342. Iran: The Three Ayatollahs – From Revolution to Dynasty

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0:59William:Hello and welcome back to Empire. It's just me today, I'm afraid, because Anita is on a different project, but she will be back next week. Now, we are going to disrupt our Mao series. They're all recorded and you can actually hear them if you're a club member. But we are taking a break from that for the very good reason that the Middle East is in the middle of a war. The Middle East is something that we have very much specialised in here at Empire. pod. We had the wonderful Ottoman series right at the beginning. We had a long 26-part history of Iran. And we did our Gaza series last autumn, which was, I think, the most successful series we've ever done.

1:38William:So we thought we would take a break from Mao and return to some of our most brilliant guests who are Middle Eastern experts and ask how they see history playing out in the present with this conflict. If you are desperate to see Radha Mitter and Mao immediately and you are a club member you just follow the link in the episode description the good news is that with me i have ali ansari our old friend of the show who led us through the iranian revolution yes women freedom when things look rather optimistic well i mean i'm not sure it's happier times but uh certainly better times uh and with uh certainly a view that uh things would change i mean i'm not i'm not entirely unconvinced that things will uh not change i think things probably are in the process of changing even now.

2:23But obviously, the way in which it's being done is less satisfactory. Let's put it that way.

2:28William:I'm intrigued that you don't regard this as a very dark time, because many of my Iranian friends are in despair, caught between the Silla and Charybdis on one hand of a horrible regime they all hate and why they're not in Iran themselves at the moment, largely because of this regime, but also in despair about the language of the Trump administration, which is calling Persians evildoers, the most evil people on earth. They won't be alive in a week. We might nuke them, all this sort of language. Well, I mean, let's be absolutely clear. I think it's an extremely dark time. And I think lots of people have very, very mixed emotions.

3:02I mean, including myself, it's an incredibly stressful time. And I think that the fact that we are in this situation shows a failure of politics and diplomacy. I mean, my biggest criticism, I think, is a lot of people who are very intensely involved in some of the politics and diplomacy, you're not reflecting a little bit on how we've got here, because I don't see this really as a product of the last three months or even the last six months. I see this as the product of much deeper historical trends, as I'm sure we'll discuss. Just as well, because we're going to ask you about exactly that, Ali.

3:30But yes, no, I mean, just to be absolutely, just to be, I mean, I see this as a tragedy of, you know, decades in the making. I mean, I don't see this as something that is, you know, you can just sort of focus, you know, particularly on Trump or this administration. I mean, this is a product of US-Iran relations going back decades, and I'm sure we'll discuss it. But it's something that I think has to be seen in that wider historical context. And what I think in the same way as you, you know, what I sort of lament about really is the number of people who see this really in the short term as if it's something, you know, very immediate.

4:03It's things that I've been warning about for years, you know, decades that, you know, this is a distinct possibility that it would always emerge. And that's the tragedy. So, you know, I really don't think that, you know, we are in very dark times. Of course we are. And it's for anyone with any interest or love of Iran, it's really distressing.

4:21William:To look back on the longue durée, on the deep history of Iran, you've been arguing in some of your recent pieces that Iran is one of the most revolutionary countries of the 20th century, that regime after regime rise and fall. And that the key pattern of these regimes, perhaps, is internal weakness rather than pressure from outside. Maybe pressure from the outside has the opposite effect, that it gathers the Iranian people together back to back, this sense of nationalism, which is never very far from the surface in Iran. And people bury their differences when confronted by outside threats. Do you think the best thing Trump should have been was just to leave it alone and not have invaded and to have let the weakness of this regime?

5:01I mean, I certainly think there were better options. I mean, there are certainly different ways of dealing with it. But the point is, is that, you know, this was a running saw. that few people in the West seem to have a serious policy about. I mean, this is the problem. And I think a couple of things I will just say there. I mean, one is obviously the Iranians themselves have agency. And I think we often forget that. We often sort of think that everything that's going on is either to do with the White House or Downing Street or whatever else. And we don't see, you know, what the Iranians themselves are doing or what they want.

5:29The other thing that I think we need to take care of, by the way, is that a lot of Iranians read back through their history, you know, through a very strong nationalist lens. I've never met a prouder or more nationalist people anywhere in the world. And it's a trope, of course. I mean, you know, it's like they say, you know, there are no people that are, as you say, prouder or more resistant or more this, that, the other. I mean, you could say that about almost any country, to be honest. You know, I have yet to find a nation that feels very humble. But Persians are particularly pleased with their history.

5:55They are. It is a fact. Yeah, but I also think that's a consequence in some ways of the sort of legacy of the building of the national state and nationalism in the early 20th century. I mean, they're basically inheritors of that. And I think from a historical point of view, however, as historians, we need to see through that, you know, beyond that lens. It's fine for Iranians to go around saying, oh, we've had a history of, you know, 7000 years of organic nation, all this. Tell me about Cyrus. Yeah, exactly. And it's complete, you know, it's from any sort of serious scholarly level, it's complete nonsense.

6:25So they can talk about that if they want. But I mean, we need to interrogate that a little bit more and see what it means, because I think it also has led them to a number of fairly serious mistakes. Overconfidence, do you mean? Yes, overconfidence may be one. You know, my point is, is that there are many people, and I think you're quite right to bring out with your friends and others who sort of look at Netanyahu and Trump with horror, but they don't share any particular love for the Islamic Republic either. I mean, that's the point. No, none at all. Yeah, it is an extraordinary situation to be in where they sort of say, well, you know, we can't stand these two gentlemen.

6:55But frankly, you know, we think the Islamic Republic's a waste of time too. And if they can get rid of it, you know, all the better. They'd love to. We find ourselves in this extraordinary situation where even if I was sitting with you six months ago, I honestly would have to say I don't think I would have found any Iranian who would have said, oh, you know, please, Mr. Trump, come and bomb the Islamic Republic. I mean, I still find myself slightly speechless at it, as you can tell. I mean, it's an extraordinary situation.

7:18William:Another thing we should establish at the outset, Ali, is the, I think it's fair to say, paranoia that Iranians have about the West. Yeah. And a lot of this goes back to something you told us wonderfully about in our episodes two years ago, the 1953 coup. And the sense that the West wants Iran to fail, doesn't want a strong Iran. Again, it's deeper than that in the sense that we can go back to the Constitutional Revolution, as we discussed earlier, but also 1953 as a sort of a locus point. It's a reference point for many sort of the nationalist constituency. Now, one of the striking things that I think, you know, we need to be aware of is that in the last five years, I would say, there's been an absolute sea change in public opinion in Iran about its recent history.

8:00Now, if you look back to the protests that took place at the end of December, beginning of January 2026, there was no mention of Mossad at all. I mean, one of the striking things is that everyone started chanting about the monarchy. Did that surprise you as much as it surprised me? Well, yeah, I mean, to the extent, yes. Yes. I mean, I had written about this and I think we discussed it about this sort of cult of the monarchy and this sort of nostalgia. We did. But the idea that, you know, you'd get people out on the street on such a wide level, you know, chanting for Reza Pahlavi and stuff like that, I thought was, you know, was quite striking.

8:29I mean, it was an extraordinary indictment on the Islamic Revolution and Republic that 47 years after the overthrow of the monarchy, there are people shouting Jarveed Shah, you know, long live the Shah in the streets again. I mean, again, yeah, I have to say the Islamic Republic hasn't helped itself by restoring the hereditary principle. and making sure that Khamenei Jr. succeeds Khamenei Sr. So again, that has a strong historical basis, of course. And I'm slightly puzzled at all the pundits and commentariat going out there saying, you know, this is simply a consequence of the war. Of course it's not.

8:59They've been planning this succession for a decade at least.

9:02William:So Ali, take us on a gallop through three supreme leaders, if you would. So we did this obviously at length in our big series, but just to refresh people. So Khomeini, Khamenei, and his son, Mojtaba. Yes. Give us a quick sort of character sketch of these three and give us the backstory. Well, I mean, I think, you know, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the, you know, the Islamic Revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic, although, you know, there's a lot of debate about whether he wanted a republic or not. But be that as it may, that's what it is. Obviously, the austere senior cleric who made his name in the opposition to the Shah was able to bind a wide range of rather disparate, it has to be said.

9:41we always think about, you know, leadership in the revolution. I mean, he was quite late to that in some ways, because many people on the left did not automatically side with him. But they did. By 78, a lot of them were coming in and leading under the banner of Khomeini. And of course, you know, when the revolution happened, a lot of people had somewhat delusional notions of what Khomeini represented. I mean, even in America, if you remember, there were people that called Khomeini the Gandhi of Iran, and that he would bring some sort of liberal democracy. Khomeini never had any intention about this.

10:08And he'd written about this in his own lectures in 1971. He was quite good, though, at leading the French, you know, those French interviews. Yes, absolutely. He did pull the wool quite successfully over the West and the left's eyes. I mean, I'm still amazed, you know, and you make a very good point there because, I mean, I talked to, you know, you see, again, the commentary saying, ah, but Ayatollah Khamenei, the second Supreme Leader, had always denied or something. He never publicly done it, by the way, but always apparently denied that he wanted his son to succeed him. And I sort of said to someone, I said, is it possible that he may have lied?

10:40I mean, it's not, you know, it's not such an unusual circumstance to happen. So, I mean, I think Khomeini, when he died, you know, in 1989, he'd basically been leader during the war, the Iran-Iraq war, an incredibly traumatic period, obviously. Khomeini, rather than Khomeini.

10:56William:The original, the original. Yeah, the original one died in 1989. And then, of course, Khamenei, who was then president of the Islamic Republic, was then sort of basically engineered by certain allies, including some more what we might call pragmatists, into becoming supreme leader. But he had never been an ayatollah. So they had to sort of basically elevate him rather quickly, make him an ayatollah. Really? I didn't know he hadn't been an ayatollah before. No, no. The key factor in understanding Khamenei and his own paranoia and the way he consolidated power was that actually nobody took him seriously when he started out.

11:28I mean, he was someone who had greatness thrust upon him, if you can put it that way. And he was always very paranoid that a lot of the senior clerics thought that he was a bit of a fraud. And when you are basically a bit of a fraud, Ahmadinejad is a similar figure. You have two conclusions. You know, how did I get elevated to such an enormously important position? Either it's, you know, luck or it's divine provenance, you know. And basically, he decided the way to bolster his confidence. A bit like the Shah, actually, beforehand. A bit like Trump, too. Well, yeah, you can. Yes. I mean, it's a mirror image.

11:59It's a very common, you know, it's a very common theme in politics, isn't it? When someone who doesn't expect to be something suddenly becomes something, they say, you know, was this just good luck? And they go, no, no, God chose me. And of course, that suddenly gives you a certain sort of fill up, doesn't it?

12:13William:And we're getting this language, though, coming out of Washington now. This is God's plan, God's battle. It's going to help bring about Armageddon, all the stuff that they've been preaching to the American army. Well, I mean, yeah, I think the problem with the stuff coming out of Washington is we need to take care. Although, you know, it's difficult in some ways because Trump likes to shoot from the hip, doesn't he, in more ways than one. But he can be very casual with some of his rhetoric. I'd be very careful. I mean, I have to say reading too much into what all the things he did, because he seems to change it every six hours anyway.

12:43Or from interview to interview. Yeah, that's what I mean. And he loves to talk. He loves to talk. But, you know, as I say, I think if you look at some of the bombast coming out of Iran, it's unfortunately just as bad. and if not in many ways worse. You know, Khamenei, the second supreme leader, was a much more measured speaker.

12:59William:So yes, give us this, because I don't have a very clear image of him in my head, what his policies were. Was he as every bit as puritanical and hardline as Khamenei? The fascinating thing about him is he started out, really, as a bit of a sort of a, I hesitate to use this word, but... Softy? Yes. I mean, and the best example of this is that when Khamenei issued the fatwa against Rushdie, Khamenei, as president, said, if Rushdie apologizes, we can forgive and forget. And it was Khamenei who said to Khamenei, you know, buck up, young man. You know, we're not having any of this willingness from you.

13:37And basically, Khamenei was told to fall into line. So when he started, Khamenei was basically seen as a right of center cleric. He was certainly not on the left of the political spectrum. a right of center cleric who you know like good literature you know people say you know he reads victor hugo and this sort of thing and uh likes a bit of poetry and so on and so forth but as people told him that essentially he was the lord's anointed and this was all god's plan he became increasingly hard line and uh what is the statement they say you know weak men place an extraordinary emphasis on the fact that they don't change their mind you know stubbornness became this sort of like you know i'm very strong actually you know his his predecessor khomeini obviously had drunk from the vial of poison to essentially end the Iran-Rak war.

14:19The reality is, is that Khamenei, once he got lodged into a particular mode of thinking, found it very difficult to shift. So from a very early day, he was anti-American on a grand scale. I mean, I know of successive foreign ministry and other officials in Iran through the 1990s onwards, who said, we need to build a rapprochement with the United States and end this. And he refused. I mean, he turned them all down. So this sort of idea that he was eminently flexible, and people quote the nuclear agreement on this, the nuclear agreement was, from his perspective, I have to say, was principally to get UN sanctions off the country.

14:55I mean, he wasn't interested in building a rapprochement with the United States. And principally because of that, and of other things to do with the agreement, I have to say, the agreement didn't work. I mean, it didn't work because the American, you know, the key factor in it was actually integrating Iran into the global economy. But how can you integrate Iran into the global economy when you're blood enemies with the United States? I mean, even the Chinese told them that. The Chinese said, you know, you think you're going to be the new China or something. Well, you're not because you don't even have relations with the United States and you're not contemplating it.

15:23You know, and there was all sorts of ideological obstacles to anything really constructive going on. And this is why I say to people, you've got to look at the longer term and see what was feeding into these policies. Because, yes, plenty of blame to go around with the United States, Europe and whatever. Of course there is. but I don't think we should forget or lose sight of the fact that there was some real idiocy going on in Tehran I mean and and you know we have to you know there's a balance of power issue here as well of course you know Iran who constantly plays the model and this is very historic of course as you know that you know they are a great empire and frankly you know we can take on the world well at the moment they are taking on the world basically they really are and I don't think it's going to end well I mean not for anyone it's not I don't think it's going to end well for them either is my point you know and and so this is the issue and it just to continue with our rogues gallery so you want the younger one now the younger one mojtaba so mojtaba came to prominence by the way in 2005 during the second of the seriously fraudulent elections that happened and basically mojtaba has been seen as the power behind the throne who orchestrated the elimination of all the moderates and reformists from iranian politics and his name came up in 2005 when one of of the reformists, Métis Karoubi, highlighted him.

16:31And we know that Khamenei Sr. was very offended that his son had been pinpointed like this. So they always kept him behind the scenes. But then he really came to prominence during the Green Movement repression of 2009. And he was seen. I mean, he was there. Now, one of the reasons I say that Khamenei Jr.'s succession was being plotted from an early day was because from the early noughties onwards, Khamenei Sr. was being identified as the what they call the ali of the age now within shia islam to be called the ali of the age it's a very very it's a very very complimentary exactly exactly and and basically it suggests that you know you are sort of a mirror image of imam ali who was the found you know basically the first of the shia imams and the shia imamate of course is hereditary therefore you know the implication there is if that if you know the way they were presenting it was that Khomeini, the first supreme leader, was the Prophet Muhammad, was the equivalent of the Prophet Muhammad.

17:28And Ali Khamenei was the equivalent of Imam Ali. And Mojtaba, of course, is another name for Hassan, the second Shia Imam. Therefore, you have this idea. And the other side of it, of course, is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who'd done very well out of financial contracts and other business, you know, basically the corruption of the economy. Oh, it's an obvious choice for them to offer continuity, to bring this young lad in, who is, you know, not really got a power base of his own, but except through the IRGC, and it protects their financial interests.

17:58William:This is an important point, just to dwell on that thing you just said, financial interest. Now, all my Iranians' friends always say that one of the reasons that the Republican Guard are so entrenched and are not going to budge is that they're all making a lot of money, that they're very corrupt. Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Because they're kids going to universities in America. In the West. But that is true, you see. So one of the reasons they say, I mean, I would say there are three overlapping reasons why the IRGC is proving a hard nut to crack for some people. And not all of them are, you know, I think people get a little bit over obsessed with the, you know, that we're sort of slightly in awe of the IRGC.

18:35And they're not. They're basically, you know, if you want good historical parallel, they're like the Janissaries in the Ottoman Empire. You know, they become a sort of business conglomerate. I never heard that.

18:44William:That's a very nice parallel. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. No, that's exactly what they are. Just to explain to those that don't know, the Janissaries are the Christian and Jewish boys. Yeah, yeah. Taken at birth, often from the Balkans, trained up to be an elite and then run the Ottoman Empire and head the army. And they were eventually slaughtered, of course, by the Ottoman Sultan because, you know, he found them an obstruction to his policy. So they have three, what I'd say, overlapping concerns. One is that there's clearly an ideological leap. I mean, you know, let's not doubt it. When people say, oh, there's a 400 ,000 strong army and they're all ideologically convinced, I doubt it.

19:19Nobody, you know, these things are never uniform in that sense. But clearly, there's a factor there. The second, which I think is more important, is the fact that they've made a lot of money. A lot of them are doing very well. And they know that, you know, if things go pear-shaped, that is going to be threatened. And they've always acted to protect their financial interests. The third one, which people don't actually look at, is obviously if things go pear-shaped, I don't think their lifespan is going to increase. I mean, you know, they must be aware that there's a tremendous hatred in wider society towards many of them.

19:46And so, you know, that will also be weighing on their minds. And I think at the moment, the view is you knuckle down, you double down and you protect your interests. But, you know, we're already seeing that it's fraying at the edges, by the way. I mean, we're already seeing that. So we need to be a little bit more cautious in our assessment about how brilliant they are.