Are Europe and the United States Finally Heading For Divorce?

28:59And so markets reacted the way they did, because they thought, oh, my God, these Europeans are reacting, trade war, trade war, and therefore we get spooked. So I actually think these things are very closely connected. So to me, the Greenland case is really a kind of gold standard, which should tell us quite a lot about how we should be reacting. I kind of put Ukraine in a middle category. I think that there has been a European willingness to say we stand up for Ukraine, even if Washington basically is in cahoots with Moscow. However, I also think that basically Europeans have been bending over backwards to try and keep Trump on side.

29:42Now, you could say, well, you know, they still need US support. But the truth of the matter is that the United States no longer provides that support, right? I mean, with the exception of, well, firstly, it no longer provides military assistance, full stop. There's still the intelligence sharing that goes on. And the US weapons are bought by Europeans for Ukrainians. So there's no support support in that sense. So in a sense, the US abandonment of Ukraine has already happened. Now, you could make the argument, you know, Trump could go the extra mile and also suspend intelligence sharing. And that, of course, remains, you know, an issue which mitigates how far you can basically just kind of say no and step to one side and we can deal with it.

30:37But I think that probably had there been a little bit more standing up, again, probably the world would not have fallen on our heads. And then I think we have the cases of Venezuela, of Iran now, of Gaza, in which Europeans have been, in my view, slightly kind of, you know, losing their soul over all of this. And they've been doing this either because they have followed a very, I think, shallow strategic logic, you know, Venezuela down, Iran down, it means Russia down, which means good for us. And I think as the Iran war especially is demonstrating, actually, this is quite good news for the Kremlin, right, for all sorts of reasons, from oil prices going up to interceptors going down to international law being completely shattered.

31:30So I think it has been strategically rather shallow. And then we come back to this norms point, if we are not those norms, who are we exactly? Who are we as Europeans? I find it really troubling when I have my own prime minister going to parliament and... You're in Italy, just so our listeners know. I'm in Italy. My prime minister is Giorgia Meloni and she goes to parliament and she says two sentences, one after the other. Yes, this is a violation of international law, referring to Iran, and you're like, yeah, yeah, indeed. Second sentence, and we neither condemn nor support it. Now, once upon a time, when there was a recognition that there was a violation of international law, the automatic next sentence would have been, and therefore we condemn it.

32:25So I think there's this sort of abdication of norms, which basically implicitly endorses a survival of the fittest, predatory powers, left, right, and center, which I don't think that as Europeans, we supported these norms because we were nice people. We supported these norms because they were fundamentally in our interests, right? And so I think it is also really rather short-sighted to think that somehow you could end up being a predatory power yourself. We'll be back after a short break.

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34:33All right. So, Natalie, I did want to pick up on one point, because with the comparison to the 2003 and the Iraq war, at that point, everyone gave the U.S. access. Everyone in Europe gave the U.S. access to their bases. Right. And I'm curious, I don't know if you guys have seen Celeste Wallander's piece that she did for foreign affairs mid 2025, but it was called Beware the Europe You Wish For. And she literally laid out the scenario in which Europe withholds access to bases for European military operations to include in Iran. So she kind of predicted that this could happen. And with your kind of assessment that Europe is becoming more about hard power and less about the ideals that it used to be, I'm just wondering how you think of this both for the U.S.

35:20interests going forward, if you could put on a little bit of what this means for the U.S. side. And also, you know, is it so bad if Europe is asserting itself in this way and actually denying access to U.S. bases and kind of standing up for itself with that hard power, even if it's not going to make the references to international law as strongly as you want them to? Well, firstly, I would say a major difference. I think it goes back to a point that Matthias was making earlier about consultation and coordination. So when we used to live in the world of the liberal international order and the transatlantic bond, even when there were these very virulent, actually, transatlantic disagreements, as there were over Iraq, there was consultation, there was coordination.

36:12even if then the end result of this was, hey, no, there was a profound policy disagreement. But actually, there wasn't a major political rift, I would say. I mean, there was a policy cleavage more than a political cleavage. And what I mean by this is that I think on the one hand, fundamentally, the social contract that kept the transatlantic partnership alive over the decades was still standing. And I think on the one hand, it rested on a policy recipe, right? I mean, there was a give and take both on security and beyond security. So I think that this narrative of, you know, the US provided security, and, you know, Europeans didn't pay their bills.

37:04I mean, of course, as we know, there is some truth to it, but it was not that it was never was the whole truth. I mean, there was a lot in it for the United States as well, including the fact that when the United States did things that actually Europeans did not fully agree with, i.e. invading Iraq, you know, they didn't really stand up to the United States. You know, so there was an overall policy social contract which held. And I think politically, there was another little magic word which now has been shattered, which is trust, right? I think the real harm being done in the transatlantic relationship now, as I said, is not one of policy disagreement.

37:46It is not one of even, you know, the possibility or even the probability or the reality of a US disengagement from European security, but it's rather the more than thought, but the increasing certainty that there's a US betrayal of Europe. And Ukraine and Greenland are really probably the most obvious sort of cases that speak to this. And so if this is a story of betrayal, then trust is broken. And if trust is broken on the one hand, at the political level, and if the policy social contract no longer holds, why on earth? Now, I personally think that this is a relationship which had certainly over the decades been extremely beneficial to Europeans.

38:36And who am I to say whether it was beneficial to Americans too? But I think that if the United States is in the powerful place that it is in the world still today, it's also because of this, right? And that I think is being, I'm not sure whether it's irreparably damaged or not, but I think there's a very real risk that once trust is broken, it's extremely difficult to reconstitute. Mattias, you made the point earlier that Europe can act and that it's, you know, a misconception to think otherwise. And it's kind of becoming clear the leverage that Europe has over the U.S. still more and more with, you know, for instance, Russian assets that are held in Europe.

39:22And so the U.S. can't unilaterally lift sanctions on Russia without Europe's approval. So, you know, any bargaining chip that Donald Trump thinks he has has to get approved by Europe. Now, with the Middle East operations and with Iran, Europe holds a lot of leverage there. Matias, you've written a lot about the kind of the market leverage as well of Europe. Do you feel like Europe is starting to assert that leverage more? And is there a shifting kind of sense of its own power? I mean, I think in the beginning of 2026, and I think the Greenland crisis and Donald Trump's speech at Davos kind of galvanized this, you could kind of sense Europe charting its own course, right?

40:00More so without actively consulting the United States, without doing this together, right? So what it was, I mean, recently they signed, very recently they signed a trade deal with Australia, right? I mean, think about the trade deals that they've signed. Mercosur, India, Australia. These are things, I mean, India started in 2000. Mercosur started in 2000. India, like, ages ago. Like, Australia and New Zealand was, like, 2017. Within six months, Donald Trump has managed to kind of give a certain urgency to the Europeans to act. But I think when it comes to defense, because you don't see this right now because the capabilities aren't there immediately, but the amount of money, if you think about Germany, by the end of the decade will invest or will spend the same amount of money on defense as France and the UK combined.

40:53right that's going to transform the kind of the way europe thinks about defense the way it can act and i think germany has fundamentally kind of changed its mindset on this and that happened with merz on election night so i i think you see this happening and i think in the end the future of the transatlantic relations has always been a much more equal relationship but then you'll indeed like celeste wallender pointed out last summer you will have a year a europe that will occasionally be a kind of tough love friend and say, hang on a minute. No, you're not getting our basis. We don't like, this is for your own good, right?

41:30This is going to backfire. This is going to completely demolish stability that what exists in the Middle East, this is going to have an impact on energy markets. And so think twice before you do this. And I think that's something, I mean, a colleague of mine pointed out, it's kind of like the traditional scenario where a husband and a wife are married and they're having a child and the husband says, you know what, why don't you stay home and take care of the kids? And then you can go back to work five years later. And then five years later, she's ready to go back to work. And suddenly the husband doesn't like it because he's gotten used to the wife taking care of all these things and just, you know, making his life easier.

42:07And otherwise, no, actually, I want to go to work. I want to get my own life again. And I feel like that's where Europe and the US are right now. This is my colleague's comparison, not mine. But it's a little bit like they're now having second thoughts, Many people around Washington, D.C. are like, well, wait, hang on a minute. When they're actually starting to do it, the U.S. doesn't like it. And I feel that's a bit the moment we're at right now. And so that's something to think about. Because, I mean, what's the main difference between China and the United States? Is that the United States has allies everywhere, right?

42:40And it has access, it has bases, it has global power. Or at least it used to. Or it used to, yeah. It used to have very, very solid alliance network. And so I think the most optimistic future for the U.S. is a transatlantic alliance where Europe pays roughly half, where it mostly takes care of its own neighborhood. And when it comes to broader threats in the world, they actually coordinate and speak truth to power, both of them to one another. But I'm not sure that that's the future that this administration has in mind, per se. Since you brought up German rearmament and how much Germany is spending on modernizing its military and investing in its military, I did want to come back to a big part of your piece for foreign affairs, which was what you guys called the Trump trap.

43:31And it's kind of the power and influence that far-right political parties in Europe have and how Europe's, by adopting a position of submission with Trump, it inadvertently created more power and more leeway for those far-right parties in Europe to gain influence, which then undoes the European integration projects. So you kind of described this Catch-22 phenomenon. I want to talk a lot about the far-right parties. I need kind of an update from maybe you, Natalie, on kind of what's happening around Europe in the parties, what's changed in the past especially three months as the kind of the conditions with Greenland and Iran war and everything have – if that's changed this dynamic.

44:14But I also want to ask, with Germany, Liana Fix, Matthias, one of your colleagues, wrote an article for us about the kind of perils of German power and what will happen if Germany has this big rearmament and then the AFD, the far right party in Germany, comes to power. So I'm wondering, how do you think about this and the risks of kind of European power and far right? So, I mean, we've been begging the Germans for the last 15 to 20 years to rearm, to do more, to spend more, to finally get rid of their, you know, ridiculous rules on debt and debt breaks and constitutionality and, you know, black zero budgets and lack of investment in infrastructure.

44:56And they're now finally doing it. Right. So I am, for one, speaking as a Belgian citizen, as much as an American citizen, but as a Belgian, very comfortable with Germany doing what it's doing. And I think we should keep encouraging it. And I do think the scenario Liana Fix is describing in the March-April issue, 2026 issue of foreign affairs, is still an unlikely one. It's something that could be, I like to think of it as an exercise for graduate students at SAIS, where Natalia and I both teach, less so as something realistic. I mean, the only scenario I can see the AFD play a role in a future government is as a silent partner in a minority government led by the CDU, where they cooperate on things like domestic policy, immigration, things like this.

45:48but you know don't don't get a veto on on foreign policy i honestly i i have a hard time even imagining the afd coming to power at all because it does seem especially in western germany they have they seem to have a hard ceiling of 20 25 percent i can't see them get to 30 35 of course you know people said that about marine le pen 10 years ago as well but again it seems to me marine le pen is going more the direction of jojia meloni than she's going the direction of victor orban The AFD would have to fundamentally change, it seems to me, if it wants to ever come to power. But by doing so, it would also become much less of a threat.

46:26But the idea that a rearm Germany will get the AFD in power, thanks to the encouragement of Donald Trump, and will then invade Poland, I think is still a sort of fanciful scenario that I wouldn't worry too much about. So I think to add just one point to this German question and then on to the rest of the far right, I think that the problem has less to do with, hey, what happens if the AFD comes to power? I mean, I tend to agree with Matthias on this one. But I think there is a structural question to be addressed. You know, Matthias earlier was mentioning the fact that by 2030, Germany will be spending more than France and the UK combined.

47:10Now, is that a healthy situation, regardless of who's in power in Berlin, right? In a sense, it brings back the German question with a vengeance to Europe. And especially in a context in which the United States is disengaging from European security, I think in structural terms, it raises questions. Now, of course, it's a question that has an obvious answer. There should be more European integration on defence, right? So there should be an embedding of this rearmament effort by different European countries within a European setting. And that kind of contains and mitigates, if not eliminates, the structural risks.

47:50Now, why is that not happening, right? And this is where we circle back to this broader far-right problem. Because I actually think, you know, going back to, Chloe, your question of, you know, are we still in the Trump trap when it comes to the far-right in Europe? I guess on one level you could say, well, actually, you know, 2026 gives us perhaps a slightly more hopeful sort of view on this. We are living in a Europe in which Giorgia Meloni lost a major referendum, a constitutional reform referendum that would have run the risk of seriously limiting the independence of the judiciary. We have had a few elections, both local and national.

48:40The Liberals won in Slovenia. In the local elections in France, the Rassemblement National did not do as well as many thought. And coming back to our earlier conversation, there has been a certain discomfort, including by far-right parties, because Trump has been just kind of so over the top, right? So I think if we're just zooming in on the far right, we could actually tell a slightly more hopeful, optimistic story. I think that the main trap that was still in, the Trump trap that was still in, is still one in which the centre-right in Europe is increasingly adopting a far-right agenda. Why is it that Mertz is so in cahoots with Giorgio Meloni?

49:34Why is it that Mertz, I don't want to just pick on Mertz, but I think he's just the most obvious example given that we were talking about Germany. Why is it that actually he's been standing against that European framing of national rearmament questions? What has he done explicitly, specifically to do that? I think it's more what he hasn't done. I think it's more when it comes to defence, what he hasn't done. So there hasn't been support for major European funds. Yes, indeed, there's 150 billion in loans. But frankly speaking, if you compare it to the broader national rearmament effort, it's still a very marginal share.

50:23So on the one hand, it's what he hasn't done. And what he has done, which takes us kind of slightly away from defence, is supported a very sort of explicit deregulation under the guise of bureaucratic simplification agenda, rowing back on key legislation, particularly when it comes to climate, when it comes to digital, under the guise of this is about competitiveness. but I think implicitly running the risk of actually spurring a process of European disintegration. And he's been very much in support of this. In the European Parliament, there is already an alternative majority between the far-right and the centre-right, the European People's Party.

51:07So to me, the trap that we're still very much in is this increasing pollution of the entire political spectrum, beginning, you know, with the centre-right or far-right agendas. I'm curious, as we kind of look to the future, is there a model for other European countries to follow? Spain has been so different in its approach to the US. It's been so different on migration and some other issues. So I'm just curious if you see, who's doing this the best in Europe right now? What would you like to see serve as a model? Because it sounds like it's not Germany right now. It's not any of the three countries.

51:47I think it's smaller or medium-sized countries that have an easier time. I mean, I would like to see, in many ways, the EU, I feel like the Commission on the trade side and on sanctions and things, I think has played its hand pretty well, but it's been held back by member states not allowing it to play this role and saying, well, make a deal or basically tying its hands, if you want. I mean, we're in a moment now where I feel the big things that President Trump wanted from Europe, the Europeans have done, right? So it's now up to Europe to say, well, a deal is a deal, you know, no more further tariff threats, you know, like, it'll take us a bit longer to implement it, because, you know, we can't just do an executive order, we have to go through the legal processes.

52:37And that's just how Europe works. and that they can finally start on a more positive agenda. Because it seems to me what the Europeans are also confused on is what is the Trump administration's China policy? What is, in the end, the Trump administration's policy? What's the end game in the Middle East? They just simply don't know. So it's very hard to come up with a kind of coherent policy if you constantly get things thrown at you that you didn't expect. I mean, yeah, to come back to what Nathalie was saying earlier in this foreign affairs interview, is that Spain is in a way uniquely placed, right?

53:18When it comes to energy, when it comes to trade, when it comes to defense, you can't generalize it, right? I mean, I feel like in the end, Italy has also stayed out of the drama. But to me, the main division has been Spain and France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other. And Nathalie is absolutely right. Merz and Meloni are finding each other. Also because I think Merz is realizing or... They even call it an axis here in Italy. And I shall say no more. Merz is worried that this time next year, you'll have a far right person in the Elysée in Paris. and that you'll have very little to work with there when it comes to European integration and so on.

54:01So I think that's also, there's a pragmatic side to Meretz, of course, is a centroid party who has a whole domestic agenda, right? So I mean, I would hope that Europe will focus much more on building up its own strength rather than in constantly being in response mode to Donald Trump. Because I still think in many ways, a lot of these threads seem empty. And then he tends to move on to the next thing. Yeah, I mean, on this question of the model, I actually think that I'm not sure we have a model, but I think we are beginning to identify ingredients of a recipe. And let me make this point actually not just for Europe, but also for the United States.

54:45And I think that we can identify four ingredients so far. And the point is then kind of building this into a recipe. The first is there needs to be delivery on policy. I mean, going back to Spain, it kind of helps if your economy is growing 3.6%, like for, you know, three years running, it helps to then say, and this is why we're legalizing 500 ,000 migrants, right? So there needs to be policy delivery. And I think that's one key ingredient. So in a sense, you know, there's a Sanchez piece of the recipe there. You need to have charismatic leadership. And that's definitely in short supply in, you know, in and across Europe and not only.

55:30So there needs to be a kind of mumdani sort of zest to this, right? And I think that's another second key ingredient. I think the third key ingredient is courage. I think that if you think about leaders like, well, actually, you know, Zelensky, to name the obvious one, but I would also add, you know, someone like Mette Frederiksen, the prime minister of Denmark, her popularity, I mean, she was not actually doing that well. her popularity started rising once again, actually, as a result of the Greenland moment. And so I think courage is another key ingredient. And lastly, and probably actually most importantly, again, because it's in very short supply, I think authenticity is absolutely critical here.

56:20You know, in his kind of weird way, Trump is kind of authentic. And I think the problem that many other leaders have is that they don't come across as being authentic. You have at times, you know, you see something there. You know, I've become a big fan of James Telerico, who won the Texas primaries for the Democrats. And he is someone that definitely sounds extremely authentic when he speaks. And I think that's easy to break through to audiences, maybe even unlikely audiences, if actually it sounds like you believe in what you're saying. and and I think as I said all this somehow needs to coalesce into a recipe that kind of makes sense and tastes good but I think we're beginning to identify certain ingredients.

57:15Mattia since you brought up China I just I want to end on the note that you know one of my favorite things about talking to foreign affairs writers a few months after their piece comes out is so often we get to say look at all the things that you suggested happen that did happen. And so you guys touched on this a little bit earlier, but in your piece, you know, you said that you wanted to see the Mercosur deal close. You wanted the India free trade agreement to happen. That happened. There was kind of like a checkmark. And, you know, it seems like a month after your piece came out, the European leaders listened and they read it.

57:47They got a lot done. One thing that was in your piece, though, that I haven't seen much about is kind of a, You suggested that Europe really needs its own China policy that's independent of the United States. For too long, Europe's been kind of just following along. And I'm curious if you've seen any developments to the contrary there. Is Europe closer to coming up with a coherent China policy, especially with the war in Iran? I've heard some people argue that Europe's going to end up buying a whole bunch of Chinese renewables because nobody wants to be this reliant on gas prices. So this could be a boon for the Chinese renewable industry.

58:25Is that something you see happening? And is there a risk of that happening? I mean, Europe is torn, right, when it comes to China. On the one hand, it is a partner for cooperation when it comes to climate change, when it comes to renewables, when it comes to energy. it remains a very important market for European exports and it remains a source of foreign direct investment but at the same time China is advancing so quickly that it's now I mean overwhelming Europe partially due to the US tariffs between the US and China that it's looking for other markets that are not American to to sell its stuff and of course the obvious alternative to the US that's a big chunk of the world economy with a little rich consumers is Europe.

59:12So it's a very careful balancing act. It's also not, I mean, in the end, I think the Europeans and especially the European Commission were much more comfortable with the first Trump administration and the Biden administration, which had a very clear line vis-a-vis China that they were then said, you know, you can pivot with us in that way. And, you know, we can do this together. We can have a global steel alliance for excess capacity and raise our tariffs together vis-a-vis countries that overproduce. And that way we protect our own industries. You could do this when it comes to export controls, when it comes to technology, when it comes to chips, all that stuff.

59:52So now they're basically forced almost by this ambivalent China policy of the Trump administration. One day he wants to make a beautiful deal. The other day, he wants to raise tariffs. But they also are collateral damage in this whole US-China war, right? Because they're now realizing when the Chinese threaten to cut off the Americans from rare earths and critical minerals, they cut off the whole world, right? I mean, not the whole world, but they include the Europeans, they include all of NATO, right? And so then they need the Americans to negotiate. So I think it has less lead in the first three months of 2026 of the Europeans that's saying pivoting to China and kind of like making up what they're no longer getting from the Americans.

1:00:34But it's making them realize that they need to reach out to, you know, what Mark Carney calls the middle powers of the world, right? Anything that's not the US, whether it's Canada, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, right? South Africa, Latin American countries, right? Where they are moving full speed ahead in coming up with alternative suppliers when it comes to all these critical inputs so they can keep building this. That said, what they cannot afford in Europe is a tariff war between the EU and China, right? So they will do it. The watchwords in Europe always are targeted, proportional, gradual, and through diplomacy.

1:01:15But so, I mean, I imagine if the relationship between the US and the EU, especially in economic terms, worsens, they will have to examine this relationship again. But let's not forget the big elephant in the room is still Chinese support for Russia, right? And Chinese support, I mean, the whole sort of axis of upheaval when it's Iran, North Korea, Russia and China, the Europeans know that they cannot fully trust the Chinese as a counterpart. So at least with the Americans, there is hope from a U.S. point of view that come 2029, there will be a more reasonable Republican or a Democrat in power in the White House that they can do business with.

1:01:56More transactional, less emotional, right, and all that stuff. And the Europeans have moved on from this. But in China, there is no such prospect, right, of having a more, I mean, acceptable leadership or a more acceptable regime in China that they could deal with in the future. Yeah, I agree. I mean, I think that the struggle that Europeans are in is learning to think about China with their own heads, you know, rather than thinking, you know, the North Star, i.e. the United States says A, and so we're kind of going to say and do A minus, right? So the US says decoupling and we say de-risking.

1:02:40So maybe de-risking is a good policy, right? But the point is that we came to it through a route which at the moment is not available because, as Matthias says, what is US policy on China? I don't know. And so Europeans have to think about China with their own heads. And it's not thought, right? I mean, because it doesn't have an illusion to it. Because on the one hand, yes, indeed, if you want to decarbonize, you have to actually, you know, work with China by whatever Chinese solar panels. But if you want to decarbonize, you also want to protect your own green technologies at home. And if you think about security, yes, obviously, inevitably, you have to think about ways of, well, you can't basically be at war and in conflict with everyone at the same time.

1:03:37And you need to prioritize. And Russia is more of a threat, obviously, than China is. And obviously, now there's this question of U.S. betrayal. So we can't have open fronts everywhere. But at the same time, we cannot not see that Russia and China are increasingly on the same page. So, you know, whether we're looking at it through an economic lens, a climate lens, a security lens, it's not an easy debate to have. But I think the point is that we need to have it by thinking through what our own interests are rather than just thinking about what does the U.S. want and we'll just do a little bit less.

1:04:15and actually, going back to the family analogy, I guess I'm a little bit more pessimistic than Matthias in thinking that maybe this is just husband and wife coming to terms with the fact that the wife's going to go back to work. Maybe I would put it in a slightly more dramatic way. this is about a separation. This is about a divorce. But maybe after a divorce, we can become good friends, right? And we can maybe even have Christmas together for the children. This is the co-parenting, the friendly co-parenting model. Right, exactly. So maybe when it comes to China, this period in which Europeans are forced to think with their own heads and understand what the trade-offs, what the pros and cons are, are going to ultimately lead to Europeans having a policy on China.

1:05:13And then when the U.S. ends up in a different place politically, we can work together on that, right? But not as a triangle, not as the Europeans doing less than the Americans, but Europeans acting on the basis of what their interests are. Natalie, I prefer Gwyneth Paltrow's term, conscious uncoupling. Okay, I can live with that. Yeah, separation, not divorce. Natalie and Matthias, thank you so much for joining me today. That was really a wonderful discussion and I'm really looking forward to whatever you two write next. Thanks for having us. It was a real pleasure.

1:05:56Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show at foreignaffairs.com. This episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Ben Metzner and Kanesh Therroer. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Irina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts. And if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.

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