H20s to China + 15% with Chris Miller and Lennart Heim

14 Aug 2025 · 1 h 7 min

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a16z Podcast Episode Notes: H20s to China + 15% with Chris Miller and Lennart Heim

Episode Overview In this episode, Chris Miller, author of "Chip War," and Lennart Heim from RAND join host Jordan Schneider to discuss the recent reversal in U.S. tech policy regarding Nvidia's H20 AI chips being sold to China, initially banned in April 2025. The conversation delves into the implications of this policy change for AI competition between the U.S. and China, the strategic importance of semiconductor technology, and the complexities of U.S.-China relations.

Key Topics Discussed

  1. Introduction to H20 AI Chips
  2. Definition: The H20 chip is developed by Nvidia, optimized for AI applications, and was initially banned due to export control concerns.
  3. Background: The chip's design came as a response to prior export controls imposed under the Trump administration, which complicated the technology landscape.
  1. Timeline of U.S. Policy Changes
  2. Ban and Reversal: The initial ban on H20 was enacted in April 2025; however, the policy shifted to allow sales with a 15% export fee.
  3. Negotiation Background: The decision involved discussions between President Trump and Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, highlighting the complexities of government-business relations.
  1. Arguments For and Against Selling H20 to China

Arguments Against Selling

  • Risk of Upgrading China's AI Ecosystem: Selling AI chips could enhance China's technological capabilities, posing a strategic threat to the U.S.
  • Military and Surveillance Applications: There are concerns that these chips could be used in ways that contravene U.S. values, including military enhancements.

Arguments For Selling

  • Market Dependency: Keeping Chinese developers reliant on U.S. technology may help mitigate risk by maintaining a market for American products.
  • Stifling Domestic Competition: Supplying chips to China could hinder domestic development of AI capabilities in China, delaying advancements in their ecosystem.
  1. Technical Specifications and Competitive Landscape
  2. Performance Metrics: H20 chip's performance is evaluated based on computational power (flops) and memory bandwidth, key factors in AI training and deployment.
  3. Comparison with Chinese Alternatives: The discussion highlighted that while the H20 chip is powerful, estimates suggest that Chinese chips are currently less capable but improving.
  1. Strategic Implications of AI Chip Sales
  2. Global Technology Dynamics: The episode explored how the sale of U.S. technology to China could reshape global power balances, especially in AI and semiconductor technology.
  3. Long-term Competitiveness: Concerns were raised about how U.S. decisions might influence future innovations in AI and chip manufacturing.
  1. Political Landscape and Legislative Considerations
  2. Congressional Influence: The role of Congress in shaping tech policy was discussed, emphasizing the need for a unified approach amidst fluctuating executive decisions.
  3. Future Projections: Potential scenarios regarding U.S.-China relations and their impact on tech competition were deliberated.
  1. Closing Thoughts
  2. The episode concluded with reflections on how technology policy decisions can have far-reaching implications beyond immediate economic benefits, stressing the importance of strategic foresight.

Key Takeaways

  • The recent policy shift regarding Nvidia's H20 AI chips illustrates the delicate balance in U.S.-China tech relations.
  • Arguments on both sides highlight a complex interplay of economic benefits and national security risks.
  • Understanding technical specifications is crucial in assessing the competitive landscape of AI technologies.
  • Congressional oversight and public sentiment will remain influential as the U.S. navigates its tech policy moving forward.

Resources

  • ChinaTalk: Additional insights and discussions can be found on the ChinaTalk podcast.
  • Horizon Fellowship: Opportunities for involvement in emerging tech policy issues are available through the Horizon Fellowship.

Outro Listening to the a16z Podcast can provide deeper insights into the intersection of technology, policy, and their broader cultural implications. For updates and future episodes, follow a16z on social media platforms and streaming services.

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Transcript

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0:01Emergency podcast. We're bringing back Leonard Hyam of Rand and Chris Miller. You guys know what Chris Miller is to talk the new age 20 drama. We went from banning it in April to now selling it with a 15 % export fee. All right, Leonard, why don't you start our narratives? What is the age 20? Why should you care about it? And what were the first few months of the Trump administration doing when it came to this trip? The H20 is the chip which Nvidia designed as a response to Xbox controls in 2023. It's a typical game. You draw some lines and then new chips get created right below the lines. The H20 is such an example, but it didn't need trick.

0:41It maxed out the specifications which are not controlled memory bandwidth. So putting on the best high bandwidth memory, well, the world currently has on this chip and created the Xbox control compliant chip, which I think was introduced at the beginning of 2024. So a couple of months after the update. And we were sold over 2024, lots of interest in this chip. And when then the trauma administration started in January, they, well, we can say the Biden administration didn't get to it. I think it would definitely be a way out of this problem. Many of the officials came out and many of them even favor, but they just never got to banning to it because again, many stakeholders and many different opinions and also just kind of running out of time.

1:20But Trump then banned this chip as we saw reported in April 2025. Not via the normal means how you do it, not via passing regulation, via using a cool tool called isimformed letters because they're pretty fast. You can just send a letter to the companies which you produce these chips and tell them like, hey, you can't sell these chips anymore because we expect there's an export control violation going on and we actually think this chip is too good. So that's where we started. So the chip was banned for my personal point of view, a big success. I think this chip should not be sold. We need to reduce our thresholds.

1:50This is just simply too good off a chip and well then then this was the last later status and I think then the last few months last few weeks we saw some flip -flopping back and forth and every day we built some more information and I don't know why would we talk probably more things would come out over time. All right so this was President Trump on Monday. Two questions one about China one about Russia if I could on China if your administration agreed to send the most advanced or advanced Nvidia and AMD chips. No, obsolete. No, obsolete, and then 15 % of the product means the 20s. No, no, that's this is an old chip that China already has and I deal with Jensen who is a great guy and the video.

2:36The chip that we're talking about the H20, it's, it's an old chip. China already has it in a different form, different name, but they have it. Or they have a combination of two will make up for it and even then some. Now, Jensen also has Jensen's very brilliant guy and Jensen also has a new chip, the black weld. Do you know what the black weld is? The black weld is super duper advanced. I wouldn't make a deal with that. Although it's possible I'd make a deal a somewhat enhanced in a negative way, black well. In other words, take 30 % to 50 % off of it. But that's the latest and the greatest in the world.

3:22Nobody has it. They won't have it for five years. But the age 20 is obsolete. You know, it's one of those things, but it still has a market. So I said, listen, I want 20 % if I'm going to prove this for you for the country, for our country, for the US. I don't want it myself. You know, every time I say like, like 747, I want. I want. Yeah. for the Air Force. So I just wanted to... So when I say I want 20, I want for the country. I only care about the country. I don't care about myself. And he said, would you make it 15? So we negotiate a little deal. So he's selling a essentially old chip that a wallway has a similar chip, a chip that does the same thing.

4:08And I said, good, if I'm going to give it to you because they have a, you know, they have a stopper. What we call a stopper, not allowed to do it. They restrict is really known as a restrictive covenant. And I said, if I'm gonna do that, I want you to pay us as a country something, because I'm giving you a release. I release them only from the AH -20. Now, on the black well, I think he's coming to see me again about that, but that will be a unenhanced version of the big one. And like, I don't know if you know it, we will sometimes sell fighter jets to a country and we'll give them 20 % less than we have.

4:48Do you know what I mean? It's just, yeah, it's crazy to see you like this discussion. Also, the level of sophistication, right? Knowing H20, knowing the black words by name, knowing what Huawei, it's clearly a big topic now where this whole exponent of things in the spotlight. So I think it's a good moment to kind of take a step back and look at the arguments in favor in against selling China AI chips. So against selling, you have broadly the argument that selling AI chips helps upgrade the Chinese AI ecosystem that's going to compete with America's broadly and that there are specific applications of the chips that we would be selling to China, which we would be very uncomfortable with, like military ones or intelligence ones or sort of broad human rights violations that you wouldn't want, sort of, America and technology to be helping to further.

5:44And then the arguments. In favor of selling, we have this idea that actually selling in video chips would retard domestic chip development, make it harder for smick and Huawei and whoever else wants to try to build in a domestic AI chip to find a marketplace and this idea that selling chips into China would maintain American, you know, Chinese dependency on the US stack. So it keeps Chinese developers using CUDA, building infrastructure around US technology, and you know, some sort of like broad, soft power, agenda setting advantages to be determined that China using Nvidia hardware will give to the US going forward.

6:30So maybe we should run through those, maybe we should run through those systematically, I guess. You know, let's start with the biggest one, which is you shouldn't sell these chips to China because upgrading the Chinese AI ecosystem is a like a strategic threat to the US. And I think that's a, I think maybe we'll throw this one to Chris. I mean, this is a, this is like a, this is like a grand strategic question almost of like how much of China's rise is okay and how much of it isn't because, you know, the military intelligence human rights applications are almost secondary to like just how scary you see a richer, more flourishing, more powerful China to be, right?

7:20Yeah, and I would even segment out the sort of richer and more flourishing side and just talk about technological capabilities. They're obviously interlinked, but I don't think US strategy has been to try to make China poor or less flourishing in general. I think the question is just who's going to lead in AI? The trend over the last five years and really the last 50 years has been that if you want advanced AI, you need lots of advanced computing. And there's a small number of companies who produce the chips in question. And so if you think that advanced technology has mattered in the past in geostrige competition, which I think is pretty hard to argue with, it's probably going to matter in the future.

7:58And therefore, who wins an AI, you know, it's a little bit reductive to ask, but I think it also matters. And just like we would be less happy if we were all using Huawei phones and relying on olive up a cloud because I think there'd be pretty significant political ramifications that were downstream of that. So too, if we find ourselves in a future where either the US or third countries are relying on Chinese AI providers, whether it's for models or for applications or for AI cloud, that implies a lot of political influence for the US. So weaker US and stronger China, that's the stakes. And I think to some degree both sides of this argument agree on that.

8:41Basic framing. Question is how best do you get there? One argument is that you restrict compute access and thereby hobble the growth of Chinese AI firms. The second argument is you try to, as Secretary Luttonic has said, get China addicted to the AI stack. And the question to ask is, how addicted are they willing to become and how addicted could you actually make them and can you leverage that addiction in the future or not? And I think these are where the empirical questions are really focused. And I think kind of one more on the in favor of selling argument, this idea that keeping China dependent on, you know, TSMC fab shifts actually lowers the risk of a Taiwan war, which I have some questions about.

9:24But this is something that Ben Thompson has been pushing, which I think has also percolated into the administration and Congress, like my mom threw me that one the other day. Anyways, I mean, what do you find? What do you make out of it, Jordan? I'm like, I'm like, who is like, for me, it's like, it doesn't seem to be the main calculus behind it. But I think it's on the margin. I think maybe on the margin a little bit. I think there's two levels to the question. First, at the political calculus to go to war, or not to go to war, it seems very, This would be an extremely kind of weighty decision where the fates of nations would be at stake to do a serious blockade or to do some strike or some actual, you know, d -day style invasion.

10:15And whether or not the chips are there trying to sort of like gaining relatively or losing losing relatively in AI hardware. Just strikes me as like the twelfth thing that you would be thinking about if you were a Chinese premier. I mean, domestic political developments political developments in Beijing, political developments in Taipei, just how willing the US is seeming to fight for Taiwan, how excited Japan is to let the US fight from, uh, uh, right from its territory. All of those strike me as much more germane decisions and there's a bit of sort of like technological myopia of tech analysts thinking that like, oh, the chips are the one thing that's like this silicon shield stopping it.

11:06It's like, no, like we're, I'm sorry, I, I really, as, as, as cool and important and, you know, over a 50 year period, potentially like world -shaking as advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence may be. If you are a head of state, this is making the biggest decision of your life, I don't think it's really going to come down to like, oh, well Huawei tells me they can only make 750 ,000 chips in 2028. So then it's not going to work out. But I do think sort of one level down from that, there is this very open question, which we debated on Sunday's edition of Second Breakfast, about to what extent the chips and the technology that they're going to be enabling ends up sort of reshaping the military balance of power.

11:58And I think that is still very much an open question that smart people can disagree on on whether or not, you know, whatever you can do with, you know, putting chips in your autonomous drone so they can like target without being interfered with or what have you, you can imagine a lot of a lot of different crazy futures where AI really matters. And by the way, like it could actually work in the other direction of lowering the risk of Taiwan war if America has a big lead when it comes to semiconductors because then a Chinese or a leader in Beijing would look at the military balance of power and the advantage that US and Taiwanese forces get from being more AI -ified that they see, oh, there's no chance of us winning why even try to play this game.

12:52The first one. I think the other key facet here is that if you look at sales advanced chips from Taiwan and the ecosystem to China, most of them are not AI chips. It's mostly some more and PC processors and AI chips are a portion, but a small portion. I think it also gets back to the question I know you've raised a lot of shows, Jordan, which is how AGI Pilled is Xi Jinping. And the answer is, you know, it doesn't seem that AGI Pilled. Best evidence for which is that, you know, Smith and his seven out of your production is still producing a whole lot of smart phone chips, which you would not do if you thought we were in a race for AGI, we told to find the future.

13:27So both of those facets again, and point against the Silicon Shield as it relates to AI chips being absolutely central here. And also just to clarify, they're not allowed to produce AI chips at TSMC. They can produce everything else there. Why not? Because in Antitilist, they did some bad stuff, but almost every other Chinese company can just go to TSMC and produce chips there, right? So there's a significant flow of chips from Taiwan, SOS, we're speaking right now, to China, right? And just not ideally not AI chips. We had some hiccups in the past, We'll also add chips, right? So I think a key question, Leonard is how obsolete is the H20 relative to A, what black walls can do, but probably more importantly B, what, what all we can do.

14:12You want to walk us to the numbers? What I would just say, I don't think this is the H20 S and obsolete chip is, is fair, right? Chips have many specifications, right? And let me try to break it down two simple ones we should care about. the computational power, how many flops it has, how many operations per second that can crunch. But then also memory bandwidth. This means basically you need to read and write memory and the memory capacity and the bandwidth how fast you can read and write memory is key. And one of the key inventions we've seen over the last few years, which actually MD did first is so called high bandwidth memory, which is a pretty complex technology.

14:47We've got three companies in the world doing it right now. SK Heinex, Samsung and Micron, building this HBM. and the H20 is really bad on the flops. 7X worse than H100, even more worse, 14X worse than the upcoming chips than it'd be 100s or more. So it's definitely no competitive chip here. But on the memory bandwidth side, which is again key for deploying chips, it's pretty good. It's even better than H100 because the H100 uses five units of HBM, whereas this one has six units of HBM. So it gets a mind like bugling four terabytes per second of high bandwidth, maybe. and no Chinese chip. Such good high bandwidth memory.

15:24And more importantly, even if they have right now, like 19C with a which has some HBM, I think it sits at 3 .2 terabytes per second. They're not allowed to buy it anymore. It's banned since December, 2024, right? So right now, China would be struggling to, first of all, getting their hands on this HBM and they're trying to produce it domestically, but this will take a bit and even if they produce it domestically, it will initially be worse. So I don't think the H20 is an obsolete chip. It's a pretty competitive chip. I think it's definitely fair to say it's a worst ship than many others. That's fair to say.

15:54But again, if we look at this other dimension, this dimension of deployment, it's pretty good. It's really, really good. But I think that is one of the key actions of debate. Some people say the goal is to stop China from training higher and therefore you focus on the flaps. If your goal is to constrain inference, you focus more on memory bandwidth. Walk us through the way these different ships are used. Yeah. I think that's a fair debate too. We should be having here, right? We should think about the X -Fogunholtz, what do we want them to achieve? And I think right now, what's fair to say, the H20 is not an amazing chip for training AI systems.

16:27There are some things which numbers don't always capture, right? Like, you still build on top of them. Video software stack, if your company would use them video before, there's a little bit of a pain to switch. There's a bunch of problems with Huawei chips, which you don't really see in the specifications. Right? The overheat, you need more of them. The software stack isn't great yet. Do you can even get enough? All of these things just mean that H20 is not a great training chip, but beyond the numbers it still use stack on a software ecosystem. So on the training goal, I think that's still being achieved here.

16:58Where the debate begins is what do we think about deployment? And what at least I've learned over time here and is if you want to be really precise, if your goal is to only stop them from training but everything else is below it or you only stop them from training big systems, it's really hard to be precise on all of this. And then AI is ever changing. And I think the most biggest thing we've seen over the last few years is this rise of test -time compute of the air models thinking. How do they think? Well, they produce tokens. And that's what the H20 is like really amazing at. So one could say the usability and importance of the H20 only went up ever since because we got models which do more thinking, generating more tokens and also generating tokens to then train the next generation of AI systems.

17:38And I think these are the arguments which you probably would say, well, actually, this is a pretty good chip. for producing these new things, which are more important than AI development life cycle. So the other argument that the president made is that Huawei already makes these chips, which is true to an extent, but walk us through the numbers there as you see them. I know that there's questions both about the quality of Huawei's chips as well as the numbers they can produce. Then I've sexually a lot next said, they can produce 200 ,000 a year. And I suppose that's right. How does that compare with what we're going to see with age 20s?

18:10The key dimensions here are just quality and quantity. And I think many always talk about the quality argument here. I personally think the quantity argument is way more important. You already mentioned the number from, I think Latinx said in Kessler also testified that 200 ,000 ASIN chips being produced in 2005. How does this compare to the US? I think we're showing out around 10 million chips this year. So significantly more. This means if we're selling, and I think there have been projections about Nvidia selling A million H20s, we sell them five times more that they can produce. And I think this is where the debate starts.

18:43The quantity argument is really key here. If you would only sell them a couple of thousands or 200 ,000 something that's a vastly different debate than selling it in a million or potentially even more. And just to sign that China wants to buy them speaks to their problems of producing domestic chips. So on the quantity side, China is simply not there yet. They're getting better and they're producing more chips than the minute we speak. That's the case. But they're many difficult as long as even they produce more chips, have enough high bandwidth memory, how would this have smuggling operation to get this memory, how would this have packaging yield, all of these things just add up that you eventually just really can't produce competitive chips.

19:23Then at the end they get chips out of it. If you compare the A790C to Nvidia's best chip right now, which is being sold to B200, it's way worse. It's way worse on the high bandwidth memory part, And it's also way worse on the computer performance. And it's also worse than H20, which is selling, at least on the memory part, which we're seeing here. And the point is, if we're selling the H20, they were many missed. There's a chip. At least there were rumors around it. And I think there were pretty good rumors. There's a chip called the H20E. What does it do? It doesn't use HBM3. It uses HBM3E. So I previously said it has four terabytes per second.

19:57If you use HBM3E, you can probably go up to five terabytes per second or even more. Right? And which indications do we have that this ship is not getting sold, right? The flop's still being kept, but the memory just continues going higher and higher and higher. And I think that's another thing to be tracking here, and as long as we don't have updated regulations for it, but just don't know where the line is going to be drawn here in terms of quality of memory bandwidth, but also most importantly in terms of quantity. So if I could ask for one thing, please reduce the quantity. I think that's the key thing we should pay attention to here.

20:25I think one of Nvidia's lines that Jensen was saying a lot is like they used to have 95 % market share before the restrictions and now it's down to 50%. First off, they've never actually given numbers for that. But second, my guess is that they were the only people making accelerators that people wanted. So, even if it did go down to 50%, it's not like it was the same pie. Like the pie went down such that that 5 % that it used to be now turns into 50 % of the whole pie. So the idea that sort of Huawei, like that number does not tell you that Huawei necessarily has the capacity in order to fill it up.

21:10And as Leonard said, like the Jensen cares about this because lots of Chinese companies are willing to spend his projection is what, like $15 billion a year in sales. And to think that, I mean, Huawei and Baidu Intensent, they are not dumb. They are going to spend billions and billions of dollars of capex. By the way, this capex number seems small if you're talking about Google and Meta, but it's actually pretty large relative to the total capex that you're seeing from the Chinese hyper -scalers. They're doing this because they think it is useful and important and relevant to their sort of, you know, AI ambitions going forward, not to like do Jensen a favor or anything.

21:57Could we talk about what we know in terms of who in China will be the large scale buyers of these ships, certainly you mentioned Tencent, Alibaba, there's AI firms like DeepSeek, there's bite dance, a huge player in China's AI ecosystem. I don't know if you have a sense of numbers of any of those Republic or at least talk about who are the buyers these ships inside of China? I don't think we have public reporting of exactly. There's definitely been some reporting that big hyper scalars, big cloud companies, right? Tencent, buy tens and hours are definitely interesting. I'm not sure interest in buy tens because they're building a tons of clusters in Malaysia, which by the way, it can buy whatever chips they want to buy.

22:40They are and just continue building. So I think just the normal hyper scalars go there. They will continue you buying these kinds of chips, but they're all hatched. They all also get asin chips. They're not stupid. We just see with the policy flip flopping. They don't know when they're going to get cut off. They're all just hatching with Huawei asin chips while they're getting better. There's something we would just subsidize the transition. Why do we do this? That's the thing which I'm borrowing about here. It's just a case that Huawei will get better. They will produce better chips. I think these chips will be significantly worse and and significant less quality in the US, but they will get better, and that's the thing we all need to acknowledge.

23:16And there was a policy at some point, which was made, which just told Huawei, they will need to produce their own chips, right? And that's just a pathway going down here, and I think there's like no going back here. The question's like, what do we do in a meanwhile? Right? And how big would a gap potentially be? And I'm a firm believer that this would be quite a massive gap, which will have big impact on AI competition. And I think that is one of the key lines of debate, but also empirical questions that's hard to really research or get hard data on, which is the decisions of the private tech firms in China, the Alibaba's, the Tencent's and others.

23:56Because the extent that you're right that there's a meaningful quality difference between Nvidia and Huawei GPUs, for example, they got a strong incentive to build as much as possible on Nvidia. So you can see an argument that says, well, they're going to buy a Sands book, sort of put them in the closet or not, I take them seriously because they want to build their products. But you're saying, no, that's probably not the case because even those firms, which don't have a strong incentive on their own to help out Huawei, do in the context of potential future export controls and loss of access to Nvidia chips.

24:30and so the argument that controls a line, the incentives of 10 cents and Iberba with Huawei and the Chinese state, you think those incentives are already at this point for your land? Yeah, I think so. I think more importantly here, we should just always, I mean, let's work through the arguments for it. Yeah, arguments in favor of selling H20, and I think that's the same debate to be had here, right? On the other side, I think it's sometimes lacking some technical details here. I think the market argument is a fair argument, right? just like you want to maintain for a video bigger market chain reduced demand for Huawei.

25:04I just don't think that's the case, right? It's an existential priority for China to produce the semiconductor industry. And importantly, it's unlike the semiconductor industry, it only gets better because of the iChips. The majority of chips the world produces are not iChips. Who's producing at the advanced node, at most advanced node, at SMIC, but also at TSMC? It's Apple, right? Usually we produce mobile phones first there, so they're pushing it forward anyways for the newest Huawei smartphone that produce probably soon something like a six nanometer node, which will then be leveraged to produce better AI chips.

25:36So even if you reduce the market demand right now, semiconductors will get better and these will lead to better AI chips eventually, if they're dangerous like transition to this. And then also what is the tech stack argument here? Sure, we keep them hooked on CUDA, and it's a pain to go from CUDA to the mind -spot to the Huawei ecosystem. And I think we can model this as like one -time transition costs. Many rare companies have done this. Google switched to GPUs at some point, right? And Propic right now is using the training chips on AWS. I think they pay a significant amount of cost to you to switching and like running these different hardware steaks, but eventually they're doing it, right?

26:13And they've also eventually do it with Huawei. And it's not like if you use CUDA, your systems are not more aligned, you know? Like if you would sell them AI systems, who don't spit on CCP propaganda. I'm in favor of that. That's like spreading American values, liberal values, right? That seems fine. But if you would be just selling them chips, there are no values, no constraints, which convivce selling chips. You can just do whatever you want on it, right? And I think that's again, where I'm just like, it's missing this text that component, and we kind of got it right in the UAE. Sell them the cloud, let Microsoft build here.

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26:45Versus here, we just sell the underlying component that can build whatever they want on top of it. And I think that's just missing the debate. You've made it 30 minutes into a podcast about age 20s. Do you want to do this full time? Do I have the opportunity for you? The Horizon Fellowship provides a direct path into the world of emerging tech policy, a fully funded placement at a federal agency Congressional Office, or Think Tank in DC for up to two years. For its 2026 cohort, Horizon is actively seeking candidates with expertise on China's technology ecosystem, its policy landscape, and broader strategic goals.

27:17prior technical or policy experience is not required. Join a community of over 80 fellows working on some of today's most pressing issues that I can personally vouch for having met a good chunk of them are some of the smartest minds working on these topics in DC. The application deadline is August 28th. Check the show notes for a link to learn more and apply. I think this is a key aspect to the export control debate, which is fascinating a lot of people don't get. It's that if you restrict sales of tools, then you hurt the tool makers, but you help the users of those tools. And so in the chip industry, if you sell fewer lithography tools, it's bad news for ASMR, but it's actually probably good in the long run for DSMC and other companies that face less Chinese competition.

27:58Similarly, if you sell GPUs to China, it's bad news for GPU sellers, or it's good news for GPU sellers, but bad news for USAI firms who face stronger competition. And so one of the kind of strategic questions is, which level do you try to cut off? And the US, as I guess, decided until recently cut off at multiple levels and is now shifting, we'll see where we're next week, but this week it seems like it shifted towards a policy of self -adduced GPUs, but keep the controls under the chip -making tools. Which makes sense, right? Like, if we would be vera's selling them extremely ultra -wide and photography machines on my SNL, it would be way more than a rem -pitch than selling them AI chips, right?

28:38And I would still complain more or if you start selling them black wells, over eights, 20s. Right, so I think that's a fair debate to be should be having you. People can fall on different types of positions here. And again, we can disagree on some arguments here and like again, yeah. And then you have like these different types of control to check if we've each other and the eye chips are the first ones to fall, I think that makes sense. So yeah, so one of the arguments is that if you make China addicted to AI chips, you gain long -term leverage. And I think like the mental model that people think of here as well, if you get them using UV lithography tools, they don't have their own ecosystem, and it takes a decade to try to replicate your own tools.

29:17So maybe this is going for a letter. Does the same dynamic hold here or is not why? What are the differences? Yeah, I guess they're many different facets being addicted to something, right? I mean, in the ideal case, it just means all Chinese firms are like really reluctant to adopt Chinese chips, right? And therefore, they have like less revenue, You smickers wondering nobody wants to buy their chips and then set all the chaniers them just buy US chips. I already talked upon how just like, smick and smick and nut that gets anyways independent of AI, right? But it's a fair thing to say, like the less people use like Huawei's AI software ecosystem, the worse it is.

29:53I think that's a fair argument to be ate. I just think they know they want to produce it anyways. They just know we need our own AI chips at some point. They're not full steam on this. I think they could go strong if they wanted to. Maybe they're full steam on it, but they're just don't do better for many reasons. So like them using the US tech right now, I think like maybe delays it to some of you even subsidize it. Let's just think about, I don't know, Volkswagen, you know, my German heritage. They're left to surpass the China. How's this going right now? Did this stop BID? Not really, right?

30:23And I expect like the share of Volkswagen has been short to China, right? The future will be low. The argument to be made here, they made a ton of money in the meantime. And I think that's a fair argument to be made. The reason why I just feel nervous about AI chips is, will you supplement, you'd increase the total compute, deployment, training capacity in the time? If, again, let's just say, AGI is a singular point, AIs, just not gonna meta the nice five years, then all we discuss here doesn't meta that much, right? Because the good thing about AI chips is they get exponentially better. We're not gonna talk about H20s in five, six years from now, because we have exponentially better chips already here, right?

30:57So I think that's an argument, we can just say, like, don't worry, man, we just sell them, we make some money, they get a little bit better AI, but AI is not going to be decisive in the next four to five years, but then later, ideally then later we stop it, right? And we don't sell them, we have like better chips, which are like exponentially better. Again, it goes back, where do we draw the threshold? And when and how does AI matter, which is a diffuse question, right? And I'm pretty uncertain view here. I was like, man, AI could be really big deal in the next three to four years. It seems likely it's going to be a big deal, bigger or less big, depending on how it goes, from just like, like, transformative economic growth, being like, determined the future of the military up to, just gonna fizzle out, right?

31:39And I think we should address this uncertainty here. I'll just work on national security risk and I'm trying to minimize downside risks, right? And I don't see the benefits here in the long run that why we should sell them. So fair argument, I think there's some good arguments here, but overall, I think it doesn't cut it at least for me. When you look at some companies, it's a really big deal, having Chinese market access. In video, it is, excuse me, until 35 % of their revenue is selling CPUs into China. This was a big deal for the tool manufacturers. In some years, it was 30%, 40 % over the past few years.

32:15In videos of $4 trillion company, they will be just fine. And still be able to deliver you that exponential curve of rapidly improving AI chips, even without the extra $10 billion of sales. I guess there's the maximalist version of this question of like, okay, you are 100 % sure that AI is not matter, does not matter, and is not a sort of strategic technology. Then yeah, sell it, go crazy, do whatever you want with it. But it is a, it's like a, it's a tricky line of thought. We're like, A, you know, we're writing an AI action plan where we wanna make AI dominance. We think this is gonna usher in a new golden age.

33:00But we're willing to like take some of this downside risk that we're making it easier on a China which we've identified as a like, like major strategic threat in order to, I don't know what, I mean, we're still, yeah. Well, it's like, okay, so if we do think this is a big chip, like there is a broader context of the relationship that you can try to trade things in, right? And to say, we wanted them to scuttle some submarines or, you know, stop messing with the Philippines. Or, I don't know, there's just, there are lots of other asks you can make from a sort of like balance of power, regional dynamics perspective that you could have put on this.

33:59And it's kind of wild that it didn't even seem to be in the context of the debate, of this sort of discussion between the US, trying to trade deal, but was just like a decision that Trump made independently because Jensen got to him and we wanted to have like good vibes in the relationship. And the 15 % tax we're putting on it, I mean, is it just going to like pay off the national debt? I mean, what if it went to like buy drones for Taiwan or to sort of shore up, you know, go into funding BIS so they could do a better job of tracking down all the chips that are getting leaked out into China. You know, there are some sort of lines of this where if you really are going to follow the like, okay, like we're all right with the premise that like China is a strategic threat and we got to kind of watch and hopefully shape just how much they're going to gain on the US from a sort of relative technological competition perspective.

35:00Like there are other moves you can do to make it more, to sort of like use this card more in your favor than just like letting the other side pocket it. I think, I think John, that's an excellent point, right? And we would just have like more insight here. Because what we've seen so far is they trained to get sold again, then postdocs somebody said it was part of the trade talks are just denied it. Then the Chinese came out denying it was part of the trade talks, right? And eventually, what I don't like about it, X -Pong Road was a national security thing. When the diffusion frame where I came out, and there were certain kinds of like Poland, Switzerland, in this tier two, many were complaining, like you're dividing European trade union.

35:44But it's a national security thing. It's not a trade deal we're doing here. This was at least where X -Pong Road originally came from. And now we're mixing them with this trade things, and now we get 50 % of the revenue share. And amazing, let's pay off the debt, let's do other great things. I don't think National Security for sale here. If we would get other national security consultations here in return, that'd be amazing. It would just be nice to hear more and communicate about this. There's definitely things where people like me and Arvus are willing to walk back hell yeah. Let's sell in the age 20 because we got a beautiful deal out of it.

36:16I just don't think 15 % of the sales is makes the cut here. Just money. Money doesn't help you. They get the computing power. You make money. You might even make more money because there is and video making money and maybe Microsoft or your favorite hyperscaler in between, why you still have more control and more leverage. So I still generally think, I think many just miss the point. You don't need chips like in your basement to run them. You just access them remotely. And so they could literally dial in. They could dial in our beautiful new UAE 5 gigabot cluster or dial in in the US and like existing cloud providers.

36:48And then in the future, a case they go rogue or you really want to make sure it doesn't go to certain military linked entities. You just have way more leverage. And I think that if we do the concessions, we talked about the different things you want to walk back. Before you sell chips, just tell them you can use the cloud, which is by the way perfectly legal as we're speaking right now. So if they really want to the computing power, use our cloud. It's totally legal. You can go for it. We still make money. So I just can put an economy dynamic here, which let me think you're referencing, which is getting back to if you sell the tools, you enable the chip maker, if you enable chip makers, that type of competitive dynamic.

37:25And what we've seen is GPU sellers in video, I think most prominent, be very vocal on this issue. We haven't seen hyperscalers be vocal at all, even though I think one should conclude this implies more competition for them. And then we've seen mixed responses from AI model companies. I think Anthropic has been pretty vocal opposed. I haven't seen OpenAI. And so it strikes me that companies that have a lot of stake have been taking very different strategies, some being vocal, some not. I don't know what exactly explains that. More observations. I got an explanation. Go for it. You know what GPUs they are using and videos.

38:03And if you speak out against them, Jensen is going to get you. Right. So if you look at an infrotec who's like slowly migrating to like more Google GPUs and Amazon training, you can see the deals. They can't be got against it where everybody else is like I'm relying on Jensen and I can at least confirm for many Conversations with many people in his companies the only competitor here is AMD right and I think it's only gonna be the market Jeff on the videos only gonna go downhill from here Right the total market will go up. I said big deal But AMD is getting better Google GPU is getting better Microsoft chips getting better Amazon chips getting better We have more and more startups getting better, right?

38:40We just have way way more AI chip competition I think like Nvidia, so to like slightly nervous on all of these issues. And I think I would love to live in a world where Nvidia had a smaller market chance to see what the hyperscalers in the eye companies would say. And I think many of them would actually come out and open the eye, at least came out in favor of ex -pokontrolls historically when they talked about energy dominance and more. And I think right now they're all just all quiet because somebody else might have knocked on the door. It's fascinating in the context of I've got lots of questions of what does industry think.

39:08And of course, you know what you're saying is, well, which part of industry are you looking at? which segment, which is the company's, yeah, fascinating political economy there. Sure, in fact, yeah. Why don't you do the HBM political economy? This has apparently been reported that the Chinese government is asking for a bandwidth memory as part of a concession number two. Maybe like, what would that, what does that tell you, Hunter? That asks. If I'd be running China, I would ask for a high bandwidth memory all the asking for H20s personally, right? because I've got my sovereign drive anyways. I want to build better and better AI chips.

39:45And if I look at my current AI chip industry, I would like to want EUV, but maybe this is too much to ask for, because we did this early on, Trump did it back in the days. But what is the thing we've only recently done is banning high bandwidth memory units. So we got our chip, and next to the chip, we put the memory and these memory units being produced by Samsung and SK Hynix and mycron, they're not allowed to go to China anymore. And we've seen reporting that at least the Chinese, Again, the Chinese put forward could be trade. HBM is still like something we can do here. I hope the US government will draw like a clear red line here.

40:17Right? We talked about how you would walk back things. There are arguments in favor of setting in chips. We talked about them. What we do here is not setting them on chips. What we do here is enabling them building better chips. The best way how the 910c or the 910d, whatever the next chip is, they produce will get better as by having higher bandwidth memory. And right now, China does not have the capacity to use even HBM3, there's reporting about first trial production of HBM3. In contrast, Nvidia and Arras are starting to equip HBM4 and using HBM3E right now. So again, don't get wrong, China will get better, they will eventually use high bandwidth memory.

40:53There's a lot more to be done, we could stop them from producing better memory. But in the meantime, while they're scaling up production and trying to get better at least, we should probably not sell them our high bandwidth memory to make their chips more competitive. because we might regret this in many years when we're then competing of course emerging markets and Huawei has a better chip which can better compete with our chip. And the interesting dynamic, the memory space is that the two of the three producers are not US but Korean. So, again, it's a problem with that. It's also why we see probably tons of smuggling here because it's pretty close by and there's like certain tricks to get more HBM.

41:26So it don't get me wrong, I think China smuggling HBM right now, which is for a cent in a year's. but again, I'm in favor for extent in the gears, and ideally we get better enforcement. So yeah, they get less HPM eventually. Should we switch to the portal to go to me this in China? So July 15th, we get the news that the Trump administration is letting in video start to sell H20s. A week later, MSS publishes a notice to the public saying to be aware of digital spying via foreign produced chips. 10 days later, the CAC, the Cyberspace Administration of China, some of them video representatives, over risks of being able to control a Chinese remotely and accuses them of having.

42:10A kill switch in them, then we have a private leading cybersecurity research firm in China. Tianxian, they publish a report which goes viral talking about all the ways that there could be backdoors. and 10 days after that. So just three days ago, August 9th, we have a state television doing a whole big report talking about how there might be backdoors already in these H 20s. And they cite former China talk guest Tim Fist, CNAS reported on this topic, which he came on to talk about on China talk a few years ago. So you're welcome. I don't know. Chris, what's your, what's your read on this lake?

42:54kind of interesting brushback pitch we've gotten from the central organs about H20s in China. So I think there are three potential explanations, not mutually exclusive. One is that the Chinese security services are paranoid and the discussion in Washington of the CHIP security act, which would mandate geolocation verification, which has been happening simultaneously to the H20 debate. has intensified those concerns. That's explanation one. Explanation two is that it's part of an effort to discourage the private Chinese tech firms from using age 20s and that there are people around Huawei or in the government who are afraid that age 20s will actually take into the market share.

43:42And so this is a way to say buy more Huawei chips as well. And then I think the third explanation is that this is actually pressure on US firms like to say, actually, we need you to do more, or else we're not gonna let you back in the market. We've seen this in other segments of the tech sector, where China will ramp up pressure on a private US firm with the aim of having that firm then try to use its resources to shift the debate in Washington. You could maybe envision the HBM debate being part of what China is looking for, the broader trade negotiations that are underway, but it certainly wouldn't be a very attractive endpoint for Nvidia if they got approval from the US side, then didn't get approval from the Chinese side to sell.

44:25So perhaps China thinks it has some leverage there. How exactly do you attribute these three causes? I'm not exactly sure what the shares I would put on each of them, but they both seem, or all three of them seem potentially relevant. Do we need to be talked about also put out guidance a while ago on energy efficiency? This was actually shortly in April or May when they age 20 was so no sorry even before so when the age 20 was so solved before it got banned initially they put out guidance that the age 20 is famously pretty energy inefficient if you look at flops right because of the x -pok control bandwidths and basically I don't know exactly what this guidance means but basically this courageous companies from using it I guess nobody's been following it because not they're buying it and they're all up in the single millions the ship but I think it feeds into the same never to fear, right?

45:13Just like you're trying to push certain companies or you create artificial demand for like some Huawei chips, like slowly tell them like, hey guys, at some point we want to do all the way and own AI chips, right? And I think that's crystal saying I think all of these stories are simultaneously, too, right? I think it all just makes sense and there's like no big downside for them to do these kinds of things, only benefits. But actually there was a steam media source, I don't know if it's going to be a rough seem Jordan, but one of its criticisms of the age 20 was that it was environmentally and fluently, unfriendly.

45:39Yeah, no, they cite this exact NDRC line that Leonard talked about how the goal is five tariff flops, or half a tariff flop per watt, and the H20 can only give you 0 .3 seven. So it's pretty bad. Pretty environment unfriendly for training, but pretty damn environment friendly for deployment of AI chips, way better than any Huawei chip, I can tell you that. I mean, I think like here's a moment where some mirroring might be in order. we've just had an hour -long conversation about how messy and convoluted and sort of like how many conflicting priorities we have in American policy towards artificial intelligence.

46:18And like, the same thing is happening in all these different ministries in China. And you know, this is big news. This is like a change in the landscape and people want to, you know, people want to have they're saying make their stamp on it. So you don't necessarily need to sort of like attribute some like forgy chassis like, oh, now's the time to squeeze them. But like, I'm sure the people in the MSS red Tim's thing and are like, oh, this would be really stupid if we bought all these chips only for them to turn into, you know, bricks or like spy on us or like have bombs in them that are going to blow up like beepers and Lebanon or something.

46:59I'm sure folks in CAC feel the same way. And then the same debate that we've been having for the past hour of, oh, is it sort of net positive or net negative for domestic self -sufficiency to have a sort of competitor to Huawei potentially take a big chunk of the market domestically is something that's being played out in China. So I agree with you that like at a broad level, now is the bright time to ask for more stuff from Nvidia. Now that they've gotten the green light and there is this kind of, you know, $10, $15 billion of demand and these chips sitting on a lot somewhere in Taiwan that they're really excited to ship out to say, hey, you know, you better step it up or cut the price or, you know, do an extra screen to make sure there aren't any guilt switches on it or whatever you know, the way this is playing out on Twitter is, oh, trying to say they don't want them.

48:01That means we should definitely sell them. I don't think it is necessarily dispositive just reading that Chinese state media or state organs are saying something means it is true. I mean, there is, it's not that hard to play the, what's not even give this credit for 40s, chess. This is just 2d chess, I was saying, oh, no, we're worried about the chips. We don't even want them chips. that changes the political economy of the debate in Washington where it makes selling these chips potentially easier to go down. So that's also something to watch out for as we see the Chinese government saying, ah, no, we didn't really want these all that much.

48:37This isn't actually a big concession. We're kind of worried about the knock, the second order effects of this. But the fact is people like the demand is not going anywhere. Like it's not like And Alibaba is not going to buy these chips because of these sort of warnings. I think Alibaba would be pretty sad if they suddenly only need to rely on other inferior chips where they can't produce enough of them. Ideally, if I were on the Chinese government, I would put out so many relations that I can sell all of the Huawei chips I can produce and then fill the rest with some nice Nvidia chips here. But I think also it's interesting, I think there's just some misunderstanding about the chip security act is supposed to do in location verification.

49:20The idea is not to check if a chip is, well, the idea is to check if a chip is in China and then we have a problem, right? So the idea is like we put this tracker on a chip in Malaysia, Singapore, wherever you think there be Smuggling, then check they don't end up in China, right? So this was never supposed to be going chips which go to China because ideally we don't have any chips going to China, at least not to advance ones, right? So this is an interesting confusion, right? Like this holy bait of this hardware and it will make a nice location verification was big in the UAE and Saudi Arabia and Singapore and Malaysia, fall of these smuggling hotspots, which people were worried about.

49:53And again, I think some people have been pushing, and I think if you think about, if you know, stop selling chips, I'm arguing we should sell them cloud. That's one line before. People go out and say, we can't sell them chips, but put something on the chip, right? But like, just knowing a chip is now in China, and we know it's in dislocation, and the city of it, how does this help us again here? Again, everybody can dial in remotely even if it sits at 10 cent who says that the PLA is not using it. You can just dial in remotely. So I don't know what's going on there after some misinterpretation of documents, just some vibes.

50:25It's a confusing status. You've previously made a point about Intel, which I think is an interesting one. We were saying Intel made a lot of money in China. And Intel is still allowed to sell their CPUs and Intel's CPUs share in China is only going down. And I think we will see the same with them video on the i chips, basically, even if you allow to sell, your share will potentially go down. Why is this a case? There is similar guidance, for example, for all government computers, to go to a homegrown domestic produced chips. We can't trust Intel any more on this, right? We will see the same on AI chips.

50:57So yes, Intel made a lot of money in China, but the share is going down over time, and they're pushing on the self -reliance, basically, to produce their own AI chips. And they also name security concerns here, right? That's why the government is coming first. I don't know the exact numbers of Intel's sales right now in China and how much money they're making there, but I'm pretty confident it's been going down and the government is not buying any more Intel chips because they just put out the Skyldens here. So we've seen this playbook playing out before, right? The only difference is now we have this confusion with which chips are allowed to be sold, which ones are not to be sold and how good are they actually, right?

51:30But the story's nothing new. Can we talk about all we know in terms of the big buyers of AI chips in China and their relationship with the state. So you got the private, you know, quote unquote private tech firms, Bob and Tencent. You've got the AI labs, deep seek most prominently. I don't know what Leonard Jordan was you have a view here, but one of the key questions seems to be how, what is their relationship with the state today and how is it changing? And to what extent should we see them as, you know, our model of the state is certainly not accurate. Totally independent and certainly not accurate.

52:04there's a spectrum. And so to what extent are these political priorities shaping their procurement decisions? Look, there was reporting which was clearly sourced by the intelligence community over the past few years that after the MSS hack of the SF86. So that's the form you submit to the US government when you want a security clearance which like talks about you which basically like you try to It's your like confession of sorts to the Catholic Church, where you talk about all your divorces and all your debt and everything that a foreign intelligence community might want to know about you. That data was actually that the MSS tapped Alibaba and by dance engineers to sort of like put into a more useful format.

52:57So like we've just seen over the past few weeks reporting from business insider about a public tender from some corner of the PLA that wanted H20 to do whatever they wanted to do with it. I used to be more sanguine on this type of thing, but I think there's, again, this is the due and the US technology to beat out other dual -use technology. So it just seems to me to be a little preposterous that in so far as this is a strategic resource that the Chinese government would not be able to leverage data centers that are living in China that the US did not have any sort of kill switches or on ship governance on in order to do whatever they want to do with it, whether that's build a surveillance system or help with weapons manufacturing.

53:54And to be clear, the Pentagon has now signed a $200 million contract with OpenAI, and this is just the beginning. So clearly, this stuff is useful that we're willing to pay a lot of money to get it into the Pentagon in one form or another. So if what we're sort of convinced with, if what you find what Leonard says is convincing is that you're selling a lot of H20s, like materially raises the amount of sort of like usable functional compute that can be put into anything in China, it would be really surprising for me if you didn't have the Chinese government wants to take out these new toys for it.

54:45If you didn't have this sort of Chinese military police complex, want to take these new tools out for a spin. So I think there's kind of two points you get out of my eyes. So one is if AI tools exist, will the military use them? And I think the obvious answer is yes there. But if you're a data center procurement official or executive at Alibaba Cloud, To what extent is your decision making there shaped by what you read in state media versus what your boss tells you to build an effective cloud which case maybe a 20s or your best option versus the sense yeah, how do we think about The those are the people who are gonna decide how many attempts to buy right unless they're getting addicted We may be are from the top now I guess like the the sort of counter example I'm thinking myself is you know There was a time when parts and maybe still don't know parts of the US military were using Chinese drones not because there was a policy in Chinese drones because they didn't have any U .S.

55:45drones. And so is there a scenario in which like your procurement executive at Alibaba is just gonna ignore the sense because they're told to build a good day center? Yeah, I think at some level, yes. I mean, these are companies that report quarterly earnings that pay their employees based on how well the company reforms, right? And people get stock options. So I think by and large, the incentives of the people who are buying these chips is to, drive the most revenue for the money you're spending on your cat -backs. But it only goes so far. And I do think that there is this sort of broader strategic realization, which you don't need Beijing to tell you, right?

56:38is that this is like a, this is, you know, this door can be closed at any time. And it's even more Beijing. It's closed to the already. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, you know, yeah. I mean, I think maybe now is a interesting moment to sort of talk about this sorts of things that could change the dynamic. We're on now, on chips and sort of on the broader US -China relationship. I mean, we have Congress as a variable. There have been a number of senators and congresspeople who have been like, wait, what are we doing selling these ships to China? I thought we banned and said we're, you know, our golden ticket to the 21st century.

57:21And then I think just because Trump is doing this at such a personal level, like we've seen him turn on Putin, right? And I mean, we've seen him gone from gone from like all Putin to like, we're gonna have some questions about this guy And you know, we'll see what the hell happens in Alaska, but I do think that there is like Jensen saying the wrong thing taking too much of a victory lap or you know, she doing something really obnoxious I mean, there's there are a lot of sort of like personal interpersonal dynamics that could change what the um what the Trump administration ends up doing, which is probably the more relevant variable than whether or not Leonard can convince you that how I can only make ex -evalent gifts.

58:11I agree on that. Yep, yep. It's an interesting moment of time because we just have all of the trade negotiations. So everything is volatile and it's just like certain things are just on the table and they'd be willing to discuss them. And we see the Chinese bringing forward the least of quality reporting, did the of HBM. And it will just be interesting to see that the government is going to say it's going to draw a red line. We had statements before that trade negotiations in London that H20 is above the red line. So they wouldn't negotiate it. And again, we can all try to put together a story what happened to you, what not, if it's part of it.

58:45We won't know for sure. But there will be more discussions about these kinds of things. The Chinese can bring it up. But I am also more interested in the semiconductor manufacturing equipment companies. If Nvidia got this beautiful deal, I know what we're doing. They're all trying to give the president elsewhere a ring. It seems like it's a handful of people are making these decisions. I just hope they're well informed of which things are more important. If I see any news about EUV machines being so -called China, I'm probably going to get a heart attack and I just really don't want to say that.

59:15I think just from a personal transaction perspective, there isn't someone in the semi -capitum equipment ecosystem that Trump's gonna give the time of day, like he felt like he had to with Jensen because this is like America's most important CEO. I don't think any of those folks have this sort of like panache and skill to make it work. And even Ben Thompson, who I gave a hard time for earlier in this podcast understands very clearly that there's a lot of downside risk in sailing, more tools to try and then we already have. I would go even so far. It wouldn't be good for Yensen if Huawei is not good at producing your chips.

1:00:00So it wouldn't be at any interest to say like, hey, yeah, let's make sure we set them all up chips. Really, let's make sure to hit them on every single dimension we can to make sure Huawei is just less competitive. I would love to see that. This would be at least a good part of the story here. I think we're going to Congress. I think Congress will be interesting to watch on this issue. because the trending Congress has been, Congress has vocally pushed for tougher controls, both in the first administration and under Biden, not universally, but I think that's been the predominant push. And so now I think we'll, we're just going to watch Senator Cotton, for example, and what he does, it does not say publicly on this issue.

1:00:43Chris, do you want to sort of tie the, you know, he's out the Russia comparison a little bit? I mean, Congress like really not happy. They ended up putting some sanctions on the table. What was the, what, what are the dynamics been there over the past six months? Well, I guess the last six months in Russia have seen Congress officially not play much role at all. They put sanctions legislation on the table and pulled a back action if you're Trump requested it. But I, I think I would say there's been a number of Republican senators who have been influential in shaping Trump's thinking. Lindsey Graham, for example, seems to have played a role in shaping Trump's thinking on Putin or the last six months and the way that Putin is stringing along.

1:01:24Now, we're going to Alaska later this week and maybe all that will prove irrelevant if Trump changes his mind, but it does seem like you could argue that even though Congress has done nothing on Russia, in fact, it has helped change thinking in the White House. I wonder if this is going to be true here, but this seems like a place where Trump's going to make more of his own decisions, especially as far as it intersects with the China trade negotiations, which seems like it pay well. Yeah, and it's kind of a less salient thing than a land war. There's no domestic... Land -revested constituency.

1:01:58Just weirdo's tech, national security podcasts.

1:02:04Other stuff we should get to. Leonard, do you have anything to say about the... But before this week, it was reported that in videos coming out with a downgraded version of some new downgraded chip, post -H20. But I guess that's not relevant. Oh, yeah, the B40 or B30, I think. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's not relevant because of the H20. It's unclear, right? If people, we flip flopped a decision on the H20, but, notably, there is still a license requirement, right? So, and VD got the license granted. So, if they wanted to go all the way back, they could have removed the license requirement, right?

1:02:38So from October 2023 to April 2025, there was no license requirement. Then they introduced the license requirement, which is still intact. The only thing which happened as of speaking last Friday is they granted the licenses, according to reporting. So if they still want to sell a chip which is not subject to expo controls, they would produce a new chip called B30 before B40. It needs to be loaded computational power threshold, so the same as the H20. and also a lower memory bandwidth. And according to the reporting, I think FT leak, what is in this, and form later, it needs to be less than 1 .4 terabyte per second memory bandwidth.

1:03:16Again, the H20Z4 terabyte per second, right? So the B40 would then probably not use HBM anymore, but probably in use to like an inferior memory technology, but significantly cheaper, because why use HBM if you can't have that many memory bandwidth? Anyways, a SoCoGGR technology, which we usually use for a graphic GPUs. And again, if people talk about this is only the fourth best chip, I don't think they had 20s to fourth best chip. I think to be 30, be 40, that's a more fair description of a fourth best chip. And I would still not call it an obsolete chip, but it's definitely a worst chip. It's not like, you know, with a chip like again, the US government at least decided, here's where we draw the new lines, this chip is fine to be exported before the license.

1:03:59So it could still be coming. I have not heard this stopping the production there yet. I guess in videos making it calculus right now, on how much demand there is, but it's clear the case dates 20 is better to question us, but all the licenses be granted going forward, right? And Crump has said, or he said at the press conference a couple days ago, that he'll consider a downgraded blackwell. Are there ways we should think about what that might look like if, in fact, the material materializes, of course, with huge questions over whether or not that's actually real. One thing which is out, he said like 30 or 15 to 50 % less performance.

1:04:38And I think what many people are just missing on AI chips and computing, chips get exponentially better. If your chip is 15 % less, that's nothing. That's still the same generation, right? So if you really want to sell worse chips, you need to go back a few generations and then the chip needs to be like seven times worse, not only 50 % or 15%. So there's an argument to be made that you want to sell worse chips, but it's not a little bit of a downgrade. We really need to take the exponential into account. If we trim down a blackwell chip, for example, a B200 by 15 to 50%, still twice or three times as good as the Huawei chip.

1:05:15And again, we can produce millions of them while Huawei has struggled, according to reporting producing 200 ,000 this year. So again, that's just a key thing to get right here. And yeah, people keep in mind the exponentials here. Like chips get exponentially better. 15 to 50 % trim is nothing. And the grand scheme of things. And I would at least, yeah, make my voice heard to say, this is probably not a good idea of what you'll be doing here. The government two lines before and the lines are way lower. And I think that's where it should be. All right, well, been a long road since October of 2022.

1:05:52Thanks for sticking with us, everyone. This information is for educational purposes only and is not a recommendation to buy, hold, or sell any investment or financial product. This podcast has been produced by a third party and may include pay promotional advertisements, other company references, and individuals unaffiliated with A16Z. Such advertisements, companies, and individuals are not endorsed by AH Capital Management LLC, A16Z, or any of its affiliates. Information is from source's deep reliable on the data publication, but A16Z does not guarantee its accuracy.

From the publisher

We’re sharing an episode from ChinaTalk that dives into one of the biggest recent reversals in U.S. tech policy.

The U.S. banned Nvidia’s H20 AI chips to China in April. Now, just months later, they’re being sold—with a 15% export fee. What happened? Why the reversal? And what does it mean for the future of AI competition between the U.S. and China?

Chris Miller—author of Chip War—and Lennart Heim from RAND join ChinaTalk host Jordan Schneider to unpack the policy flip-flop, why China is publicly downplaying interest in the H20, and why high-bandwidth memory and semiconductor manufacturing tools may be even more important than the Nvidia chips themselves.

Resources:

Listen to more from ChinaTalk: https://link.chtbl.com/chinatalk

Check out the Horizon Fellowship to work in DC on emerging tech policy issues like AI chip export controls: https://horizonpublicservice.org/applications-open-for-2026-horizon-fellowship-cohort/

Outro Music: It's a Shame, The Spinners, 1970

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