In short
a16z Podcast Episode Notes: Balaji and Dan Wang: The Engineering State vs Lawyerly State
Episode Summary In this episode of the a16z Podcast, Balaji Srinivasan engages in a deep discussion with Dan Wang, the author of *Breakneck*. They explore the juxtaposition between China's rapid industrial rise and the United States' strengths in software and finance. Key topics include the dynamics of the engineering state vs. the lawyerly state, the future of the dollar, and the implications of their coexistence amidst costly mistakes by both superpowers.
Key Concepts and Themes
- Engineering State vs. Lawyerly State
- China is characterized as an "engineering state," focusing on industrial capabilities and manufacturing dominance (e.g., drone technology, robotics).
- The U.S. is depicted as a "lawyerly state," heavily influenced by legal frameworks and financial engineering rather than industrial output.
- Historical Context of China's Industrialization
- Reference to Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 1978, which effectively transformed China into a capitalist economy under communist branding.
- Shenzhen as a case study of China's rapid industrialization through special economic zones.
- Current State of Affairs
- The U.S. tech landscape remains unmatched, but questions arise about whether its software-oriented economy can compete globally without a robust industrial base.
- China experiences growth in various sectors, but faces significant issues such as political purges, property market instability, and youth unemployment.
Discussion Highlights
- U.S. Perception of China
- Discussion on the American viewpoint, often downplaying China's advancements and focusing on potential weaknesses (e.g., demographic decline).
- Contrast with China's advancements in manufacturing, leading to a more nuanced understanding of its industrial capabilities.
- Misconceptions and Realities
- The U.S. tendency to remain optimistic about its capabilities while underestimating China's strategic growth.
- Exploration of how U.S. domestic issues (e.g., inflation, socio-political division) could weaken its global standing.
- Future Outlook
- Speculation on the evolving relationship between the U.S. and China, particularly in technology and manufacturing.
- The need for the U.S. to rethink its industrial strategy in light of China's rapid advancements.
Key Takeaways
- China's Duality: China's rapid industrial growth is coupled with internal issues and potential instability, such as youth dissatisfaction and economic challenges.
- American Challenges: The U.S. faces systemic problems that could hinder its global leadership, particularly if it continues to operate as a "dis-United" entity.
- Strategic Adaptation: Both countries must adapt strategically to maintain their respective positions on the world stage; this includes recognizing the strengths of each other's systems.
Resources Mentioned
- Follow Dan Wang on X: [@danwwang](https://twitter.com/danwwang)
- Follow Balaji on X: [@balajis](https://twitter.com/balajis)
- Subscribe to the Network State Podcast: [YouTube Channel](https://www.youtube.com/@nspodcast)
Conclusion This episode of the a16z Podcast offers a comprehensive examination of the contrasting paradigms of industrial and legal-based governance, shedding light on the potential future trajectories of the U.S. and China. It emphasizes the importance of understanding both nations' strengths and weaknesses in the context of an increasingly competitive global landscape.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOChina's Industrialization and Strengths
0:45 to 6:10
Discussion on China's industrial growth, strengths, and the implications for the U.S.
“By 2025, China led the world in cars, solar, ships, and advanced manufacturing.”
Personal Anecdotes and Connections
6:10 to 7:55
Hosts share personal stories and past interactions, setting a conversational tone.
“He got rid of several of his successors.”
Understanding China's Political Landscape
7:55 to 11:15
Exploration of China's political environment and its impacts on entrepreneurship.
“And I think in many ways you sort of explain stuff because so many Americans are in cope mode, less so perhaps in 2025.”
Contrasting U.S. and Chinese Economic Systems
11:15 to 14:01
A deep dive into the differences in economic systems between the U.S. and China.
“We sort of see like two paths there with network versus state and state over network in my parlance, you know.”
The Role of the Plunge Protection Team
14:01 to 15:20
Explore how the U.S. stock market is influenced by government interventions.
“And they're doing that a lot, both overtly and covertly.”
Contrasting Economies: U.S. vs. China
15:21 to 17:40
Understand the differences between American and Chinese economic structures.
“your thing on the engineering state versus the lawyers state, I think we could do a lot of iterations on that.”
The Future of American and Chinese Influence
17:41 to 20:34
Discuss the geopolitical dynamics and the potential future of the U.S. and China.
“Yeah, so Apple is a hardware company also, but yes, your point is correct.”
The Asymmetrical Contest: Internet vs. State
20:35 to 23:26
Examine the implications of the internet's role against state power.
“And it protects property rights and has the best monetary policy in the world and has smart contracts and so on.”
Self-Defeating Powers: USA and China
23:27 to 28:00
Analyze how both the U.S. and China undermine their own strengths.
“because it depended on being ideologically hegemonic.”
Japan's Sovereignty and Historical Context
28:00 to 28:34
Explore Japan's lack of sovereignty and its historical ties to the U.S.
“Japan's constitution is written by the U.S.”
Show all 36 chapters
China's Strategic Decisions and Sovereignty
28:34 to 29:26
Understand China's strategic choices to maintain sovereignty against foreign influence.
“It took worse terms in some ways to preserve, right?”
Digital Borders and Control
29:26 to 30:02
Discuss the implications of digital borders and China's information control mechanisms.
“The great firewall will be seen in some ways as a very farsighted thing because it is digital hard borders.”
China's Cultural Insulation and Policy
30:02 to 30:57
Analyze China's cultural policies and their impact on social stability.
“So they've got like multiple levels of firewall and they can just like sip green tea and everybody is shooting each other, you know, in other countries as the dollar goes away.”
AI Developments and Ethical Considerations
30:57 to 31:56
Delve into the advancements in AI and the ethical implications of rapid development.
“And so, you know, I think like you can't tell the Chinese you really need these products in your state.”
The Role of the CCP in China’s Governance
31:56 to 33:14
Examine the CCP's influence on societal norms and policies in China.
“China just wants to be totally stable and then, you know, close the doors in the celestial empire and then let the barbarians tear each other apart and eat some mochi balls and then drink green tea.”
The Evolution of Arguments on China
33:14 to 35:06
Trace the evolution of perspectives on China and its global role.
“I think they're going to figure out new and novel ways to destroy the country themselves.”
The U.S. and China's Competing Narratives
35:06 to 35:59
Discuss the contrasting narratives of the U.S. and China's global strategies.
“The second is actually China's super strong and it's good, everything will be fine.”
Future Dynamics of U.S.-China Relations
35:59 to 38:10
Speculate on future dynamics and potential power shifts between the U.S. and China.
“And so the bad part, the V3, is China will expand in such a way that it actually has unchecked power.”
The Complexity of U.S. and Chinese Strengths
38:10 to 41:29
Investigate the strengths and weaknesses of both the U.S. and China in global affairs.
“because China will be insanely, insanely, insanely, insanely, insanely powerful.”
Long-term Competition: The U.S. vs. China
42:00 to 42:30
Explore the dynamics of competition between the U.S. and China, focusing on overconfidence and mistakes.
“But there's also, if you wanted to focus on the most ugly parts of America, you can definitely paint a horrible picture just as the same with how you can do that with China.”
Xi Jinping's Strategic Decisions
42:30 to 43:20
Analyze Xi Jinping's actions during a peak period for China and the consequences of his decisions.
“because I felt like I lived through this in China when at the end of 2020, at the start of 2021, Xi Jinping felt like he was at the top of the world.”
Controlled Demolition: Economic Consequences
43:20 to 44:10
Discuss the implications of China's economic policies and their impact on various sectors.
“He definitely hit all kinds of people, you know, entrepreneurs and so on.”
The Importance of Manufacturing
44:10 to 45:10
Understanding the pivotal role of manufacturing in national economies and its implications.
“You're just making that decision, the greatest good for the greatest number.”
Inflation vs. Deflation: A China Perspective
45:10 to 45:50
Examine the effects of inflation and deflation in China and its potential economic crises.
“And so this is where I think that it is still important to flip a few more pages past the business pages of the Wall Street Journal into the economics pages because youth unemployment is real.”
Future of the United States: Political Stability
45:50 to 47:00
Discuss potential challenges facing the U.S. as a coherent political entity amidst changing dynamics.
“which is that I think that, you know, the country that's going to be ahead is going to make all sorts of mistakes driven by overconfidence and hubris, which is what I think, for the most part, she did.”
The Shift of Global Millionaires
47:00 to 48:20
Explore the relocation trends of millionaires and the implications for global economics.
“has that much longer to live as like a coherent political entity.”
China's Youth and Nationalism
48:20 to 49:20
Analyze the sentiments of new generations in China and their relationship with nationalism.
“We've got a billion Chinese people here, right?”
American Political Divisions and Global Relations
49:20 to 50:40
Investigate the growing divisions in U.S. politics and their impact on international relations.
“Like that's why I say America, it's not the United States, the dis-United States.”
Perceptions of Xi Jinping in the U.S.
50:40 to 51:40
Reflect on the changing perceptions of Xi Jinping among American politicians and their implications.
“There's a new killing, crazy blowing up thing on X every single day nowadays, unfortunately.”
The Complicated U.S.-China Relationship
51:40 to 52:50
Discuss the complexities of the U.S.-China relationship, particularly during political shifts.
“There's no one in Hollywood like this guy, as if Xi Jinping had Tom Cruise levels of handsomeness, which I find not.”
Soft Secession and Economic Implications
52:50 to 54:00
Explore the concept of soft secession within American politics and its economic consequences.
“aren't just copycats, they're actually innovators and so on.”
Impact of Demographic Changes on China
54:00 to 56:00
Analyze how demographic changes could influence China's future economic and social landscape.
“Have you seen this thing on soft secession that the Blues are doing?”
The Future of AI and Robotics in Society
56:00 to 57:19
Explore the implications of AI advancements and potential societal impacts.
“But in like 25, 30 years from now, demographics will yawn larger and larger.”
Political Dynamics and Leadership in China
57:20 to 58:25
Analyze the role of leadership transitions and political dynamics in China.
“all of their own political problems too.”
COVID-19 Response: A U.S. vs. China Perspective
58:26 to 1:00:46
Discuss contrasting approaches to the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S. and China.
“and showing, you know, that the numbers going up.”
Local Governance and State Capacity in China
1:00:47 to 1:02:32
Examine the challenges faced by local governments in enforcing policies.
“America is very unusual to see that because usually it'll be something where they're just critiquing like a local party person versus the big dog or what have you.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00Digital borders and physical borders are like the same thing, right? The Great Firewall will be seen in some ways as a very farsighted thing because it is digital hard borders. I think that the U.S. can very credibly point to these amazing strengths that the U.S. has. I think China can also point to these amazing strengths, namely these drone armadas, which are very powerful. Chinese robotics are actually really good. And for the first time, Tech America is actually taking China seriously. I am going to let no one talk me down from my stance at manufacturing as almost everything. What does it take to industrialize a continent in a single generation?
0:37In 1978, Deng Xiaoping kept the communist branding but rewired everything underneath. Special economic zones became Shenzhen. The eastern seaboard industrialized. By 2025, China led the world in cars, solar, ships, and advanced manufacturing. That growth is real. But so are the cracks. Political purges, a property implosion, youth unemployment, and a wave of entrepreneurs leaving for Singapore, Dubai, and beyond. Meanwhile, America's trillion-dollar tech companies remain unmatched. The question is whether software valuations and financial engineering can sustain a great power, or whether the U.S.
1:13needs to rebuild its industrial base to compete. And if it does, who builds it? Previously aired on the Network State podcast, Balaji Sreenivasan speaks with Dan Wang, author of Breakneck, about the engineering state versus the lawyerly state, and what builders on both sides of the Pacific should understand about what comes next. Dan, welcome to the University of the State Podcast. And I think, you know, we hung out several years ago in the before COVID times, I think, at some Stripe thing, if I recall, that Collison organized something like that. One of these. Frontier Camp. We played a very, my favorite board game together.
1:53Yeah. What was it? It was one of these things. Was it Werewolf? No. What was it? It was something close. It's called Avalon, in which there are roughly seven of us around the table. Three people are evil. They know who each other are. And the four good people don't in general know who anyone else is. And the aim of the game is for the evil people to assert themselves as good and for the good people to deduce who the evil people are. I've been playing this for many years now. I play it in different cities, and I'm glad to have been able to play it with you in the woods of Northern California. That's right.
2:30And I think as I remember, this is the first time I played it and I was thinking, what if we wrote the state space matrix on a whiteboard, which is either the really smart thing to do or really dumb thing to do. And like Guern got annoyed at that or something, as I vaguely recall. This is like many years ago. Yes, that's right. But I still think there's something to that. I have to go back and play that, and I feel like you might be able to, maybe it'd be bad to write it on the board, and it takes away the mystique of it, but there's something to that, the process of elimination. Anyway. I remember you doing that, and I think I was evil, and I managed to deduce who the Merlin was based on your calculations.
3:11Yeah, there's something about, like, there's an underlying data structure behind the thing, some kind of process of elimination, you know, sort of like the Monty Hall problem in stats, where you actually write out the decision tree, and then you can actually understand it better. At least I wanted to see what would happen. Anyway, maybe it took some of the fun out of it, but it was fun for me at least. So maybe hopefully for you. Anyway, so we sort of traveled in some of the same circles. And, you know, I liked your book, which we'll get into in a second. So breakneck and we'll put it on screen.
3:41And I liked it because, so, you know, what's funny is maybe this conversation will be a little different than some of the other ones you've had. because it says a lot of things that I think are, that Americans should understand, but are super obvious to anybody who's paying attention to Asia. And in fact, I actually think you go easy on the U.S. I'm much more of a bear perhaps on the U.S. than you are. Maybe you pull some bunches in that or what have you. Because I'm actually, I'm messaging, I'm talking to you right now from Singapore. And so let me see if I can, you know, obviously others have summarized the book, But essentially, China is an injuring state.
4:19America is a lawyerly state. China actually is on the right in many ways because Xi is all about the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Even if he's kept the communist symbols, you know, he, you know, Mao went after the four olds and went after filial piety and so on and so forth. And Xi completely reversed that where it's really, you know, a nationalist conservative, you know, revival of 5 ,000 years of history and so on and so forth. And in many ways, when Deng Xiaoping took over in 1978, you know, a rebranding changes the logo, but not the guts. And Deng Xiaoping did a reinterpretation where he kept the logo, but changed the guts completely.
4:57It was basically, in my view, a coup, which is funny because neither the Communist Party nor Democrats nor Republicans admit the extreme discontinuity between Deng and Mao. Because, like, I know I'm butchering the pronunciation, but Hua Gua Feng and the Gang of Four were supposed to be, like, the successors to Mao. And Deng managed to take over and shifted it towards a capitalist road, even after he'd been perched three times and his son had been thrown through a window. and, you know, the famous, you know, black cat, white cat, doesn't matter if it catches mice and the Zhao Gang contract where those villagers, at least that was the idea of it.
5:35Maybe that was just a legend, but there's villagers that had a contract to do capitalism and they weren't actually executed unlike everybody else. And that was kind of like, held up a hand, Deng Xiaoping held up and said, okay, capitalism is legal in these regions, the special economic zones. And thus began Shenzhen and the things that are on the Eastern Seaboard. And that's how China modernized, didn't go to capitalism all at once, right? So I may be getting some of that wrong, but was that roughly accurate, kind of a quick capsule history? Go ahead. Yeah, the only thing that I would quickly add is that I think Deng had a lot of the governing styles of Mao.
6:07He certainly purged a lot of people. He was really ruthless against some of his enemies. He got rid of several of his successors. And I think he was, in the words of one party historian, half a Mao. And so I don't think he's, no saint there. I mean, he was as ruthless, I would say, even though his ends were much better, for sure. He started out as a communist, right? And he was in the party for a long time. And actually, somebody said that even the war in Vietnam, which is one war that was, you know, was that Dung held it. I had read this book. Let's see if I can find it. To distract the generals from—because he was doing a lot of changing of the guard in Beijing at that time.
6:48So he just sent them all to go and fight Vietnam again. so he could go and do some reforms or whatever in the capital. I don't know if you ever heard that. Yeah, it was to get the army support to give them a really fun war and then he'll have their support forever. Yeah, something like that, right? And then that began sort of the tradition of, or maybe I'm wrong about this, maybe that predated Dung, but there were like three posts that the head has, which are the titular head of the state, the head of the party, and then also like the head of the military or something like that, right? Yes. And Deng began the tradition of holding all three of those crowns to run China, if that's correct, if I'm not mistaken.
7:23Or maybe not. He was the state president, but he was, I'm not even sure he was head of the Communist Party, but he was head of the Central Military Commission. CMC, right. Yeah, this is why I'll get some of the details wrong, but there's like three things that he had and he was kind of running. It's like, you know, uniting the Triforce, to speak. Okay, fine. So maybe we'll flash up what I got wrong. Okay. So the reason I say that is here is what I will stipulate. Well, so I want to play your book back to you and you tell me if I got it wrong. And then I want to actually debate with you what comes next.
7:56Sure. Okay. First, everybody should read Breakneck. Awesome book. And I think in many ways you sort of explain stuff because so many Americans are in cope mode, less so perhaps in 2025. But for the last 10 years, they've had extreme cope where they've been pretending, you know, the Peter Zaihan kind of argument that China is going to get old before it gets rich. It's going to fall into a ditch. It's actually weak and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. and that keeps not happening. And instead, it's number one in cars and number one in solar and number one in all kinds of industries, especially the post-COVID burst of energy into advanced manufacturing and so on by 2025 seems to have really worked.
8:37And it's also number one in surface ships and it's signing all these trade deals and down the list, all kinds of things seem to be working for China, whereas the U.S. keeps struggling in many ways.
8:52I mean, one way I put it is your book is kind of explaining these sort of obvious things. To be clear, I wouldn't say they're obvious to everybody, but it's like you're very gently kind of breaking reality to you. Let me know your thoughts. Go, go. Yeah, I think that all of those things are true. Everything is real. And I think, but there is more to this, a little bit more to the story, which is where I feel like you're doing a really good job of summarizing the business pages of the Wall Street Journal or whatever, Bloomberg. But I think we could also flip a few pages into the economics and the politics pages, which I think the situation there does not look really good.
9:33That, you know, the concurrent with China's rise in EVs and solar, all of which is real. You know, there's also crazy politics. The Xi constantly purges its generals, purges its defense minister, purges his foreign minister, a lot of strange party politics that none of us really, I think, can understand outside of a few folks in Beijing. Economic growth has definitely weakened in some severe ways. Property implosion is real. The youth unemployment is real. There's a lot of folks who have decided to leave China. I'm sure a lot of them are washing up at your doorstep in Singapore. A lot of amazing Chinese entrepreneurs who have thrown up their hands at the political environment in China.
10:18A lot of Chinese have decided to fly to Ecuador where they don't need a visa and try to walk across to the American border. And so last year, Customs and Border Patrol were apprehending something like 40 ,000 Chinese nationals every single month. And so that's a lot of people who want to take leave of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese ethnostate, right? So, you know, I think that there are, you know, real economic issues. I think there's a lot of political uncertainty in addition to amazing technological growth. So, you know, we had to reconcile all of these. So, you know, the Ecuador part, I've certainly heard those reports.
10:55That is the part that I don't fully understand because, you know, the other interpretation is China's just sending a bunch of people to go and embed in the U.S. or what have you. You know, military age males crossing the border, blah, blah, blah, blah. So, but the other piece of it, so let me discuss those other pieces of it because I'll give maybe, you know, obviously a lens you probably considered.
11:20Xi goes and purges Jack Ma because he doesn't want something like Elon to happen in China, where the tech zillionaires of China get their own ideas and they control these giant networks and, you know, they can turn against the state, right? We sort of see like two paths there with network versus state and state over network in my parlance, you know. And in some ways, this is provocative, but in some ways, China is the best for the most and the Internet is the most for the best. where if you're up to, let's say, the 98th percentile in China, you have clean streets and no crime and 24-7 delivery services and an upper middle class up to that level, you're fine.
12:04But once you start getting to the top 1 % or 2 % of society, now you better watch carefully. You know, you're basically constantly surveilled to make sure that you're in line with the party and what you could be hailed for a year or two ago suddenly you're on the outside of something, and that's too sinuous a twist for a good chunk of people. So they head overseas to Singapore or Dubai or something like that. Would you say that's roughly right? Yeah, I think the great contrast, I think you're exactly right in all of these. I think the great contrast, one of the great contrasts between the U.S.
12:38and China is that America works really, really well for the rich. If you're rich in America, you know, you really don't have to suffer too many of the problems in, let's say, New York and California. You don't worry about the housing crisis. You have a giant home in Atherton. You don't worry about taking the New York subway to work every day, you know, which is like screechingly loud and dirty and doesn't work very well. You get to live in these skinny skyscrapers in Manhattan. I think that there's nowhere else in the world that's better to be enormously rich than in the United States. I disagree with that now.
13:13And the reason I say that is I think that maybe was true. The reason I smiled is just like, I think that was true. And I think there's several bad parts about that now. The first is it's fine to be wealthy if other people are doing okay. But a good chunk of American wealth is Keynesianism, which is really like, you know how China's actually capitalist, but they call it communist. America is actually Keynesian, but they call it capitalist in the sense of the money printing is actually a gigantic redistribution of, it's basically, you know, inflation is taxation without legislation, if you've heard that one by Milton Friedman.
13:56So when they print trillions of dollars, it's like diluting down the currency for everybody. And they're doing that a lot, both overtly and covertly. And then the plunge protection team, have you heard that thing from Greenspan, the plunge protection team? Okay, that's a useful thing to look up. That is why one thing you mentioned in the book is like American stocks have done well and so on and so forth and Chinese stocks are flat. But part of that is because there's almost a social contract in the U.S., which is the upper middle class and upper class have all these index funds, you know, stakes in index funds, 401k.
14:30So they expect the stock market to go up. And that's actually the metric, the number go up of the society. And so the plunge protection team at the Fed will actually print to make sure that in extreme circumstances, the stock market doesn't go down. Some of that was explicit, like obviously the mortgage-backed securities that were bought in 2008. Some of that is implicit where they'll spot Goldman or Morgan, like the, you know, or for example, the BTFP program that they just did where treasuries weren't actually mark to market. They were valued on what they were bought for, not what they were sold for.
15:02So there's all kinds of manipulation they do to just keep the market nominally going up. But in real terms versus gold or digital gold, it's going way down. Like, for example, if you just saw it, as of today, gold has actually outperformed the S &P over the last, you know, right? So in my view, the U.S. is actually a fake economy, a Keynesian economy. And actually, you know, your thing on the engineering state versus the lawyers state, I think we could do a lot of iterations on that. And I'll give you the ball in a second. But I love your book so much, I want to say so much, so jump in. But yeah.
15:32I mean, can I say, I want to tease you a little bit about this. Please sound like Xi Jinping, man. He has this term that the Communist Party calls this, the American economy, the fictitious economy, and also the bubble economy. Not like a financial bubble, but just something that can pop very easily. And I think there is certainly something to this. I mean, a lot of Americans would tell me, Dan, what are you talking about? This country has no problems. Look at these giant trillion dollar corporations that we can create and the Chinese cannot and no one else can. And I don't, and so again, I'm coming back to just to slightly put a close to the sloop, which is that I think the U.S.
16:08works extremely well for the rich, and I think it cannot stay a great power if it works only well for the rich. And, you know, there is something strange about China where if you're an elite, let's say you're some sort of an elite in Beijing, you're working in tech. Who knows if your tech company would be smashed by Xi Jinping, as he did a couple of years ago. Like the gaming companies got just sent to zero. Online tutoring, you know, They really declare it to be non-profits. Let's say you're working in something like finance, and then Xi announces a salary cap, as he did two years ago, of$300 ,000.
16:40So maybe you need to give your back pay. If you're within the party, military, state elite, you never know when your patron might be taken down by some sort of an anti-corruption purge, and then your entire network will fall. And so there's something really precarious about being rich and powerful in China, in which in the U.S., if you're rich, you can more or less transmute a lot of your wealth into political influence. And maybe that's bad, but it's much easier to be rich here. But I fully agree with you that there is something like very strange and fictitious about the American economy. The contrast that I like to set up is, let's think about Apple, something like$3.5 trillion market value now.
17:19Spent 10 years debating whether it could produce an electric vehicle. And after 10 years, hold the button. And what is Xiaomi's market value? Something like$200 billion, last I checked. So the Apple is worth something like 15, nearly 20 times more than Xiaomi. And what would you rather have? A company that is able to build cars within four years of announcing it, as Xiaomi did, and for these cars to go win major racetracks in Norberg Ring and in Western Germany, or to be kind of Apple and just not, you know, debate this for a while and then give up. Now, I think I would rather take Xiaomi, and I think this is less an indictment of Apple than an indictment of the financial system in the U.S., which assigns these crazy valuations to highly profitable companies, but these mostly software companies.
18:10Yeah, so Apple is a hardware company also, but yes, your point is correct. So my view on this is looking ahead to 2035, 2040, maybe in 2030. You know, I've written about this, but to briefly summarize, I think I wouldn't even, I don't even think of it as the United States. I think of it as the dis-United States because like, for example, there's no Korea. There's only North Korea and South Korea, right? Like it's not actually, you can't talk about Korea and Korea's position on this and Korea, because North Korea and South Korea literally have different foreign policies. They're opposed to each other.
18:44They have different morays. They both might write in Hangul, but they're saying totally different things. They have different vocabularies, you know, premises, all that kind of stuff, right? So there's no... For the most part, only one Korea matters to us. You know, only one Korea is in the global economy producing any memory chips, right? That's right. South Korea. Exactly right. But North Korea, obviously, is pointing missiles and so on and so forth. But yes, correct. So we can't talk about Korea. we have to talk about South Korea, North Korea. In the same way, I don't think we can talk about America.
19:09We can talk about Blue America, Red America, and actually Tech America. And those are like three separate groups. And whatever you would hear a defense of America, it's almost always coming from Tech America talking about the trillion dollar companies or sometimes Red America talking about, well, we can still re-industrialize and we still have the 1945 spirit and so on and so forth. And Blue America is sort of not really, you know, that animated in terms of its defense of democracy and so on and so forth nowadays, but they were a few years ago. in my view at least maybe you'll disagree is like tech America is actually the internet and it overlaps with European tech and Indian tech and especially crypto which is which I know you don't love crypto or you're probably skeptical about crypto yes but the way I think you know how like when Rome fell what survived was Christianity interesting right in my view like Like America is going to go to zero.
20:14And what will survive is the intranet. And the bad version of the American legal system is the one you mentioned, which is obstructing and constricting and so on and so forth. And it's being abused by all these lawyers and so on and so forth. But the good version is the intranet legal system, which is a predictable order. And it's rule of code as opposed to rule of law. And it protects property rights and has the best monetary policy in the world and has smart contracts and so on. and even if Americans and Chinese can't trust each other's legal systems, actually lots of Chinese people do appreciate Bitcoin and BTC is actually the genuine balance to CCP as opposed to USA, which is going to zero.
20:54Let me pause there. I have a lot of I can say about that. That's a crazy idea, man. That was BTC is going to be the alternative against CCP when USA goes to zero. I think that's a great phrase. You should tweet that if you haven't yet. I have tweeted that. But I have to, that's actually the, so just to explain, it's more than just a meme. It's like a compact phrase, but right. Like in the 20th century, the contestation was symmetrical between Eurasian communism and Anglosphere capitalism. It was like tank for tank, plane for plane, USA versus USSR, you know, and so on and so forth. But I think in the 21st century, it's asymmetric.
21:29It's between China and the internet. China is like Apple, vertically integrated with a nation, you know, the Han Chinese language, culture, thousands of years of culture. the party state, and then, of course, the network, which is the firewall and the apps and all the Chinese tech companies. That's vertically integrated, and something like 97 % of people of Han Chinese descent are in this sort of vertically integrated, very functional Voltron, this meta-organism that coordinates all these people in this really, really powerful way. And the other something 7 billion people are going to initially, and perhaps for a long time, be the weaker of the two sides, and that'll be the internet, which is messy Android, chaotic, but also more free.
22:12And that's how I think things square up after the fall of the dollar. Balaji, I think this conversation is going to be amazing when it's published. I hope everybody watches this on video because you'll see me smiling this entire time because I love your catchphrases. I love these on tweets. I'm still hung up by this idea of BTC being the alternative against USA and CCP. But then let me rephrase this, which is that, oh, well, it seems like USA and CCP must both hate BTC. And so because it is representing the alternative order, what if they crush BTC? I don't know if BTC is powerful enough. Oh, that's the question.
22:49So basically, the way I put it in the network state is actually I say, CCP, NYT, BTC, the party, the paper, and the protocol are sort of like a rock, paper, scissors kind of thing. And when I wrote it, NYT still hadn't been defeated. but with Elon, X has basically defeated NYT. I think NYT has lost its hegemony and so forth. So it's sort of like, you know, in the mid 20th century, there was communism, fascism, and democratic capitalism and two of them teamed up on the third and then the other two fought amongst themselves and so forth. So I feel NYT is just being knocked out of the box as a shadow of what it was.
23:26I don't think it's going to be coming back because it depended on being ideologically hegemonic. So CCP versus BTC, you're right that there's, like, that is a genuine polarity because, you know, for example, in the early 20th century, the swing vote in Germany was like the German worker. Like, the Soviets would appeal to them as a worker and the Nazis would appeal to them as a German. So one was appealing on the basis of, like, class and the other was appealing on the basis of race, right? And that was like the swing vote. with this last election, somebody like the black American or female American or gay American, the wokes would appeal to them as black or female or gay, and the magus would appeal to them as American, right?
24:06That was like the swing vote, right, in the center, okay? And I think in the dispensation that is to come, the swing vote will actually be the Chinese technologists because the Chinese will appeal on the basis of, China will appeal on the basis of race and the internet will appeal on the basis of class. Right. So that's often a kind of thing like, you see what I'm saying, right? Like sometimes it's the left that appeals on the basis of, in the case of the Wolks, they'd appeal on the basis of race or genetics. And the Mag is actually we're appealing on the basis of class in the sense of membership in the American class, you know, which is like a software thing, whereas race is like a hardware thing.
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24:40You know, let me pause there. Yeah, maybe. I mean, I wonder, I mean, first I would wonder about your idea that Elon has defeated NYT. I think Elon has certainly defeated someone and that someone is himself. And I think Elon has been extremely adept at defeating himself. I mean, he got himself out of being co-president. How's Tesla doing? I don't know. It doesn't look great. How's X doing? I'm not sure. I think NYT is winning this round. But you think so? Okay, go, go, say it, say it. Yeah, I mean, I think that, you know, I'm almost mostly off X at this point, but I'm reading more on MIT. So maybe I'm not the target audience.
25:17Maybe I'm defeating myself. But I would also say that, you know, I think the only force that is more powerful than the USA, the only force capable of defeating the USA is the USA. And the only force capable of defeating China is the CCP. And I see that both of these nation states have become extremely powerful at beating the shit out of themselves. And I think these humiliating self-beatings will continue until morale improves. But I think that, you know, Biden did a terrible job. Trump is being kind of apocalyptic. And I think they have a good chance of unraveling the United States, yes. And I think the Chinese have been driving a lot of its smartest people, a lot of its most entrepreneurial people, a lot of its best creatives out of the country.
26:04And I think the CCP will also defeat the Chinese ethnostate. They'll defeat the great rejuvenation. So that's my model. I'll pause there. What do you think? Okay. So what I think is, I think Xi is a lot like FDR in the 30s, where he was the least bad in the sense of like there's lots of things. I mean, FDR interned the Japanese. FDR basically did the gold seizures. You know, FDR essentially pushed, I mean, he used the government against all of his enemies. He went after Andrew Mellon. He pushed the great fortunes into foundations. People credibly alleged that he, you know, pushed the Japanese into World War II and so on and so forth.
26:41All kinds of stuff. He ran for four terms, which broke all previous norms, blah, blah, blah. All kinds of stuff FDR did, right? People think he made the Great Depression great. He prolonged it. But net-net, when all the dust settled, ultimately, the U.S. was in the strongest relative position, and it screwed up the least. Yes. Not that it didn't screw up. Go ahead. Yes, go ahead. Right? It screwed up the least out of the Soviet Union, which has gotten killed, Nazi Germany, which has gotten itself blown up, the Japanese got nuked. The U.S., both through competence and through luck or whatever, screwed up the least out of them and was therefore the most powerful in that dispensation.
27:22And I think China's big instinct because of the century of humiliation, you know how like a great founder will take a lower valuation, but always preserve control, right? My view, and you can probably fill in the gaps on this is, especially also seeing what happened to Japan with the Plaza Accords in the 80s, right? Lots of people, our friends will say something like, oh, you know, people were saying Japan was going to beat us in the 80s and therefore it'll happen exactly like that and we're going to beat China the same way. But Japan didn't just lose. It was basically killed because it's like a U.S.
27:57occupied country, right? There's a military base there, you know, thousands, tens of thousands of troops. Japan's constitution is written by the U.S. And most importantly, Japan's not a sovereign. One way of putting that, in 2017, actually, NYT released an article that said in 2010, China had killed a bunch of American spies in China, right? Japan can never do that. That means China has deliberations that America can't see in a way Japan couldn't. And so Japan, with the Plaza Accords, it was handicapped, it was forced to buy U.S. treasuries. Its whole decade of stagnations began at that point.
28:28And China's hyperconscious of not going through that. So China, at all stages, it took less money to preserve more sovereignty. It took worse terms in some ways to preserve, right? So because of that instinct, that wall building, for example, it took all these hits when it banned foreign social media and it built its own, right? All these PR hits constantly, and it was willing to do that to preserve sovereignty. I think that's going to end up being the farsighted decision, for better or worse, in this century. For example, you see what happened with Ukraine where they're scripting drones on Russian soil?
29:01No, what does that mean? So, like, a few months ago, the Ukrainians managed to, like, have some exploding drones activate within Russia and go blow things up, right? So they could control things remotely, right? So in my view, that means, and I talked about this actually 12 years ago, but now it's actually becoming real. Digital borders and physical borders are like the same thing. The great firewall will be seen in some ways as a very farsighted thing because it is digital hard borders. People won't be able to script drones on Chinese soil. They won't be able to script humanoids on Chinese soil.
29:39They won't be able to also send in destabilized memes, destabilizing memes into Chinese soil. Right. Whereas the unmoderated anglospheric internet will just be filled with all of these scissor statements and crazy things that are all driving everybody crazy as we're seeing. Yes. And so China is also insulated against that because people only speak Chinese. So and Xi is taking English out of the schools. So they've got like multiple levels of firewall and they can just like sip green tea and everybody is shooting each other, you know, in other countries as the dollar goes away. I think that is a reasonably compelling idea.
30:17I think that... I have a solution for this, but go ahead. I feel like the Chinese are... They've really taken Napoleon's maxim to heart that the game goes to he who does not lose. Now, obviously, Napoleon... The do-nothing-win meme. Napoleon won nearly all his battles, but he just lost Waterloo and a couple of others, right? And then he lost, and he lost badly. And so I think the Chinese are very intent on not losing. And there is certainly some good things that I see that the Chinese are doing. I mean, I agree that the Great Firewall, in retrospect, looks like a good decision. You take a lot of PR hits.
30:57But as I wrote in one of my letters, it becomes really difficult to say that the Chinese really wanted the Internet in the late 2010s, when Congress was regularly dragging Zuckerberg and Twitter and everyone else into Congress to say, your products suck, you're destroying us, you're killing us, man. And so, you know, I think like you can't tell the Chinese you really need these products in your state. And I think that makes a lot of good sense. I take a look at what is going on with AI today. You know, last week we have Sora 2 and we are able to produce like hyper-realistic slop that like friends have told me that their family members were not able to distinguish that this was an AI-generated cameo, right?
31:40And I think that's kind of incredible. Like, why are we so focused on releasing this stuff? And this seems like crazy decisions being taken by the AI labs without any real consideration for how the state, how the people might actually use it. And so, you know, there is a sense in which I think that China just wants to be totally stable and then, you know, close the doors in the celestial empire and then let the barbarians tear each other apart and eat some mochi balls and then drink green tea. Yeah, I mean, that sounds good. But I think that there is a problem here, which is that the only force capable of hurting China is the CCP, which, I mean, in my book, I write about how they had zero COVID and they had the one child policy in which they were really dumb and they were really autistic about thinking in such literal minded terms.
32:31Oh, there's going to be ecological doom if we have overpopulation. The solution is one child per couple and then, you know, conduct 300 million abortions over this period. Or, oh, you know, we don't care about people who need chemotherapy or need dialysis treatment. The only thing that we care about is preventing the spread of the COVID virus. And so we are going to, you know, prevent the spread of the virus at all costs. And so here is where I think the engineers with their literal mindedness will not be able to leave the people alone. I think the best case scenario for China is if the CCP decides to spend all day sipping green tea and then just leave the people alone.
33:12And I don't think they're going to do that. I think they're going to figure out new and novel ways to destroy the country themselves. What do you think? So it's interesting because I want to make the case for China and then I'll make the case against China. right but that's to say um let's say there's like v1 v2 v3 v4 of an argument you know i mean i think maybe you and i are on v4 but let me let me let me do the v1 v2 just get to our progression right because you go to undisphiscate arguments you get a sophisticated one right okay so the v1 is kind of the naive like that's a chinese communist party they're you know and people think they're all maoists and it's slave labor and so on and so forth and that's also that's a or that's still the ideological mouse.
33:54They've got a very outdated view of what China is. They see the Chinese cities and their response is, oh my God, there's LEDs on the cities. They don't realize the point is the cities didn't exist 30 years ago, right? And they're actually very clean and beautiful or whatever. Then the V2 is, I'm not attacking him, but let's say somebody like Arnaud Bertrand on X, right? Or Carl Zha, which is basically, you know, I welcome our new Chinese overlord. Someone will say something like that, right? And it's like their case is something like America's been blowing up the Middle East. China's been building up Africa.
34:26America just has a bailout economy for the wealthy. China has shared prosperity for everybody. China hasn't started any wars. America's starting all these wars. China's internally united. America's are totally divided. And actually also with these tariffs, China's been doing trade deal after trade deal. And by the way, that also is why I think Xiaomi or, you know, BYD, DGI, their market caps will probably rise because Chinese market access has expanded as a function of all these trade deals that, you know, Xi has recently inked as a function of the reverse thing on the tariffs. Okay. Then the V3, so that is like the first is, you know, USA is still 1945, it's going to win, China sucks.
35:06The second is actually China's super strong and it's good, everything will be fine. The V3 argument is basically the U.S. was on balance better than the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1991 but then after it won it became by degrees worse and worse and worse behaved and started bombing people and abusing its power and so on. And one way I think about it is at home, China's a one-party state, but abroad it's a two-party state because it's checked by America. Conversely, America at home is a two-party state with Democrat-Republican, but abroad was a one-party state where it blew up everybody because it wasn't checked.
35:42It's an interesting way of thinking about the last 30 years or so, right? And now America's coming home because, you know, it's the national defense strategy, if it's real, says pulling troops back from Asia, like it's becoming a country, not an empire. It's giving up the imperial burden, like the end of the Soviet Union. And so the bad part, the V3, is China will expand in such a way that it actually has unchecked power. And even, for example, zero COVID would never have actually been undone in China without the signal from other countries. Because the Chinese diaspora knew that zero COVID wasn't working elsewhere, because other countries were, you know, that external signal was certainly filtering into China in some ways.
36:22And people were aware that Chinese people didn't have to live like this. And that was part of the signal. I think another part of it is Xi just wanted to win his re-election in 2022. And zero COVID was sort of a way to winkle out anybody who wasn't super loyal to him. And then right after, you know, I think the November 2022 Congress, then they unlocked everything. So it wasn't really about zero COVID. It was about third term. or fourth term, whatever, you know, and the term. And so then the V4 would basically say, okay, the USA is going to zero. It's not 36 trillion debt, it's 175 trillion debt.
37:01The dollar is being devalued against gold. It's dropped by 100 million X against Bitcoin. It's pulling back its troops. People are shooting each other domestically. It's telling NATO to go fight for itself. It's basically sanctioning itself on trade, essentially withdrawing itself from world affairs. It's like, you know, have you seen a steel cage match? Yeah. Yeah. So imagine, I imagine like a new iron curtain, like a steel cage UFC octagon thing descending over America. And all talent is told, go home. All the researchers are told to go home. All the wealth is getting, going to the internet, where it's S &P 7 or the digital asset treasury companies.
37:38S &P 493 is flat. U.S. treasuries are down to zero. And conversely, all the manufacturing and military is in China because of the robots and drones there. and all the media and money is on the internet. And now North America is just this gigantic steel cage match with all the shouting and all the shooting. And it's like basically what the Eurasian continent was under communism, unfortunately, in the 20th century. All kinds of crazy people shooting each other, warlord era, collapse of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan Civil War, all that kind of stuff. I think it's coming to North America. So in the V4 is basically, okay, in that world, something needs to balance the Chinese drone armada.
38:13because China will be insanely, insanely, insanely, insanely, insanely powerful. It'll be like 5 or 10x America at its peak. It will be because it's actually hitting more steam. Chinese overproduction just means like so many widgets popping out of, you know, the ground. They're still gaining steam, right? Like the country still hasn't been fully developed. And so China will just be the most powerful physical force to have ever existed. And right now, many Americans aren't mentally living in that world because they still think like the U.S. military exists, right? But the U.S. military is being, unfortunately, beaten by the Houthis.
38:46NATO is being beaten by Russia. If NATO can be beaten by Russia to the point that there's peace treaty talks with Putin, China is like 10x Russia easily. You know, Hegseth has said Chinese hypersonics can sink all U.S. aircraft carriers, right? The Secretary of the Navy said one Chinese shipyard makes more ships than the whole U.S. Navy combined, right? Raytheon's CEO has said you can't decouple from China. So what can possibly balance the Chinese drone armada? I think the entire American mentality of like fighting with your fists and so on and so forth is a very romantic 20th century thing that can't be done against China.
39:18So you actually need something totally different, which is Gandhi and nonviolence, decentralization, agility, invisibility, something totally, totally different against this enormous force. So that's where I'm at with like V4. Let me pause there because that was a lot. But let me get your thoughts. Yeah, I think my problem is that I'm on like V73 and it has a remarkable convergence with V1. And I think I've kind of horseshoed my way back into the start of the snakes and ladders. Sure. I think this is, I think, I mean, you're right that there is kind of this negative element with both of them. And this is where I would think about how you say that MAGA was appealing to the gays as Americans rather than as gays.
40:04I think there is something to that. But there is also, you know, MAGA is also very interested in defining who the internal enemies are. And probably they're throwing, they would like to throw more of the gays in jail. In 2025, yes. In 2024, it was a very different message up until the election. And then it shifted 30, 40. Yeah, go ahead. Well, I mean, when you hear these terms like heritage Americans, first I think of like when you say heritage American, I think of like a giant Thanksgiving dinner that's with a big turkey in the middle. And, you know, I think that it's just these very strange sort of terms.
40:40I agree that there is kind of this iron curtain that the Americans are self-imposing on themselves. And that feels really strange. And maybe it's good for the troops to withdraw from the rest of the world and give up the imperial burden, but I think it's not good to deport a lot of South Korean engineers, or let's just call them Korean engineers, who are trying to build heritage Americans. That's right. And humiliate them in chains. That is totally a horrible own goal. I'm just always very conscious of the ability for the Chinese to impose own goals for themselves as well. You know, it would be great if they spent all day sipping green tea, but they can't leave anything alone.
41:22And they just constantly have to meddle in everything. Is America Keynesian? Yeah, sure, maybe. But the Chinese are, according to Adam Tooze, just so much more Keynesian. They Keynes everything, right? And I think that there is kind of just this endless meddling mentality. Now, let me just make a broader point, which is that I think the U.S. and China are in competition. and rather than one country having all of the structural advantages on its side, I think I wouldn't agree with that characterization. I think that the U.S. can very credibly point to these amazing strengths that the U.S. has. I think China can also point to these amazing strengths, namely these drone armadas, which are very powerful.
42:00But there's also, if you wanted to focus on the most ugly parts of America, you can definitely paint a horrible picture just as the same with how you can do that with China. And so my mental model for all of this is that this is a long-term competition. There will be no country that completely implodes and fails to get back up in the way that Gorbachev did really kind of drive the Soviet Union. Okay, so that's a big difference of opinion. Finish your saying and I'll say something. Go. I think that, you know, when one country is ahead, it is going to get overconfident and make a lot of mistakes.
42:33because I felt like I lived through this in China when at the end of 2020, at the start of 2021, Xi Jinping felt like he was at the top of the world. He was able to control COVID in which, you know, the U.S. was not. January 6th just happened and China looked like it was like a super stable, economically prosperous place. What does he decide to do? Smash a lot of tech companies, destroy the real estate sector, and then also hold on too tightly to COVID. I think that is a classic mistake of overconfidence. and arguably... But was it? But was it? Because let's analyze it now from 2025. Okay, go ahead.
43:08The three red lines essentially were sort of a controlled demolition of the real estate bubble. It didn't actually fully crash the economy. He went after the video games. He went after after-school tutoring, which there was a red queen phenomenon after school. He definitely hit all kinds of people, you know, entrepreneurs and so on. But advanced manufacturing, the transition into it did work. I know you mentioned the little pinks in your book say this, but maybe they're actually right because he avoided the fire economy, you know, finance, insurance, real estate of the U.S. He avoided going too far into it, popped it, doesn't seem to have, it caused some damage.
43:46I mean, one way of thinking about it, if the country, you know, rather than talking about it in very ideological terms, if the country is like the platform and the companies are like the apps on that platform, right? Sometimes Zuck will make like a breaking change to the Facebook APIs and break Zynga, for example, if you remember when they did that, right? Because it was spamming the feed too much. Nothing against Zynga or whatever. You're just making that decision, the greatest good for the greatest number. Like Zynga is working in its own way, but long-term, this is spamming too many people with zombies or whatever it is.
44:20So actually, no, we don't want to have Zynga. We're going to push Zynga into its own archived inbox, like a spam inbox and so on and so forth. And so in the same way, if he's got root over the Chinese platform, he's like, actually, we don't want these apps. We don't want any more than we want the advanced manufacturing stuff, which seems to have worked. Yeah, I mean, if the only thing that matters to your economy is advanced manufacturing, and I am going to let no one talk me down from my stance that manufacturing is almost everything. And so I think that manufacturing is really important. But, you know, he didn't only hurt a lot of the video games.
44:53And maybe, yeah, you should control the video games. You should control the social media. You should control the short-form video apps. You should control the AI slop. Frankly, the Americans ought to do more on all of these different things. He also smacked around people like Jack Ma, people like John King. Yeah, real guys. And other people, right? And so that's pretty important, too. And so this is where I think that it is still important to flip a few more pages past the business pages of the Wall Street Journal into the economics pages because youth unemployment is real. Tomping is real. You talk about inflation being, what's the Friedman line?
45:26inflation is a taxation. Inflation is taxation without legislation. Without legislation. And I think, you know, yeah, inflation is bad. But the only thing that might be worse than inflation is deflation, which the Chinese are not quite able to get out of. And C is kind of this boomer who says, why do people dislike deflation? Don't people like lower prices? Well, not if you are an investing company. Well, so here's where I want to argue with you. Go ahead. All right, well, let me just make one more point, which is that I think that, you know, the country that's going to be ahead is going to make all sorts of mistakes driven by overconfidence and hubris, which is what I think, for the most part, she did.
46:01I think that the controlled demolition of the property sector destroyed a lot of confidence in housing and construction activity is still not back. And we still might get some sort of a weird financial crisis because of the supposedly controlled demolition of the property sector. I think that this was not as controlled as we'd like to believe. And arguably, you can say that the United States grew overconfident, which is how it imposed this octagon upon itself to make people destroy each other, that's a mistake of overconfidence. But the more that you're ahead, the more you'll make these sort of mistakes, the more that you're behind, the more that you're interested in patching up your deficiencies, which is why I think this is going to be kind of a neck and neck race for a very long time, because we can't just look at a race based on structural advantages.
46:47As it goes on, you know, people will trip up and stumble and fight harder. Okay, so here is my worldview and where I disagree with you on is basically a few things. First is, I don't know if the U.S. has that much longer to live as like a coherent political entity. I think we're on the verge of a end of USSR type scenario. Dalio describes it as a debt heart attack. Elon thinks the government isn't going to last very long. you're seeing gold flipping U.S. treasuries. For example, if you saw that graph, gold is flipping U.S. treasuries as reserve asset of states. And certainly Bitcoin has risen more than 100 million X against it.
47:26There is, you know, the U.S. has not become the, like the U.S. used to be the number one destination for global millionaires up to 2019, plus 10 ,000 millionaires. After 2020, it dropped 85%. It hasn't recovered. And global millionaires capital has relocated to Dubai and Singapore, number one and number two. They've left China as well, a good chunk of those millionaires, but China regenerates them so fast that it's basically seemingly fine for them. And China's view, I think, is that the new up-and-coming generation of 20-somethings speaks purely Chinese. They have purely Chinese apps. They'll be Chinese nationalists.
48:04And unlike the 40-somethings that have some sympathy for the West, a lot of these Gen X or older millennial entrepreneurs is like, you know what, why don't you guys go and it's fine. Jack Ma can be a teacher in Japan or something like that, what he's doing and somebody else in China can run that. We've got a billion Chinese people here, right? That's essentially Xi's bet that he can do without these sort of older Chinese entrepreneurs. And now he just wants those, the younger ones who have grown up on Xi Jinping Thought and all the Chinese apps and think China's number one and Luckin is better than Starbucks.
48:40And maybe they're right. BYD is outselling Tesla in neutral markets. Xiaomi is able to ship a car when Apple wasn't. TikTok needed total state intervention. And the combined efforts of Google and Facebook and so on and so forth couldn't beat TikTok. And DJI is the cheapest and largest scale drone manufacturer in the world. And an end-to-end, you know, like essentially, the U.S. can't compete with China abroad, with the exception of maybe Elon, and even Elon is having a tough time. In any neutral market, Chinese products win. And so the U.S. has retreated to just trying to tariff and build tariff barriers around the U.S., which is going to fail in the medium to long run because the Democrats may defect from that.
49:19Like Newsom has said, hey, maybe he'll import goods from China if he saw that. Right. Like that's why I say America, it's not the United States, the dis-United States. Blue America has its own foreign policy distinct from red America. And Newsom and Walls and Hillary Clinton have all signaled that they may want to align more with China than the Republicans do. Like, you know, you saw the thing with Newsom and how it wasn't just that they cleaned up San Francisco for Xi. It was that Newsom was the only Democrat to get the meeting with Xi. Do you remember that? Yeah. My view on that is, again, a lot of Americans don't know this, but like within China, you can't just jump straight to the presidency like Obama or Trump.
49:57You have to go from like, you know, mayor of a village and then governor of a province and all the way up and you make it to the central committee. And so Xi recognized Newsom as having a similar path going from San Francisco mayor to California governor to possibly president. So recognize him as a credible, possible person. And when Newsom was in China, he said he wants to be China's long-term stable and strong partner. My view is that after the dollar ends, that's the last strand that's holding blue and red together. Because blue is only 4 % of Democrats marry Republicans. Democrats certainly don't vote for Republicans.
50:32Democrats don't even talk to Republicans anymore. They're in their own blue sky versus X, you know, kind of thing. Digital secession is already here. They're now starting to shoot each other, blow each other up. There's a new killing, crazy blowing up thing on X every single day nowadays, unfortunately. And it's the last piece of paper that's holding this thing together. It's not, you know how people say it's not a, it's a country, not an economic zone. You've seen that kind of post on X? It's actually an economic zone, not a country. Because the only thing holding it together is this piece of paper called the dollar.
51:03And when that tears, unfortunately, there's nothing keeping blue and red together. And Democrats will side with Xi if they don't have D.C. Yeah, well, I don't know. I mean, why would Xi want to meet Governor Newsom? This is a guy who looks exactly like the lead actor in American Psycho. If this came to his interest to me, that's just weird. And I think there is someone who is more willing to give a bear hug to Xi Jinping than Governor Newsom. And that is President Donald Trump. I mean, I was digging up these quotes for an article I was writing, which Trump told the Wall Street Journal, Xi is so smart, brilliant, everything nearly perfect.
51:42There's no one in Hollywood like this guy, as if Xi Jinping had Tom Cruise levels of handsomeness, which I find not. But Trump is unpredictable because he'll say that about someone, then he'll insult them, then he'll come back and say it. Well, right now he's trying to bear hug Xi Jinping. And so, you know, I think you're right. I mean, maybe there is more than one thing that unites Democrats and Republicans. That's the paper. Rather, it's like a love of Xi Jinping. What do you think about that? What's interesting is a few years ago, people were saying that one bipartisan issue was being anti-China, right?
52:14My view is Democrats were only anti-China because there was a contestation for who would run the most powerful state. Like, basically, first China disrupted manufacturing, so it disrupted red America. Then, post-2020, it seemed to become the most powerful state. So then Blue America really fought it. And now recently, finally, Tech America, which always had a sense of superiority versus China, has finally started to see, wait, Chinese AI models are actually giving us their own for the money. Chinese robotics are actually really good. And for the first time, Tech America is actually taking China seriously, not just one-off like TikTok, but actually, whoa, actually the Chinese engineers aren't just copycats, they're actually innovators and so on.
52:53That's always been the thing which tech is, you know, American tech has felt they've had the edge. and now that edge is maybe slipping.
53:02So I think, though, at almost a genetic level, I think red Americans at the base, not Trump, have a more visceral aversion to China, whereas Democrats, it's funny to put it this way, this is a one-liner, okay? But Democrats and China are both natural communists, so they'll be, that's a joke, okay? But there's, you know, they're statists, right? Democrats are willing to be administrators in a multi-ethnic empire. And so they could find something under the Xi dispensation. Sort of like, you know how Venezuela is like this dysfunctional kleptocracy, but it's sort of bailed out with Chinese goods.
53:39China's willing to, as you know, it's willing to work with, you know, Iranian fundamentalists and Singaporean meritocrats and Venezuelan kleptocrats and Russian Orthodox, so long as they don't interfere in China's internal affairs. Right. And so I think they will support the Democrats and just ship them goods and support them in this way. Have you seen this thing on soft secession that the Blues are doing? Right. Right? So in that soft secession, they just get goods from the West Coast ports, from China. They don't enforce the tariffs. I think it's very likely something like that happens. Newsom has talked about it.
54:16I'm not even inferring this. Go ahead. I don't know. Biden Democrats, this guy from Delaware, another potential port town. There's a port of Philadelphia. Didn't get a lot of didn't do a lot of good for Joseph Biden when he was president. And but but Biden Biden is 19 born 1942 and Trump's born 1946 or something like that. So they're actually both of you zoom out. They're both like, you know, coarse, handsy guys from the northeastern U.S. born at the time of like peak America who grew up thinking the USA is number one on everything effortlessly. And Biden would say things like, we're the United States of America for Pete's sake.
54:52Like essentially they just think USA number one. Go ahead. Yeah. I mean, I think the, I mean, look, you're focused on a lot of weird shit happening in America. And no doubt the weird shit is real. But I am living, I'm speaking to you from San Francisco. I look out the window and I see three weird pieces of shit a day before breakfast. You know, that's just how odd things are. But if I am trying to think a little bit about China as I looked at, there's plenty of dissatisfaction. I don't know if they're regenerating all the millionaires very quickly. You know, there's a lot of this, when the biggest driver of wealth in China is the property sector.
55:30When you have a property sector collapse of 25 % and then people aren't really buying homes, it's really hard to build more wealth after that. There's a lot of uncertainties about the corporate sector. There's a lot of young people who've decided, to move to northern Thailand where they could smoke drugs that are legal in the state of California. And they're taking leave of, you know, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese ethnostate that's being undertaken in their name. And all of these millionaires are leaving. And there are, I mean, I don't think the, definitely the demographics is not an issue in the next 20 years.
56:00But in like 25, 30 years from now, demographics will yawn larger and larger. It seems like they're not going to be able to escape this hole very well. I understand they're deploying a lot of robots, But what if, you know, the Silicon Valley bet is real, which I don't really buy. But let's say we invent God in a box and we get the super intelligence and they invent all these humanoid robots. And then we get to take control of these humanoid robots because we have the AI and they don't. You know, that could be bad. You know, maybe finally all of this AI slop, we should just consume all of the Sora 2 videos just to support, give OpenAI a hand so that they can take charge of the robots later.
56:38And, you know, the Politburo seems pretty dysfunctional. Xi Jinping, you know, I know, I get he's like more handsome than Tom Cruise, but he has a belly. I don't think that, by the way. I think that, you know, he's smoking probably too much because, you know, Xi was born in like 1952. And all of these people smoke way too much. If he falls over one day, are we going to get tanks in the streets in Beijing? I don't think so. I think they'll have an orderly transition. But what are we really going to get? And so I think there are all of these, you know, disunited Politburo comments that we can also have as soon as this guy keels over.
57:12And so, you know, I don't know. It's like, I think that the tariffs will be enforced. It's more likely for the tariffs to be enforced on California than for the Chinese somehow to figure out all of their own political problems too. What do you think? I think Li Chang is very competent, and he is potentially the number two after Xi. I think very few Americans even know who the seven, I'm sure I'm butchering the pronunciation, but it's like L-I-Q-I-A-N-G, I think. Yeah, and you know who this guy was? This guy was the party secretary of Shanghai during the worst lockdown ever attempted in the history of humanity.
57:44Every other democracy was able to toss out the bastard who enforced COVID on their policies. And then what did the Chinese decide to do? Elevate this guy into Premier. That's weird. Wait a second. But Trump was the one who did COVID lockdowns in the U.S. and he's president again. Right. So I'm not sure. I'm not sure that's true. Well, but yes. I mean, Republicans ultimately didn't care that much about like COVID is a very complicated kind of thing. because everybody switched positions on it like four times. Like at first, Democrats said it was racist to talk about COVID and Trump was calling it the China virus.
58:19It's Jan, Feb, 2020. And then Trump started saying, oh, okay, you know, we need to start, you know, covering up the testing and showing, you know, that the numbers going up. And Democrats started saying it was a big deal. Then Democrats flipped in the U.S. and said, actually, racism is a real pandemic and we need to go and do Black Lives Matter riots. and Trump was doing the warp speed vaccine. And Kyle Mahara said that she wouldn't take a Trump vaccine. Then, and the vaccine was actually blocked. People said that they were, you know, I think, gosh, I forgot this guy's name, but there's a scientist.
58:52There's a report in like MIT Tech Review that they were blocking the vaccine's approval until after the election to make sure Trump didn't get a bump from the vaccine, which is a big deal, by the way, because it's a close election to a tree. Then after the election, suddenly the vaccine became a tool in the hands of the Democrats. And fundamentally, I just looked at that as something where it wasn't a scientific issue. It was just something that was a tool in a power struggle. And similarly in China, I think it was just a tool for Xi to get his third term. It was just that. I don't think they actually believed in it.
59:26Well, let me give you an alternative view. But first of all, let me say that, you know what the Americans got and the Chinese didn't? The vaccine. the mRNA vaccine. Yeah, sign of a farm didn't work, right? Pretty important. I mean, the Chinese were locking people up and swabbing their noses and mouths, you know, every other day. And they did not do the vaccines, which is really, really strange. They were just using police to keep shutting people in. I think that after living in China, after living in Shanghai in 2022, what I observed was that, yes, politics was part of it. Xi's coronation. I feel like Xi felt like he had the coronation in the back.
1:00:07And he did the most blatant possible insult towards the Shanghainese by elevating their most hated politician into the head of premier. And I was surprised that, I would have been surprised if Li Qiang was still vice premier, one of the four vice premiers after this. And then he was elevated to be premier. Think about how that distorts the incentive structures of all of these other party secretaries who thought this guy messed up big time and he gets promoted. I was living in China and I felt that the protesters did play perhaps some role in showing Xi that they are dissatisfied. I was living in Shanghai.
1:00:41I went to one of the protests the day after that. All of these youths staggered out of their cocktail bars and, you know, started chanting down with Xi Jinping, down with the Communist Party, which is kind of. Yeah, that was very unusual. America is very unusual to see that because usually it'll be something where they're just critiquing like a local party person versus the big dog or what have you. It's not their fault. They had too many of these Western cocktails in the French concession. But I think the other big thing was that I felt very strongly that the local governments everywhere throughout China, especially in smaller cities that are not as wealthy as Shanghai, they could no longer enforce zero COVID.
1:01:19They had just no state capacity to do onto Shanghai what Li Tiang did onto Shanghai. And they had given up. They were really exhausted. And I think when the virus started really spreading in Beijing, the central government took a look at itself and said, can we, the central government, enforce a lockdown upon the central government? And then they decided no and threw up their hands. And then they completely let this whole thing collapse. Yeah, in 2023. It sounded like a mistake to me. It didn't have to happen this way. Because you know what they didn't have? Vaccines. Yeah, the Chinese vaccine did not work.
1:01:51So I'll agree with you on all of that, basically. And I know that the Shanghai lockdowns were actually like seriously house, you know, like house arrest type things. And people who were zillionaires or whatever were literally locked in their house and people like had pregnancies messed up, all kinds of bad stuff happened during that time period. So I will completely agree with you. I don't think China gets everything right at all. I just, however, think they're messing up less. And the reason I say they're messing up less is if you take a flight from San Francisco or Seattle or L.A. or any Western city which has syringes and refuse and drug addicts on the street and people attacking you as you walk down and so forth.
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From the publisher
Balaji Srinivasan speaks with Dan Wang, author of Breakneck, about China's industrial rise, America's competing strengths in software and finance, and what happens when an engineering state and a lawyerly state collide. The conversation covers manufacturing dominance, the future of the dollar, why both superpowers keep making costly mistakes, and where builders fit into what comes next.
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