How Brazil Gave Birth to One of the World's Greatest Jet Makers

26:14It wouldn't even show up in their balance sheet. It's walking around money. Maybe SoftBank can give them like 50 billion or something. Why not? Be better than going into like some new SaaS company. Okay. I have just one more question. And this is something that I read a number of times when I was researching what makes Embraer special. And people kept saying it's also ease of the mechanics. So the idea that it can be fixed up pretty quickly and pretty simply, and that's probably important if it's a smaller jet. That's going into smaller airports or more far flung locations where resources are more limited.

26:55And I guess my question is, A, is that true? And then B, how do you achieve that? Because my assumption would have been that every aerospace manufacturer in the world would be trying to create a problem free aircraft that doesn't need a lot of work on it. And I'll just add a quick C on Tracy's question. But do the constraints of having to operate in a country like Brazil or regional areas like that, do they have a forcing effect on achieving that result of simplicity and ease of prioritizing things like ease of repair, stuff like that? When you go back to the origins of the company, when they were designing planes like the Embraer 110 Bandirante and other planes, some agricultural aircraft, they were all too mindful of the rather difficult operating circumstances of a developing country like Brazil back then.

27:43And they've had that mindset ever since. Now, are regional jets from Embraer, business jets from Embraer, more maintainable than others? Not really. But what they have gotten as a consequence of that experience is an awareness of the importance of good product support. And it takes that background, that experience to realize that. Like right now, you know, you've got everyone talking about Comac in China. Yes, excuse me, you need a worldwide global support infrastructure before we even talk about exports. And they're like, we need what now? And that is one of the very biggest barriers to entry.

28:22And because of Embraer's origins, recognizing the importance of maintainability, they've always emphasized that. They've always been really good about it. So since World War II, there's exactly been one country and one company that has successfully entered the industry of building commercial airliners, and that's Embraer. That's incredible. Maybe the Chinese are almost there. Maybe. We don't quite know. They certainly haven't done so on an export basis the way Embraer has. But in the historical context of everyone trying to get into this industry and everybody failing, Embraer stands out as a remarkable success story.

29:02Richard, thank you so much for coming back on the show. That was fantastic. No, it's my pleasure. Thank you.

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30:30And you could get LTE business internet starting at$39 a month when paired with select business mobile plans. That's unlimited data for unlimited business. There we go. Get the internet you need at the price you want. Verizon Business. Starting price for LTE business internet, 25 megabits per second, unlimited data plan with select Verizon business smartphone plan savings. Terms apply. That was our conversation with Richard Abulafi about the extraordinary success of Embraer. But we want to understand more about where this company came from and the sort of political and economic environment in Brazil out from which it emerged.

31:07So we're going to be speaking with Juan David Rojas. He is a columnist on LATAM issues at Compact Magazine, as well as a contributor to American Affairs. So, Juan, thank you so much for coming on the podcast. Thanks for having me on. I'm a big fan of the show. Thank you so much. So we had the conversation with Richard. We sort of got a rough outline of the history of Embraer was founded in Brazil in 1969. What was going on in Brazil economically or politically, and maybe perhaps even across LATAM, such that the country felt it necessary to have some sort of homegrown aviation company? So between the 1930s and the 1980s or so in Brazil and across most of Latin America, but in Brazil, starting with the government of Getulio Vargas, you had consecutive administrations from across the ideological spectrum, both democratic and authoritarian.

32:02Vargas is actually a great figure to look into there, but they promoted what were called ISI policies, import substitution industrialization. And in a nutshell, what that means is they use protectionist measures, tariffs, subsidies, the like, to both block the import of industrial goods and foster the development of those same products domestically. And this is actually what we've seen Brazil do just weeks ago, along with a number of other countries, Mexico, the EU, US, raising tariffs against Chinese EVs and solar panels. So the idea is that, you know, we want to develop our own EV industry. We can't compete with China as such right now.

32:39We don't want to import their goods. Now, in Latin America, ISI policies get a bit of a bad rap with some good reason, but they really shouldn't. Why? Today in Brazil, of its 20 largest companies, half either were now or at one point worse, they don't. These are Petrobras, Vali, CSN, Electrobras, and of course Embraer. In each of these cases, it took decades and loads of failures before any of these companies became profitable. That's just industrial policy 101. Depending on the industry in question, there's learning curves where failure necessarily contributes to long-term success. And what's sad is that around the time that Embraer was created, right in the middle of the ISI period, Brazil was something of an industrial powerhouse in the region, specifically in auto manufacturing.

33:29Again, a lot of these companies weren't necessarily profitable, and there were ambiguous failures, such as in nuclear power on computers in Brazil, for example. But they were high-value sectors that contributed to huge gains both in productivity and GDP growth. For perspective, average GDP growth in Brazil during the ISI period was around 5 % a year. And since the 80s, 90s, it's been around 2 % with productivity being stagnant. And, you know, this makes a lot of sense because what we've seen since the 90s is that Brazil's economy has really transitioned towards mining and agriculture versus manufacturing, which manufacturing inherently is more beneficial towards productivity growth.

34:11You know, starting in the 90s, industrial policy became kind of a byword for cronyism and inefficiency. and you haven't really seen efforts in Brazil to develop high-value sectors and new industries where economies of scale are important, like aviation. Of the companies I mentioned, you know, this makes sense. What were these? You know, Petrobras, Bali, et cetera. They're all in mining hydrocarbons. Ironically, still thanks to past industrial policy, which isn't to say that privatization in some of these cases was useful, but Embraer really is the outlier here in that it's an aviation manufacturing throne.

34:45So can I ask you to dive a little bit more into the political atmosphere when Embraer was created? Because my understanding is that, OK, it had some roots in the 1940s and the 1950s, but it wasn't until 1969, as Joe mentioned, that it was really crystallized into a company. And of course, Brazil in 1969 was undergoing a lot of political change. And sometimes when people talk about industrial policy, there is an implication or a connotation that in order to have very fast industrial development, sometimes you need a command economy or a dictatorship of some sort. And that was sort of my understanding is that was kind of the background in 1969.

35:32Yeah, that's exactly right. It's a really interesting point. It was a 20-year military dictatorship where Brazil took power in 1964, left power in 1985. They actually created Embraer because in the decades up to that point, the past governments tried to promote aviation solely in the private sector, and it didn't really work. Actually, interestingly, from the beginning, Embraer was a mixed private public enterprise with the government holding only a 51 % stake. And Brazil's military dictatorship was also interesting in that unlike Pinochet's dictatorship or the last military dictatorship in Argentina, they had more of a developmentalist bent, whereas, you know, the ideas of the Chicago boys were more prominent in Argentina during the 70s and 80s and Chile as well.

36:21but um importantly with embriaght and aviation as a result there was a concerted and consistent effort over decades to really develop the company in aviation richard mentioned the cta and i want to say a little bit on that they did this right and that they laid the groundwork through the cta and what's the cta the translation it's like technical aerospace center and um it was Yeah, they were modeled after MIT. They actually brought in MIT professor, Richard Smith, and they developed all of these research institutes that would focus on developing different designs for different planes and the like.

37:02They actually produced one of Embraer's founders and longtime CEO, Zidi Silva. And this is a guy I want to mention because he's just incredible. He was both a pilot and an aerospace engineer. He actually worked on the prototype for the Bandeirante, which was Embraer's flagship program since its inception. Actually, funny story, he left after like 86 and then came back once the company was privatized. But he was flying a Xingu, which was actually a jet that unfortunately failed. But he was on his way back from Brasilia with President Sarney to São José dos Campos. and he reportedly was one of the first people to see brazil's 1986 ufo incident there were like 20 like flashing lights all around so joseph dos campos and it's famous in like ufo lore but it's just kind of funny he was one of the first people to see it i never heard the 1986 brazilian ufo incident may 1980s series of radar and visual contacts this is going to establish a new precedent of all Odd Lots guests must come prepared with one piece of UFO lore.

38:15Yes. Wow, that's crazy. Yeah, it really happened, huh? Okay, I'm a believer. Just to stay on the politics, the military dictatorships are not that uncommon from time to time around the world, particularly not that uncommon at various times in the 20th century in Latin America. But I hadn't really thought about that, that you do get sort of different flavors of them from an ideological perspective. So it's interesting, as you say, Chile sort of famously bringing in people to give advice from the University of Chicago, somewhat infamous, I suppose. But it's interesting, as you said, your point, maybe you can expand on that, that the Brazilian one had a very different attitude towards domestic economic development.

38:59Yeah, you know, I'll step back a sec. If we think about all the countries in Latin America, where a company like Embraer would really succeed, it makes a lot of sense that Brazil would be it. It's a massive country with multiple major cities far apart, making aviation critical for both national security and commercial purposes. On the latter, that benefits from economies of scale, given that Brazil has a large domestic market. There's a lot of moving parts here, but really the intermingling, And you could say this about a lot of other similar companies around the world. The intermingling between the military and commercial dividends of the company, particularly in Embraer's case where exports became prominent, was critical.

39:44You know, you think about it. You need the military as a source of stable demand, given the business cycles and aviation can be really volatile and revenue tends to be limited, especially in a country like Brazil. On the other hand, the potential for waste as a monopoly or oligopolistic firm, depending on the state military, lends itself to the classic problem of protectionism. At one point, the military insisted that all public sector planes had to be purchased from Embraer and that all travel should take place on those planes. And crucially, after 64, the U.S. imposed restrictions on military aid and weapons sales in a similar way now to Russia to force them to rely on their own domestic industry.

40:27But the way you mitigate that potential for, you know, cronyism and the like is by gearing your commercial operation towards exports in foreign markets, particularly if you can find a niche, which is something you guys talk with Richard about. I hadn't realized that, but it actually it makes a lot of sense. The idea that Brazil is a very large country with a lot of remote areas. And so it really needs aircraft in many ways. But I guess one thing I'm kind of curious about is when Brazil was developing Embraer, what was the argument for comparative advantage if there was one? Like, was there a moment in time when people said like, OK, we need aircraft and we can develop them in-house and lots of countries are developing their own national aerospace companies at that time.

41:14But was there a moment where they said and we'll be better at it than other people? That's a really interesting question. And it goes back to that point on finding the correct niche. It's important to keep in mind that Embraer came onto the scene very late in the history of aviation. At this point, Argentina's FMA, for example, was way ahead of Embraer, to say nothing, of peers in developed countries. Very astutely, the leadership of the company looked at the global landscape and said, you know what, there's no way we can compete with what's coming out of Europe and the U.S. Is there a place where we can specialize?

41:51And so lo and behold, by the early 70s, they produced the Ipanema and Chavanchi. The first one was a small agricultural spray plane and the second a small jet fighter. that was designed by one of the CTA's research institutes. Then in 73, they unveiled the Bandai Nantes, a 19-seat turbo prop plane, with around 500 models sold, mostly to the Brazilian military. And almost immediately after this, the firm made the strategic decision of orienting itself towards exports and engaging with partnerships with foreign peers. when you talk about like developmentalism in latin america you often see the region compared to the asian tigers where the explanation will be the isi policies worked in you know like taiwan south korea etc because they geared um their industries towards exports rather than just the internal market which was more prominent in most latin american countries and with most firms so you mentioned that by the time Embraer came into existence, Argentina already had an aviation company, FMA, which I'm just looking at Wikipedia right now, apparently was founded in 1927, which seems hard, but maybe.

43:08Yeah, yeah. Right around the time, actually. So what happened? Can you maybe give us the short compare and contrast version of why regional carriers in the U.S. are not flying on little planes made by FMA? there's a lot more history that you know ember i went through a lot and saw a number of failures but you know you compare it to fma and it's just night and day why and it's sad because the fma had that advantage they started so many decades earlier and this is to give you an idea it was first created yeah i think in 27 by secret decree and as a result if you can believe this there are no audits or financial records from the argentine government and you know another factor that's important too is the fact that brazil you know they had this 20-year military dictatorship but comparatively there was a lot more stability the that military dictatorship lasted a lot longer and there was continuity between these dictatorial and democratic governments in argentina during the 20th century there were like i think something like 30 something coups and um they had this effort during and after the second world war in argentina you know peron famously took in a lot of germans from not nancy germany and apparently they didn't jive well with the argentines i have a few good data points on here that um in just five years 55 and 60 they went through nine different directors with a maximum term of 23 months and it was just extremely volatile it was just a complete disaster and and then but i added the difference was that they really specialized in going after these small and later regional jets that then uh the regional ones took off in the 90s after the company privatized and they ended up privatizing fma also in the 90s, and that was a complete disaster.

45:08It was run by Lockheed, and they promised to, not lay off, but to the workers and made other promises, broke all of them, but the Argentine state still looked the other way.

45:34going back to Embraer can you talk to us about I guess its role in the overall Brazilian economy because this is something I was thinking about we did that episode with Ricardo Hausman where he was talking about. That episode is very much in the background of my mind. Yeah, exactly. And he was talking about, you know, this idea that once a country develops one industry, it sort of leads to other industries where there are synergies or where that technological knowledge can be built upon. So I'm curious, like, were there other trees that Embraer actually led to within the Brazilian economy? The military industrial sector had a number of different firms and actually one that comes to mind right now, unfortunately, because it runs the risk of being acquired by a foreign company, Avibras, which specialized in making a number of military hardware.

46:30And the CTA, it was based out of São José dos Campos in the state of Sao Paulo.

46:39It's turned into this huge industrial hub. I believe Lula actually worked out of there when he was a union leader for Brazil's metallurgy union. Embraer is a pretty small company. It's worth only about, what, like$5 billion. And unfortunately, what we saw after the 90s is that a lot of Brazil's industry in manufacturing really collapsed because of the fact that they liberalized trade and privatized a lot of these companies. Some of them did better, like Petrobras and Avali, for instance. But a lot of the indigenous auto manufacturing firms basically collapsed overnight, unfortunately. So this touches on a couple of things and what I was going to ask next.

47:26But in your view, I mean, the whole reason we're interested in Embraer in the first place is because two things, right? The first is, it's really hard to make a plane, period. And we see that in the US, and we see that in China. And I guess Europe seems to be doing fine with making planes at Airbus. But objectively speaking, building a reliable commercial plane is really difficult. So that's very unlikely. And then B, there are just not many advanced manufacturing success stories in Latin America, period, which sort of touches on the question that Tracy just asked about. So part of the question here is like, what happened such that A, like how is there this one company that managed to overcome two very unlikely things happening?

48:11And B, is it just a matter of premature liberalization in your view? Or like, what are the factors that cause that there aren't more Embraer's, you know, why isn't there a Brazilian BYD or whatever it is? As far as why Embraer succeeded, a lot of it is luck. A lot of it is just smart investments, really good competence and cultivating talent for this company. But as far as why there isn't a Brazilian BYD, you know, there's this automaker in Brazil, Burguel. Its president was known as the Brazilian Henry Ford. And to be honest, most of the cars that this company made weren't great, but a lot of them had potential.

48:53They were actually making EVs during the 70s and 80s. They were these small little cars. And the Jeeps that they made were pretty good. Unfortunately, after they removed tariffs and allowed competition with imports in the 90s, the company went bankrupt in 1996. And we talk about premature liberalization. It's interesting because what I would argue with a company like that is that you don't want to just prop up these companies unnecessarily, especially if they're not giving results. But if there's potential there, things maybe would have been different if, let's say, policymakers have said, you know what, we don't want you to fail, but we want to see results.

49:33You need to gear your operation towards exports. And we're going to condition a lot of our support on increasing production, et cetera. What's the new industrial policy in Brazil? I keep hearing about that. And I guess the big question is, when you say new industrial policy, how does that differ from the old industrial policy? Lula, I believe it was earlier this year, unveiled what he called his new industrial plan. I forget exactly the figure, including a bunch of subsidies, local content requirements, credit lines in order to attract investments, specifically in manufacturing. And actually, the results so far are pretty good.

50:14Atlantis, BYD, Great Wall Motors, a number of key firms have opened up plants in Brazil. And the idea is to be able to benefit from that technology transfer. And it's one thing just if foreign multinationals are opening up plants in your country. Another is that you can really actually learn from them and then create your own firms. There's been plants in Mexico for a long time. U.S. automaker plants, but Mexico does not have, as far as I know, a rising domestic auto industry of its own. What are the barriers? Why is it that in some cases, in theory, that works? You have some foreign automakers like Ford set up a plant, and then there's know-how, and then there's domestic building, and there's rising the value chain.

51:00And then sometimes you're still just basically capturing only a modest share of value as a place for end finishing, and it doesn't spread out. Mexico is really today one of the few countries in Latin America that has a really robust manufacturing sector. But as you stated, it's all really just assembly. They just import inputs from abroad, assemble these finished goods and send them to the U.S. And this is actually how a lot of the Asian tigers started out. Taiwan, Singapore, et cetera. They started out assembling these goods and then exporting them. But they eventually graduated, such to the point where, you know, they develop companies like Samsung, TSMC, the like.

51:44And exactly why that hasn't happened in Mexico, for instance, and other Latin American countries, it's hard to say. I think we could chalk it up to an extent to a lack of imagination, honestly. So on that note, I mean, I know your expertise is Latin America, but do you think nowadays you could have a repeat of an Embraer in the sense that you could have, you know, a homegrown high tech industry, despite the idea that there are all these, you know, quite high barriers to entry, especially for something as complex as building aircraft? that's a tough question because if it were to happen it would take decades and it would take decades for us to see a firm that's really successful i meant to get into this mbaird was really in crisis mode during much of the 80s and early 90s why during the 70s brazil saw this huge boom upwards of like 10 growth each year and they were investing in all these you know manufacturing companies, but a lot of that was financed with external debt.

52:54You get to 79, I believe, and Mr. Volcker and the Federal Reserve starts massively raising interest rates. This causes a huge crisis in Brazil that causes the country's debt to explode and similarly affected a lot of other countries in Latin America. You guys might have heard the term the lost decade to refer to the 1980s. Interestingly, actually, in Brazil, up until like 85, the military their view was that they could um pay down some of their debt by promoting exports and they ran these huge surflaces then after uh 85 they started uh more of an austerity regime there was also a slump in the early 90s because of the gulf war but the company was given like a half a billion dollar rescue package but um when it was finally privatized it actually had to be put up for auction like five times because it was viewed as so undesirable.

53:48So that's interesting. The Volcker shock sort of clobbering the economies of countries that had gone into debt to do domestic investment. You mentioned the Gulf War downturn, which I hadn't thought about. But after the military dictatorship ended after 20 years and then the company went private, like what was the sort of policy stance of the government at that time? Was it a sort of sort of classic Washington consensus pursue that kind of liberalism? Like what was the environment, the domestic policy environment during that sort of those rough years in the 80s and 90s? You know, I think you could say it's a bit of both.

54:29The key thing is that when the company was privatized, the government kept what's called a golden share, giving them, you know, veto power over changes in ownership and really strategic decisions with regards to the running of the company. And it's really because of this golden share that the company is still a Brazilian company. Avibras, actually, which I mentioned before, was completely privatized. The government kept zero ownership. And it's because of that that it runs the risk now of being sold off and no longer being Brazilian. They had this pre-privatization venture into, I think it was the ERJ that really took off after privatization.

55:09There's all these interests in regional jets. But on the one hand, there was a more laissez-faire approach. But, you know, because aviation manufacturers, it's really necessary to have support from the government. I mean, you know, Boeing and like their government contractors. The support that Embraer had received from the Brazilian state was similar to its more developed peers. You know, they're still subsidized and the like. Juan David Rojas, thank you so much for coming on Outlaw. That was great. Thanks a ton, guys.

55:54Tracy, I'm really glad we finally did an Embraer episode. I think my big takeaway is it's really hard to make an airplane and you also just need a lot of luck. Yeah, it's funny you say that. I was about to say the exact same thing. Like there's a tendency to think like, oh, they must have done all the right things or there's some sort of like insight that you can pull out of this one specific example. But it seems in some respects like, yeah, they got lucky. They made some good decisions. They had some good management. I guess the one thing that they did was identify that niche. Right. And the other thing I was thinking about is actually Juan hit upon it really well in that second part where he was talking about how the geography of Brazil kind of lent itself to the need for aircraft.

56:41And I guess within that, you would want lots of regional or smaller jets because you're going to more remote locations and probably not, you know, big metropolitan centers all the time. And so in some respects, it kind of lent itself to that regional jet or business jet idea. Totally. And it dovetails with the point Richard made to that one of the preconditions for establishing any sort of aviation company at scale is that really excellent customer support or customer service network. And so you think like, well, one reason why Brazil and not any other country in Latin America is just by luck, I guess, the sheer size and the sheer necessity of having to build out all that stuff at scale just to even serve the domestic market.

57:28Absolutely. The other thing that I think is interesting is that idea of like synergistic economic development. And I guess we shouldn't make this a three-parter, but maybe we need to get Haussmann on to explain why Embraer didn't like lead to a bunch of other synergistic businesses in Brazil. Right. You'd think it would because, you know, there's like other certain component manufacturers that could then sell into others. Exactly right. All these different things or engines that go into a jet that can be modified for engines for something else. So if you're doing it for nationalistic reasons, at least initially, you would think that security would be a factor here, that you wouldn't necessarily want to rely on imports for some of those like vital components.

58:14And yet that seems to be the case here. So I don't know. Yeah. No, I don't know. It's a very interesting story. it is i think to you as you sort of there's like it's a little unsatisfying only in the sense that we can't look to ember air and say like oh that's how it's done yeah that's because what you want is you want to see like oh this is you know i feel like when we talk about east asian manufacturing success stories that blueprint at least on paper looks a little bit clearer right it's like yeah you do final assembly first and then you do this and then you set a series of there's like a natural progression.

58:52And you set these export targets and then the companies that hit the export targets are presumed to be making something good because they've satisfied the export test and then you give them more, et cetera. But at least in Embraer's situation, there aren't enough other examples of such a thing, although obviously the export discipline was part of it where you can say, OK, now let's repeat this over and over again. Yeah. But still very fascinating. Absolutely. I'm glad we did it. I am glad we finally— I still have questions, so maybe this will become, like, a multi-part series. It also—I mean, it is.

59:26The Houseman episode just sort of looms in my mind during the whole conversation, because it's like, oh, yeah, you did it once. Why can't you do more? Or why can't Mexico then do more, given the longstanding existence of final assembly plans? I don't know. I guess if it were easy, every country would be rich by now. You know what we should do, Joe? Yeah. Every time we talk about that Ricardo Hausman episode, I get that vision of like monkeys leaping from tree to tree. We should write a children's song about economic development monkeys and industrial policy or something. I'm seeing a children's book.

59:58Oh, a children's book. Oh, I like that. Okay. All right. Let's leave it there. Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart. Follow Juan David Rojas. He's Rojas R-Juan D. Follow Richard Abu Lafayette's firm Aerodynamic Advisory Aerodynamic Adv. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armin, Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, and Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks. And thank you to our producer, Moses Andam. For more OddLots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash OddLots.

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