Risky Business #856 -- 8-bit encryption, PHP megabugs and more

0:05Hi everyone and welcome to Risky Business. My name's Patrick Gray. We've got a great show for you this week. There's plenty of news to get through and joining me to discuss it this week is my colleague James Wilson. And in the third chair this week, we're joined by Mark Khoury, otherwise known as Solstice on Twitter. And by day, he is a security engineer. I guess by night, he's still a security engineer, but also does some YouTube stuff and is just generally pretty sensible when it comes to all things cybersecurity. So we asked him to join us to talk through the news this week. Mark, thank you very much for joining us.

0:43Thank you for having me. Huge fan of both of you, Patrick and James. Happy to be here. Long time listener, first time caller, right? So that's great. And this week's show is brought to you by Trail of Bits. And I didn't do this week's sponsor interview. That was James who did it. He spoke with Anish Naik, who talked about some of Trail of Bits' work with OpenAI, the patch the planet stuff. And they've actually created a couple of plugins or sort of skills files that people can use to find bugs, right? So they're going to be chatting about that later on in this week's sponsor interview. But first up in this week's news.

1:25Yeah, so this is ominous. There is apparently a pair of CVSS 9 plus bugs coming in PHP core. And this is what I'm loving about the AI age, right? is we stopped seeing certain types of bugs. We stopped seeing bugs in WordPress core and everything moved to the plugins. But those sort of bugs are back. We stopped seeing bugs in things like PHP core and now they're back. We saw a bug in Drupal recently as well. But PHP core, when you think about how much of the internet runs on a LAMP stack, this could be like a meteor hits earth moment. Apparently details of the bug in the patch are coming out later today.

2:08So it could be huge impact or, as often happens, it could just slide right by with minimal impact, right? And who can say what will happen? But what's your feeling, James, on how this is going to shake out? Because I figure it's like a coin toss between nothing noticeable or Internet on Fire, which is fun.

2:26James Wilson: Yeah. I kind of think this might be Internet on Fire. Just when you think about beyond PHP, you know, WordPress, Magento, Laravel, all the things, like you said, the LAMP stack is so old and so prevalent. yeah it could be could be an interesting week coming up yeah and we saw you know really bad bug that was patched over the weekend in like uh you know uh kernel-based virtual machine software right like that that that was huge didn't seem to amount to much but i guess there's like a handful of really big providers uh who needed to uh sort that one out uh mark you have noted here uh that there's a lot of tweets telling people to patch now uh which is funny because the patch isn't actually out yet yeah yeah on on twitter everyone's like you have to patch right now at least I saw a few tweets like that.

3:09It's like, well, maybe wait till tomorrow till the actual patch is out. Seems the important part of it. There's also been some funny tweets around, oh, PHP, nobody uses PHP. Why are you using PHP? You deserve it. It's like, oh, actually, a large double digit percentage on the high end of the internet is running PHP. So largely, likely a lot of people are affected by this. Yeah, I mean, PHP makes Java seem obscure, right and i don't think everyone necessarily knows that so it could be um yeah it could be a fun day tomorrow anyway you know i like i feel like at the moment uh working in security is like being someone with a telescope who's seeing these huge meteors just like slide by just just just grazing the atmosphere you know what i mean but not um not causing any damage like one of them's going to hit us eventually so uh let's see if someone uses like glm 5.3 to worm that one tomorrow in which case Oh, that's going to be a fun day.

4:05Now, look, speaking of some other stuff, this is just funny. That's the only reason this one's in here. Some certificate authority, apparently, a bunch of their intermediate certificates turned out to be generated by keys that were, I guess you would say they didn't really contain much entropy given that they were one of 256 possible values. Mark, you've been tweeting about this today. Please tell us about these 8-bit private keys because it's somewhat hilarious. I was fascinated by this one because initially it didn't make sense at all. So the private key associated with these intermediate CAs, CA certs, was one of them was four, the number four.

4:48And you can even see it, like it's just like 60 zeros and then a four at the end. And it turns out that what likely happened was that the random number generator was the wrong one, maybe? because instead of having around 360 or 384 bits of entropy, there was just eight. And so all eight of those certs had private keys that were, one of them was four, then you had 56. The largest one was 237, all of them less than 255. I mean, it does tend to suggest something has gone wrong in a tool, in a chain of tools somewhere that is, you know, generating these things. And why? Like, how could that, you're a CA.

5:32It seems like you would have to have a good understanding of how to avoid this to become a CA. Yeah. Well, I mean, you would think that, but like the length, like the sort of stuff we see at a CA is on the regular, you know, apparently, apparently not. But yeah, this is some company called eMudra, I guess, is how you would pronounce that. And yeah, so I think Mozilla's already revoked those certs. I think six of them were for TLS, two of them were for code signing. James, any thoughts or anything interesting here that you wanted to add to it?

6:03James Wilson: I'm a little bit curious as to how the researcher found that these private keys had such low entropy. Because the keys weren't leaked, they weren't stolen, but he somehow discovered and reproduced the results here. Well, I think we're having a joke about, you know, calling this brute forcing when the key space is 256 bits. It's less brute force and more like, you know, tickling. or something like that. It's a mild tickle. I mean, was that it? Was he just running like some test of like what happens if I produce a cert and suddenly it happened to be valid for these ones? I don't know. It's an odd one to like, how did you stumble upon this?

6:36Can you imagine if you're doing a sequential brute force and you get like, you know, eight hits on the first. With the fourth iteration. Exactly. You get eight hits on the first 256 attempts, you know. That would be funny. All right. So moving on, let's have a quick chat about this open code breach because this was kind of interesting. It looks like whoever was behind this, what they were doing is compromising OpenCodeConsole accounts. Now these weren't, you know, it wasn't CLI based accounts. So it was people who were using OpenCodeConsole. And then what they did is they used those accounts, those accounts accounts with the Frontier Labs to run a bunch of queries to do distillation.

7:18So basically someone breached open code console in order to steal tokens and to conduct some sort of distillation attack against frontier models, which, you know, I mean, I see this and I sort of think, you know, nice. Let's get you on this one first, James.

7:35James Wilson: Yeah, look at this and just go, this is the new norm, right? These tokens are so valuable and so useful. Of course, if you're in the position of holding them, you're going to be, you know, target number one that said there's some details here that don't quite stack up just yet uh like i haven't seen and i went looking to try to find evidence of you know how they're actually determining this was a distillation attack i think it's a reasonable assumption but i haven't seen logs or transcripts that show exactly what they were doing uh with this um the other thing that i think is a little bit odd is some of the commentary around you know we we were getting hammered by you know 48 hours solid they kept attacking us over and over again and we had to deploy our own defensive agents you know it sort of reminds me of clem from hugging face after the their incident and someone said hey you know why didn't you have ai running you you know ai against ai and he had a very calm and good reasoned response where he said look that's it's just not the how that happens right we don't have ai playing sword fights in in attack scenarios but anyway look it's it's interesting to see and hopefully they do publish a really detailed post-mortem so we can get some more details around this.

8:41I mean, they did say, though, that in this case as well, they had problems trying to use the Frontier models to do instant response, so they had to switch to the Chinese models. I mean, this just keeps happening over and over and over again because the guardrails are kind of nuts. It's funny just when you were talking there about like, well, was this a distillation attack? It reminds me, you know, there's that meme people send around which says like, everything I don't like is woke, and there's a guy pointing to an engine and a car, and he's like, this engine is woke. It sort of feels a little bit like that at the moment with the American Frontier Labs, like everything I don't like is distillation.

9:18It is a little bit like that. Mark, you had some thoughts here. You also noticed that OpenCode, they recently patched a pretty serious bug, right? Yeah, so as I was looking into it, trying to find any more information on it, I found that there was an article published today, October 20th, on how OpenCode, the client, the harness on on windows and wsl had an rce where if you connect to a malicious mcp you're just vulnerable to rce and apparently open code or anomaly team patched it a couple weeks ago silently without really disclosing anything or issuing a cve and that just makes me think about their maturity in terms of transparency and how they respond to incidents because as James mentioned earlier, comparing it to the Hugging Face incident, they were very transparent.

10:10They had an excellent post-mortem report. I hope to see one for this incident, but we haven't really heard much or seen anything yet. Yeah, I feel like Hugging Face were really transparent because it was an awesome way to shake down OpenAI for tokens though. But yeah, no, I take your point. I mean, that, you know, this vulnerability that you were just talking about, I mean, it probably doesn't connect to this incident. But the fact that they were like, oh, nothing to see here. CVE, what's that? You know, probably not a great sign of how they're operating. What else have we got here? DHS in the United States is banning DeepSeek from federal civilian agencies.

10:49I don't think this is surprising at all. The way the show works, for those who are not familiar, is, you know, we develop a run sheet through the week and we all put comments on it as we, you know, get closer to the show day. I think there's a comment here from you, Mark, saying, well, you know, why are they not self-hosting these things? And my guess is, you know, for the average Fed in the US government, like trying to get budget approval for inference hardware, like it just ain't happening. Right. So I'm guessing they are banning people from actually using DeepSeq accounts, which I think is, you know, I don't think US federal government agencies should be using Chinese cloud AI.

11:25I think that is not a good idea. James, would you agree?

11:30James Wilson: I would certainly agree with that. I will say, though, that when you actually read the notice, it's more than just banning the internal use of DeepSeq. This is DeepSeq, DeepSeq-affiliated products and third-party products and services developed using DeepSeq implementations. Well, how are you going to enforce that? Well, I don't know. I mean, but it's just a... On one hand, it's an oddly specific notice because why just DeepSeq? Why not GLM and Quinn as well? But then, oddly, quite broad. It's like, you know, I won't buy anything off you even if you've used DeepSeq. Not that I'll ever know that you did.

12:02Well, not that even, and I think this is a point Mark's drive out in the notes here. It's like, you know, if you're using some sort of LLM proxy or router, like you might not even know that you're using DeepSeq, right? Yeah, don't worry.

12:13James Wilson: We're not using DeepSeq. We use OpenRouter and OpenCode. That's what we use. It's fine. Exactly, right? So, Mark, what are your thoughts here? Yeah, my initial thought was like, are you not self-hosting? So if you are self-hosting, why would you care? I mean, there's a separate conversation about like the model having bias. Maybe that's why they want to avoid it. Because the model is a communist. Right, right. So if you're self-hosting, it should be fine, right? Now, if you're not self-hosting, why are you beaming all of your government docs to servers abroad? That's also weird, right? I mean, if you work for the part of the US government that is responsible for cataloging the history of the Tiananmen Square incident, the Tiananmen Square massacre, Okay, you know, like maybe don't use DeepSeek on a self-hosted thing, but it's hard to imagine outside of that why.

13:01Yeah, I mean, considering it is used, Chinese models are used to do exploit development. I wonder. So that's an interesting thought. I wonder if there are exploits currently in use by the US government that they bought from contractors who may have even used DeepSeek to do some of the exploit development. That'd be interesting. I think almost certainly by this point. Yeah. Yeah, that's it. Now, look, we had a really great statement tweet from Rob Joyce, you know, friend of the show, connecting to something we've been talking about on the show. Now, last week I said that, you know, coming back into the office after a couple of weeks off, I had seen just heaps of breaches, more than usual.

13:40Feels like things are really ticking up. You know, Brad Arkin, his reply to that was, well, you know, we may have seen a doubling in incidents, but we haven't seen an increase in incidents that sort of commensurate with the increase of like, you know, public vulnerability reports and whatnot. which is a completely reasonable thing to say. But Rob here seems to lean towards thinking the breachpocalypse is here as well. Like things are really ramping up at the moment. He links through to a Reuters report about some Chinese-aligned hacker or Chinese-speaking hacker who used AI agents to own heaps of websites automatically.

14:17But he also said something interesting which is that IR firms are saturated and turning away work. Now, there's nothing mentioned about that in the Reuters article. But I and a lot of people were replying to Rob saying, well, there's nothing in the article about that, you know, citation needed sort of thing. You know, I know Rob reasonably well and he's not a shoot from the hip kind of fella. But I did get in touch with him and we just had a bit of a back and forth, you know, messaging about this. And I'm like, I'm guessing this is something that people in IR are telling you. And he's like, yes, it absolutely is.

14:49So, you know, I generally feel it's pretty safe to take statements of fact from from Rob Joyce pretty seriously. But I don't know, man, it does feel like we're at the precipice of something, but we are just going to have to wait, aren't we? But James, is there anything particularly novel or interesting about this? You know, and what a difference a year makes, because a year ago we would have been talking about, you know, a single hacker using AI to, you know, I think it's DeepSeek and Claude in this case, wasn't it? Yeah. to own a bunch of websites. Like that would have been a stop presses moment.

15:20Now it's like, eh, it's just a regular Wednesday.

15:23James Wilson: Look, I think this all comes down to a visibility issue, right? We hear about the vulnpocalypse and the bugpocalypse because there's so much glory to be gained from getting the CVEs and getting on those advisories. There's very little glory in ending up in a breach notice. And so I imagine there is a huge amount of breaches occurring that are still either coursing through IR, going through internal sort of triage that are not yet publicly known outside of just firms that have to do a certain amount of publicity within a shortened amount of time. So yeah, look, I have no doubt that there is wreckage left, right and centre.

15:58James Wilson: We're just not seeing it yet. But those IR firms turning away work would be a very good leading indicator. Well, that's exactly what I was going to say. Like that, you know, running out of IR capacity is a little bit like, you know, the yikes emoji, a little bit like that. Mark, you are the one of us, you know, here, you're the only person here is actually a practitioner who's out there at the coalface. You talk, I'm guessing, to a bunch of people in New York where you're based about what's going on out there. What's your feeling for the state of things at the moment? Because it really feels like, because I monitor the news very closely, obviously, really feels like over the last month or something, there's been a pretty serious uptick.

16:36There's definitely been a serious uptick. And I completely agree with James' point around how people like to talk about breaches and increased offensive capabilities. And we're seeing a lot of discussion around that. And on the other hand, there has been also a very real and significant improvement on the defensive side, on the blue team side, both for fixing your stuff, detecting vulnerabilities, but also for incident response, for knowing how to respond to anything. There's good improvement there. but what's sad is that given all of that improvement on the offensive side and given that we're seeing more attacks so far it hasn't really anecdotally maybe and for the from the people i talked to it hasn't correlated with increased security budgets even though the dollar spent today can you can do so much more with it even if it's just like tokens but like with one one extra security engineer headcount on your team today you can do so much more but i don't see teams growing in terms of security engineers or detection engineers on the team.

17:43In fact, some of them are shrinking, thinking like, oh, I can just get Claude to do anything, but you still need someone to drive Claude. Here's some tokens, peasant. Here's some tokens, nerd. Now stop bothering me, is the attitude. I mean, let's see if that holds. I have a feeling though, that if we're running into capacity constraints with incident response firms, we're going to start hitting capacity constraints in other parts of the industry as well. So I don't know, maybe you want to hire those engineers while you actually can, right? Before we start hitting those hard caps. Speaking of engineers, this OpenAI guy, this is such a weird story, right?

18:22So I think this was just breaking last week as we were recording the show around that time. This guy is a Saudi Arabian guy who was working for OpenAI. He put a bug behind a television in a conference room. Now, what makes this interesting is, you know, it's been reported as this big thing, espionage, ooh-ah-ooh-ah, but he's been like asking OpenAI's models, like, where do I put a listening device and how does it work and how to do corporate espionage and whatever. Wired has some really good reporting here where they've looked at the court documents and stuff. It turns out he's previously worked for a Saudi venture capital firm.

19:00He's offered consulting services to Saudi Arabian companies. and apparently he's friendly with like a Saudi royal. And there's, you know, frequent communications via WhatsApp with this member of the Saudi royal family, both last year and this year. And, you know, this royal allegedly was trying to recruit him for some sort of Saudi Arabian AI initiative and said, look, Saudi needs you more than the US. And the individual like hit a 100 react on that one, right? So you sort of get the impression here that this feels like, this doesn't feel like, you know, state-sponsored espionage per se, but the line's a little blurry.

19:42It's like, hey, you know, we're spinning up this AI initiative. You've got to come back, do it for your country sort of thing. And then all of a sudden he's sticking listening devices in conference rooms. So I sort of feel like this is mostly like just typical like employee secrets, theft, but with like a little bit of a shade of like state aligned espionage on it. Like, James, did you get that vibe as well? Like, it's pretty clear what's happened here and what was motivating the guy, I think, at least.

20:11James Wilson: Yeah, I agree. Like, this just comes across as a very, very foolish attempt to gather some data that's going to be helpful for his next adventure moving back to Saudi Arabia. I don't get any sort of deep state tradecraft. As we were joking in the notes for this, the real tragedy here is that the AI's advice was to use like an ESP32 board, wrap it up in toilet paper and jam it into the back of the TV. Like, what? We can do so much better. You can do so much better. So much better. And this is what Trump calls super intelligence. Man, it's so amazing. It's so amazing. I'm getting the press releases now.

20:51where all these large companies are now referring to it as super intelligence. And I'm just like, aren't you embarrassed? Like, aren't you embarrassed? Yeah. Are you embarrassed? Are you embarrassed? You should be embarrassed. I think I sent a screen cap of one of those press releases to a mate followed by an image of one of those, you know, solitary chairs in a hotel room next to a bed. A little bit what it feels like. Now, look, speaking of AI safety, though, Anthropic is shopping around its own safety bill to lawmakers. I don't want to get bogged down talking about this one. Politico got their hands on it somehow.

21:29And their proposal allows, it's funny, James, because you zeroed in on the same things I did on this one. Their proposal allows the government to block a model only if it poses a foreseeable imminent risk of more than a billion dollars in damages or of killing or seriously injuring more than 50 people. So I like that they are obsessed with model safety, but they will allow their model to kill up to, you know, kill 49 people, that's fine. If there is an imminent risk that it will kill 49 people, but not 50, that's where they draw the line.

22:00James Wilson: Yeah, clearly this is like the anthropic version of the trolley dilemma. The switch goes one way, it's 50 people. The switch goes the other way, it's 49. And they've solved the problem. The dilemma's gone now, 49's fine. Yeah, I mean, it just is funny though, that they talk out of both sides of their mouth, these companies, right? where they talk about being safety obsessed. They put ridiculous guardrails on everything. But when it comes to the crunch, what we are seeing in AI at the moment is an epic land grab. You know, this is where like technical debt came from in the cloud ecosystem. This is why Azure has so many issues is because Microsoft was trying to get that market share.

22:32They don't care about the safety. They're not trying to slow down. It's just go, go, go. We've seen it time and time again. Same things happening in AI. They don't care about safety. They are pretending. and they like making their models seem scary and super capable because it helps them raise money. Okay, so let's just be honest about what is going on here. Now, this one, Mark, I want to talk to you about this one. And you've both got some interesting, we've all got our opinions on this one, but people are trying to do sort of SEO style gaming with political messages designed to kind of fool chatbots, right?

23:08So, you know, you might be a voter in a US election and you ask, you know, who should I vote for in the upcoming election? You know, here's what's important to me. And, you know, we've had relatively pure results coming back to us because this is a relatively new technology. But it's my concern that some of these SEO types are moving in on this now. And that's apparently what's happening, according to this piece from CyberScoop. But how's your feeling? What's your feeling for where that's going to go, Mark? We'll start with you because you're the American and this is focused on the American election, upcoming midterm.

23:42Yeah, so this one, first, it's not about training the data. This is about like web retrieval. Once you prompt, ask it something, it goes and fetches sources online. And this has been a problem for a while, right? Like even Google, right before the Gemini summaries at the top, for me, Google was unusable because it was all like SEO optimized slop at the top, like more than a page of just like useless. Sloptimization. Right, right, right. And so it was a problem. Like Google was unusable. You couldn't find anything of quality because it was all, well, AI generated stuff was just at the top. And so now this same tactic can be used for your agent to get it to fetch a specific article.

24:33And so what are the ramifications of that? I don't know if there's a good solution to that yet. Because as a problem in general, how do you vet the quality of an information source, which is also applicable for even 20 years ago, right? Like, how did you know if a news source was credible or not? Yeah, I mean, funnily enough, this is why I'm an AGI skeptic, is because how is an LLM in a training run supposed to really know what's right and what's wrong?

25:04James Wilson: Well, funnily enough, that was exactly the chat that Josh Devon from Sondera and I had that we published on Monday. They don't know, but more to the point, they don't care what's right or wrong. That's just not something that is, you know, really an emergent property of an LLM. I mean, that could be a problem later. I mean, I guess that's why I found this story an interesting one to talk about because, like, don't we want them to kind of, you know, be good at that? Well, we certainly do before we give them opposable thumbs. It comes back to that. Yes, exactly. All right. What else have we got here?

25:35We've got an absolutely incredible story here in front of us from Brian Krebs over at Krebs on Security. So we're now looking at a, he's run a story basically saying that the FBI suspects a ransom negotiator who works for a prestigious American firm may have actually been involved in running Shiny Hunter's leak site. Which is just amazing. And there's a whole bunch more detail about this Edward Dubrovsky guy getting arrested. And it's like, it's almost too much to summarize here. I actually did have a chat with Brian the other day after he published this one. He was just emerging, right? Because he was locked in for like four or five days.

26:13You know, he sent me the story. I read it. And then we were having a chat about it. And he's just like, yeah, man, I was locked in. And I'm like, I can see why. Like, this is dense. This story is dense. If you want to really get the skinny on what's going on here, yeah, read his article. But it looks like this new suspect, really, the thinking is he was quite involved. But I really wonder, right, about all of this. Like, as I said to Brian, I said, look, imagine you're not so bright, right? This is your starting assumption. Imagine you're not so smart and you are working for a company that does these sort of negotiations or helps people recover or whatever it is.

26:53and by doing a bunch of forum work, you wind up coming up with some, establishing some good contacts with a group like this and you sort of wind up becoming a bit of a go-between, much like these guys in Somalia who act as go-betweens between the pirates and the companies who own the boats that get seized or their insurance companies or whatever. And after a time, you stop thinking really, you're just in your niche. You're thinking, wow, I'm in this really good niche. No one else is here. I am very smart because I've established myself in this niche and you're not thinking, gee, am I actually just acting as an extension of this criminal group, right?

27:31So I don't know what's happened here, but that's why I'm keeping an open mind because as I say, like it's entirely possible these people just, hey, maybe they're just not so bright. James, what do you think of all of this? I mean, it's just a crazy story.

27:48James Wilson: It's a crazy story. and I think the thing that I found fascinating is how it's evolved my thoughts around this Dubrovsky character. I mean, I remember when we looked at this last week, we sort of looked at, you know, the profile photos of the guy and just went, he looks so square. There's no chance he's actually involved in this. They've just happened to snap him up because he travelled from Ontario to Philadelphia for a conference and he's got some loose connection, whatever else, right? And then maybe it's a good way to collect some intelligence, choke off the money supply, whatever, right? There's a bunch of reasons, yeah.

28:17James Wilson: He knew how to talk to shiny hunters. Therefore, let's go talk to him. He's in the country. Sure. Now, you know, the Krebs read is so great because it's like watching a plot of a movie unfold. And there's this section where it gets to Dubrovsky earlier this year filed a lawsuit in Ontario accusing a former business partner of essentially sidelining him and cutting him out of the business and then being involved in sort of with this third actor in terms of having a much closer relation to shiny hunters. and it's just like, whoa, hang on. This is a lot more of a murky involvement with this when you've got sort of these lawsuits being raised and all this alleged sort of conduct.

28:57I mean, if you're trying to go derp mining, you've just struck a rich vein of derp all around on this, you know. Yes, yeah, yeah. It's wild.

29:06James Wilson: So look, honestly, I don't know what to make of it other than, gosh, this needs to be turned into a movie, TV miniseries or Netflix at the minimum. Well, and there's some novel techniques used by the police in all of this. Mark, why don't you tell us how the Dutch police got around signal encryption? Because it's a very interesting technical technique. they needed the they got incriminating evidence about uh dobrowski that was on signal and uh you can um you can actually easily decrypt signal uh communications and the solution is you wait for when you see someone on their signal you can throw a flashbang on them and then you go get the phone with signal open flawless yep that's it they flash banged they flash banged that guy they arrested uh pep in van der stop uh in the netherlands and uh he was the one i guess uh was was chatting with djabrowski or whatever but yeah they flash banged him because they saw that he had signal open i just can't wait for the next iphone to be released that's got like this new feature where the ambient light center detects a sudden spike and locks the phone for you immediately flash bang detection puts it in puts it in bfu mode right and it means that someone had binoculars just like staring and waiting for the right moment or they had a camera in the room which is just as likely, but, you know, fun stuff.

30:25What else have we got? Yeah, look, there's a whole bunch of these fridges. Like we spoke last week about this, you know, the attacks against freezers and fridges in Europe. It looks like, yeah, there's just so many of these devices still online. But, James, you noticed something here, which is that the devices that were being attacked weren't actually individual freezers. It wasn't your typical IoT stuff. It is like a device. It's still an IoT device, but it's like a controller that's designed to control all of the freezers. And you think it means that it's a little bit less forgivable that this attack was possible, that these devices were not being managed correctly because you would think, you know, surely a device that's designed to manage all these other devices should be monitored and looked after properly, I guess.

31:17James Wilson: Well, the insinuation last week was, you know look this is what happens when when ot devices fall through the cracks sort of like framing this as these were little black boxes jammed inside refrigerators with a 5g modem and you know maybe a refrigerator contract a contractor deploys these so that they can do proactive maintenance and like if it was that sort of out of sight out of mind hidden device that corporate it might not have even been aware was there then sure i can buy that narrative that these things do fall through the cracks this device that was attacked yes it's an embedded device insofar as it's not like an app on windows or mac os but this it's a control panel with a screen that is is essentially orchestrating and controlling and managing all of your fridges and fridges throughout a supermarket and it's the kind of thing that's going to be sitting in the manager's office and it's going to be visible and it's going to be part of the store running procedures and i actually i actually looked at the at the website for this thing and it is something that's designed to be embedded in a wall yeah right so it is still like so that's i understand what you're saying but it's still got the feeling of something that gets installed by a refrigeration tech and forgotten about i guess but the the moment i just see that's that's exactly the crux of it i don't think this does get forgotten about because this is what the store manager comes in glances at is my fridges running why is that too warm and the moment it becomes part of like the standard operating procedures for a store it's at that level of visibility where corporate it is going to know about it and that to me makes it less forgivable that this happened No, I can dig that.

32:46Yeah, I absolutely get what you're saying. Now, look, just staying on IoT stuff is, oh, by the way, I went to that website and I did look and I saw, you know, that's how I saw what the form factor of the thing was. Their website for that device is all about how they're doing like, oh, it's really secure now and it's great and it uses HTTPS and it's like, oh, yeah, you guys, you know. But yes, they're definitely on the back foot because all of the messaging on that website is about security now. But staying with IoT, OT stuff, Booz Allen Hamilton has just put out a report where they looked at using AI to do sort of OT environment hacking.

33:25And they found that it could pivot around and, you know, do some interesting stuff. I don't think this is particularly crazy research or anything, but it is, I guess, noteworthy when a company like Booz Allen Hamilton is doing these sort of reports. I mean, my joke about this one is that, you know, maybe Booz Allen Hamilton contractors are going to wind up developing this as a capability for like Cyber Command or something. And we'll all get to find out about it because it's always their staff who leak all of these secret programs, right? Pull in a Snowden. Now, this one's great. Microsoft and friends have disrupted this huge Chinese language phishing kit ecosystem.

34:05system. Mark, let's hear from you on this. The store, like this was such a sophisticated marketplace. Like it's actually really impressive when you look at what this criminal organization built here. It's all been torn down now, but you know, wow, I got to say, I was, color me impressed. Phishing marketplace. We love to see it. And you can buy warmed up accounts. You can buy pre-built login pages for various services. They work very well. And one thing that I found interesting is that how were they selling warmed up accounts? And part of it was that they would go and buy domains from legit organizations that let the domains expire.

34:51or maybe they had some companies could go bankrupt and stop, but you can just recover the domain and use that to take over their Google workspace. You sign into Slack, you log into HR systems because everyone assumes you have ownership of the domain. And so that's been a pretty large attack surface. Yeah, and I'm guessing with Slack too, Like there's all of those like federated connected slacks and whatever, and it's going to get you into all sorts of interesting places. But yeah, it's good. It's good. Microsoft were able to shut that one down. We've got to whiz through the rest of these reasonably quickly.

35:34This one's interesting because the headline says, Feds crack down on North Korean IT worker schemes with new raids, charges and arrests. And you caught something interesting in this, James, which is the feds are touting that they got nearly 200 laptops during 40 raids. And you're like, well, hang on, that's only five laptops per raid. To which my joke here is, you know, this is less of a laptop farm, more of a laptop hobby farm by the looks of things, right? But yeah, the numbers here don't quite make sense, do they?

36:09James Wilson: They don't make sense from a like juice worth a squeeze sort of thing. but they do paint an interesting picture of, like, I wonder if this is intentional. Like, do the operations decentralize this for this exact reason, right? If they've got lots and lots of people running five or six laptops, that's going to be so hard to dismantle and disrupt that scale. It's almost like that's a resilience property built in. Maybe. I mean, I did say a while ago when we started seeing these raids that this was going to be the template for how the FBI tackled this issue, which is to just find anyone who's proxying those sort of connections.

36:44And, you know, so I think these sort of raids, they're just turning the handle on them these days. It's not like the FBI needs to work particularly hard on this stuff. No offense to the FBI people who are listening who are like, hey, man. But you know what I mean? It's not the first time they're doing this, right? So I don't know. It probably still is worth the squeeze, considering the harm that that stuff causes. What have we got here? We got a federal bankruptcy court in the United States its system, I think it was being run by BAE Systems. One of their systems got disrupted in some sort of hack, so that's been causing some drama.

37:22VK in Russia, which is, you know, VContact, which is their equivalent of Facebook, that's been having some trouble because, you know, their data center got blown up by the Ukrainians. So this is interesting, right, because we've seen the Yandex stuff getting blown up. Now we're seeing VContact stuff get blown up. and you know right on Q404 Media published a story saying data centers are war targets now I mean I think the Iranians proved that with some of their early attacks against like Amazon regions earlier this year but it is an interesting moment I think because we are seeing you know Tom Uren wrote an excellent edition of Seriously Risky Business about this last week there's some irony here in what's happening with Russia because they started hitting Ukrainian data centers.

38:08And Ukraine had already done a bunch of lift and shift into Azure, right? So it didn't really cause like an absolutely massive impact. So Ukraine in response started hitting their data centers and Russia's done a huge data sovereignty push, right? So they're trying to put all of this stuff in their own data centers. Yandex has only got six. Ukrainians hit three of them and stuff's been falling over left and right. So I do think the Ukrainians have proven that, you know, in a country where they're trying to really centralize their data and do this data sovereignty push, attacking those sort of centers can cause real problems.

38:45So I do find that interesting. Now, last week, I also, I wanted to follow up on this because last week I mentioned that, like, I had, you know, just it felt like a lot of Russian bots disappeared. When this Yandex thing happened, all of the data since says that nothing changed. You've got anecdotal reports, though, saying, well, Tucker Carlson's engagement on social media dropped by like 70%. We've seen that number pop up in a few spots. But then we're seeing people who claim to measure this stuff saying there was no difference. James, you said something on this, which I agree with, which is there's a disconnect between the data and the experience here.

39:24James Wilson: Yeah, like I'm not a heavy Twitter and Blue Sky user, but I honestly mistook Twitter or X for Blue Sky the other day when I was scrolling through just because it was such a materially different experience, right? Normally I go to Blue Sky when I want sensible commentary. It's not full of nonsense. But I was on Twitter and I was looking through the comments and it was relatively sane, which is just not the words you tend to use with an X or a Twitter feed. So, look, it's hard, right, because this is all data points of one with you and I sort of looking at our feeds. But something did happen. The experience is different.

39:57James Wilson: The data doesn't stack up. I mean, if you scroll back a month ago in the White House Twitter feed and scroll it, it's all like people cheering every announcement, every tweet. And now you look at it and it's just like hostile, man. Like I think the midterms are going to be interesting because it's downright hostile on X, which is a platform, you know, favored by conservatives in the United States. So just interesting. But, you know, Mark, I know you're unconvinced by this. I mean, it certainly feels to James and I that something changed here, but you're a skeptic. I haven't noticed anything, but admittedly, I don't look at the comments under the White House posts.

40:33You're missing out, man. That's where you got to go. That's where the good stuff is. I don't want to see it. But Cloudflare has an interesting blog post analyzing the index outage. and they did mention that most of the impact was search indexing that Yandex runs. They mentioned that the bots just migrated to other ASNs and there was a small drop in vuln scanning activity, but otherwise for bot activity, supposedly it was not noticeable. I mean, I think we're being the tinfoil hatters at the moment here, James, which is an unfamiliar position for us to be in, but there you go. Now, look, I just mentioned 404, their story about data centers.

41:13They published an absolute cracking yarn about a Chinese crime ring that hacked into a system at Staples in the United States and used their access to this system to mint 15 ,000 gift cards worth over$5 million. And then they sent their mules to go and buy all sorts of electronics and stuff from Staples. They sent them back to China to be sold for profit. I just love these really intricate scams that rely on hundreds of mules and whatever. We see it with ATM cash-out scams and whatever. It's just so much effort to go through. And I'm sure they made money, but wow, that's a lot of work involved in that.

41:55What else? Microsoft has dropped, patch Tuesday, 1 ,400 bugs. I just figured it was worth mentioning the number. But I wonder what sort of functionality it's going to break because it feels like we get Patch Tuesday now. And then the week after the Patch Tuesday news, we get all of the news about like, oh, people can't use their clipboard if they're running this software. Like this thing randomly crashes. And just the QA on patches, it's got too hard to both close the bugs and make sure that they're perfectly QA'd. Not throwing shade at Microsoft on that. I think everybody's in the same boat. So GitHub is expanding its malware advisories to eight package ecosystems.

42:36It was just doing this for NPM, right? So James, talk us through this one.

42:42James Wilson: Yeah, so it's come out from the Dependabot team within GitHub. And I put this under the category of good to see, right? Dependabot is a useful service. I get PRs every now and again, regularly, of things that need to be updated. And I probably wouldn't pay attention to them if it weren't for Dependabot. So it's a good service. Extending that to the other package ecosystems is great. Good to see it. But it's just, I don't think this materially changes the frequency or the problems being caused by supply chain attacks. Because by the time a depender bot PR reaches your repo to tell you that there's a malicious package in a given ecosystem, it's too late, right?

43:18James Wilson: Because they're getting picked up in the developer's workstation or in the CI workflow. So good, but don't rely on this to put a big dent in quelling supply chain attacks. Yeah. Yeah. Now, speaking of supply chain attacks, and I want to get your thoughts on this one, Mark. This looks like a pretty cool sort of supply chain-ish type of attack going through a ConnectWise backup app into Microsoft 365 tenants. and we all know once you're in a Microsoft 365 tenant you know it's you can actually swim downstream um into um you know an actual Windows network so it's just like good hacking uh here but walk us through this one mate like how did they how did they do this yeah so if you're an IT team and you want to back up like mailboxes data on OneDrive and SharePoint you can use tools and this one connects to your cloud has read access to all the data also has write access to be able to recover the data so inherently it's a tool that's in a privileged position now folks found that there was a login through that app that's installed but the login didn't come from one of azure's ip addresses came from an external one that's the first red flag and gaining access to the data was one issue.

44:35But in many environments, they found that the service gave itself global administrator and was able to add new credentials and access other applications on the tenant. That's a bit harder to explain. Don't think it generally needs this level of global admin on the tenant. But also in some cases, it was just like an old service that's no longer used. So another just problem of like not cleaning up things correctly. And one last interesting point I found that the Hunters team has a blog post on this and they said that some of the backdoors were attempted via Microsoft Graph or MS Cloud API and the Microsoft Graph directory reads, leave no audit records.

45:22So that's another thing that makes it harder to respond to. Yeah, yeah, that's not helpful, we would say, right? So what I'm guessing someone managed to grab like the authentication tokens or something from ConnectWise. Is that roughly how this would have gone, James?

45:39James Wilson: Yeah, it's not EuroAuth, as I understand it. This is like statically provisioned service principal accounts would have had an API token that was handed off to ConnectWise. But similar to Mark, when I looked at the reporting where it says, you know, the cloud management MS Teams granted itself, granted itself, global administrator. Yeah. I'm not an intro expert, but I don't think that's a good idea. Yeah, well, now I'm king of Australia now. Because I said so. Seems a bit like, yeah. I mean, it is a little bit of a blink moment when you see that in the write-up. There's over-provisioned, but then there's self-over-provisioning.

46:13James Wilson: That seems to have gone too far. Yeah. Now, we've got a report here about ad-fection. This is a CyberScoop write-up on some work at a Citizen Lab. And look, I find it really interesting. Basically, they're looking at this Israeli digital advertising company that looks like it manages to squeeze malicious ads into the major ad distribution networks like Google and whatever, which is, you know, cool and, you know, so far so normal, right? Like if you, sorry, I should take a step back for a moment, right? They are squeezing into these ad networks in order to deliver, you know, iOS malware to specific targets, right?

46:52So it's like a targeting platform. That's the allegation here is that this advertising network is used to distribute malware like Kandaru in a targeted way onto particular devices. So look, that part of it's really not surprising. What I do find interesting here, though, is that there is apparently this angle to it where this ad network looks like it is trying to de-anonymize people as well and sort of tie their online activity to identifiers like, you know, and selectors like phone numbers and whatever. I find that more concerning actually than a malware delivery network existing like this because like you just it's just something that's so totally expected.

47:33But the idea that SIGINT agencies or state-backed actors or their contractors are starting to really infiltrate the ad ecosystem in a widespread way to do really, let's be honest, a form of mass surveillance, that strikes me as being much more concerning than the malware delivery vector. James, what was your feeling on this one?

47:54James Wilson: I 100 % agree. I mean, this is an advertising industry, an industry that has a huge amount of money running through it that is wholly and solely geared towards knowing, understanding, triangulating, and predicting how to get the right message in front of the right person at the right time. And that's in the good case. But when that message is linked to a watering hole that has an exploit, it's no different. The technology can be used in all the same ways. And all the data that they collect to do advertising in a way that a consumer might expect is just as equally valuable to an adversary or an intelligence operator.

48:24it's real funny man i remember when the snowden leaks first happened talking to someone in the intelligence community who was big mad about the leaks being misrepresented at that time now this was very shortly after the leaks and just something they said to me struck me it stayed with me if we could do like a hundredth of what google does to violate people's privacy we would just have incredible insights like you know we are careful blah blah blah that was that that was the gist of what they said but you know that's what's crazy about this is like someone here is having a crack at like okay let's be google um and that's um i wonder you know it doesn't feel like something that would pass legal master in the u.s i don't know but it's look it's an interesting story it's linked through in this week's show notes people can go and read it um just going to run through these quickly there is a ivanti bug being exploited in the wild it is a chain of three bugs cissa is warning about that one.

49:23We also have a Beyond Trust IT support appliance Oday being exploited since August. It's being used by a group called Armory Castle. They apparently really know these Beyond Trust appliances quite well. Mandiant has seen them use custom malware for it and stuff. It's, you know, pretty interesting attack, but like, yeah, really like a Beyond Trust remote access appliance. Those words send a shiver up my spine. You're expecting problems immediately just with that sentence. I mentioned it earlier. Drupal has patched a critical RCE. Palo Alto Networks has just fixed a pan OS bug that's being exploited for root level code execution.

50:05Sounds like a good time, except for people who run pan technology. Eight US states are suing OpenAI over alleged harms to users. What I found interesting about that is I looked them up and all none of these states are democratic states right so one is arizona which is kind of a purple state i just think it's really interesting that you've got this republican president who's very pro ai and then you've got eight states that lean heavily republican um trying to trying to sue open ai right so the politics around ai at the moment are just fascinating uh to me uh there's been some sort of attack too that has halted work on a denmark to germany tunnel i only mention it because we love real world impacts.

50:46That's one for the slide decks for all those people preparing their PowerPoints out there. Yeah, ransomware groups are expanding their targeting of a Palo Alto network's vulnerability. Just crazy. So much going on. But the last thing I wanted to mention too is, you know, there's been this ongoing story about some activist in the United States who had his phone seized when he was crossing the border into the US. He's actually an American and had his device, they asked him for his device passcode and he put in a duress password and he was running graphene. So it nuked his device and he's been charged for that and could go to jail for five years.

51:23There's just been some interesting developments in this. And one of them is that they, they had actually marked him for device seizure because they knew he was crossing the border. So this to me says that these permissions that US authorities have to examine people's devices as they cross a border, are being abused. Because if you want to look at somebody's device, you should get a warrant. That's how this works. You shouldn't just abuse a customs authority to get a warrant-free look on someone's device. This happens regularly, and it's bad, and I really hope that prosecuting him for this backfires and we wind up with a precedent that cuts the other way.

52:04But again, people who want to check that one out can read it in this week's show notes. But that is it for this week's news segment. I think we've gone reasonably over time. It was a good time. James Wilson, Mark Coorey, thank you very much for joining me to talk through all of that. It was very, very interesting.

52:22James Wilson: Thank you. Thanks, Pat. What a week.

52:30That was James Wilson and Mark Coorey there with a check of the week's security news. Big thanks to them for that. It is time for this week's sponsor interview now. and this week's show is brought to you by Trail of Bits. And in this week's sponsor interview, Trail of Bits Principal Security Engineer Anish Naik joined James Wilson to talk through a bunch of work that Trail of Bits has done in cooperation with OpenAI. They are working together on the so-called Patch the Planet initiative and they have released two open source plugins, Patching Bugs and Regression Hunt. And that is what Anish Naik joined James Wilson to talk about.

53:13Enjoy.

53:14James Wilson: We're going to be releasing two plugins. One of them is called Patching Bugs and the other one is called Regression Hunt. Now, did marketing get involved in creating these names? No, it's all me. Because that sounds a lot like engineering, yeah. Yeah, this is exactly what it does. Yeah, we're literal people here. And yeah, it's effectively an amalgamation of what we've learned through over 60 different projects on Patch the Planet. And it's effectively looking at all the different PRs, every single PR that we've merged into an upstream repository, as well as looking through thousands of codex sessions of the engineers that were on these projects.

53:55James Wilson: And we said, okay, well, can we condense and distill this information into best practices that we can then provide to open source maintainers to deal with all the bugs that they are already facing and probably will continue to face in their different projects? Give us a sense of where does a developer actually use these? I mean, we've got the two plugins, patching bugs and regression hunt, but where in the lifecycle of actually fixing all these deluges of bugs do these actually get invoked by a developer? I want it to be as easy as you have a bunch of GitHub issues that have been opened by people out there looking to use your product or found bugs.

54:34James Wilson: And I'm hoping that people can just take these plugins, provide a list of PRs or commits or even issues and say, is this bug legitimate? If yes, come up with a minimal patch that solves the violated security invariant. And most importantly, let's check our homework. Let's make sure that we didn't introduce a bigger issue or an equally bad issue. Again, all from a security perspective. We want to make sure that whatever patch goes through does not make the system worse than before we started with the patch in the first place. And so that's sort of how I would like for people to use it. You throw them in, say, look at this commit, and then it goes from there.

55:16James Wilson: Which sounds, the framing is good, but you've almost oversimplified it in terms of why this such a problem because you know just even you mentioned sort of three steps there is this bug worth fixing how do we do the minimal amount of fix to fix it and then how do we make sure we haven't broken things those are not i guess i would say characteristics that are inherent to coding agents as we see them today right codex and uh well particularly codex wants to solve all the problems all the time and feels good when it's solved far more than you wanted to do And so just even the notion of knowing what to fix is not necessarily something that a model can do a good job with unless you nudge it in the right direction.

55:57How do you go about telling a model almost like,

56:01James Wilson: calm down, don't fix everything, don't fix every single problem you see, just do that initial triage. How do you nudge the model in that direction? Yeah, that's a great question. So the first thing I'll say is, I assume that the agent will get better. If I asked an agent to patch last year versus this year, Codex objectively has figured out that patching is not just writing the diff, but it's also testing it, not with just a unit test, but also let's try to do an integration test. So it knows that there's more to it. But, you know, so I'm going to assume that it gets better. And so what I wanted to do through this process is ask, what are the gaps between what our Trail of Bits engineers are doing?

56:45James Wilson: Like if I were to do it manually, these are the steps I would take. And so we looked again at the session data and the PR data and said, okay, well, it's really good at this stuff. But if I could just tell it to do a POC, I want user interaction. I want source to sync, right? I want to see where user flow data is going. And so, you know, the little nudges are use a POC. And so the entire, all the plugins are driven by live reproductions of the underlying bug or vulnerability on the actual system. So it's not just a unit test. Oh, I, you know, like a unit test to be like, oh, there's a bug and I have this unit test that shows the bug.

57:25James Wilson: It's like, here's the bug and I can show you how to get there through on a live deployment. And then the second component is with regression specifically, right? Like we don't want to introduce more issues is it's more important to tell the agent what a regression is not than what it actually is because a regression can be a thousand different things it could be a build compatibility issue a a performance consideration but what it's not is more important because that reduces that noise to help defenders at scale right like i want to if i have a patch i want to know quickly there's no issues or there's maybe one versus like 10 possible ones well now i went from one patch to 10 possible new bugs right that's what that's that's like the antithesis of the goal.

58:14James Wilson: And you can always find more regressions if you broaden the scope of what is a regression. And so I guess it's like, yeah, it's knowing how to define the regressions we care about, I guess is the important thing. But you know, what you mentioned there in terms of the patching bugs side of this, and we should say these are being released as open source plugins. And basically, as I understand it, these are skill files. Is that the right way to think about what this is? It's not like a harness or something, some new tool, it's going to integrate directly into what you're using. That is correct. They're very lightweight skill files.

58:48James Wilson: And so yeah, each plugin is like, I think, five to seven skills. And you can pick and choose which ones you want. So let's say you have a patching pipeline you're really happy with, you can just use parts of the regression hunter, and vice versa. So yes, they're just their skill files. Okay. And so, you know, the patching bugs work, right? Do the triage, is this worth fixing, come up with the minimal fix, I can see how a skill is super useful there, because it does, it governs these models that increasingly just want to run amok and give you 1 ,200 solutions for 500 bugs. But I want to push back a little bit on the notion of the regression hunting aspect of this, because we've got this ridiculous expectation that software should be stable, and yet it's so complex.

59:31James Wilson: And the way in which we have sought to improve the quality of software over time is with a lot of deterministic testing, unit testing, functional testing, integration testing, end-to-end testing. why would i want to throw a non-deterministic large language model into the process of ensuring i don't have regressions when really what i'm asking for is deterministically prove to me that my software will continue to operate the way it always has but now with this bug fixed right why why add an llm into this for regression testing totally i think i i'll answer in a few different components the first one is at the scale that we're dealing with bug reports for these different projects, you kind of have to meet that scale with something that also scales really well.

1:00:14James Wilson: And so like AI becomes this almost like natural provider. And more importantly, I think like there's a lot of effort that goes into using AI for adversarial work, building harnesses and all that stuff. But like, you know, it's good to find bugs. You want to find the bugs, but it's only good if you can like also fix them. And so I think a lot of the work that we do is try to arm defenders with this, you know, this solution to use it effectively. So I, you know, and I don't think it is, you know, the final, you know, the AI is going to perfectly, you know, fix your patches and maybe it will get there one day.

1:00:49James Wilson: But it's sort of like another kind of step in the middle of, okay, you have these, you know, 20 bugs, and you have 20 patches and the, you know, with the plugins, and, you know, hopefully you have some kind of a threat model or your own opinions about what your patches look like, you have a prioritization exercise of saying, hey, James, here's these 20 patches. I think you should fix probably these two or three because they're reachable from the user perspective. And so it's basically part of a prioritization exercise of you're dealing with so many. How do we get to something that's actionable quickly?

1:01:20James Wilson: And how do I empower open source maintainers that don't have a whole army or security team, like it's two or three people who are just passionate about it? How do they deal with the 100 bugs when they have 100 ,000 users across the globe. So it's a step in that direction. Yeah. And you mentioned also that there's a point in time aspect to this as well, right? Where last year, if you asked a model to patch a bug, you'd get a very different behavior and outcome. Today, I find Codex in particular is like, I fixed that bug and I found these three things along the way. Do you want me to fix those? And you say, yeah, go fix those.

1:01:56James Wilson: And then for each one of those, it's like, I fixed it and I found five things along the way. And it's like, you can sit there and use your entire token budget over and over again, just saying, yeah, okay, go fix all the things. And then your net result might be some, you know, god awful mess. But that's just the way they're operating right now. As you said, they're going to get better. How do you think about evolving these skills? Like, is this just something TrailerBits has said, look, we've learned this, here's something that's useful, have at it. Or do you want to keep evolving these and changing these over time?

1:02:25James Wilson: That's a great question. I think to the first point, I think a lot of it comes now to opinions and tastes, like how you guide these agents. I'm always going to assume they're going to get better. And it's about guiding them and telling them, this is what I want it to look like. So this is what I consider aggression. This is my threat model for my system. These are my patching guidelines. And so if you provide the opinion, you can guide the agent the way you want to outside of whatever it does in its own best practices. And then the most important thing for us is these plugins are live things. We already use these every day in our new wave of patch the planet projects.

1:03:04James Wilson: And I am actively collecting all that trace data from all the engineers. And I would love to get feedback from maintainers and open source project owners. And I want to collect all that. And I want to make it better because I do think that defense of patching is not the most fun thing. Obviously, it's better to find RCE, but someone's got to fix them. And I think fixing them is more important. And so yeah, we're hoping to have a really good feedback loop where these plugins get better over time. All right. All of this makes a lot of sense. I'm actually excited to try it out myself. So where do folks find this?

1:03:38James Wilson: How do they get on board? For sure. So these plugins are open source public. You can find them at github.com slash trail of bits slash skills. Outside of these plugins, we also have obviously a lot more. And again, we do really care about this a lot. Please provide your feedback as a pull request, as an issue. I'm going to try to incorporate it as much as quickly as possible to make sure that everyone in the open source world has access to try to deal with this pertinent problem effectively. All right. It sounds awesome, mate. Thank you so much for dropping by for a chat. Awesome. Thanks, James.

1:04:15James Wilson: Appreciate it. That was Anish Naik of Trail of Bits there, joining James Wilson to talk about a bunch of the work that they've been doing with OpenAI. We're going to wrap it up there, though. That is it for this week's show. I do hope you enjoyed it. I'll be back soon with more security news and analysis. But until then, I've been Patrick Gray. Thanks for listening.

1:04:45Thank you.