Iran Is at a Tipping Point. Here's How Trump Could Push It Over

14 Jan 2026 · 44 min · 17 chapters

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Podcast Summary: The 1600 - Iran Is at a Tipping Point. Here's How Trump Could Push It Over

Episode Overview This episode of "The 1600," hosted by Carlo Versano with guest Tom O'Connor from Newsweek, focuses on the current political turmoil in Iran, the ongoing protests against the Iranian regime, and the implications of Donald Trump's potential military response. The discussion explores the precarious state of the Iranian government and the conditions leading to civil unrest.

Key Themes and Discussions

Current Situation in Iran

  • Protests and Government Response: Widespread protests in Iran are being fueled by economic hardship and dissatisfaction with the regime, prompting discussions about the potential for regime change.
  • Trump's Position: Trump recently tweeted support for Iranian protesters, suggesting U.S. assistance and indicating a possible military response, including airstrikes.

Economic Factors

  • Economic Crisis: Ongoing economic malaise in Iran, including high inflation rates (50-70%) and currency devaluation, has sparked frustration among citizens, particularly youth who desire better opportunities.
  • Impact on Protests: Economic grievances are identified as the primary motivators of protests, aligning with patterns observed in past social movements across the region.

Geopolitical Dynamics

  • Iran's International Standing: The Iranian regime is viewed as vulnerable, with diminishing military credibility and setbacks in regional conflicts.
  • Role of External Actors: Discussion on how global powers like Russia and China might respond to U.S. military actions and how Iran's international alliances (or lack thereof) impact its strength.

The Future of Iranian Leadership

  • Potential Leadership Changes: Speculation on who could lead Iran post-regime change, including exiled figures like Reza Pahlavi and internal factions such as the Revolutionary Guard.
  • Concerns of Fragmentation: The fear that a government collapse could result in anarchy or fragmentation due to Iran’s diverse ethnic and political landscape.

Trump's Military Doctrine

  • Historical Context: The episode explores Trump’s military strategy, noting his preference for limited, decisive operations rather than prolonged engagements.
  • Iran as a Potential Target: Consideration of what military action against Iran might entail, including potential strikes on military targets and the risks involved in such operations.

The Role of Domestic and International Protest Movements

  • Domestic vs. International Solidarity: The episode touches on the disconnect between protests within Iran and the international solidarity movements, particularly among progressive groups hesitant to fully endorse an anti-Islamic regime stance.
  • Diverse Opposition: The lack of a unified opposition front in Iran complicates the potential for successful regime change.

Key Takeaways

  • Iran is at a critical juncture: The combination of economic despair and rising civil unrest presents a significant challenge to the Iranian regime.
  • Trump's potential military action could exacerbate tensions: While there is a possibility for military strikes, they are fraught with uncertainties regarding their effectiveness and the implications for the Iranian populace.
  • Future of Iran remains uncertain: The lack of a clear opposition figure or cohesive strategy following a potential regime collapse raises questions about the stability of a post-Islamic Republic Iran.
  • Impact of global dynamics: How world powers perceive U.S. actions and what it means for future international relations, especially regarding China and Russia, as they navigate a changing geopolitical landscape.

Conclusion The discussion presents a nuanced view of the complexities surrounding Iran's current state, the potential for U.S. involvement, and the broader implications for international relations. As protests continue and the regime struggles to maintain control, the future of Iran remains uncertain, making it a pivotal moment in both regional and global politics.

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

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Current Protests in Iran

0:45 to 1:40

Discussion on the ongoing protests in Iran and Trump's tweet supporting them.

“I mean, this all sort of plays into it, you know, each other right now.”

Iran's Political Landscape

1:40 to 4:15

Analysis of whether the Iranian regime is truly on the brink of collapse.

“I guess, Tom, my first question is, is this regime actually on the precipice of collapse?”

Economic Crises and Unrest

4:15 to 6:45

Exploration of economic issues in Iran fueling public discontent and protests.

“we complain here in America when inflation goes above three percent.”

The Role of External Factors

6:45 to 10:05

Examination of how international relations and past conflicts impact Iran's current situation.

“And, you know, it just took two years to sort of push this back, roll it back completely.”

The Complexity of Iranian Dissidence

10:05 to 13:00

Understanding the various dissident groups in Iran and their potential impact.

“I mean, this is one of the hardest things.”

Future Scenarios for Iran

13:00 to 14:00

Speculation on potential leadership changes and the future trajectory of Iran.

“There are, you know, Arab, Azeri, Balochistan factions.”

Internal Dissent and Protests in Iran

14:00 to 15:00

Discusses the role of paramilitary organizations in managing protests in Iran.

“the Besiege, which is their paramilitary organization that deals with suppressing internal dissent.”

Potential Scenarios for Iran's Future

15:00 to 17:40

Explores various hypothetical outcomes for Iran amid current unrest and leadership challenges.

“And the same with the below Chistan areas, the areas near Azerbaijan, for example, these areas, the Arab areas near Iraq.”

Reza Pahlavi's Role in Iran's Future

17:40 to 19:30

Analyzes the potential of exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi as a leader if the regime falls.

“Now, of course, it's been replaced in some ways by the experience of the Islamic Republic.”

U.S. Military Action in Iran: Possibilities and Implications

19:30 to 22:20

Examines the feasibility and implications of U.S. military action in Iran amidst ongoing protests.

“First of all, the guy's 86 years old, right?”
Show all 17 chapters

The Complexities of Military Intervention

22:20 to 24:20

Discusses the challenges and potential consequences of U.S. intervention in Iran's internal conflicts.

“but it also has deep economic interests and probably cares about its survival.”

Comparing Global Protests: Iran and Palestine

24:20 to 28:00

Explores the dynamics of protests in Iran compared to pro-Palestinian movements in the U.S.

“And there are, you know, we have footage now of some of those strikes hitting busy streets in Tehran or major cities.”

Protests and the Islamic Republic's Complexity

28:00 to 30:20

Explore the dynamics of protests in Iran against the Islamic Republic's regime.

“So I think a lot of the folks who support the Palestinians are hesitant to flip on the Islamic Republic.”

Conditions for Revolution in Iran

30:20 to 32:30

Learn about the five conditions for successful revolutions and Iran's current situation.

“Iran would be a nice, nice addition to that.”

The Trump Doctrine and Military Strategy

32:30 to 36:40

Understand the implications of Trump's military doctrine and its application to Iran.

“There's there's issues that if not addressed this time around, will certainly lead again, as I said earlier when we were discussing just just further protests and perhaps to get worse and worse and worse.”

Geopolitical Implications of U.S. Actions

36:40 to 42:06

Discuss how U.S. actions in Venezuela and Iran affect global powers like China and Russia.

“I don't think Trump would want to step into anything without having some sort of idea of how it's going to go in the end.”

Geopolitical Dynamics: U.S., China, and Taiwan

42:06 to 43:16

Explore the complexities of U.S.-China relations and Taiwan's status.

“So it becomes more, I think, sort of competitive in terms of what you'd allow China to have or where you'd give them space.”
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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00The big geopolitical story this week is the Iranian regime on the verge of collapse and is Donald Trump now that he's in his team America world world police are going to get involved in the US to get a good job of the Iran Trade Center in New York City. I'm Carlo Versano, and this is The 1600. Today, we're talking Iran, and I've got my good friend and colleague, Tom O 'Connor, in the cut with us today. Tom, good to see you. Thanks for having me. Tom's our deputy editor of foreign policy here at Newsweek. He's been covering the Iranian story. Actually, Tom, you've really been covering everything lately.

0:34It's been quite the year, right? Good start to the year, yeah. Yeah. No shortage of news. We'll get to some of the other stuff with Venezuela, China, Russia. I mean, this all sort of plays into it, you know, each other right now. But the big story this morning is Iran. President Trump, I want to bring this this tweet up or this true social up. As we were just coming on the air here, the president posted, quote, Iranian patriots keep protesting. Take over your institutions. Save the names of the killers and abusers. They will pay a big price. I've canceled all meetings with Iranian officials until the senseless killing of protesters stops.

1:10Help is on its way, MIGA, which I assume means make Iran great again, President Donald J. Trump. So that is the president of the United States essentially offering U.S. support for these protesters, which is something that I think a lot of people have been hoping for or waiting for anxiously. Also, the Wall Street Journal reporting today that Trump is leaning toward airstrikes or some sort of military strikes in Iran as a way to, you know, potentially hasten the collapse of this regime. I guess, Tom, my first question is, is this regime actually on the precipice of collapse? It's a little it's it's not so cut and dry, is it?

1:49Yeah, I would say that, you know, there's no doubt that this is perhaps the greatest threat to the Iranian government since the Islamic revolution, certainly since the 2009 protests and perhaps since the Iran-Iraq war itself as well. Yeah, absolutely. And looking at it right now, there are certainly a lot of indications that this is somewhat of a perfect storm where you have economic malaise. You have this general feeling that the government is not responsive or holding itself accountable for the needs of everyday Iranians in many sectors of life. And of course, you have this kind of sort of saga recently of military setbacks, which is difficult when you're trying to establish a position of strength.

2:29Obviously, a lot of what the IRGC and stuff like that, and Khamenei as well, supreme leader, portrays this idea of Iran as a powerful guarantor of stability in the region. And, you know, when you have these big conflicts and confrontations and you're losing a lot of guys from it and suffering some some defeats here and there, of course, they also struck Israel quite a bit as well, but they lost a lot of guys. And that's, you know, it's concerning. And you have the other people after years of going back and forth between these reformists and principlists now is a reformist president, actually. And they feel that they're just not getting the results from the system.

3:04So there are serious threats here, I think. And even if the government ends up prevailing in these protests and, you know, at least prior to this tweet or a truth social that President Trump put out, there did seem to be seem to be some indications that the momentum was subsiding of the protests. We saw the pro-government rallies yesterday. I think that even if the government comes out ahead in this round, that there's still a lot of unaddressed concerns that if they don't move to alleviate or take significant steps to sort of address the core grievances that that sparked these protests, that there's only going to be greater opposition down the line.

3:40And there's been and there hasn't been signs yet the government is taking that route. So in terms of those grievances, I mean, you know, protest movements are pretty much all the same in the sense that they start economically. Right. I mean, the Arab Spring started in Tunisia with that fruit vendor. Right. who set himself on fire because he was being overly taxed or had to had to pay, you know, some sort of fees or something in Iran. You know, their economy is in the toilet. Right. I think the the real is is basically collapsed. Their currency is is essentially worthless. I saw, you know, inflation runs between 50 and 70 percent, which, of course, you know, we complain here in America when inflation goes above three percent.

4:18Right. It's cause for for alarm. Imagine have imagine that sort of price instability. Like you can see why people are just fed up, right? They're fed up with the economic situation, the lack of economic opportunities for a country that is full of educated young people, right? That's another thing that makes Iran so different from so many of the other countries in the Middle East. These people are young and they're hungry for a better life. And then you made the point about, you know, these external factors, right? So I think that's one of the things, I mean, from my angle, having covered Iranian protests, as you have going back years, decades, I mean, the one thing with this, you You know, they start.

4:55It seems like this could be the moment. The regime violently puts them down. And that's sort of the end of that. Right. Happened a couple of years ago. It happened in 09 with the election protests and the Green Revolution. Do you agree that, you know, to the extent that anything is different this time, it is the combination of the total collapse of the economy and what you said about how they're kind of naked on the world stage right now? Right. I mean, Trump and Netanyahu have done irreparable harm to the country in terms of the bombings that we did on their nuclear facilities over the summer.

5:29Their proxies where they project their power on the world stage are in complete disrepair right from Hamas to Hezbollah. And they're big backers in Russia and China have their own problems, but they've got bigger fish to fry. And one of the things that we learned from the operation in Venezuela is those guys are kind of fair weather friends. They're not, you know, Moscow and Beijing, they may support you. They may buy your oil. They may say that they're going to be there for you. They may sell you air defenses that don't work, but they're not, you know, when the rubber meets the road, it doesn't seem like they're really going to, you know, come to your aid.

6:01Does that seem accurate? Yeah. I mean, it's sort of this, you know, we've talked about this before, obviously, this sort of new era of great power competition where it's not just this sort of proxy battles behind the scenes, you know, competing over trade and influence, but some real kinetic stuff happening. And there are countries that are going to caught up in this middle powers like Iran, who is not a major power of the world, a great power, let's say, but also not a tiny minor country. And it's part of this axis of resistance. And it's part of this axis of resistance. So, you know, since what we've seen since, you know, October 2023 with the war in Gaza has been the axis of resistance slowly being eroded in many of the places that decades of investment and training and personnel were put into this axis, you know, from Lebanon to Syria to Iraq.

6:49And, you know, it just took two years to sort of push this back, roll it back completely. I wouldn't say it's completely unraveled, completely defeated. You know, Hezbollah still exists. Obviously, the Syria equation is completely flipped up. Assad's gone. Yeah, exactly. And that cuts off geographically the link there. You know, you still have Iraq to an extent and obviously Yemen to an extent. But it's not the same world we were living in before that. And it does leave. I mean, the point of the axis of resistance was to have forward operating deterrence, strategic depth against Israel. That depth has now been reversed to Iran itself where we've seen Israeli strikes and even U.S.

7:26strikes against Iran. So they have to consider what their national security strategy looks like in terms of actually thwarting enemies where now there are people openly talking about U.S. and Israeli intelligence agents in the streets of Iran. I'm not saying that that's the main driver of these protests, of course, not at all. But the fact that that is an open factor we can talk about now shows that Iran is in this moment of vulnerability. And they're using that messaging also to kind of portray these protests as, you know, foreign backed and, you know, the result of outside incitement and everything.

7:58But there's a lot at play here. I mean, it is remarkable, again, having having covered these for so long to just see how many people are on the streets. I mean, we're talking about I mean, the estimates I've heard are a million plus. Right. I mean, this country of 93 million people, I believe. So, you know, it's relatively small, I guess, in the scheme of things. But that's when you have a million people on the street, that's that's huge, legit, no matter what kind of country you're in. And also, you know, the young people, particularly the young women who are out there. I don't know if you've seen these viral images of some of these young Iranian women who are lighting their cigarettes with flaming pictures of the Ayatollah.

8:33You didn't used to see that in other. Well, I will say that a lot of those images coming out are not from within Iran, but from abroad, because there is also a lot of protests. And that's the thing about Iran is that there is a huge diaspora population in places like, you know, in America, obviously, but also Canada, the UK. And you're seeing this, you know, solidarity with the people in the country at the same time. And this is, you know, this is something that I think is not very well understood many times is that when the government takes steps like it does to restrict the Internet access and, you know.

9:05But the country's in a total Internet blackout. Yeah, and really throttles access to just a few, you know, semi-official and official news outlets that give their narrative. On one hand, yes, that does suppress the narrative and the capabilities of the domestic opposition and civil activists to get their word out and to get these images out. On the other hand, it seeds the information space to a lot of the foreign or, you know, based abroad dissident groups and opposition groups, exile groups, stuff like that. whether it's Pahlavi's faction or the MEK or, you know, a diverse number of Iran to live around the world who are very anti-Islamic republic.

9:45So, you know, we're getting this sort of information now from a lot of people who are not in the country, who some of them obviously talk to people within the country. But it's a very mixed bag. So we have to be careful with how we're reading this and try to understand that there's probably a disconnect between what Iranians in Iran feel and what Iranians outside of Iran feel. So that's a good point. What do the Iranians think inside? I mean, this is one of the hardest things. Iran is a hard story to cover as a journalist. You can't get in. It's very hard to get information out, especially when there's an Internet blackout.

10:17And from my understanding is it's not, you know, it's not a monolith. I mean, no country is a monolith. Right. But the Iranian street is not a monolith. They're not. It's not like Venezuela, where there is a, you know, an opposition figure who exists within the country that who could take over. Right. You've got a you know, it's not just the Ayatollah, right? There's the Revolutionary Guard that is essentially the security apparatus that runs the country. It goes very deep. And we don't know exactly what would even replace this regime should it collapse or be decapitated by U.S. or Israel. Is that fair?

10:50Yeah, absolutely. And there's a, you know, first thing I'll say is that when it comes to the debate within Iran, I mean, Iran is a democracy in a sense. I mean, there are political parties, really, I kind of alluded to them before, the two main camps, the reformists and the principlists who, you know, go back and forth for power, as I said before, President Pozeshkian is seen as a reformist. I mean, he ran on a platform that we have to focus more on the economy. We have to improve the lives of everyday Iranians. Obviously, this came amid one of Iran's most fateful confrontations, you know, since its beginning.

11:23So, I mean, there hasn't really been that opportunity to pivot there. And there are a lot of forces who are very influential within the broader Iranian, their version of a deep state, you know, which includes the IRGC, obviously, which obviously have their own priorities and are pushing more towards things that don't quite align with any sort of reformist or moderate agenda. On the other hand now, so, you know, the reason I make that point is because I think that that that idea that, you know, Iran was slowly reforming from within was was what did keep people off the streets for a while. They felt like, OK, well, if we vote in a moderate reformist, then we'll push things back.

11:59Exactly. But the experience right now, I think, has a lot of people losing faith in the system. On the other hand, now, looking at what a collapse could look like if it was something dramatic, let's say, you know, decapitation or, you know, the government falls apart one way or another. I think that also instills a lot of fear with a lot of Iranians who I've spoken to who are concerned about what's happened in neighboring countries. You look at the experience of Iraq, look at the experience of Syria, of Afghanistan, even like going as far away as Libya. The idea that the U.S. would come in and be, you know, the guardian or the guide.

12:33That never works. I mean, obviously, you know, the experiences speak for themselves. And I think it's complex. You know, maybe it takes time. But there is also that fear. And I bring that up also. One final point I want to make on that is that in Iran, there are armed groups that have a history of committing acts, you know, killing civilians. I mean, ISIS just committed the I think it was just two years ago around this time. They committed the deadliest terror attack in Iranian history. There's Kurdish factions. There are, you know, Arab, Azeri, Balochistan factions. And not all of them are violent.

13:04Not all of them are armed. But, you know, there is this concern that what people know as Iran as a state could disintegrate if the government does collapse. Which is, you know, I mean, again, I know that Iran is not Iraq. right or first of all it's it's shiite iraq is sunni iraq is i mean it was it was a bunch of things but it was the government was sunni yes right um when we went into you know we didn't take into account all of these factions when we went in right we decapitated the government we took out saddam and you know what filled the vacuum was a civil war and insurgency that lasted for years yeah um so i mean i don't i don't know what my question is there but i guess it's just Like, are these various dissident and insurgent groups, is there any one of them that could theoretically take power?

13:51I think what would happen, I mean, again, before I even get into that, I'll say that, you know, one of the prevailing scenarios is just that someone within the government itself or the military would just take power and just, you know, use the existing apparatus of the IRGC, including the Besiege, which is their paramilitary organization that deals with suppressing internal dissent. would use this system already, just easily kind of march in there and sort of split the difference between the protests. Say, OK, well, Khomeini is no longer in power. You know, this is the new, you know, this is the new regime now.

14:22And try to just, you know, to quiet things before it gets to that point. The other side of it, the other scenario I was kind of mentioning before, where you did have this broader, you know, anarchy in a sense, I think that the concern would be not that one of these groups specifically talk about the ethnic factions would seize power in Tehran, but more that they would sort of break off the country. You know, you have a Kurdish semi-autonomous state right now in Iraq, which, you know, deals with the central government, but in Syria it doesn't. And there's a big problem there right now. So there's a history of that, the U.S.

14:53backing, you know, these semi-autonomous Kurdish sort of territories within a country. And some of these groups also have historical relationships with Israel as well. And the same with the below Chistan areas, the areas near Azerbaijan, for example, these areas, the Arab areas near Iraq. So, you know, it's a mixed bag. It's a huge country and right in the middle. And Iran has a long history of staying together, which works in its favor. But you have to remember, this is not a country that's gone through a major civil war recently, anytime soon, even during the Islamic Revolution. It went through a major war with Iraq, but that was an external enemy that did involve some groups from within basically fighting on behalf of Saddam or so.

15:35You know, there is this idea the country wants to rally together. But, you know, it's a time of uncertainty right now. So people are looking at these worst case scenarios, taking them very seriously. You mentioned this guy, Reza Pahlavi, who is the exiled crown prince. He was the he's the son of the Shah who was deposed by Khomeini in the in the 79 revolution. So, I mean, I've read that Pahlavi is I've seen him. He was on Fox News. He was, you know, appealing directly to President Trump saying, you know, you're a man of peace. Do what has to be done to, you know, to to foment this this revolution.

16:07Is he I mean, he doesn't even live in Iran, right? He lives in D.C., I think. Is he the best shot to lead? Should the regime fall? How would that even work? How do you even lead a country from exile? I would say that if you had had this conversation maybe just a year ago or so, that it would seem just completely unlikely. We have seen now, we have some footage of some people within Iran holding his picture, chanting his name. Are those the majority of protesters? I think a lot of people are just fed up in general. I don't think they have strong opinions on the monarchy or maybe even on the Islamic Republic itself.

16:42They're just sick. They just want life to be better for themselves, which even some of the government officials have acknowledged is obviously is a valid concern on their part. Pallavi himself, he's positioning himself right now to be a potential substitute. He's done this for a very long time. He's dedicated his life to it. And he – it's not the first time he's come out and said this is the end of the Islamic Republic. You know, take me in. I'm the only alternative. And, you know, there are some competing factions out there, but definitely he is he's positioning himself as a symbolic figure, as the most prominent figure.

17:17And he probably is in many ways. But, you know, as you said, he has he's not living in Iran. Obviously, he couldn't. And the extent to which he could actually put together a coalition. Remember, you can't just walk in there and restore the monarchy. And I know he says he wants a constitutional monarchy. So he's not saying he'd sit there and just be the king and rule over everything. He's saying that he'd have free and fair elections. But, you know, that legacy of the Shah and it's, you know, and the situation of the country at that time still looms large in Iranian history. Now, of course, it's been replaced in some ways by the experience of the Islamic Republic.

17:52But those are two competing narratives that people don't necessarily see as one is better than the other. I think that there is some nostalgia out there for a time where, you know, anything they see is better than this. But, you know, it's difficult. And that's what I'm saying. Me, I cannot sit here and say, you know, I would want to have to try to say what the Iranian people think broadly. And I think, again, going back to the government, you know, restricting media acts, stuff like that. It doesn't work sometimes the government's favor because it allows these other narratives to really take take hold, especially when it comes to foreign media outlets, foreign officials.

18:25And, you know, the extent to which, again, Pahlavi, I feel like, is able to just step in there. I mean, he would have to he'd have to make alliances. He'd have to deal with some figures. He's probably within the government right now. You know, as we said before, Iran is a massive country, a lot of competing factions. And the person who does step in after Kemeni, whether it's through protest or just when Kemeni passes and he has no, you know, we have we have no idea who his successor might actually be, is going to have to be in some ways a compromise candidate among very, very different factions.

18:57Let's talk about Trump for a minute. You know, we mentioned his his post this morning. This comes, as I said, the Wall Street Journal reporting that he's leaning towards taking military action in Iran. You know, I wouldn't a few months ago, I would have said there's no chance of that happening. Obviously. I mean, he already like you mentioned, we already took military action in Iran. I don't know what else we could do. I mean, we you know, we bombed there the nuclear facilities, the enrichment facilities. What would what what would military action even look like? It's not going to be like a Caracas situation where we go in with Delta Force and they snatch the Ayatollah out of his bed.

19:33First of all, the guy's 86 years old, right? I don't even know. What would that even do? I mean, if there was, let's say, a Venezuela model, and that's what some of the folks I've been talking to have been discussing this, this idea of a Venezuela model for Iran, what that would look like. Obviously, you know, as you said, Iran's a very different country. It's a totally different playing ground there. We did take more dramatic military action back in June during the 12-day war. And at that point, we thought, I mean, not we, but some folks out there said, well, this is the biggest challenge of the Islamic Republic.

20:07You know, this is the point where it might collapse. And I think, you know, some folks in Israel were saying, well, you know, why aren't the Iranians taking the streets now? Here's the moment. You know, the government now is in a far more, more even than today, certainly, state of disarray. We have senior senior posts, people killed, not yet replaced. I mean, that's a that's real, you know, operational momentum there. But what we did see after that really is a lot of Iran is kind of rallying together. Sure. Of course, there were some people who, you know, just like they do now back then were opposed to the government.

20:37But there was a fear that that the that the what came next could be some sort of chaos and anarchy or the government was in disarray. And the IRGC, despite its losses, rallied together, consolidated power, filled the posts. and particularly when it comes to domestic sort of intelligence organizations of a siege, really stepped up and kind of clamped down on things. Now, those same officials and the same apparatuses are in full force today to try to overcome these protests right now. So what does U.S. military action look like? Well, I mean, I guess what I'm trying to say is it wouldn't be so simple to just strike a bunch of major targets because we already did that.

21:15And so the Israelis, even more so than us. We struck these military targets that were like out in the mountains. What would I mean? Is there a situation in which American warplanes are striking targets in Tehran? Sure. I mean, it certainly could happen. But again, to what end? You know, it's easier to destroy a house than to build one. Right. And I guess that's the issue is that you can you can you could just, you know, pummel the Islamic Republic. Like you could pummel Iran. Their air defenses obviously are no match for ours. The ones that are still existing. So it's not really a concern. It's just that what's your operational aim?

21:47You can't force a peaceful transition of power, you know, through military means. Right. Either you're going to have either you're going to install someone or you're going to, you know, build a coalition on the ground. So I guess to go back to the Venezuela model thing, what would have to happen is you'd have to have a deal with someone either within the IRGC or within the political apparatus. Who's ready to flip. Who's ready to flip. who's ready to step in there. And that's not an unthinkable scenario. Looking at the IRGC today, it's a very deeply ideological organization that is on paper sworn to Chemenini and probably is sworn to Chemenini, but it also has deep economic interests and probably cares about its survival.

22:26And again, I think a lot of those folks there also have those same concerns I mentioned earlier about what the alternative look like if there isn't a strong man that shows up, if there is a sort of broader instability that sweeps the nation. And, you know, that's the points they've been saying out loud. I think they believe that. Right, right. It's like, look at the debathification of Iraq, right? Yeah. I'm trying to like put my, pretend like I'm Donald Trump here. And, you know, what is he thinking? How does he think of these things, right? We saw in Venezuela, he has no interest in, I think, you know, the dirty and the hard work of regime change.

23:02But he loves these sort of like spectacular shows of American military might. So I think that it's certainly plausible that, you know, we maybe even, you know, today or tomorrow, there's going to be some sort of military strike on some sort of, you know, government or regime targets in Tehran. And I guess the argument in favor of that would be, you know, if, as you said, the momentum of these protests might be slowing, could that alone be a reason to, you know, to keep the pressure on this regime and to keep the protesters in the streets saying, look, America is ready to help you? I don't know.

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23:35I mean, I guess that's the argument that I would make in favor of American airstrikes, you know, against Iran. But again, we've both been burned by, you know, our misadventures in this region so often. You know, it's hard to say, right? Again, I mean, it's tough. You can't sit there and and pretend to have an idea of what these 93 million people want and because they don't want the same thing as various different factions there. There are a lot of people abroad who see military action as a as a viable solution to expediting the fall of the government. While it's the people in Iran, they're going to have to deal with those strikes.

24:14I mean, the Israeli strikes. I mean, again, we don't know the full numbers, but, you know, the government at least reports that a thousand people died during the 12 day war. And there are, you know, we have footage now of some of those strikes hitting busy streets in Tehran or major cities. I'm not saying that the majority of the targets were civilians, but we don't, we think is we don't know the extent and people are going to die. If you're sitting there and you feel like you might be winning the argument against the government, even if the protests are subsiding, and then all of a sudden American warplanes show up and start bombing positions near you because you're protesting in front of big government buildings, that could also be seen as problematic to a lot of people and might concern them.

24:53They might maybe what the government said about the U.S. being behind designs to destroy the country is true. Right. So, again, there's two sides to it. And it's a gamble the U.S. will have to take or decide either way. Do you let the momentum sort of fizzle out and just apply pressure to the government, try to make better contacts within the government to try to find a way to move things? Can you make some sort of grand bargain, grand deal? Or do you say we're never going to get this opportunity again? Right. And that's why I think I mean, I just feel like Trump is so emboldened having these, you know, having I mean, And Caracas, regardless of what you think of the policy of us, you know, ousting dictators in sovereign countries was obviously a huge tactical in operational success militarily in terms of intelligence.

25:35The operation against the Iranian targets over the summer was a huge success. I mean, I don't know. I don't know if it was a huge success. We don't know actually still the extent to which we've destroyed those facilities. But it was a success in terms of there was no real blowback. Right. I mean, they launched a couple of missiles at our at our air base in the in the region. But they called it in first. So like it wasn't wasn't legit. What do you this? I know that this isn't really your your bag of tricks. So I'm going to ask you anyway. There's been a lot of talk about like what where are the protesters in America?

26:07But you've got this you know, you had this huge pro-Palestinian movement that took over these campuses and marched in the streets of New York and many other cities over the last couple of years after since October 7th in the war in Gaza. I've heard people on the right say, where are those people? Why aren't they out in the streets in support of the Iranian opposition and the people in the streets of Iran? I think that that's a bit disingenuous. I think that at least in theory, the protests in America were against U.S. involvement. We were funding – we fund Israel weapons, right? So we had a stake in the war in Gaza.

26:43You know, the campus protests were, again, theoretically at least about divesting from Israel, those institutions divesting from Israel. We don't have an economic relationship with Iran, right? However, you could argue that, you know, the sort of like leftist worldview, you know, among progressives and among people who were in the streets for Palestine is solidarity, solidarity among, you know, the oppressed versus the oppressors. There is no greater fight between oppressor and oppressed in the world right now than Iran, is there? Maybe North Korea. I don't know. I think that, you know, there's a lot I can say about that.

27:17I think that first thing I'll say is that. I mean, the point that you made as far as the U.S. obviously being involved to an extent in the Gaza situation and other wars like the Iraq war and stuff like that, you know, does kind of obviously bring a domestic element to a conflict or any sort of U.S. foreign policy action that. makes some folks more interested, particularly on the left, I think, because they feel like they're connected to it. Tax dollars, which has been sort of the ideology of that side of things politically and also historically on the other side. I mean, this idea of broader leftist philosophies on, you know, anti-imperialism and stuff, despite, you know, the Islamic revolution being not a leftist movement, although there was obviously some leftists involved in it during the initial 1979 overthrow of the Shah.

28:05It does speak to some of that. And there was alignment there. So I think a lot of the folks who support the Palestinians are hesitant to flip on the Islamic Republic. So there's a lot to that. And, you know, you can speak to hypocrisy and anything. But then the other thing I just, you know, the third thing I guess I would just say is that just because you protest one issue doesn't mean you have to protest everything. You know, I mean, there's things going on in Myanmar, things going on in Yemen, things going on all around the world. You know, the Ukraine, Ukraine war, you know, things happening.

28:34You mentioned North Korea. So, I mean, it's people choose their issues and they specialize in them and they or, you know, at least in their minds. And, you know, they come out and that's part of part of how they spend their time. But if you're processing everything, then you wouldn't really have much. Sure. I mean, I have my personal take is and I'm not going to ask you to opine on this, but I just I think that the fact is these protesters are protesting Islam to a degree. Right. I mean, Iran is an Islamic fundamentalist regime. And I think that the American left has sort of been conditioned to not, you know, support anti-Islam movements anywhere in the country.

29:14Yes, I know. I mean, and that's the thing. Maybe that's reductive. I don't know. The only thing I'll just say on that is that you have to remember, Iran is a Muslim country. I mean, it is, you know, I don't know the figures off the top of my head. It's vastly majority Shiite Muslim. And the idea that, I mean, there are, because you go again, like into the rabbit holes of different opinions being put out there by some opposition figures, some of them looking at a pre-Islamic era like, you know, Zoroastrianism, you know, we're far away from that. This is not going to turn into a secular American loving republic under any circumstance.

29:49It could get very secular because a lot of people in Tehran themselves are quite secular. So, I mean, I'm not saying that they're, you know, it's not that the level of conservative mentality is so ingrained in society. Certainly not. And that is part of these protests. You're absolutely right. I'm just saying there has to there is, you know, there is it is still a Muslim majority country and whoever rules, no matter whether they're from abroad, from within or whatever background they are, is going to be must. Right. Or Marco Rubio. Maybe that'll be his new job. I think he's already he's supposed to be what?

30:20Governor of Cuba. Yeah. I think that's the job. Iran would be a nice, nice addition to that. I read a piece in The Atlantic this week. It was by the historian Jack Goldstone, and he wrote that there are five conditions for revolutions to succeed. And his argument is that Iran has met all five of these. So these conditions, according to Goldstone, are a fiscal crisis, divided elites, a diverse oppositional coalition, a convincing narrative of resistance in a favorable international environment. So I think just going through these fiscal crisis, yes, obviously. Divide elites, I think so. I would say probably more than we know for real.

30:57I would suspect that there is quite a bit of division, even though they're actively looking to clamp down on this. But, you know, let's say that there's an element of that. I'm not convinced. We haven't seen a we haven't seen big action. So I think you have to take that into account that just like in June, you know, they rallied behind their flag and we haven't seen anyone leaving the country, anyone running away. In fact, everything, you know, they're putting, I think, in the inner side of things, we said it's not a mile. There are competing clicks and perhaps some discussions being made. But the divisions are sort of happening outside of the of the public eye, at least so far.

31:30Diverse oppositional coalition. That's, I think, what they're missing. Diverse, yes, but unified, no. You know, diverse in the sense that this started off as a protest that took place in Tehran's Grand Bazaar, a working class protest, whereas a lot of protests in Iran over the years typically were coming from middle class folks. This was a working class protest. That's an important point, right? And now it's expanded, obviously, into various segments of society, including the middle class, including people who just, again, are just fed up with the system. There are people out there for economic reasons, people out there for political reasons, people out there for all sorts of things.

32:08But what we haven't seen is any unified set of demands or aims or figures emerging. And again, this is also the work of, this is what the IRGC and the Iranian government specializes, making sure those don't surface. So they are actively working against this. But without that, I still think that it's very difficult to imagine how the government is going to tomorrow or even in the very near future collapse. I think there's decay. There's there's issues that if not addressed this time around, will certainly lead again, as I said earlier when we were discussing just just further protests and perhaps to get worse and worse and worse.

32:45But without that, we still we're not seeing that the alternative yet. Interesting. Right. Well, so the next one he lists is convincing narrative of resistance. Certainly. Yeah. I would say that that exists in a favorable international environment that sure exists. Right. So, OK, so I think four of the five, maybe we could argue. I guess the other thing I just wanted to ask you before before we get going here is and for all we know, since we've been talking, we've already launched strikes. Right. Based on how this year has gone. Yeah. Who knows? But but, you know, how does how does this fit into this sort of like Don Roe doctrine that we're now calling it, which is this, you know, sort of reordering of the global, you know, order.

33:25Whereas America is, you know, fiercely defends its back. This is this is sort of like the Trump, you know, argument here. We're going to fiercely defend our backyard and our hemisphere. Iran's not in our hemisphere. Right. But it does play into, you know, what he's doing. Right. I mean, the Iranians are, you know, have have facilities in Venezuela. Right. I believe they make manufactured drones in Caracas, or at least they did. So how does Iran, regardless of what happens, how does it, do you think it fits into this sort of like, I know we're calling it the Don Roe doctrine, but I prefer to just call it the Trump doctrine and this sort of idea of, you know, hemispheric strength.

34:03And, you know, maybe we're going to spend less time overseas, whether it's in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific. How do you square that with the possibility that we're about to do, you know, military intervention in Iran potentially? Well, a couple of things. I mean, the first thing is it doesn't. I mean, in some ways. Secondly, though, it's to looking at how Trump thinks historically, as we've seen him operate, especially when it comes to deciding to greenlight military operations. There's been plenty of times where he's been on the brink and said no. Yeah, he does have a good point. He's not he has he has a has restraint.

34:36He has restraining. That's exactly what I was going to use. He has this this this streak of restraint in him to a point. And I think that especially during the first administration, a lot of it wasn't really until he killed Soleimani that people realized, you know, no, he can he can come through on those threats. Seriously. Right. That was a massive. That was the moment when I think everybody was like, oh, wow. Like he's he's prepared. to show American force overseas. And obviously this time around, I think that's just beefed up extremely given the strikes on Iran, given the Venezuela operation.

35:11So we know that certainly he's serious about this, but he thinks about it in ways that are limited, precise operations. So if we talk about his criticisms of the forever wars, obviously something he ran on, the people within even MAGA who are very pro-restraint and anti-interventionist, when the when the Maduro thing happened it was over before that's before anyone could really react to it right without any you know they were in and out yeah without anyone Americans same thing with the Iran strikes you know we didn't lose any aircraft or anything so if you can you know the idea that you can succeed in these things and get away with them and and achieve your results which are limited but still quite grand in the grand scheme of things you then it does afford you a lot of operating space, even among people who might be opposed to those sort of actions.

36:00So Iran, in this sense, if we do operate in Iran, if there are strikes and, you know, we still don't know what he means by offering support to protesters, as he said in that Truth Social post, it's going to be, I think, quite limited. I mean, sure, it could be grand the steam is things where you might strike a bunch of military targets, but it's not gonna be boots on the ground. That's what I guess what I'm trying to say is you can do a lot from the area, but you can't, you still can't overthrow the government physically. Someone has to step in and do that. It would have to be, I mean, protesters, protesters don't lead a government.

36:32They'd have to, who's their figure, right? Does Pallavi come in, fly in? Is it someone else from abroad they have in mind or someone within the government? So there's a lot of unanswered questions. I don't think Trump would want to step into anything without having some sort of idea of how it's going to go in the end. Well, this is, so this is, again, one of these big, I think, arguments people are having about the operation in Venezuela and what comes next, right? So the one argument is we didn't do anything other than take out this one guy and send him to jail in Brooklyn where he's going to have a big show trial and go to prison.

37:05Okay, well, his regime is still in place, right? Okay, well, the other argument to that is, well, again, back to Iraq. It's better that his regime is in place and are talking and under our thumb than just wiping out the entire infrastructure and, you know, political governing party. Well, you just skip the whole war. Right, exactly. Skip the war and you just go straight for the, I mean, if you could do that, that's great. You know what I mean? That's a, I mean, you just go straight for the head, for the commander in chief and skip the whole army basically. No, I mean, that's sort of the, I mean, I don't know if it's called brilliance, but that I think was the, is the operating, you know, fundamental idea behind this Trump doctrine.

37:43It's right, we don't need to go in and do a, you know, four year regime change where we have American soldiers getting shot at. Yeah, yeah. We're going to, you know, if we have the opportunity to take one of these bad guys out, we're going to do it. And we're going to hope to, you know, that there's something we'll fill. We're going to do what we can to, you know, ensure that the vacuum gets filled by something that is pro. Yeah. In American. But the other thing I'll say is the other side of that, though, is that obviously all the folks who are pro opposition Venezuela thought this would be their moment to come in.

38:13Sure. And he threw Machado under the bus immediately. So far, it's not. I mean, I think there's a lot of reasons for that. We could discuss maybe another podcast more about Venezuela in terms of Trump's sort of experience with the Venezuelan opposition. Right. Given the history. They didn't trust him. But yeah. So the other question then, you know, going back to the sort of like Trump doctrine is what, you know, what are the and I think this doesn't get talked about enough. Like what are the what are we showing Russia and more importantly, China with these moves? Right. Because I've heard the argument that, you know, us going into Venezuela and, you know, snatching a, you know, a dictator, but still out of state of a sovereign country is, you know, gives a pathway for somebody like Xi to say, OK, you know what, if there's no, you know, if the international rules are that far gone, then I'm just going to go for Taiwan.

38:56I don't buy that argument. I think that if anything, what we did in Venezuela probably scared the shit out of the Chinese and the Russians, at least in the – I mean we collapsed their air defenses. You know, Russian-Chinese air defenses were useless. We showed American military might is still the best in the world. Where do you sort of stand on that? Do you think that, you know, something like an invasion of Taiwan is more likely in this new world order where we're more interested in our own backyard? Or is it less likely because our big global adversaries are saying, maybe we underestimated the Americans.

39:29We don't want to get on, you know, to be totally reductive. We don't want to get on their bad side. We don't know what they could do. Do I think it's imminent now? No. And do I think that the operation, including the one Iran in June, and the concerns now have one, but the operation of Venezuela most recently definitely sent a message to China and Russia? Absolutely. I think it does make them sort of reassess the threshold of Trump specifically. I mean, I'm not talking about America in general, but Trump specifically, his willingness to use action. So certainly. but in the question of this world order that we're talking about the idea of the u.s you know establishing this corollary of the of the monroe doctrine um the maga monroe doctrine right or don roe doctrine that we want to call it um i do think it what it does is it is it incentivizes russia and china to engage with america i think in a different light one and play a game that i think that they know how to play.

40:30And I think Trump knows how to play as well. Don't get me wrong. But it's almost it almost gives it. We're almost speaking the same language now in terms of how we view the world in spheres of influence. Right. When it also and, you know, you didn't mention this, but I think it also sends a message to all our allies, too, including Europe specifically. I know we you know, we didn't talk about the Greenland situation, but but that's but not just Greenland in general. What America the extent to which America feels it has to shore up Europe's against Russia. You know, we all read the national security strategy.

41:00And I mean, it seemed that Europe was almost the main target of that. There was a lot of language dedicated towards Europe's, you know, inadequacies in terms of ideology and its relationship with Russia and the U.S. wanting to basically see Europe take a different course in a lot of things. So what it looks, it's a new sort of great game being played around the world. And if we look specifically at flashpoints like Russia, Ukraine's already on fire. But I think Trump wants to see a way out of this, that he thinks Russia could walk away with something that's satisfactory. The Ukrainians get to walk away with the state.

41:37They're still having a country. In his mind, that's a win. When it comes to China, it's obviously more complicated because China is seen as the number one geopolitical competitor. And it's also a domestic issue because China - We're so intertwined with the Chinese. Yeah, I mean, we talk about Iran and Russia having some influence in the Western hemisphere. I mean, China is here already, you know, in terms of its vast trade deals being the number one trading partner for most of the hemisphere, I believe, certainly for South America, at least. So it becomes more, I think, sort of competitive in terms of what you'd allow China to have or where you'd give them space.

42:14I think it's a lot more difficult to have that conversation. But when you have these conversations between the U.S. and China, between the U.S. and Russia, between Russia and China, I think it is very much about these spheres of influence. I think China will continue to make the argument and perhaps try it in different ways now that it sees how America has shifted priorities to make the argument that Taiwan is firmly within its sphere of influence, not just a part of its territory like it claims, but that it's not worth it for the U.S. to get involved. What can China offer the U.S. in exchange for that transactionally?

42:50I think that's certainly something that informs the Chinese thinking right now. That's a little bit scary. Yeah. But potentially. I mean, look, this is a you know, we talked about this off camera, but like it feels like we're in the we're in the beginning of something. Right. This big. We're in the we're almost in the middle of it. I mean, not in the middle. I think, yeah, you're right. We're in the beginning stage of something like that. But it's happening now. We're at this hinge point. Yeah. We're at a real deal political hinge point. But I appreciate you coming on to thank you. Help make make sense.

43:18Hopefully this was helpful to you guys. Again, Iran is a tough story to cover, even under the best of circumstances. is the internet blackout has made information coming out of that country extremely difficult to come by. Again, some of the, you know, I was fooled by some stuff that I saw online that I thought was legitimate that turned out to be either government propaganda or opposition propaganda. So be careful out there. It's a tricky information environment. Tom O 'Connor is one of the best in the business to help you make sense of it. You can find his reporting on newsweek.com. And we'll see you guys soon.

43:54Thank you.

From the publisher

Protests in Iran are closer than ever to pushing the country over the brink. With thousands of protesters reported dead, will Trump sit this one out? Or is "help" on its way? Carlo Versano is joined by Newsweek's Tom O'Connor to break down the latest.


Watch this episode: https://youtu.be/yA5qL5f4Sq8


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