In short
The episode argues that software-driven autonomy in drones and defense will make non-AI weapon use unethical within 5–10 years, because non-autonomous systems increase collateral damage. It also explains why “AI in defense” is mostly software/robotics (perception, planning, control), not “Skynet,” and why fully lethal autonomous targeting is politically constrained but likely unavoidable if adversaries move first.
Guest backgrounds
Yaroslav Azhnyuk is associated with The Fourth Law, building massively scalable autonomous drone systems for Ukraine’s war needs. He discusses Ukraine as a long-running “field testing” environment and emphasizes edge/on-device autonomy, low-cost deployment, and rapid iteration with military units. He contrasts their modular approach with Eric Schmidt’s more vertically integrated defense efforts.
Key claims
Autonomy must be cheap enough for mass FPV drones (example: level-1 autonomy for aerial interception; level-0 is AI detection aiding pilots). They claim autonomy modules can be integrated across many interceptor form factors and domains. They argue the U.S. lacks capacity for mass drone production and that targeting/navigation are not “solved” universally due to many edge cases.
Notable examples
Tycube’s thermal camera company (used in interceptors and FPV frontline units); “Shahid” drone threats over Poland; Ukraine producing ~4 million FPV drones (at ~$500 each); interceptor sales to Poland/Romania; “Wild Hornets” and its Sting-like interceptor form factor; the “Factorio” analogy for escalating automation; and the claim that autonomy can multiply drone effectiveness 2–4x even at partial autonomy.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOThe Irony of AI in Defense
0:45 to 1:53
Exploring the shift from creating pet cameras to military drones.
“Actually, there is a second company in defense as well, which makes cameras.”
Autonomous Systems for Drones
1:53 to 2:55
Delving into autonomous drone technology and its applications.
“The interceptor drones are those for FPV or those for Shahid or what?”
Competition in Defense Tech
2:55 to 4:00
Analyzing the competitive landscape of defense technology companies.
“Schmidt's also working on interceptors for Shahid.”
Funding and Production Insights
4:00 to 4:47
Discussing the financial aspects and production capabilities of defense tech.
“And the, uh, I think we're, we're close to them in terms of the ground economy.”
Challenges in Semiconductor Manufacturing
4:47 to 5:33
Examining the semiconductor supply chain challenges in Ukraine.
“and we have some of the best engineers in Silicon Valley, etc.”
Levels of Autonomy in Drone Systems
5:33 to 8:13
Defining the various levels of autonomy for drones in military applications.
“Because it's relatively small by Eric Schmidt's time.”
Dimensions of Autonomous Warfare
8:13 to 14:00
Detailing the dimensions and strategies of autonomous warfare technology.
“So you can do sort of circuit board assemblies in Ukraine.”
Understanding Military Autonomy Levels
14:00 to 16:26
Learn about different levels of military autonomy and their implications.
“You can use quadcopter, but it can be in ground-to-ground domain against enemy, infantry, or tank.”
Ukraine's Unique Defense Strategy
16:26 to 18:03
Explore Ukraine's strategic advantages in its ongoing conflict with Russia.
“Like here now in this room, there is a guy who like sits somewhere here who works in the industry, whom I know very well.”
The Future of Global Arms Development
18:03 to 20:09
Discuss the future of arms development and global rearmament trends.
“And for me, it's obvious the world will be rearming for the next couple of decades, driven by supply chain instability, by obviously advances in drones and robotics, and obviously by AI.”
Show all 25 chapters
The Impact of Drones in Modern Warfare
20:09 to 23:21
Understand how drones change the dynamics of military engagements.
“Because these systems, they just change the equation so much.”
China's Advancements in Autonomous Warfare
23:21 to 24:27
Examine the potential threats posed by China's drone technology.
“And then if they really want to, they can probably do them not with propellers, but with wings.”
The State of AI in Military Applications
24:27 to 27:44
Analyze the current state of AI technology in military applications.
“Well, that's a very interesting question.”
Collaboration Between Tech and Defense
27:44 to 28:00
Explore the importance of collaboration between technology companies and military units.
“I went through a Wicom Nature program in 2016.”
Understanding Defense Technology and Strategy
28:00 to 29:10
Learn about the strategic considerations and technologies in modern defense partnerships.
“And, well, obviously for Android, the customer is Department of Defense.”
The Ethics of Autonomy in Warfare
29:10 to 31:39
Explore the complexities and ethical considerations of autonomy in modern warfare.
“And then again, they went back into silence.”
AI vs. Software in Defense Systems
31:39 to 33:28
Discuss the role of AI versus classical software in developing defense capabilities.
“So, and then, you know, it's, I think this is made more complicated by the press than it should be.”
The Future of AGI and Autonomous Systems
33:28 to 36:28
Gain insights into the future of AGI and its implications for autonomous defense systems.
“What we should be really talking about, I think, is software and defense.”
Sovereignty and Technology in Global Defense
36:28 to 37:38
Understand the implications of technological sovereignty in global defense strategies.
“So in that extent, I think we should be careful about AI, but first and foremost about AGI.”
Developments in Drone Technology and Autonomy
37:38 to 41:18
Examine advancements in drone technology and different levels of autonomy.
“One thing I think about AGI is actually that there's very high probability that to develop AGI it will have to get into physical bodies.”
Reflections on AI Mastery and Global Power
41:18 to 42:00
Reflect on the implications of AI mastery as a key to global power.
“really take over the control of the drone.”
Exploring AI and Warfare
42:00 to 43:55
Discussion on the implications of AI in warfare and historical context.
“and obviously you know not everything I can talk about but yeah it's a very exciting and fast race And then remember, in 2017, Vladimir Putin said that whoever will master AI will rule over the world.”
Challenges of AI Autonomy in Drones
43:55 to 47:55
Challenges and limitations of AI autonomy in drone technology in warfare.
“They have huge setbacks in their rocket programs.”
Technical Complexities of Targeting
47:55 to 51:41
The complexities of navigation and target detection in military drones.
“Again, there's so much sort of common, like you would think it was solved.”
Ethical Concerns of Autonomous Warfare
51:41 to 53:03
Ethical implications of fully autonomous drones in warfare scenarios.
“fully autonomous just in terms of the human cost of war i'm not sure what you mean by that question if you have fully autonomous AI guided fire and forget drones, maybe even launched.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00There's lots of conversation about AI and defense. What we should be really talking about, I think, is software and defense. We started with making hammers for pets and now we're making hammers for drones and we're throwing explosives to people who came to occupy our land. I think, like, within 5-10 years, it will become unethical to use weapons without AI. The same way as it might become unethical to use cars without AI. Because those that are less lethal and non-AI weapons will be more likely to cause collateral damage, not less like them. But my only question to these companies is, if you're so great and powerful, why aren't your asses helping us fight out the rushes?
0:36Why aren't they on the front lines?
0:41Okay. So then you decided to get involved in defense tech. Actually, there is a second company in defense as well, which makes cameras. It makes thermal cameras, which are now some of the most popular thermal cameras in the military. They're used in interceptors. There was probably over a couple thousand heads down with drones with these cameras. And they're used in just frontline FPEs as well. so it's funny there's some people from Tycube who also helped to start this company and because they were doing cameras for the last 14 years cameras for pets oh that's right they have a lot of experience with that so it's so ironic like yeah we started with making cameras for pets and now we're making cameras for drones cameras for drones.
1:43And we were throwing treats to dogs, and now we're throwing explosives to people who came to Occupy Our Land. So that's Faith Love's irony, for sure. There seems to be a focus. You're doing counter-drone technology. Yeah, I mean, with the fourth law, we're working on massively scalable autonomous systems for drones and at this point it involves the like frontline FPV drones and then the interceptor drones and some other drones as well. The interceptor drones are those for FPV or those for Shahid or what? Yeah that's that's a very good question so probably like the most dynamic area that's had interceptors.
2:37But obviously, when you're talking about interceptor drones as class, that can apply to intercepting tryheads, ISR drones or reconnaissance drones, and then smaller drones like FPV drones, so frontline protection. So it's a very important question. Schmidt's also working on interceptors for Shahid. Is his, at SwiftBeat, is his company only looking at Shahid, or are they doing the full range? Well, I think from the public sources, they've been telling that. I think there are at least three initiatives. One is Shahid Interception, another is Frontline Autonomous Drone, and the third one is something like a mid-strike drone.
3:30So this strike drone capable of maybe, I don't know what is theirs, but mid-strike as a category is up to 200 parameters. Right. Yeah. And they're very capable, I think. Yeah. Yeah. Certainly. I mean, Eric Schmidt is no one more capable on AI. Like, they're our main competitor slash peer. So, like, we don't strictly think of these companies as competitors because they're sort of trying to accomplish the same goal as we are. but yeah obviously this episode in Silicon Valley the show where they're like okay these guys are making work better in place but we don't want them to make this better than we're making work better place something like that it's not like that so but there is three some friends I appreciate that but I think that are like what they're doing is like for example far ahead from what any other company outside of Ukraine was able to demonstrate for ahead of say, and drill or housing.
4:29Right. And the, uh, I think we're, we're close to them in terms of the ground economy. It's like on ground, so sort of actually the economy and we're somewhat behind in terms of, uh, the aerial interception. Yeah. I think obviously they have a minimum budget. and we have some of the best engineers in Silicon Valley, etc. And at the moment, I try to do back-of-the-millions of dollars. And he has this incubator with D3, right? Yeah, it's like full disclosure. I was somewhat involved in starting that. In the D3 incubator? It's a small group of people who were sort of at the inception of that. Right, right.
5:16And is that funding primarily defense tech or are they funding everything? Yeah, I think their public stance is that they're funding defense tech. And it doesn't have to be necessarily Ukrainian teams. I think part, like, have about half of their portfolios teams originally from Ukraine, another half is not in Ukraine. Right. Because it's relatively small by Eric Schmidt's time. So I think it's like a couple dozen million dollars. So it's like very small money. How much? Maybe like it started with like 10 million dollars. Oh, is that right? Maybe now tens of millions of dollars. Yeah. And do you have any sense of their production versus your production?
6:04I mean, how many interceptors they're building? Well, this is not something that you're supposed to disclose in public. We do have sense of course. You have what? People in the industry do have a sense. Have a sense, yeah. I mean, but is he full production now? Are you full production? Are you still ramping up? Well, I think everyone is ramping up in this world. Yeah. It's like, obviously, they're called Nero, the interceptors by Eric's company. I think they've started selling them to Poland and Romania. I think they had some actually like production roadblocks for Ukraine. I'm not sure, you know, what the plan is with their activity in Ukraine.
6:58They're also very capable interceptors by other companies, which are not as advanced with AI, but those companies are intercepting and they're buying AI modules from us. So that's a very different approach. I would say what Eric is doing is more kind to sort of Apple strategy. They have the full vertical integration. they ship that to you and what we are doing along with some other ukrainian makers is more kind to android strategy where different different teams work in different modules so for example we provide autonomy modules which which are growing in their capacity and those modules can be adopted onto various types of systems versus
7:49because i was trying to understand where their models are coming from where their chips are coming from yeah he was saying they produce them in in ukraine uh is there a adequate semiconductor manufacturing or assembly in ukraine to provide chips yeah i think he might have misunderstood the question there is no semiconductor manufacturing in ukraine uh maybe he was talking about the The circuit boards. The assembly, yeah. Yeah. So you can do sort of circuit board assemblies in Ukraine. You know, present facilities where you can do up to eight layers, but I don't think they are necessarily using them or...
8:37Well, it doesn't matter. So you can do a lot in Ukraine, But then in terms of the actual chips or the sensors, like we're using sensors for thermal cameras, these currently have to be bought from MAID and semiconductor fabs. There are some plans to do semiconductor manufacturing in Ukraine, including our plan of building a thermal sensor factory. But that is still planned. They have this rocket-shaped form factor that then flies like a cruise. Are you guys using something similar, or are you using the traditional? As a maker of autonomous systems, we're providing modules which can be integrated onto this form factor.
9:29So the most successful interceptor is a company called Wild Hornets, and they're producing this drone called Stain. So it's a very similar form factor to General Cherry's. In fact, it was a similar scandal where Sting said that General Cherry just copied what they did. It's more or less like, you know, you made a car, so you copied my idea for a car. It's hard. It's an IP that's hard to protect. So we're working with all of these guys. And then there are two major categories. One is sort of what we call a rocket drone or sort of a tail-sipper drone with these four sort of wing propellers. Another is a more classic sort of plane form factor.
10:19And there are a number of companies which are making planes. Fixed wing, you mean? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Sorry. Fixed wing, fixed wing, UEDs. So we're working with both of those. When you say autonomous, how autonomous are these? Yeah, like there's a rabbit hole here. So I sort of have this classification that I suggested and most people in the market sort of accept that it's something that makes sense. So when we talk about the individual autonomy for single drone, we talk about these five levels of autonomy. And when we talk about the ecosystem, we talk about sort of eight dimensions of autonomous ecosystem.
11:01So the five levels for autonomy, for example, five levels for safe self-driving, you have level one is autonomous terminal guidance. So whenever you see the target as a pilot, you're flying as a pilot, non-autonomously manually, you target log. And after that, the drone is capable to autonomously hit the target in all the possible circumstances. That's level one. time level two autonomy is is sort of the same but instead of hitting it kind of kind of style you do vomit so you you you calculate when to drop the ammunition and you do the escape right um so that would be level two level three would be when your system can identify the target honestly uh and make a decision to start so it's flying and then it scans whatever it sees through its camera and when it sees it it knows that it is now in a mode where it's sort of in a kill zone is to find target when it sees the target it it first recognizes it and then gets enough confidence to make a decision start strike which would be again either level one or level two or kind of kind of concept level four is navigation so that you can navigate all the path from you start where the residual zone where you need to find the bed gun.
12:24O5 is autonomous takeoff in length. So it could be bombing you can reach on the land. So that's for sort of for flying drones, you can sort of adopt it to any kind of autonomous vehicle. And then when you look sort of further about the, like for us, individual autonomy is imperative, is very important to accomplish is very important to accomplish in mass. So if the system that allows drones to be in visual autonomy costs even a couple thousand dollars, it will be difficult to use such system on FME drones which cost just$100 per piece. Such system has to be relatively inexpensive and also relatively easy to manufacture so that it can be manufactured in millions, because that's what the money warfare demands.
13:18And then if you look further, the individual autonomy, you have this autonomous battlefield. There you have these eight dimensions of autonomy, as we say. So dimension one is levels of autonomy, five levels of freedom. Dimension two is the kind of carrier that you use. so it can be a capture can be an fpv you can be a larger survivor so it can be a fixed frame uh it can be a missile it can be um even um a shell nuclear shell can be a man see vehicle or under c vehicle or a man brand vehicle uh the third layer of the third dimension is dominant so if you do You can use quadcopter, but it can be in ground-to-ground domain against enemy, infantry, or tank.
14:16It can be ground-to-air, an interception. It can be ground-to-sea, which is quite a different task, and all the combinations of domains. So that's sort of the third dimension. The fourth dimension is sort of what we call higher levels of autonomy, things like swarms bone carriers bone nests etc um then you have uh like number five would be different um outside conditions so day night winter summer um different types of targets because attacking an infantry unit or attacking um tank or or or vehicle are slightly different tasks which which requires different developments um then you have level six you have a command and control uh systems so as as commander of the brigade which is like two to five thousand people or even ports can be up to 40 000 people um how do you manage all of your units with the these autonomous assets, how do you manage all the data coming from those assets, how do you command, analyze, etc.
15:39Then on level seven, you have all the infrastructure needed for all this to work, starting with simulations which are used routinely for testing, etc. to things like data collection mechanisms, security subsystems, remote deployment subsystems. And then finally, sort of dimension number eight is how massively deployed that system is because if you have one system deployed in hundreds of thousands of minutes, another just has the field test provisions and are just being tested, you know, a couple hundred units being tested. Those are very different systems, very different levels of capability. So that's sort of how we think about this whole ecosystem.
16:25system. I think it's like what's going on here is just astounding. This is like the defense valley. Right, exactly. Like here now in this room, there is a guy who like sits somewhere here who works in the industry, whom I know very well. And this happens to me all the time. Like I come to meet some defense technology founder and then there is another defense technology founder of Washington and we introduce each other so it's a very very like Silicon Valley vibe yeah you know lots of confidence and demands the ideas flow yeah lots of expertise so even with the domain expertise no I say this all the time that my definition of strategy is that strategy is a plan of victory using the uniqueness of your situation the uniqueness of of the Ukrainian situation is that we've been at war with Russia for 12 years and no one else in the world wants to steal that advantage from us so you have a couple million people who were one way or another involved in this so either as fighters or as makers engineers entrepreneurs right or as assembly workers or as volunteers operation specialists governmental clerks So this is an incredible domain experience, and it will remain so for the decades to come, even if tomorrow there is a ceasefire.
18:03And for me, it's obvious the world will be rearming for the next couple of decades, driven by supply chain instability, by obviously advances in drones and robotics, and obviously by AI. So, three huge factors that will drive the global rearrangement. Conventionally and unconventionally, I think we have probably another dozen or dozen and a half countries in the world who are now working on their nukes, who do not have an official nuclear status. So unconventionally, I think that will also proliferate. Again, because of Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum and the current policy um foreign policy by the us now there's this very unique moment in time for for ukraine which can be a cornerstone of not just ukrainian but european strategy building you know the florence of defense here um and this is happening i think the government can definitely accelerate that if they pass some smart regulations but one way or another uh ukraine and ukrainians will play critical role in the re-armament of the West.
19:22Do you think that the industry will turn back to commercial consumer tech after the war? Do you think that not the defense of a defense industry has been built, but Ukraine will become a supplier? Absolutely. But I think that when I hear after the war, I imagine something quite different. If we have ceasefire with Russia in 2026, this is not after the war. After the war is when the global arms race is good to extend still. Before that, unfortunately, in the next couple of decades, the whole world will be re-arming. And, you know, one piece prepared for the war. So that's what everyone is going to be doing.
20:09Because these systems, they just change the equation so much. You can take out a$5 million tank, the drone costs them$500. And if you can add autonomy to that drone for the cost of a couple hundred dollars on top, and autonomy itself makes every drone usable by 100 times as many people, if you don't need to train as pilots, makes 10 times more precise, makes it not one-time kamikaze, but multiple-time bombers, probably 10 times more utility. so you guys basically order over 10 000 times improvement by adding uh complete autonomy to the system five million dollars and five hundred dollars how many orders of magnitude this apps is like thousand ten thousand so it's ten to like ten to the fourth multiplied by ten to the fourth It's like 10 to the 8th.
21:07It's like, what, 10 million, 100 million times more people than current systems. It's hard for a human to imagine what that is. And then, like, if we talk about threats, like, in September, Remember, there were 20 Russian Shahad imitators, Herbera, what they call it, flying over Poland. Only four of those were shut down with equipment that cost probably two orders of magnitude more than the assets. General Secretary Ruta had a press approach saying, we did a fantastic job. We shown resolve of NATO how we can protect our land. But it's obvious to everyone. It was a huge disaster. Now imagine Russia attacking with those were even drones without any explosives in them.
22:17Imagine Russia attacking with 50 actual Shahads. With 50 Shahads. So they're attacking an airport in Jeshu, a city where close to Ukraine, lots of the planet equipment is going to come back well that's you know when you're talking russians say you know it's a legitimate target i think that what will europe and data do well we send um 50 storm shadows to some obscure russian city well most people i talk to when you say that we won't have the guts to do that but even if will it be sort of an eye for an eye no it'll be huge defeat for europe huge defeat for the free world there will be a precedent and russia doesn't care ukraine blows your cities every night so what and obviously huge impact on the markets huge impact on the economy huge impact on everything now the second scenario is Ukraine produced about 4 million of these inexpensive FPV drones last year 500 each so if Ukraine can do that but by the way United States cannot do it today you cannot you can just there's no capacity to produce that many drones in here but if you think can do 4 million can easily do for billion.
23:45Yeah. And then if they really want to, they can probably do them not with propellers, but with wings. So fixed wing, which is launched from a tube, which flies not 30 kilometers, but maybe 200 kilometers. And DJI is the world's leading drone technology company, and I'm sure they have the autonomous capabilities that they need. And then Chinese shipbuilding is also very impressive. So can they build thousands of autonomous submarines capable of carrying those drones? I'm pretty sure they can. So what if China builds 5 ,000 underwater submarines carrying a couple hundred of these autonomous drones, is very inexpensive, capable of going up to 200 kilometers inland each, and shows up to the coast of any coast, like California or Taiwan or Great Britain.
24:51Is there a good response to that? I don't think so. Hunter subs won't be enough.
25:00Well, that's a very interesting question. Yeah. One of my questions that I've been asking for friends, Why hasn't that already happened? Because Russia does not have very strong AI research. But this is not cutting-edge research. This is pretty much a solved problem. Well, that's what I thought. And you would think that... But it's not about only Russia. Even the United States doesn't have the capability. No. The United States doesn't have two autonomous drones, which don't rely on GPS. And it doesn't have them at an inexpensive cost. And what it has, well, I'm sorry to say this, but I'm not sure if it works because I don't know, I have tremendous respect for companies like Canterill.
26:01But my only question to these companies is if you're so great and powerful, why aren't your asses helping us to fight Russia? Why aren't I on the front lines? Although this is what interests me about Eric's. He is different in that extent because his stuff actually works. Yeah. And my guess is that for him, Ukraine, as you said, there's going to be a rearmament. Ukraine is like a development zone and field testing. yeah yeah look um i think eric is a remarkably smart guy i had a chance to meet him a couple times
27:01and he just saw around the corner before everyone else remember he was doing work for the u.s department of defense before russia yeah and he also had the luxury of a lot more free time than many others. He was able to think deeply and think ahead about these problems. And that's why he focused so much of his attention on the plane. And still is focusing. I think one of the smartest things that he did is actually hiring a lot of people here and very quickly iterating with actual military units. because you cannot, you know, I went through a Wicom Nature program in 2016. And one thing they teach folks who get in is, actually, they teach everyone, talk to your customers.
27:57Talk to your customers. This is the most important thing that you can do as a company. And, well, obviously for Android, the customer is Department of Defense. They're doing their job. For HMIT, the customer is some future fighters which will fight future wars. And so because the future is currently here, he comes here regularly, he has a wide team here, forward deployed engineers, working with particular brigades. And that's why they were able to build something that actually works. And that actually saves lives because they, you know, their essence intercepts above our has and um saved lives of infantry by uh now destroying Russian advances um so I think that's why he succeeded and I think other companies are slowly coming around to that and um there's more and more um for foreign officers talent uh coming in here and that's why that's why it is the the the defense valley of the the florence of defense yeah why do you think he's avoiding press oh i think it's it's funny um because he's been avoiding press but then from time to time there are these huge press releases which is like this is so inconsistent with that strategy like The first one was when, I think, the last year in Denmark, they signed a big deal with Zelensky, and there were photos of Eric and Zelensky.
29:37And that was out of the blue. I saw that. It was like, okay, strategy change. And then again, they went back into silence. And then I think there was news of them doing a deal with Poland. So that was, again, sort of public. So I have no idea. I think it's just, I think there's a good team of lawyers who are thinking this through. Yeah. Yeah. On autonomy, I'm trying to understand these levels of autonomy. You know, I worked on the National Security Commission on AI, which Eric was the chairman and was a Pentagon funded. I think you were referring to his work with the, I've forgotten the name, but the outfit in California that was...
30:31I think he was like either an advisor to the government or something like that on the matters of defense technologies. Right, yeah. Even writing about that along with some accomplished people in the military, you can tell he's been thinking deeply about these problems. But they make it very clear when they speak in the United States that full autonomy is off the table. You know, lethal autonomous weapons that target autonomously is something that they will not do. Well, what if China does it again? Well, that's right. I mean, that's what I say. That's what they say. But everyone knows. It's like Iran with their enriching uranium.
31:30They say, oh, we're only going to enrich this much for fuel. But to get to the next level, you just run it longer. Yeah, you just flip the switch, basically. So, and then, you know, it's, I think this is made more complicated by the press than it should be. The ethics of AI in defense. Let's take an example of an artillery shot. when do you make a decision to uh strike a target with an artillery shot well in the moment well when you pull it for you you fired a gun so you cannot stop an artillery shell 500 meters away from the target and and ask for a human confirmation whether it's the right target or whether we uh shot you know two kilometers in the wrong direction and then hit the village you can think of an autonomous drone as an artillery shell with propellers and you make a decision the moment you launch, the moment you give command.
32:29So that makes things much, much easier. The second thing I want to say on this topic is that I think like within five to ten years, it will become unethical to use weapons without it. The same way as it might become unethical to use cars without it. Because those are less lethal and non-AI weapons will be more likely to cross-providal advantage, not less level. And the third one is we can be good guys, but bad guys are not going to abide by the rules. So we've got to have at least the capability to have these systems working, not at the speed of a human command chain, but at the speed of the software command chain.
33:18And also, you know, there's lots of conversation about AI and defense, but AI is just sort of the latest big thing. What we should be really talking about, I think, is software and defense. Because a lot of these new capabilities are created not with AI, just classical software and, like, even AI software, right? Right. And then, like, look, even AI is such a buzzword, right? Alex Smat is, what, 15 years old? And, like, image recognition capabilities are, you know, at least a decade old, and they're more than sort of cases. And a lot of what is called AI for defense is just image recognition. And then, obviously, we're interacting with large language models now as consumers.
34:13So people think that, okay, a drone with AI is something like a Chad GPT with propellers that can explode. It's not like that at all. Of course. It's far from that. And if you think about the robotic system, in an academical sense, you have sensors in. So you have basically physical data, receptive by hardware, by sensors. When you have three software layers, you have perception, planning, and control. and then you have actuators out, so commands to monitors, which move the thing somewhere or make things global. And those layers, perception, planning, control, each of them can be done by classical software, lots of literature on that, lots of evidence, lots of robotic systems which use that.
35:04And then each of them can be done by a neural net or all three of them can be combined into one neural net or they can be grouped two by neural net, one by task cloud. So we're definitely sort of going towards the world where these systems will be able to do control on their own and some will have some freedom in decision-making. But the first decision these systems are going to make is, okay, enemy vehicle is hiding behind a building. whether I go around the building from the right side or from the left side. And for years ahead, an AI-enabled defense system will be no closer to a Skynet appraising than a warehouse of 155 caliber shells.
36:02It's just not there. And then I think before we are at a risk of being wiped out by defense Skynet, we will be many years on the risk of being wiped out by advanced AGI developed on servers of one of these big hyperscale firms. So in that extent, I think we should be careful about AI, but first and foremost about AGI. And even with AGI, I'm not as afraid of it in the coming years. So I think that it's more subtle than Skynet. Yeah, I think that's a good one. And then also sort of raises, goes back to the question of sovereignty. And like people mostly talk about the sovereign supply chains, but there's also sovereign technology and sovereign know-how.
37:08I think it was yesterday was in the news that Donald Trump said that they might ban tragedy in Germany or something like that. And that basically sends the signal to not just to Germany, but to the entire world. you've got to develop your own financial models. And obviously one person that's very happy is Jensen Huang because he's like, that's his message box. Every country should have their own sovereign and of course they should buy our chips. He's in very good business. One thing I think about AGI is actually that there's very high probability that to develop AGI it will have to get into physical bodies.
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37:58It will have to be, like, these agents will have to be actual robots and track them through the world. Because I think the good analogy I sort of came up with is, it's like the Plato's Cave. Like, the current LLMs are living in the Plato's Cave, and they're learning about the world from the shadows on the walls, which are what humans wrote about the world but they cannot experience the world themselves yeah so for them to be able to experience uh the world that they would have to have the buddies and walk out of the cave and i think it is also like like there are a number of researchers who are sort of working that direction like tafe lee i think is like her work is very interesting um and yeah i like some people in the industry share this intuition as well on the autonomy when you're saying uh the decision is is whether or not to launch but once it's launched navigation targeting and execution or yeah are all autonomous that has to be uh on board that model you can't be connecting to the cloud.
39:14You can have connectivity as an option, right? But you have to be able to have a fail-safe mechanism. Like, there is no connectivity. Connectivity can be jammed. The point where it connects to can be destroyed. So you've got to do all of that on the edge. And actually, so you said it starts when it's launched, but it will gradually start even earlier and earlier. So imagine autonomous system detecting and then launching. Then autonomous system launching systems which will detect. So it's like this Factorio computer game. So you just keep automating, automating, automating, higher, higher. And the drones that you're building, how autonomous are they at this point?
40:10So we are building drones, but we're also building the autonomy modules, as we call them. And sometimes we just even license the manufacturing of these modules, license them out, and we license out the software. So we then we just produce the software, which the manufacturer of drones installs in their drones. But we do make our own drones as well. it's just like making drones is sort of a more of a commodity and um the really like interesting thing about this is uh you know drone is like a hamburger so you can make a hamburger in your kitchen but the really difficult thing is making a McDonald's so they make a factory which makes same hamburgers with a very short time frame you can make millions of them without onions or with audience, you know, and that's what the Ukraine drone making companies are.
41:03But what we ship currently in mass is sort of level one autonomy for ground interception and we call a level zero for aerial interception, which is a detector, as AI detector, which helps pilot to see the target, but doesn't really take over the control of the drone. And the other systems we have on various levels of development and deployment, there are five systems which are sort of ready to be fielded and are in the process of early testing by the ML tournaments.
41:45and yeah it is like as I've said there are so many like different dimensions to this right so it's like same level of capability but in different platforms or in different domains or you know daytime, nighttime camera etc and obviously you know not everything I can talk about but yeah it's a very exciting and fast race And then remember, in 2017, Vladimir Putin said that whoever will master AI will rule over the world. I remember. Like, just think about how evil that phrase is. Will rule over the world. Will not cure all the diseases. Will not save the humanity. it's like it could have been like even knowing putin it could have been saved the humanity right with his uh kgb lies but no he was very explicit what what he wants to do that's right although although he he hasn't done a very good job of mastering ai well no that's just classical russia they they lost everything they could they lost the uh their space technology and like in in in 2011 when the u.s sunsetted the shuttle program uh like soyuz operated by russia but developed by ukrainian kordov because that's kordov's legacy kordov is ukrainian he basically thought of himself as Ukrainian.
43:21The first ever song which was sang in space to Kordov's wish was a Ukrainian song, which literally says, why am I not a Falcon? Why don't I fly? So basically, when the American program wasn't ready, everyone flew into space on a Ukrainian ship operated by Russians. And And then now they have their planes falling apart and that they were not able to build their own plane. They have huge setbacks in their rocket programs. So it's a country that's completely destroyed by corruption and incompetence, but still can do a lot of harm. I'm trying to like zero in on autonomy because some people say, well, the AI isn't there yet.
44:14that we don't have models that can target precisely for example cannot differentiate between a tank and a civilian car I don't think that's true yeah like come on like who believes that of course we can like so why are the drones produced by Ukraine why aren't they given that level of autonomy is it a cost issue that the or a supply chain i'll ask you a couple other questions in that and and that line why aren't drones produced by the us don't have that capability well that's right but but the us is not in an active yes then why don't we have self-driving cars and but that's a regulatory issue it's not not really like the technology isn't ready and the reason and and it's close i mean way more operates it's going to be in I know, I know, I know.
45:10But it's been closed for, what, 10 years, more? Well, I mean, Sebastian started in 2007 and NASA challenge was even before that. The answer, and then also, why don't we have AI agents all over the internet doing useful work? Why didn't they replace you and me and all of our friends? I think the answer to all of those questions about why isn't AI more widespread is the edge cases. Like thousands and millions of edge cases, which have to be polished out. And the thing with Warfare is that if you have, say, an FBD drone, it's a system that's used by millions, but what is its effectiveness? Well, it's between 10 % and 20%.
46:0110-20 % of these drones which are used actually hit the target and explode when it's going to cause the desired effect. You're talking about the interceptor drones? No, I talk about the frontline. Right. So that's a low sort of mark to overcome, right? And that's why drones like ours are currently used in the frontline, and they increase the sufficiency by two to four times, even with the level one autonomous system. And then as you go further with wider, wider economy, you basically multiply cases. And then add to that not autonomous, but robotics problems. I think most of the things we deal with is not about AI, it's about software and robotics.
46:51So from the outside, because AI is such a valid buzzword, it might seem that a drone company that does AI has 80 % of its staff or engineering staff doing AI. But it's more like 10%, because there are so many other problems. So it will happen. It will just have to go through all of these issues, and it's hard to predict when there's always this S-curve, right? You go over some threshold and you have this takeoff. I certainly predict that it's going to not take as long as it took this organic course. Yeah, and regarding the U.S., I mean, there's an existential imperative in Ukraine. so things are moving much faster than elsewhere in the world.
47:45Sure.
47:48In terms of the targeting, navigation's been pretty much solved, right? Not really. Oh, is that right? Yeah. Again, there's so much sort of common, like you would think it was solved. It's not because if you think about the navigation problem, Well, first of all, it's not one problem. It's like 100 different problems. Because navigation for a$500 drone, which has to fly 40 kilometers and maybe 20 kilometers, and then we turn back and flies at speeds of up to 100 kilometers per hour, 60 miles per hour, that's one problem. Navigation for a wing missile that goes slightly subsonic is another problem.
48:34Navigation for, I was like last night, or corrections for hypersonic is a very different problem as well. You're flying above the altitude of flight as very much important for navigation. As you're flying high, it's easier to navigate. Flying low, you have less data about what's what's going to do. Then you fly above a body of water, much more difficult to navigate than a body of land if you fly at low altitude. So all of these factors, the length, the cost, the altitude, the terrain, all of them impact the navigational system and there are only like one AI, you know, Google Maps that solves it for anything and customer handlers is in your smartphone.
49:19It's going to be very different than that. Although maybe at some point there will be something like I just described. And then, but yeah, you were about to ask about the target detection actually. yeah so the target that that part is solved right but you have a camera you have uh object recognition either thermal or or yeah segmented uh and you the drone hits that target i'm talking about kamikaze right it's that target yeah why isn't or is that already being used well it is it is solved to some extent right it's it's easy to spot um you know a green tank on on on a white field it's much more difficult to spot something camouflaged then uh you see russians riding on donkeys uh like was that in the data set probably not um then you see dressing the russians dressed First up, like penguins, was that in the data set also?
50:29Not really.
50:32Then when you talk about the practicality of this, it's not just about the algorithm that can recognize an image. Say you have an FPV drone that's autonomous. How high should it fly? If it flies slower, it's closer to what it does recognize. It can maybe recognize it better, but it has a smaller field of view. And how fast does it fly? Does it scout the territory in order to find something? Or how does the recognition integrate with navigation? And then how does that integrate with the tactics of its usage? like do we need autonomous drones against an infantry or do we need against any logistics there are so many of these questions um that in practice going from the technology of being able to recognize something to the device that's actually usable useful usable and creates more utility than the existing alternatives is not a super obvious thing yeah are you worried about fully autonomous just in terms of the human cost of war i'm not sure what you mean by that question if you have fully autonomous AI guided fire and forget drones, maybe even launched.
52:09That's a pretty terrifying prospect on both sides. Oh, no. It's terrifying if the enemy has it. If we have it, it's a savior. That's right. And if we don't have it, that is what is terrifying. And obviously, you need to have autonomous interceptors to counteract enemy atomic drones because uh the mass and and like like how many of them they can deploy the world will not be as into the humans now and then obviously even now it's hard for human to match the speed agility of machines that will be become harder and harder um so i am what i'm terrified that is that we won't get that we won't get there as fast as the enemy does yeah that's uncharifying yeah okay
From the publisher
A Ukrainian entrepreneur who spent 14 years building cameras for pets pivoted to building cameras that down Shaheds, and is now building the autonomy software that could define how wars are fought for the next generation. Yaroslav Azhnyuk, co-founder of Fourth Law, joins Craig Smith in Kyiv to explain why Ukraine has become what he calls the Defense Valley or the Florence of Defense: a dense, fast-moving ecosystem of founders, engineers, and military operators who are building, testing, and iterating on autonomous drone systems in real combat conditions, with a feedback loop that no defense contractor in the West can currently match.
The conversation covers Azhnyuk's five-level autonomy framework for drones, the eight-dimensional model for what a fully autonomous battlefield ecosystem requires, and the economic math that he believes makes global rearmament inevitable: a $500 drone that can already destroy a $5 million tank becomes roughly 10,000 times more capable when full autonomy is added for a few hundred dollars more. The competitive landscape is mapped with unusual candor, an "Apple vs. Android" comparison between Eric Schmidt's vertically integrated interceptors and Fourth Law's modular platform approach, alongside two arguments that cut against the mainstream narrative. First, that within 5 to 10 years it may become unethical to use weapons without AI, because non-AI weapons cause more collateral damage, not less. And second, that the real AGI risk isn't Skynet, it's the subtle transfer of power that happens when 100 smarter advisors gradually stop waiting for the President to decide, and nobody notices until the President is no longer the one making decisions.
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