will collapse or deteriorate because of the judicial reform. The fact was that the Israeli economy kept prospering even in 2023.

36:34Dan Senor: So if you're Prime Minister Netanyahu and your perception is that you're fighting the deep state, be it in the IDF or in the Bank of Israel or in the academy or in the, of course, the judicial system. So you might take such worries with a grain of salt, especially when you see that nothing is happening on the ground with the IDF. That's why I highly suspect those warnings, general warnings, when you should give me details. Who is going to fight us? Who is going to, where they are going to fight us? What should we do? But Amit, it doesn't work like this. In strategic warnings, sometimes you get just, everybody wants all the information.

37:13No, no, no. This is in the perfect world. Just tell me something. But I want to explain something. Put your soldiers when your mouth is. Not your money. Put your soldiers. Put your soldiers somewhere. Somewhere. Amit, Amit, but you're presenting a picture as though the IDF was celebrating in Tel Aviv. Yes. The IDF has limited resources. It doesn't have a lot of fronts. Only for one platoon in Kirachmuna? One platoon in Metula? Two platoons in Shlomi? No, we are not that limited. I think that the IDF is extremely limited or was limited before October 7th. And we saw that. It was a smaller army.

37:49We can discuss why. But the truth is that they weren't headed to a different front. So this wasn't done because of negligence. This was how it was for years before that. And I think that one of the key aspects of it that people don't understand, when the head of the Shabbat calls and he says, I'm warning you as to war, people think that this is the end of it. Then he shuts down the phone and he says, thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister, it's up to you. No, there is a specific intelligence that I cannot share here that leads him to that. Several pieces of intelligence. When the intelligence branch warns the prime minister in that summer, then it has very sophisticated intelligence.

38:33Electronic, you meant others that are telling. Now, when you see the intelligence itself, if you see it, you understand that it's immaterial. Now, the prime minister saw it and he can see it. Now, it's true. Everything was political back then. But this is the reason that you choose leaders. Absolutely. I agree. So I am not going to sit here and again portray this as though they only wanted to take out Sinwar. But there's a lot of generalizations here because you're talking on the one hand on one person, Netanyahu. This is the structure of this entire conversation. And then there's the defense chiefs.

39:08They all come from the same politics, the same approach. Nadav Argaman, the former head of the Shabbat, told the prime minister, the Shabbat, the Shin Bet, objects to transfer of money from Qatar to Hamas. Nobody denies it. You're absolutely right. He objected to it. He was against it. And he wanted to kill Yachiyat Sinwar. He thought it was very dangerous. This head of the Shabbat, Ronan Bar, offered to assassinate Sinwar more than four times. The reason that the prime minister didn't want it, by the way, it's a very significant reason. The prime minister thought that he's on the way to normalization with Saudi Arabia.

39:42And he thought this might blow everything up. And he didn't want to occupy Gaza.

39:46Amit Segal: We'll be right back after this short message.

39:52Amit Segal: The high holidays invite us to look back on the year behind us and consider the future we want to help build. For 54 years, Jewish Communal Fund, JCF, has helped individuals and families transform their values into meaningful philanthropy. As the nation's leading Jewish donor advised fund, JCF simplifies charitable giving while providing the expertise, stewardship, and personalized support that help donors give with confidence. JCF is about more than where you give. It's about having a trusted partner who understands what matters to you. Whether you're supporting the Jewish community, Israel, education, health care, the arts, or any other cause close to your heart, JCF helps turn generosity into lasting impact.

40:38Amit Segal: Learn more at jcfny.org or follow the link in the episode description. Jewish Communal Fund, strategic giving, powerful impact. And we're back with Nadav and Amit. separate from the conversation we're having about this mbz communication with netanyahu what you're raising here is ronan bar at the time the head of the shin bet had been advocating according to reports and it sounds like your own very direct sourcing he had been advocating for israel to take out yehia sinwar this is weeks before october 7th so i just want to make sure i just want to establish a baseline here amit do you dispute that that ronan bar was advocating for taking out Sinoir.

41:22Amit Segal: We'll get into whether or not it made sense to do it or not. But I just want to, do you acknowledge that that happened?

41:27Dan Senor: Okay, so I think it was one of the options presented to Prime Minister Netanyahu. I don't think from what I know that there was one side around the table that said, let's take him now. And Netanyahu said, no, I want Gaza to be peaceful and quiet. The idea was about taking the, as far as I understand, on October to actually kill the guy in Hamas in charge of the terrorist activity in the West Bank, in Judea and Samaria. Not more than this and not something operative. By the way, Nadav Argaman, Nadav mentioned Netanyahu, Nadav Argaman and Ronenbar offered Bennett as well to kill Sinoir and it didn't happen.

42:05Dan Senor: Why? Because when, probably when you're prime minister, between 2009 to 2023, most of the time it was Netanyahu, but not all of the time, you prefer Gaza to be a problem that can be managed rather than a war that might lead, in your opinion, to nothing. Because no one then would have agreed to Israel taking over the Gaza Strip. The public wouldn't allow it. The world wouldn't allow it. The United States wouldn't allow it. And so forth. I want to say that I totally agree. You know, the Shin Bet can make recommendations to assassinate Sinwar. And that's akin to saying, let's open a new war. And let's try to open this war by killing the leader of Hamas.

42:45Then what happens? And this is where you need to have the prime minister. But nobody can deny that this was the position of the Shin Bet. They thought that this entire idea of transferring money from Qatar to Hamas, Qatar, who supports the Muslim Brotherhood, is a mistake. They being who? Who's the they? The Shin Bet. Basically, the Shin Bet. Not all the IDF thought that, but the Shin Bet thought that. And they also thought that the idea, which is the Netanyahu concept here, and nobody can deny it, that better to have Hamas in Gaza than to have the Palestinian Authority controlling both Gaza and the West Bank.

43:20And this was the Netanyahu directive. And Netanyahu himself spoke about this in many ways, including in front of the Likud members of Knesset. But his supporters spoke about this in many ways. That Hamas, and I quote, is an asset. This was not only said by people in the media that support Netanyahu. This was said by Betalel Smotrich at the time, and he was explaining this as a PR thing, okay, to be completely candid about his reasoning. But Hamas is an asset, was an expression. And the Israeli defense apparatus was saying, no, that's not a good idea. At least the Shin Bet was saying that. Again, I want to be absolutely clear.

43:59There were parts of the IDF that thought we can't do anything with Gaza. And I agree with the bottom line that Amit just said. If the Israeli prime minister would have come to the world, and I said that to you, Dan, a year ago, and would have said, look, I have just learned about a terrible plan to invade Israel, to murder 1 ,200 people, to kidnap hundreds of Hamas, and therefore I am launching a preemptive war against Hamas in Gaza. What would the world have said about Netanyahu? They would have said he's completely nuts and he's crazy and he's a warmonger. and they would have sanctions against Israel because it didn't happen.

44:37Two things.

44:37Dan Senor: One, I'll just quote from the report from August 2024. Ronen Bar wrote, resuming the understanding, the MOU between Israel and Hamas will allow to preserve stability for a very long term. Hamas continues with the strategy of Sinwar, promoting the goals of the organization without getting into a war. That was on October 1st. OK, and the last remark, I said on October 8, 2023 on air that there is enough guilt for everyone. So I think, I mean, our listeners should not take our conversation as if Nadav thinks that only Netanyahu is to be blamed. And I think that Netanyahu is sacred and the entire military apparatus is to be blamed.

45:21Dan Senor: No, I think we all agree on the fact that they made grave mistakes, all of them. And I think Nadav is irritated by the fact that Netanyahu hasn't paid the full price, like the head of the Shin Bet and the IDF chief of staff, and that is still running for office. While I think from my democratic point of view, that there is a difference between the officers and a politician. Officers should resign because there is someone that nominates them. And we, the public, nominate our politicians. So in 47 days from now, the public will decide whether Netanyahu can go on or not, like they did with Golda Meir in 1973.

46:03I need to respond to that. I'm not irritated by Netanyahu not retiring. The fact is that Netanyahu has not assumed responsibility. By the way, if I would have advised him politically, I would have told him, I think Amit would have said that too, take full responsibility from day one. Absolutely. He could have said, look, I take full responsibility. I'm leading this country. This strategy falls under my responsibility. He didn't do that. What he's been doing for the last three years is litigating the case as a lawyer, not as the leader of the country responsible for everything that happens, who has absolute power in terms of security.

46:41informally. It's the prime minister who knows everything, who can get everything done. And suddenly he's from a different story. And this is something that is remarkable. These people that we're speaking about, they assumed responsibility, they resigned. But it's not about them being in that position or that position. But it's about them saying, look, I made a huge error, a grave mistake, and they did that. And Netanyahu has not done this. And he's running for office again. And there is a huge media machine that tries to explain, unlike this nuanced conversation, that the entire issue is that the security chiefs maliciously didn't wake up Netanyahu that night.

47:23Maliciously.

47:24Dan Senor: You never heard it from me, of course. I would just like to say that I don't believe in those, you know, conspiracy theories. And on the other hand, I don't see Netanyahu as the devil. I think, by the way, it's something more general about the Israeli society. There are people in Israel who really believe that Netanyahu can make no wrong. And there are people in Israel who really believe that Israel's entire problems emanate from the fact that Netanyahu is the prime minister. And I have some news for Israelis. The failure of October 7th would have happened, in my opinion, with other prime ministers, because they all made the same mistakes and the same perceptions about the Gaza Strip.

47:59Dan Senor: And the weather in Israel is still going to be unbearable in July and August, even if Bennett, Eisenkotter, Lieberman are going to be prime ministers. And on the other hand, Israel is not going to be held on earth if only Netanyahu is toppled and the opposition takes office. And I think and I hope that the conclusion from this election is going to be something else, something more sober about the very nation. We should make Israel's political system more sane, to say the least.

48:26Amit Segal: OK, so all right, but it's not sane. So let's just live in the world in which it's not sane. And I want to talk about the next 48 days. I'll start with you, Nadav, and then come to you, Amit. What impact do you think this quote-unquote bombshell report will have on the election, if any? I'm not sure it's going to have any bearings on the elections. And by the way, Channel 12 just published a poll this evening that showed that practically did not have any. I don't see any change. And I don't think that there's going to be any change because this is the project of this election that has been lasted for three years.

48:58And the project is try to politicize everything that relates to October 7. And if someone wants a national state commission, you know, why national state commission? We should have a state commission that isn't led by a Supreme Court judge because Netanyahu doesn't trust the Supreme Court. We always had national state commissions with previous prime ministers, left and right, including Menachem Begge and Golda Meir and others and Rabin and Eud Barak. But this time, it's this machine that tells you it's impossible. You talk about the responsibility and you write things like I write, you know, that the security chiefs are responsible for a dire tactical failure.

49:41A prime minister is responsible for the entire policy for 15 years. And what you get back usually is people who support the prime minister was saying, no, it's only them that are responsible because they didn't wake him up at night, et cetera, et cetera. So to your question, Dan, because it's so tribal and it's politicized, you know, truth or stories, it makes no bearing on the real elections. And I think this is a testimony to how tribal our politics became, that people simply don't believe stories if it's not comfortable to them. And I think that to what Amit said, which is basically talking about the Netanyahu derangement syndrome and all that, you know, a person has been in office since 2009.

50:25We are in 2026, besides one year. So many people hold him responsible for many things. I think it's not only natural, but it is the process of democracy. And it's true that Israel will have huge problems and challenges after. And it's not all related to Netanyahu. and some things may get worse or get better. I don't know. Amit, now tell me your view on the impact on the election.

50:50Dan Senor: So I think it damages Netanyahu, but in a different fashion that people think. Elections are usually about setting the agenda. So far, and we're still 48 days from the election, 47 days, Netanyahu has failed in what was his best skills in the past, to set the agenda. So far, Netanyahu hasn't initiated a single issue on the agenda since the election campaign has begun some 70 days ago? Nothing. The opposition talks about October 7th. He responds. The opposition talks about the draft dodgers, the ultra-Orthodox draft dodgers. He responds. He failed devastately, and the results in the polls can be explained by this.

51:32Dan Senor: If Netanyahu fails to change the agenda, I think he's going to face a failure. Now, he has some problems. In 2019, for instance, two weeks before the election, President Trump recognized Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights. I'm not sure the relationship between Trump and Netanyahu is that good these days that Trump will actually schedule major announcements a week before. Trump hasn't even supported Netanyahu or hasn't even endorsed Netanyahu so far in the election. So if I were Netanyahu, I would be quite worried about losing the skills that portrayed me in the past and about losing the control over the agenda in the Israeli election.

52:12Dan Senor: I think Amit is being much too harsh with Netanyahu. Much too harsh with Netanyahu. As always. Yeah, I think that he managed to... The fact that the Likud is still polling the way that it's polling and that both of the blocs have narrowed their margins, I don't want to say significantly. It's not significant yet, but it's in the road to the significant. It's statistically significant, yes. Okay, so I think that's meaningful looking into the future. Absolutely. And I agree that in terms of October 7, I think it's sort of an October surprise that we thought somehow that the war is not going to dominate the new cycle of the elections.

52:53I don't know why we thought that, but in the last two weeks, it's not the case. Is it changing people's votes? I don't think so, because I think they already litigated the war and they're very entrenched in that sense. but Amit might be right and his pessimism as to this or his somewhat pessimism as to Netanyahu chances in that regard might be proven right

53:14Amit Segal: Alright gentlemen I'm not sure if we've reached a consensus in this conversation but it was definitely spirited so spirited that I got to kind of just step back and let you do most of the work for most of this conversation which was always a nice reprieve for me and want to wish you a meaningful Shana Tova

53:30Dan Senor: Shana Tova

53:33Amit Segal: and we'll be in touch before Yom Kippur which will give you plenty of time to apologize to me and to each other and seek forgiveness for your sins so we have I'm apologizing for you

53:41Dan Senor: because I'm sitting in your office in Washington right now this is true

53:45Amit Segal: this is true alright guys thank you

53:48Dan Senor: thank you so much bye bye thank you

54:06Amit Segal: As we close today's episode, a final thought for the high holiday season. This is the time of year when many of us reflect on the values that guide our lives, the people who have shaped us, and the impact we hope to have on the generations that follow. Philanthropy is one way we carry those values forward. Jewish communal fund, JCF, is a philanthropic home where individuals and families can turn generosity into lasting change. Whether you're supporting the causes you care about today or creating a legacy for tomorrow, JCF helps you give with intention, purpose, and confidence. This high holiday season, consider not only what you want to give, but the future you want to help create.

54:50Amit Segal: Learn more at jcfny.org or follow the link in the episode description. Jewish Communal Fund, strategic giving, powerful impact.