Trump's New Strategy for Latin America: Venezuela, Cuba, & the 'Donroe Doctrine' | Brian Winter

27:22And it's why one concern that I have now is that the Chavista regime that remains in place, led by Delcy Rodriguez, they are sort of saying the right things with this statement that they issued about collaborating with the Trump administration. But the Chavistas are, and have been over the years, absolute masters at pretending to negotiate, at pretending to be reasonable, when their real game is to draw things out, hope that their counterpart loses focus or loses power so that they can remain in power. Because again, their biggest fear is ending up in a federal prison, which is exactly what has happened now to Nicolas Maduro.

28:08Can you give us a sense of, there's obviously a power vacuum there now of some sorts. We don't really know who's in charge. We saw what happened when that situation occurred in Iraq, where the US did have boots on the ground. They could be in control. And as Dimitri, I think, intimated, it's difficult to see how they're running things without anybody being there, except probably a few thousand CIA operatives. But can you give us a sense of the vacuum, the various players here that might want to step into that vacuum and how that kind of Game of Thrones type power struggle might play out? Well, I would respectfully disagree with the idea that it's a vacuum.

28:50Yeah. I mean, this is the same power structure that was there before, minus Nicolás Maduro. Okay. Led by Del C. Rodriguez. And this is where it becomes not exactly a vacuum, but it's not also a neat org chart, right? Like where everybody neatly respects whoever is directly above them. I mean, the chaotic aspect of this, which I think you're sensing, is Del C. Rodriguez herself now has to manage all these different power centers. And that's the Game of Thrones analogy. She has people in her orbit sitting at her table who might want to kill her and who might want the throne for themselves and will probably make a move for it if things go the wrong way.

29:39People like Diosdado Cabello, the interior minister who commands these colectivos, which are these kind of almost paramilitary forces, thugs really, with guns who enforce the regimes and his will throughout Caracas and other parts of the country. But look, I mean, I think it's important to note that there is still a functioning authority here. And, you know, this is sort of the case in favor, at least so far, of the way that the Trump administration has decided to play this. Instead of trying to fly in Marina Karina Machado and have her, you know, be on the ground in Caracas and try to organize her own government from scratch, the Trump administration is in some ways, perhaps learning the lessons from what happened in Iraq more than 20 years ago.

30:37and leaving almost all of the prior regime in place. And I don't know if that's the right decision or not, but the argument, time will tell, but the argument in favor of it was basic services are still being provided. There is no armed conflict in the streets of Caracas, at least at the moment. You don't have different factions battling each other for control. The dark side of this is that, according to many media reports, oppression is being now stepped up even higher than it was before. So there are obvious and very negative tradeoffs as part of this decision. But that's where we stand as we record this is a Chavista regime that is still very much in charge, has its own internal complications, but it ain't civil war, at least not yet.

31:33Demetri Kofinas:So, Brian, I got a couple of questions. I'm going to try to stagger them, but they're all related to trying to assess how this is going to work out and if it will work out according to US plans, understanding, of course, that we don't really know exactly what those plans are. My first question is, given how unpopular Maduro actually has been, what explains Rubio's comments that they thought it was too risky to try and topple the regime and bring in the opposition? Well, there's a long history there. And the opposition, it was divided for many years. In the last five, six years or so, it has found unity by rallying around Maria Karina Machado, who was previously a divisive figure within Venezuela and maybe even within the opposition itself, seen by some as kind of too hard line, too right wing, essentially.

32:32But over the years, she has consolidated support with the opposition. But what the Trump administration is telling us is that she did not have the support, essentially, of the military in Venezuela. And, you know, again, I don't want to insist on clumsy comparisons with Iraq, but we've seen what happens when you have a change like this, and then the military is either dissolved or is not on board with the new leader. And that was something that the Trump administration clearly wanted to avoid. We've also learned in the last couple of days that CIA assessments essentially agreed that if they tried to install Maria Carina right away, that it was not likely to work, that it could immediately result in an insurgency, breakdown of civil order, perhaps a great breakdown of civil services, because the Venezuelan military controls not just security, but big parts of the economy as well.

33:39Again, in retrospect, perhaps some of this is obvious. The danger though, the other side of this is if the Trump administration waits too long to call elections and try to have a legitimate democratically elected government, they risk not accomplishing any of their objectives. And let's just cite one example here. The Trump administration is counting on private companies, US companies going in and reactivating this long suffering oil sector, energy sector in Venezuela. Venezuela has the world's biggest oil reserves. It used to be a powerhouse. But based on conversations I'm having, I think a lot of companies are going to be hesitant to do that until the Chavistas are gone.

34:32And you've got a legitimate democratic government in place. It might all turn out well if you have this transition for six months to a year. I don't know what the right timeline is, but there's so much risk. And it's clear that we're closer to the beginning than we are to the end of this crisis.

34:49Demetri Kofinas:One more question in terms of assessing how this is going to go. When we invaded Iraq, the national security advisor was a Sovietologist, a Russian speaking PhD. The secretary of state was a kid that was raised in the South Bronx to Jamaican immigrant parents. In this case, both of those officers are held by one person who is the son of Cuban immigrants who speaks Spanish and has been invested and interested in the region going back to his earliest days. How significant is that in terms of both shaping the fact that Rubio isn't in this position in terms of shaping US policy toward the region? And what do we know about how much Donald Trump is relying on and leaning on him in order to devise and effectuate that policy.

35:41This White House is more focused on Latin America than any US government in at least 40 years. It's not just Venezuela, of course. There's been so much focus on Mexico, Argentina, where we saw the$20 billion rescue package, Brazil in the middle of last year, where the Trump administration, at least for a while, passed some of the world's highest tariffs, Cuba, Canada, it's not Latin America, but it's part of the Western hemisphere, right? And the personnel that President Trump chose for his second term reflects that. I mean, if you believe in the old expression that personnel is policy. That is a bet that President Trump has made with his appointees as well.

36:30It's true. Marco Rubio is the son of Cuban immigrants, steeped as much as anyone as I've ever known in the politics of South Florida, knows Latin America or much of Latin America very well, has the contacts, has made the travel or has made trips over the years. But it's not just him. Christopher Landau, who is the deputy secretary of state, the number two, went to high school in Asuncion, Paraguay and speaks astonishingly good native Spanish. He's the son of an ambassador. That's why he grew up there. And you have other people throughout the administration, like Susie Wiles, who doesn't have Latin America experience per se, but was forged in the politics of Florida.

37:23And that is a state that lives and breathes the politics of Latin America. So these are people who know the region well. Now, you asked another question, though, which is how much of what we're seeing reflects Marco Rubio's influence. And we may have to wait for the memoirs to know for sure. My sense is that a lot of what we're seeing right now is Secretary Rubio, but there's also clear influence from people like Stephen Miller and from the president himself. And to cite just one example of how these disagreements sometimes play out, there has been reporting by the Washington Post and others that suggest that this whole idea of striking Venezuela and bringing Nicolas Maduro to face justice in the United States actually started with Stephen Miller's desire to strike drug cartel targets in Mexico.

38:18And that other people in the administration, presumably including Secretary Rubio, talked the president out of it saying, hey, God, I mean, if we go strike the Mexicans, we're going to lose their cooperation, which we really need on drug interdiction and managing of migration at the border. We shouldn't do that right now. And that that instinct essentially evolved into looking at Venezuela as the right way to essentially show our teeth to the cartels and show that we were serious about drugs. And of course, there were other factors, including oil. But no administration is a monolith. And I think we're going to continue to see various power centers competing for control.

39:03Demetri Kofinas:So, I mean, Rubio is, again, Cuban. If Trump is, in fact, also interested, I mean, are we going to see what's next here? Are we going to Yes. And Rubio made the point in a press conference that if he was in Havana, he'd be concerned, he'd be worried, whatever word he used. Are we going to see a Trump logo slapped on the Hotel Nacional? Is this going to be a place where US corporations are going to be rushing in to create the new sort of waterfront casino empire? I say that's sort of like tongue in cheek, but are there deep commercial interests chomping at the bit to get into Cuba? And is that going to, let's say, lead US foreign policy toward focusing there next?

39:45Demetri Kofinas:In other words, is the logic that operated in Venezuela going to lead us next to Cuba? A few things to think about. There are three countries that all of us are focused on right now in terms of what might be next. Two of them are Colombia and Mexico. Colombia is the world's biggest producer of cocaine by far. It has seen production triple over the last 10 years. They've really lost control of that. And they have a leftist president in Gustavo Petro who has been very combative with President Trump. And there are many observers who believe that when President Trump has threatened the possibility of hitting Colombia next, that that's a real possibility.

40:35Now, in this case, hitting would not mean spiriting President Petro away in the middle of the night to face US courts, because if for no other reason, there's no case open against him that we know about anyway. But also, I just don't, I think it's very different, and this needs to be said, very different situation from Venezuela. Colombia is a democracy. President Petro is an elected leader. But that does not preclude the US military from making some sort of unilateral strike against cartel targets on Colombian territory. I think it's very much a possibility. And the same scenario could happen in Mexico, which is the source of fentanyl coming into the United States, or at least the main source.

41:25the Chinese chemicals that come into Mexico and then are shipped as fentanyl to the United States. And President Trump explicitly said in the hours after the operation against Maduro on Saturday, that Mexico was not doing its part and that the cartels were running amok, essentially. And everyone understood, including people in Mexico City and the government of President Claudia Sheinbaum, everyone understood that that was a warning. Even though the Sheinbaum government has been very cooperative with the Trump administration, has established a stable relationship, even though it's another leftist government and they disagree on many things.

42:06The issue with Trump is that it's never over. It's never over with Trump. You never arrive at a safe port and sort of stretch your arms out and say, ah, now we've got his trust and everything's cool. It's always, what have you done for me lately? And his mind appears to be changing again, based on his rhetoric that he's been using about Mexico. But Dimitri, the third country, I mentioned there were three, the third one is clearly Cuba. And that could almost merit a podcast in itself. I'll be brief. Cuba has been in its worst economic crisis for several years now. And I know that we're accustomed to hearing that Cuba's in crisis.

42:51And I know also would recognize that people in the United States, in Miami and in Washington, especially have been waiting for the Cuban communist regime to fall for 65 years and counting. And it never happens or hasn't happened yet. But it's also true that they've never been through a crisis quite like this one, where the economy is not only shrinking, but by many estimates, as much as 20 % of the Cuban population has fled the island in the last five years. So it's already in a very precarious position. And there is no doubt that many people in this administration, especially Marco Rubio, would be delighted if that government fell.

43:35And if there's something that they can do to hasten that day, they'll do it. US power is limited. I don't think it's just a question of them deciding that it's something that they want to do. If that was true, maybe Bay of Pigs or the exploding cigars of the 1960s would have taken Fidel Castro out then. But I suspect that there people in Washington, especially saying, hey guys, this is as close as it's ever been. And taking out Maduro was an important step toward achieving that prize. So Brian, let me move things in a slightly different direction if I can. When Dimitri and I started to do this particular series, it stemmed from conversations we'd had, things we've both written about this feeling of change in the world.

44:26It's kind of ephemeral, can't really put your finger on it, but the world just feeling different around us. And we wanted to explore that because it kind of ties in with an awful lot of cycle theories, particularly the Strauss-Howe generational theory, fourth turning, et cetera. And when I woke up to this news at the weekend, and Dimitri's written something beautifully eloquent about this, I think today, actually, It feels as though the norms that we've come to expect as part of the last 60, 70, 80 years post-World War II in terms of how policy is conducted, how statecraft is executed, and this framework of legal norms and do's and don'ts and red lines that have held since the end of World War II pretty much, apart from regional stuff.

45:16That all feels to me as though it's been trampled over this past week. And it feels as though the response to it, particularly from Europe, which I guess being a European, one has come to expect a lot of kind of sound and fury signifying nothing. But a lot of, you know, harumph, harumph, we're outraged. Nothing really concrete because it doesn't feel like Europe has any real leaders with the exception of George Maloney, which is interesting in and of itself. But how do you frame this in terms of the much bigger picture, in terms of a change in the way our world functions? Because I don't know that people are ready and have adjusted to this idea that the way Trump is handling situations like Venezuela may not just be, oh, that's Trump being Trump.

46:09That may be how the world is going to operate going forward. How do you think about that very big picture potential shift? That's an amazing question. I think there are a variety of ways that I could try to answer that. Let me try to do it as a Latin Americanist, as somebody who follows this part of the world. It is striking to reread some of the classics. The classic works about the United States in Latin America over the last 200 years. and see echoes of what President Trump has done. In some of the other cases I've cited, but also in the case of Venezuela, people talk about the Monroe Doctrine.

46:58That's what everybody knows best. That's what the president himself has talked about over the last week. He's even called it the Don Roe Doctrine, which was originally coined by the New York Post, the tabloid newspaper here. And the Monroe Doctrine was rolled out by the fifth U.S. president, James Monroe, in his State of the Union address in 1823. And it was essentially a warning that foreign powers in the hemisphere, meaning extra hemispheric powers at the time Europe, should not interfere in, quote unquote, our hemisphere. But it was amended over the years. And perhaps the most famous corollary was the so-called Roosevelt Corollary, which came from Teddy Roosevelt in the 1900s, which said that the United States essentially granted itself the right to be a police power in the Western Hemisphere and specifically in the Caribbean.

47:52And that is explicitly what President Trump is doing here. And that's something that has been very common in U.S. history. But it's not really something that we had seen over the last 35 years or so. You know, since the end of the Cold War, the United States policy tended more to treat Latin American nations as equals, as democracies who also, you know, had a seat at the table and ultimately had sovereign power over their own affairs and their own alliances. It's very clear, based on the president's own rhetoric, as well as that of people like Stephen Miller, that that era is now over, or at least the Trump administration wants it to be over, and will act in a way to ensure that it's no longer the case.

48:49to now zoom out a bit and talk about this global phenomenon that you're discussing. I think it's clear, and the president has spoken about this as well, that the Trump administration wants to return, or perhaps believes we have already returned to a world of spheres of influence, where the Western hemisphere, which is to say Latin America, Canada, Greenland, in their view, is part of the US sphere of influence. And that essentially the other great powers, Russia and China, will also have their own spheres. Well, this is absolutely, you know, contradicts the world order as it has existed since the end of World War II.

49:33And I think people in the administration would tell you, hey, you know what, like, we're not the ones who ended it, but that is how they see it. And then I just finally kind of my own opinion here, which I often leave out, but I don't personally understand the nostalgia that has been expressed by some members of the administration for life as it existed prior to 1945. The defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, when he renamed the Pentagon as not the secretary of Defense, but the Secretary of War. He said, well, prior to 1945, we were the Secretary of War, and that was back when America won wars. And I think anybody who understands history, I don't understand nostalgia for the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

50:26Demetri Kofinas:Not to mention that the defense establishment became powerful after we moved from having a Department of War to a Department of Defense, which created the permanent defense establishment. Yeah. I mean, again, to be fair, I think the administration, if you had somebody from the administration here, they would say, look, look at the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and the failures that those wars constituted. Look at what has happened in Ukraine. We're not the ones who ended the quote unquote rules-based order. We are just in some ways acknowledging reality as it exists, where the strongest powers will do as they want and do as they must.

51:12Demetri Kofinas:So Brian, I have a question. I'm skeptical of this framing that the Trump administration supports a world of multiple spheres of influence, that the United States gets the Western hemisphere, that China gets Asia, and that Russia gets something in between. I mean, when you read the national security strategy, they spent more time discussing China and Asia than they did Latin America. And they doubled down on the Taiwan Relations Act. And it seems to me that actually what they're saying, at least again, in their formal communication, is that we're going to lock down the Western hemisphere. We're going to essentially be more extractive.

51:48Demetri Kofinas:We're going to support right-wing political movements internationally, be they in Latin America or Europe. and we are going to work to prevent China from dominating Asia. So I'd love to understand, because it sounds to me like you're saying, actually, they're actually pursuing the spheres of influence strategy. What makes you feel that way based on what the official communications of the administration have been? Well, look, I would say two things. I had a different reading of the national security strategy. Western Hemisphere, was explicitly first. And they said, the Trump administration said that essentially the hemisphere had been neglected over the course of 30 years, and that they were going to reposition military forces in permanent fashion from spheres that were no longer as relevant to the United States.

52:43Now, presumably they mean the Middle East, but they made clear what they saw as the neglect of the hemisphere over time and also portrayed it as, I guess, in a way, a zero-sum game, where they said that they would reallocate military resources, which leads me to believe that this buildup that we've seen in the Caribbean since August, which some people still seem to think is temporary, I think some version of that is very clearly here to stay. The second thing I would cite is if you were an alien who had come from outer space and knew nothing about the world and learned about it only through that document, you would say that the biggest enemy of the United States is Europe.

53:28I mean, there's criticism in that document of Europe that is much stronger than it is of China or Russia. But look, I would also acknowledge that those of us who are analysts in this space, we love to pore over documents like this. And I think that this one in particular was important. But you can also kind of overstate its import. This document was a important hint as to how this administration will behave. But let's be honest. I mean, Donald Trump did not write this. I think it's fair to ask whether he read it in its entirety. I think you could say, by the way, I'm not - No, no, no. I think it's a valid question.

54:11I'm not denigrating anyone here. I think Donald Trump's a very smart man. But presidents in particular are known for not having the time to pour over long policy documents. And so I think what this document reflects is, and there's been a lot of speculation over who really wrote it. And some people see the influence of Rubio. And many people have said that they think they see J.D. Vance. But even if we knew exactly who had written which parts, these things can often break down when it comes to their implementation. So I think it's more important that we judge this administration by its actions more than what some of its officials may have written over the course of last year.

54:54It wasn't that long ago that Nancy Pelosi told us all that we had to pass the bill so we could find out what was in it, I seem to remember. So I think your comments are well-founded. But, you know, Dimitri talked there a little bit about this move to the right. And you published a remarkable piece at the, I guess, tail end of last year, Latin America's revolution of the right, which Dimitri sent me an eye. And I found absolutely fascinating because it's, as you pointed out, it's unusual for there to be so many right-leaning political movements in Latin America gaining up a hand at the same time.

55:26And this is another big change from what we've been really used to over the last, certainly the last several decades. So perhaps you could talk a little bit about that piece and the broader context of what's happening in Latin America politically, because it does, again, come back to this idea that Dimitri talked about, where the Trump administration said they were going to support right-leaning. I hate using the word right-wing, because it just conjures up so many images in people's minds, but certainly right-leaning political parties across the world, and they've got a lot of them making headway in their own backyard.

55:58What's happening in Latin America right now challenges so many of the conceptions that the world has about the region. You know, for so many decades, if you ask people, who's the first Latin American president who you think of? The answer was Fidel Castro with his, you know, his camouflaged uniform and his Coiba cigars and his eight hour rants against Uncle Sam. Today, nobody has quite the global fame that Fidel Castro attained at his peak, but the two leaders who come closest are Javier Millet of Argentina and Naive Bukele of El Salvador. These are the celebrity leaders of today's Latin America, and they're both on the right.

56:48They're both Trump-allied conservatives. And they're not alone. In several elections in the last year, we have seen right-wing leaders have been elected in Chile. We saw one re-elected in Ecuador. We saw a sort of a center-right reformist take power in Bolivia after 20 years of socialist rule there. and the possibility of even more to come with elections happening in 2026 in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Brazil. So it's very possible that 12 months from now, you could see a Latin America that is even more aligned with Donald Trump and more willing to help out with his efforts on security, resource management, talking about not just oil, but rare earths and critical minerals as well.

57:43I mean, it could be a real paradigm shift. Yeah.

57:47Demetri Kofinas:So what explains the transformational energy on the political right in Latin America, Brian? And what are the similarities and differences, would you say, between the movements in Latin America and what we've seen in Europe? So you've asked why this is happening. Why is this shift to the right underway? And I would cite two main reasons. The first one is frustration over organized crime. And look, this is not a new issue in Latin America, okay? This has been part of the firmament of the region for as long as I've been living and working there for 30, 40 years now. But it has gotten much worse over the last 10 years.

58:31And the main reason for that is cocaine. The amount of cocaine that is being produced in Latin America, keeping in mind that almost all the world's cocaine comes from three countries, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, the amount of cocaine has tripled, almost quadrupled over the last 10 years, according to the United Nations. And that has made these organized crime groups flush with cash, and it has allowed them to diversify into areas like human trafficking, illegal mining, everyday crimes like extortion and cargo theft in ways that have affected virtually every country in the region. Virtually every country is an important transit point for cocaine that is bound for the United States or Europe, but Latin America is also itself increasingly a consumer market for the drug.

59:32Brazil is now the world's number two consumer of cocaine. That's a change compared to 15, 20 years ago. So this is all reverberated. And I've lived in the region and I of course always did so in a position of privilege. I lived in Sao Paulo in an apartment building that had double security gates that you had to go in and out of every time I walked outside. Most people in places like Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, elsewhere, have it far worse than I ever did. But there's been kind of this collective realization over the last couple of years that they don't have to live that way. And I think part of that is because of what has happened in El Salvador with Naive Bukele.

1:00:24And look, the Bukele story, it's a very complex story. You know, homicides there have fallen 90 % over the last seven or eight years. By some measures, it's now even safer, at least from a murder rate perspective, than Canada. And that has involved, you know, the sacrifice of due process and human rights. And there's a dark side to that story. But the bottom line is people in Latin America know about that, and it has captured their imaginations. This idea that maybe they don't want to do exactly what Bukele did, but they understand that a different, better life is possible. And they believe that if they can get the right politicians in charge, that they won't have to live with extortion and kidnapping and murder in their neighborhoods in the way that they have for so long and that they've seen get worse.

1:01:22So, you know, violence and organized crime, that's, I think, the first factor in the rise of the right. And the other one has been the collapse of Venezuela, which, you know, really discredited the left and socialist policies in a way that nothing else in recent Latin American history had. And, you know, this was something that people in most of South America, especially, have been able to see with their own eyes because the collapse of Venezuela caused an exodus over the last 10 years of 8 million people from Venezuela. And we talk about that here in the United States because some of them came here, but the vast majority, talking about probably seven of those eight million, ended up elsewhere in Latin America, mainly in places like Colombia, Peru, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina.

1:02:16Which is all to say, in those countries, people have seen with their own eyes the disastrous effects of the Chavista 21st century socialism. And, you know, they see, they know Venezuelans, who in many cases used to be doctors and lawyers back in their home countries, who've now gone to places like Lima and Buenos Aires or Sao Paulo and have become Uber drivers or food delivery people. And in some cases are living on the street. I had the experience of walking through a city in Colombia and having someone, a beggar on the street who was just saying, soy Venezolano, soy Venezolano, soy Venezolano.

1:03:03And so I think that that has had the effect of discrediting even some moderate capitalist politicians on the Latin American left, and it's provided more energy behind this conservative shift as well.

1:03:21Demetri Kofinas:I hosted one of our genius dinners this time last year in Buenos Aires, focused on this question of whether or not Millet's administration heralded a move toward more right-wing economic policies and whether we might see a kind of domino effect in Latin America. Besides the appeal of right-wing policies on issues like immigration and organized crime, do you think that we're going to see a durable shift towards the right in Latin America on economic policies as a result of the examples of socialism's abject failure to produce better economic outcomes and improve the quality of life for people in Venezuela and Cuba?

1:03:59That's less clear to me, Dimitri. I do think that Javier Millet has his admirers as well as his imitators. I would cite the recent case of Jose Antonio Cast, who was just elected the new conservative president of Chile in elections back in December. And one of the first things he did was meet with Millet to show that there's going to be an alliance there. He's also promised deep cuts in government spending, similar to what Millet has done. And look, I think that what Millet has accomplished in Argentina so far has been notable and is another case that has, I think, surpassed almost everyone's expectations.

1:04:45To take inflation from 200 plus percent like it was when he took office and now have it somewhere, I believe it's in the high 20s more or less on an annual basis, is an amazing achievement. That said, I'm not sure that economic issues are really top of mind in Colombia. It's also true, frankly, that not every country in Latin America needs that kind of the chainsaw that Javier Millet famously wielded. In Argentina, it made sense because Argentina was spending about, if I'm not wrong, about 35 % of GDP on its public sector. That's one of the highest levels in all of Latin America. Only Brazil is comparable.

1:05:35A place like Chile or Mexico is in the mid-20s. And then you've got some countries like Guatemala and some of the Central American countries that only spend somewhere in the high teens. Those are countries that need to build out their state rather than slash it. This is testimony to the differences that you find within Latin America itself. So in summary, I think it's a bit early to say that we're going to see a wave of economic reform like the one that Argentina has led under Millet. And it's not, with crime, it is very clearly showing up in polls in country after country as the number one issue.

1:06:18Brian, if I may, just something you said there that, again, comes back to this broader sweep of what really was the impetus behind this podcast. And that's this kind of change that we're going through. And you talk there about a really Machiavellian political climate whereby people are perfectly happy to suspend due process and do this. The end really does justify the means here. If you can bring crime down, we're going to turn a blind eye and you can do whatever it is you need to do. And that, I completely understand why that resonates with people. It's a very different extreme in somewhere like the UK where people are just fed up with not being allowed to speak freely and the hashtag first world problems and all that kind of thing.

1:06:59But the attitude in the UK is very much, look, I'll put up with all kinds of things if I can have my country back again. And while the reclaiming the country in the UK is a very different nature from getting rid of organized crime gangs that are terrorizing the entire population, this shift towards, well, I'm not so worried about due process anymore. I want the outcome. And the means how you get there, you know what, that's up to you. I'm going to elect you because you tell me you're going to get there. And that's a big shift. And the fact that we're seeing this across Latin America, the fact that we're starting to see it, as Dimitri pointed out, in places like Hungary and in Europe, and to a lesser extent, but perhaps a more important one in Italy with Maloney, this is part of what I feel to be this big change, that we're not so worried about how we get there anymore as much as we are the destination.

1:07:52Is that fair? And if so, what do you think that portends if that, what we're seeing in Latin America along those lines, starts to branch out and move further afield? That's a great question, Grant. And I would say that, you know, look, I think it's proof that governments must provide security first. Right. If you can't guarantee people's safety, then a lot of these other priorities will go out the window. And to be fair, I think a lot of governments in Europe recognize that. It's also, I mean, the statistics for crime in Europe compared to those in Latin America are like night and day. I mean, I think the average homicide rate in Western European countries is somewhere around 2 per 100 ,000.

1:08:41In Latin America, it tends to be about 20. So literally 10 times. But I think it's the rate of change that's upsetting people. It's not so much the absolute numbers. It's just the rate of change that's really got people agitated. You're totally right. And I would cite Chile as an example. Chile is a country that is much safer than the rest of Latin America, than places like Colombia and Mexico. But they just voted for this right wing figure in Jose Antonio Cast, who was promising a crackdown on crime, who was embracing, at least in rhetoric, some of what Bukele has accomplished, who was promising to build a border barrier to keep out illegal immigration in a manner very similar to Donald Trump.

1:09:26And some people said, oh, why is he doing that? Because Chile, it's not as bad as Peru, or it's not as bad as Colombia, but that's not how people think. People are not comparing their fate to that of another country. They're comparing it to their own memory and the way it used to be. And I think quite rightly in some cases saying, we're not going to go down that road. And if a government fails to get this under control, we're going to elect another government who will at least try to do so. But look, I think that as ever, these instincts are tempered by certain things. In Latin America, it's interesting to see how the strongest democracies today, And I'm talking about Chile, Argentina, Brazil, especially those three, Uruguay, I think smaller, but part of that group.

1:10:16Those are all countries that lost their democracies in the last 40 years that have recent experience with dictatorship and don't want to go back there. And so there's more defense of these democratic principles in some of those countries than I see, frankly, sometimes here in the United States. Chile has this marvelous tradition that was just continued in the election that we saw last month, in which the winner of the election speaks on the phone with the president-elect on live television, and they congratulate each other for the work they've done. What a wonderful tradition. Can you imagine that having happened in the United States over the last 12 years?

1:11:06And there's other examples too. So people are complicated. Societies are complicated. This desire for change and for security can reside alongside principles. But to now, having lifted you up a bit, let me now sort of crush our hopes a little bit and say that it's clear to me that when governments fail to deliver on that promise of basic security, that even in some of those countries, these principles can go out the window. And that's why you have governments that are working so hard to deliver right now.

1:11:44Demetri Kofinas:I know, Brian, that we're running up towards the end of our time limit. I'm curious, Just looking, let's say, 10 years down the road, what are the sorts of things that we know to be true today about Latin America that will no longer hold in your view or are less likely to hold? And what is your optimistic view for the region and for its economies? There are two questions that I'm really focused on right now. And the first has to do, it's related to this matter of civil liberties and democratic rights. It's clear that artificial intelligence is going to provide governments with a very powerful tool to stop or reduce crime.

1:12:29The monitoring capability of AI in coming years and its ability to maybe not prevent, but certainly track down and the guilty is mind boggling. And I wonder if in this trade-off between privacy and civil liberties versus security, if some of the countries that are going to be most willing to make that trade-off are in Latin America, which is the most dangerous part of the world. It's 8 % of the world's population and about 30 % of the world's homicides. So that's one thing that I'm very focused on. And then the second thing is demographics. I'm old enough to remember an era, barely, when people were worried about overpopulation in Latin America and the globe generally.

1:13:29But in many countries, there were birth rates of six or higher as recently as the 1970s. today, Chile has a lower birth rate than Japan. These are countries that are falling off a demographic cliff. And it's another phenomenon that we're seeing all over the world, but is especially accelerated. And I have to say, particularly unexpected in Latin America and And the consequences for pensions, economic growth, social stability, and so on, they just boggle the mind. And yet another challenge for a region that I have seen so much progress over the last 25 years. We've been focused on problems in the course of this conversation, which always happens, right?

1:14:25That's the nature of these conversations. But I've also seen the spread of democracy, the growth of the middle class. These are all 21st century stories in Latin America that I think will come under increasing strain if we see populations that are aging and where economic growth may become much more difficult to produce. Brian, but before we close, and again, thanks so much for giving us the extra time. It's been such a fascinating conversation. Can you give us a sense of, because the next days and weeks, there's going to be all kinds of stories and headlines and pendiums are going to swing in all sorts of directions.

1:15:04Can you give us, and by extension, the people listening to this, a sense of some of the things that you'll be focused on in Venezuela, particularly in terms of things that you'll be looking to see happen or not happen, depending on which way you think They might go particular personalities that either concern you or you'd like to see, you hope will get involved in a meaningful way. Just so people can have a sense, almost a cheat sheet, because there's so much information flying around. As I said at the beginning, there's so much certainty around it. And I'd much rather speak to someone with your kind of background and expertise to get a sense of what we should be looking for.

1:15:41Look, I think the biggest question of all is whether Delce Rodriguez, the former vice president, now the acting president of Venezuela, will do President Trump's bidding when it comes to oil, reducing drug smuggling, starting to kick the Cubans, Iranians and Russians out of Venezuela, or whether it will start to seem like one big kabuki theater where she is pretending to cooperate. And if the Trump administration becomes displeased, which I think is almost inevitable, even if, by the way, she's moving in the right direction, then what? And, you know, that's not just up to President Trump. I think it's going to be really important to see here in the United States how domestic public opinion evolves and how favorable the American people will be toward continued attention toward Venezuela.

1:16:47You know, there's been some polling already that suggests that, especially in the MAGA base, people are very happy with what happened in Venezuela. And I get it. Because if you look at the result and some of the video, it was kind of awesome. You know, not to banalize war, but for, you know, everyday Americans, they were like, yeah, wow, that was pretty cool. the second that it starts to resemble an occupation, the second that it starts to feel like Iraq and Afghanistan, that's not inevitable. But if it does, I think you could see public opinions start to shift very quickly. And I wonder, and I really, you know, I asked this question not knowing the answer, I wonder if ultimately there is an impasse there.

1:17:45Can the Trump administration force Delce Rodriguez to do its bidding without a US troop presence on the ground in Venezuela? And the second part of that question is, and I feel like this one I know the answer to, would the American people tolerate a significant presence of American troops on the ground in Venezuela? And my gut tells me that the answer to that second question is no. And the problem would not be Democrats, who of course, President Trump doesn't really care what they think. I think the real obstacle for the administration would be what the MAGA base thinks. And they're pretty united right now.

1:18:32Talk of divisions in the MAGA base over Venezuela in particular has been way overstated. I mean, the polling shows us that the MAGA is behind the president on this one so far, and that I get it. But if it gets more complicated, this could fall apart. That said, I really can see how this story could evolve in a way that is to the president's liking. It is possible to me that we'll see a transition government of six to 12 months that makes at least some progress on these priorities that President Trump has highlighted, and that we could see elections and a return to democracy and stability in Venezuela.

1:19:12I think that option is also on the table. We just have to see how it goes.

1:19:17Demetri Kofinas:Brian, thank you so much for doing this and for making yourself available last minute. This has been incredibly value additive for me, for Grant, and for our listeners, I'm sure. So we're really deeply grateful. Guys, I enjoyed it. It's been a busy week. Yes, of course. You know, this has been the biggest story out of Latin America that I've seen in my career. And it's one that I know all of us are going to continue watching. What's the best way for people to follow you and read your work? Well, I can be found on the different social media platforms at Brazil Brian, and that's Brazil with a Z, by the way, the Brazilians spell it with an S.

1:19:53true to my gringo roots. I spell it there with a Z. And I'm the editor-in-chief of a publication about Latin American politics called America's Quarterly. And you can find our work at americasquarterly.org. Phenomenal. Brian, it's been a real pleasure. I've thoroughly enjoyed this. Thank you again for doing it. And good luck. I hope you get the sleep you need to navigate this new cycle. Ah, who needs sleep, Grant? Thank you to you, to Dimitri as well. I enjoyed it too. Take care. Bye-bye. Well, mate, I thought that was tremendous. As I said right at the beginning, we were talking off mic and when Brian joined us, it's so nice to find someone you can talk to that's been there, is unsure about things.

1:20:38It's such a breath of fresh air for me. I'm drowning in certainty and it's killing me.

1:20:43Demetri Kofinas:Yeah, no, it's always a good sign. I mean, there are certain heuristics you can rely on to assess the credibility of a source, even if you know nothing about the topic or the subject at hand, and humility is right at the very top. Amen, amen. But it was fascinating. There's so many parts to this that I have no idea how it's going to play out, but having that background is going to be so helpful to me. And as this kind of thing progresses and takes the inevitable twists and turns that it takes, it's going to be so useful to have this last 90-odd minutes as kind of background in the back of my mind so I can gauge things and put them through the filter that Brian's given us.

1:21:20So I love that every minute of it.

1:21:22Demetri Kofinas:Yeah, it was also interesting to hear Brian essentially express his doubt about the US commitment to Asia. I mean, he's one of many smart people who have said the same thing. And it's hard for me to reconcile that view with what was articulated at the national security strategy. And I suppose I'm skeptical because I think the US has made so many commitments to Asia and has so many important allies in the region, and Asia is by far the most important economic continent. It is essentially, to quote Elbridge Colby, the equivalent of Europe after World War II. It's the area which is the most economically important.

1:22:02Demetri Kofinas:And so I question really how much the US is prepared to cede Asia to China. And I continue to view the actions in Latin America as part of a larger global strategy to deny China regional hegemony. But I think this is going to be a story you and I are going to be covering for a while. So we'll have a chance to see how events confirm or disconfirm that hypothesis. Yeah, I agree with that. The avenue we didn't go down, and it wasn't appropriate to, given Brian's background, is the financial component to all this. The oil component, the dollar component, the stable coin component. Because this is the piece that I'm interested in because it, to me, you can make a very cogent argument that this move is more a sign of weakness slash desperation than strength and purpose.

1:22:54I'm not saying that's the case, but I'm saying you can make a very cogent argument about that. And that's kind of, for me, that's the big picture. That's where we are. We're stuck between this strong America and weak America. And maybe it's Schrodinger's America. Maybe it's both strong and weak, right? And it's perfectly possible that it could be. So the China aspect of it, if America is perhaps worried about it being weak, it makes sense to gently try and secure your backyard, realizing that you're not strong enough to fight on two fronts and you're not strong enough to fight an extended war out in the Pacific when Europe's going to be no help to you whatsoever.

1:23:32If you're a strong America, it's a very different argument. And I really don't know which is which, and I'm wrestling with that all the time. And I'm sure that question is going to come up many, many more times in many, many different scenarios.

1:23:45Demetri Kofinas:No, I agree with you. I think it's a sign of relative American decline and weakness. I mean, what was that line by Tywin Lannister in Game of Thrones when he was speaking to his soon to be deceased grandson that anyone who feels the need to say that I am the king is no true king. And I think that 20 years ago, the United States wouldn't have felt the need to engage in Latin America and to state the obvious that the Monroe Doctrine holds. And I think that the fact that we have is a sign of our relative military decline. But I am also skeptical at the same time of the extent to which the game is, quote, over.

1:24:23Demetri Kofinas:I think that a lot of folks are quick to call the US out. I think that's a bad idea. I'm a little concerned, though, I have to say about this doubling down on oil and gas and internal combustion engines as the platform on which the United States is going to build its economy in the 21st century. I am no expert in this area, so I'm going to keep my mouth shut. But the little that I've read and covered on this podcast tells me that there's really something there in terms of battery technology and innovation of the electric grid, China's going down that road, and how it facilitates a lot of the advanced manufacturing, the future, automation, AI, getting integrated into all of that.

1:25:07Demetri Kofinas:So I think that's also an important thing to think about as we view. And also a conversation I had with Wolfgang Munchau about a year ago or more. He's the FT journalist who wrote a book called Kaput about the German economy. And I learned from him something I did not know, which is that essentially Germany was stuck in an analog era technologically. And so I've used that example also as a sort of analog to think about what could happen to the United States if we double down on our preexisting energy platforms and don't sort of look to compete with China. I mean, I am not ideologically or in principle opposed to tariffs or protectionism.

1:25:50Demetri Kofinas:What I am opposed to is isolationism and isolating ourselves from foreign competition. The Chinese have done the exact opposite. They protected their industries, but they also exposed them to foreign competition in order to use that competitive pressure to evolve the quality of their domestic manufacturing ecosystem. So there's so much that we have to do in America to remain competitive and to come out on top, so to speak. And I'm not seeing as much of that as I'd like to, to feel as hopeful as I would like. Yeah, I get that. And again, it comes back to something Brian said, right? I mean, this idea of going back and doubling down, it's an extension of this, I want my country back.

1:26:29I want my world that I'm familiar with, which is not being forced to buy an electric car. I like my big gas guzzling F-150. It's more doubling down. But I have to say before we close, if you're going to quote Tyrion Lannister, I think Margaret Thatcher said it way better than he ever did.

1:26:43Demetri Kofinas:Tywin Lannister, yeah. Tywin Lannister, yeah. Being powerful is like being a lady. If you have to tell someone, you are, you're not. And I just think that is perfect. Wow. Talk about a quote that works on many, many levels. Many levels. In today's cultural world. Many levels. Yeah. Yeah, exactly. Wonderful. All right, my friend. Well, that was spectacular. I'm so glad. Thank you for arranging that. You did great work in getting Brian to come and join us. Our thanks to Brian. As he said, you'll find his work at AmericanQuarterly.org and also Brazil Brian with a Z, the correct way to spell it if you're a gringo like the three of us.

1:27:16And thanks to you out there for listening. I think Dmitri and I thoroughly enjoy these conversations and we love all the feedback we get from them. Dmitri, tell them where they can follow all your amazing work in case they aren't already doing so.

1:27:27Demetri Kofinas:Well, they can follow me on Twitter, which I use sparingly, at Kofinas with a K. And they can find the podcast, subscribe to the premium feed and learn more about our genius community at hiddenforces.io. .io, amazing. And that's with an S also, not a Z. There you go. All right, my friend. We'll do this again soon, I hope. I have no idea who our next conversation is going to be, but I'm already looking forward to it. Me too, man. Me too. If you enjoyed listening to today's episode and want to join in on the conversation by becoming a member of the Hidden Forces Genius Community, which includes Q &A calls with guests, access to special research and analysis, in-person events and dinners, you can do that at hiddenforces.io slash subscribe.

1:28:14Demetri Kofinas:And if you still have questions, feel free to send an email to info at hiddenforces.io and I or someone from our team will get right back to you. Today's episode was produced by me and edited by Stylianos Nicolaou. For more episodes, you can check out our website at hiddenforces.io. You can follow me on Twitter at Kofinas and you can email me at info at hiddenforces.io. As always, thanks for listening. We'll see you next time.