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Semi Doped

9 Nov 2026 · 57m · 22 chapters

Episode artwork

Intel's Earnings Disaster: Bad Luck, Bad Planning, or Both?

In short

Intel’s stock plunge after earnings, despite “good” quarterly results, driven by weak guidance. Hosts debate whether the miss is bad luck (supply disruptions) or bad planning (misaligned production and capacity).

Guest backgrounds

Austin Lines (Chipstrat newsletter writer for institutional investors/tech executives) and Vic Shaker (founder of Semi Exponent; works with institutional clients on semis/investing; writes a Substack).

Key claims

PC/client demand weakened because DRAM/memory prices rose due to AI-driven memory scarcity, leading OEM/channel inventory buildup. Intel expected to redirect wafers to server CPUs, but advanced packaging substrates (EMIB/IO die integration) were constrained. A tragic Fab 28 Israel explosion (gas leak; two deaths) disrupted IO die supply, with potential $300M+ damages/impact.

Notable examples

CFO said client revenue held by price increases, not volume. Discussion of Intel chiplet nodes (Intel 3/7/18A) and substrate bottlenecks; mention of agentic AI CPU demand and the “foundry 2030” thesis (14A/18A).

Written by AI. May contain mistakes.

Chapters

0:45

Setting the Stage for Intel's Earnings

An overview of Intel's recent performance and market expectations.

“And I also write a sub stack called Vic's Newsletter.”
3:59

Understanding Intel's Weakness in the PC Market

Discussion on the decline of the PC segment and its impacts on Intel.

“It was like the dumbest thing I've ever heard.”
8:12

Intel's Market Challenges and Missteps

Exploration of Intel's strategic errors and market challenges regarding memory demand.

“click through and make sure you claim that five dollars give it a try and support us back to the show.”
10:10

Analyzing Intel's Client Segment Performance

Deep dive into Intel's client segment performance and internal coordination issues.

“ships because I have all of this quarters that I still haven't sold yet.”
14:00

Analyzing Intel's Client and Server Teams

Discussion on Intel's internal teams and their decision-making during a chip supply crisis.

“So you could ask yourself as a client team, what should we do?”
17:20

Earnings Call Insights

Insights gained from Intel's earnings call, highlighting discrepancies in expectations.

“was when it basically was, hey, we've got 18A is doing great.”
18:40

Challenges in Chip Production

Exploration of production challenges, including wafer supply and substrate issues.

“So broadly speaking, I like that we're going through each reason in depth because I think one step leads to another and this is a good way to progress through what exactly happened.”
21:00

Advanced Packaging and Production Nuances

Discussion on the complexities of modern chip design and the role of advanced packaging.

“Now we're in an era where the cost, obviously the cost of every new node is way more expensive.”
24:10

Impact of Fab Explosion on Supply Chain

Analysis of how a recent explosion at Intel's fab affected their supply chain and production.

“all of our server supply because everyone is depending on this node.”
27:50

Decisions Following the Explosion

Discussion on the decision-making process following the fab explosion and its implications.

Show all 22 chapters
28:00

Assessing Intel's Strategic Decisions Post-Accident

Learn about the implications of Intel's prioritization of external customers in light of a recent accident.

“But now the question is, when we have this terrible accident and we have to decide what to do, does Lit Boutan prioritize, and Naga, do they prioritize external foundry customers or do they prioritize Intel?”
30:00

Long-Term Vision vs. Short-Term Challenges

Explore the contrast between Intel's long-term foundry strategy and its current challenges in the CPU market.

“Qualcomm chips, stuff gets made at Intel Foundry.”
31:21

Challenges in the CPU Market and Supply Constraints

Understand the impact of supply constraints and market dynamics on Intel's CPU production.

“But before I get there, I'll just pause and say, yes, I think it was a miss that this was an opportunity to make foundries look like it's still making the right decisions in light of hard things that are happening.”
33:15

Navigating Process Node Limitations and Design Challenges

Learn how different process nodes affect Intel's ability to respond to market demands.

“Like how much money are you going to make in the next three months, next six months?”
35:59

Strategic Planning for Future Demand

Discuss potential strategic shifts Intel could have made to better align with market demands.

“the fab equipment from 18A and go use that to bring up more Intel 3 capacity.”
37:58

The Interconnectedness of CPU and Memory Supply

Examine the relationship between CPU demand and memory supply in the tech market.

“But Mike, going back to like, what should Lipboot have done?”
42:04

Intel's Supply Chain Challenges

Analyzing Intel's supply chain issues and the need for strategic investments.

“We were short of memory last year, actually.”
45:30

Future Prospects for Intel's Technology

Discussing the potential future of Intel's technology and chip manufacturing.

“So we need to get better at validating our customers' forecasts.”
46:41

Intel's Custom Chip Potential

Exploring Intel's capabilities in producing custom chips and ARM processors.

“As far as I can tell, it's in high demand as well for mostly mobile applications.”
50:29

Lessons Learned from Intel's Situation

Key lessons and observations drawn from Intel's current challenges and market dynamics.

“Hopefully maybe in the next couple quarters we could get some more good news of other people taking even TSMC tiles but having them packaged in the United States.”
56:01

Challenges Facing Intel's Business

Explore the complexities Intel faces with its diverse business segments.

“they've got a server business and a client business that are very different in elasticity.”
56:25

Engagement and Audience Thoughts

The hosts invite listener feedback and insights on Intel's performance.

“In the meantime, here we are, and we're here on SemiDoped, and thank you for listening and following along with us.”
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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00Recently, Intel had its worst day on the market since 1971. The stock was down about 30%. Although the quarter was really good, and the problem is the guide was bad. There's been a lot of discussion about Intel, and we took a few days to discuss the news and digest it. And today we get into it and discuss what happened and what it really means.

0:28All right. Hello, everyone. Welcome to another Semi-Doped episode. I'm Austin Lines of Chipstrat. I write a newsletter for institutional investors and technology executives. Hey, I'm Vic Shaker, and I'm the founder of Semi Exponent, where I work with institutional clients on semis and investing. And I also write a sub stack called Vic's Newsletter. All right, Vic. So today we are talking Intel. Obviously, everyone's talking Intel. I was just looking up the stock. So we're recording this Tuesday, November 3rd. Everyone's voting today or everyone already voted. But in the United States, it's a big day for voting.

1:04But here we are. We're talking Intel. Right now I'm looking at the stock. It's down 35 % since the earnings call. So that is why we are talking Intel. You and I have talked a lot about it, have a lot of thoughts. We're going to get into that today. So I'll throw it over to you to set the stage. Yeah, so Intel was quite the recovery story that everybody expected because they had a leadership change like some time back. Lip Kutan became CEO and everybody was optimistic that they're going to make a comeback in the foundry business. And that is very important for the United States because Intel is a leading-edge foundry, and the world needs an alternative to TSMC.

1:52And especially if it's United States-based, it's a perfect win-win situation for US companies. So that was the expectation. And the stock ran up recently from like$40 all the way to, I don't know,$120,$130, I think. So there was a lot of expectation and stuff. And things were looking okay for quite some time. Intel has their substrate business where they make advanced packaging through EMIB, which is embedded multi-die interconnect bridge, which is the way you connect a couple of chiplets together is through this technology called EMIB. And the world needs an alternative to TSMC's COOS as well, like chip on wafer on substrate.

2:43So Intel was perfectly poised for advanced packaging. And then a couple of quarters ago, they were also really well poised for CPUs because agentic AI became a thing and who else could make CPUs than Intel? They've done it for like 50 plus years. So it's a perfect position to be in and expectations were running high. After the earnings call, even though the numbers were pretty good, the data center segment is growing really, really well. but then you know what happened was that their guide for the future quarters to come was kind of dim and the tone was subdued and there were good reasons why you know Intel ended up in this situation which we will get into in quite some depth but I just want to list out the three reasons that Intel's guide didn't pan out and the investors were disappointed.

3:42And then we'll debate them. Yeah, we'll go through each one and we'll see what that actually means and how we got here. But the first one is that the PC segment has become very weak. And that's primarily because of the memory price increases. you know data centers are sucking up all the memory there is no memory left for you know regular pc consumers to use anymore so much so that i don't know austin if you followed this but sam altman there was this like you know he said on this cheeky pint podcast that people are wasting ram on their home pcs it's like idle 95 of the time you know it's probably better if we had it for data centers or something like that.

4:32And there was like this entire... Yeah, I was shaking my head because I was like, dude, it's an interesting argument to ask where should the incremental RAM go, like net new, but to be like, oh yeah, we're just wasting all this RAM in our laptops and our desktops and our phones. It was like the dumbest thing I've ever heard. I'm sorry, this is like a little of a tangent, but it's like totally worth it. you know there's all these memes around this like about how you know ways to get trap sam altman you know there's like people have put like dram chips like candy and then at the end of it there's like a box with propped up with a stick you know so you can trap sam altman when he comes run comes to pick up dram chips you know so many funny things happening anyway apart from all the fun and jokes uh it's just that there is not enough dram to go around for like computers anyway so So because of that, memory is very expensive.

5:30And so basically Intel just passed on all the costs to the customer. And what ended up happening was like the demand petered out. Okay, like it's just, that's about it. Like nobody wants to buy PCs. They're like, I've got, I'm happy with what I have. Either it's enterprise or like, you know, consumers like us, we're like, yeah, it's fine. My PC is fine. I can't buy computers at like a premium right now. I just stick to what I have. So that segment has been slowing down. It's a very elastic market, as everyone knows, especially consumers, of course. If you were maybe thinking about a new computer, obviously if it's$500 more or$1 ,000 more, you're totally not going to buy it.

6:10I think enterprise is surprisingly elastic as well. So yes, you've had your laptop for three years and it's slow and we want you to be as productive as possible. But if it's going to cost an extra$500 ,000 a person times all the people in your company who are up for a refresh, they're just going to push it back. So it's very elastic. This episode of Semi-Doped is presented by Crusoe, where you can fine-tune and serve open models without managing a single GPU. When we sat down with Crusoe's serverless fine-tuning product team, we asked the question every AI user wonders, what will you do with my data?

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8:18Shouldn't Intel have seen this coming? How long have we known that memory prices are skyrocketing due to AI? And that obviously the same three memory companies that have memory wafers that make DRAM that get used for HBM, stack DRAM, and also for DRAM, it's the same wafers that are making DRAM for consumers. And like, you know, shouldn't we have all foreseen this, haven't we all foreseen this for a long time. Specifically, if you look at Intel's, you know, quarterly earnings calls a year ago, October 23rd, 2025, there was no memory warning back then. I think they just said something like, hey, we're prudently preparing for another year of strong demand in 2026.

9:04So, you know, one question is like, why did they not call it out then. In January 22 of 2026, we got the first warning in the earnings call where Intel said, industry-wide supply for key components like DRAM, NAND, and substrates has come under increasing pressure due to intense demand to support the rapid expansion of AI infrastructure. So benefit of the doubt, okay, January of 2026, you saw the substrate thing coming, you saw the DRAM thing coming. So how did we get to where we are now? And I'll let you continue on of, oh, and I think, you know, maybe I buried the lead here a little bit, but oh, um, we made, we, we are trying to, we produced a lot of, uh, laptop and desktop chips, client chips for PCs that aren't going to sell.

9:57And so our OEMs were kind of, the channel's being stuffed essentially. And that's part of why the guide is going to be down is because they're going to sit on all this inventory that's not selling right now because the demand is elastic and consumers don't want it. And therefore next quarter, the OEMs are going to be like, wait, I don't need any more client ships because I have all of this quarters that I still haven't sold yet. Yeah, so that's the whole problem. I was reviewing the earnings calls from the last one to what they said now, and I was trying to understand where things went wrong. And I'm writing an article on the Substack that goes into some of this stuff in more detail.

10:30But essentially, you know the story is i didn't go too far back i just wanted to see like everything was reasonably upbeat last earnings call but like what's what's happened now so the the whole story is that the if you see the last earnings call q2 you know what we just had was q3 the q2 earnings call um you know one at the analyst asked the the cfo basically what do you see happening here because you say your client segment actually grew in revenue. Did that revenue grow because you actually sold more parts or did you increase the chip prices and then make more money? So the CFO replied and said, yeah, we sold the same number of chips, but we may increase the price of each chip.

11:19And then the analyst goes, hey, what are you going to do for the second half of this year? You know, this is already slowing down. You know, we can see this in Q2. What's your plan for Q3 and Q4? You think, can you sell it at this price, essentially? And the CFO's response was like, yeah, yeah, yeah. We know that demand is going to be soft. So, you know, there's one point to take note of. In Q2, definitely they knew that demand is going to be soft. It's in the earnings call. You can go read it. But the explanation for why things are going to be A-OK is because they were like, oh, we can't make, you know, like it's a good thing that there's no demand for client-side chips because we don't have enough, you know, supply anyway.

12:08Like we are not able to make chips fast enough anyway. So it's a good thing, quote unquote, good thing that client is like weakening. Now we can take all those wafers and build server CPUs with them, which is amazing because everybody wants server CPUs for agentic AI. So it was actually framed as a, don't worry about it if the client is weak. We'll sell more server CPUs and make up the shortfall. Everything's good. But that actually didn't happen. So that's a different story we'll get to. But yeah. Yes, yes. I'm realizing that I kind of interrupted you. You were setting at a high level like the three things that sort of went wrong, right?

12:48You were talking about client and how that was very weak. And then I think that I jumped in and went down the rabbit hole right there because that was to me like the most shocking thing, which is back to your point, like, okay, Intel is an integrated device manufacturer, meaning they have their own foundry. And so they should be able to have tight coordination between their product planning group and their foundry team. Now, of course, their foundry is also working on becoming an external foundry and serving external customers. But even internally, there should be a very tight conversation between the planning groups.

13:29The client team should have stood up. You would think that they would have stood up a year ago and said, guys, memory prices are really high. We're trying to pass it on. Right now, some people are still buying, but our volumes are going down, even if the prices are high. So our revenue looks fine, but volumes are going to be soft and they're going to be soft for the foreseeable future. Because like, come on, every time you and I talk about memory on here, we talk about like, this is not going to go away until 2028 when more supply comes online. And I think even then you can make the argument because of data center AI that it's continuing to increase as models continue to get better.

14:05Agentic AI gets more useful. MetaMuse is spinning up CPU VMs in the cloud and, you know, running all this AI, we're probably not going to get to a point where everything just, even in 2028, it's just like, oh, hunky-dory, like we have all the memory supply we need. So you could ask yourself as a client team, what should we do? And the answer has to be, you know, well, we should be pretty conservative and we should not overproduce chips here, even though, you know, their client team is pretty strong and they sell, I've got a Dell XPS that has 18A in it. which is pretty awesome. It's a great chip and everything.

14:43And I paid a lot for it. So, you know, it wasn't cheap. So they made some money there. Thank you. Thank you. Bolestering some sales for Intel. Yeah, totally. Now, but this is where the internal advantage of having a client team, having a server team, and having a foundry, like the client team would raise their hand and say like, guys, it's not going to like help our metrics, but we want to take one for the team. We think things are going to be soft. let's be a little conservative here and let's give those wafers to the CPU team, which would have been perfect, you know, if they stand up and say that a year ago, because in the CPU team, the server team could say, great, our life has been really hard for many years now.

15:23A &D is as competitive as ever in server CPUs. They've got this high core count product that's really popular. Agentic AI is coming, you know, maybe they couldn't have even seen it back in October of 2025. It was a little bit before like, like the agentic stuff really took off. That was more of like the January 2026 call. But already lots of x86 CPUs were being used for head nodes. And so they could have said, amazing. And by the way, ARM chips have been pressuring in the server, in the data center, pressuring Intel as well. And it would have been like, my goodness, this is like divine intervention.

15:58We've got this huge thing happening where agentic AI, we need all these CPUs. This is perfect. Give us all of your wafers. Let's plan accordingly. And let's sell as many wafers as we can. Yes, it might hurt our client business a little bit, but we're going to make a ton of money in data center. Data center demand is inelastic to some extent, and therefore we'll sell everything we can make. If it's made on Intel 7, Intel 3, Intel 18A, when that comes for data center, we're going to sell it all. We'll be able to charge a lot. Let's go all in on that. And then the foundry could have said, great guys, we're all on the same team.

16:31We're going to take these wafers here. We're going to give them over there. And by the way, we still need to have enough wafers for our external customers because really that is the long-term story for Intel. That is the true growth potential for Intel. The 2030 story is Foundry. So Foundry obviously could look at this opportunity and be like, I want to give as many wafers as possible to the server team, but we do not want to screw our customers that we've worked so hard to convince them 18AP is great. 14A is coming. It's going to be awesome. Trust us. You know, it would be the opposite of what Intel wants to do to be like, but except we're giving all of our wafers to Intel Server Group because we've got this once in a lifetime thing with a genetic AI, right?

17:15So all of this conversation could have happened. And so I think that's really what shocked people on the call was when it basically was, hey, we've got 18A is doing great. Austin likes his Dell XPS. We've actually got too much of that. And by the way, we don't have enough server CPUs still. So this is a big company. I have never seen a big company like that work in concert across its product lines. It's a sad manifestation of companies that really become large. They kind of fail to work their different business parts in unison sometimes. So maybe it's an execution thing. Speaking of execution, there was one thing I was also comparing is basically like Intel 3 yields and cycle times for these wafers, which is basically how long it takes to get wafers through the fab, you know, from start to finish.

18:09In the Q2 earnings call, it was like, oh, yeah, it's exceeding our expectations. Literally, that was what was on the call. And then this time, you can hear Liput and say, yeah, yeah, it's a concern. He didn't say it's a concern. He said, cycle times are good and yield is good, but I am demanding exceptional execution from the team. I'm like, wait, I thought everybody was doing fine. Why do you have to go about demanding execution from them? Like, are they not doing well now? So, but yeah, yeah. So broadly speaking, I like that we're going through each reason in depth because I think one step leads to another and this is a good way to progress through what exactly happened.

18:56So it's a good thing that we break down reason number one, which is the weakness in the PC segment so much because the idea was that you just shift over wafer supply over to the other side. But when we get to the second point, I'm going to argue that maybe it wasn't an execution thing. Maybe they had no choice. And the reason I say that is because you can make as many server CPU core chips as you want to. Maybe you divert Intel 3 wafers away from client CPUs and you go make server CPUs with them. Great, you've got like a Xeon 6 processor in your hands. Now, the question is what happens after that?

19:39And this is where like so many other problems came and haunted Intel. All at the same time, it was like when it rains, it pours kind of thing. So the second reason, I think it's a good segue into the second reason. See, whenever these chips are made, they're useless by themselves. Like this piece of silicon is basically useless, right? you have got to put it with other chiplets that have other functions like io die is a chiplet that is not made on intel 3 it is made on intel 7 intel 10 whatever so those chiplets have to be integrated with the core die which is built on intel 3 now how do they how are they integrated you know now you need advanced packaging you know and that's that's the whole problem so even if they had directed all their wafers to Intel 3 and made Xeon 6 server CPUs out of them, there are just not enough substrates.

20:31And this is Intel's reason number two for all their problems. The industry is severely constrained on substrates, and we can cover what these substrates are, but they can't make server CPUs without these substrates. So what do you say to that now? Yes, yes. Okay, good. This is a great nuance. So the first nuance you hit, which I think is very important, and we should debate whether intel should have gone into this level of detail to explain the miss um or not but it used to be in a monolithic era um maybe back like 2021 and earlier where intel would just make the entire server cpu soc on the same node um so you know intel 10 nanometers or even of course back in like the 22 nanometer day 32 nanometer 45 nanometer and so on let's just use all the same size transistors, whether it's IO, CPU, GPU, memory controller, what have you.

21:26Now we're in an era where the cost, obviously the cost of every new node is way more expensive. Transistors aren't necessarily getting cheaper even as they're shrinking. So transistors are pretty expensive. And so for a variety of reasons, it's cost effective to say, hey, which by the way, all this io doesn't necessarily a cpu of course you want your these high performance part these digital logic parts you want the smallest transistors you can you want as many transistors as possible like you definitely get the performance game from moving to the next node some things like io um you might not actually get as much benefit out of going to that next node so hey keep it on intel 7 that is the right thing to do strategically that is correct so this is the chiplets so the disaggregated design, the tiles.

22:17Okay, we're going to make our beefiest parts on the latest and greatest node, 18A or 3 or whatever, and we'll keep some of the other stuff on the old nodes. And by the way, maybe those fabs have been like amortized or we're helping amortize them over more and more chips because every CPU we make is using its base nodes on, you know, 3 and maybe had the IO die on 7. So this is strategically good, strategically correct. And Intel has been able to do this for three, four, five years now. And partially because they have really great advanced packaging and they have EMIB and that's how they tie this stuff together.

22:49We had that nice conversation with Ravi recently from Intel talking about EMIB. So all of this is strategically correct. The one nuance, and I never thought about this, is now it means that every CPU that Intel wants to make and sell, whether it's going to be their future one on 18A or on three or on seven, they all depend, for example, on Intel seven, or they, a lot of them depend on Intel three, they might have several process nodes. And so now there's this interdependency where it's not like, oh, there was a, and we, we would be remiss not to mention, and people following closely know this that there was a very, very tragic accident at Fab.

23:31I think it was Fab 28 in Israel and there was an explosion and that impacted some of their supply. And this has ripple effects because now it means that, sure, maybe I have my dyes from Intel 7 or Intel 3 or whatever, but I'm missing other parts. And so I don't even have all the pieces to stitch them together, even if I had the substrates. So that is one interesting nuance and complication. I think there would have been opportunity to explain that story concisely in a way to show people that, hey, it's complicated. We had this tragic accident. It actually has a ripple effect and it actually impacts like all of our server supply because everyone is depending on this node.

24:18But then to your point, Then there's the whole substrate problem, which is, yes, even if we have all of these tiles and even if we didn't have that accident, the question is, can we get the substrate so that we can tie this all together? To that, I would say the same thing that I would say with memory, which is the substrate issue is not a new issue. so the question is what's going on with the planning team and where when substrates started become a problem where did intel because if we know this and can explain it obviously everyone inside intel knows the complexities and can explain it and again you would have to ask shouldn't people raise their hand and say we're not going to get enough memory we're not getting enough supplies we're not gonna get enough dram okay everyone let's sit in a room and let's plan all of this out it's complicated but we're going to war room we're going to sit down for a week and heads of every team are going to get together, we're going to figure this out.

25:11Yeah, that was exactly the conundrum I think Intel faced in the last few months. And the reason number three was actually the explosion, and you covered it nicely. And that's why I said we should go in a logical order here. Because reason number two, which is advanced packaging problems, no substrate supply, leads to the fact that, you know, the Fab 28 in Israel blew up because of a gas leak, two people actually died. So this is like really tragic stuff. And those were running input-output die, which is what we've been referring to as IO die. And if you can't get them, you can't piece together the CPU anyway.

25:52But then the argument against that is that, look, it's not the only 10 nanometer class fab they have. I think they have at least four more fabs that are 10 nanometer class. So could they not source the IO die from those fabs, you know, is one question. But then for them, this explosion actually happened only in October. Right? Like, it's literally a few weeks ago. So it's still very early for them to make those kinds of transitions. It's not like you can switch things over in a day. Like, frankly, Intel has been known to copy exactly, which means they try to copy fabs exactly the same so that, you know, they all can be like fungible between each other.

26:36But then as much as you do it and try to make it exactly the same, transferring one product from one fab to another is always more challenging than it seems on the outside. Because there are differences. You have to make sure that the product is still fine. So you might have to go through a qualification process. Like just because you change fabs and they're both 10 nanometer fabs doesn't mean they have to work the same. And you've got to check that they work the same. So there's some work involved. So things have been so recent that I think they will recover from the supply issue of the 10 nanometer IO dye chiplet supply issue.

27:12Because they're going to probably transfer it to somewhere else. Or they will restart FAB28 and things will go on as usual. And they'll hopefully solve whatever caused that explosion. So that problem will be fixed. But anyway, they have lost$300 million just from that explosion. and that's for this quarter they expect another 300 million damages opportunity cost, however you put it I don't exactly know how in the next quarter and more I mean 300 plus and nobody knows the exact extent of the damage because it's been like so recent, I'm not sure how long this will proceed, there's no reason to believe that it's 600 million dollars and done if it goes to 700 or 800 I'm not surprised at all right so here is probably a missed opportunity as well which is hey by the way yeah this happened at the start of october so we were two months in so the first two months should have been fine um so there's a question of how much of some of the server cpu supply miss is directly attributable to this versus just, you know, poor planning.

28:27But now the question is, when we have this terrible accident and we have to decide what to do, does Lit Boutan prioritize, and Naga, do they prioritize external foundry customers or do they prioritize Intel? And the opportunity would have been to get on the call and say, we had this terrible thing. We're dealing with it. In the meantime, we're doing everything we can to prioritize our external foundry customers first ahead of Intel products team. That would be a very tough decision. That would be the right decision. I think that that's what LitBoo is doing, prioritizing external customers. You got to take credit for that.

29:05You got to say that publicly. And then that, to me, that is a better explanation for the miss. It's not just like it was mismanaged or we're not going to give you enough details to say what went wrong. We'll just say, oh, it was a substrate supply and this terrible accident. No, get on and say this accident happened. It was terrible. and we had to prioritize external customers, but that is a long-term deposit in the customer trust bank account and it had a short-term financial impact, but we want to bet long-term on our customers. So I think there could have been an opportunity to somehow spin it and show us that, hey, it was a bad accident.

29:41They're trying to do the most of it, but that their culture and their prioritization is right. And therefore you should continue to believe in the long-term thesis of Intel. Why did Intel go from$30 to$140 within one year? It's because of the Foundry story. Because like you said, Trump's a backer. NVIDIA is investing. People are saying, dude, I think Trump's going to make sure that NVIDIA chips, Apple chips, Qualcomm chips, stuff gets made at Intel Foundry. And then meanwhile, we see 14A. There's finally CapEx purchases. Ohio's coming back online. Intel is in a tough position as a Foundry because they can't announce their customers.

30:18It's up to the customers to announce, I'm going to use 14A. Obviously, there's the whole dynamic of everyone else is using TSMC and you don't want to make TSMC mad. And Intel Foundry does definitely not want to get between a customer and TSMC. So you just have to trust it. But when you see Intel investing in tooling and CapEx, it's like, oh, good. That's because it's for 14A. And when you see the WFE, Wafer Fab Equipment Company, is doing well and you can kind of deduce like, oh, this is coming from Intel. Like that's the 2030 story, the 2030 trajectory. So even the short-term miss could have been framed in terms of the long-term story saying, we made it, we had a miss.

30:56It's going to impact product team in the short term, but the long-term thesis is still intact. You know, and, and again, by the way, on this call, everything I heard and I'm thinking about with Foundry is still good other than this capacity thing, which I think there's a question that we could get into in a second, which is, is it the product team? Is it the foundry team? Ultimately, it's LitBoo who's responsible for some of these capacity misses, but should we be concerned about Intel as an external foundry? But before I get there, I'll just pause and say, yes, I think it was a miss that this was an opportunity to make foundries look like it's still making the right decisions in light of hard things that are happening.

31:37Yeah, that was not mentioned at all. That's a good point. You know, Intel internally is in a hard place, right? Their CPU client, the PC market is slowing down. It's going to go down 20 % or more just in the next quarter and probably 12 % down all of 2026. And then the outlook for 2027 isn't any better. Like the memory supply is not going to get better in 2027 and everything is going to still be constrained in the mobile markets and the PC markets. And everybody knows this. now substrates are of short supply and Intel has been trying to get prepayments and supply commitments from the Japanese substrate makers like Ibidin or Unimicron and there are a few of them like AT &S all these people can make these substrates but they're making the investments so it takes time for substrate supply to come back up so it puts them in a hard place think about it from Intel's point of view they are they don't have the ability to sell into pc market because memory is wrecking everything they don't they can't make server cpus even though the demand is amazing because apart from the like the plant blowing up thing and you know the supply of 10 nanometer being disrupted a little bit which i'm sure they'll recover the bigger problem is subsets not going to be you know come online so so what product do you make as intel like what do you do all you have to give them is investors is like, look, we're focusing on the foundry business.

33:09We don't have any like solid people announcing, but trust us, bro. We've got customers who are waiting to tape out. It's not a strong story. Do you know what I'm saying? Like, where is your current story? Like how much money are you going to make in the next three months, next six months? The Intel foundry story is a good one. But like you say, it's a 2030 story. You can't sell it to anybody in the next two, three months or six months. Right, and this is the problem with not planning well in advance, which is, and maybe for listeners, you might say, oh, Intel doesn't have enough Intel 3 supply or they've got lots of extra 18A because they're actually ramping yields quicker on 18A than they expected and the PC's down.

33:53And right now, all of 18A has been only used to make client CPUs. Can't they just quickly use that 18A to make server CPUs? Well, you know, and I'm sure people know this, but just as a reminder, like there are different chips that are designed for the different process nodes. So Sapphire Rapids and Emeril Rapids are these server CPUs that were designed for Intel 7. And by the way, let me look at my notes. So the Rapids chips, anything with the Rapids on it is a server CPU with the performance cores, a P core. So think like beefy, probably good in a head node, good in your data center for memory, like heavy, like big databases that need lots of memory, that kind of thing.

34:36That's Rapids. If it ends in forest, it's a server CPU with a lot of efficient cores. So this could be good for like agentic CPUs, for example, or just for like traditional serving APIs and that kind of thing. um so so um back to what i was saying was like sapphire rapids emerald rapids those are on intel 7 so if you're like oh no we had this uh tragic accident we can't get enough intel 7 you can't just pick up those designs and be like oh put that on 18a or something like no it was designed for an older process node of course then you've got sierra forest designed for intel 3 granite rapids designed for intel 3 clear water forest designed for 18a so if there's lots of extra um 18a capacity, you can't just immediately go, oh, pull Clearwater Forest forward because, yes, that chip has been designed, but there's obviously validation, testing, ramping it, that kind of thing.

35:29So it's not so simple to just like, you can't grab CPUs and just kind of print them wherever you want. So the only, about the only thing that Intel can do right now is say, oh, can we take some of our tools from, if we are able to, if, what was the term they used that, 18A is underloaded. It can make this many chips, but we're not going to make that many chips, even though it can. You can't move a design over to 18A. The only thing you can do is take the fab equipment from 18A and go use that to bring up more Intel 3 capacity. So tools that do etching and deposition that, and you know, um, yeah, that, that kind of stuff.

36:14I buy that in theory, but you know, it normally that would take its own sweet time one. It does. It does. That is the problem. That is a problem. The second thing is that if you've got all these machines hooked up and they're, you know, currently being used to improve the yield of 18A, which is a very important thing because this is the competitor to TSMC's two nanometer technology, you don't want to stop that train from moving and go backwards by taking away equipment from 18A. That is, like you say, the 2030 story has to remain because the world needs a foundry alternative to TSMC's two nanometer and 18A is critical to that.

36:57So strategically, maybe that's not the best idea to do, to take away 18A. So yes, to your point, you know, 18AP is really the node that externally will be used. So maybe if it was like only for 18A, they could move some of it. But to your point, you do not want to rob Peter to pay Paul. You don't want to pull away from the future of the company and what the external foundry is riding on just to make some of these old chips to sell right now, right? So this is where they are. And these are some of the decisions they're making. But again, you would have rather seen this and predicted this stuff six months ago and had a backup plan so that you didn't have to move tools around.

37:37Yeah, yeah. So I'm trying to think about, you know, maybe this is like an open brainstorm session for us. What could Intel have done? Like literally, like everybody has opinions on like, oh, look how badly they did. Or look how they poorly executed it. Why didn't they look this in advance? I mean, I've seen many online discussions around these things too. But Mike, going back to like, what should Lipboot have done? Right, here's what I... Okay, you go. The one possible outcome I could think of is if a year ago they made a decision to say, hey, October of 2026, there's a lot of stuff they couldn't have foreseen.

38:19But even if they waited until back in January when agentic stuff was taking off and you could say, holy crap, this is gonna use a lot of CPUs. what if in October 26 instead of having too much client and not enough server what if they made a bet to have too much server and not enough client what if they would have reprioritized things then and said let's err on the side of having too many server cpus and not enough client what what would have happened well if client would have would client is obviously very soft so they would have ended up fine server is very strong they would have sold it all I think they'd have been totally fine.

38:55But even if client wasn't to sell the client down 20 % this quarter, and they thought it was only going to be down 10%, um, and, and servers crazy hot. And even if that wouldn't have been quite as hot, I think investors would have given them the benefit of the doubt of saying like, Oh, you bet on AI good. Okay. You missed on client PC. Man, I get it. Okay. Right. So if they would have made that bet, they would have won today. And even if the future wouldn't have turned out the way that it did, I still think investors would have given them the benefit of the doubt as compared to, literally, it's been like five straight quarters or something of saying, not even six straight quarters of saying, oh, there's more server demand than we can meet.

39:37Imagine if this quarter they would have said, we actually had too many server chips. We'd have been like, you're paying attention. Good job. That's the only thing I can think of. yes I agree with that I think your idea has two downstream consequences one is that if you planned early enough first of all it was very surprising for me that a company like Intel with all its smart people were actually surprised in an earnings call that agentic CPUs had such a demand like I remember like two quarters ago the earnings call like oh wow look at that agentic CPU demand we didn't expect that I'm like, hang on.

40:18Like, you guys know stuff about CPUs, right? Like, you're the experts. And if you have seen that there is a trend of, you know, the open claw and all this stuff coming up, you kind of have to have an inkling of how it works and what that means for your hardware demand. So that's the first thing. Why were you taking the back of energetic demand? Yeah, yeah, say it. Yes, don't forget your second thing. We'll come back to it. But on that one, this could be the biggest downside of Intel not having a competitive GPU. It's not that they're missing out on all this money. You know, NVIDIA is obviously crushing it.

40:57AMD is growing and trying to make money. But they're missing out on those conversations with customers to get as early insight as possible of, holy crap, they're going to need a ton more CPUs. Now, Intel's data center department should have those and do have those kind of relationships with Google, with Meta. I don't know if they have it with OpenAI and Anthropic. In theory, OpenAI and Anthropic are still running on CPUs that their hyperscalers are buying. But I think that maybe it's Intel's lack of a relationship with the model labs in the same way that NVIDIA and probably AMD have that put them further behind here.

41:40That's my hypothesis. Could be. Could be. So being taken aback by CPU demand was taking, I was taken aback by them being taken aback. You see what I mean? Right, right, right. Yeah, totally. It's like you have one business. It's CPUs. Everything else is a rounding error. Okay. so they were surprised by it this was like i think february or something this year like whenever the q1 they were surprised in q1 okay now we've entering q4 um so the like you say at that point at least if they had made the the decision to go entirely into data center because you know like memory has already been short since the early this year like everybody knows like you know this Memory shortage is not even new this year.

42:26We were short of memory last year, actually. And so everybody knows how LLM works. So you know that memory is going to be short. Now, not only do you know memory is going to be short, you know that if you're going to make even PC or server CPUs, any CPU needs memory too. So even if you came across the concept that, oh, wow, we need agentic CPU demand is high, at that time you should realize that DRAM demand goes hand in hand with server CPU demand so DRAM is going to get further constrained and so what does that mean for the client you know if the clients cannot pay that price for DRAM spot prices will increase and what does that mean for the PC business nobody can buy PCs because you know it's too expensive and therefore we better double down on servers and what do servers need by the way they need this was my second point They need substrate supply.

43:23So get on the substrate suppliers a year in advance and invest in them. You see what NVIDIA does with Lumentum? They're like, oh, we're going to Optics soon. Here at Lumentum, here's$2 billion. Go do something with it, right? Right. Now, of course, NVIDIA has a lot of cash and Intel cash is tight. But if not invest, pay a premium for those wafers. Pay more than TSMC. I don't care. You can show up on the earnings call And you can say, I met all the supply, but our ASPs were really high. And therefore, the market was a little bit softer than we expected. But I had the supply because I got the substrates.

44:02How'd you get the substrates? I paid a premium for them, right? Like, take that kind of risk. We're going to have the supply. It's just going to be expensive. Our costs were too high. Our margins. Look, okay, because here's, let me give some, there's lots of positives for Intel still. The foundry is looking great. We were at a position two years ago where I was like, oh, five knows in four years. I think it's going to crash and burn. I don't think they can make, I don't think 18A is going to work. I don't think 14A is going to work. And now people are like, no, I think that stuff's going to work.

44:28The question is just how much can they make of it, right? And so I think the best thing Intel could have done is said, we can make stuff. It's really expensive right now. And we have to get better at yields and we have to negotiate down our suppliers and that kind of thing. But we can make stuff. but when your whole even 2030 story is about making stuff you don't have enough of the right stuff that's where people are concerned and then you know there's the question of is it does that ultimately come down to foundry and then so should we be concerned about them not being able to make the right stuff for their customers or were they prioritizing their customers and it's you know this was they purposefully you know did this uh or is this a product planning thing where the product team, as we just talked about, should have said, we're going to need more CPUs, agents, we're going to need more memory, we're going to need more substrates.

45:17So should the product team have been driving this? I don't know. The best case sort of like, quote unquote, blame, ultimately, at the end of the day, it's all Intel's problem. They're all on the same team. And this is all falls onto LitBoo. The best thing is that the product team should be, if they're the ones that we're misplanning, then Foundry is just like, hey, we're trying to serve all of our customers, and this is yet another customer who didn't give us the best forecast. So we need to get better at validating our customers' forecasts. But if it has to do with Foundry at all, then that starts to get concerning again, which is, I thought the 2030 story is Foundry.

45:53If you can't even plan capacity for your biggest customer, Intel, which you guys share at cubicles, how are you going to do this for everyone else? Yeah, that's an argument. But going forward, I think, long term there is still you know 18A will eventually be adopted somewhere somehow because if this AI build out continues I find it hard to believe that the entire thing can all those gigawatts can be fulfilled with just TSMC making chips somehow it seems like that's not going to happen like somebody somewhere has to start making 18A chips and they will unlock a whole lot of capacity for Intel and hopefully that helps.

46:36It's just not happened yet, but I hope it happens in the future. 14A is very good. As far as I can tell, it's in high demand as well for mostly mobile applications. Mobile applications are the ones who usually go for the most cutting-edge technologies because the energy saving is the most there, right? So it's very important for phones. So they tend to go for the most advanced process node all the time. So 14A I think is going to be like Apple-centric node, whereas the rest of the accelerator industry will go from three nanometers to two nanometers. So that's kind of the transition. So Intel is well poised to benefit from both of those things.

47:20They just have to get out of this 2027 down cycle, which is, I think they're going to expect substrate supply to start coming in second half of this year. So in my mind, the first two quarters of 2027 looks pretty dim. Correct, yes. So yeah, looking forward, unfortunately, 2027 is not going to look good. We would love if a customer came out and said, I'm committed to 14A. That would help draw attention over here and not over here on the fact that there's still not enough supply and that the client PC is still soft. We probably aren't going to get that. but that would be the dream scenario in the meantime if i was intel i yes you know they can they would be able to make mobile chips which would be great they also make high performance cpus and so they could say we'll make anyone cpu and i think they actually did there's a little bit of talk of custom a6 custom a6 which is a very broad bucket by the way and they talked about making x86 cpu ip that you could someone else could instantiate i believe did you hear that on the call so it's like if i wanted to make an x86 core in a custom product i could instead of arm or risk 5 so there's probably like more to lean in there um but i don't know i'd just be like hey we can make high performance cpus we should be able to make high performance accelerators like you'd think they'd try to go after accelerators on 14A too.

48:54And this whole custom ASIC thing, which I don't think is XPUs, I think it's more like a custom networking chip or a custom CPU. We'll tweak it a little bit. Obviously, if they could make XPUs on 14A, that would be amazing. But as a foundry business, there's nothing stopping Intel from making ARM processors, right? Correct, and they save as much. In fact, when they prove, when they do test chips to show how good 18AP is or 14A, they make ARM cores so that you can compare apples to apples, say, built on Intel, built on CSMC. Here's how this ARM core does. Yeah, so if any ARM company, ARM itself, wants to go and possibly make it on Intel, that will be interesting, actually.

49:40The dynamic of ARM making a CPU in an Intel foundry is just, I don't know, it's weird. It's just weird. Today's sponsor is Meter. You've got the GPUs and the power. Now, who builds the network and who do you call when it breaks? With Meter, it's one call. Tell them your GPU or server count and they design, deploy and run your front-end storage and management networks. Meter builds its own networking hardware, switches and all, and writes its own network OS. So that call goes to the team who built it. Running a new cloud of clusters in a colo? Go to semidope.com slash meter. Links in the show notes.

50:28E-mib and advanced packaging. Hopefully maybe in the next couple quarters we could get some more good news of other people taking even TSMC tiles but having them packaged in the United States. Made in TSMC Arizona, packaged by Intel in New Mexico and shipped. Those would be stories that would be promising. And again, continue to show that 2030 thesis playing out. Yeah, yeah. Since we're getting down to the wire here, I wrote down a couple of lessons I learned from this whole episode, because I feel like it'll apply everywhere. And it doesn't have, today it's Intel. Tomorrow it could be any company, to be honest, because a lot of these themes go across everybody and every company and every investor, right?

51:13So the one thing I was like thinking about and that came up in my mind was lesson number one I learned was demand itself doesn't mean anything. Like Intel still has demand for their CPUs. People want Intel server CPUs. And the market has been pricing in just demand. Like, oh, look at how much demand we have. This happens so much across like the optics industry or whatever. You know, like we have demand, but we can't meet supply. and everybody's like stock up because like, wow, imagine what would happen if they could meet the demand. Like so much demand, they're going to continue to print money because customers are waiting out the door.

51:53It's exactly like this, right? Like there's a restaurant down your road and you go there, it's like there's a long line out the door and immediately you go tell all your friends like, oh, I found this great restaurant down the street. But the question is, when you go to stand in that line, are you ever going to get to eat before you die of starvation? Probably, you know, You're not going to get to eat for like one or two hours, just the wait line. Then you ask yourself, was it worth it? This is what is happening. Everybody has demand, but no supply. And so this is what happens. Sometimes, you know, Intel is in that situation.

52:24So it doesn't matter if you have demand. So I think something to keep in mind. So second thing is, within a company itself, I think AI can help one business, like server CPUs in this case, and hurt another. like the client business, the PC business. Because the server CPUs are sucking up so much resources from the ecosystem overall that it affects their own business on the other side. It's kind of funny how this works, but that can happen to a company, right? Yes, let me jump in here too. What just popped in my head was, the funny thing too is that on the client side, in theory, if AI PC was really a thing, the client side should be hit even worse because you'd be like, no, I really want to run local AI and therefore I need more memory.

53:08But like memory is crazy expensive. So this actually, I had a tweet that said Intel should retire the term AIPC and it's not just Intel, it's Microsoft and everyone because no one's actually running really LLMs locally and that's fine, but don't sell the value prop. This is an AIPC and you can do AI locally. Actually, this would have not only been a good time to do it just because it's not true for the last three years, but also because memory is so expensive. you don't want people to think oh an AIPC has all this memory because it's going to run all this stuff locally and therefore I should definitely not get it you know just retire that and come up with something else and make it clear that it doesn't have to have a ton of memory you know maybe next quarter but carry on with your lessons yes lesson number three I came up with that I can see going forward is that just like beating earnings and it used to be enough you You know, like company did well and stuff was good.

54:08But a lot of times I think nowadays that is not enough and there is an expectation that outruns reality. And I'm not saying that's a good or bad thing. It's just like a fact of the investing markets at this present time. Just an observation. It's good to keep that in mind. Like good numbers always doesn't mean good things for the stock, right? Like from an investor perspective. and finally the market at this point we are reaching a boiling point in the industry where people are asking for returns going to come asking for the receipts and that's going to be important right so i think that's that's my like big takeaways here things are changing i can i think the tides are the excitement is uh you know leveling off and people are starting to ask for the receipts overall.

55:02And that affects materially how we view a lot of companies in this space, not just Intel. So to recap, the market is in an interesting position. Lots of things are happening externally. So to Intel's credit, yes, they are down 30%, but the whole market is also down broadly. Interest rates are high. There's a ton of volatility. People are starting to demand returns. You can't just promise, hey, we have high demand. you have to meet the demand. You can't just have a good quarter. You have to show that you will continue to have a good quarter and then a good quarter now, but a soft quarter tomorrow, investors are smart and they're going to see that.

55:40I think the same thing could even hit Apple. You know, they'll have some good quarters, but memory will impact them too. So it is tough to be Intel. They're managing, making their own wafers, tragic accidents, all these different process nodes, depending on all of them. They're managing substrates, they're managing memory, they've got a server business and a client business that are very different in elasticity. And then on top of it, they're trying to stand up an external foundry, which they can't talk about really. So we have to play investigator to try to figure out what's going on. So it is not easy to be Intel.

56:17And let's hope that they control the narrative and have a great quarter next time. In the meantime, here we are, and we're here on SemiDoped, and thank you for listening and following along with us. We want your thoughts, too. If there's anything you've been thinking about on this story or lessons learned like Vic had, like zooming out meta lessons that you have, definitely put those on YouTube or email us or tweet at us, and we thank you for all of your engagement. We'll talk to you next time.

56:59병

From the publisher

Intel just had its worst day on the stock market in 55 years, with shares falling nearly 30%. But here's the strange part: Intel actually reported a strong quarter. Revenue grew, its data center business surged, and the company beat expectations. So what went wrong?

In this episode of Semi Doped, Vik Sekar and Austin Lyons dig into Intel's Q3 2026 earnings and the problems behind its disappointing outlook.

Three issues are at the center of Intel's troubles: a weakening PC market driven by rising memory prices, a shortage of advanced packaging substrates that limits server CPU production, and a tragic factory accident in Israel that disrupted chiplet supply.

But how much of this was bad luck, and how much was poor planning?

We debate whether Intel should have anticipated the surge in demand for server CPUs from agentic AI, whether its manufacturing strategy can respond quickly enough, and what these problems mean for its ambitions to become a leading-edge foundry alternative to TSMC.

We also step back to examine what Intel's experience tells us about the broader semiconductor market.

Topics covered:

- Why Intel's stock crashed despite strong earnings

- How the AI memory boom is hurting the PC market

- Why substrate shortages are constraining server CPU production

- The consequences of Intel's Fab 28 accident

- Whether Intel misjudged demand for agentic AI CPUs

- Intel 18A, 14A, and the long-term foundry opportunity

- Why strong demand doesn't necessarily translate into revenue

- Why investors are increasingly demanding returns from the AI infrastructure buildout

The bigger question: Is Intel facing a temporary supply-chain problem, or are its troubles a warning sign for the broader AI semiconductor industry?

Presented by Crusoe: Fine-tune and serve open models without managing a single GPU. When we sat down with Crusoe’s product team, Austin asked: what will you do with my data? Their answer: They don’t touch or see it. Your training data is encrypted so even Crusoe’s own admins can’t see it, and the fine-tuned model is yours. Deploy on Crusoe in one click, or download and run it anywhere. Upload a dataset, pick an open model, and pay per token rather than per GPU hour. Run a few versions, compare them, and download the one that works best. Accounts are free, and get $5 in credit when you sign up. Try Serverless Fine-Tuning: https://semidoped.com/crusoe

This episode is supported by Meter. You have the GPUs and the power. Now who builds the network, and who do you call when it breaks? Meter designs, deploys, and runs frontend, storage, and management networks on its own switches and its own network OS. One call reaches the team that designed the hardware and wrote the software. https://semidoped.com/meter

Chapters:
0:00 Intel's 35% Stock Drop
1:22 The Pre-Earnings Bull Case
4:03 Reason 1: Weak PC Market
12:25 The Flawed Q2 Pivot Plan
17:17 The IDM Model's Failure
20:23 Reason 2: Substrate Bottleneck
23:18 Chiplet Design's Fragility
25:18 Reason 3: The Fab 28 Explosion
40:46 The GPU Intelligence Gap
45:51 The Foundry Thesis Question
50:22 Packaging as a Hope Story
51:19 Four Lessons from the Meltdown

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