In short
Podcast Episode Summary: Nuclear Tensions in the Middle East
Podcast Overview
- Title: The Documentary Podcast
- Description: A platform highlighting global stories, fostering curiosity and understanding through documentary storytelling from the BBC World Service.
Episode Details
- Title: Nuclear Tensions in the Middle East
- Description: This episode discusses the resurgence of nuclear fears in the Middle East, tracing the roots of nuclear ambitions in the region and examining the implications of recent geopolitical events, particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Key Themes
- Global Security Landscape Transformation
- Russia's invasion of Ukraine has reignited fears of a new nuclear arms race reminiscent of the Cold War.
- The invasion has implications far beyond Europe, touching the Middle East's nuclear aspirations and security concerns.
- Historical Context of Nuclear Ambitions in the Middle East
- Iran's nuclear program has origins dating back to the 1950s under the Shah.
- Nuclear ambitions have been driven by a desire for energy independence and international prestige.
- Nuclear Doctrine of Iran
- The Shah's initial push for nuclear power faced U.S. concerns about proliferation.
- Post-Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini banned the development of nuclear weapons, shaping Iran's nuclear narrative around peaceful energy use.
- Tensions arose due to clandestine nuclear programs and continuous scrutiny from foreign nations.
- Impact of the Iraq War and U.S. Policies
- The U.S. invasion of Iraq and its aftermath influenced Iran's perception of its own security and nuclear aspirations.
- Iran temporarily suspended uranium enrichment in hopes of negotiating a favorable nuclear deal.
- Recent Developments and JCPOA
- The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) allowed limited enrichment under international oversight but was undermined by the U.S. withdrawal in 2018.
- Iran has since escalated its enrichment activities, nearing weapons-grade levels, leading to heightened tensions with Israel and the West.
- Israel's Nuclear Posture
- Israel's nuclear capabilities remain ambiguous, primarily employing a strategy of deterrence.
- Iran's threats have driven Israel to preemptively act against perceived nuclear threats, culminating in recent military actions against Iran's facilities.
- Regional Dynamics and Saudi Arabia's Position
- Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions are influenced by the rivalry with Iran and its own energy needs.
- The kingdom's potential acquisition of nuclear capabilities raises concerns about regional stability and arms proliferation.
- Turkey’s Nuclear Status
- Turkey hosts U.S. nuclear weapons but also expresses intentions to develop its own capabilities in light of regional threats.
- The relationship with the U.S. remains complex, particularly in the context of Turkey's ambitions and its historical ties to Russia.
Key Takeaways
- The Middle East is experiencing a profound shift in nuclear dynamics, with various nations re-evaluating their security policies in response to regional threats and global tensions.
- The historical context of nuclear ambitions significantly shapes current narratives and policies, reflecting deep-seated fears and aspirations among Middle Eastern countries.
- Ongoing geopolitical developments, especially related to Iran and Israel, suggest that nuclear tensions in the region will likely continue to escalate, impacting international relations and security frameworks.
Contributors
- Barry Sadeed: Insights on Iran's nuclear history and current status.
- Shaina Oppenheimer: Analysis of Israel's nuclear doctrine and recent military actions.
- Florence Dixon: Examination of Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions and regional shifts.
- Nihan Kale: Overview of Turkey's nuclear posture and complexities in U.S.-Turkey relations.
Closing Remarks This episode of The Documentary Podcast provides a comprehensive look at the evolving nuclear tensions in the Middle East, emphasizing the need for continued vigilance and dialogue in a region marked by profound historical and contemporary complexities.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00This BBC podcast is supported by ads outside the UK. We focus on the part of the internet that most people don't know about. It's called the dark web. Undercover in the furthest corners of the dark web, US special agents are on a mission to locate and rescue children from abuse. Move in now. Police! From the BBC World Service, World of Secrets, the darkest web follows their shocking investigations. Search for World of Secrets wherever you get your BBC podcasts.
0:59and how to make those markets work for you. Follow Merin Talks Money on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen.
1:14Russia's invasion of Ukraine hasn't just threatened to redraw the map of Europe, it has transformed the global security landscape. The ripple effects have been felt way beyond the continent, reigniting fears not felt since the Cold War of a new nuclear arms race. Ukraine always comes up as an example for Iranian media when they're talking about the benefit of a nuclear program around the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Iran hadn't fully begun secretly aiding Russia, and there was a lot of sympathetic reactions from newspapers in terms of Ukraine as a nation that was having its sovereignty violated.
1:55And the reason Ukraine was being invaded was that it had given up its own nuclear capacity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, independent Ukraine inherited the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. The presidents of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, and the prime minister of the United Kingdom will now sign the Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine. The country gave up its nuclear arms in exchange for international security guarantees to protect it from an attack, known as the Budapest Memorandum. But it ultimately failed to protect Ukraine.
2:41For Iranian media outlets, it's an example of a sovereign nation that basically exposed itself to attack by giving up its own nuclear deterrence in exchange for what came to be meaningless international guarantees for its safety and security. In this episode of The Global Jigsaw, we take stock of the nuclear narratives in the Middle East. We go back to the beginnings of nuclear ambitions in the region, the doctrines built on ever-growing suspicions and fears to weigh up the consequences for the world today.
3:17Welcome to the documentary from the BBC World Service. I'm Krasi Ivanova-Twig, and this is the global jigsaw from BBC Monitoring, where we look at the world through the lens of its media, exploring the narratives, the propaganda and the disinformation. Radio Tehran. We didn't get on the territory of Ukraine. Western countries are not the international community. That era has finished.
3:48The words Iran and nuclear seem almost inseparable in the news. Iran's nuclear ambitions date back to the 1950s, well before the Islamic Revolution, when the highest authority was not the Ayatollah, but a certain Shah. Mohammed Reza Patlawi. Barry Sadeed from BBC Monitoring's Iran team will trace Tehran's nuclear path, starting from an Iran that was very different from the one we know today. Iran was a relatively pro-Western country. And at the time, the Shah's justification was probably a similar justification for a lot of oil-rich countries today which want to pursue nuclear power, like Saudi Arabia, for example.
4:29Fossil fuels are a finite resource. And on the other hand, it's being part of the so-called nuclear club to claim that level of international prestige by having the capability, but also the autonomy to be able to develop a nuclear capacity, control over the full nuclear fuel cycle, from mining uranium to developing it, to processing it, to enriching it, using it for nuclear energy and then disposing of it. The country that dropped the first atomic bomb in the world was quick to step on the brakes. The US, who was selling around these reactors and wanted to apply some conditions, was worried about proliferation.
5:04And what's significant is how the Shah's rhetoric mirrors that of the Islamic Republic today, because both point to the NPT, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Iran was one of the first signatories to, which Iran uses to justify its right to specifically enriching uranium, articulating this kind of language of rights. We have a right to nuclear power. We are a powerful country. We are a regional leader, and therefore we deserve nuclear energy. Whether Tehran had ambitions beyond meeting its energy needs is one of the many unknowns in this story. Iran has always stressed that their nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only and never about nuclear weapons.
5:47The only Iranian leader in history to briefly claim that Iran wanted nuclear weapons was actually Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the ex-shah of Iran who was overthrown in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
6:04The first supreme leader, Ayatollah Raul Khomeini, was dead opposed to the development of nuclear weapons soon after the Islamic Revolution followed the Iran-Iraq war.
6:20In about 1983, there were already factions within the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and its military bodies. And we actually have reports of these officers approaching Khomeini and saying that we can start developing chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons to counter the Iraqi threat. Khomeini, up until his death, said, we, the Islamic Republic, will never develop weapons of mass destruction. It's un-Islamic. He forbades these factions of the military from developing any kind of weapons of mass destruction. This ideological decision from on high had a real material impact on the war, because Iraq continued to use these chemical weapons.
6:58And that was one of the reasons that Iran was forced to, in Khamenei's words, drink the poison chalice and to sue for peace and a ceasefire in 1988. And that opposition from that supreme leader level continued under Khamenei and was formalized when he issued a binding religious ruling of Fatwa.
7:21Where he basically banned Iran from developing any kind of nuclear weapons. Few things can carry more weight in an Islamic society than a fatwa. So if we take Iran's theocratic leaders at their word, there's nothing to worry about. Yet Western suspicion may have been justified. The International Atomic Energy Agency too had its doubts. Nothing official, but there are reports coming from Iran around the Armad program, a clandestine nuclear weapons program. There were factions, there were people who were actively considering developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent. The Armad program lasted until 2003, the year of the Iraq invasion.
8:03The US invasion of Iraq was launched by President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks in pursuit of Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction. They turned out to be elusive. And their absence inspired a philosophical digression by then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, which quickly achieved meme immortality. As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns. The ones we don't know, we don't know. The Iraq war toppled Saddam.
8:47According to conservative estimates, at least 100 ,000 people were killed. All the while, Tehran watched from the sidelines, drawing its own conclusions. The possibility of Iran being invaded, that fear felt very real amongst Iran's establishment. And in 2003, that's when Iran voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment in order to engage in negotiations over its nuclear program. The official fatwa came out from Khamenei in 2005, at which point Iran was already engaged in this kind of diplomatic wrangling with the West. Iran was talking of having the right as a signatory to the NPT to join the so-called nuclear club to be able to develop its nuclear energy in line of international law.
9:33Has that changed, though, since 2005? Absolutely. There's media, low-level officials, MPs, who are arguing for a change to Iran's nuclear doctrine.
9:49Right now we're talking from the vantage point of the aftermath of the Iran-Israel war, where Iran was attacked on its soil for the first time since 1988. Existential fears around the survival of the Islamic Republic have definitely been revived. And it's known within Iran that possessing a nuclear deterrent could be one means to deter that existential threat. But for much of the outside world, the idea of Iran possessing a nuclear deterrent was, and still is, out of the question. You might remember the drawn-out negotiations a decade ago that led to the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the Iran deal.
10:33What the JCPOA achieved was that Iran was able to enrich uranium at quite low levels, the minimum needed for nuclear energy. That's 3.67%. And it had the most supervised nuclear program in the world. in the minds of the Iranian establishment and probably Iranians themselves, Iran had asserted itself as a power on the world stage and managed to secure a longstanding desire of a peaceful nuclear program. The lifting of international sanctions and prestige, Iran becoming a normal member of the international community, but one that had that exclusive, if very controlled and vetted right to nuclear power and nuclear energy.
11:12Then in 2018, President Donald J. Trump, Still in his first term, withdrew the United States from the JCPOA. The Iran deal is defective at its core. If we do nothing, we know exactly what will happen. In just a short period of time, the world's leading state sponsor of terror will be on the cusp of acquiring the world's most dangerous weapons. Sanctions relief was really meaningless. without the meaningful involvement of the US Treasury. Since then, Iran began to engage in a series of very open, very theatrical, escalating announcements of its enrichment of uranium. The deal had capped Iran's enrichment at about 3.67%.
12:04The amount you would need to produce a nuclear weapon would be 90%. Iran so far has reached up until about 60%. And this, to varying degrees, was under the supervision of the IAEA. Tehran probably thought that telling the world what it was up to was a smart move, perhaps even a bargaining chip. This was in an effort to force the US back to the negotiating table and to also force the European powers into meaningful concessions. Once the US had imposed sanctions, it was as if all of the parties had reimposed sanctions because it's really the US Treasury that matters here. Every private company, every government lives in fear of the US Treasury.
12:45And once a country has been sanctioned, it makes trade at even the most granular levels incredibly difficult. And it's that fear itself that keeps the international system in check. Or at least that's how it's seen in Tehran. Fast forward to June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency made an announcement that put Iran on the defensive. Just thus tensions with Israel were reaching boiling point. The Board of Governors adopted a resolution finding Iran in non-compliance of its nuclear safeguard obligations for the first time since 2005. And the resolution mentioned that Iran had stock-powered 400 kilograms of uranium enriched that 60%, which the IAEA estimated would be enough for nine nuclear weapons.
13:31The day before Israel launched its attacks on Iran and Iran's nuclear infrastructure, Iran was officially condemned by the IAEA. So with this provocative behavior, they miscalculated really and provoked what they feared the most, an attack. Exactly. And for Iran's hardliners in particular, there's an irony here because they believe that if they actually had nuclear weapons, they wouldn't have been attacked. And that's what's fueling these calls for a change to the nuclear doctrine.
14:04We focus on the part of the internet that most people don't know about. It's called the dark web. Undercover, in the furthest corners of the dark web, US special agents are on a mission to locate and rescue children from abuse. Move in now. From the BBC World Service, World of Secrets, the darkest web follows their shocking investigations. Search for World of Secrets wherever you get your BBC podcasts.
14:58and how to make those markets work for you. Follow Merrin Talks Money on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen. You're listening to the documentary from the BBC World Service. It might be time to enrich our vocabulary with some technical terms to help understand the situation and how Iran may have misread the room. Nuclear latency means the theoretical capability to produce a nuclear weapon without actually having one. And the ability to strategically wield this kind of latency is called nuclear hedging. And what I imagine a lot of people in the establishment thought was that just by having this kind of nuclear capacity to use it to throw their weight around on the world stage without actually having developed a nuclear weapon, that wagers failed.
15:46That's the irony of Iran's halfway position of pursuing nuclear latency, nuclear hedging without actual nuclear weapon.
16:00And the US, and now the European powers as well, actually, adamantly opposed to Iran having the capacity to enrich uranium on its own soil. That enrichment has become the new red line. It seems Iran's attempt to taunt Western powers with its growing nuclear capabilities has backfired. And that's a problem for a country in genuine need of energy. Iran faces terrible issues when it comes to its electricity supply. We've seen that especially this summer because of the climate change, because of the heat waves, electricity demand typically goes soaring and that's when we see the most severe blackouts.
16:38We've seen literal shutdowns of government offices and this is with Iran being a huge producer of oil and gas and that's because a lot of Iran's oil and gas goes for export, even under sanctions and nuclear power could go a long way into addressing that imbalance. Which countries are willing to ignore the sanctions and buy Iranian oil and gas? In short, China. China is now the biggest customer and has set up a shadow system of transit tankers that enables the export of Iranian oil to Chinese refineries. Iran has been expanding its relationships with, say, Russia, Central Asia, China, India, through these alternative international fora, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS as well.
17:28China has been characteristically vague about buying oil from Iran, emphasising its trade with Tehran is reasonable and legal. But it has been tight-lipped about doing so via the so-called dark fleet of tankers. As for Russia, since Washington distanced itself from Tehran after the Islamic Revolution, Moscow stepped in with an offer it's made to plenty of other countries too, nuclear expertise. A lot of Iran's nuclear facilities had developed under the JCPOA, under international supervision, but with the help of Russia, in particular the Boucher nuclear power plant. And even before the conflict of Israel broke out, there were reports that Russia sought assurances, guarantees from Israel that they wouldn't attack that particular nuclear power plant because of the presence of Russian experts.
18:21You are listening to The Global Jigsaw from BBC Monitoring.
18:30Let's head now 1 ,700 kilometers west to the country Iran sees as the source of its existential threat. And by the way, the feeling is mutual. Israel has taken a different approach to communication. While Iran's been flaunting its increasing ability to enrich uranium, its adversary has kept stum about its own nuclear capabilities. Shaina Oppenheimer, who works for BBC Monitoring's Jerusalem bureau, will shed light on the country's nuclear doctrine. Israel has never really denied or confirmed whether or not it has a nuclear program, though it's widely understood that it does have a reactor in Dimona, which is a southern city in the Negev Desert.
19:17By not really confirming or denying its capabilities, Israel's pursuing this policy of deterrence. And this ambiguity allows it to maintain some credible threat without triggering any real international scrutiny. It is widely understood that Israel does possess nuclear weapons. Over the years, a few insiders have lifted the curtain. One man paid a heavy price for doing so. The most famous case, Mordechai Venunu, who was a nuclear whistleblower who worked at Israel's nuclear reactor, and he leaked details and photos of its weapons program to the British newspaper The Sunday Times in the late 80s.
20:04And according to reports, He was lured from London by a Mossad agent to Italy. From there, he was reportedly kidnapped, drugged, smuggled back to Israel, convicted in a closed door trial, and he served 18 years in prison. Ehud Omer, who previously was a prime minister, he did kind of imply that Israel has a nuclear weapons program in an interview. Iran openly, explicitly and publicly threatens to write Israel off the map. Can you say that this is the same level when they are aspiring to have nuclear weapons as America, France, Israel, Russia? And there's been these subtle hints, usually not from sitting leaders.
20:51And then, of course, in this ongoing Gaza war, there have been calls by some Israeli ministers to nuke Gaza.
21:03Not to say that that is an explicit confirmation of Israel's nuclear program, but this kind of general idea that perhaps Israel has that capability. There has been this very longstanding perception that Iran's nuclear program isn't just a security concern for Israel. It's an existential concern. It's coupled with decades of messaging from the top levels of government that Iran is not only seeking to build a nuclear bomb, but it intends to use it against Israel. The current prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has been talking about this since the 90s. When he was an MP, he talked about Iran being three to five years away from some kind of ability to produce a nuclear bomb.
21:52To understand what the world would be like with a nuclear-armed Iran, just imagine the world with a nuclear-armed Al-Qaeda. In 2002, he goes to the U.S. Congress and he calls on them to invade Iraq. Based on this idea that both Iraq and Iran were racing towards nuclear weapons, he brought this again to the U.N. General Assembly. Brought a diagram for you. This is a bomb. This is a fuse. And he brings these images showing what he says is Iran's nuclear capabilities. And he unveiled what he said was Iran's secret nuclear archive, showing these mock-ups of nuclear warheads. And I think he also knows for the Israeli public, nothing brings them together like some kind of external threat.
22:43Does Netanyahu not have a point? Because days before Israel attacked Iran's nuclear facilities, the IAEA confirmed that Iran was enriching uranium to a degree that was beyond what's been agreed. We have this statement come out, and then you also have to look at the timing. There was a huge domestic crisis going on in Israel, not only in terms of growing calls for a ceasefire in Gaza and growing public frustration with what many critics would say a prolonging of the war. But you also have Netanyahu averting his own political crisis with some of his key coalition partners, ultra-Orthodox parties, over failure to push through legislation that exempts them from mandatory military service.
23:42And Netanyahu tends to pursue public policy that's quite popular. And Iran and the perception that it is racing towards nuclear weapons and it will use them on Israel is something a lot of Israelis can get behind. Israel is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. and although it has signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it has not ratified it. So where does it stand on the JCPOA, the Iran deal we spoke about earlier? Israel has long argued that a nuclear deal is a mistake. Such a deal does not block Iran's path to the bomb. Such a deal paves Iran's path to the bomb.
24:27It's this idea that easing sanctions and giving Iran various terms that would make it want to come to the negotiating table would actually strengthen the Iranian economy and that money would flow directly back into its nuclear ambitions, its proxies and its larger influence in the region. On principle, Israel doesn't believe that Iran should have a deal and there shouldn't be a deal unless that deal is requiring Iran to dismantle and destroy all of its existing nuclear infrastructure. We've reached June 2025, the moment Israel attacked Iran. How was that framed for the Israeli public? Back to Shaina Oppenheimer from BBC Monitoring.
25:12It was portrayed as a necessary step that Iran was on the verge of striking Israel.
Read the full transcript
25:24And if you look at public opinion polls, it shows pretty big support for this. One could argue those fears were justified. Just a year earlier, in April 2024, Iran launched an attack on Israel for the first time directly from its own soil. The Israel Democracy Institute polls showed how much of this fear of this existential crisis was really embedded in the Israeli psyche. About 82 % of the public supported the timing and the justification of Israel's attack on Iran. How did the Israeli media describe the war with Iran? From the very early moments of Israel launching its airstrikes on Iran, it was portrayed as a massive military success all the way to the end.
26:19It was talked about how Israel was really hitting Iran where that would hurt the most. And there was even discussions in Israeli media about possible regime change, which Netanyahu himself had kind of alluded to. The country under attack had its own version of the events. Here's Barry Sadid again with a look at the mood inside Iran during the 12-day war. In terms of examining the disconnect between what, say, foreign-based opposition, or say the Israeli establishment imagined the strikes would inspire within Iran, I think it's useful looking at the example of Evin prison. The Israelis announced that they were carrying out this so-called symbolic strike.
27:00They bombed the gates of Eben prison. What happened in reality was not some kind of fanfare from the opposition or activists in support of Israel for bombing the gateway of the prison. Because what Israel had done in reality was endanger their lives, killing dozens.
27:20And that naturally drew out a lot of fury, a lot of anger from Iran's most committed opposition activists, those most opposed to the Islamic Republic, including within Evin Prison, activists of all stripes from all Iran's political currents. And I think that really sums up what anyone could reasonably expect to be the reaction of a country being bombed. It's not to say that the attacks on Iran by Israel produced a wave of pro-government feeling, but it certainly did not produce any wave of opposition feeling. Speculations about regime change turned out to be wishful thinking. As for whether the main aim of Israel's attack was achieved, crippling Tehran's nuclear program, that again depends on who you ask.
28:06On the ground has conducted over 1 ,100 precision strikes against nuclear facilities. Israeli media still continued to push this idea that Israel had set back Iran's nuclear program by many years and really deterred it from any possible threat to the country for quite some time. Israel took control of Iran's skies in just two days. Reports differ over how much damage has been delivered to Iran's nuclear program. Iranian media outlets of all stripes struck a triumphant tone following the end of the Iran-Israel war.
28:50There are a lot of pictures, for example, of Tel Aviv and the material damage that Iran had managed to deliver. The hardline outlets denied the extent of the damage to Iran's nuclear facilities. We also saw at the same time a lot of rage towards the IAEA for kind of providing the justification for these strikes. The intervention from the International Atomic Energy Agency certainly sounded like a validation of Israel's fears, which are fundamental to its nuclear doctrine. Israel has long portrayed itself as the only democracy in the Middle East, as the main alliance for the West, And it believes that any other countries obtaining nuclear weapons would once again be an existential threat to Israel and Western allies.
29:38This rhetoric really come out at the start of the Gaza war. Israel is the first front. The West is next. That was really clear in messaging. The West is next.
29:50And then Israel also largely following what's called the Begin Doctrine, in which Israel carries out preemptive strikes against countries perceived as developing weapons. And those Israel sees as intended to use those weapons against it, particularly nuclear weapons. So this doctrine is a nod to when former Prime Minister Menachem Begin authorized an attack on Iraq's nuclear facility in 1981. For simple logic, we decided to act now before it is too late. And even before this, you already see Israel starting to make military decisions based on the idea that it needs to act preventatively. Even in the 60s, for example, when Egypt under Nasser was developing its own arsenal of ballistic missiles, we saw the Mossad step in.
30:51Mossad is Israel's spy agency, and they went after the German scientist that was helping Egypt. And there were a number of reported incidents where several scientists were killed by parcel bombs. And then we saw this again in 2007, when Israel struck Syria's nuclear facilities, and they said that Bashar al-Assad, the then president, was secretly building a reactor. And it all goes back to this notion of nuclear weapons by neighbours and an existential threat to Israel.
31:28You are listening to The Global Jigsaw from BBC Monitoring. Next, we'll explore the neighbourhood. To the southeast of tiny Israel, just across Jordan, lies another regional heavyweight, the vast and powerful Saudi Arabia. In the weeks leading up to the Hamas attack on Israel and the war in Gaza, a quiet rapprochement was shaping up between Jerusalem and Riyadh, known as the Abraham Accords. Florence Dixon from our Middle East team has been keeping a close eye on the kingdom, the crown prince and the shifting power dynamics in the region. Israel and Saudi Arabia were in a way united against Iran.
32:13And pre-October 2023, there was a potential Saudi-Israel normalization deal on the table, which was even talked about by Mohammed bin Salman in this interview he gave to Fox News in September 2023. If we have a breakthrough of reaching a deal that gives the Palestinians their needs and make the region come, we're going to work with whoever's there. So it's very striking that a month after that, that really got swept off the table. Since October 2023, the prospects for Israel's relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries has really deteriorated. deteriorated. We've seen Saudi Arabia's strategic calculations in the region actually switch from potential relations with Israel to focus on improving ties with Iran.
33:08The public anti-Israel sentiment is just higher than it's ever been before. And this unprecedented sense of anger and grief about Gaza among populations across the Middle East about this perceived inaction from Arab leaders. The leadership knows it won't allow any normalisation with Israel at a time like now. The Gaza war tilted the regional geopolitical balance. Saudi's thought with Israel went back into the freezer, while its attitude towards arch-rival Iran began to warm. Saudi Arabia and Iran had this rapprochement deal in March 2023. But Saudi Arabia was very reticent on actually advancing this.
33:52And you could sense from the media tone, they weren't wedded to this deal, but it gained momentum all of a sudden in 2024, when it had Iran where it wanted it to be with this much, much weakened regional alliance without Hezbollah, without Bashar al-Assad in Syria. These are major regional shifts. The multi-layered proxy war in Syria entered a new chapter following the fall of the Assad regime. And over the last year, Israel succeeded in significantly weakening Iran's network of proxies, the so-called axis of resistance, including Hezbollah. You had this landmark visit by Ayla bin Salman, who's the Saudi defence minister and also the brother of the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, go to Iran and meet various top officials, including the Ayatollah.
34:53And then at the outbreak of the Iran-Israel war, the official Saudi line was very conciliatory towards Iran. The Saudi crown prince calling the Iranian president, his brother, putting all the blame on Israel.
35:11What were they really thinking, seeing Iran, their arch enemy, weakened? This domino effect that came from Israel's actions in its war in Gaza and with Lebanon, the domino effect of Bashar al-Assad's rule falling, really precipitated these very advantageous shifts in the regional power dynamic and allowed it to really cement this very long term goal of being the regional hegemon. And that's really down to Iran's axis of resistance being weakened by the war with Israel. So Saudi Arabia has really been the beneficiary of this big power shift. Just like Iran, Saudi Arabia claims its interest in nuclear technology is for energy production.
36:06Saudi is the world's second largest oil producer behind the US. So this is another example of a fossil fuel economy aspiring to join the nuclear elite. Saudi Arabia has been very clear that nuclear energy is part of its Vision 2030 programme, which is this big flagship programme of economic reforms. And a key element of this is to increase the share of natural gas and renewable energy for its electricity production to 50%. The main subtitle of the programme is diversification, exploring these various parts of how it can maintain this economic hegemony, I guess, by taking advantage of its oil revenues.
37:00And green energy infrastructure is talked about a lot as part of this, including the civilian nuclear ambitions framed in this green sustainability language, which has elicited accusations of greenwashing because despite all of the talk, the country's public funds are still vastly coming from the revenues from fossil fuels. So much for the official story. But is there more to it? Its uranium enrichment plans are driven by developments with its rivalry with Iran. Purchasing uranium would actually be very challenging for Saudi Arabia, given that the country has in recent years expressed an intention to develop potentially nuclear weapons if Iran did so.
37:47If they get one, will you? If they get one, we have to get one. Iran getting a nuclear weapon is a huge potential destabilizer to whatever dynamics Saudi Arabia has crafted so far. The nuclear issue remains at the forefront of Saudi concerns in the region and keeps it very engaged in its relationship with the US. We'll come to this relationship in a moment. But first, let's look at how Riyadh, the peace broker, talks about its nuclear ambitions. When it comes to military nuclear programs, there's a slight awkwardness in the media there. Even though the leadership's been clear in the past few years that it will seek to obtain nuclear arms if Iran does, These statements are mainly made to foreign media and it's generally not talked about in domestic or pan-Arab Saudi media because it clashes with one of the central narratives which is all about Saudi Arabia as a peace broker, as a proponent of de-escalation.
38:59There's a steady stream of commentaries in the leading Saudi newspapers about the dangers of nuclear escalation and especially of Iran getting a nuclear weapon.
39:14And here we come to the United States, Saudi Arabia's powerful ally. The importance of that relationship was unmistakable when President Trump chose Riyadh for his first major international trip in May. The visit resulted, among other things, in an agreement worth about$150 billion focused on boosting defence capabilities and energy resources. A memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Energy and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Trump came to Saudi Arabia to push forward a civil nuclear agreement. But what seemed to emerge from that was that the US would decouple this nuclear agreement from its longstanding condition that it would see Saudi Arabia normalise ties with Israel.
40:08Saudi leaders have been clear that they would prefer the US to be its main partner in developing a civil nuclear programme. But there's this long-running US condition, which is that Saudi Arabia doesn't enrich uranium domestically. That's known as the gold standard for nuclear non-proliferation. Deals with the US often come with strings attached, something other countries seeking to lure Saudi Arabia away from Washington's orbit are well aware of. It's also explored cooperation with China and Russia, who wouldn't maybe offer these as tight restrictions on enrichment. Both China and Russia seem very keen.
40:51China's the biggest buyer of Saudi oil, but Saudi used that relationship strategically as leverage with the US. And when it comes to something as significant as the nuclear issue, I think it knows what it's doing in terms of playing the two off against each other. And the final piece in our nuclear jigsaw, Turkey, another country that sees itself as a regional heavyweight and a peace broker. It also holds a curious nuclear status and stance. Nihankale in our Istanbul bureau has looked into Ankara's overt and covert nuclear ambitions. Turkey has been a party to the NPT since 1979, which prohibits Ankara from developing, acquiring or testing nuclear weapons.
41:43That's the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It also signed the CTBT, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, in 2000. But Turkey does host a US airbase in southern Turkey believed to have nuclear warheads. We have seen media reports that there are an estimated 50 nuclear bombs, these Cold War era B61 gravity bombs that are stored at the Incilik Air Base in Adana province. This was considered to be an open secret for years. As Nihan was saying, the nuclear bombs in Turkey are a relic of the Cold War. But times have changed. In the last decade, the relationship between Ankara and Washington felt a lot like a rollercoaster ride.
42:24This base has always been a topic of debate in the US and in Turkey as well. Whenever relations had become hostile between countries, we've seen a lot of calls from the Turkish side that we should not be hosting US warheads. We should be closing the Angelic Air Base to the US. And I've seen similar calls on the US side when relations between Ankara and Moscow were friendly. Politicians saying that Turkey should not be hosting these warheads because this NATO member state was becoming closer to Russia. Turkey's relations with the US and Russia have always been not really straightforward. And when Turkey enjoys good relations with the US, there's a lot of questions over how that is going to affect its relations with Russia.
43:09Relationship status, it's complicated. As a NATO member, Ankara is hosting the alliance's nuclear bombs. But it also struck a deal with Moscow to buy the Russian S-400 missile system. That caused a ruckus within NATO, especially with Washington. In 2019, President Erdogan had said Turkey would consider closing Incirlik, as well as the Kuregic radar station, in retaliation for Washington's possible sanctions amid fragile relations. If it is needed, we will close Incirlik. If it is needed, we will close Incirlik. Six years on, the alliance with the U.S. is once again stirring emotions, this time for a different reason.
43:53Especially with the Gaza war, a lot of the Turkish people are very pro-Palestinian, and they say that opening this airbase and allowing U.S. access making Turkey complicit. A lot of pro-government voices are saying that this airbase is not providing Turkey any nuclear superiority. It doesn't have access to those warheads. and they've argued that Ankara should be independently developing, acquiring and possessing nuclear weapons. Nükleer silahımız olmasına gerek var. Maalesef ve üzülerek bunu söylüyorum. Hakan Bey, Miço Takis. Bu arada, Miço Takis. After the 12-day Iran-Israel war, the public sentiments has shifted.
44:30There was a recent public survey showing that overwhelming majority said that Turkey should own nuclear weapons. that if Israel carried out those strikes on Iran, nothing is stopping it from carrying out those similar attacks on Turkey. Turkey's alarm as a NATO member is unlikely to be about an Israeli attack on its soil. To understand it, we need to look beyond its borders. Since the fall of the Assad regime, neighbouring Syria has increasingly become a battleground between Turkey and Israel. Turkey has been accusing Israel of stoking tension in Sueda, in Syria, given the recent developments in northern Syria, where Turkey expects the Kurdish-led Syrian democratic forces to disarm and integrate into the Syrian army, especially at a time when Turkey is also initiating these peace talks with the PKK, the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey.
45:26It wants the SDF to disarm and not seek autonomy so that it doesn't harm the peace process that's happening in Turkey. Turkey wants to see a united Syria and it doesn't want any of these autonomous regions, which it believes that Israel will be behind these groups. We won't go into the complexities of the Kurdish issue here, but if you're interested in exploring it, have a listen to our series on the Kurds, which you can find on the Global Jigsaw podcast feed. A lot of the pro-government voices have been saying that Turkey is emerging as a global player and that developing these nuclear weapons will complete Turkey's ambitions.
46:04What does President Erdogan himself say about this? In 2019, he said that it was unacceptable that other countries owned nuclear warhead missiles, but that Turkey could not own any.
46:21But he also criticized nuclear powers over a disparity between their nuclear arsenal while advocating for non-proliferation. Turkey staunchly criticized Israel for using nuclear facilities as an excuse to strike Iran. Following the Israel-Iran war, Foreign Minister Haqqan Fidan actually criticized the NPT, which Turkey is a signatory to, for acknowledging that countries with nuclear weapons will have ultimate military superiority over states that don't own nuclear weapons. So the messaging has a lot of strong criticism of the global nuclear order. As a founding member of the nuclear club, Russia extended a helping hand to Turkey, just like it did with Iran and Saudi Arabia.
47:04Turkey started building its first nuclear power plant, funded and built by Russia's Rosatom. Turkey is saying that its only aim is to diversify its energy resources, and that it will not enrich uranium that could potentially be used to build nuclear weapons. The public messaging regarding this nuclear power plant is that really it's for Turkey to become energy independent because it's reliant on foreign supplies. Currently, Ankara depends heavily on Moscow for its fossil fuel needs. To throw nuclear into the energy mix, Turkey would need to import uranium and manage nuclear waste, a process typically handled by the country that builds the reactor, in this case Russia, unless other options are available.
47:49Turkey's close relationship with not only Russia, but countries like nuclear-armed Pakistan or a recent deal with Kazakhstan, which is rich in uranium resources, have prompted some in the media to speculate that that sort of cooperation with these countries could potentially kickstart a nuclear weapons program. So far, we have looked at events that could shape the future. All those known knowns and known unknowns. As for the unknown unknowns, we bring in Barry Sedid again to explain the latest development in Iran's nuclear saga. And here's a final term for our nuclear glossary, the snapback mechanism that was built into the Iran deal.
48:30The snapback mechanism is baked into the original JCPOA. The US can't activate it, but the E3, who are technically still signatories, meaning UK, Germany and France can. And what it means is if those parties deem Iran to be in violation of the nuclear deal, they can unilaterally activate this mechanism, which would mean the return of UN sanctions on Iran. And that's what happened. The E3 did trigger it at the end of August. Yes. What was Iran's reaction? Iran's reaction to the triggering of the so-called snapback mechanism was twofold. First of all, in the domestic sphere, Iranian officials were very, very keen to downplay any kind of possible impact it might have economically.
49:12They said, we've been through this before. These are the old UN sanctions. The US sanctions we're suffering under right now are actually worse. So let's not overestimate the impact on the economy. And this is really significant because newspapers have been raising fears of inflation escalating to hyperinflation. Internationally, Iranian officials have been attempting to stall the return of these UN sanctions. So we've seen in September a Cairo agreement between the UN's nuclear watchdog, the IAEA and Iran. It's allowed for a so-called cooperation framework. What it hasn't allowed for is for the immediate inspection of those highly enriched nuclear materials that have effectively gone missing since the Iran-Israel war.
49:55So that's the big gap there for the E3 who activated the snapback mechanism, and that's the sticking point. And just the sanctions were reimposed at the end of September. Moscow and Tehran signed a$25 billion deal to build four nuclear power plants in southern Iran.
50:18So Barry, when you're reading Iranian papers, mainly between the lines, What is your takeaway? In what headspace is Iran currently? What we're seeing from the Iranian media is the kind of touting of this policy of nuclear ambiguity. The West has laid down this hard line. So for Iran, it's really, does it in effect capitulate, find its way towards a deal and step back what's been such a huge corner of its nuclear policy, not just for the Iranian government, but now for the population as well? Or will we see the continuing of a kind of hard line policy? The total absence of inspectors from the country means that in the Iranian eyes, they have a free hand to do whatever they want of the nuclear material about other countries knowing.
51:00And what this means, in effect, is kind of Iran going dark.
51:08This is the documentary from the BBC World Service. Thank you to our guides, Barry Sedit, Shaina Oppenheimer, Florence Dixon and Nihon Kalle. The people who crafted this episode are exec producer Krista Shaturi, Barry Sedit with his producer hat on, and me, Krasi Ivanova-Twig. Last but not least, John Boland, who perfected the sound. And do check out our back catalogue on our podcast feed. There are episodes that are relevant to this story, for example, on Iran's so-called axis of resistance, that could give you a more rounded understanding of the region. Bye for now, and thanks for listening.
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From the publisher
The narratives and the doctrines built on ever-growing suspicions and fears that are once again stirring the Middle East. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not just threatened to redraw the map of Europe - it has transformed the global security landscape. The ripple effects have been felt way beyond the continent, reigniting fears not felt since the Cold War - of a new nuclear arms race. In this episode we go back to the beginnings of nuclear ambitions in the Middle East to weigh up the consequences for the world today. With contributions from Barry Sadid, Shaina Oppenheimer, Florence Dixon, and Nihan Kale.
