Francis Fukuyama: The End of History author on democracy under threat

11 Sep 2026 · 50 min · 23 chapters

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In short

Francis Fukuyama discusses his “End of History” thesis, common misreadings of The End of History and The Last Man, and why liberal democracy still has a universal claim despite recent backsliding and threats like populism and authoritarianism. He also connects his intellectual journey to real-world policy experience, arguing liberal societies can defend themselves if people avoid “doomer” cynicism.

Guest background

Francis Fukuyama is a political scientist and author of 11 books, including The End of History and The Last Man, Trust, and a memoir In the Realm of the Last Man. He grew up in New York City, studied at Cornell (Telluride House; influenced by Alan Bloom), spent time in Paris, then earned a PhD in political science at Harvard (studied with Harvey Mansfield). He worked in U.S. government policy planning (including during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations) and later became a major public intellectual.

Key claims

“End of History” was about the triumph of liberal ideas of equal rights, not that history literally stops; pessimism about liberalism is self-fulfilling; policy intellectuals need both big ideas and “skin in the game.”

Notable examples

Berlin Wall fall (1989) and Eastern Europe democratization; neoconservative overestimation of threats (linked to Iraq and Saddam); America’s low trust and polarization (discussed via Trust); Trump’s “war against the deep state.”

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

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Misinterpretations of 'The End of History'

0:46 to 2:40

Discussion on the misinterpretations of Fukuyama's famous work and his true arguments.

“Well, you know, on social media, every week, you know, I post a picture of, you know, my wife and said, I thought it was the end of wives.”

Curiosity and Writing Process

2:41 to 4:35

Fukuyama shares his motivations for writing and learning across disciplines.

“And I really think that you can't get a full view of what human society and human behavior is like unless you escape these disciplinary boundaries.”

Family Background and Academic Influence

4:36 to 6:50

Fukuyama discusses his family background and its influence on his intellectual pursuits.

“Because you had the space and the time to do it.”

Education and Early Experiences

6:51 to 9:00

Insights into Fukuyama's early education and how it shaped his views on society.

“When did you discover, can you remember how old you were?”

College Life and Political Awareness

9:01 to 11:15

Fukuyama reflects on his college experiences and involvement in political movements.

“So that's State College, Pennsylvania, did not set a particularly high premium on your skill set.”

Influence of Alan Bloom and Philosophy

11:16 to 14:01

Discussion on the influence of Alan Bloom and the importance of big philosophical ideas.

“And a woman got up and said, yeah, I object to them getting married.”

Philosophical Foundations of Western Thought

14:01 to 17:00

Explore how philosophical reasoning shapes our understanding of justice and democracy.

“And they go through possible definitions of justice.”

The Impact of Strauss and Bloom

17:01 to 20:08

Learn about the influence of Leo Strauss and Alan Bloom on political thought and personal development.

“I mean, this is an incredibly rich tradition and one that I had not really been exposed to previously.”

Intellectual Hothouse at Cornell

20:09 to 22:36

Discover the unique academic environment at Cornell and its impact on Francis Fukuyama.

“And he created a self-governing student association where he felt that you couldn't actually learn self-government unless you actually did it.”

Transitioning to Political Science

22:37 to 26:08

Understand Fukuyama's shift from literature to political science during the Cold War.

“And I guess I felt that even at that young age that, you know, there was something quite not right about that kind of intellectual stardom.”
Show all 23 chapters

Internship with Paul Wolfowitz

26:09 to 28:00

Learn about the pivotal internship experience that shaped Fukuyama's views on foreign policy.

“And once I decided to make that leap, I never looked back.”

Neoconservatism and Personal Ambitions

28:00 to 29:16

Explore Fukuyama's early political ambitions and influences in neoconservatism.

“Yeah, at that point, there were big arguments over arms control, over what kind of threat the Soviet Union represented.”

Churchill and the Moral Narrative

29:16 to 31:29

Fukuyama discusses the moral narrative of Churchill and its impact on Cold War thinking.

“So, I mean, that's a political ambition, but not power for power's sake.”

Critique of Neoconservative Intervention

31:29 to 32:50

Fukuyama reflects on the consequences of the Iraq War and neoconservative policies.

“And this is where you part company with the so-called neoconservative movement, because you saw it coming.”

The Dangers of Pessimism

32:50 to 34:28

Discuss Fukuyama's thoughts on hope and the dangers of pessimism in liberal societies.

“relationship with hope francis with hope your personal relationship with hope well Well, I believe that it is extremely important not to become overly pessimistic.”

Combining Theory and Practice

34:28 to 35:56

Fukuyama emphasizes the importance of combining intellectual theory with practical policy implementation.

“So there's a duality here then, isn't there?”

The End of History Concept

35:56 to 39:50

Fukuyama explains the concept of the 'end of history' in relation to political evolution.

“The next big moment then is 85, is Gorbachev's arrival, because you're now a Russia Middle East specialist, effectively, looking at ways in which you can influence and implement.”

The Impact of His Essay

39:50 to 42:00

Fukuyama shares the significance of his essay on the 'end of history' and its reception.

“the berlin wall yeah it's around this time that the the idea for the end of history occurs to you yes if this is true if communism is finished or if it has lost all optimism, then we've reached the end of history.”

The Impact of 'The End of History'

42:00 to 42:50

Explore the transformative impact of Fukuyama's essay and book on his life and career.

“you go forward, then you go backwards, but there is a broader trajectory.”

Writing 'Trust' and Its Implications

42:50 to 43:57

Learn about Fukuyama's second book, 'Trust', and its relevance to societal relationships.

“I guess that's the one thing I'm the most thankful for.”

The Decline of Trust in America

43:57 to 46:01

Analyze the historical context of America's trust issues and their political ramifications.

“beyond traditional networks or family networks and things like that.”

Memoir Insights and Past Reflections

46:01 to 48:24

Delve into Fukuyama's memoir and how it ties into his scholarly journey and political observations.

“No, at that point, in terms of an academic career, again, I've been really kind of magically blessed because my first academic position came with tenure and a chair, a named chair at George Mason University.”

Current Political Landscape and Future Outlook

48:24 to 50:26

Discuss the contemporary political landscape in the U.S. and Fukuyama's predictions for the future.

“you know finally put the end of history thing to bed in a more final way um and it ends arguably in the in the with with america itself in the worst state it's been for all the years that you've been studying.”
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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:02This is a global production. If I say the name Francis Fukuyama, there are probably two responses. The first is who, and the second is, ah yes, the end of history. He is the chap who contended very powerfully that history had ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the triumph of liberalism. If you're in the first category, it's your lucky day. You're about to find out more about one of the most interesting thinkers of the last 50 years. And if you're in the second category, you're wrong. that is not what he actually contended or argued although almost everybody i know is of the opinion that he did that's just one of the reasons why this is such a fascinating interview with an absolutely fascinating man if you're a big fan of full disclosure i wonder if you could make a list of the guests with whom i appear to display signs of intellectual insecurity and possibly try a tiny bit too hard to establish that i do know what i'm talking about honest let me know what you think afterwards let me know your thoughts let me know actually whether you agree with me that the man's a stone-cold genius francis wikiyama welcome it's a fascinating life even before we get to the seminal and and influential work about which i knew next to nothing previously um i i mean we should probably begin with the with the tricky bit which is the widespread misinterpretation certainly of the later chapters of your most famous book, The End of History and The Last Man, I sense a sort of resigned disappointment with some of the ideas that have taken hold that don't actually do much justice to what you wrote.

1:44Well, you know, on social media, every week, you know, I post a picture of, you know, my wife and said, I thought it was the end of wives. how do you think of yourself because political scientist is uh it's it i mean it covers an awful lot of territory do you have an idea in your own head of of what you were put on this earth to do well uh it was not to be a bureaucrat i tried that and i didn't like it i guess it's really to write books because uh you know i've now done 11 of them and uh i think it's it's it's a good experience because I actually teach myself a lot in the course of writing these books.

2:25And what are you trying to find out when you sit down to write? Well, it depends. I mean, I've been interested in this question of history, you know, with a capital H. And I've learned a lot of history as a result of, you know, doing this. I think the main thing for me is although I'm a political scientist, I wander off into a lot of fields like evolutionary biology, sociology, anthropology. And I really think that you can't get a full view of what human society and human behavior is like unless you escape these disciplinary boundaries. And that's what you're trying to do. You're trying to get a full view of why humans human.

3:04That's right. That's right. And also cross-culturally, I taught myself a lot about China and India and the Middle East in the course of writing these different books. So So your heritage is Japanese, although your upbringing wasn't really. It wasn't Japanese at all. My father was also born in the United States. His father came over around the time of the Russo-Japanese War early in the 20th century to escape impressment there. But, you know, I grew up in New York City. There was never a Japanese-American community there. So I really never felt, you know, particularly rooted in that particular ethnic group.

3:43When did this curiosity first manifest itself? Because it's quite a huge field, isn't it? Humans, human behavior. Well, I guess it started when I wrote the essay, The End of History with a question mark at the end. And it became, you know, widely read. And I got a lot of offers to turn it into a book. And it's that point where I saw there's a real opportunity. I had 13 months to write it. So I said, I'll write it in six months. And I'll give myself seven months just to read. And that was great. I mean, this is something I've done with all of my books is just to sit down and really teach myself something about, you know.

4:28So, for example, there's been a lot of writing on the question of history. Is there such a thing as progress? And I could go through a lot of that literature very systematically in a way that, you know, I wouldn't have as a regular academic. Because you had the space and the time to do it. Yeah. And you didn't have the pesky business of teaching. That's right. Or students knocking on your door every 20 minutes. That's right. I want to go back further than that because there was a sort of shift, wasn't there, after you moved to Paris. But, I mean, let's start with your first schools. Did you shine immediately when you got to school?

5:00It was a very intellectual household, I think. Lots of weighty conversations. Yeah. So my father had a PhD. My mother came from an academic family. We always had a lot of books. Actually, it's kind of relevant to the cultural background because Japan in my mother's generation, So her father was one of the intellectuals that was sent to Germany before World War I to learn about European culture and to help Japan catch up. He came back with the library of Werner Zombart, the German social theorist. And I still have part of that library. I have the three-volume original first edition of Karl Marx's Das Kapital.

5:48How did he end up with Zombart's library? I don't know. He was an economist. He was an agricultural economist. And he, I don't know who he studied with, but he, you know, wanted to acquire European books to bring back to Japan. They're now actually sitting in the library of the municipal Osaka Municipal University. he founded the economics department i think when he got back at kyoto yes university so it's fair to say that yours is yours was not a household or an upbringing where academic ambitions were either frowned upon or or or uh or rare well you know my grandfather was actually a bit like me he was a public intellectual he um was actually this is shiro kawata yeah shiro kawata and he was actually an early supporter of feminism.

6:38He wrote several books on women's rights, and this was in the 1920s and 30s where those kinds of progressive ideas were frowned upon because you have this rising militarist government in Japan. When did you discover, can you remember how old you were? Because it's a wonderful thing to discover that a family member, a grandfather, has not just an intellect but also a visionary. Well, I didn't fully appreciate him until I was older. I visited Japan for the first time when I was probably like in my early 30s. And I connected my cousin is also a university professor. He was also the president of a Japanese university.

7:19And it's actually through him that I got to know a lot of that family history. So when you get to school, I presume that your, I mean, just your basic intelligence became very clear very quickly. Uh, well, yeah, it depended on the school. I went to a private school in New York city. That's not of a piece with Marxist. No. No. And then, you know, when I was in high school, my father got a professorship at Penn state. So we moved from New York city to rural Pennsylvania. That was a very, that was quite a culture shock. A different experience. But did you do, I mean, what enthusiasms did you develop first?

7:58I was struck also by the observation that um when you went to school in in uh um when you went to middle school middle school at riverdale country school a predominantly jewish class would have had the descendants of grandfathers who'd fled the other side of the that's right that's right is that i mean i don't want to be a cod psychologist but that's the kind of thing that perhaps pricks an interest in the broader ebb and flow of history the fact that two descendants can end up in the same classroom having come from completely opposing sides of an actual literal battlefield. Yeah. And also, I think intellectually, you know, that class of Jewish students would have come from themselves very academic or very well-educated backgrounds.

8:43And so there was a strong emphasis on scholarship. I was actually elected to the student council because my fellow students regarded me as the smartest kid in my class. When I got to State College, I fell to the bottom of the social hierarchy because there it was all football players and cheerleaders that were the popular ones. That's when you get to Pennsylvania. So that's State College, Pennsylvania, did not set a particularly high premium on your skill set. No. Was that hard? I mean, did that? No, no. I mean, I found a niche. It was in it was the late 1960s and hippieism was just coming into vogue.

9:22And so I kind of associated with the theater crowd that, you know, started to grow their hair long and started to smoke marijuana and all that stuff. You had ambition at this point? I mean, because you're talking about Vietnam civil rights protests, did you get involved in student radicalism at all? Not heavily. I did go to one big anti-Vietnam War protest in Washington, when I was an undergraduate. But already I had started to turn more conservative under the influence of some of the early teachers I had at Cornell. Okay. Again, I'm jumping a little bit ahead to when you get to university. I'm just trying to work out who you were when you came to consider your options for college.

10:06I was a very conventional liberal, I would say, at that point. My father was quite liberal. He was very involved in the civil rights movement and kind of anti-Vietnam War activity. He was a minister in a very, so American Protestantism, the mainline churches, his was the congregational church. It was one of the original churches in like the three churches in New Haven. On the green there are all congregational churches. And, you know, it was congregational ministers that were very involved in the abolitionist movement before the Civil War. and they continued that up until, you know, the 1960s when they were opposed to the Vietnam War and so forth.

10:53Did you have clear ambition at this age? I mean, there's two thoughts occur to me. Did you have any idea of what you wanted to do when you grew up because you graduated at 17 and did religion play much role in your life? No, no. Not at all. Did you reject it? You have to understand that my father's form of religion wasn't very religious. Liberal protestants at that point very live and let live uh yeah i mean it uh for him you know the civil rights movement was his religion uh and you know i believed in that stuff as well but we he was never pious in a in a strict sense we went to judson memorial church which at that time was a very avant-garde uh church in greenwich village uh new york the first wedding i ever attended was with an interracial couple where at the moment where the minister said, if anyone has any reason for this couple not to be married, let them speak now forever, hold your peace.

11:50And a woman got up and said, yeah, I object to them getting married. I've been living with the groom for the last year and he never told me he was going to marry this woman. So my, you know, it was that kind of, it was that kind of ambience in New York that I grew up in. And did you have any idea when you applied to Cornell or when you went to Cornell, what you wanted to do afterwards, what you wanted to do with your degree. I was heavily into literature at that point. I read a lot of, you know, heavy novels and existentialism, you know, seemed at that point like something, you know, really sexy.

12:24So that was the kind of stuff I read when I was in high school. And I thought I would continue that when I got to college. So you were going to write the great American novel then? Something like that. Yeah. What happened when you got to college? Well, I met Alan Bloom. To do classics. Yeah, well, I didn't start that way. I met Alan Bloom, the political theorist and the author of The Closing of the American Mind, which was a big bestseller in the late 1980s. He hadn't gotten to that point when I met him. It was right on the heels of the big Cornell crisis when the whole university was shut down over protests, over the treatment of black students and the Vietnam War.

13:03so it was really a pretty turbulent time in on american campuses you know four students had just been shot at kent state university by you know national guardsmen and uh there was a lot of polarization you know in the country at that moment right if i think blum had sort of half shut the door on cornell as a consequence of the he he resigned in protest because he thought that the administration was being too weak in the defense of academic freedom and came back to teach this one course. Yeah, he had a contractual obligation. Okay. Why was this final seminar on Plato's Republic so important in your intellectual development?

13:45Well, I think that a liberal education, and Bloom wrote and argued this, really needs to expose you to big ideas. And Plato's Republic is a discussion between Socrates and a couple of young Athenians about what is justice. And they go through possible definitions of justice. And, you know, it's kind of an exemplar of the sort of philosophical reasoning that I think lays at the foundation of Western thought, you know, use of reason and reasoned arguments to ask big questions and to try to answer them. I suppose I'm a bit mystified by how this could have had such a deep impact on you, how it could have almost taken you by surprise.

14:32It's just because your studies hadn't gone in that direction before. Well, Bloom was a student of Leo Strauss who had a very particular concern, which was modern relativism. He said that the Western project began with the philosophical attempt to use reason to understand the human condition. But by the time you got to philosophers like Nietzsche and Heidegger, they basically, the tradition had collapsed on itself because they argued that there is no truth. There is no overarching way of understanding the human condition because human reason is not sufficient. And, you know, Strauss felt that that That was a big crisis because, among other things, if you say God is dead, it opens you up to all sorts of other possibilities like Nazism.

15:26And both Nietzsche and Heidegger were associated with Nazism for not accidental reasons. Once you deny, for example, the Christian idea of the equality of human beings, then why shouldn't the stronger rule the weaker? And that was really the conclusion of a lot of Germans in the early 20th century. And why did this ignite young Francis's thinking so much? I had never been exposed, I guess, to philosophical ideas in that kind of a direct way before. And also it opened up a questioning of basic assumptions about liberalism and democracy, which... Why? Well, because, you know, from Strauss's perspective, you had to think about them in contrast to other ways of understanding, you know, political regimes.

16:20And they were not necessarily the best. You had to really question all of the premises that, you know, you would start with as an American liberal. As in the best way to run a society is not necessarily the way that everybody currently thinks it is. That's right. In terms of liberal democracy. I suppose other philosophers, people like John Rawls and the veil of ignorance and coming into just maybe if we did things like this. That's what excites you, the idea, my God, things don't have to be like this. That's right. That's right. And that's the moment that your life begins to head in the direction it subsequently followed.

17:00And also, I think it created this respect for writers in the Western philosophical tradition and the way that that thought had evolved through the early moderns, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and then getting into Hegel and the German idealists. I mean, this is an incredibly rich tradition and one that I had not really been exposed to previously. So the 19th century continental philosophy, which sought to create moral codes absent a God, that seems to me to tie together some of the things that we've just been talking about. Yeah, absolutely.

17:47it's just sort of as if entire vistas are opening up in front of you and if you have an inquiring mind and you actually want to get to conclusions you want to be able to write something that fits all of the conditions that you've studied thus far that's why you spend seven months reading before you actually spend six months writing a book yeah uh the other thing about strauss is that And he argued that many philosophers wrote esoterically, meaning that the surface meaning that you would think that they were conveying was not necessarily their deeper understanding because they wrote under authoritarian regimes and they couldn't speak truth to power in many respects.

18:28And it made you stop and read more carefully books that modern people had kind of rejected, saying, you know, well, this is just historically interesting, but, you know, not something to be taken seriously. Because if you were writing, for example, behind the Iron Curtain or a previous equivalent of that, then you're obviously writing differently from how you were writing in America. Absolutely. And you can find, if you look hard enough, the things that are not explicit. Absolutely, yeah, that was the basic idea. And, you know, Strauss had a view that ultimately philosophy was not compatible with political order because philosophers would always question, you know, the gods of the particular society that, you know, they lived in just as Socrates did and was killed for it.

19:21and therefore you know you couldn't as a philosopher be completely honest and it's completely different from the post-enlightenment view where reason and politics you know can go together and and will solve everything eventually we could find the right questions um you had a sort of Plato's symposium of your of your own as far as I can tell under the influence of of Alan Bloom and in in a if I've understood it correctly in a kind of um in a house at Cornell where visiting academics would break bread with students. That's right. I mean, an extraordinary hothouse of intellectualism. Yeah, it was called Telluride House.

19:58There was a Telluride Association that was founded by a somewhat eccentric robber baron that had made a fortune in electric power in Colorado. And he created a self-governing student association where he felt that you couldn't actually learn self-government unless you actually did it. So, for example, we had an endowment, and I was the chairman of the investment committee when I was an undergraduate and managed to lose one out of the$4 million in the endowment in the big market decline in 1972. That was, I mean, an incredible baptism, really, into extraordinary high-level thinking. And Bloom became very close.

20:48Yeah, so I became close. But French postmodernism hit Cornell like a freight train in the early 70s. So we had several professors. So Derrida and – Yeah, well, one who had been a student of Jacques Lacan, another had been a student of Derrida. We had Michel Foucault visited, Cornell, Julia Kristeva, a whole bunch of French luminaries. And that was the other pole of kind of modern thought that appealed to me at that point. Well, it's the third pole, isn't it? Because you've got your father's liberalism, which is what you were carrying when you arrived at Cornell. Yeah, that's right. And then you've got Bloom's.

21:28What word do you use to describe Bloom's ideology? Well, he's a Straussian. Yeah, okay. And then you've got the French arriving as well. So how evenly split were you? How did you feel the shifts inside? Well, I then decided I would, I graduated early and I spent half a year in Paris and I attended Derrida's. At that point, he was such a rock star. So he had this big lecture at the École Normale. Roland Barthes had a smaller seminar and I went to both of those. And then I actually sat down and read through their books, which is the point at which I decided I actually couldn't continue down that path.

22:08I'd been accepted into the comparative literature department at Yale, whose luminaries at that time were Paul de Maun and Jeffrey Hartman. And they were, you know, full into French postmodernism. but by the time I arrived there I had decided I couldn't do this for you know for the rest of my life and so I had a kind of unhappy year at Yale and applied immediately to political science departments but you couldn't do this for the rest of your life because you had concluded it was I don't think you used this phrase until a little later in your life you'd concluded that it was all total bullshit yes yeah i mean that's quite precocious well you look i mean foucault made his career around denying the possibility of master narratives and you know derrida was a deconstructionist who wanted to take apart the apparent structure and therefore the wisdom that lay behind you know great authors and show that they didn't understand what they themselves were talking about and yet they all believed in a master narrative which was basically marxism uh you know they a lot of these people were you know julia kristeva uh in the kitchen of telluride house told me that stalinism really had a point and it just seemed to me that if you don't believe in master narratives you know you shouldn't believe in stalinism either and are these i talk a bit about ego because of these ideas that hijack you or ambush you do you think who am i i'm just you know i've only got one degree and i'm now essentially calling time on on some of the greatest thinkers of our age whether they should be or not is is immaterial isn't it was there ever any sense of um being awed i i suspect not yeah i i guess uh i felt that there was the well this is true of loom as well there's a cultish quality you know he had a circle of favorite students but there was certainly a cultish quality around these post-modernists like derrida uh you know people would be waiting out in the corridors you know trying to get into his lectures because he was so popular.

24:29And I guess I felt that even at that young age that, you know, there was something quite not right about that kind of intellectual stardom. Oh, okay. There was a slight irony there, given that you went on to become something of an intellectual star. But I think the key objection is that it had, in your words again, it had nothing to do with the world, what they were doing. Yeah, that was actually also something quite important because, yeah, it was so abstract and so divorced from any kind of real world concern that, you know, I just felt it wouldn't be fulfilling to study that. So what are you now, 21, 22?

25:11Something like that. And are you, in the moments where you contemplate the future, your personal future, are you now thinking it's a life of academia, it's a life of the mind for me? I just haven't quite found my… Well, I wanted to go into something more real world related. That's why I decided to go into political science. The Cold War at that point was heating up in the 1970s. You had Ostpolitik, but you also had the Soviets intervening in Afghanistan and various places in the third world. And so it seemed to me that there was an international relations crisis that I felt was important to know about.

25:54This is quite a leap, isn't it? Absolutely. From comparative literature in Paris to feeling a real internal drive and urge to actually get your hands dirty with the nitty-gritty of modernity and reality. That's right. And once I decided to make that leap, I never looked back. Well, clearly you didn't. And it was an easy leap to make? You didn't? It was easy in the sense that in a way I was returning to the Straussian, you know, roots that I had developed at Cornell. I went to the Harvard Government Department. I studied with Harvey Mansfield there. And there were a lot of people in that department that were in political theory.

26:36However, I actually also decided I wouldn't do political theory myself. I got into Harvard under false circumstances because a friend of mine who's... I won't tell anyone. Yeah. A friend of mine that was teaching there already said, if you want to study theory, don't say you want to study theory because we have too many people that want to do that. Say you want to study national security issues because hardly anybody does that in the Harvard government department. So I falsely claimed that that's what I wanted to do. But then when I got there, I realized, yeah, that actually is what I want to study.

27:10And it's not hard to see why, is it, given what we've discussed so far? There's a crystallizing taking place at the moment, and it is somehow taking what you learned when you were studying Plato and applying it to real-world problems. Yeah, that's right. Thinking the world better. So I still did two fields in political theory, but I also did French politics, international relations. And I wrote a dissertation that was completely based on, you know, it was a Soviet and Soviets in the Middle East thesis that really had no political philosophy in it whatsoever. So what was it? It was a typical international relations theory, you know, trying to explain Soviet behavior.

27:59And nuclear weapons underpin an awful lot of this as well. Yeah, at that point, there were big arguments over arms control, over what kind of threat the Soviet Union represented. And I think it's at that point that I got sucked into this group that would later be known as neoconservatives that were very hawkish on Cold War issues. This is partly as a consequence of interning for Paul Wolf of its thing. Yeah, he was a very influential person at that time. I thought he was the smartest person. I had ever met. More smarter than Alan Bloom? Well, smart in a different way. Yes, of course. And smarter in a real world way.

28:40Yes. Crucially for you, I think. He did foreign policy and he really understood it and understood Middle Eastern politics and Soviet politics and that sort of thing.

28:57How highfalutin were your ambitions then when you moved to the US Arms Control and Disarmenment Agency. Do you see what I mean? Did you see yourself as someone who could perhaps bring peace to... Well, I told Bloom that I wanted to be the first Japanese-American Secretary of Defense. That's pretty highfalutin. So, I mean, that's a political ambition, but not power for power's sake. You actually thought that you could, because you'd thought so deeply about things and worked stuff out, you would eventually be in a position to actually impose the consequences of your thinking on human beings in a way that would make everything better.

29:37Yeah, I think that was the ultimate. You know, there was a moral narrative that was very influential in subsequent years, which was really about Winston Churchill, you know, that while England slept, he alone understood this rising threat from Nazi Germany. And he, in a very lonely way, tried to rouse his fellow countrymen to understand that threat. It was only after, you know, the threat emerged with Dunkirk and the invasion of France that his fellow Brits understood really that they were in a, you know, a very dangerous position. And he was vindicated in the end because, you know, the United States came to help and they eventually won the war.

30:23And, you know, that narrative is very stirring and inspirational. A lot of people during the Cold War felt that we were in a very similar kind of situation. And it led to, you know, a kind of moral, well, for some people, actually to a moral panic about, you know, the situation we were in. But also, it was a very stirring narrative that made you want to, you know, be the Churchill of your time. Now, it turns out that this was also, it had a very bad effect because George W. Bush in the Iraq war thought that he was Churchill. He had a bust of Churchill on his desk, and he thought that Saddam Hussein was the new Hitler, and that he was going to, you know, make a stand and stop, you know, this new Hitler from getting a nuclear weapon.

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31:17And, you know, it had the consequences that we now see that he wasn't Hitler. It was a great overestimation of the threat that Saddam Hussein actually presented. And this is where you part company with the so-called neoconservative movement, because you saw it coming. Well, I wouldn't say I fully saw it coming. I didn't think we were ready to really deal with the consequences of toppling Saddam Hussein, because I had spent a lot of time in the 1990s thinking about, you know, Central America and the Balkans and other places where we had tried to intervene, but very unsuccessfully. I need to ask you, I suppose, at this point in the conversation about today and Iran, and whether or not that is a, I presume that is a continuation of the pattern that you've described thus far, albeit with someone perhaps uniquely unhinged in charge.

32:11Yeah, well, you know, I just feel so kind of outraged that we go through this whole learning experience about how difficult it is to use American power in a region that we don't understand very well, like the Middle East. And we've gotten burned on this twice, and yet we're making the same mistakes all over again. and in fact it's worse because this administration has not taken on board any of the lessons and has not relied on any of the expertise of the people that had to live through these earlier fiascos and so they get into a new fiasco you know uh a worse i mean in many ways what's your relationship with hope francis with hope your personal relationship with hope well Well, I believe that it is extremely important not to become overly pessimistic.

33:10There is a kind of doomer attitude that many people or a catastrophizing attitude that many people have. You know, you see populism appear and you think that it's kind of the inevitable wave of the future. I've got a friend, I get really fed up with him because he is full of this narrative that liberal societies are weak and they can't stand up for their own liberal principles and they're inevitably going to be overwhelmed. And I say to him, look, you know, did pretty well during the Second World War. We did pretty well during the Cold War. What makes you think that liberal societies can't actually defend themselves?

33:50And I think that's a danger right now that, you know, if you become too pessimistic about the future of liberal societies, it's going to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. And you come to this in liberalism and its discontent, I think. And that's why you come to it. Yeah. Sort of a reminder that, you know, it might be the least bad, to coin a phrase, option that we've got. No, that's exactly right. I think that if you don't, especially if you're a younger person that has somehow become prematurely cynical about the liberal society they live in, you're never going to rise to defend it. And, you know, it is going to be overwhelmed by its enemies.

34:32So there's a duality here then, isn't there? There's the what you might call the hands on half of your work. And then there's still the cerebral side of your work. and they're quite nicely knitted together at this point. I think this is actually very important for any kind of policy intellectual. You have to have that larger framing. If you don't have the big ideas, you're not going to understand what values you need to pursue as you make public policy. But on the other hand, if you haven't gotten your hands dirty with the details of how you actually implement policy, If you don't understand the constraints that policymakers operate under, you know, the real world politics, you're also going to be completely ineffective.

35:22You know, someone like Bernard-Henri Lévy that I got to know a bit over the years, I think is an example of an intellectual who's really just innocent of reality. Innocent is a very kind word. you know i mean he takes these you know dramatic moral stands but with no appreciation of you know the real world politics of actually getting to the results that he wants and i think that's a you know that's a real disease of certain kind of intellectual i i don't know why the phrase skin in the game just came into my mind there you need i mean if it's not your own skin you have to recognize that there is real skin in the game and it's not just an exercise in intellectual theorizing or thinking so it's an extraordinary trajectory that we're kind of jumping in and out of you get your phd in political science um at the age of 28 about seven years after you decided that comparative literature wasn't wasn't for you and then of course the first-hand experience that as we're talking about at the moment has underpinned um every point in your in your career since.

36:33The next big moment then is 85, is Gorbachev's arrival, because you're now a Russia Middle East specialist, effectively, looking at ways in which you can influence and implement. The arrival of Gorbachev, Glasnost, Perestroika becomes absolutely seminal. No, that's right. What was odd about that period was that there were still hardliners that could not believe that the soviet union was actually changing you could oh yeah no i i had lots of sources of information about what was going on in eastern europe and in moscow i visited moscow several times in that period and i really believe that there was a serious change going on and there was a you know there was a group of people that were saying oh this is just a soviet disinformation campaign you know that the kgb is still in it turns out the kgb actually was more in charge than we realized at the time but more in charge than a lot of i mean perhaps even gorbachev realized at the time but but you know gorbachev was for real yes and uh in the that anna mirabilis of 1989 one of the big fights we had within the bush administration was which you were in by now yeah i was in the policy you'd been under you'd worked under ronald reagan in the state department yeah and then again in in under uh james baker when george hw bush was president and a lot of the senior people there could not believe that communism was actually collapsing and so there's this constant effort to try to update them and say no no you don't understand how quickly things are changing there and they couldn't believe it because it would be a bit like the sun not coming up one day.

38:20It was just that they hadn't really got the vocabulary to process. I wrote a memo to Jay that my boss, Dennis Ross, who's the head of the policy planning staff, was very close to Baker. So I wrote a memo in May where I said, look, Hungary and Poland are already transitioning to democracy. It's inconceivable that East Germany could remain this little bastion of Stalinism in the midst of all this democratizing Eastern Europe. And therefore, we need to think about German unification. And the reception of that was, I mean, all the German experts said, this is just ridiculous. You're mad. Yeah, yeah.

39:05It'll never happen. Only somebody that doesn't understand German politics could ever write a memo like this. And it was really quite interesting. I went to a NATO planners meeting in the south of France in late October of 1989. And I remember the German representative from their foreign ministry got up and said, Germany will never unify in my lifetime. And like 10 days later, the Berlin Wall falls. It's an incredible time to be doing what you were doing. I know there's never really any dull points in human history, but there are certainly less dull points that was you know probably the most i mean and it was very formative for me i was the single most uh impressive political event that i experienced personally the berlin wall yeah

40:01it's around this time that the the idea for the end of history occurs to you yes if this is true if communism is finished or if it has lost all optimism, then we've reached the end of history. Right. Now, I think I know what you mean by that, but a lot of people don't. So I haven't done Hegel since I was at the LSE where you were the other night. So it's about political evolution. Yeah. And the idea that there's nothing now left to be discovered. Yeah, I mean, Alexandre Kojev, who was really the interpreter of Hegel that was the most influential for me, somewhat playfully said history ended in 1806 with the battle of jena but you know uh what he meant by that was that the ideas of the french revolution about the equality of rights uh and that you know a liberal regime built around the equality of rights was a winning idea that was articulated at that point and you know as kojia said it's not being implemented everywhere it's being implemented unevenly, but there's in the end no way of stopping this because there isn't a superior set of ideas that will supersede it.

41:13And that still holds. I think it does hold. Despite Vladimir Putin turning Russia backwards in some ways, it doesn't challenge your central thesis. Yeah. I mean, I don't think we're all going to become Saudi Arabia or Iran. I don't think even we're going to become China in the future. I think that it's still the case that that belief in the universality of, you know, essentially human dignity is the winning idea of modern times. Would you remove the word unabashed from the phrase unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism? Yeah, well, clearly, you know, we're in a period of backsliding and we have been for, you know, the last 20 years or so.

41:54So, but, you know, if you take a longer view of history, you realize that, you know, it's not linear and you go forward, then you go backwards, but there is a broader trajectory. Well, and speaking of broader trajectories, this is when things explode for you, isn't it? So 89, you're back in the State Department as Deputy Director of Policy Planning under George H.W. Bush, but you've also been asked by the national interest to expand on this idea in an essay. The essay kind of explodes in circles where I think you've described an almost unanimous consensus by which everyone agreed that you were wrong.

42:33But it's, I mean, it's an incredibly,

42:40it's a rare moment in political thinking or public intellectualism for something to take hold in quite this way. It becomes inevitable that you write a book and in some ways then your life changes. Completely changes, yeah. I guess that's the one thing I'm the most thankful for. you know most young academics have to basically follow the rules of their sub-discipline and in order to get tenure you know they they become jargon-laden and narrow and so forth and my career had the opposite because i remember after the end of history and the last man was published it was a successful book my publisher came back to me and said okay what's your second book going to be and I said, oh, second book, I hadn't thought about that.

43:26Did you really not? No, I hadn't. And he said, you know, so I said, well, what should I write about? He said, anything you want. Of course. And at that point, you know, it just occurred to me, wow, this is the most incredible opportunity. I can write another book and I can write about anything I want and that's the point where I, you know, I had been interested in this question of the relationship of culture and economics and that's what I wanted to write a book about and it eventually became my second book, Trust. This is 95 now and that's about building things beyond traditional networks or family networks and things like that.

44:06And was it as satisfying the work as you hoped it would be? Well, in a way it was more successful because first of all, the idea of trust is a really powerful one And among other things, I started doing a lot of speaking at corporations because no CEO thinks that they've got enough trust. But it also got me interested in other parts of the world that I had described as low trust. So that was Korea, Latin America, a lot of places where you had very poor trust relationships between citizens, between citizens and their state. And it kind of introduced me to a whole different set of issues in terms of modern government.

44:54And it's quite, from an American perspective, it's quite prescient because it comes 20 years before fake news and alternative facts and all that kind of thing. And so the idea that a society's health is dependent upon the amount of trust in a society, America has become a case study. Very low trust, yeah. Subsequently. No, that's a really, it's kind of a sad story because at the time I wrote Trust, most people thought that America was a relatively high trust society. There's a long history to that. Alexis de Tocqueville's, you know, description of America is full of associations because Americans could work together very readily.

45:34You know, I think that was a dominant view of American society. Yeah. But the mid-1990s was also the moment when polarization really began to set in. And this poisonous idea that you've got a deep state that's working against your interest at the other side are basically enemies that need to be countered rather than conciliated in some way. And there's not much sign of us coming out of that anytime soon on either side of the Atlantic. Unfortunately, no. really um and and what follows some of it we've touched upon uh the break with the with the neocons over iraq which i mean i think if i hadn't already asked you about your relationship with hope i'd probably ask you again again now but the i mean the way that the the success freed you to to explore and to study did it also free you to to make breaks like that i know you write about it and after the neocons, but you didn't have to worry about, for example, paying the bills by staying in the building.

46:37That's right. No, at that point, in terms of an academic career, again, I've been really kind of magically blessed because my first academic position came with tenure and a chair, a named chair at George Mason University. And then I went on to size to another named chair. And, you know, it gives you a, it does give you a level of security where you feel you can say, you know, whatever you want. Yes. I mean, that's what tenure is supposed to do. Unfortunately for many people at that point, they're already socialized into, you know, a kind of cautious, intellectually cautious stance, you know, that doesn't allow them to really explore new areas.

47:22But, but in my case, you know, it did. I'd say extraordinary. actually i mean it's not it's more than serendipity isn't it because you'd put yourself on these paths but then the planets align in ways that you couldn't really have asked for more it suited you better yeah i i think i say this at some point in the memoir but um conservatives tend to think that people are self-made and that their position in life is entirely their doing and i just don't think that's true my position in life was just a matter of luck in so many respects you know there's an american phrase i love about being born on third base and thinking you scored a triple yeah that's right that's what you're describing yeah and then finally francis the memoir in the realm of the last man i mean did your publisher come to you again and say what do you want to write about next no no i i told him i want to write a memoir and uh they went along with it and it is i mean a classic blend of of personal and professional yeah and there were various you know loose ends that i wanted to tie together uh that i you know finally put the end of history thing to bed in a more final way um and it ends arguably in the in the with with america itself in the worst state it's been for all the years that you've been studying.

48:45Yeah. No, I began my interest in modern states really with Iraq and Afghanistan where we managed to collapse these two states and we didn't know how to put them back together. And that started me thinking about the importance of having a modern state and then the realization that America itself did not have a fully modern state. And that, you know, then culminates in Donald Trump's war against the deep state. There's a prescription, though, as well, not just diagnosis. You do attempt to... Yeah, no, I definitely have ideas about how you needed to fix the American state. Whether those will ever come to pass, we'll have to see.

49:27We will. And in the meantime, the midterms are just around the corner, and a lot of people are very, very fearful about what could be coming next. Are you? I'm not, actually. I actually think we're going to do okay in the midterms, But, you know, we'll see. And it won't prompt any of the sort of apocalyptic scenarios that some Trump critics have suggested. Yeah, I think he's going to do everything he can to manipulate the election. But in the end, I don't think he's going to be able to. However, it's going to free him afterwards if he does have a Democratic Congress to try to change the subject by doing a lot of crazy things.

50:07So as I said, it's never dull human history, but some periods are less dull than others. Francis Fukuyama, whose memoir In the Realm of the Last Man is out now. Thank you so much. Thank you for talking to me.

50:23This has been a global production.

From the publisher

He famously argued that liberal democracy marked the end of history. Now, with war, populism and authoritarianism reshaping the world, Francis Fukuyama asks whether liberal democracy can still win.

In this episode of Full Disclosure, James O’Brien speaks to the political scientist and author about the ideas, accidents and encounters that shaped his life. Fukuyama reflects on growing up in a highly intellectual family, his early immersion in philosophy, and why a formative period in Paris led him away from literary theory and towards the realities of international politics.

They discuss the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enduring misreading of The End of History, and why he believes the idea of equal human dignity remains powerful despite democratic backsliding around the world. Fukuyama also looks back on his time in US government, his break with neoconservatism over Iraq, and the danger of letting pessimism about democracy become self-fulfilling.

Thoughtful, wide-ranging and urgent, this conversation is about big ideas, political mistakes and the case for defending liberal societies without pretending they are perfect.

Find out more about In the Realm of the Last Man by Francis Fukuyama here

Full Disclosure is a Global Production

Listen or watch every Friday on Global Player, YouTube or wherever you get your podcasts.

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