In short
Stanford Psychology Podcast - Episode 166: Steve Rathje: The Psychology of Virality
Episode Overview In this episode, host Su chats with Dr. Steve Rathje, an incoming Assistant Professor at Carnegie Mellon University, about his research on the psychology of technology, focusing on the virality of content on social media. Rathje discusses his background, significant findings in the field, and his recent review paper titled "The Psychology of Virality."
Key Participants
- Host: Su
- Guest: Dr. Steve Rathje
- Assistant Professor of Human-Computer Interaction, Carnegie Mellon University
- NSH and AXA postdoctoral fellow at NYU
- Research Interests: Psychology of technology, misinformation, political polarization, and the interaction between technology and mental health.
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Key Themes and Concepts
Background of Steve Rathje
- Initial Interest: Started with theater and playwriting; transitioned to psychology after taking an inspiring introductory course at Stanford.
- Educational Journey:
- Bachelors in Psychology and Symbolic Systems at Stanford.
- PhD from the University of Cambridge, focusing on misinformation and political polarization.
- Research Evolution: Shifted toward the psychology of technology influenced by involvement in psychology labs and the technological environment at Stanford.
Research on Virality
- Definition of Virality: Explores why certain content spreads rapidly both online and offline, driven by emotional, social, and structural factors.
- Recent Review Paper: "The Psychology of Virality" synthesizes findings across disciplines to understand what drives information spread.
Core Findings
- Emotional Drivers:
- Content that is highly negative and evokes moral outrage generally goes viral.
- Positive high-arousal content can also gain traction but less frequently.
- Cognitive Processes:
- Attention and memory play crucial roles in what gets shared.
- People often share content based on social motivations (identity, status) rather than purely cognitive evaluations.
The Paradox of Virality
- Widely Shared but Not Liked:
- Many people engage with content they do not necessarily like, driven by addiction-like behaviors, social pressures, or the actions of hyperactive super spreaders.
- Super Spreaders:
- A small percentage of users account for the majority of shares, often skewing perceptions of normative behavior in political discourse.
Structural Features Influencing Virality
- Algorithms: Social media algorithms often prioritize engagement over user preferences, amplifying divisive content.
- Platform Design: Features like "likes" and "shares" can misrepresent user sentiments; for example, a lack of a "dislike" button on Twitter leads to misleading impressions of popularity.
- Norms: Different platforms have distinct norms (e.g., LinkedIn vs. Twitter), which shape user interactions and content virality.
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Future Directions
- Global Research: A significant gap exists in understanding virality across cultures; Rathje's future studies aim to address this by leveraging AI and large language models for cross-cultural analysis.
- Human-AI Interaction: Exploring how people interact with AI, including the phenomenon of "AI sycophancy," where chatbots overly agree with users, potentially leading to more extreme beliefs.
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Conclusion The episode provides insight into the intersection of psychology and technology, emphasizing how emotional, cognitive, and structural factors work together to shape our interactions with information in the digital age. Rathje's work not only expands our understanding of virality but also raises questions about the implications of technology on society and mental health.
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Additional Resources
- Steve Rathje's Paper: [The Psychology of Virality](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2025.06.014)
- Steve's Personal Website: [stevenrathje.com](https://stevenrathje.com/)
- Podcast Website: [Stanford Psychology Podcast](https://stanfordpsychologypodcast.com)
Contact
- Email: stanfordpsychpodcast@gmail.com
- Twitter: [@StanfordPsyPod](https://twitter.com/StanfordPsyPod)
This episode serves as an enlightening exploration of how psychological principles can be applied to understand the dynamics of information sharing in the modern age.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00Welcome back to the Stanford Psychology Podcast. I'm so happy to share my conversation with Steve Ratchey. Dr. Ratchey is an incoming assistant professor of human-computer interaction in the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University. He is an NSF and AXA postdoctoral fellow at New York University. He received his PhD from the University of Cambridge Trinity College. His work centers on the psychology of technology. He studies how core psychological phenomena like polarization, intergroup conflict, the spread of information, and mental health interact with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and social media.
0:38Through a combination of behavioral science, computational methods, and large-scale data, his research sheds light on how our minds and our societies are being shaped in the digital age. In today's episode, we discuss his research background together with his recent review paper, The Psychology of Virality, in which they explore why certain content spreads rapidly online and offline, often involving a mix of emotional, social, and structural factors. So, without further ado, here's our conversation.
1:31Thank you so much for joining me. I'm so excited to be hosting you today. And to start us off, can you tell us a bit about how you first became interested in the psychology of technology or going even further back? What exactly do we mean when we talk about the psychology of technology? What initially drew you to study of psychological processes in the context of social media, online platforms, and digital devices, as well as how these processes play out in our offline world? First of all, thank you for having me. I'm a big fan of this podcast, and I've been a listener for years, so I'm excited to be here.
2:11So to introduce myself, let's start at the very beginning. Well, my journey into psychology actually started at Stanford, so it's fitting that I'm here on the Stanford Psychology Podcast. Going way back, I grew up in Portland, Oregon, and what I was primarily interested in was theater. I wanted to be an actor and a playwright, and I was very serious about it. I wanted to pursue a BFA in acting or playwriting and really go seriously into that route. Things changed a little bit in high school. I took AP psychology and started to get a little bit interested in psychology. but not extremely interested to the point where, you know, I was sure I wanted to do it for a career.
2:50I think the moment everything changed was actually the first semester of my freshman year. I didn't know what I was going to major in when I arrived at Stanford, but I took an amazing intro to psychology class that was taught by James Gross, a professor at psychology who's just incredible. He was such an incredible teacher. And I was so inspired and awestruck by everything about psychology. And I think I realized that psychology wasn't that different from what I was doing with theater and playwriting. Theater is all about exploring what it means to be human, exploring the human experience. And psychology just seemed to be a different way to do that, but in a scientific way.
3:33So I got super into psychology. I eventually decided to major in psychology, and I minored in symbolic systems, which is Stanford's interdisciplinary major that integrates psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and computer science as well. And then my research interests didn't develop into psychology of technology until a bit later on. I started working in a few psychology labs. I worked with Aaliyah Crum, who does a lot of work on mindsets and health. Later, I started working with Jimmy Ozaki, who does a lot of work on empathy. I remember around my junior year, I really got interested in political psychology.
4:08Specifically, I took a social psychology class co taught by Rob Willer and Aaliyah Crum. And I learned about Rob Willer's amazing work on moral reframing and persuasion. And this happened around the same time as the Trump election. This was shortly after 2016. Everyone was interested in politics and fake news and why people vote. And I thought his work on political persuasion was just really cutting and interesting. So my interests were around political psychology and empathy toward the end of my Stanford career. I think also being at Stanford and being in such a technological environment got me interested in the psychology of technology.
4:49I actually remember a moment toward the end of my undergrad, where I thought to myself, like, hmm, I want to maybe study the psychology of technology for the rest of my career. I actually thought of that specific phrase, the psychology of technology. After I graduated at Stanford, I did my PhD at the University of Cambridge. And I think that's when I started really getting interested in technology. I began working with Sander van der Linden, who studies fake news and misinformation. And I was really interested in the misinformation issue and how it integrated with technology. and I combined that with some of my interests on political polarization and one question I had was does the incentive structure of social media contribute to this problem of growing political polarization that we're having in the country right now and you know additionally around the world in several countries and that led to my first research project which ended up being a research project that became my most cited paper and became the paper that sort of I developed on for the rest of my career.
5:48It was called Outgroup Animosity Drives Engagement on Social Media. And for that paper, I analyzed large-scale data sets of Facebook and Twitter posts from politicians and news media sources. And basically what I found in the data is that the biggest predictor of virality out of all the predictors I measured was outgroup animosity, or when a politician dunked on a member of the opposing party, was negative about a member of the opposing Party. So essentially, the main point of the paper is that the incentive structure of social media might encourage politicians or news media sources and influencers and everyday individuals to constantly be negative about the outgroup on social media in order to get attention, in order to be visible by the algorithm.
6:38And this might have downstream negative consequences on polarization in society. And I really think that paper set up the rest of my journey. We're going to talk a little bit more about my recent paper, The Psychology of Virality. But ever since then, I've been really interested in this question of virality and what goes viral on social media and sort of the incentive structures of emerging technologies, such as social media, and now increasingly AI? Just hearing your journey, it's so amazing because oftentimes an early career scientist and also students, we see this fear of missing out when they start off with something else and then they increasingly start realizing that, oh, like, actually I'm interested in psychology, I'm actually interested in this and that, but I started off with something completely different.
7:28More and more people are coming from increasingly diverse backgrounds. And I think that is contributing to the field of psychology, because as we said, it's the study of human, it's the study of society, and just having all these different mindsets, it contributes to the development of knowledge here as well. It's really interesting to hear that. Thank you. Yeah, no, that's a good insight. And I think it's fitting that I'm joining an interdisciplinary department, Carnegie Mellon's Department of Human-Computer Interaction, which has psychologists, computer scientists, and people from all disciplines.
8:00And yeah, my journey was pretty, you know, interdisciplinary, especially early on. I think my work on technology is always very grounded in psychological theories and basic psychological processes of how humans act with and without technology. My next question is going to be very relevant to that. As you've been mentioning a lot now, your work sits at the intersection of social science, technology, and society fields that are evolving rapidly and often in response to one another. You integrate classic social psychological theories with new computational methods, digital field experiments, and model-based analysis of large-scale data.
8:41What has it been like building a research identity across these domains, especially in such a rapidly changing technological and scientific landscape? I know that you mentioned a bit about it, but I guess I just want to dig a little deeper into that. Yeah, no, of course. I really like using a variety of methods because each method tells you something different. My first major study of my PhD that I talked about, the Outgroup Animosity paper, I remember really distinctly what it felt like when I first got my hands on social media data, when I was able to analyze these data sets of millions of Twitter and Facebook posts.
9:19I was like, this is so cool that I could analyze what millions of people are doing and generate theories of human behavior based on millions of observations. Previously, I had done more small-scale studies, and I just thought it was so powerful to observe real-life social media behavior. I really benefited from sort of the revolution of big data and computational social science in psychology early in my PhD, and I think big data is able to tell us something different from what experiments are able to tell us. After I conducted that study on outgroup animosity, I followed it up with a series of psychology experiments where I was interested in this question of why people believe in and share misinformation.
10:00And you can't really get people's psychological motivations based on just observing their sharing behavior. That's something you have to really experimentally manipulate. That's something that's more conducive to the experimental method. So this is when I really started to learn about what experiments could tell us. So I conducted a study where the The main question is, why do people believe in misinformation? And do motivational factors, does motivated reasoning, for instance, drive people's belief in misinformation? And the way I tried to answer this question is, what happens if you try to pay people to correctly spot true versus false news?
10:35What happens if you pay people to be accurate? Do they get better at discerning between true and false news? Does creating an accuracy motivation change how people respond? And we found that, yes, paying people to be accurate did improve people's ability to discern between true and false news. And this effect was particularly strong for conservatives, although it was prevalent for both liberals and conservatives. And this told us something really interesting, which is that people aren't just duped by fake news. It's not simply a lack of knowledge. At least part of it is a lack of motivation to be accurate.
11:10And then we followed this up with a number of studies where we had other questions. One of our questions was, do social identity motivations perhaps sometimes interfere with our motivation to be accurate? So we conducted a follow-up study where instead of incentivizing people to accurately discern between true and false news, we gave people a financial incentive to first correctly identify whether a news headline would be liked by a member of their political outgroup. And this was meant to mirror the incentive structure of social media, where you are on social media and you're constantly thinking about, will this article that I share be liked by my politically like-minded friends and followers?
11:53And we found that this incentive, basically incentivizing people to think about their partisan identity motivations, actually reduced people's ability to discern between true or false news. So in study one, we found that incentivizing accuracy can make people more accurate. And in study two, we found that incentivizing people to think about their social identity can distract from accuracy. And I think this tells us something about the incentive structure of social media, which I talked about earlier. Social media is something where we think that social identities are hyper salient on social media.
12:28You're constantly thinking about, will this article that I share be liked by my friends and followers? You also self-consciously signal your social identity on social media. If you look at people's Twitter bios. They often say what their political affiliation is. They often say whether they're a mom or a dad, they signal aspects of their social identity very publicly. And you don't really get to see what's going on beyond the social identity, what sort of the nuances of the person are. You see these very self-conscious social identity signals. Then we also conducted an additional follow-up study where we wanted to answer the question of, is there a way to incentivize people to be accurate without paying them.
13:08And we found that even just having people read a text that emphasized the reputational consequences of being inaccurate, or that emphasized social norms about accuracy, also slightly improved people's ability to discern between true and false news. And this is reassuring because this suggests that you don't have to pay everyone on the internet to be accurate. I'm sure that would probably make the world and the internet a better place. But there are other ways to incentivize people to be accurate. You can leverage social motivations, you can leverage identity-based motivations. That study, which is called Accuracy in Social Motivations, shaped judgments of misinformation.
13:44That really taught me some of the benefits of the experimental method. And then after that, I began exploring with methods even further. I conducted a study where I linked people's Twitter data to their survey data. And this was specifically right after COVID with the advent of the vaccine. And I wanted to survey pro and anti-vaccine individuals and link the self-reported data about vaccine hesitancy to people's Twitter networks. And basically what we found in the study is that people who were anti-vaccine were in very different online communities than people that were pro-vaccine. Essentially, they were in echo chambers.
14:24They were often in conservative echo chambers, especially in the United States, not necessarily so in the United Kingdom, but they tended to be more conservative networks, and we were able to get detailed information about who they followed and what news sources that they shared. And sort of as expected, following individuals like Joe Rogan and Candace Owens, who frequently publicly, you know, express vaccine hesitancy, did predict actual real-world vaccine hesitancy. So this was a really interesting methodological study for me because I could actually link this behavioral data on social media to people's offline survey data.
15:01And then later in my PhD, I expanded on that even further by doing a large-scale social media field experiment where I manipulated people's online social networks. I conducted a study recently, it's currently under review, it's not yet published, in which we incentivized a number of Twitter users to unfollow hyper-partisan Twitter accounts for one month. And we looked at how this impacted people's polarization, their feelings about Twitter, and their well-being. And what we found was that unfollowing these hyper-partisan accounts improved feelings toward the opposing party one month later. And this effect also lasted six months after the intervention was completed.
15:43So this was a very long-lasting effect. We also found that unfollowing these hyper-partisan accounts led people to share more accurate news and to feel more positive about their feeds. And interestingly, we found that most people, the majority of people, even when given the opportunity to do so, did not refollow these hyperpartisan accounts when the experiment was done. Which is interesting because it suggests that maybe people didn't really value following these hyperpartisan accounts enough in the first place to go out of their way to refollow them. So this was a really interesting method because we linked survey and Twitter data, and we also did this causal, long-term longitudinal manipulation.
16:22And in my future work, and in my current work as well, I'm exploring different methods such as global studies. I'm conducting two global studies right now. One is a global study that's testing the causal impact of reducing your social media usage in 23 countries around the world. This is a huge ambitious field experiment that's taken lots of grants and lots of collaborators from around the world. We have more than 200 collaborators from around the globe who are helping us translate materials and conduct this study. That's really exciting because most research on the psychology of technology or the psychology of social media has been limited to the US.
16:58I'm also conducting another global study where we're looking at what goes viral in more than 56 countries around the world using large language models. And in the future, I'm really interested in AI as a method to transform social science. I think as AI is rapidly developing, I'm really excited about its possibilities to transform social science. So yeah, that was a long answer. But just to briefly summarize what each method, I get excited by new methods, because they always tell you sort of a different way to answer your question. I'm hearing you talk about all these new methods. It makes me get excited.
17:34Good. I'm glad. Yeah. Yes. As you mentioned, now that you will be leading your own lab, how do you see your research direction evolving i mean you kind of hinted that like you will still keep a part of your previous research but now that you have this new environment where you will be calling your own what kinds of questions or projects are you most excited to pursue with your group especially in this moment of rapid technological change and as you mentioned ai or just like social media platform getting more and more global and bigger, more influential? Yeah. So my vision for my lab is to call it the psychology of technology lab.
18:16And the reason I want to call it the psychology of technology lab is I do want to keep it pretty broad. I want there to be this through line, which is I draw on a lot of psychological theories and I study psychological processes and phenomena. I'm really interested in things like motivated cognition and social identity, polarization, intergroup conflict, well-being, mental health, all these important psychological processes. And I'm interested in how they interact with technology, both how they, you know, change how we interact with technology and how technology psychologically impacts us. And I wanted to keep this lab name broad because technology is ever evolving, and I want to allow lots of opportunity for different directions.
18:57I'm really excited to also be in, I mentioned this earlier, but in an interdisciplinary department that's also located in Carnegie Mellon's computer science school. Part of this is because I'm really interested in computational methods. I've relied a lot on computational methods. And I'm excited to be around a lot of computer scientists who are at the forefront of these new methods. And sort of the niche that I believe I'll carve out for myself there is I combine those methods with a lot of my training as an experimental psychologist and my sort of theory-based perspective as a psychologist and my experience with psychological theories.
19:33I imagine doing projects that are similar to what I'm doing and continuing to get more global with my research. You know, I talked about these large-scale global studies that I'm currently conducting, and I also think with the advent of large language models, it's easier to analyze more global data. I'm also getting more and more interested in studying human-AI interaction. I think that's one of the things that's probably going to change from some of my past work is with this explosion of AI we're living in currently, I'm interested in the psychology of how we interact with AI. I'm actually currently conducting some studies on what's known as AI sycophancy that I really hope to expand upon.
20:11You might have heard of that big controversy. It happened in around April this year where OpenAI's model GPT-4.0 became too sycophantic. It essentially became way too agreeable and validating, and it would even validate basically absurd or dangerous or harmful beliefs sometime. It would just validate you basically at the expense of accuracy or telling you hard truths. We just conducted a study about the impact of interacting with sycophantic AI chatbots in one condition, regular GPT 4.0 in another condition. we also had a different condition where people interacted with instead of an agreeable ai chatbot a disagreeable ai chatbot that would gently challenge their beliefs and open them up to new perspectives and make them consider the opposing viewpoint we had them talk about polarized political issues in study one we had them talk about gun control we're you know replicating this with other topics and other models in future studies and basically what we found was quite interesting, in my opinion.
21:14We found that the sycophantic AI chatbot basically led people to hold more extreme beliefs. It led them to double down on their prior beliefs and be even more certain about their prior beliefs. The disagreeable AI chatbots did the opposite. It led people to hold less extreme beliefs and consider the other side a little bit more. But what was really interesting is that people liked the sycophantic chatbot much more. They enjoyed using it much more. And they said they would want to use it more in the future. Another interesting finding that I actually found surprising is people found the sycophantic AI chatbots to be unbiased.
21:50And they found the disagreeable chatbots to be very biased, which is interesting because both of these chatbots were biased. They were just biased in opposite perspectives. We literally prompted these chatbots to either agree with everything the person said and validate them or disagree with them. But people didn't seem to notice the bias in the sycophantic chatbots. We also found that people found the sycophantic chatbots to be both very warm and very competent. And they found the disagreeable chatbots to be neither warm or competent. And we think part of the explanation for this is rooted in psychological theories, such as, you know, motivated cognition, where people uncritically accept opinions that agree with theirs, as well as this idea of naive realism.
22:34We tend to think that our perspective is just true and accurate and objective, and any perspectives that disagree with us are not. They're biased, they're based on propaganda, and they're completely wrong. And for this reason, we think that AI sycovancy might be a particularly sinister bias, because I don't think people really notice AI sycovancy. They're just like, oh, this chatbot is right because it agrees with me. I think people will only notice if it's like an absolutely absurd case of sycophancy. On Twitter, I saw a lot of screenshots of absurd instances of AI sycophancy. And I think that's when we noticed, but I don't think we noticed subtle sycophancy.
23:10And I think this actually relates to some of my prior work on the incentive structure of social media platforms, because social media platforms have this strong business incentive to create addicting products that we'll use again and again. And what content grabs our attention. It's often negative content, divisive content, polarizing content, or content that confirms our viewpoints. And this can lead us to become potentially more polarized or put us into echo chambers. There has been a lot of concern about social media echo chambers, but I think we're starting to see AI echo chambers, basically, with these sycophantic chatbots.
23:46We're starting to see, because of the incentive structure of commercial AI companies, AI companies want products that people use again and again, we might have AI that constantly agrees with us and reaffirms our belief. So this is a future direction I'm really interested in getting into. I'm hoping to get into the space of human AI interaction more. That is so, so interesting. I don't know if you saw it, but like I kept taking notes, all the wheels in my brain, they were like turning. Oh, good. I'm glad. Now I realize that most of your work and your future directions you just mentioned, they're going to connect really well to this recent review you conducted called the psychology of virality, which we will discuss in this episode because you started talking about type of content that goes viral, the type of content that is incentivized in these social media platforms, these online communities.
24:44If you're ready, I would like to shift our attention a little bit towards that view. Sounds good. In that review, you walk us through a rich literature review spanning fields from neuroscience to computer science. And you argue that similar psychological processes drive information spread across diverse environments interacting with structural features. Could you begin by elaborating on this core thesis for our audience? What are the fundamental psychological drivers you identified that led to certain types of information? Yeah. So I think this review really started with a lot of my early work and indeed my first PhD paper was about what goes viral on social media.
25:26And as I mentioned earlier, there are a lot of studies suggesting that sometimes the most negative or outrage evoking or polarizing content will go viral on social media. My work shows that outgroup animosity goes viral. A lot of other work suggests that moral outrage and moral and emotional content goes viral. Lots of other work suggests that misinformation or negativity goes viral on social media. And while you can interpret these findings as being about, you know, social media specifically or the incentive structure of social media, which I think they are about in part, I also have this question of is social media really unique in its tendency to amplify things like polarizing content and outrage and negativity?
26:09Or are these more parts of our basic psychology? Is this because of basic psychological and cognitive processes? Or perhaps, alternatively, is this because of an interaction with, you know, the structural features of social media, and our basic psychological processes? Well, this is a review paper. So we don't really make a strong opinionated argument, but we do synthesize the literature. And the conclusion that we come to based on this synthesis is that social media might actually not be as unique as we think it is in its tendency to amplify things like outrage. It seems like similar types of content went viral long before social media.
26:51To give an antidote that illustrates this, you've all known Harari has this book called Nexus, where he talks about the early days of the printing press in the 1400s, after the printing press was inventive. He talked about how the bestsellers in the early days of the printing press were not scientific texts, even though we often attribute the printing press to spurring the scientific revolution, but instead it was things like witch-hunting manuals that were bestsellers after the invention of the printing press. In other words, crazy conspiracy theories and outrage and misinformation also went quote-unquote viral in the 1400s, long before the invention of social media.
Read the full transcript
27:33In addition, if you look at the research on gossip, which goes back to the 1940s in social psychology, there's a strong literature on gossip. It seems like similar types of gossip go viral as well. Gossip is disproportionately negative. It's almost always negative. And it's often moral in nature. We're often discussing the moral transgressions of others. So it seems like it's not just moral outrage that goes viral on social media, but moral outrage goes viral in terms of gossip. And I know we use this term viral often to discuss social media content, but this paper we introduced the term viral to talk about the spread of information broadly.
28:12Information has always gone viral in some senses in our offline networks after the invention of the printing press. The term viral just seems to refer to the tendency for content to spread widely. One thing we do in this article is we review some of the key studies on what goes viral, both on social media and in our offline networks in terms of gossip. And we plot all these key studies on according to their arousal and their valence. So a lot of emotion theorists talk about emotion in terms of valence or how negative an emotion is, and how high arousal or intense emotion is. So we plot all these key studies on these two axes, negativity and arousal.
28:58Most studies support the idea that what goes viral is often both negative and high arousal. Oftentimes they are a combination of highly negative and high arousal. So for instance, outrage, outgroup animosity, anger, these are all high arousal and negative emotions. However, high arousal negativity isn't the only thing that goes viral and it seems like that there are a lot of context dependencies some studies suggest that high arousal positive content goes viral for instance analyses of the most shared articles in the new york times suggest that emotions like awe or high arousal positive emotions go viral one analysis of data from upworthy suggested that people were likely to click on articles that evoked sadness so a low arousal negative emotion So there are a lot of inconsistencies, but there are some clear patterns.
29:51Interestingly, we didn't find any articles suggesting that low arousal positivity ever predicted virality. So emotions like calmness or calm never seem to really go viral. So there are some patterns on what goes viral, and there seem to be some context dependencies. And some of these patterns seem to be rooted in key psychological processes. So for instance, we know from studies on attention and memory that what grabs our attention and what we tend to remember seems to be both negative and high arousal. So one reason that negativity and high arousal content might go viral is because it simply captures our attention.
30:31In a crowded information environment, high arousal negativity is what we're going to attend to and what we are going to remember. So it seems like these psychological processes might explain why content goes viral on social media as well as in our offline networks via gossip. However, we also aim to reconcile some of these conflicting findings in the literature. Why does positivity sometimes go viral? Why does high arousal positivity go viral sometimes? Why does low arousal negativity go viral? Why do these conflicting findings exist? One reason, of course, is that psychological data is often messy and social media data is messy.
31:08But another reason is likely because of structural factors of information environments. So in the second half of the review article, we talk about how structural features of an environment, such as algorithms, incentive structures, or norms or networks also shape virality. You talked about attention and motivation. These are mostly related to the self. We are motivated or our attention is taken. But sharing information, it's not only about grabbing attention or engagement, but it's also a deeply social act shaped by motivations like identity, status, reputation, affiliation, and the desire for a shared reality.
31:54I'm really interested in how these social motifs can sometimes interact with or override other considerations like accuracy. How do you think this tension plays out when individuals decide whether to share, modify, or withhold information? And more broadly, how should we think about the difference between me as an individual consuming information privately versus me as a social being embedded in a network responding to and acting on that same information? Yeah, great question. What I talked about earlier were primarily cognitive processes that drive information sharing, what we attend to, what we tend to remember.
32:38And I think that's certainly part of the story. Something that grabs our attention is more likely to go viral. On TikTok, for instance, they pay close attention to watch time statistics. And what you tend to watch, what you can't look away from, is what goes viral. But as you mentioned, there are a lot of social motivations at play as well. When we are choosing to share an article or a piece of information or a piece of gossip, this is a self-conscious social motivation. We're thinking about our self-presentation. We're thinking about our social identity. There are neuroscience studies, for instance, that suggest that when you view viral content, it activates areas in the brain that are implicated with social processing.
33:19It seems like when we're thinking about what to share and when we're looking at viral content, this is often a really social decision. We call it social media for a reason. There are a ton of articles that look at the various social motivations that drive sharing behavior. There are articles on motivations for status driving social sharing behavior, motivations for belonging, motivations for conformity. There's a great article suggesting that one reason we share misinformation is because this conformity desire. We'll have this fear of missing out if we don't share misinformation that promotes our group.
33:53We do it for this social reason. There are also sometimes antisocial reasons why we share articles. There's great work by Michael Bang Peterson that suggests that one of the key predictors of the sharing of misinformation and hostile political rumors is a need for chaos, basically. However, I call this an antisocial motivation, but it's also a status-seeking motivation because Michael Bang Peterson finds it's really people who have this belief in what's called a need for chaos or this desire to burn the system down, who share misinformation and hostile political rumors. And often these people have this desire because they are frustrated with the system and they think that this is a means of them for gaining status.
34:35If they are constantly trying to generate chaos, this is perhaps a means for them to get status. Indeed, he finds that individuals who are highest in status-seeking motivations have this strong need for chaos and often share misinformation and hostile political rumors. You also mentioned how accuracy and social motivations, there can be a tension between them. And I think that's what my study that I mentioned earlier that looked at whether you experimentally manipulate accuracy and social motivations, how that shapes sharing behavior. And indeed, we found in that study that if you make social identity motivations particularly salient, it can often distract from accuracy motivations and cause you to share or believe in misinformation.
35:19And we think that this is oftentimes what's happening on social media because social media makes the social aspect of sharing hyper salient. You get a lot of rewards. You get likes and shares. Social media isn't necessarily an environment that makes accuracy salient. There are other environments where accuracy is more salient. If you're a scientist, for instance, you're embedded in a system where you have peer review. You have people constantly critiquing your work, and also your identity is sort of intertwined with accuracy. Part of your identity and your reputation depends on being accurate.
35:56That's not necessarily true on social media, and especially in some political communities on social media, where perhaps it's more important to signal your partisan identity than necessarily to be accurate all the time. we tackled the psychological processes that drive information, dissemination, or sharing behavior but one of the key ideas you explore is the information as a virus metaphor answering the question one you also touched upon that in this review you mentioned both its strengths and limits I would love for you to dig into it a bit more for us out of the studies you review could stand without this metaphor, yet it plays a central role in how the paper frames information spread.
36:46So what do you think makes this metaphor especially compelling to use? And where do you think it breaks down, especially when we consider the role of human agency and how intentional so much information sharing actually is? yeah one of my first interests in psychology was actually in the psychology of metaphor going back to that intro psychology class that i took my freshman year one of the most interesting studies i learned about in that class was work by lara borodisky that found that if you frame crime using the metaphorical frame of a virus it changes how people think about crime versus if you frame crime as a beast.
37:31And you can instantiate this metaphorical frame using just a few words. But if you propose that crime is a virus that is infecting this hypothetical town, people tend to propose more systemic or reformative solutions to deal with crime. But if you say that crime is a beast that is haunting this hypothetical town, people tend to propose more punitive solutions. George Lakoff wrote this book called Metaphors we live by back in the 1980s that was basically about how we oftentimes use metaphor to think, and we often need metaphor to think and to reason through things. I think that the virus metaphor is really unavoidable if you look in this literature.
38:14It has really been so central. We talked about viral videos in the early 2000s, but people have been using this metaphor of information as a virus for decades. Metaphors can help and harm. Sometimes they really help shed light on an issue, and sometimes they can change how we think about an issue, as I talked about with that prior study. And I will say there are some notable critics of this information as a virus metaphor. And we cited a number of the notable critics of this information as a virus metaphor. Some people think that maybe it's too negative when, you know, information is something that's pretty neutral.
38:49Perhaps it implies that people are too passive, for instance, and that people are passively infected by viruses when psychology is really more complicated than that. People can ignore information, people can change information. So this metaphor has flaws, but I also think it has a number of strengths, and I think it's pretty powerful. And I also think that all metaphors have flaws as a thing. You're never going to find a perfect metaphor. But yeah, beyond metaphor, people have even used epidemiological models to model the spread of information. And these models aren't perfect. No model is perfect, but to some sense gives us some way to think about information spread.
39:29In the paper, we review some ways in which this information as virus metaphor is useful. So like viruses, some forms of information are more contagious than others. People talk about viruses having a certain are not value, which is a measure of how many people the virus is on average thought to infect. So just like how some viruses have a higher R0 value or are more contagious than others, it seems like some forms of information are more contagious than others and have always been more contagious than others, like negative information or moral information. In addition, information exposure has psychological consequences.
40:06It changes us. Information, like viruses, can mutate over time, and some mutations of that information might become more contagious over time. During COVID, we talked a lot about COVID super spreaders. There were super spreader events. There's also research suggesting that some people on average are more infectious than others when it comes to viruses. We don't exactly know why, but there are some people who tend to be super spreaders of viruses. And there also tend to be super spreaders of information and misinformation. There's a really powerful statistic that suggests that around 0.1 of Twitter users share about 80 % of misinformation on Twitter.
40:51So there's this huge sort of Zipion distribution where it's only a small handful of people who are sharing a ton of misinformation. And you also see similar patterns when it comes to toxicity on Reddit. It's only around 3 % of active users who contribute to about 33 % of toxicity. So you see these distributions where there are these super spreaders of false and hostile content on social media. In addition, just like how some viruses will spread faster in some contexts, so like a crowded room where people are close together and where they're en masse, a virus is going to be more spreadable, some types of information are more spreadable in some contexts.
41:35And this gets to where I was talking about the structural features that drive the spread of information. There will be some networks or there will be some social media platforms where misinformation or hostile content are more spreadable. In addition, many other people have talked about interventions that inoculate people against misinformation, essentially. Just as there are ways to stem the spread of illness and viruses, there are ways to stem the spread of viral misinformation or polarizing content. I think this metaphor is quite powerful and can be extended in length, and we use it as a central frame for the paper, while also acknowledging its downsides.
42:17Metaphors can be great for theorizing, and they can help us theorize, and they can help us think, but we should also not let them lead us astray. So it's a powerful metaphor that we should also take with a grain of salt. one of the most intriguing findings you identify is the paradox of virality the idea that widely shared content is often not widely liked and i think this is a central theme in some of your previous work as well this seems counterintuitive for content that becomes so prevalent um what are the primary explanations you propose for this paradox because as i mentioned it just doesn't on your intuitive that people oftentimes make the content that they tend not to like go viral.
43:04What do you think it is? Yeah, what led us to study the paradox of virality is Facebook when describing their algorithm, they will say publicly on their website, this is how we predict the content that people want to see. And I was thinking after publishing this work on outgroup animosity, I was like, do people really want to see outgroup animosity? I don't think they do. People might engage with outgroup animosity, but I don't think they like it. And sort of an interpretation of my paper at that time was people were like, oh, that's human nature. People love to hate on the outgroup. And I was like, do they really love to hate on the outgroup?
43:40I mean, people do it. People engage in outgroup animosity, but I don't think that's what people like. So we conducted a study where we surveyed a nationally representative sample of United States participants, and we asked them what do you think goes viral on social media and what do you think should go viral on social media in an ideal world? And we found that people were actually pretty aware that divisive and negative content tended to go viral on social media. People's perceptions of what went viral were in line with past research on what actually goes viral. However, we found that people expressed a strong stated preference such that they thought that divisive and negative content should not go viral, and that instead educational or scientific or positive or nuanced content should go viral and be amplified by social media algorithms.
44:27So then that leads to the question, if people don't like this content, why do they engage with it? Why do they literally click like and share when it comes to divisive content? And there are three potential explanations we propose for this paradox. One is just that people's revealed preferences are different from their stated preferences. This language of revealed and stated preferences comes from economics, and a lot of economists will say that we should kind of ignore people's stated preferences and just pay attention to their revealed preferences. So that's one interpretation of this finding.
44:58You can just say that people's stated preferences of what they want to see on social media are unimportant. People engage without group animosity, therefore they like it. But I don't think that that's a correct interpretation of this finding, because I think when it comes to things like addiction, for instance, we should pay attention to people's stated preferences. For instance, there's research suggesting that around 70 % of cigarette smokers say that they want to quit smoking. But we don't say that they have a revealed preference for smoking. We'd instead say that they're addicted to smoking and that they don't want to continue.
45:30And I think it might be similar with social media. It might be like, we don't actually like this content, but instead we can't look away. In some way, we're addicted to it. It's a little bit like if you see a car crash on the side of the road and you stop to look at it. it's not because you like that car crash or want to see car crashes in the world it's just that you can't look away yeah that's one potential explanation basically is that it's not that people like this content but it's that it's attention grabbing and because social media is an attention economy that tries to be addicting and have us use their product again and again they won't show us content that we actually like or say we that we want to see they'll show us content that we can't look away from.
46:12And I think that's one explanation for the paradox of virality. But I think another explanation that is often ignored or not paid enough attention to is this idea of super spreaders that I talked about earlier. I don't think it's the vast majority of people who are liking and sharing outgroup animosity on social media. I actually think it's a small percentage of people. People have done survey experiments to follow up on some of my work on outgroup animosity and they find in these experiments that if you survey just like a representative sample of u.s participants people won't show this preference for sharing outgroup animosity in a survey experiment or they won't show a preference for sharing divisive content however when you zoom in on the small percentage of participants who are highly active on social media and who engage a lot with politics on social media they actually say that they do have a preference for outgroup animosity, and they do want to share outgroup animosity.
47:13So I think that's what's going on as well. When you log on to social media, it's a few hyperactive super spreaders who tend to be more extreme. They tend to like more polarizing content, and they're sharing a lot of the divisive content on social media. There's really an invisibility of moderate voices on social media, and this can have negative consequences. It can have us infer false norms or hold false beliefs about the opposing party because sort of the only representation that you'll see of the opposing party or even of your own party are the most extreme voices because those are the people who are most motivated to post on social media.
47:51I remember about those super spreaders, one of the co-founders of this podcast, Eric Newman, he had a recent study about that. And I remember him going around in the lab, just 3%. They're just like representing 3%. That's amazing. And it stuck in my mind. That's so interesting to hear. And oftentimes people are unaware of these facts. If they knew, I know maybe our behavior towards these posts or these information, maybe it would be different. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I know some of his work in this area. And I think he's trying to educate people about these super spreaders. And I think he finds that that's generally effective.
48:29So I think that That is one route to fixing some of the issues we have with social media is either I talked about my unfollow study earlier, you can unfollow those super spreaders, you can clear up your feed and your information diet, or you can just be more aware and have some literacy about these super spreaders. Your paper also outlines how structural futures of information environments such as algorithms, platform design, these platforms norms and network size and properties interact with these psychological processes. And in your review, you also mentioned historically much of the research has framed the comparison as online versus offline information environments.
49:09But now with the expansion of both offline and online spaces, each with distinct structural characteristics, it seems the landscape is far more complex now. How do you see these varying structural differences shaping the ways people engage with information across different contexts? And in what ways might this challenge or expand our traditional understandings of information dissemination and our behavior towards these information? So yeah, your point about how the online and offline world is increasingly interconnected is, that's a good one. And that's one we grapple with a bit. It can be so hard to study social media because, you know, more than half the world is on social media and it has such complex effects, basically.
49:57It doesn't just affect individuals. It affects communities. And it's really hard to even isolate online and offline behavior because what happens online informs our offline discussions and vice versa. It's super interconnected. In this paper, we try to zoom in on a few structural features of social media environments and online environments and explore what their impact might be and how their impact might be different than offline environments. I emphasize the online and offline similarities. People are people wherever they go. hostile people tend to be hostile online and offline. We tend to be attracted to negativity in all contexts.
50:34So there are important similarities, but there are also important differences. One difference is algorithms, for instance. You don't have algorithms mediating your in-person conversations, basically. I say that, but then I immediately think that there are things like dating apps that use algorithms to filter who you talk to in real life. So that's one important nuance. But basically, when you're having an in-person conversation with someone, your messages aren't being filtered by algorithms and i i think that's a key difference algorithmic audits of twitter's algorithm for instance have found that what tends to be shown in the algorithmic as opposed to the non-algorithmic feed on twitter tends to be more negative about the outgroup tends to be more polarizing as expected especially in a political domain and tends to not align with people's stated preferences.
51:23Interestingly, this doesn't seem to be the case for non-political tweets. The algorithm seems pretty good at showing us effective non-political tweets, but when it comes to politics, it will usually show us the most divisive posts. So that's one important structural feature that's really, really hard to study, actually, because we don't really know how algorithms work under the hood. A lot of the engineers of the algorithms also don't know how they work under the hood. But there have been great audit studies, like the one that I just mentioned, some of the ones that we study, that try to get at it.
51:54Another structural feature is design features of social media platforms. So one thing that's interesting about Twitter, as opposed to Reddit, for instance, is that you have a like button and that you have a retweet button, but you don't have a dislike button. And that probably informs what goes viral, because the algorithm can't have negative signals of what people dislike or what people don't want to see. Jeremy Freimer has some great work where he finds that the most liked posts on Twitter tend to be paradoxically the least liked. And he also finds that they tend to have the lowest like per retweet ratio.
52:36So basically, what happens here is really divisive or toxic content gets retweeted a lot. And as a result, it gets shown to more people and it gets more likes, but it has a lower like to retweet ratio indicating it's less liked. And he also had independent reviewers review these posts with the low like to retweet ratio. And he confirmed that the like to retweet ratio seems to be a good indicator of whether or not someone actually likes or approves of a tweet. So this phenomenon happens on Twitter, basically, where these tweets that people don't like will just be highly liked because they're highly seen.
53:17They're so retweeted, they drive a big conversation because they're very polarizing. So adding a dislike button could potentially change those dynamics, for instance. So that's an aspect of a design feature. Other researchers have found that if you added a trust button or a misleading button to a social media posts, or if you actually had someone rate the accuracy of a post and you added that as an algorithmic input, that would absolutely change social media. So that's another key design feature that's important. Another important structural feature is the norms of various social media platforms.
53:52The norms of LinkedIn are very different from the norms of TikTok. And we have preliminary research suggesting that negativity doesn't seem to go as viral on LinkedIn. It seems to be more about arousal as opposed to negativity. Some people talk about toxic positivity on LinkedIn. There isn't really a norm about being negative or engaging in outgroup animosity, whereas I think the norms of Twitter, especially after Elon Musk purchased Twitter, became quite divisive and polarizing. So that also shows how the norms of a social media platform can rapidly switch. The norms of Twitter rapidly switch after Elon Musk purchased Twitter.
54:26Another important structural feature is network size, or network size and structure, I would say, because those are both important. One key difference between social media and the offline world is there are hostile individuals online and offline, but online hostile individuals have huge networks and they can spread misinformation and toxicity around the world rapidly in just a few minutes amplified by attention-grabbing social media algorithms. Now, there are also super spreaders in the offline world, I was looking at the literature on gossip, and there are super spreaders of gossip as well. There are people who gossip way more than others.
55:05But what's interesting about the gossip super spreader literature is it suggests that while a little bit of gossip predicts increased friendship, it will predict you having more friends, people who gossip the most actually have the least amount of friends. It's a negative predictor of friendship. And this is the opposite of what happens on social media, where spreading rumors and toxicity and hostility will get you a lot of followers. If you're more extreme, you have a lot of followers. But if you're like that in the offline world, that won't get you a lot of attention. So those are four structural features that we talk about algorithms, design features, norms, and networks.
55:42It's so interesting to see that we see all these patterns looking at different platforms, different cognitive processes, different people who are engaging with different mediums. I think what you're doing here with this review is pointing us to a direction saying that how we study it doesn't matter because we see all these things happening across platforms, across mediums, online or offline. Thank you. At the end of your review, you talk about some of the future direction. You mentioned that most of this literature is conducted on English language data in Western world. There are not that many cross-cultural references happening.
56:23Looking ahead, how did this review direct you? Or where did this review direct you? How do you describe the paper? I liked how you described the paper because we wanted to be really big and grand with this paper. We wanted it to be a big review that's all-encompassing of virality across history, across context, across online and offline, around the globe, for instance. I think one key important point for the future of the field is looking at virality on a global scale. As you mentioned, there are very few cross-cultural studies. This is a problem that's inherent to social science and a lot of psychology in general is that we don't have enough cross-cultural research and most of our samples are limited to a United States context.
57:10And there's some preliminary research that suggests that what goes viral in other contexts might be very different. For instance, there's work conducted by Jeannie Psy at Stanford. Instead of viral, they talked about information being contagious, which they operationalize as more likely to impact people and change how they communicate on social media. So they looked at something slightly different from virality, but it's related, I think. So basically, they found that high arousal negativity was contagious in the United States, But in more collectivist cultures like Japan, it was actually high arousal positivity that was more contagious.
57:48And one potential explanation for this stems from Jeanne's size theory of ideal affect, different cultures prioritize different emotions. So for instance, individualist cultures like the US prioritize high arousal positive emotions like excitement, whereas more collectivist cultures tend to prioritize low arousal positive emotions. So the fact that we value and express emotions differently in different cultures will probably mean that we'll get lots of results in different cultures. And I thought that work was very inspiring. And it inspired a project that I thought of with my advisor that we call the global virality study.
58:25We thought of it actually a few years ago, where we really wanted to look at what goes viral in countries around the world. And we really wanted to look at cross-cultural differences and country-level moderators, like individualism, collectivism, perhaps moderating what goes viral in different countries. And what's interesting is that when we initially thought of this idea, this was before large language models took off. And some of our methods for doing text analysis were a lot worse. It was a lot harder to analyze text from multiple countries around the globe. But in 2023, I published a paper on how GPT is a really, really effective tool for analyzing text, analyzing psychological constructs in texts in multiple languages.
59:12We found that GPT was highly effective at detecting sentiment, emotions, and other psychological constructs in 12 different languages, including a lot of lesser spoken languages. So now that we have large language models in AI, we have a lot of potential to analyze what goes viral around the globe and look at these cross-cultural differences. And that's what I'm trying to do with some of my current and future work. And also, I think AI unlocks some interesting new methods such as agent-based models that can simulate people and and simulate groups of people, and simulate societies, and what goes viral in groups of people.
59:50I mentored James Hay on this paper where he was using little societies of large language models interacting with each other to basically simulate collective behavior. And he found that not only do large language models seem to simulate individual behavior, but they also simulate collective behavior, like our tendency to form echo chambers or engage in homophily. So we He's now left academia. He's founding a startup called Artificial Societies that aims to do this on a really large scale and simulate giant societies to look at how messages spread within communities. I really think AI has just unlocked our methods and will lead to sort of a revolution in our methods of studying virality to the same scale, or perhaps even a bigger scale, to what the internet did to our ability to do computational social science.
1:00:40I'm really excited for AI-based methods for the future of virality. Thank you so much for giving us all these insights into your paper. Before we leave our conversation, I just want to ask one more question. For students or professionals who are interested in both psychology, social psychology, and technology, what advice would you give them for bridging the gap between these two fields? Are there key skills or knowledge areas they should focus on? And also like Stanford psychology podcast, it's basically a science communication platform. And I know that you're also big on science communication.
1:01:21And how do you think that is helping you do science? Yeah, great questions. Okay, so first, my advice for students who are interested in the psychology of technology, my advice might differ depending on whether you come from a psychology background or a more technical background like computer science. My advice for people who don't maybe come from a psychological background or are steeped in psychological theory is I think I have really benefited from basing all my work and all my questions pretty deeply in psychological theories. Like social identity theory, like motivated cognition, naive realism.
1:01:57I really base my questions about how we interact with technology on the psychological literature and psychological theory. And I think that really helps us create better questions and do better studies. It gets you much further than just saying, what is the impact of AI or what is the impact of social media to really zoom in on a psychological theory. And then my advice for students who are really already steeped in psychological theory is get their hands on new methods. What I really benefited from early in my PhD was really taking the time to get effective at computational social science and analyzing big data, learning these new methods, your PhD is probably really the only time in your career where you'll be able to sit down and learn all these new methods.
1:02:46And some of my broad advice too is pick your advisor carefully. Advisors really, really matter. In academia, your PhD and postdoc advisor, I'm very lucky with the advisors I've had who have been absolutely incredible, who let me be both independent, but also steered me in the right direction and gave me really amazing advice at all times. I'll connect this advice question to my work on science communication, because my background in theater and playwriting and writing was so transferable to science and really, really helped me both in science and science communication. And sort of toward the end of my time as an undergrad, I began writing op-eds, for instance, The Guardian or Psychology Today, and I was writing about the work of Rob Willer or the work of J.
1:03:33Vaughn Babel, who ended up being my postdoc advisor, and that really helped me think through ideas and communicate ideas well. And learning to communicate is so important, and science communication, it helped me form better ideas, and it helped me write scientific articles better. And how you communicate your idea is so important to having your idea go viral or spread widely. Like communication is so important. And academic writing can be so hard, it can be really dense. I think doing science communication really teaches you to be clear. And yeah, so also some more background, I've been running this science TikTok channel, Steve Psychology, for the past five years.
1:04:14I've been able to grow a following on that platform, and that also helps me with public speaking. It will help me with teaching in the future. I think doing science communication, it's often underappreciated in some departments, especially more traditional psychology departments. But I think it's really important growing your skill set in writing and communicating, which is so central to the field. And more than that, it's also just really valuable to see just how people outside of academia and outside of the ivory tower will benefit from their work. It's really nice to see people excited about my work and about psychology work in general and see how psychology ideas benefit people's lives.
1:04:58And I think a lot of us are in research, not just because we want to communicate to other academics, but we want our research to have an impact on the world. And I think one of the greatest ways our work can have an impact is through science communication and through spreading it to the world. Such a wonderful way to wrap up the episode. Thank you so much for joining me, Steve. Thank you. thank you so much for listening if you enjoyed this podcast help us make even more people excited about science by leaving us a review on spotify apple podcast or elsewhere and subscribing to our no spam all fun substack at stanford scipod to connect with other listeners you can also shoot us an email with your thoughts or suggestions at stanford scipodcast at gmail.com thank you and have a wonderful day
1:05:47Thank you.
From the publisher
Su chats with Dr. Steve Rathje. Dr. Rathje is an incoming Assistant Professor of Human-Computer Interaction in the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University. He is an NSF and AXA postdoctoral fellow at New York University. Steve’s work centers on the psychology of technology. He studies how core psychological phenomena like polarization, intergroup conflict, the spread of information, and mental health interact with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and social media. Through a combination of behavioral science, computational methods, and large-scale data, his research sheds light on how our minds and our societies are being shaped in the digital age. In today's episode, we discuss his research background together with his recent review paper “The psychology of virality," in which they explore why certain content spreads rapidly online and offline, often involving a mix of emotional, social, and structural factors..
Steve’s paper: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2025.06.014
Steve’s personal website: https://stevenrathje.com/
Su’s Twitter @sudkrc & Bluesky @sudkrc.bsky.social
Podcast Twitter @StanfordPsyPod
Podcast Substack https://stanfordpsypod.substack.com/
Let us know what you thought of this episode, or of the podcast! :) stanfordpsychpodcast@gmail.com




