How the White House Thinks About Economic Security

25:30And Japan and Korea were left as the only other major global players. And that created a major economic and geopolitical vulnerability that has been exposed in recent years. Now, we could decide, should we compete writ large in shipbuilding? I think we should, but we have to start somewhere. And so what we're doing is picking a niche that plays to our competitive strengths. Because as I mentioned, this is a highly specialized niche, the one that I'm describing with polar icebreakers. It requires a lot of technology. Finland and Canada are best in class. And if they're willing to partner with us and share with us in rebuilding our productive capacity, that's why this deal makes sense.

26:11In terms of the numbers, we're actually working on an MOU. I can't give you the exact numbers, but I mean, I would go back to the global order book that I mentioned. There are 70 to 90 icebreakers that the likes of India and Brazil and Argentina and Chile and Sweden, Many countries want icebreakers. We want to be their supplier of choice. All three of our countries do. And so instead of building two icebreakers in the past 50 years, we want to capture, you know, let's say 10, 20, 30 icebreakers of demand over the next decade. And you can only have the kind of investments and workforce development that I'm describing if you have that sort of demand signal.

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28:18Go to cmk.co.stories to learn how CVS Caremark helps members save just by being members. That's cmk.co.stories. So you mentioned strengthening cooperation with our allies through some of these initiatives. And, you know, I take the point when it comes to things like icebreakers, but certainly in some areas where we've identified strategic importance or a particular industry that we do want to build up, I'm thinking specifically about domestic electric vehicle manufacturing. there is sometimes a tension between building up our own domestic capacity and our own independent supply versus the interests of some of our allies, and specifically Europe in that case.

29:09Can you talk a little bit about how you balance those competing interests? Yeah. I mean, so I'm glad, I mean, EVs, that's a great example, because you could generalize the challenge we're facing in EVs to the entire tradable goods sector. And I mean, And the problem confronting the world, not just the U.S., is that China's production trajectory, it's set to flood the world well beyond what global demand can plausibly absorb. And it's not a new problem. We've seen China run this play for the better part of the last two decades. It's how China has gained dominance in steel and solar and wind and medical devices, machine tools.

29:44But now the trend is broadening. It's intensifying. It's moving up the value chain. So EVs are a good example of how they're doing so. but semiconductors or batteries would be other good examples. And the starting point is one of the worrisome aspects because China already accounts for 30 % of the world's manufacturing sector in value-added terms, and that's more than the US and Germany, Japan, India, and Mexico combined. And look, if China's dominance, if its growing dominance of these sectors was merely the result of indigenous innovation and market forces, we should applaud. We should applaud the positive spillovers that would accrue to the rest of the world.

30:23But the reality is that China is competing with massive state support. It's beyond anything we've seen in any other industrialized economy. And you can see it. I mean, we could talk through the metrics. There are volume-based metrics, nominal metrics, financial results from its exporters. You could measure the scale of policy support directly. You could look at market structure and how much it's concentrated. You arrive at the same conclusion. And so your question is the right one. How do we confront that challenge without alienating allies. And we've tried to articulate three levers that we deploy.

30:58And, you know, which lever you deploy and to what extent, it's more empirical than ideological. But the first lever is, yes, we are going to make investments at home to strengthen and scale up our productive capacity. I mean, much in the way that I described for the icebreaker deal. And that's an R &D and infrastructure and technology and manufacturing. It's also the size and skills of the labor force that's required to build out the capacity that we're trying to generate. But the second is partnerships. So partnerships with countries that are playing by the same rules to give each other access to our productive capacity and our purchasing power.

31:36And then the third part of it is, and it's regrettable, but it's the use of restrictive tools like tariffs with on-trading partners that are not playing by the same rules. And that really is to prevent our investments from getting undercut. And I really do wish we didn't have to use tariffs, but the reality is that we're not competing by the same rules. And the harm from standing aside and doing nothing is not acceptable to our economic strategy or our national security or to our political economy. Now, I mean, the challenge in terms of keeping our allies and partners with us, it's how exactly do you calibrate the use of all three of these levers?

32:14And the optimal scale and scope of tariffs, it really depends on the pace at which we and our allies are deploying productive capacity and the extent to which our investments are getting multiplied by the private sector and how China responds with affirmative measures or restrictive measures of its own. So this gets back to the point I was making earlier. I mean, we want to partner with our allies in terms of this analysis of multi-stage, multiplayer game theory. You know, we have choices to make. So does China. So do our allies. And so do non-aligned countries. So we actually want to roll up our sleeves with allies, think several steps ahead, anticipate the response from other players, and then make ex-anteed judgments about whether our interventions, whether they're affirmative inducements in our productive capacity or whether they're tariffs to remedy harm, are they going to make us net better off in equilibrium for decades to come collectively?

33:10And that's the kind of conversation they welcome. And, you know, I know we've had endless ink spilled about whether allies are alienated by our actions. But I have to say the technocratic dialogue that's taking place and really it's I mean, I was at the G7 earlier this summer as well. The dialogue at the highest levels of government, it has become, I would say, it's remarkably constructive. You know, I was away for a year and a half. I came back and the tone has really changed. You know, another area that we've seen this administration really fuse the idea of economic strength and geopolitical security is in the novel use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which by its name, you know, people thought of it as like, oh, it's just a mechanism in case where suddenly the U.S.

33:57is like shut off from being able to import oil, which is no longer a big deal anymore because we're such a big oil producer. and now it has this sort of economic balancing effect. In fact, you wrote a piece that got published in the FT in February with previous OddLots guest, Arna Badatta, about this. But then there was talk about, well, can SPR-like mechanisms be used for other strategic commodities, such as the various minerals that are necessary for, say, EV batteries, et cetera? Where are we on this? Is this still just in the sort of tweets and blogs and white papers world? Or is there a trajectory for more SPR-like infrastructure to stabilize a market, induce demand for these other critical commodities?

34:44Well, I mean, I no longer live in the world of tweets and blogs. Yeah, that must be nice. It can be. But there is real work taking place. I mean, for the reasons that I wrote about with Arnab, when we created the SPR, we were a major net importer of petroleum, and we were going through the oil shocks of the 1970s. And it made sense, of course, to have a very large stockpile as a buffer against shocks. Now, everyone knows we're a net exporter, but we have quite a bit of vulnerability on many of the inputs that are needed to make a clean energy transition, and also for many of the refined products that come from petroleum that sometimes become scarce, particularly during the winter months.

35:26So can we broaden the concept of the strategic petroleum reserve to think about resilience more generally? And if you want to think about critical minerals, the reality is if you look at each of the markets, and they're really embryonic markets, for many of the critical minerals that are needed, like lithium or nickel or manganese, graphite, etc., we are facing serious shortfalls and underinvestments in new supply. And much of the investment problem relates to price spikes and just outright volatility in these markets. And I don't think the market is going to solve this problem by itself because the risks for producers, they're asymmetric to the downside.

36:08If they undersupply a critical mineral, okay, they may lose a little bit of profit. If they oversupply, they are potentially facing insolvency. And they always, of course, there's a sort of Damocles hanging over all of these markets, which is China flooding the market. So there's an opportunity for the public sector to step in. And really with some novel financial tools, can we think about an authority that gives us a demand backstop, the ability to create a demand backstop with price floors or guarantees or insurance mechanisms or a buyer of last resort function? Could we have the ability to intervene in markets to buy when the spot market is depressed and then sell the equivalent amount in futures markets?

36:52Or create a synthetic reserve by selling put options without actually having to physically stockpile the mineral? If it's feasible, if the good allows for it, can we stockpile? Can we provide non-recourse bridge financing to an illiquid but solvent producer? Can we create a marketplace for high standard critical minerals, the kind of minerals that have high standards for labor and environmental impact or just transparency? These are all the kind of authorities that when I talked about reinventing or reimagining our tools, these are examples of the kind of tools I think we're going to need as we undergo this transition over the next few decades.

37:29So I know you were talking about minerals just then, but I have sometimes joked on this podcast that I'm going to campaign for a strategic pork reserve. So I feel it's incumbent upon me to ask, how does food security fit into your thinking? And also, is there potentially an overlap between the Biden administration's stated goal of bringing down prices and inflation and also building up independent supply and resiliency and things like that? that? Yeah, I mean, look, no one should laugh. Food security is national security. There's no question we have to take it seriously. And sometimes markets for food fail.

38:09I think there is something to what you're asking. I mean, there's another idea that is worth thinking about more, which is, you know, should we create a pool of patient capital that could be invested with flexibility and at scale to advance strategic objectives that the private sector left to itself may not prioritize, especially during moments of exigency. And food security could be one of those objectives. So for example, and you can call this what you want, but if you had a pool of flexible capital, perhaps we could give discretion for the US government with all the appropriate guardrails to make investments at home or abroad to advance strategic objectives that Congress or some other form of democratically legitimate deliberation decides are worth advancing.

38:59It could be energy security, could be food security, could be addressing supply chain vulnerabilities. It could be sustaining technological preeminence. That could be one purpose of it. A second would be, and this maybe gets to the more likely use case for food security, could this pool of capital help us respond to or deter a disruptive shock, particularly a disruptive shock from economic coercion? And this happens all over the world. It's happening right now, to some extent, in the Philippines? And then three, could this pool of capital just help address what I think goes back to one of your questions from before, Joe, a strategic US disadvantage compared to some of our adversaries who can make very long-term strategic investments over the course of decades?

39:43We don't have anything like that, but they have sovereign wealth funds. Many of them do. It helps them gain a first mover advantage or just a competitive edge in many critical supply chains or foundational technologies. And it can confer a lot of soft power. So should we have something comparable to that? That's another, you know, if you ask me what's in the R &D lab, this is something we're thinking about. One of the things we've talked a little bit about strategic planning in the area of relationships with our friends and allies. But one of the things that people talk about is that some of our actions to impair our adversaries or constrain our adversaries can backfire or not be as powerful as we thought.

40:23And there's a lot of been a lot of articles about how the Russian economy, for example, is doing much better than people would have expected in spring 2022 after the sanctions were first hit. Maybe it's not booming, but it does not seem like it's totally crippled. And then in the context of China, for example, you talk about tariffs, we've had technology export controls, things like that, constraints and what NVIDIA can send to them and so forth, you hear, well, this is just going to prove to be an accelerant for their own domestic initiatives and that it's going to cause their, they're going to do even more and they're going to do better, et cetera, than they otherwise would have been because they're going to have to double down on homegrown technology.

41:03Taking that latter one, do you buy that premise? Do you think that China is making progress faster than it otherwise would have because of certain constraints that have been imposed by this administration in the last one. I mean, Joe, we could spend multiple podcasts on the Russia sanctions regime and export controls on China. Let me try to answer your questions on China. So look, no, I do think these controls are absolutely necessary. But let me back up a little bit just to give you a sense of why I believe that. I mean, the first rule is do no harm, right? Because our capacity to innovate, we know it's one of our superpowers.

41:40Maybe it is the most important superpower we have as a country. And we do not want to dull the incentives for innovation, neither here or anywhere abroad. And we don't want to reduce our company's access to foreign markets unless we're confident that there is some national security objective that's implicated without controls. But here is the reality, and this is why the China export controls are absolutely necessary. There are a set of technologies that are foundational to economic growth potential and national security. AI, quantum, semiconductors, biotech, hypersonics. I mean, that list is going to change over time, and those of us in government need to be humble.

42:19We're always going to be behind the frontiers of the private sector, but let's just stipulate there is a list of so-called foundational technologies that really, really matter. Number two, military-civil fusion in China. It means the CCP doesn't make a distinction between its commercial and military sectors. And then three, our private sector, the private sector everywhere in the world, it does have this overwhelmingly strong incentive to sell cutting-edge technology to an enormous Chinese market. And so that's the problem, is that if we had unfettered diffusion of our most foundational technological advances, that would be tantamount eventually to giving up the crown jewels of the American economy.

42:57And that's why we're pretty emphatic about not letting that happen. And export controls are just an acknowledgement of that geopolitical reality. They're not an attempt to hold China back. But that's why that you've heard my boss, Jake Sullivan, one of my bosses, talk about the need to be careful and precise, the metaphor of a high fence around a small yard. And so what does that mean? I mean, here again, like I can share with you a bit of the thinking, the framework. I mean, number one, it's what are the technologies that are likely to be foundational to U.S. national security and economic growth potential?

43:29So come up with that list. Number two, of those technologies on the list, where do we have the largest lead? And therefore, where will we most likely see maximal effort by our adversaries to close the gap if the diffusion of U.S. technology was uncontrolled? And then conversely, where are we behind and therefore most vulnerable to foreign controls that might slow or impede our own technological development? And then three, we do think really hard about whether and to what extent the targets of export controls have substitutes for U.S. foundational technology, either through indigenous development.

44:03And there's been a lot of press, of course, about what China is doing in lagging edge semiconductors in this regard, or from third countries. Can they get the supply from somewhere else? And then four is, can you build a coalition? How broad and how deep? And could we plausibly sustain it around any control for foundational technology? And the fifth part of having a small yard high fence or a strategic anchor is, again, stress testing and simulating. If we get into an escalatory tit for tat of technology controls with our adversaries, how does it play out in a multiplayer, multi-stage contest over time?

44:37And then put a guardrail on ourselves that any imposition of control, it has to surpass some threshold of efficacy compared to the next best alternative. Is it going to make us net better off? So this is not like arbitrary and reflexive placement, placing of controls on really important technologies for really important markets. We are taking this process very seriously. I'm trying to give you a bit of a flavor for that. So Joe brought up the sanctions against Russia, and you were a key architect of those. So I feel we would be very remiss if we didn't talk about them a little bit more. But one of the criticisms that you sometimes see of those is A, the efficacy, which Joe already alluded to, but B, this idea of weaponizing the dollar's special status in the global financial system, the reserve status.

45:27So a lot of what we've been able to do is because the U.S. dollar is central in the financial system and there are a lot of flows that go into dollar assets and things like that. So as a result, we have seen more concern about potentially countries like Russia and China, maybe moving away from the dollar, maybe moving into gold or the UN or whatever. Is that something that you are actively concerned about? And then how do you balance the, I guess, the power that the dollar's special status gives the U.S. with maintaining that special status and not, I guess, overreaching in terms of weaponization?

46:10So I'm going to be a little careful about speaking on the dollar. There's some kind of lightning bolt that will strike me down because that's really the preserve of the treasury secretary to talk about. But what I'll do is I'll talk to you about it in the context of my job. And you're right. I mean, dollar primacy, it's a privilege. Perhaps it's exorbitant. And it allows us to fund our government, our households, our businesses much more cheaply than would otherwise be the case. It allows us to absorb a shock like no other country. And yeah, with sanctions and other forms of economic statecraft that does give us a unique capacity to deliver a shock.

46:44And every time you use sanctions, especially when you do so forcefully, you do create an incentive for some countries to hedge against the dollar-based financial system. And we've got to take that very seriously. But look, you also have to, I think, step back and look at the numbers. Right now, if you think about the measure of primacy, is the currency used? How is it used to save, to borrow, and to transact. Right now, the dollar's global share is on the order of 60%, 60%, and 40 % on those measures. The renminbi share is somewhere between 0 % and 2%. And I think the euro is in a distant second place, somewhere around 20%, 20%, and maybe 35 % on those measures.

47:24And so the dollar still is the operating system of global finance. It has incredibly powerful network effects. And my view is that displacing the dollar would essentially require us to commit a series of unforced errors that you would think of as a failure from within. And I think that kind of failure would also have to be coupled with a more credible alternative to have sustained impact. And that is somewhat hard for me to see with Europe still challenged by internal divisions, Japan trying to break out of multi-decade stagnation, and China just obviously moving in the wrong direction in terms of institutional reforms.

47:59But look, I mean, And as I mentioned, dollar primacy, it's a network. All networks have tipping points. Those tipping points are often psychological ones that are really hard to identify in advance. And we know from the study of networks, anybody knows. It doesn't matter whether you're talking about biology or technology or finance or like my daughter's lunch table at school. They lose value slowly, then very suddenly. So we're always going to be paranoid about dollar primacy. We'll never take it for granted. We'll always try to build a better product. And so it really depends on our policy choices, what kind of country you want to be.

48:34We need to put to rest questions about whether the dollar's institutional strengths are going to be sustained across political cycles. Rule of law, transparent regulation, independent judiciary, deep and liquid capital markets. And the most important, from my perspective, is our story, our ability to generate trust and to attract ideas and talent and investment. That's really ours to lose. You know, when I look at the big picture and I get excited about re-industrialization efforts and the new factories and all seems really cool. But the other thing that worries me or one of the things that really worries me is that the legacy industrial powerhouses of the United States seem to really be struggling.

49:15And I'm thinking of Boeing in particular, and I'm thinking of Intel in particular, which is like, okay, it's great if we have new things, but these are like our powerhouses, and they're not doing well on a raft of measures. What's going on there? Like people have different – oh, is the financial – people, they got too focused on financials. There are different stories that people tell about what happens to legacy domestic industrial capacity. But I'm curious how you sort of think about identifying the problems that we've seen at some of these companies. Well, Joe, I'm not going to speak about a particular company, but let me try to answer your question more generally because I think it's a really good one.

49:53Let me pick like a legacy sector that really matters for our national security. And so I don't know if you've heard about ship-to-shore cranes or if you know much about them. But it is what it sounds like. These are cranes that take a good from a ship. They bring it to shore. It may not sound like it, but this is a critical piece of legacy. You may call it legacy. Legacy, relatively lower tech infrastructure that really matters. And it has a real vulnerability because the vast majority of the goods that enter or exit our economy, they're shipped to ports and they're pulled off of ships with cranes.

50:31Here's the digital aspect of it. These cranes have onboard electronics that allow for remote software updates, and they could allow a foreign actor to interfere with port operations during a crisis, maybe even shut it down. Well, China makes 80 % of these cranes that are used in the US. It's priced out the competition with massive subsidies to a state-owned crane producer called ZPMC. So that gives China tremendous opportunity to collect information on what's coming in or out of the country, including for goods that supply our military. So the risk of another Huawei situation, it's non-trivial.

51:09And so I'm mentioning this because what to do about it, it's similar for many other industries that you could reference, many companies that you could reference. And again, it has to start with public investment to catalyze, ideally through the private sector, the rebuilding of our production capacity. So on ship-to-shore cranes, last month, this administration announced it was going to take$20 billion from the bipartisan infrastructure bill and start building cranes again because of the national security threat that it poses. But then the second piece of it, and it relates to a lot of the questions you've asked, you need friends to do this the right way, friends with expertise in building cranes in this case.

51:49And here, Japan is one such friend. I mean, the$20 billion that I referenced, a good part of it is going to go to a U.S. subsidiary of Mitsui, a Japanese company. And they're now going to build the first domestic option for ports on ship-to-shore cranes in 30 years. And it hopefully will give this firm a chance to scale up and compete with a heavily subsidized Chinese rival. But to give that a better chance, the president did propose 25 % tariffs on Chinese ship-to-shore cranes. And the last bit is the Coast Guard is going to, in the meantime, it has been given authority to inspect all cranes for any signs of hackers that are burrowing into the software, violating security protocols.

52:29So in any of these industries, Joe, I mean, this is going to be a painstaking process. It's going to require years of effort to do basically the economic forensics of where do we have vulnerabilities, to what extent is it critical for our industrial base? Does it have a nexus with national security? And what combination of investments and diplomatic agreements, and in some cases, restrictive measures, can give us a chance to compete in a much more contested environment? I mean, this is not laissez-faire free market economics. You know, I came of age in the 1990s, and we're just not in that world anymore.

53:03So this is what industrial policy is going to look like. Dalib, I'm going to squeeze in one more question, which is just going back to that idea of patient capital. So number one, how serious are those discussions or how serious is that idea being taken? And then secondly, in the realms of it building out industrial policy or capacity, one of the discussion points that you sometimes hear is whether or not it's more valuable to throw money at the initial investment. So building the first factory or whatever versus the government committing itself in one way or another to longer term forward purchasing agreements so that there's always a floor on demand and companies can kind of plan accordingly and maybe avoid big cycles where demand is like vacillating up and down very dramatically.

53:54How are you thinking about that? Yeah, I don't want to put odds on whether the kind of work I was describing is going to end up with a particular final form. I'm always wrong. But let me just try to answer your question. I mean, I think what we're going to do if we have time and political space is to continue to identify sectors that we think are going to be foundational to economic growth and essential for national security and where the private sector on its own likely doesn't have the incentives to make the investments we need at pace and with scale to compete. And that really is all about identifying where there are clear market failures.

54:35It could be in infrastructure. It could be in particular sectors. It could be in the size and skills of our labor force. But we do know if we don't prioritize growth in these strategic sectors and make sure that we have enough investment and we have enough diplomatic partnerships to help them scale, then we're probably going to have a continued hollowing out of our industrial base. And we're going to be vulnerable to shocks, all manner of shocks. And we're probably going to have a political economy that becomes more and more disillusioned and will have a feeling that they've been left behind. And that leads us to a very bad place.

55:09Dalip Singh, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics at the Biden administration. Thank you so much for coming on All Thoughts. Really appreciate it. Yeah, that was fantastic. Thank you so much. So great to get to chat with you. Really my pleasure.

55:35Joe, I thought that was very interesting. It also felt nice just to talk about supply chains rather than market volatility for a little bit. I thought you raised a crucial point in the industrial capacity build out, which is in some respects, the U.S. government is at a disadvantage because every four years we have the possibility of major political change. And if we're thinking on longer term time scales, you know, things like semiconductors take years, if not decades, to actually build out that capacity. It can be difficult to maintain continuity. Obviously, we're in an election year. We don't know who's going to be president just yet, but it will be really interesting to see in 2025, like how much of this has continued.

56:24Yeah. You know, I think to Dilip's point, look, we don't want to be an authoritarian system. Democracy is good. And as you put it, that's a feature and a bug. It's annoying because it does make long-term planning in theory more difficult, but it's good because it also provides a very important check on long-term strategic mistakes in theory. And so that's all good. I think where it's worrisome specifically is that if you have priorities that shouldn't necessarily be particularly controversial, such as say - Icebreakers? Icebreakers, right? But if you have a political system that's sort of like so like polarized and perverted that everything automatically becomes in this hyper-partisan lens, you can see then how any sort of priority becomes very difficult to execute on because, as he said, people will seize on it politically one way or another, even if in theory it shouldn't be.

57:24Well, and also the thing I was thinking about was something like icebreakers was done in coordination with Finland and other countries, as Dalip was talking about. But that's an interesting aspect where supply chains are becoming more of a coordinated thing. I think that's relatively new, at least in the West. But how does that continuity risk play out with allies? Is there a concern that if they commit to a specific thing, then maybe in four years or in a year or whatever, the political circumstances will change and U.S. interests won't be there in the way it was previously. I think we just got to build more ships.

58:05I mean, just I'm going to say an opinion. Like, it does not seem great that we've let our sort of shipbuilding capacity because it's obviously not just icebreakers. It's been a long time since we built like aircraft carriers and dredging and all that stuff. You got to build some more ships in this country. We came so close to making this a 1906 foreign dredge episode, but we didn't quite get there. Next time. The Jones Act didn't come up either. Oh, yeah, that's right. Okay, shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway.

58:36You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. And I'm Jill Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at CarmenArmand, Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, and Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks. Thank you to our producer, Moses Andam. For more Odd Lots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash Odd Lots, where we have transcripts, a blog, and a newsletter. and you can chat about all of these topics with fellow supply chain nerds in our Discord, discord.gg slash oddlots. And if you enjoy Oddlots, if you like these supply chain episodes, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.

59:11And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad-free. All you need to do is connect your Bloomberg account with Apple Podcasts. In order to do that, just find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening.

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