Is This the New Trump Doctrine?

24:40And so we've heard these Trump officials kind of defending this by saying this is the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This is the Don Roe Doctrine, as Trump has said. You know, it's just squarely focused on, as you said, you know, that, you know, we see China, we see Russia, Iran, these other countries. in our backyard. We can't have that. And yet then you hear Trump talking about also threatening to strike Iran again, obviously, you know, now that Iran is threatening, you know, protesters that are protesting in Iran. And so that is a little bit undercut. You know, is this a doctrine that's really squarely focused on the Western hemisphere or is it a lot broader than that?

25:13I mean, obviously, if you look at Trump foreign policy up to this point, you can't make the case that it's been focused on the Western hemisphere. You know, he's trying to create peace in the Middle East, in Ukraine. Now he's already bombed Iran once. Now he's talking about doing it again. So I just think it's a, I think you see attempts by Trump officials to kind of shoehorn this into kind of, you know, a very kind of clear and concise philosophy. And I think the reality is that Donald Trump, as ever, you know, is not much of a foreign policy philosopher or any sort of policy philosopher. He kind of goes with his whims, does things as he wants, enjoys kind of big kind of shows of force is much less interested and kind of much more protracted kind of wars.

25:51The issue being, of course, it's not always up to the president, you know, what becomes, you know, a brief, really quick surgical operation and what becomes a much longer and much more chaotic situation. Well, I mean, yeah, that's that's just what scares me, having been burned by so many, you know, of our military misadventures in the past is, you know, we talked about this in the newsletter and on the podcast many times. It's just the law of unintended consequences, right? Like once you start going down these paths of destabilizing these countries, you don't know. I mean, in some ways, right?

26:19I mean, you know, it's true. Rubio has this great quote that I think you put in your newsletter. He was on Face the Nation on Sunday. I'm just going to quote him. I think this was very revealing. He said, quote, I still think that a lot of people analyze everything that happens in foreign policy through the lens of what happened from 2001 through 2015 or 16. The whole foreign policy apparatus thinks everything is Libya, Everything is Iraq. Everything is Afghanistan. This is not the Middle East. And our mission here is very different. This is the Western Hemisphere, end quote. So he's basically making the point that we've been talking to that, like, this is not Iraq was a different ballgame.

26:53Right. There's not you know, we don't have to deal with Islamic fundamentalism. There's no Shia versus Sunni, you know, civil war that's going to break out in Venezuela. But but again, Venezuela is a big country. There's 30 million people there. Right. We don't you know, there's all sorts of factions, guerrilla fighters in that country. We don't know how that's going to play out in some sort of, you know, protracted time of instability. Right. But back to Iran, what do you what do you make of his hawkishness towards the Iranians? Is it possible that he sees the Ayatollah and the mullahs as on the ropes with these new protests and he's going to just sort of try and do what he can to exert maximum pressure as he typically does?

27:36Or is there – I mean the fact that he's saying that we could potentially strike Iran if they hit protesters, that would be a huge escalation that no one has asked for or wants, I think. I think it's certainly possible. I mean, I think, you know, one thing, you know, if you can kind of draw a bit of a parallel, I guess, is I think clearly the one that we've heard from Trump during the period where he was out of office. And then I think kind of that's been actualized by the events of this last weekend is a measure of regret that maybe he didn't strike Maduro earlier, kind of when the iron was hot, you know, during his first term when there were protests in Venezuela and when there was kind of a lot of international pressure to oust Maduro.

28:14And we've heard Trump kind of muse about regretting that he didn't oust Maduro then. And obviously, you know, now he's doing it now. And so perhaps you kind of see him. You could make a case that maybe he feels burned by that experience, feels he should have struck Chuck Venezuela earlier. It was obviously talked out of it by, you know, the John Mattises and John Kellys of the world then. And now, you know, sees a similar situation. Right. And right. And wants to take advantage of it. Again, I'm just skeptical of any sort of kind of overarching, you know, guiding philosophy. I or really hesitant to really make any predictions.

28:47I mean, obviously, Donald Trump is someone who was elected very explicitly, you know, both a big part of how he won the 2016 Republican nomination. And frankly, it was even bigger part of his 2024 campaign, you know, campaigning so explicitly against regime change, against nation building. It was really core to his premise. And, you know, something I've written about before is I think Donald Trump was always something of like an awkward fit for an isolationist, because if you think of like, you know, what it means to be more of an interventionist or more of, you know, being a globalist or kind of playing the role of the world's policeman, you know, kind of darting around conflict zone to conflict zone, you know, striking peace deals or dropping bombs and, you know, really kind of setting the global agenda.

29:25You know, that sounds much more like the type of thing that the Donald Trump we know would have interest in than, you know, keeping his vision just to kind of the borders of the United States, just kind of what he claimed was all he was interested in in his campaigns. But I think the idea of him as an interventionist is much more of a piece with kind of how Donald Trump views his role in the world and views himself more broadly. And so he's someone who campaigned against regime change. And yet shortly after he dropped bombs on Iran, you know, several months ago, he I don't remember the exact words, but he wrote on True Social, you know, kind of musing about regime change.

29:59Maybe regime change in Iran wouldn't be so bad. Maybe it is time time to have it. So I think certainly I agree with what you said. I mean, I am someone that I think oftentimes when Donald Trump speaks, I'm kind of pretty willing to kind of dismiss it as bluster or not really kind of take it seriously. Obviously, Nicolas Maduro did the same thing and is now seeing the consequences of that. So while I don't think there's necessarily a plan to strike Iran tomorrow, I think anybody who really dismisses at this point Trump using force in any of the places that he's throwing out, clearly these are things he's willing to do.

30:35Clearly, there's no one around him who is that focused on kind of constraining him like there was in the first term. And there doesn't really seem to be any effort in Congress to assert kind of their constitutional authority over declarations of war or to even do much oversight at all over the military actions coming out of the White House. So I think it's really hard to dismiss anything that could happen next. Hold that thought on Congress because I want to get to that in a second. But I think it goes back – what you're saying really goes back to that great – I forget who even said it. But it was a quote during his first term about how you don't take Trump literally, but you do take him seriously, right?

31:11And I think that's sort of what we're seeing now. So yeah, let's talk about Congress or to the extent that Congress is even a functioning body anymore. I mean, I heard Chuck Schumer come out and say, you know, he's got concerns, probably going to write a strongly worded letter to the administration.

31:34So what do you what is going to happen here? Not just the Democrats in Congress, because I understand that they're out of power and there's not much they can do other than write strongly worded letters. Are you seeing in your reporting and among your sources that Republicans are having any sort of plan here to try and check this president when it comes to matters of foreign affairs? And I say that – let me say that by saying I'm not arguing that what we did in Venezuela actually needed congressional authority, right? I mean I don't know the actual specific legals, but George Bush did essentially this with Manuel Noriega in Panama.

32:10He didn't go through Congress. He didn't alert our allies in the region. So this is not without precedent. I mean, this is a much bigger country than than Panama. This is a much more complicated maneuvering that that's what's happening here. But there is some precedent to this. I will note quickly, I think you're absolutely right. I mean, obviously, with Panama, Panama had declared war against the United States and attacked US Marines. So I think there are differences there. But the broader point is certainly true that this is not the first time a president has kind of asserted pretty broad war powers.

32:41and Congress has really let it, let the president do it. You know, that's been decades and decades of, you know, Congress really looking at, you know, and it's an awkward constitutional system that the founders set up where, you know, Congress declares war, but the president is commander in chief. And, you know, I think increasingly, obviously, the kind of second part of that equation has really dominated. I think my sense is, I think a lot of Republican lawmakers are in a wait and see mode. And that, you know, if you look at the polling, I'll be interested to see the polling, you know, now that we actually have, you know, captured Maduro.

33:09And, you know, now that there's actually been some pretty serious developments. But if you looked at the polling beforehand, you know, Nicolas Maduro, it shouldn't be surprising. You know, he's a murderous dictator. He was not a super popular guy among the American public. That should not be shocking. So there was general support, you know, for the idea of Nicolas Maduro not being the president of Venezuela anymore, for the idea potentially of ousting him, at least kind of more support. But there's very little support for any sort of, you know, long drawn out campaign in Venezuela. If you really depends how you ask the question, you know, I think before it actually happened, your questions about, you know, kind of one and done kind of strikes, I think we're much more popular than the idea of if you ask you really about do you want the US to go to war to Venezuela?

33:53So I think it really depends what happens next. You know, if this is all the US does in Venezuela, then I think Republican lawmakers are very OK with this idea of, you know, kind of this muscular show of force and allowing the president to do this no matter what the kind of war powers laws might be. But, you know, as we've seen in previous conflicts, that's the thing. It never is. Right. Right. It usually drugs out longer and the longer it goes, the less popular it gets. I mean, that's what we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan. We see that again and again. And I think when you already have a president who's already a lame duck, you already see kind of cracks in his support.

34:25And I think especially importantly, when the you know, if you take I I mean, it's this kind of weird situation where if you take the Republican Congress, the people that are generally most opposed to Trump are kind of the more neoconservative, hawkish Mitch McConnell's of the world who are thrilled by this sort of action. And then you have the people who are more allied with Trump who would be more likely to be skeptical of intervention like this. So I think it really is an issue that kind of scrambles the Republican coalition. And so I think the higher likelihood of kind of skepticism is where if you had kind of a much more drawn out campaign, I think you'll see some of Trump's own allies be the kind of first ones who will be much more concerned about this.

35:03But Trump does have this way of really kind of quelling that sort of dissent. I saw, you know, I thought one interesting kind of sign was Mike Lee, the senator from Utah, in the very early hours after the attack. Big MAGA guy. Yeah, big MAGA guy. But but but a libertarian, you're kind of like a Rand Paul libertarian. and he kind of posted that he was concerned. He wanted to see what was the legal justification for this. Why wasn't Congress brought in? And he posted that. And then he talked to Marco Rubio, who apparently assured him that nothing more would go on in Venezuela, even though that's really not what the president has been saying publicly.

35:37And then just within a few hours, Lee, which as is his want, was posting memes of Marco Rubio dressed up in kind of military garb as though he was going to be the next. The generalissimo of Venezuela, his newest job. Exactly. Exactly. And so, you know, he pretty quickly switched just into memeing and kind of, I think, realizing where the MAGA base, you know, that maybe he thought the MAGA base would be kind of skeptical of this. And then once it was clear they weren't, you know, just started memeing about it and everything like that. And I think that's a pretty good encapsulation of a lot of Republican lawmakers.

36:04You know, they'll follow the public opinion. I think maybe some of them do have kind of principled concerns about it. I think as long as it stays fairly popular, they'll stay quiet about it. But I wouldn't be surprised if, you know, the polling starts really tipping another direction. If you see more and more Republican lawmakers saying, you know, we have 2026 reelection bids to think of, you know, we're going to actually hold some hearings. We're going to actually exercise some overs. Right. Yeah. No, it'll be very interesting to see the polling in this, because I think what's going to happen is you're going to see you're going to see Trump's approval shoot up on this because the as you said, the act itself was just a masterclass in, you know, the projection of military power.

36:40Also, something that's not being talked about nearly enough is just what an intelligence success this was. Right. Like we're talking about CIA had people inside. You know, they didn't they weren't able to do this without having people on the inside of the inside of Maduro's inner circle. So that was just an incredible, you know, intelligence get, if you will. So, yeah, I think I think you're going to see his, you know, his approvals will probably shoot up in the in the short term or at least they don't really shoot up anymore. Right. He's got a pretty he's got pretty low ceiling and high floor.

37:13So maybe it'll be a couple of points because he he intuits what I think a lot of Americans are the same way. And that, like, they may not like war, but they certainly like the spectacle of an American military success. And, you know, so so I think that will go well. But but again, it goes back to what you said of what is the next day plan? Right. We had this question for Netanyahu in Gaza. They never really gave us a good answer. Now it seems to me like we're going down that road. So Rubio said we're not going to manage the day to day in Venezuela, which, again, is is basically the opposite of what Trump said.

37:50But but if you if you take Rubio at his word here, what he's basically saying is we don't want anything to do with internal Venezuelan politics. Right. We're not here to, like, pick up the trash or to, you know, to to do anything that like a, you know, a regime would do. But for matters that concern us, such as getting your gigantic oil reserves and all that infrastructure back online. So we're going to be calling the shots and Delce Rodriguez, who is the, you know, basically our our puppet right now, is going to ensure that that happens. And we will pull levers to make sure that she works on our timeline and does what we want.

38:23But but again, this goes back to what we're saying. The problem with these puppet governments that we install is they never do what we want them to. Right. Even if they want to do what we want them to, they end up, you know, getting, you know, infiltrated by terrorists or criminal groups or just good old fashioned corruption. I think that, to me, is the biggest question here about how we go forward, right? Can we really trust this? And just like in the United States, how Marco Rubio and J.D. Vance, you know, they're members of the same government but don't have the same philosophy. The same is true within, you know, Maduro's or what was Maduro's government in Venezuela.

38:56You have Delce Rodriguez, who obviously the U.S. has identified as someone they think they can work with, someone they think will kind of do their will. But then there are also other cabinet ministers around her, including the ones that actually control the military, which is obviously whoever controls the military is probably going to be the one calling the shots, at least for as long as we don't have on the ground there, who are much harder line figures who have been much more resistant to negotiating with the U.S., who are much more, I don't want to say much more loyal to Maduro, but seemingly much more in line with kind of, you know, potentially Maduro's vision of kind of a future for Venezuela that did not involve the U.S.

39:31And so and then also you obviously they all of them need to worry about their own personal safety and security and they all want to hang on to power, which obviously is being threatened. And so, you know, what often happens in situations like this is we just see all this sort of, you know, the top guy gets out and then there's a huge power vacuum of squabbling between pre-indifferent factions, which just leads to even more chaos. You know, obviously the president has described this as an effort, like you said, to kind of stem the tide of Venezuelan migrants coming into the U.S. It's the biggest refugee crisis in the world.

40:01I'm not quite sure how instability and potentially even more kind of internal fighting will lead to fewer migrants trying to leave the country. I mean, theoretically, in a case where there was maybe some grand democratic transition and Venezuelans felt very liberated, maybe they would want to stay. But if instead we see even more kind of brutal crackdowns and more kind of internal division, I would expect probably a greater flow of migration. That's the question, right. That's definitely a risk. I think obviously the president is also highly optimistic about extracting oil. There's a lot of oil companies that, you know, have said to the administration, basically, we don't want to go to Venezuela.

40:38It is not a safe place for us to be extracting oil. It would be very expensive. It would take a long time. And we're just not confident enough about the political situation there to want to go there. And also, even if they did go in, even if they did go in, I mean, who's securing them? Is that Blackwater? Is that the U.S. military? What happens if what happens if a Chevron employee is killed in the streets of Caracas? Right. Is that an attack on America? There's yeah, there's so many questions here. And there's so many questions that the president has said we will be running Venezuela, but apparently we'll be doing so with not a single boot on the ground.

41:12And that's just an incredibly difficult thing to do. And I think, you know, obviously if and then if the president, if that becomes untenable and the president feels he has to kind of send troops into Venezuela, that's we go back to the kind of political risks that we were talking about. That would be a much that would be a much less popular act. But it is kind of hard to imagine how a foreign power would stabilize Venezuela and be able to control order and ensure that its will is done without any sort of presence there at all, either diplomatic or military, since we don't we don't even have an embassy.

41:42Right. And apparently they might be trying to reopen it. But at least for now, we really have no presence in this country that apparently we are now running. And so I think there's a huge, you know, huge crop of questions that really have yet to be answered. And it doesn't really seem that the Trump administration has an answer to them. And I think, you know, there's just a huge amount of instability that I think is at least possible. Now, obviously, as we said at the beginning, the president, you know, he really feels that, you know, experts are always warning about this level of instability.

42:12We saw similar warnings in his first term when he moved the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. We saw it in this term, you know, when he bombed Iran several months ago. And in both cases, you know, those are things that foreign policy experts had warned presidents against doing for a long time. And then they happened and it didn't unleash all this kind of chaos that the experts warned about. So maybe Trump will be right and the experts will be wrong. And, you know, I think there's also the chance, you know, Colin Powell, you know, once referred to kind of the pottery barn rule that, you know, if you break it, you buy it, that, you know, if the U.S.

42:42intervenes somewhere, they'll be responsible. I also wouldn't be shocked if, you know, Donald Trump, you know, you mentioned Gaza. I think he kind of did something very flashy there and then kind of lost interest in the day after. We started the same thing that he says, I broke it. I don't need to buy it. You know, we took out Maduro and they can figure it out, even though he says that we'll run it. You know, maybe there will be all this kind of instability on the ground and he won't send in troops because he knows that's unpopular. He doesn't want to do that and just lets chaos reign. So I think that's a possibility, too.

43:10Now, that's obviously far from best case scenario for the Venezuelan people. but you know and probably wouldn't be best case scenario for his kind of dreams of oil as well but it would still allow him to score what was a big win you know we'll see this big huge trial of nicolas maduro which will be perceived as you know a big win for the president without any of the headaches um that i think a lot of people would assume would come with once you do that needing to kind of intervene and kind of stay you know responsible for what happens next but i wouldn't be shocked if donald trump just says i'm moving on i'm gonna be focusing on iran or cuba or anywhere else now.

43:41And, you know, I'll leave that to the Venezuelans to figure out amongst themselves. I mean, that's what worries me a little bit is what you said about how he's he just, you know, all the experts are always wrong. Trump's always right. And he just and he internalizes that. Right. And then it comes out and, you know, by him on Air Force One last night feeling sounding so emboldened that he's threatening Mexico with military strikes. Right. Greenland, which is Denmark, which is our ally and a member of NATO. Like, I don't even know how that would work. So, yeah, it's just he I'm I worry that he is, you know, getting high on his own supply a little bit and thinks that, you know, hey, the experts are always wrong.

44:22I can basically do what I want and nothing ever happens until something does. Trump was right about everything. Hat was that exactly, you know, maybe a bit of a clue. Yeah, exactly. OK, I want to get your your thoughts on some other political things. But before we move on, let's just talk about the Democrats for a second. So I mean, politically, you know, Trump has done a good job, I think, of putting the Democrats in a little bit of a box here. Right. Because first of all, they don't they look toothless with Schumer and Jeffries. They don't have any sort of response to this that's meaningful.

44:52And then you get, you know, he creates this scenario where you have Democrats on the, you know, particularly ones on the left, like the AOCs of the world and, you know, Dorn, in Mamdani or New York who who who are so against this that it comes they come across as being almost supportive of somebody like Nicolas Maduro, who is a you know, like you said, he's a gangster, right? Like nobody. And you can believe that this was he shouldn't have been removed from power or under these scenarios, but also that he's not a good guy. So so I wonder I wonder how the Democrats are going to play this. Right.

45:29I don't know what the what the best answer is. I don't know. I don't know what I would do if I were in Hakeem Jeffries position. Yeah, I agree. I think it's difficult. I mean, I think we will see most likely this next week, at least in the Senate and probably pretty soon in the House as well. You know, the war powers resolution, which is kind of this 1970s law that does dictate a lot of these kind of, you know, war powers, you know, procedures, you know, it contains provisions such that just one member can force a vote on, you know, any sort of kind of war powers matter. And we've seen Tim Kaine.

46:00And he's going to be doing that next week. So we'll have all the Democrats, at least in the Senate, and I suspect there'll be a House member that will force a vote, too. We'll see all of them on the record. And I'm sure all the Democrats will oppose this, which I think you're right. Although I'd be curious to see like a John Fetterman, who's been somewhat more supportive of this operation, be curious how he'll vote. But we'll see most of the Democrats oppose this. I think Donald Trump had an interesting quote on Fox and Friends the other day, saying you'll hear the Democrats just saying, oh, gee, that's unconstitutional.

46:27and he kind of dismissed that, which is a quite a thing to hear from the president of the United States, kind of dismissing concerns about constitutionality. But then again - Way past that, Gabe. That ship sailed a long time ago. I would agree. But from a political matter is perhaps there is a point there that I'm not sure kind of these process concerns, which I think is what we'll be hearing from the Democrats, are gonna ignite a whole lot of support from the American people. That'll be, oh, you know, where was the war powers resolution or was there a AUMF, you know, invoked before this? You know, I'm just not anticipating a whole lot of concern in that realm.

46:58So I think the Democrats like the Republicans, you know, it's going to be this wait and see. I think the Democrats, no matter what, I've seen a lot of takes that, you know, this is going to become some big issue in the 2026 midterms, unless it really kind of expands into some large, you know, really, you know, bloody drawn out war. I anticipate the midterms, you know, even as explosive as this seems, And this is a really explosive international development. I think the midterm elections will be about the same things they were going to be about two weeks ago, primarily on inflation, affordability.

47:31And so I think I think you're right. Do Democrats have a really great message? Like, what do you say when you support the fact that a dictator is ousted but really hate how it was done? That's like not a really easy message to get out there. So I don't think they do have a good message here. But either way, I think they know that they can always just pivot back to the economy and that at the end of the day is I still suspect what most American voters will be voting on in November 2026. Again, barring this becoming some huge Iraq or Afghanistan style entrenched foreign conflict that I think the Democrats, they probably just won't focus on it that much.

48:05And frankly, you'll probably be, you know, trying to get the AOCs of the world that you're talking about to talk about it as little as possible. And that even if they want to, you know, we've already heard, you know, reportedly Hakeem Jeffries, you know, is in talks with Ilhan Omar, is trying to push an even broader war powers vote in the House. And that he does not want her to do that because I just think they don't want the attention on this issue. Yeah, no, that's that's my take as well. So back to Marco Rubio. So, right. In addition to being the secretary of state, national security advisor, isn't he like the archivist?

48:37Yeah, national archivist. Right. And now the leader, I guess, of Venezuela. Is it too early to say that he might be the frontrunner in 2028? I do think it is. I mean, I think, you know, if you listen to his own statements, not that we should always listen to what a president says or what a politician says about running for president. You know, he is pretty explicitly in that Vanity Fair piece, you know, endorsed J.D. Vance if he wants it. And I still think that remains the case. There's no question Rubio is kind of on this kind of power trajectory within the administration. But, you know, the fact is the last time, you know, vice president ran for a sitting vice president ran for their party's nomination and lost it.

49:17It was 1952. Harry Truman's vice president, Alvin Barkley, who everyone recalls, I'm sure, who who who lost that party's nomination to Adelaide Stevenson. And so that's been a long time, you know, pretty much every time since then. You know, not every vice president has run. Dick Cheney didn't run as a sitting vice president. Joe Biden didn't run as a sitting vice president. But every time they've wanted it, they've gotten it. primarily because they have the sitting president's support. And I suspect Trump would still go behind Vance. Now, is Vance Rubio ticket? If they announced that right out of the gate, they clearly, from all the things we know, although I think it's true that there are differences in how they kind of view the world and in their foreign policy philosophy, but reportedly they've gotten along quite well and that they are really kind of chummy behind the scenes and that they're kind of each other's first call on kind of any situation.

50:07And so, So, you know, I think more than Rubio being the frontrunner, I'm kind of wondering if there's a situation where, you know, just right out of the gate and kind of whenever the 2028 primaries start heating up, you know, mid 2027 or whenever it will be that maybe they just announce some sort of unity ticket and, you know, really kind of squash any hopes of anyone who's kind of less aligned with the Trump administration's vision, whether that's Marjorie Taylor Greene or Ted Cruz or Josh Hawley or Nikki Haley, you know, all people who to varying degrees are aligned with Trump, but but, you know, maybe have been less bought in to some of the exact priorities of the administration that perhaps they just announced, you know, a Trump administration super ticket.

50:47Trump endorses them. And that's kind of it. OK, so I'm going to put a prediction on on the record here and we can come back when this prediction fails to materialize. You can tell me I'm an idiot. I think Trump is going to throw Vance under the bus. I think that and I think that I think he's going to throw Vance under the bus and he's going to support Rubio. I think he sees Rubio as a more deft operator as well as more, you know, more politically palatable for independence. I think that he understands that Vance is very smart and Vance is very good at, you know, at defending Trump in the press.

51:22But look, it's notable that Vance was not behind him on Saturday at Mar-a-Lago. I know that I know that Vance's people put out some BS thing about how like, oh, they couldn't be in the same location or something like that. But the fact that he wasn't there and the fact that he sort of spent the last few days, you know, fighting with people on Twitter about this and like, you know, trolling. And Marco Rubio was on Face the Nation and Meet the Press and did the rounds. And I have to say, I'm not a big Marco Rubio guy, but he did come across very well this weekend in terms of being the one person in this administration that appears to at least have have be thinking about this more than like 10 feet in front of this.

52:00This is his bread and butter. I mean, Latin America. This is his thing. This is his specialty for a long time. And if he's able to pull off, you know, pull a rabbit out of a hat here and do some major Latin American geopolitical realignment ahead of 2028 and he can run on that. I don't know. I think that it's it's possible. And it wouldn't be the first time that Trump has, you know, thrown somebody under the bus who was last vice president. Yeah, exactly. Okay, so we'll bring you back on in 28. We'll see if I was right about that.