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Talking AI

27 Oct 2026 · 36m · 19 chapters

Episode artwork

The New Attack Surface Is Everything Your Agent Can Chain Its Way To: Cogent's Anirudh Ravula on AI Security

In short

AI security for agentic systems—how the “attack surface” shifts from networks to anything an AI agent can chain together (tools, code, email, cloud, customer data), and why defenders must move from guardrails to agent/harness security.

Guests

Anirudha Ravula, head of AI at Cogent (raised $42M Series A); builds agents that find and fix vulnerabilities at machine speed. Previously: 5 years at Google Research defining modern transformer architecture; founding engineer at ThoughtSpot.

Key claims

Guardrails and sandboxing can fail via “reward hacking” and sandbox escape (OpenAI cyber benchmark agent escaped despite no internet intent). Defenders must assume capability can be distilled from coding models; gating access doesn’t gate capability. “Harness” (tools, context, policy/enforcement) matters more than the model alone.

Notable examples

OpenAI→Hugging Face incident: package proxy vulnerability enabled broader internet access; tens of thousands of files accessed over ~5 days; Hugging Face detected only after ~2 days. Berkeley work on agents hacking benchmarks; Exploit Gym dataset. Cogent approach: security “world model” + simulated attack-path discovery; iterative context building with validation gates and background “swarm” agents.

Written by AI. May contain mistakes.

Chapters

0:45

Introduction of Guest Anirudh Ravula

Matt introduces Anirudh Ravula and his background in AI security.

“And before that, he spent five years at Google Research on the team that helped define the modern transformer architecture.”
1:02

Hugging Face and OpenAI Incident

Discussion begins on the Hugging Face and OpenAI security incident.

“And I want to start with the hugging face, OpenAI drama.”
1:15

AI Agent Behavior During Benchmark Testing

Anirudh explains how the AI agent escaped its sandbox during testing.

“So the attacker's AI had no guardrails and the defender had too many, right?”
2:54

The New Security Landscape

Exploration of how the landscape of AI security is evolving.

“it found a vulnerability on that package.”
4:24

The Implications of AI Agent Behavior

Discusses the implications of AI agents acting without harmful intent yet causing security issues.

“Defenders are having to operate in a different setting than attackers today.”
6:01

Understanding New Attack Surfaces

Anirudh describes what the new attack surfaces look like for companies.

“So I think going back to the opening eye, hugging face incident, the good thing is that there was no evidence that the agent was actively trying to harm any production system.”
7:42

Building Solutions at Cogent

Anirudh shares how Cogent is addressing AI security challenges.

“A lot of our listeners, they may not be the most technical AI savvy folks, but they know this is a risk.”
9:45

Using Open Source Models in AI Security

Discussion on the use of open-source models for improving AI security.

“Because obviously the short answer is, okay, we're using AI to combat AI and how it's attacking and whatnot.”
12:30

Future Trends in AI and Security

Explores the future of AI security and potential industry shifts.

“Or do you think we'll be in a world in call it five years where there's still three, two, three big frontier players and 80, 90 % of people use just those?”
14:00

Exploring Attack Vectors in Open Source AI Models

Learn about potential security risks associated with open-source AI models and the importance of community vigilance.

“So I've heard this debate on several different sides.”
Show all 19 chapters
16:00

Understanding the Importance of Harnesses in AI

Discover the concept of a harness in AI and why it may be more critical than the model itself.

“I feel like anything's possible in today's age, in a sense.”
20:20

Building Effective Context Management for AI Agents

Learn about strategies for managing context in AI systems, especially for long-running tasks.

“It's an interesting, fun little experiment, but how do you think about this, this problem of context, getting it when you need it, especially when we start to have agents that are working for potentially hours at a time?”
23:10

Evolving AI Skills and Harness Engineering

Explore the evolution of AI skills and how harness engineering changes with new model generations.

“We avoid one potentially bad trajectory getting out of the way.”
28:00

AI in Software Development at Cogent

Learn how AI is integrated into different aspects of software development at Cogent.

“and essentially like you are using AI and building Cogent in a sense in the code base.”
28:36

Optimizing for AI Agents

Discover how the optimization process changes when considering AI agents as developers.

“So it's not just code generation, it's code review, testing the product, design iteration, writing design docs, ops review for the engineering teams, debugging production incidents, deployment orchestration.”
30:21

Feedback Loops and Knowledge Capture

Understand the significance of feedback loops and knowledge management for AI agents.

“I'm curious just how you think about that in a new company nowadays and any unique instances or use cases of that.”
32:11

Future of Security Operations with AI

Explore predictions for AI's role in security operations and the potential landscape in two years.

“To wrap it up, paint me the picture, security operations 24 months from now, what are AI agents doing?”
34:16

Human Role in AI-Driven Security

Learn about the shifting role of humans in a future where AI handles security tasks.

“Well, last question for you though, where is the human in the loop in this future?”
34:58

Closing Thoughts and Resources

Get final insights from Anirudh and resources to learn more about Cogent.

“Where can people learn more about Kojin, find you?”
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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00If the response to all this is to vote an AI feature on the same tooling and carry on, then most security teams will simply be underwater in two years.

0:09Matt Paige: Welcome to the Talking AI Podcast, where we talk AI with both experts in the field and early adopters. I'm your host, Matt Paige, and we're here to demystify AI for you so you can get some value from it. Let's talk some AI. Your attack surface used to be your network. Now it's everything your AI agents can reach, your code, your email, your cloud, your customer's data. And we just got a preview of what means with the recent hugging face and open AI drama. And my guest lives on the defense side of the story. Anirudha Ravula is the head of AI at Coach and Security, which raised$42 million Series A about six months after launch to build agents that find and fix vulnerabilities at machine speed.

0:50Matt Paige: And before that, he spent five years at Google Research on the team that helped define the modern transformer architecture. He's the founding engineer at ThoughtSpot going from zero to unicorn. Anirudha, welcome to Talking AI. Yeah, thanks, Matt. Great to be here. Yeah, excited for this discussion. And I want to start with the hugging face, OpenAI drama. So your co-founder and CTO wrote a post about it with a line that I want to go deeper on. So the attacker's AI had no guardrails and the defender had too many, right? And so essentially, I can kind of break down the story and please fill holes as I go, but essentially, OpenAI had a new model.

1:29Matt Paige: It's not in production right now, right? And they were doing some benchmark testing, and the model was essentially taking the test for the benchmarks. And in order to do better on that test, it actually escaped its own environment, went out, and found answers to the test. And in the process, essentially broke into Hugging Face and their domain. but give us some context on how that's possible and where this new world of security is going. Yeah. So the setup was as follows. OpenAI was measuring how good their models are at cybersecurity tasks. And every provider evaluates their models across a wide range of domains and tasks.

2:09You have to know what the model can do before you ship it, right? And for an evaluation like this, and in particular for cyber, you do turn off those guardrails that these models are trained with, right? Otherwise, you're not measuring the underlying model capability, but you're measuring the filter, right? So in this case, the guardrails were turned off, the agent was operating inside a sandbox, and it was not supposed to have any internet access. Think of it as working on a homework inside the sandbox. So it can't go out and cheat, exactly, right? Yeah, it is not supposed to, right? It is not supposed to go out and cheat.

2:46And which is why they cut off access to the internet in some ways, or at least they thought they cut off the access. But then it got out anyway. So there was like a package manager, package proxy that was there on that sandbox, and it found a vulnerability on that package. And through that, it was able to find its way out to the internet, right? And it's still the package proxy was only supposed to give it a very narrow access to internet, but it broke out of that and got broader access to the internet, right? And then it figured out that the Ancestorist benchmark could be sitting on Hugging Faces infrastructure and data stores and went looking after for them.

3:23And all that it was chasing throughout this five-day attack was basically solution to that data set that could potentially be present on Hugging Faces data stores. So four different services along the way on the internet have been compromised, tens of thousands of factions over a five-day period. And the surprising part to me was that it was inside the Hugging Face infrastructure for more than two days before they caught it and cut it off.

3:50Matt Paige: And the crazy thing too is that they couldn't figure it out with just the standard frontier models out there due to the guardrails. They actually had to use, I believe, what was it, GL 5.2, like an open weight, open source model to figure it out. So you have this like interplay right now where the attackers, the hackers, the people that are trying to attack your systems are leveraging potentially models that don't have these guard rails in the open weight sense. And then you're trying to protect it with these guard rails in place. Like there's this imbalance in a sense that's at play right now on the frontier.

4:23Yeah, absolutely. Defenders are having to operate in a different setting than attackers today. And if you think about it, when Anthropite put out Mythos, they were quite open about this. In their own words, they said the performance on cyber tasks emerged as a downstream consequence of generally training the model to be good at coding and reasoning, right? And the same improvements also happened to make it better on downstream cyber tasks. So what this means in theory is that an adversary can distill your model on coding tasks, never running into refusals, and get better at cyber as a result. And distillation isn't hard.

5:00It's widely believed to be happening already. Gating cyber access isn't the same as gating cyber capability. Yeah, yeah.

5:06Matt Paige: The other part that kind of blows my mind too when you think about this, like OpenAI had no intention of the model going and attacking hugging face and doing all this. It had a goal to do the test against the benchmarks and whatnot. And this is the way that it went to solve it. So you almost have two things at play here. You have hackers and people that are intentionally trying to hack certain systems. And then you have the unintentional consequences of just everyday people, everyday companies that are giving their agents or multiple agents goals to go do something. And there's almost this fallout potential from that.

5:44Matt Paige: So I just wonder, is there almost an element of this where companies should be proactive in terms of that there isn't these like negative consequences that their agents are doing by accident in a sense? Yeah. So I think going back to the opening eye, hugging face incident, the good thing is that there was no evidence that the agent was actively trying to harm any production system. Right. So it was purely trying to get the answer to a problem. So it's benign in nature. Yeah. Yes. Think of it as a student trying to cheat on a homework, right? So that's really what it was. And then HuggingFace noticed that every destructive call that it could make, it was issued in like a safe mode and it was just trying to map what it could reach.

6:30And it was not being intentionally about breaking things. But then by the end, it did have access to admin controls, right? So it could have destroyed the systems of it if that's what it was going for, right? So it was the intent of the agent and not the capability that saved hugging face here, which is scary if you think about it. And in reinforcement learning, we call this reward hacking. It shows up whenever there's somebody that is trying to gain a particular task. And actually, this is pretty well documented when it comes to benchmarks. There was a work out of Berkeley where they built an agent to attack benchmarks instead of solving them with near perfect scores on nine out of 10 tasks.

7:08And interestingly, Exploit Gym, the benchmark that this OpenAI agent was tasked with, is all sort of Berkeley, like the Exploit Gym dataset, right? That's interesting. Yeah. So I think, but then in those benchmarks where the Berkeley lab found that the agents were hacking, the setup was very different. The evaluation infrastructure was separated from the agent, was not very well separated from the agent. But then in this case, to be fair, the environment and the containment was pretty solid, and it still wasn't enough. Right. So it was just that the agent was a whole lot more determined here.

7:42Matt Paige: Zoom out for me. A lot of our listeners, they may not be the most technical AI savvy folks, but they know this is a risk. So what does the new attack surface look like? Take just a midsize company out there. They have a dozen agents deployed. What are the attack vectors at play? What are the most common attack vectors? What are the things people should be most prepared for in a sense? Yeah, I think the common answer here that most people kind of agree about is that it's everything that your agents can reach, right? So all the tools and systems and the data that you've connected them to. Now, that is true.

8:20That is definitely interesting. But then there is another interesting part because reach, right? So what your agent can reach makes it sound like it's like a list that you can go and lock it down. You can audit and call it a day, right? Now, if you pick Hugging Face, right? So if you audited the evaluation sandbox on day one and asked what all things could the agent reach, the answer would have been the package proxy. And that's about it, right? But then in reality, it broke out of the package proxy through enumeration and through thousands of actions. And five days later, the same process was on Hugging Face's corporate network, right?

8:54So the way I would put this is that the new attack's purpose is everything your agent can chain its way to. And once it's inside, it changed, like in case of a fucking face incident, once it was inside, it chained together things you wouldn't necessarily have classified as critical, right? None of those individual weaknesses in the system were necessarily a P0. And plenty of enterprises actually have far worse sitting in their environments, right? So chaining them together used to take a rare kind of expert and now it's become easy.

9:27Matt Paige: And that's the scary part. It's almost like there's this Rubik's cube of tons of combinations that the agent can play to get to where it wants to go. And it's, to your point, it's just not easy to solve. So what, and this, like, this is what you're building at Cogent effectively. So how are you thinking about solving this problem? Because obviously the short answer is, okay, we're using AI to combat AI and how it's attacking and whatnot. But how are you thinking about that from a model standpoint? I'm assuming that you are fine-tuning models and making things very hyper-focused and specific to security in a sense.

10:07Matt Paige: But how are you thinking through what you're building? We internally built out a security world model. Think of it as like this concept where the agents and the underlying models that we've first trained have extremely rich and detailed understanding and insights into your environment. and they're also trained to discover these potential attack paths that can be chained together very easily, right? The model runs the simulation behind the scenes to discover all possible attack paths and the likelihood of each of these attack paths being exploited, and then uses that information, combines that with the context of the environment to surface things that the customers should address ASAP.

10:47It's been working pretty well to that end.

10:50Matt Paige: That's super interesting. And so, but how do you, I guess what I'm trying to get, you mentioned the world model. So are you actually from square one building your own model effectively, or are you taking something existing or open source and tailoring it for this use case or some combination? Cause when you say world model, my mind immediately goes to what Google talks about when they talk about world models and all of these different things. And they talk about being able to move around in a world model. and was it Omni, I believe they've mentioned, is that like the same kind of thing or different in a sense?

11:23So, yeah, no, I guess the world model here is really was just mainly used as an analogy. So it's not like the robotic simulation type world model, but I guess the, like the in spirit, I think it kind of maps back to similar things where you're training on enterprise, like hyper realistic enterprise environments and using those RL environments to train your models and kind of making them good at some of the defensive tasks, right? Most of these models are pretty good at offensive capabilities and they're good at detecting vulnerabilities given a targeted code base. But then oftentimes, what does that actually translate to for a defense is not super clear.

12:00So yeah, how do you, so we kind of use those capabilities from open source models too. So that's, we recently built something on top of an open source model, but we also use a lot of closed source models and build agents on top of that.

12:12Matt Paige: I feel like we're going to start to see so much more of this just with companies with everyday tasks, whatever domain specific thing they want to solve for. I feel like obviously you're in the security space, but you could apply the same thing to in number of domains out there effectively. I'm curious, do you see that pattern proliferating in other domains? Or do you think we'll be in a world in call it five years where there's still three, two, three big frontier players and 80, 90 % of people use just those? I think it really depends on the task at hand and what is it that you as a company are trying to achieve.

12:50But yes, I think some of these recent incidents have definitely shook the industry and folks are, I guess the open source community is a lot more vibrant now. There's a lot of chatter around the open source community around how being dependent on just one or two vendors is a scary thing, right? And this is also very nuanced, right? So they're not talking about cutting off access to anybody. Like in this particular case, Hugging Face had the access, right? So it was not like Hugging Face was not able to use the models. It was just that the capability that you are paying for changed under you without any notice at the worst possible moment, right?

13:27Yeah. So in that sense, I think like the relationship with vendor is very different in this case, but the access to the capability itself is changing. So what this actually means is that I think enterprises are starting to also realize that your capability and your product or the services cannot depend on somebody else's willingness to serve you and that you need to have a plan A, plan B, and a plan C, right? And plan A can absolutely be using frontier models, if that makes sense for you, but you always need a fallback option. You need a plan B, a plan C, whether that is using open source models or open weights models or training your own model, hosting it in your infrastructure, whatever that be.

14:06Yeah.

14:06Matt Paige: So I'm curious about this. So I've heard this debate on several different sides. So take an open source model, you're actually hosting it on your own infrastructure, open weights and everything. Are there still potential attack vectors that could be leveraged in the big debate is with Chinese open source models. And is it safe to go and use those? because they are so good, but are there still potential risks out there? And I don't think anything's actually been documented, but I guess from your standpoint on the security side, I guess I'm asking, is it theoretically possible? So there still could be attack vectors at play with an open source model that you're running on your own infrastructure or whatnot.

14:46Yeah, 100%, but I think that's where the power of open source and the community comes in, right? So it's things hopefully like, you know, get discovered way faster, get fixed also pretty fast. and yeah model poisoning poisoning the weights of the model is very well documented and is an active area of research right so where somebody changes something very small during the training process or tricks the model into training training incorrectly or training for an incorrect objective manipulating it through data sets so all of these are very common and they're done for sure but i guess it's i've not heard at least like today till date anything with k3 like a chemi k3 or a glm 5-2 or like any of your SCME models or GLM models falling under that bucket or have actually been exposed to attacks like that.

15:32So I think, but it's possible. If the question is it possible, I think that's possibly like the attack vector of an agent. Like even if you were to build an agent on top of, I guess like close source frontier models, I think the attack vector, like your own agent being an attack vector is never out of equation. But then you also have no choice, right? So if you are a security team in an enterprise, you have no choice, but to almost defend AI with AI. Otherwise, it's just not going to scale.

15:59Matt Paige: Yeah, exactly. That's interesting. I feel like anything's possible in today's age, in a sense. But you have this, I want to shift to this. You have a thesis around the harness and why it matters so much. And even to the point saying the harness matters more than the model itself. And I went for our audience, because I think a lot of people have heard of the term a harness. But what is a harness, right? Right. And then why is it so important in relation to the model, which is also important, but how do you think about, how should our audience think about what a harness is and how to leverage it?

16:30Matt Paige: And maybe some examples of what they are. Yeah. So the model itself is basically a function, text in, text out. For the most part, it has no memory. It cannot touch anything. It stops when it stops, right? The harness is everything else. What tools can it call, what, and how those tools are described to it, what goes into the context window of a model, what gets thrown away, what it writes down, what it reads back later, whether it's one agent or several, how they hand off work between them and who's holding the state. And then there is also the control side, right? So the policy and enforcement layer on top of these agents, on top of these models, what is it allowed to do without asking anyone and what checks have to fire before an action goes through?

17:12What happens when a step fails and then it's done. So everything except intelligence basically is hardness. And the intelligence itself comes from the model. The hardness is what turns that into an agent, right? So something that can actually run a complicated job for hours on end, well past anything that a model could hold in its context window on its own.

17:34Matt Paige: When you think of like clock code, that's a harness, right? Codex, that's a form of a harness, co-work and things like that. But I guess how should companies think about building their own unique harnesses for specific functions in their company or their work? Or should they? I guess when should you do that versus just leveraging the tools you have at the frontier level and whatnot? Yeah, I think that's a great question. Again, it depends on the task and the cost sensitiveness of that company for their product and services that they're offering, right? Now, I can give a framework for how to think about it.

18:11So if you are a company that's trying to solve some workflow or a given task, you can map the task as a proxy to one of the benchmark tasks on which these models are evaluated. Maybe, let's say, the nature of the services and the task or the workflows that you're trying to automate, if it can be mapped closely to the capabilities of a coding model, then you look for the capabilities and the benchmarks on this coding tasks across these frontier models, right? And then compare that with where the open source models stand. If the delta is very small, then it is probably something that you can very easily close through hardness engineering, right?

18:53So just having a better hardness. Now, if the delta is slightly big, and now I think like there is recent research that's coming out and active area of research that's becoming popular, is that even when the delta is slightly larger, so maybe 10, 20 percentage points, absolute percentage points difference, you can still cover it through hardness and by building better hardnesses. So in all of those cases, I think it just makes sense to focus on the hardness itself and use like a cheaper model or like an open source model. Now, however, if you're somebody that is not cost sensitive, right then you would rather take one variable out of the equation right so just go with the the best possible frontier model out there because then you don't have to answer this question hey was it the hardness was it the model was it my task what is it that is broken right so you actually remove the like you you go for the maximum intelligence in in an in an attempt to push the agentic frontier capabilities and what is possible with some of these models and then work your way from there, right?

19:55So it depends on where you are on the cost sensitivity spectrum.

20:00Matt Paige: You mentioned a term called supply-side context. Context is critical. And on top of that, we also have agents that are running for literally hours at a time. I randomly the other day had CloudCode go and build me a clone of Call of Duty, and it spent the entire night going off and building it. And I had different sub-agents going through and building different components of it. It's an interesting, fun little experiment, but how do you think about this, this problem of context, getting it when you need it, especially when we start to have agents that are working for potentially hours at a time?

20:35Yeah. I think everybody knows that context is useful and that it's what makes the agent useful, right? But then what very few talk about is how you get it, right? And the usual answer is like rag or graph rag or larger context windows, better retrieval, designing better retrieval systems. But then retrieval assumes that answer is sitting somewhere in one passage somewhere. But then that's usually not the case for our domain, for security domain. And we internally spend a lot of time thinking about how do we collect context autonomously, right? So we run hundreds of background agents that continuously map out a customer's environment, that read across tens of different data sources, clouds, scanners, ticketing controls, Slack, internal docs, and map out what is there.

21:17And one way I like to think about it, and it's a decent analogy from my experience, free training large language models, is that we have a first swarm that is doing free training. Now, this is just like an analogy. So we're not actually training any weights of the model or updating weights of the model. But just from an analogy and for building intuition, it helps to think that this initial swarm of agents as doing the free training task, right? So there is no specific task. It is just building a security, like a world model of the environment. And after that stage, the agents are hopefully already good at a wide range of security tasks out of the box, right?

21:52And then if you want them to be tuned for something very specific, like auto-remediation or attack path analysis, we run what is called as a post-training stage where another swarm of agents, they kind of try to align the context to what the task needs and what the human actually wants. So this is, again, this maps to the reinforcement learning stage of large language model training. And in both these stages, we push for iterative improvement rather than trying to get everything in one run. So a lot of our long-running background agents, they have this iterative nature, right? So they're not trying to just finish the task in one run.

22:28In fact, we actually break the task and we break them into many runs that span for many weeks. And in both these stages, right, so we do this iterative improvement with validation and a gate at every step. So nothing gets promoted to the main context until it's been checked. and everything downstream reads of that. So what this protects us from is that one bad trajectory or one flaky data source shouldn't be able to poison the context. And look at it, there is like a recent research paper at iClear this year where they prove that if there is more errors in a model's context, the likelihood of the model producing an error on the next token is much higher, right?

23:10So we can avoid that. We break it up into multiple runs. We avoid one potentially bad trajectory getting out of the way. And so what we go for is many smaller runs. By small, I don't mean like we artificially constrain it, but then we just encourage the model to learn iteratively or the agent to learn iteratively. And yeah, I think so this has been working pretty well for us. Yeah.

23:33Matt Paige: It's super interesting. It's like a whole new domain because context is just so important. It's like you now have version control of context in a sense. But it's also context specific to the task, the question, whatever it has to do at that point, which gets, I get to the term you mentioned, supply side context. It's like having the right context at the right time, in a sense, from this being built up over time. That's extremely, I feel like that's a whole business approach in and of itself. That's correct. And then this also falls under the area of meta-harnesses that some companies have already been exploring too.

24:09And we internally have been independently exploring, which is where can you have the agent build out the harness itself by optimizing it for the task at hand? Maybe there is a task and you split the task up into like a validation set and an evaluation set and the training set. and then you have the agent build out the harness, optimize for the task, and then you use this development sets and the training sets to kind of optimize for the harness and then you evaluate against the actual test set. It's almost like the agent building out the harness for the task at hand. Optimizing and kind of automating harness engineering too for the task at hand.

24:46Matt Paige: Another interesting angle, I'd be curious your take here, like skills, cloud skills, skills you can use in any tool and platform or whatnot have been such a big thing, but I feel like there's this future ahead of us to where you don't actually have to dictate or design a skill. It's just the models determining and creating their own skills over time. And I think it was Boris Turney the other day was saying, you should just completely delete all of your skills, your clot.md file, because the models are getting so good and you don't want kind of the stale old context and way of doing things over time.

25:18Matt Paige: Like any thoughts on that statement for him and the evolution of skills as they are today? So I think, I think it's, it's also a very live area. Like in the sense, every, every new model generation makes you revert the harness a little bit. Right. And you're right, Boris, I guess Boris, somebody from the CloudCode team has publicly said that when their newest models came out, they deleted like 80 % of the system prompt. Right. So yeah. Yeah. But then that doesn't necessarily mean that the hardness actually got simpler so much as the change shape, right? So you take a few things out and then you put a few things back around where, around whatever the model is now good at.

25:58But yeah, it's a very live area, the whole hardness engineering, how do you adapt it for different models? And does a hardness optimized for one model necessarily work well for other models? Do you need to have separate harnesses across different models. How do you actually build interesting harnesses by observing how, like, how do you build interesting harnesses by using learnings from like a more stronger or a powerful model and distilling them into a harness that can be powered by a much more smaller and cost-effective model. That's interesting.

26:32Matt Paige: You mentioned earlier your time at Google Research, and you were there during the evolution of the transformer architecture. And I believe you were specifically working on long sequence attention. But I'm just curious, like at that point in time, you're working on this, which is going to be one of the most pivotal things, you know, potentially human history, who knows. But like at that point in time, did you think it was going to get to where we are today? Are you, are your mind blown of what, in terms of what it has evolved into? I'm just curious, go back to that point in time, if you can, what were you thinking?

27:04Matt Paige: and like if you had the crystal ball, what would either surprise you or not surprise you about where we are today? Obviously, we did not know that it would end up becoming this big, right? So like the transformer architecture and the effectiveness of how well that would work in practice and the amount of impact it would have, I think that's beyond any single person's wildest imagination, right? So nobody would have thought about it properly, probably. So I think like the biggest surprise was that how general it ended up being and how applicable and how transformative it ended up being in practice.

27:38Yeah, I wouldn't have thought anywhere close to that being a possibility.

27:43Matt Paige: It's so cool to think about being that close to the beginning of all of this, in a sense. You wrote something, it was back in January. Your agent is fine, your process isn't. And I love the framing here because it really gets at the heart of how the software development lifecycle is changing and evolving. and essentially like you are using AI and building Cogent in a sense in the code base. So all of it is in effect, quote unquote, AI generated. But how do you think about using AI in the software development process today and doing it in a safe, secure, reliable manner? Like what techniques and approaches do you think about in that process?

28:29Yeah, so we, that's correct. Most of our code base, almost 100 % is AI generated. And for us, what it means day to day is across the development lifecycle, right? So it's not just code generation, it's code review, testing the product, design iteration, writing design docs, ops review for the engineering teams, debugging production incidents, deployment orchestration. So I guess it's across engineering, product, go to market, everybody's AI at Cogent.

28:57Matt Paige: Which is super interesting because it's like for new companies nowadays, that's just like the going in model, right? I feel like there's so many legacy businesses out there that are trying to make this shift. But a new company like you, it's just, okay, we're already resource constraints. Obviously, we're going to leverage AI and what we're doing and what we're building. And I think these new models and approaches are just starting to emerge natively with startups out there nowadays. That's correct, yeah. And in fact, actually, the more interesting part for engineering is that it changes who you're optimizing for.

29:30The stack that we pick, how the code is laid out, which tools we use. We make all of those decisions, assuming the primary developer and maintainer of this code base is going to be an agent and not a human, right? So that's a genuinely different set of trade-offs.

29:44Matt Paige: And you mentioned the feedback loop becomes critically important. The context window, because that's a limiting factor in a bottleneck, in a sense, when you're building. So it's like you're having to account for these different problems and like bottlenecks in the process that are different from what it was previous to AI in a sense. Yeah, that's right. And I guess I feel like there's a broader thing here as well, just with the concept of closed loop systems. This is not just applicable to engineering. This could be with any process. This could be in marketing. In a sense, it could be marketing, it could be operations, it could be legal.

30:20Matt Paige: But this sense of building closed loop systems where you have feedback coming back into the system. I'm curious just how you think about that in a new company nowadays and any unique instances or use cases of that. Yeah, I think I can give one very specific example for what we do internally with an engineering team at Quagent, right? So we have an internal stack overflow, except it's for our agents, right? So all the bespoke one-off human knowledge that normally just lives in people's minds or gets buried in a Slack thread somewhere, we've made it very easy to capture and to get this information out of people's minds and put this in a place that is easily accessible for agents.

31:05So we've made it easy to get all of that added automatically so that the next time agent hits the same wall, it can go find out an answer to that in this internal stack overflow. So I guess that's a great feedback. double-flicking even more whenever there's a lot of interesting conversations that happen in Slack and it's kind of, it's like a goldmine for knowledge work.

31:24Matt Paige: Oh yeah, but it's hard to weave and it's completely unstructured in a sense, right? Exactly, yeah. It's completely unstructured, but then what we do is that obviously we have our agents connected to Slack internally, but then on top of that, what we do is that whenever there is like a new interesting piece of information that somebody shares or new issue that they ran into and post a solution for how they fix that issue, right? So all this, I guess, knowledge tidbits floating around. We make it easy to get that added to an index that agent can access. So folks just go in and tag a particular thread with an emoji.

31:56And that emoji triggers like the agent feedback loop. So there's like another agent that summarizes the thread, adds it to like our stack overflow, the internal stack overflow for agents, so that all the subsequent agent sessions can benefit from the stack overflow that was built.

32:11Matt Paige: To wrap it up, paint me the picture, security operations 24 months from now, what are AI agents doing? What does the landscape look like? I know it's hard to predict anything three months down, a couple years down in the future. What does the future landscape look like? yeah i think there's nothing much changes if the response to all this is to bolt an ai feature on the same tooling and carry on then most security teams will be under will simply be underwater in two years so what's arriving is machine generated and the triage is human speed and the gap doesn't close by hiring right it's almost like a bit like it's a bit like game of thrones by the end everybody has heard about the white walkers some of them have seen it but very if you actually comprehend the scale of it, right?

32:58I think that's roughly where we are. The version that I think is achievable looks very different, right? In that world, maybe there is no alert queue, no triage queue, no ticketing concept that the security teams are necessarily looking at as their primary focus. Nobody's working on a list because nobody can. And agents are probably doing the investigation and people make decisions. People continue to make the decisions. And the unit of work stops being an alert or a ticket and becomes an attack path. So that's probably where the unit of work shifts. And there's one asymmetry that genuinely favors defenders here.

33:34In a world where both sides are running agents, attackers agents would be walking into the environment. It doesn't know, right? But then hopefully integrators agents are operating in a setup where they are aware of everything about their systems. That's the home advantage that they have. And it's the only structural advantage that any defender has. but it's an edge only if you've actually built it right real systems real intelligent systems doing real security work inside your environment right so asians with genuine context and genuine authority to act otherwise it just becomes a security theater if you don't have that you've

34:08Matt Paige: given away the one advantage that that you had so effectively you need some some dragons to help combat that back to the game of thrones reference or coaching i guess is the alternative in the future you're painting here. Well, last question for you though, where is the human in the loop in this future? Because you mentioned it's not like this ticketing thing that I'm having to maintain this backlog of tickets and escalations and things like that. Where is the human in the future? So I think agents are performing all the grunt work behind the scenes and then humans are deciding on what agent actions to approach and they are the ones providing like deciding the higher level, making the higher level decisions and using the insights from the agents to act on higher level things as opposed to closing one ticket or working on one particular item.

34:56Matt Paige: No, that's interesting. Anirudh, thank you for jumping on and talking AI. Where can people learn more about Kojin, find you? What's the best way to get in touch? Yeah, I think our website is a great starting point. We also have a presence on LinkedIn, Twitter. We also publish a lot of blogs on our website. So all of those usual channels should be pretty good. Also, the blog is very good, by the way. I was checking it out in preparation for this, so I highly recommend that. But Adiru, thank you for jumping on and talking some AI. Awesome. Yeah, thanks, Matt. Thanks for listening to the Talking AI Podcast.

35:27Matt Paige: If you enjoyed the show, give us a follow or subscribe on your favorite podcast platform. And don't forget to leave us a review. We love those. For more info on Talking AI, visit TalkingAiPodcast.com. Quick break in the pod. I keep hearing the same pattern with companies I talk to. Cloud's helping employees move faster, but in many companies, the business itself hasn't changed. The value's still trapped in isolated chats and experiments. And that execution gap is why forward-deployed engineers have become one of AI's most talked-about deployment models. They embed with your team instead of advising from the outside.

35:58Matt Paige: It's also why the FDE model is now central to every client engagement we lead at Hatchworks AI. As an official Anthropic partner, we embed Anthropic-certified FDEs to identify high-value business problems, build and deploy the solution, and put governance and security around it, then transfer the capability back to your team. If your cloud rollout is still mostly individual usage, check out how Hatchworks AI FDEs work at hatchworks.com slash claw dash FDE. You can also find it in the show notes. Now back to the show.

From the publisher

In July, an OpenAI model under evaluation escaped its sandbox through a package-proxy zero-day, broke into Hugging Face's production infrastructure, and went looking for the answers to the benchmark it was being tested on. Nobody told it to attack anything. It wanted a better score.

In this episode of Talking AI, Matt Paige sits down with Anirudh Ravula, Head of AI at Cogent Security, which raised a $42 million Series A to build agents that find and fix vulnerabilities at machine speed. Before Cogent, Anirudh spent five years at Google Research working on long-sequence attention for transformers, and he was a founding engineer at ThoughtSpot.

Anirudh's read on the incident reframes the problem. The attack surface is not a list of what your agents can reach. It is everything they can chain their way to. He explains why defenders end up with more guardrails than attackers, why your AI capability cannot depend on one vendor's willingness to serve you, and why the harness around a model now decides what an agent can do.

In this episode, you'll hear about:

  • What actually happened in the OpenAI and Hugging Face breach, and why the agent's intent, not its capability, limited the damage
  • Why blocking cyber prompts doesn't block cyber capability when models can be distilled on coding tasks
  • The new attack surface: chained weaknesses that were never a P0 on their own
  • How Cogent builds a security world model of a customer's environment
  • Plan A, plan B, plan C: open-weights fallbacks and the risk of a single AI vendor
  • What a harness is, and a framework for when to build your own
  • Supply-side context: swarms of background agents that map an environment over weeks
  • Meta-harnesses, model-generated skills, and deleting most of the system prompt
  • Working on long-sequence attention at Google Research before transformers took over
  • Running an engineering team where agents are the primary developer, plus an internal Stack Overflow for agents
  • The security operations center in 24 months, and where humans still decide

Key moments

  • 00:01:03 The OpenAI and Hugging Face breach, step by step
  • 00:03:49 Defenders vs. attackers: guardrails, Mythos, and distillation
  • 00:05:06 Reward hacking: it was the intent, not the capability
  • 00:07:42 The new attack surface is everything your agent can chain its way to
  • 00:09:27 Cogent's security world model
  • 00:12:12 Plan A, plan B, plan C for AI vendors
  • 00:14:06 Can open-weights models still be an attack vector?
  • 00:15:59 What a harness actually is
  • 00:17:34 When to build your own harness
  • 00:20:00 Supply-side context and agents that run for weeks
  • 00:24:03 Meta-harnesses: agents that build their own harness
  • 00:24:46 Skills, claude.md, and model-generated context
  • 00:26:31 Google Research and the transformer era
  • 00:27:49 Your agent is fine, your process isn't: building AI-native
  • 00:30:07 An internal Stack Overflow for agents
  • 00:32:11 The SOC in 24 months
  • 00:34:11 Where the human sits in the loop
  • 00:34:56 Where to learn more about Cogent

Key Links


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