In short
Podcast Summary: The 1600 - Episode: How The U.S. Came To Fight Israel's War ft. Noah Kulwin
Podcast Overview Title: The 1600 Host: Carlo Versano Description: An unfiltered guide to the politics and culture defining the Trump era, exploring the forces reshaping our world with lawmakers, experts, and modern thinkers.
Episode Overview Episode Title: How The U.S. Came To Fight Israel's War Guest: Noah Kulwin Description: A historical framework for understanding the current U.S. involvement in conflicts related to Iran, touching on the concept of "blowback."
Key Themes and Discussions
Historical Context
- Current U.S. Involvement: The episode discusses the recent U.S. military actions in the Middle East, particularly regarding Iran, and how these are situated within a broader historical framework.
- Concept of Blowback: The guest, Noah Kulwin, introduces the idea of "blowback," explaining it as a self-reinforcing cycle where U.S. interventions create conditions for future conflicts. This concept contrasts with the more simplistic view of unintended consequences.
The Iran-U.S. Relationship
- Cycle of Aggression: Kulwin traces the antagonism towards Iran back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the U.S. support of the Shah, leading to a long-standing aggressive posture.
- Impact of Historical Events: The conversation highlights the 1953 coup that removed democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, illustrating how U.S. actions have fundamentally shaped Iran's current political landscape.
U.S. Military Strategy
- Technological Changes in Warfare: The discussion notes the evolution of warfare, particularly the role of drones and modern tactics in conflicts in the Middle East, and how these have changed the nature of U.S. military engagements.
- Potential Consequences: There is concern about the humanitarian impact and the potential for increased anti-Western sentiment following U.S. military actions, particularly when civilians are harmed.
Israel's Influence
- Israel as a Key Player: Kulwin argues that the current U.S. actions are largely influenced by Israel's geopolitical interests, suggesting that the U.S. is effectively fighting a war for Israel.
- Public Opinion: The episode discusses changing sentiments in the U.S. towards Israel and Palestine, suggesting that there is growing sympathy for the Palestinian cause among the American public.
Critique of U.S. Justifications for War
- Lack of Credible Threats: The podcast questions the validity of U.S. claims regarding Iran as an imminent threat, noting historical instances where Iran has sought diplomatic resolutions rather than conflict.
- Racism and Ideological Narratives: The episode touches on the role of racism in U.S. foreign policy towards Muslim-majority countries, suggesting that it fuels aggressive military postures.
Future Implications
- Destabilization Risks: Discussion includes the potential for destabilization throughout the Middle East as a result of U.S. and Israeli actions, including the risk of creating new refugee crises.
- Kurdish Involvement: The episode mentions the role of Kurdish militants and the implications of U.S. support, including the potential for exacerbating tensions with Turkey.
Conclusion
- Call to Understand History: The conversation emphasizes the importance of understanding historical contexts when analyzing current events in U.S. foreign policy, particularly regarding Middle Eastern conflicts.
- Upcoming Work: Kulwin shares about an upcoming miniseries titled "No Daylight," which will explore the complex relationship between the U.S. and Israel, focusing on moments of tension.
Key Takeaways
- Historical actions shape present conflicts, particularly regarding U.S.-Iran relations.
- The concept of "blowback" illustrates how interventions lead to future conflicts.
- Israel's interests significantly influence U.S. military actions in the Middle East.
- Changing public sentiment in the U.S. could impact future foreign policy regarding Israel and Palestine.
- Understanding the interplay between ideology, racism, and military strategy is crucial in analyzing U.S. foreign policy.
Further Reading and Resources
- [Blowback Podcast](https://blowback.show/)
- [Watch the Episode](https://youtu.be/GIAWhUq3KaQ)
---
This summary encapsulates the intricate discussions from the podcast episode, shedding light on the broader implications of U.S. foreign policy while framing them within historical contexts.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOUnderstanding Blowback in U.S. Foreign Policy
0:45 to 2:49
Discussion on the concept of blowback and its historical context.
“and the blowback that could very well be coming.”
Iran and the Cycle of U.S. Intervention
2:49 to 4:48
Exploration of the U.S.-Iran relations and historical cycles of intervention.
“Well, that's what feels so unsettling about this moment.”
The Long Shadow of the 1953 Coup
4:48 to 6:48
Examining the consequences of the 1953 coup in Iran on current events.
“I know that there are ongoing conversations about setting up things like no-fly zones to support potential Kurdish rebels, which would essentially be fomenting a civil war akin to what we did in Libya in 2011.”
The Iran-Iraq War and U.S. Support
6:48 to 9:32
Discussion on U.S. involvement in the Iran-Iraq War and its implications.
“a leader in pretty much, you know, the Shah of Iran between the 60s and 70s.”
Current Justifications for War with Iran
9:32 to 13:10
Analyzing the justifications given for military actions against Iran.
“And so we had supplied those networks and armed them.”
Iran's Threat Perception and U.S. Strategy
13:10 to 14:09
Exploring the perception of Iran as a threat and implications for U.S. strategy.
“I want to talk about the justifications or the sort of reverse engineering of the justifications that we're getting for this new war out of the administration and their mouthpieces in the media.”
The Justification of Military Action
14:09 to 20:05
Explore the various justifications presented for military action against Iran, including nuclear threats and regime change.
“So you have the nuclear justification, which is always there.”
Racism and Misunderstanding in U.S. Policy
20:05 to 27:51
Discuss how racism and misunderstanding of Islam influence U.S. foreign policy, particularly regarding Iran.
“Trump has also floated a couple sort of like random ones.”
Understanding Blowback in Conflict
28:00 to 29:20
Explore the concept of blowback and its role in U.S. foreign policy, particularly regarding Iran.
“Isn't that part of sort of the blowback story, too?”
The Role of the Kurds in U.S. Strategies
29:20 to 30:40
Discuss the historical and current involvement of Kurdish militants in U.S. strategies against Iran.
“You know, they're opposites, the people that are going to remember those dead schoolchildren and who are going to be motivated by it.”
Show all 25 chapters
Complexities of War and Regional Alliances
30:40 to 33:40
Analyze the complicated geopolitical dynamics involving Turkey, the Kurds, and their impact on U.S. military actions.
“So this was the flash that came over the wire last night from ITV News.”
Consequences of Military Actions in Europe
33:40 to 38:00
Examine the potential consequences of U.S. military actions on European nations, especially regarding refugee crises.
“And we're just about to send millions more refugees into into Europe or into Turkey, at least.”
Israel's Influence on U.S. War Decisions
38:00 to 42:00
Investigate Israel's role in shaping U.S. foreign policy and military actions, particularly in relation to Iran.
“Quote, America is a thing you can move very easily.”
Understanding the Israel Lobby's Influence
42:00 to 43:00
Learn about the ideological underpinnings that strengthen the Israel lobby in the U.S.
“The ideology of the American political leadership and the ideology, you know, like what is it?”
Shifts in American Public Sympathy
43:01 to 44:00
Explore how recent polling reflects changing American sympathies towards Israel and Palestine.
“And I think that as a public, that is clearly a fact that is less and less commonly accepted as time goes on.”
Israel's Strategy of Destabilization
44:01 to 45:25
Delve into Israel's strategy regarding regional destabilization and its implications.
“The Palestinian cause is now ahead of the Israeli cause, according to Gallup, in the U.S.”
The Diplomatic Landscape of Israel
45:26 to 46:28
Examine how Israel's actions affect diplomatic relations in the Middle East.
“that it would instead be a de facto agreement.”
Economic Dependencies and Regional Security
46:29 to 47:55
Understand the economic dynamics between Israel and Gulf states amid regional tensions.
“There is no Syrian military to speak of that could ever challenge, you know, any Israeli military action.”
Israel's Security Guarantees in Question
47:56 to 49:30
Assess the reliability of America's security guarantees to Israel in a volatile region.
“I mean, the deal with these Gulf countries, with the Emiratis and the others, was always that, you know, the Americans will put their bases on your soil.”
The Evolving Nature of Arab States
49:31 to 51:45
Learn about the internal dynamics of Arab states and their implications for Israel.
“many meaningful trading partners Israel has and how, despite committing a genocide, you know, countries as diverse as China and the United States consider them, you know, important trading partners.”
Naftali Bennett's Controversial Statements
51:46 to 54:47
Explore Naftali Bennett's perspectives on Turkey and Iran's roles in the region.
“The Gulf era state question to me is one of the more vital ones right now.”
Upcoming Miniseries on U.S.-Israel Relations
54:48 to 56:00
Discover details about a new miniseries exploring the U.S.-Israel relationship's complexities.
“There may be some really stable and durable amount of support for it.”
Exploring U.S.-Israel Relations
56:00 to 56:39
Learn about the historical moments of tension in U.S.-Israel relations.
“And we're doing for the first time a miniseries, which will be just three episodes, and it'll come out the end of April or early May.”
Tensions Through the Decades
56:40 to 58:48
Discover key historical tensions between the U.S. and Israel from the 1950s to the 1980s.
“Because the, you know, the length of our relationship over almost 80 years at this point has been one of close collaboration.”
The Relevance of Historical Complaints
58:49 to 59:15
Understand how past complaints against Israel echo in today’s politics.
“it's it is I'm not going to say that it's well timed but I will say that it is timed I think that it is.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00Carlo:Hello again, everybody from Newsweek headquarters at the top of the World Trade Center. I am Carlo Versano, and this is The 1600. This country was stone cold dead. We're continuing our special coverage of the war with Iran. This is we're taping this on Wednesday. What is today? Wednesday, about midday. So you'll probably be seeing this Friday morning. So my my warning remains the same. Some of what you may hear could be outdated by then. But nevertheless, I think these are important conversations for us all to keep in mind in the beginning days of this latest adventure of ours in the Middle East.
0:32Carlo:A lot of history unfolding these last few days, for better or worse, probably worse, almost certainly worse, at least in my opinion. I say that because I wanted to step back a little bit and take a little bit of a historical approach to this latest intervention of ours in the Middle East and the blowback that could very well be coming. And I use that word blowback specifically. My guest today is Noah Colwyn. He is the co-host of the excellent Blowback podcast. You should definitely listen to that wherever you get your podcast, whenever you can. It's really good. And it's all about this idea that, you know, forgotten history is sort of what makes all of our new wars possible.
1:12Carlo:So, Noah, thank you so much, man. I really appreciate it.
1:16Noah Kulwin:Thanks for having me.
1:17Carlo:So, yeah, are you enjoying our first politically incorrect war, as Defense Secretary Pete Heggs has said, our first non-woke war? In a word, no.
1:30Carlo:Yeah, so we got a lot to talk about here. I want to talk about the concept of blowback, which is, like I just said, the name of your show. You and your co-host, Brendan James, I've followed you guys for a long time. I'm based and tell me if I'm wrong here, but your argument is essentially that blowback isn't so much like a cause and effect. It's more of this like self-reinforcing feedback loop, right, where every time we do these interventions, it sort of like creates the conditions for for the next one. Does that seem like a sort of fair, you know, quick and dirty analysis of that term?
2:04Noah Kulwin:Yeah, I think that's the fair elevator pitch. OK. And yeah. And also for us, the only other thing I would add is that that stands in contrast to the sort of popular understanding of blowback, which is just, you know, mere unintended consequences. Right.
2:22Carlo:And I've been saying in the newsletter on the show here for a while that, you know, the law of unintended consequences is the law of the land in basically everywhere, but certainly in the Middle East and certainly when it comes to U.S. intervention there. And it feels like there's just a lot of people sort of walking around that don't seem to understand that or maybe have forgotten that lesson from Iraq. But before we get to the parallels with Iraq, all the other things I want to ask you, let me just ask you, where does Iran sort of fit in this feedback loop? And like, what's the next turn of this cycle likely to be in your in your estimation?
2:54Sure.
2:55Noah Kulwin:I mean, I think cycle is an interesting and good word because you could argue that this current cycle of the American position vis-a-vis Iran is one that is dated back to 1979 and that we may now be embarking on a new cycle, whereas the previous cycle had been the previous 30, 40 years in which America cultivated a Cold War alliance prior to 79 with the Shah of Iran. And then once the Iranian revolution happened and the the Islamic Republic was created and the Ayatollahs took over Khomeini and then Khomeini in succession, we have developed a posture of consistent aggression toward Iran that has culminated in what we are now seeing and what we are now seeing, what it leads to, who knows.
3:42Noah Kulwin:But, you know, I think that this is a story mostly of intended consequences, although at the moment what we are seeing is surely a chain of escalation that anybody who can tell you with a straight face that they know exactly where it's going is lying to you.
3:59Carlo:Well, that's what feels so unsettling about this moment. We just saw a press conference from Pete Hegseth again. SENT CONC commanders are going out there. They're clearly trying to make this pitch after the fact. They didn't bother to explain any of this in the run-up to this war. But they're certainly trying to make more of a pitch to the media and to the American public about what exactly it is we're doing and the alleged successes that we're having in the skies over Iran. Hex has said this morning that we do finally have air superiority. I thought we already had that. And, you know, I sort of take what he says with a big heaping grain of salt, as I'm sure you do.
4:39Noah Kulwin:Absolutely. I would also add that air superiority in 2026 means a very different thing than perhaps it did even in 2011. I know that there are ongoing conversations about setting up things like no-fly zones to support potential Kurdish rebels, which would essentially be fomenting a civil war akin to what we did in Libya in 2011. And at the same time, though, we now have, you know, part of why it's a bit different is because of the drones. And because we now have this very, I don't think that there's another word for it, but a much more chaotic war environment, even by the standards of Middle Eastern wars led by the United States, which in the last 20 years, 30 years have been nothing but chaos.
5:22Noah Kulwin:We may be breaching new frontiers in chaos simply because of how technology and how war making has developed in the years since. You know, I think the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the use of drones there has sort of been an obvious prelude to the kind of war that we're now seeing in which Iran is using drones to enforce, you know, a no shipping zone over the Strait of Hormuz, as well as, you know, launching attacks in the neighboring countries that host U.S. bases. Right.
5:53Carlo:And civilian infrastructure, not just U.S. bases. Right. They hit the Dubai airport.
5:57Noah Kulwin:The countries of the U.S. bases, they are not just attacking U.S. bases, let's be clear. They're hitting hotels. They're hitting they are hitting they are hitting full infrastructure.
6:07Carlo:So back to the blowback thing. What is the sort of specific history about Iran that you think is kind of being apps that sort that's absent in the media coverage of of what's happening right now?
6:21Noah Kulwin:I think that one thing that Americans are in a sort of loath to be reminded of is not just the misconduct of our country and our government in the past, but also how determinate that misconduct may have been or that bad policy may have been in guiding historical events to their current point. And in the case of Iran, I think the 1953 coup that was supported by the United States in which a democratically elected nationalist, Mohammed Mossadegh, was overthrown and replaced with the Shah. a leader in pretty much, you know, the Shah of Iran between the 60s and 70s. By the 1970s, about a third of all, you know, exported arms sales, foreign military sales, went to the Iranian government.
7:17Noah Kulwin:So through the 1970s, after we had overthrown this government, you know, we did our best job because we viewed as through a kind of Middle East NATO through the Baghdad, called the Baghdad Pact, we tried to enforce a kind of anti-Soviet posture in the Middle East by supplying arms and setting up this military government that also was highly incompetent, was not able to manage the economy or development of the country well at all, and was extremely murderous and was ultimately overthrown by a broad front revolution that was later dominated by the clerics. But there was this, you know, again, the American hand in setting up the current reality was that, well, we sort of, you know, we, we, we plied this government, the Shah's government with arms, with fighter planes, with missiles.
8:07Noah Kulwin:And we developed an infrastructure that then pretty much overnight fell into the hands of people whom we then deemed were our greatest enemies. And so to me, there is this process by which the kind of foundation of the current conflict in which the U.S. did everything in its power to support with arms and more a cruel and despotic military power like the Shahs throughout the 60s and 70s. And then once the government we didn't like took over, all of those arms, all of those munitions that we had supplied to the previous government now became the pretext on which we developed a consistent 40 year posture of hostility and aggression and with pretty much in afghanistan too it's not it's not too far off in afghanistan we supplied i think it's it's a version of the same story you know where like the the actual content of it is a bit same right like we're not talking about a basic national army in that case or sorry a more uh not basic but like a more standard issue kind of government that we'd be familiar with in the case of afghanistan it was We used, you know, through the CIA and other means, we armed and supported a bunch of radical guerrillas who then became essentially the basis for the Taliban and al Qaeda and many of the other jihadist networks that we then went to war with after 9 -11.
9:32Noah Kulwin:And so we had supplied those networks and armed them. And then we later went to war with them. And that is very much the same dynamic as what we were just talking about with Iran.
9:42Carlo:And it brings me back to season one of Blowback, which I think was your best work, which was about Iraq. And it was specifically about, or at least part of it was about how the U.S. backed Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, which essentially made those two countries enemies back to back. How does that history of like the U.S. sort of alternately arming and also targeting these same regional actors shape what we're seeing now?
10:08Noah Kulwin:Does that make sense? Yeah, when the Iran-Iraq war was taking place in the 1980s, it was considered at that time the longest conventional war of the 20th century. since you know it's it's it was a brutal conflict a meek rider and the u.s carried out under reagan a policy that was known at the time as the tilt to iraq but i think which we can better now understand as part of the same sort of um uh covert strategic cold war uh you know policy framework that also produced stuff like iran the iran contra scandal where we were actually selling arms to Iran. And we were arming thus both sides of that conflict.
10:49Noah Kulwin:Right. But essentially what we had figured out and what Henry Kissinger was sort of famed for remarking about that conflict was that it's a pity they can't both. And so what we did was pursue a policy as a government that actually reflected that reality even though Kissinger was not in power at that time. We armed Iraq which was the smaller country and which was not expected to win and which was not considered to have much of a shot against a much larger Iran. And we were able to, with active support, we helped them carry out massacres. And, you know, this was a war in which chemical munitions were used and we helped Saddam carry out chemical massacres, chemical munitions massacres.
11:30Noah Kulwin:I think that to the, to the rest of the world and particularly to people in the Middle East, observers in the Middle East, the American policy thus over the past 45 years can be described as one of incredible cynicism. And I think that the cynicism, the idea that we would willingly play these sides against each other, and then we would destroy Iraq, you know, through sanctions and the invasion, you know, in the subsequent decade is even more evidence of that. And now we're going after Iran, even after Iran's regional enemies who are our allies, like Saudi Arabia, most importantly, you know, even after Saudi Arabia and Iran broker major peace breakthroughs, which then leads one to wonder, well, what is the common thread, right?
12:10Noah Kulwin:Like, why would we pursue this, even if we're at a moment when many of Iran's allies in the or sorry, many of Iran's neighbors, not allies, many of Iran's Sunni Arab neighbors are beginning to warm up the idea of peace with this country. And that, I think, has more to do with the immediate context, which is about Israel and which is really agitator for many years now in trying to get America to have war with Iran. Just as Bibi Netanyahu, he testified in Congress on behalf of invading Iraq. I think it's best and easiest and simplest to understand what is currently taking place, the immediate geopolitical pretext as sort of, yeah, it emerges from this stuff decades ago.
12:51Noah Kulwin:But the immediate stuff really does seem to be about our relationship with Israel and how we understand our foreign policy goals and Israeli foreign policy goals.
13:01Carlo:No, put a pin in that. Hold that thought for a second because I want to come back to the Israel question. In fact, I have many questions about that specifically. But first, let's just take a step back. I want to talk about the justifications or the sort of reverse engineering of the justifications that we're getting for this new war out of the administration and their mouthpieces in the media. So one of them was that, you know, Iran has a nuclear program that we can't let them have. Right. Iran has been on the precipice of a nuclear bomb for like 20 years. Right. Probably even longer, at least according to to the you know, the people who say so.
13:40Carlo:I don't know if they are or not. In fact, it seems to me like they from what we know, their their nuclear program is was all but destroyed last year. At least that's what we were told by Trump.
13:50Noah Kulwin:But the other thing that's just worth pointing out is that the Iranian nuclear program issue was more or less solved with the Obama deal. I think that there was there had been measured compliance and it wasn't, you know, we meaning like we turned back the clock on that problem. Right.
14:09Carlo:So. All right. So you have the nuclear justification, which is always there. You've also got this sort of one they've been testing about, like, you know, Iran was an imminent threat to the United States because its ballistic missile program. This is something that Rubio said the other day. Its ballistic missile program was getting, you know, so big, so so so advanced that they now had ballistic missiles that could reach the U.S. homeland. OK, well, first of all, plenty of countries have ballistic missiles that can reach the U.S. homeland. Iran being an imminent threat to America. I don't. Does anybody actually believe that?
14:40Noah Kulwin:I mean, as far as I know, the Iranian government has never made a substantial, not never, but like in the relevant political context that we were talking about the last couple of decades. I mean, Iran offered to help out after 9-11. They wanted to help us go get al-Qaeda. Right. I think that Iran and this is and this is something that's worth observing as a wider, you know, in a wider context, because this this specific tension of do they really pose a direct threat to the U.S. is not just a live question with Iran, of course, but also with, for example, Venezuela, with Cuba and in a grander sense, I think, of course, also with China and even Mexico, that these are sort of live questions in that there is a political wing that is now obviously ascendant in power in the White House that does believe that these countries, as a matter of national doctrine or ideology, have some measure of opposition to America and even pose some kind of threat.
15:39Noah Kulwin:And in pretty much all these cases, I think it's worth pointing out that the governments are to some degree or another, to one degree or another, all of them are willing to negotiate and try and pursue diplomatic, earnest diplomatic resolutions of their various issues with the United States. But they were, at least. I mean, they were until we decided to either up, you know, either just throw, you know, turn the table upside down, or I would argue in some cases push these governments into positions where the only options that we left for them were military escalation, particularly in the case of Iran.
16:12Noah Kulwin:And it doesn't strike me that there has been any kind of effort to even really, you know, those comments you referred to by Rubio. What would be the next thing out of his mouth? If you were to say this, like, well, they don't pose in him and threat to the U.S. What Rubio and other people in that wing of the party would sell, you know, other wing of the country would say to you is, well, hold on a minute. These people have a radical ideology that demands our, you know, that demands our extermination. It's an us or them thing. So we got to get to them before us, which is, you know, in addition to we, by the way, being a replay of, you know, Cold War logic.
16:48Noah Kulwin:This is always, yeah, exactly. Or Iraq. Or Iraq.
16:50Carlo:This is the smoking gun in the form of a mushroom cloud or whatever the fuck that line of bullshit was.
16:56Noah Kulwin:A big part of what mediates it is, you know, what did in the 2000s, which is rank Islamophobia. I think the remarks by Mike Johnson, I think it was today or maybe yesterday, but I think it was today, he called Islam a misguided religion. The largest state sponsor of terrorism, Iran and its proxies, have killed more Americans than any other terrorist regime on Earth. They are dedicated to it. They have been and they say the quiet parts out loud. They wanted to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth and they'd like to take us out as well. We're the great Satan and their analogy and their misguided religion.
17:31Noah Kulwin:And there was no way to appease them. And, you know, Sutton tells me that he wasn't just specifically talking about Shia Islam. But I do feel that he, you know, is representative of a kind of bigotry that is also, you know, allows people to. To pretend that people who are Muslim don't want peace or something ever, that there is some kind of Muslim anti-peace, pro-war, anti-West. gene that we'll never be able to live with. And, you know, another word for that, to me, at least, would just be racism.
18:04Carlo:Well, and I think he's all people like Johnson are also just counting on Americans not understanding the various factions within Islam, the difference between Shia and Sunni and that Republicans, as long as I've been alive, they've always sort of counted on on on that misunderstanding. Right. So they can paint. I don't even think George W. Bush, though, would go as far as this.
18:22Noah Kulwin:Like, no, I know. There is a kind of I think it is worth observing that like yes while american politicians have very cynically exploited the let's call it the the what they would you know what they probably conceive of as judeo-christian uh ignorance of such matters i i do think that there is now we're actually seeing a kind of um you know this is a this is a bad cliche these days that people lean on but i think it works it's kind of mask off i I do think that there is a bit of unvarnished bigotry that people are letting themselves use as an open explanation for why we're doing this stuff. And part of that is because it's what's filling the vacuum left by, you know, the absence of any even attempt at a rational case for doing this war.
Read the full transcript
19:08Noah Kulwin:I mean, Christ, George W. Bush at least tried to get everybody on board with the idea of WMD. You know, they're not even they're not even bothering with that this time around.
19:18Carlo:I know. In some ways, I'm actually I've written this before, actually. and people have given me a lot of shit for it, but it's like part of me is kind of like, if we're going to do these, since we don't have any say in this, right? The voters don't, nobody gives a shit what the voters think. The voters don't ever want to go to war, and yet we still do it constantly, right? So it's like they don't, I don't know. But let me just bring it back to this idea of the justifications, right? So we've talked about the nuclear program, the imminent threat from the ballistic missiles. Next, we've got regime change, which some people in the administration have said is part of this.
19:51Carlo:I think Hegseth has said it's not supposed to be a regime change war, but the regime has in fact changed, which it hasn't actually. I mean, we got the big guy, but it doesn't, and they're obviously still launching missiles. So somebody in the regime is still around. Trump has also floated a couple sort of like random ones. You know, this is about naval supremacy in the Gulf, about, you know, sort of protecting shipping routes. It's about, you know, keeping defanging Iran's ability to launch terror attacks through its various proxies. And then, of course, there's the, you know, the one that I don't think they're even bothering with anymore, which is, you know, this is about liberating the Iranian people.
20:28Carlo:Right. It seems to me like the real the real one is just decapitate the regime and hope for the best. It's hard for me to understand what they want to do beyond that. But what do you is what is the justification, the actual justification, the mask off justification?
20:43Noah Kulwin:I think some of it is what I said before about racism and believing in like some very crude and essentialist stereotypes about the nature of Iranians and the nature of, you know, clerical political leadership. Like, yes, the Iranian government is extremist. Yes, it is religiously authoritarian. Yes, we see the brutality they meet out against their own citizens. None of that is really deniable. at the same time there is in all of that like okay we see all that but they're just not rational or trustworthy actors and the idea of them having a nuke oh my gosh and and so there is this again like a leap in logic that is like i said a kind of crude essentialist logic uh to me at least which is that the there that these people can't be trusted with nuclear weapons let alone or sorry these people can't be trusted with rational geopolitical whatever, let alone, you know, nukes.
21:39Noah Kulwin:There's no way we can trust them and so forth. And I think that that base assumption actually has a lot more explanatory power for why these people let themselves think that war is the option that's necessary here. And then I think the other option, which we reason, the other real reason, which we talked about earlier, or at least referenced is I think about Israel, Israel and Israeli leadership's aggressive desire, aggressive desire for, as you say, decapitating Iran or decapitating the regime. I don't believe decapitation is an accurate metaphor based on what we know about how the Iranian government has reorganized itself in the last decade, 20 years to accommodate essentially this reality.
22:22Noah Kulwin:I think in the last two years - But they've been expecting this to happen. Yeah. I mean, the last two years, Israel has has done this. And so is the U.S. I mean, the Maduro kidnapping in January is a kind of attempt at decapitation. The bomb, the bombs that killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah are also a representative of a kind of decapitation. And so they've been preparing for this. And like what we're actually seeing right now, the kinds of attacks that are taking place, experts and I'm not talking about, you know, people who appraise the Iranian regime who are considered outre in the U.S.
22:53Noah Kulwin:political spectrum. I mean, Vali Nasser, who is he's affiliated with CSIS, one of the most, you know, like, frankly, one of the most Langley affiliated think tanks that we have. I mean, he's talking about how, yeah, this strategy that we've got of decapitation doesn't really seem like it's going to work because of the whole multinodal thing that the Iranian government has done, where they're, you know, the way that they've distributed command means that this is a force that is able of fighting a war for quite some time without the conventional, you know, command central command structure. Um, and so I think that there is also a way in which, because Israel has helped convince the United States through a number of different means that their, uh, political interests are our political interests and that Israeli, uh, security concerns are directly American security concerns.
23:41Noah Kulwin:And it's meant that we're willing to overlook some, you know, some facts that we know about this country and willing to pursue, you know, again, with the permission granted by the stereotypes we have about them. You know, we now are in a position where it's like, all right, well, we're willing to wage a war, even though the facts suggest to us that, like, it's not going to be nearly as easy as we think and that a strategy like decapitation may not work. you know it's it's this is an administration that is also at this particular moment in time looking for political victories domestically things are incredibly difficult for them the economy is not doing great politically they're very unpopular at home and you know this is not the first administration that in fine looking you know like in in rummaging around for solutions to its political problems has stumbled upon the idea of, well, why don't we start a war?
24:39Noah Kulwin:Why don't we start multiple wars? Why don't we try and find enemy leaders, popular villains in the American imagination and take them out? And, you know, I am not optimistic that that will be a I'm not optimistic that that like strategy will be disappeared from the American toolkit, even though this one doesn't seem to be going so well. But I do think that people recognize that it is quite obvious that this is what Trump is doing. It's not lost on anybody.
25:08Carlo:No, I mean, I think Trump correctly intuits through his sort of like, you know, lizard brain of being a TV guy his whole life that like America, it's not that Americans are anti-war. Americans are anti-losing wars. They're anti-long wars of attrition in which a lot of Americans come home in boxes. I think what he thought is that, you know, look, what you just said, right? We did it in, you know, the Israelis did it with the Hezbollah guy, Nasrallah, I'm sorry. We did it with Maduro. You can just sort of take these guys off the board. It's no big deal. It looks good in, you know, the American media.
25:46Carlo:And then whatever comes next, like, that's not really our problem, right? Right.
25:52Noah Kulwin:Yeah. Well, and also in their part, I mean, like this is an administration who's, you know, their their strategic intellectual backbone really does seem to have the attention span of a goldfish because, you know, Hezbollah still exists. They're now bombing Israel right now as we're having their back in the mix.
26:13Carlo:big time.
26:14Noah Kulwin:Exactly. You know, even if they're, by the way, like even if it's politically unpopular within Lebanon at this moment to do so in ways that it may not have been a couple of years ago, they're still doing it. And I think that there is a real, you know, it's to me evidence of the idea that decapitation is just a bad metaphor. It's just not like it's it's a it's very aspirational on the part of the people who most espouse it simply because as we see, they do these things. And then, you know, a year later, six months later, a week later, we've still got the thing that we supposedly decapitated more than twitching around, but instead doing a whole Washington Irving on us and, you know, headless horsemaning it up, you know, like all through all through Sleepy Hollow.
26:57Carlo:To say nothing of the, you know, again, the blowback of killing. I was looking at, I was just looking through pictures on the wires yesterday and there was this photo that stopped me in my tracks. It was an Iranian state media photo that they put out, but it was sort of this aerial shot of central Tehran on Sunday, or not Sunday. It was, I think it was yesterday. And it was a, you know, basically just a lot of mourners in the street. And they weren't mourning the Ayatollah. They were mourning the deaths of these schoolchildren that were killed by who knows, the Israelis, the Americans, the Iranians.
27:29Carlo:We don't know yet. I certainly have my suspicions, but, you know, whatever. And I was just thinking, like, it doesn't actually matter who, sadly, who killed those schoolchildren, because we did. You know, they will see it as us doing it, us being Israel, the United States, the West. And what the hell does that create, right? When the West comes in and dozens of young children are killed, how many, you know, terrorists, how many anti-Western people does that create in its wake? Right. Isn't that part of sort of the blowback story, too? On top.
28:08Noah Kulwin:I mean, and in this case, you know, what is what is the tour to, you know, how we open the conversation about like what is blowback? Right. And the idea that this this kind of system of conflict, this model of how to how we fight is self-sustaining, even if its participants don't conceive of it that way. But like, you know, this is this is how it operates in the world. In this case, it's like, all right, they want a civil war in Iran. You know, you want to set people up, you want to generate combatants for that. And we want to weak Iran and we want a conflict. In Israel's case, they want that because they perceive Iran as a threat.
28:41Noah Kulwin:And if Iraq is turned from a functioning country into, you know, this like desiccated state that it currently is in which militias wield enormous power and they want to do the same to Iran, you know, like that's how that goal works out for them. And that's where it's like, all right, you know, or at least in the in the United States conception of that conflict, how something like blowback figures in is that, well, if we share that goal and we want them to be weak and unable to function as a state, then actually it's good that we create the conditions for this kind of degenerated civil conflict.
29:16Noah Kulwin:And if there's a faction that's armed by the CIA and is viewed as pro-American, then we are also summoning into existence right now. You know, they're opposites, the people that are going to remember those dead schoolchildren and who are going to be motivated by it. And frankly, because the country as you know, we are setting it on a path for some kind of if not state collapse. I mean, vastly diminished qualities of quality of life for millions and millions and millions of people. You know, what else are they going to do if there's no right? If there's if the raw materials to run a bakery aren't there, but the men who would have staffed it are on and the men who staffed it are unemployed and angry and, you know, left without really much capacity to have political agency in their country that doesn't come from the barrel of a gun.
30:02Noah Kulwin:And I mean, you know, I don't think it takes I don't think it takes Einstein to to really deduce what flows from that. And the only people it really does seem to serve, again, are the people who have an interest in having a non-functioning Iran that is not able to be a stable country and thus project any power, even the softest of power outside its own borders. And obviously the country that has openly said that that is their interest and has gotten us to say it as well, based on what Marco Rubio says, is Israel. Right.
30:34Carlo:OK. So, again, I want to get to Israel and I will in two seconds. But first, I just want to ask you about the Kurds who you just alluded to. So this was the flash that came over the wire last night from ITV News. Thousands of U.S. and Israeli-backed Kurdish militants reportedly expected to begin ground operation in western Iran within days. This came after CNN reported that the CIA is arming the Kurds and they are hoping to foment an uprising in Iran. OK, well, putting aside the idea of us, you know, arming rebel groups and how could that possibly ever go wrong? You got a feel for the Kurds, right?
31:07Carlo:It's like they're they're always fighting our wars and they don't. What do they get in return? Right. They don't even have their own state.
31:15Noah Kulwin:no i mean the in this case it's also such a so the cia has historically the u.s has armed kurds uh both in previously against iran and also previously against iraq uh and in the more recent decade you know the u.s armed them as part of the fight against isis uh in the mid-2010s and that created a lot of tension between the united states and the second largest standing army and NATO, which is Turkey. And Turkey is now on the receiving end of drones and munitions and attacks from Iran and is bound up in this conflict. And Turkey is also, I mean, the political situation has changed somewhat in the last year with the diplomatic agreement they reached with the PKK.
32:00Noah Kulwin:But as I understand it, what is now, you know, or not as I understand it, I think what anybody could really understand, Turkey has a lot of anxiety about the CIA and about the United States and about the United States or other Western powers giving a ton of aid to Kurds in Iran and are very much afraid that that could spill over as a conflict into something that, you know, contests their rule. And so there's a you know, I think that this this latest development is actually a pretty compelling piece of evidence as to how waging this war with Iran is both just not thought it's clearly not. It was not thought through that hard by the people waging it.
32:41Noah Kulwin:But also it illustrates for us like why a conflict like this is never that simple. And it's because the countries that we can count on in a sort of crude, you know, like we're playing a game of risk sort of way is like, oh, this is our territory. This is our people and they're going to go to war against our enemies very simply because they've got these alliances. It's like, well, it turns out there are some non-state populations that, you know, whose interest against one government and interest against another government may end up, you know, creating tensions, you know, for us and the party that we need to be involved.
33:11Noah Kulwin:You know, Turkey, you know, the country that we need very badly, not just for this war against Iran, but for all of the other wars that we fight and for all of the other conflicts that we're currently engaged in.
33:23Carlo:To say nothing of like what I was just going to say, to say nothing of the idea that, you know, if we if we are fomenting some sort of civil war in Iran, you know, what are the knock on effects of that? Right. Is that going to create a new refugee crisis? You know, we've been J.D. Vance has been out there telling the Europeans, you know, how terrible they are. And we're just about to send millions more refugees into into Europe or into Turkey, at least.
33:48Noah Kulwin:What makes it so goofy to me is that the European leadership appears just as asleep at the wheel about what's happening as the United States. There's one large government. There's one large European countries government that is like really being outspoken right now about the fool. Yes, exactly. Pedro Sanchez in Spain. But the foolishness of the American war on Iran. Because you have, you know, MERS, the German chancellor, Friedrich MERS, who is sitting next to Trump and essentially agreeing with Trump that, you know, Spain should just, you know, like that essentially like the U.S. should be allowed to abrogate whatever its agreements are with Spain and continue to use its facilities there for military operations.
34:31Noah Kulwin:Even though Germany and Spain are both in the EU.
34:33Carlo:It's crazy.
34:34Noah Kulwin:And I think that there is a kind of some some non-ambulance that is characterized like a sort of their sleepwalking into their next continent continental disaster because they have been so blinded by or they've been their vision has been made so narrow in their hatred of Russia and in their in their in their, you know, real fear that the Russian threat is the only one worth considering. Right now that as we saw, you know, they then realized they got some wake up call with Greenland. But evidently a month later when it became clear that Trump isn't going to go through with that, I guess they've now decided to crawl back in bed with Trump.
35:16Noah Kulwin:And we're in this bizarre position of seeing them walk into another disaster without realizing it where they're going to. Yes, as you point out, they may have millions of refugees to deal with. And even if they don't let in refugees in the same way that they did in the previous cycle of war and violence during the Syrian civil war, we may now see humanitarian disasters that are going to be European responsibilities all across the Mediterranean, for example, or an Eastern border. Or, you know, it's a very it is a difficult situation to imagine. I mean, sorry, let me rephrase that. It is difficult for me to imagine the like the full ignorance that really seems to be on display in Europe.
35:53Noah Kulwin:It's just the extent of it, because they're the they are as a force. They should be the ones most pressuring the United States to back off right now, given how much is at stake for them with this, particularly with the energy crisis that may result as as a that may come as a result of all this.
36:09Carlo:Which already is. I mean, I think Qatar today said they're taking at least 20 percent or more, I think, of their liquefied natural gas, which a lot of which goes to Western Europe. They have to take it offline because it's just it's too dangerous to ship it. I guess. I mean, I think it's the way when they take that offline.
36:25Noah Kulwin:That takes at least two weeks to restart production on. So we're now talking about, by the way, like, you know, we're now at a phase of the conflict already where let's say there were some sudden diplomatic breakthrough. The lingering economic costs of this would be substantial and would not, you know, would not go away hardly overnight, if at all.
36:43Carlo:Yeah. And you're going to see it here, too. I mean, gas already up like 20 cents just this week. So, I mean, that's a whole nother question why he's doing this now before the midterms when this, you know, the Republicans are fighting tooth and nail on this affordability issue. I mean, actually, I know the answer. Trump doesn't give a shit. He doesn't care about the Republicans. He knows he's got he knows they're going to lose the midterms.
37:02Noah Kulwin:It is kind of cool to me how he somebody must have told him or at least the political logic of the people around him has gotten to the point of like, well, we're going to get washed anyway. So this is a house money turn. And that to me is like truly I you know, it's it's on the one hand, if I were in on their team, like if I were in their corner, if that were my political affiliation, I'd actually might be kind of jazzed about that, you know, because that's like, you know, we're throwing caution to the wind. But as the person with a brain and immense sympathy for the people are currently experiencing the unconscionable amount of devastation that we're wreaking right now, that's not my feeling.
37:42Carlo:Right. No, of course. All right. So let's talk Israel. I noted this quote. This is a quote from Benjamin Netanyahu in 2001. I think sometimes people forget how long this this this maniac has been around and calling the shots. This is Bibi in 2001. Quote, America is a thing you can move very easily. You can move it in the right direction. They won't get in our way. End quote. Well, he was certainly right about that. Is this Israel's war or is this our war? No.
38:12Noah Kulwin:Well, I hate to break it to you, but because we're in it, it is now also our war quite fundamentally. But the spirit behind your question, I totally understand, which is, you know, yes, this is Israel's war. We are fighting a war for Israel, you know, more more than any other single cause that we can identify. There's so many reasons why we are able to go to war in this room, as we talked about before. The racism, the legacy of antagonism towards Iran. But in this particular moment, like why now? Why are we doing this? The answer is Israel. And I think in the case of Israel, it's because since October 7th, the Israeli government has kind of backed itself into.
38:55Noah Kulwin:You could argue that they've either backed themselves into a corner or the people within Israel. They would say that they have been liberated to pursue goals that they have been held back from for a variety of reasons in the last few years.
39:08Carlo:And Bibi found its deal in Trump. I mean, I would say the biggest single thing that has changed, though, especially in the last six months, at least to me, has been that the current Israeli government has
39:27Noah Kulwin:not found any kind of consistent political stability. and the current political leadership of Israel, somebody like Netanyahu, as he has had to work harder and harder as time goes on to consolidate political control, the factions within his government that are most desirous of the most extreme outcomes, whether it's the Palestinian policy in the West Bank or it's the resettlement of Gaza with Jews or it's a population resettlement plan for Palestinians in Gaza or its war with Iran, there have had to be constant compromises made to the, you know, to the, you know, to reckon with the political reality that you just can't do all that.
40:11Noah Kulwin:And even though the people are baying for blood rather constantly among both the Israeli public and its political leadership. And so now that the United States has been, you know, again, increasingly put in the position of unpopular domestic politics, an increasing willingness on the part of the Oval Office to try these grand foreign policy gestures in what the American press seems to report is this new legacy-making mood from Washington, the desire for Trump to leave his mark on the world. We've arrived at sort of the perfect circumstance where Israel was able to get the U.S. on board with this.
40:50Noah Kulwin:And also, as we saw, I think Israel was able to convince the United States leadership that this would be quick. And I don't think I do not think Israeli leaders and I do not think the Israeli military and intelligence establishment has any such illusions and nor frankly does the American one. But they know and that it's politically advantageous for Israel to have a weak Iran. And so they went as hard as ever to make sure that the Americans would back them up on some kind of military aggression. And they managed that political jujitsu such that, as Marco Rubio announced this week, Israel in, you know, by by credibly convincing America that it was going to pursue unilateral military action against Iran, you know, not just bombing nuclear targets, but going for something wider that well, because Iran might retaliate against the U.S., the U.S.
41:48Noah Kulwin:thus had to back up Israel.
41:49Carlo:And that aside the fact that they're our client state and we don't they we call the shots. The Israelis don't call the shots.
41:58Noah Kulwin:So this is where I think ideology is a really important factor. The ideology of the American political leadership and the ideology, you know, like what is it? You know, what does it mean to have an Israel lobby is, you know, like, yes, there is a group of organizations. And yes, there is a a political surrogacy for Israel within the United States that is more well organized, you know, than, you know, for example, the pro Chiang Kai-shek China lobby of the 1940s and early 50s. You know, this is it's a it's more powerful and well organized and effective than even the Cuban-American lobby. You know, this is and I bring these other examples up because I really don't want to make I don't want to exceptionalize, historically speaking, what the Israel lobby does.
42:41Noah Kulwin:However, I think that the United States, part of what has made the Israel lobby so effective is that we are ideologically sympathetic and conditioned to back them up in ways that we aren't with our other, if not client states, because that quite isn't prescribed to those other relationships, but with these other causes. I think that we are willing to do more for Israel because we are bought in as a country on the idea that doing this stuff for them matters. And I think that as a public, that is clearly a fact that is less and less commonly accepted as time goes on. But as a truth that is embodied and lived by our political establishment and, you know, the ruling class, for lack of a better term, because it is something that goes far beyond politics.
43:28Noah Kulwin:It's in corporate life as well. This, you know, again, this this this this ideological sympathy is incredibly widespread. And this sort of, I think, helps explain a lot of why it is exactly that we would go, you know, we would pursue something like this war right now that is so reckless and so damaging.
43:48Carlo:I mean, so you mentioned the public opinion. I mean, it's fascinating that this is coming. Literally, a couple of days ago, Gallup put out this poll for the first time in their polling. Israel is no longer ahead in the Americans' view of sort of like sympathies within the Middle East. The Palestinian cause is now ahead of the Israeli cause, according to Gallup, in the U.S. It's hard to imagine that line is not going to go even further down after this. But also, you mentioned, I want to bring back to something you just said, which is that, you know, Israel wants Iran destabilized, which is obviously true.
44:21Carlo:I would go a step further and check me on this. Tell me if I'm wrong. But Israel wants the region destabilized, right? Because destabilization gives them freedom of action. That gives them an opportunity to, to your point, do whatever they want to do in the West Bank, do whatever they want to do in Lebanon and Syria and Gaza, because the more it's destabilized, the more American public says, we want to get out of this. We don't want any part of this. The more the Israelis have freedom to operate. Is that a sort of fair assessment or am I getting into sort of like conspiracy land here?
44:55Noah Kulwin:No, I think it's a fair assessment, but I think the way to view it is that when what you describe right as freedom of action, another way to conceive of it is as leverage. You know, ever since the creation of Israel, there was originally, you know, there was there was some discussion in the late in 49 and the early 50s about the idea of negotiating a final political settlement. But in reality, what, you know, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and others at the time in the 50s particularly recognized, and this became sort of an implicit policy until we get to the era of, frankly, Oslo and kind of the 80s, I guess, is that it would instead be a de facto agreement.
45:32Noah Kulwin:And that essentially Israel would have to demonstrate that its Arab neighbors and Muslim neighbors, because not all of its neighbors are Arab, would have to learn to live with it. And I think that this is sort of how Israel still sees the world, that Israel has to essentially make everybody copacetic with the reality of Israel. And the way you do that, I mean, the model for them is Syria, which is you, you know, like like Syria, like Syria, when Syria did not fall into civil war just because Israel. But the Syrian civil war was, you know, at the beginning of it, there was a state, Israel, you know, there was a country that Israel had an incredible political rivalry with.
46:15Noah Kulwin:There was incredible antagonism. There was something of a, you know, both like a more of a peace than on the Lebanese border directly. But at the end of the Syrian civil war, Syria is now a non-factor. Israel has freedom of movement. Israel can take territory as much as it wants, frankly. There is no Syrian military to speak of that could ever challenge, you know, any Israeli military action. And so, yes, to your point, that gives them freedom of action. But it also means that, you know, as far as the diplomatic arrangements longer term, they can leverage that. But I mean, now we're hitting upon what does seem to be the actual longer term strategy of Israel here, which, you know, beyond religious fanaticism and hoping to claim as much territory for themselves.
46:57Noah Kulwin:But it is this idea that, well, if everybody else is weak, then they will have to respect our strength. And this may not result in a final agreement with the Palestinians through, you know, some weird American process like Camp David or Oslo. But instead will be the result of us having been the last people standing, you know, with with smoking, with, you know, with with with guns. and obviously just the last thing I would say obviously what has counteracted that so far at least in the past couple decades has been the uneasy quiet peace sort of formalized by the Abraham Accords that has developed between Israel and its wealthier Gulf Arab neighbors like the UAE and Saudi Arabia and I think they are now and what happens to them and their economies may end up being part of what is is, you know, so go them, as go them, so goes Israel to some extent.
47:55Carlo:Well, and that's a whole other ball of wax is, you know, the destabilization within the Gulf. I mean, the deal with these Gulf countries, with the Emiratis and the others, was always that, you know, the Americans will put their bases on your soil. Your people might not like it, but even so, you know, you're going to get under our security umbrella. And because of that, you're going to be able to build these glitzy sort of like cities of the future that are essentially just tax havens for Westerners to either live in or at least spend their money. That whole thing, that illusion has been totally stripped away, right?
48:27Carlo:I mean, the fact that probably one of the more important things that happened in the last week is that an Iranian drone hit the main terminal of the Dubai airport, the busiest airport in the world. So I don't understand where the Israelis, because the Israelis need these Gulf countries to be on their side, don't they?
48:45Noah Kulwin:Yes. I mean, this is where Israel, I think, in an earlier stage of its life was able to live without them in in the sense that these were less developed countries. And frankly, until the 1970s, I mean, you know, that was when we that was when we essentially began the process. Part of how we stabilized the part of how we got ourselves out of the trouble of the Arab oil embargo in 74 and by 79 was that we just began selling these countries huge amounts of armaments. And, you know, 40, 50 years later, you can look at Yemen to see what that's bought us. But I think the the the reality as it is now is that these countries occupy a place in the global economy that is far more indispensable on an aggregate level than what Israel provides, which is still, to be clear, quite valuable considering how many meaningful trading partners Israel has and how, despite committing a genocide, you know, countries as diverse as China and the United States consider them, you know, important trading partners.
49:45Noah Kulwin:um and i i don't quite understand frankly uh how israel you know sees this through other than betting the house that it will be able to just be the strongest kid on the block um right because it does seem that we're in this weird reality right now where the you know the you know if again you know if a few desalination plants because that's by the way how most of these countries including Israel, by the way, rely on stable supplies of drinking water are tons and tons of fossil fuel powered desalination plants that could very easily be targeted. It's no surprise that hasn't happened yet. Well, and it's, you know, it's it's it's I mean, I think I think we can see why it hasn't happened yet.
50:28Noah Kulwin:But it's definitely scary to think about, you know, as things snowball, could we get to the situation where those things do start to get hit? And I and again, I don't think a lot of the security guarantees that Israel relies upon long term are really worth all that much from the United States. If our interest in the region, you know, protecting stable oil and energy supplies above all else, of course, is all of a sudden jeopardized. You know, I think one of the things Israel especially doesn't count on or has discounted quite dramatically is the fact that the largest, most populous Arab country in the world, Egypt, which is just to its south, you know, has been pretty well bottled up by the brutal military dictatorship that has ruled there since the Arab Spring.
51:12Noah Kulwin:And it's easy to imagine that, again, you know, like jeopardizing not just the wealth of the Gulf Arab states, but, you know, upsetting this whole regional Middle East. I mean, we've seen riots in Bahrain for the first time since the Arab Spring, a country where every single video pretty much shows the local residents cheering the missiles falling from Iran because they hate their government so much. I think that there's a real possibility that Israel ends up igniting something that like reveals that a lot of the security that they've thought they've had for the last 15 years is actually a little bit more rickety than they've thought.
51:46Noah Kulwin:The Gulf era state question to me is one of the more vital ones right now.
51:53Carlo:Okay. I want to ask if you've seen this just before we move on. And I also want to get to the show you guys are working on. But this is a clip. This is a video of the former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. I want to be very clear. Turkey and Qatar have gained influence in Syria, are seeking influence elsewhere and everywhere throughout the region. And from here, I warn Turkey is the new Iran. Sorry, what? Turkey is the new Iran? Turkey is in NATO. Some of these people, they just won't ever stop.
52:29Noah Kulwin:I mean, listen, man, it's I don't know if you know this about Islamism, but it's whack-a-mole. I mean, that's at least the Israeli doctrine. Look, Naftali Bennett is in part. He is not part of the Netanyahu camp. He was the prime minister. That's a good point.
52:44Carlo:Yeah, he's not. He's not briefly.
52:46Noah Kulwin:He needs. I think that there's always like a measure of outflanking within Israeli politics and rhetoric that should always be accounted for when you hear people say stuff like like that in particular. Right. That said, Israel has held a lot of animus for Turkey over many, many years. In 2010, the Mavi Marmara flotilla that was sent with aid to Gaza was intercepted by Israeli military. And Erdogan for many years was kind of able to, you know, whatever credibility he lost for being this, you know, important leader within NATO and for making in for further integrating Turkey in the NATO firmament, he would rhetorically lean very, very hard or lean on symbolic shows of support for Palestinians and the Palestinian cause.
53:30Noah Kulwin:And I think that a lot of Israelis are kind of fooled by that and that they look at Turkey as this kind of eternal enemy rather than as like the actual, frankly, kind of ideal partner or shadow partner, you could argue, because they would never actually directly partner with Israel. But they're never directly threatening Israel. And frankly, I'm not a fanatic. no and well moreover it's like turkey enables nato and western powers to do a lot of things in the middle east that they otherwise wouldn't be able to do that serve israel's benefit in terms of how they counter iran and iraq so it's like when avtali bennett mouths off like that you know i think he understands the the situation well enough to know that like he's pretty much biting the hand that feeds by talking like that but on the other hand i do think he's smart enough also to get that like hey nobody will scold me from america for talking like this or if they do who gives a fuck but in israel i am appealing to people to say like listen you know bb he's attacking this one threat at the expense of leaving another wide open um right and i wouldn't be surprised by the way if we see more and more of that the worse this situation goes on and as missiles or bombs and sirens continue to rain in israel um because you know a war can get on you know there may be mass support for what Israel's doing or for this conflict right now in Israel.
54:50Noah Kulwin:There may be some really stable and durable amount of support for it. But that could get diminished the longer this thing goes on, and particularly as the economic damage of being in wartime continues to pile up.
55:02Carlo:So the reason why I wanted to bring you on, Noah, is because you and your co-host, Brendan, are working on a new miniseries. It happens to, I mean, kiss me out, I guess, because it's pretty well-timed. It's called No Daylight, and it's all about the special relationship between the United States and Israel. So I guess what I want to ask you is, you know, have have you locked the show yet? And because presumably recent events in the region might change something in the show now.
55:29Noah Kulwin:Well, I will say one of the benefits of making a history podcast is that we only ever really stand to benefit from current events getting worse all the time in our narrative sense. and it doesn't really change what we say in the show in a in a in in the substance of what we're the story that we're telling but i think it absolutely gives us opportunities to frame it in more accessible ways for people who are tuning in um and this show is this series we're doing so the way we ordinarily do our show is every year we release a 10 episode narrative story our first season is about the iraq war and we've since done you know seasons about the cuban revolution korean War, Afghanistan Wars, Rise of the Khmer Rouge, and most recently about Angola, the Angolan Civil War and the fight against apartheid and the Cuban intervention there.
56:17Noah Kulwin:And we're doing for the first time a miniseries, which will be just three episodes, and it'll come out the end of April or early May. And this miniseries, the idea that we had was we wanted to tell a story about the history of the U.S.-Israel relationship that focuses on moments of tension between the United States and Israel. Because the, you know, the length of our relationship over almost 80 years at this point has been one of close collaboration. It has been a quote-unquote special relationship, you know, language that we also use for talking about the U.S.-U.K. relationship, for example. But there are actually these moments of tension that I think are very revealing and that speak to kinds of conflicts, kinds of frustrations that even though we bury them and put them aside at the time, end up becoming very prescient for understanding the political problems that persist years and decades later.
57:20Noah Kulwin:So these moments of tension, you know, they include in the mid 50s, the Suez crisis in the 80s. There was actually some serious tension between Israel and the U.S. and the Reagan administration, which entered the White House as an extraordinarily pro-Israel force. And, you know, Bush one is another figure who had a lot of serious issues with Israel. And so I think that, you know, again, by focusing on these moments where there in fact was daylight, we can see what it is exactly, you know, what are both paths that we didn't take or pursue. But also, I think it gives us a bit of an insight into just how repetitious some of this shit is.
58:06Noah Kulwin:You know, it's it's much of the many of the complaints that we lodge against Israel today, frankly, have their roots in earlier tensions between the U.S. and Israel. Many of the same complaints that leaders of our government, when they are brave enough to say something critical of Israel, you know, they are just even if they don't know it, especially, you know, and surely they don't know it. They are repeating almost verbatim quite often some of the complaints that earlier generations of politicians had. and then it's also of course a bit revealing why it is then we go back to just acquiescing or working with Israel and you know that also has an interesting explanation in the form of both the Israel lobby and Cold War strategy on the part of the United States and so this miniseries I think it's it is I'm not going to say that it's well timed but I will say that it is timed I think that it is.
59:00Noah Kulwin:I think that it definitely, I don't want to be so bold as to say that it fits the moment really well, but I do think it will be very relevant and that I hope it'll be able to teach people some stuff about the history of the region and our relationship as a country to it.
59:15Carlo:Well, I'm very excited for it. You guys can check that out when it comes out later this spring at blowback.show. That's your correct web address, right? Yeah. And it'll be behind you all.
59:26Noah Kulwin:So You got to go there to get it.
59:28Carlo:Gotcha. Okay. And we'll put that in the description. And while you're waiting for that, check out some of the past blowback seasons. Noah and Brendan are some of the smartest minds in this stuff. And I want to bring you back, Noah, when we invade Cuba, which presumably is the next thing that I guess is happening.
59:46Noah Kulwin:I sure hope not. But thanks for having me.
59:50Carlo:I really appreciate it. Noah Colwin, everybody. Thank you, guys.
From the publisher
What does blowback look like? Noah Kulwin joins Carlo to offer a historical framework for the moment the U.S. finds itself in Iran.
Watch this episode: https://youtu.be/GIAWhUq3KaQ
Blowback: https://blowback.show/
Follow Noah: https://x.com/nkulw?lang=en | https://www.instagram.com/nkulw/?hl=en
See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
