What is so-called 'Jihadi cool'?

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1:20We all do it. You open Instagram or TikTok and before you know it, you have wasted hours watching cats or other people's lives. Documenting their daily routines, whether it's eating out in a cafe or in a public place. But some influencer content comes with a catch, a subtle nod to something darker. It's those indications where they use a pro-IS hashtag, a particular IS nasheed, and that signals to others on the platform that they are part of the IS group. These aren't isolated cases. It appears to be a network of supporters shaping a social media trend of their own. A move away from direct operational instructions to do-it-yourself jihad, where they are outsourcing, pushing as much material as they can and constant incitement, constant messaging.

2:15To avoid detection by the platforms, they've learned the art of disguise. There's obfuscation. The front page will be an image of nature or something very innocuous. But when you click on it, it's a manual for bomb making. Once they are unmasked, the game of whack-a-mole begins. It's a cat and mouse relationship where these platforms are chasing these accounts, trying to suspend them, but then they really merge. This is a recruitment drive for the Islamic State Group, trying to exploit platform features designed for maximum reach. We explore the obfuscation tactics, the continuous cycle of removal and re-emergence, and where it could lead.

3:01Welcome to the documentary from the BBC World Service. I'm Krasi Ivanova-Twig, and this is the global jigsaw from BBC Monitoring, where we look at the world through the lens of its media, exploring the narratives, the propaganda and the disinformation.

3:32In August 2024, a 19-year-old Austrian man was arrested for planning a terror attack on a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna.

3:49The police said he was radicalised online as a teenager and swore allegiance to IS.

3:58Mariam Susi from our jihadist media monitoring team decided to check out how easy it would be to find posts by sympathisers of the Islamic State group on social media platforms. The research that I conducted over a period of several months looked at jihadist content on Instagram and TikTok, the dominant narratives and the tactics. I used Arabic and English hashtags that are basically familiar within the IS ecosystem online. That enabled me to pick up on official Islamic State propaganda, and that would lead me to users who are actually hosting such content. And TikTok and Instagram's algorithms would suggest other similar accounts.

4:40And this is how a journey down the rabbit hole might begin. I looked at around 50 to 100 accounts on Instagram and TikTok. It's evident from the start there are hundreds if not thousands of pro-Islamic state accounts and I would just follow them and then more similar content would appear. What is the content that they're pushing out? Official Islamic State propaganda, whether it's dissemination of the group's weekly newspaper, attack claims. You also have content that is not official, users documenting their daily routine. But at the same time, they're using hashtags, they're using emojis that are familiar within the IS ecosystem, such as the black flag emoji or raising the index finger or the ninja emoji to signal affiliation with the group.

5:26Are these IS supporters acting on their own initiative or has there been a steer from the group? It's difficult to say whether there is kind of coordination between Islamic State official accounts and supporter accounts. What we can see is the repackaging, I guess, or the reamplification of official IS material. However, Islamic State supporters use a lot of obfuscation techniques to hide and mask this content. We'll come back to those techniques in more detail. Needless to say, those users are careful not to reveal too much about themselves. So what do we know about them? Many users take deliberate efforts to remain under the radar.

6:07However, some do give signals of their age. On TikTok, I did come across some accounts where users were of young age and they were showing their faces. They used the black flag emoji to kind of cover parts of their face. And that user was probably under the age of 15. The jihadist supporters are presenting in a way that looks as if complying with the platform rules. But their presence here is distinctive from the jihadist material our team has been observing for years, such as the prominence of female supporters. There was a more female user presence on Instagram compared to other platforms. The gender norms and interactions on Instagram were more loose and relaxed, men and women mixed.

6:51They often appeared to follow and interact with each other on Instagram. And I guess they took on a more non-traditional role, more active where they were documenting their daily routines, whether it's eating out in a cafe or in a public place. Our top jihadist media expert Mina Al-Lami too has been watching jihadist behaviour on all sorts of platforms for many years. Here's her take on the prominence of women on the hugely popular apps. A major difference between what we have been seeing on Telegram, Facebook and Rocket Chat, there is very strict segregation between male and female users. There is a clear and consistent messaging from the male supporters of IS that women should not be online full stop.

7:37They should not be showing themselves. But when we started looking at TikTok and Instagram, there were many female supporters, not in strict all black niqab, but trendy niqab, projecting this coolness, but also really trying to resonate with young audiences. So this is not just women's places behind closed doors, cooking and cleaning and raise the next generation. But actually, they can also be cool online. We see them on skateboards, brandishing guns, driving in the desert. And yes, some of them just present themselves as Muslim women or Islamists, but we can definitely see from various symbolism that yes, they are signaling that we are part of that circle.

8:20So these people, some of them, as you say, they're trying to stay under the radar and you can't tell much about them. With others, the women you described who are describing their daily routines, it fits into this influencer style presence where the personality is very important. You can't keep that under the radar. Do you have those openly there? Yes, there was quite a few actually who were presenting what we call it as Jihadi Cool, this Instagram influencer. And so while you would see the daily routines or them posing or driving or drinking coffee, whatever, again, it's those indications where they use a pro-IS hashtag, a particular IS Nasheed, and that all signals to others on the platform that they are part of the IS group.

9:03Whether it's making hand gestures resembling firearms or physically engaging in strenuous activities to show that they're preparing themselves for future jihad. It seems that what they're doing is saying it's cool to be jihadists and it's cool and it's okay normalising this being part of this society. But what's the message? I think it's more about how Islamic State can be presented now to a much younger audience. It's emotional, engaging material. I think it's more kind of ideological recruitment. It's also a form of defiance and rebellion. The West present jihadists are backward, but this is a different presentation of female who are embracing and flaunting their hardline Islamist identity, if you like.

9:53And it doesn't look backward. It looks actually cool and edgy. And I think what IS supporter accounts, females as well, is saying actually you can be part of this as well. Now it's more trendy, it's a younger audience where women can be part of this online group. It seems extremely subtle and it's playing perhaps on the appeal of this sense of belonging. We can belong, wink wink, we know what we are about, rather than pushing an extreme message to attack Western targets. A lot of the jihadist messaging has been about the sense of belonging. And it is this wink, wink. We all know that we are part of this camp, if you like.

10:34And I think they have to shift to these more subtle and softer tactics if they want their message to resonate. I mean, if they have this ultra extreme, hardline, strict message online, this is not appealing to these young people. I think there is definitely a trend on Instagram and TikTok that we have not been seeing on other platforms. You mean the trend of women taking part? Women, but also even young men. So we're seeing a lot of young men flexing their muscles, literally, in gyms or on the streets, doing an acrobatic as well as tough guy look with their gym clothes, flaunting his muscles and all his moves.

11:16But you have the Ayes Nasheed. So again, it is a wink wink. Jihadists always talk about, even if we're not at war, then it is a phase of preparation. You train your body, you train on weapons, you have to be fit, you have to be ready. So even though these videos are not directly presented as this is part of our preparation, it is the context. If you're familiar with that narrative and with these spaces, you understand that. The platforms surely try to close these accounts, right? Or do they manage to stay under the radar? From my observations on Instagram and TikTok, both platforms were actively removing accounts.

11:54So if I came across an account and I would follow and then I would go back to check the content, I would actually find that account has been suspended. But the next day I would find a similar account has reappeared. I think it's definitely a continuous cycle of removal and reimagines. Whack-a-mole. Yes, whack-a-mole indeed. And the challenge for platforms from what we're seeing is that they're getting better at masking the content. As the moderation gets tighter, these accounts are also adapting. They learn from that and say, okay, so next time we won't have the title of the IS message or the Nasheed.

12:29We won't have that hashtag that refers to it.

12:35choiceology an original podcast from charles schwab is a show about the psychology and economics behind our decisions join host katie milkman an award-winning behavioral scientist and author of the best-selling book how to change as she shares true stories from nobel laureates authors athletes and everyday people about why we make the choices we do and how to make better ones to help avoid costly mistakes. Listen to choiceology at schwab.com slash podcast, or wherever you listen. Support comes from Wise, the smart way to manage the currencies you need around the globe. Fed up with losing out to hidden fees when you send money abroad with your everyday bank?

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14:05Al-Nabba is the Islamic State Group's main publication. The front first image would be plain black and white, just referencing the name Al-Nabba, the issue number and a release date in Arabic. but you would not actually see the publication until you scrolled through it. Another account dedicated just to posting official Islamic State attack claims was mimicking a pan-Arab news channel. It would use breaking news alerts in Arabic and then they would have the attack claim. Another tactic they would use is they insert English language letters into Arabic keywords or they would have a space between the letters.

14:40There was one account that was predominantly posting Islamic State memes and it was referencing the Bondi beach attack in Sydney. And one follower asked what had happened. In response, this account used a juice carton emoji and replied an attack on the Jews. That's Jews, as in Jewish people. Yes, and that was a reference. Juice carton emoji. Yes. So those familiar emojis we all use are being repurposed and funneled into the obfuscation machine. IS supporting accounts drowning jihadist messages in love hearts. Love hearts are used to actually mask individuals associated with IS, such as the former IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or prominent well-known IS attackers as well.

15:26This was really predominant on TikTok. To hide the image or change the meaning is they were adding either hearts emojis or bows or flowers. What's the aim of all this? I would say it's the engagement that they're getting from these posts. One video featuring an image of Mohamed Emwazi, or Jihadi John, from his school years attracted around 25 ,000 likes. It was saved more than 3 ,000 times and it was shared over 2 ,000 times by users. I guess they don't have large numbers of followers, but I think it's the amount of likes and interactions what they're looking for. Mohamed Mwazi was a British IS member, notorious for taking part in beheading videos and responsible for the death of Syrian civilians, American journalists and British aid workers.

16:15And yet his image attracted tens of thousands of likes on the popular platforms. We definitely haven't seen the same comparable level of engagement with pro-IS posts on platforms like Facebook or Telegram. But similar posts on Instagram, they got thousands of likes, interactions or views, pushing material and content to people who are not actively seeking that content. A lot of the users actually, when referring to Islamic State, use coded language. They use the term carrot state. They also have other references such as ice cream or pizza to reference the Islamic state. And I guess it's a tactic that they use to evade automated moderation systems.

17:01And I think what they're doing there is making the most of the wider trend of AI slop content, images of fruits and vegetables talking or saying silly things. They're trying to tag along on that social media trend. This is different from the usual sources of jihadist material our team has been monitoring for years. which have severe limitations when it comes to reach. On the encrypted app Telegram, where jihadists are mostly active, if I put a search word, it will only show me content that is posted by the people that I'm following, even if I use a hashtag. Whereas on Instagram and TikTok, you put a hashtag, it can reach millions of people on the platform.

17:42And what these supporters are doing, they're not only using jihadist hashtags, They're exploiting popular mainstream hashtags because they want to reach unsuspecting audiences. You have these jihadist media operatives on the same platforms where you have some young people spend many hours of their day on these platforms. If jihadists are aiming for likes and shares as part of their recruitment drive, how do they turn the social media engagement into full-blown radicalization? The idea really is then to identify potential recruits who might be attracted to this or might be kind of curious clicking on this propaganda.

18:27And then these recruiters will try to move the conversation to more encrypted apps where they can communicate directly with these potential recruits. And once you click on the comments section, you will see a link taking you to Telegram or any other encrypted chat app. Or in many cases, they will just simply put out manuals. Of course, there's obfuscation. The front page will be an image of nature or something very innocuous. But when you click on it, it's a manual for bomb making or on how to use a weapon, how to stab a person in a fatal way. It could be kind of operational instructions that are posted on these platforms.

19:08You are listening to The Global Jigsaw from BBC Monitoring. All of this suggests that jihadists are now using mainstream platforms and tools to adapt their outreach tactics. And that also means adapting their methods. From the messaging by these groups, there definitely seems to be a move away from direct operational instructions or recruitment to do-it-yourself jihad, where they are outsourcing, pushing as much material as they can and constant incitement, constant messaging, glorifying the role specifically of young people who live in the West. There is always a message from Al-Qaeda, from IS, saying to young people in the West that you are in a unique position to take action to what they say to avenge fellow Muslims.

20:03They're tapping into genuine Muslim anger, frustration, helplessness over, let's say, the suffering of Palestinians. They're saying violent action is one way how you can help Palestinians. The incitement is there. The narrative is already there. And here's also the instructions, the manuals, if you wanted to carry out lone wolf attacks. This is the shift. You don't really need to be a member to be useful to the cause. Jihadists are prepared to let go of the top-down control structure to create ad hoc havoc. And that's why, of course, these platforms are crucial for them. They want to be where these young people are.

20:42They don't want to be in confined echo chambers. IS has pushed this argument that you don't need to be an operational member. All you need is, in your heart, believe in this cause. And that, as IS in its words said, it makes you one of us. The guilty plea and sentencing of an 18-year-old. The suspect was motivated by an allegiance to ISIS. A teenager tried as an adult gets nearly 20 years. Safar in court saying he planned to join the Islamic State. In the current knowledge, this was a 16-year-old Orthodox man with assaults. Worried he'd become fixated on ISIS, the parents sought help when he was 13.

21:24Now he's pleaded guilty to publishing violent ISIS videos on Instagram and emailing... We can bring you more now on the sentencing of a teenager for encouraging terrorism. The number of teenagers arrested on terrorism charges is growing, So the stats would suggest that there is uptake of this kind of message among the young people. Would you say this is because they have found a way to reach these young people? There was a rise in anti-Semitic attacks against Jewish targets in Western Europe. And in many of these cases, young teenagers were involved in these, according to authorities and media reports.

22:01Some of these people said, we don't really have any direct affiliation with this group that has recruited us, but it's all done online.

22:11In 2024, there was the case of, I think, a 15-year-old in Switzerland who attacked a Jewish man.

22:25And he said that I took action based on the latest IS message online. And IS actually then paid tribute to that teenager after the Bondi Beach attacks. IS said we inspired the attackers. IS taunted governments in the West globally, and they said, you will not be able to shut down our messages. You won't be able to end our influence as long as digital communications exist. As long as the internet exists, our message and influence will exist. Close an account or five or 10 or 100, we will still reemerge. It issued the same message after the New Orleans attack in January 2025. They took that as an example of IS inspiration online.

23:11We asked TikTok and Meta what they're doing to prevent distribution of jihadist propaganda on their platforms. We voiced up their responses. Meta has one of the most comprehensive policies in the industry, targeting terrorist organisations, hate groups and large-scale criminal organisations. We do not allow organisations or individuals that proclaim a violent mission or are engaged in violence to have a presence on our platforms. We do not allow content that praises, supports or represents individuals or groups engaging in terrorist activity or organised hate. The Islamic State group is designated as a terrorist organisation and is banned from our platforms.

23:55We do not allow the group or its supporters to maintain a presence, meaning we work to remove their accounts and remove content that glorifies, supports or represents them whenever we become aware of it. In the first half of this year, we took action on over 19 million pieces of terrorism content from Facebook and Instagram and nearly 2 million pieces of organised hate content. While Instagram has outlined the steps it's taking to address this issue, a number of accounts previously reported by our team remained active on the platform at the time of mixing this programme on the 23rd of July. The company said their review of the flagged accounts is ongoing.

24:35We have removed the content and banned the accounts involved for violating our policies. TikTok does not allow violent extremists, hateful organisations or individuals on the platform, nor content that promotes or supports them. We use a combination of technology and specialist moderation teams to enforce our rules. With 99.6 % of content removed under our violent and hateful organisations policy between January and March 2026 detected proactively before it was reported. We regularly train our safety professionals to help them better detect hateful behaviour, symbols, terms and offensive stereotypes.