From the Archive: How the Past Shadows China's Future: A Conversation With Odd Arne Westad

27:38I remember being struck when I was in government and continue to be struck in talking to policymakers and politicians since then that they use historical analogies all the time. They also use kind of theoretical constructs. Often those are, you know, it's bad history rather than really careful history of the kind you're doing. And so in some sort, I'd rather have people grappling with these explicitly rather than just letting people making decisions use half-remembered history from their college days. I think that's true. I mean, you know, the old saying, beware of historians bearing false analogies.

28:15I mean, I think there is a lot to be said for that. But also, I mean, I remember my late and much valued colleague at the Harvard Kennedy School when I was there, Ash Carter for Central Defense, always used to say that, you know, in the corridors of power, there is only one language that really matters, and that is the language of history. You can try to speak political science, you can try to speak economics, and you wouldn't get many people to listen to you, unless you simplify it to an extreme degree. But history is something that, particularly an angle that people haven't thought through, is something that can be immensely powerful.

28:49But as you rightly pointed out, I think that's true both for good and bad, right? I mean, it's not given, which you often hear, that any situation in which you have to believe you have to stand tall could potentially be another Munich. Or that every American intervention, however much you want to resist them, would be another Vietnam. So, I mean, you have to be very careful with how we actually use these. And they have to be built on some kind of understanding of actual parallels, not just overall political argumentation. And you could add to those Versailles or the Concert of Europe or plenty of other parallels that are misused all the time.

29:27Absolutely. And maybe especially today when we see these dramatic changes in the international system, right? Going back to Ash's point, I mean, that's exactly the moments when people are grasping for some kind of parallel that might make sense. And very often, of course, makes sense in the policy direction that that individual wants to move in. So with those cautions, let's go into the period of history that you find most resonant and important to consider at this moment. I think a lot of people have, as we discussed, spent time looking at the Cold War parallels. There's been plenty of consideration of the 1930s and the kind of period of American isolationism before World War II.

30:05You see more value in looking at the period before World War I, especially as a look at the mix of rising powers and incumbent powers and how those dynamics play out. what's the case for looking at that period? Why does that stand out so much to you? So I think there are many reasons for this. I mean, I think, again, we have to warn here there are no exact similarities between that period and our own, and there are significant challenges in terms of applying it in any kind of mechanical way on the situation today. But there are also very striking parallels. Multiplarity coming out of the 19th century that had seen Britain as a world-leading power, not always predominant in the same ways as the United States has been, but the central balance in power in the continent that was most important at the time, meaning in Europe, and sometimes even further afield.

30:57That role was receding. Multipolarity was the order of the day. Globalization, which in the late 19th century had been tremendously successful on a global scale, in part because Britain was as the center of that system, upholding free trade. as the only possible way of economic interaction by the early 20th century. All of this came under pressure, not least from within Britain itself, where many British leaders claimed that other countries had taken advantage of Great Britain because of the spread of globalization. Difficulties that had to do with terrorism, with nationalism, with the rise of racism in terms of international relations, All of this is something that our own time, it seems to me, has in common with that time period.

31:48So these are, in my view, sort of structural elements that existed in the world that came out of the 1890s and existed in the world coming out of the 20-teens, which have a lot in common. And I think it's important to think in those terms. Now, in addition to that, obviously, we also have to look at the individuals who are in charge at the top. And very often we find that some of their thinking is strikingly parallel to what you find today in terms of thinking about the policy outcomes of this change that they are observing with regard to alliances, with regard to military strategies, with regard to how to react if their great power comes under pressure in wildness.

32:34The parallels between China and Germany that you sketch out in the peace and foreign affairs, sleepwalking toward war, and then the book that you have forthcoming that expands that, when you look at Germany and China, that seems like in some ways the echo that is most concerning, both in the sense of the German sense of the time, Chinese sense now, that the incumbent powers really set out to contain them and nothing will change that. And then also the failure of the rising power to, you know, kind of effectively reassure the world, perhaps in China's case, it doesn't really want to, but no kind of effective reassurance to the rest of the world that it doesn't have dramatically revisionist aims.

33:10That in some ways seems like the most worrying element of this as I look at it. Yeah, it is. Although I have significant worries on the other side as well, where I see striking similarity in many ways between positions taken by Great Britain back then and the United States now. I mean, maybe first and foremost, the speed which Britain was willing to undermine an international system that itself had set up and at which it had served as the center for a very, very long time, compares quite well to what you see, particularly in the second Trump administration in terms of American attitudes. But on the Chinese side, yeah, I think there are a lot of parallels with imperial Germany.

33:50So this is where my history gets a little bit dicey, particularly when I discuss these things in Beijing or in China, because most people in China, being somewhat removed from European history. When I make a German parallel, they think Nazi Germany, and they think the 1930s, which, of course, is not the case, and very far from the kind of parallel that I draw. What I'm seeing is, in the German case, a European power, a new power, the center of Europe, that grows much more rapidly in terms of its influence and power than anyone had expected, including inside that country itself. And as you said, I mean, really has trouble from within finding a role within that system that always exists.

34:33Now, not all of the reasons for that are on the German side. There was also a complete failure of imagination, particularly when you get to the very latter part of the 19th century, for the establishment powers, if you could call them that, to find some kind of role for Germany, to have ideas about what Germany could do within a European setting and within a more global setting. The answer far too often seem to be towards Germany, as my colleague Paul Kennedy wrote in this wonderful book, The Rise and Fall of Anglo-German Antagonism. He talked about what the British were saying was, little Hans, if you stop growing, everything would be okay.

35:13That's what you have to do. And that was what Germany was told very often, that the problem was Germany's growth. It was not something inherent with finding a place for Germany within the international system. So I think there are problems here on both sides, issues that we can learn from Germanist rights. The key, though, in the end, I mean, what led from these structural conflicts and resentments over on to actual war, as I outline in the book, The Coming Stone, is that Germany started moving politically in a direction which almost foresaw some kind of military conflict with other great powers in Europe.

35:58It was a slow process. I think China has, to some extent, been going through part of that same process. And then a world-class crisis that no one could foresee, a black swan event, really, in the summer of 1914, comes along. And no one is able to retreat from that most existential fear that the positioning, including the military plans and of the great powers, lead to. So we have to be aware of both of these, right? I mean, we have to be aware both of the structural elements in creating a world or potential conflict leading up to the First World War, but also the actual decision making. And even on that, I see difficulties with regard to our own time that point in similar directions.

36:45I mean, we've just been very lucky that we haven't had a crisis of that kind coming up. You say in the essay, the foreign affairs essay, that Taiwan is a prime candidate to be the Balkans of the 2020s. We spend plenty of time thinking about a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, of course. It's far from a black swan. If you kind of play out a scenario that alarms you, how does that crisis spread into something much worse? How do you see that risk? So Taiwan is, if you want to use the parallel with the First World War, Taiwan is a little bit like Alsace, Bosnia and Belgium rolled into one. You know, it has the territorial issues that connect to Alsace.

37:25And the idea being that this is something that is national territory and therefore cannot be bargained away. It is a bit like Bosnia in the sense that it is a situation in which it's quite likely at some point that something is going to happen connected to that particular country, that particular place, that could create a great power crisis. crisis. And it is like Belgium in the sense that on the German side back then, and I think on the Chinese side now, the basic calculation that the leaders have to make is whether a military operation against that country, it's something that could be undertaken without an international constellation of great powers allying against you, and particularly without the intervention of the the strongest military power back then Great Britain and now the United States.

38:23So I think those are the sort of parallels that are there. I mean, in terms of scenarios, I could easily give you 100 scenarios with regard to Taiwan, where all of this in one form or other could play itself out. That's why I'm so worried about it. Though I think it is also important to underline that it's not just Taiwan. I mean, there are other potential conflicts within Eastern Asia that could easily set of the kind of situation that we saw in 1914. I should also mention that one of the parallels that I see, and I spent a bit of time on in the book, in terms of China, is Germany up to World War I was allied very closely with Austria-Hungary.

39:03Indeed, it was the only real important ally that Germany had, not because they loved the Austrians, far from it, but because it was the only ally that was available. Right. Just like in that situation, China is moving closer and closer to a de facto alliance with a decrepit empire on its own doorstep, namely Russia. And not just an empire that's in internal decline, but also that has quarrels with almost all of its neighbors, just like Austria had. Many of those quarrels, just like for China and Ukraine, many of those quarrels back in the early 20th century were not Germany's quarrels. But there was this sense that they had to keep that alliance together or there would be bigger trouble in a strategic sense.

39:47I want to go back to the Sino-Russian relationship in a bit, but just to linger on Taiwan for a moment. You spend time talking to people in Chinese policy circles about Taiwan. And you've also, of course, written the best book out there about the Chinese Civil War, Sites of Encounters. And in some sense, Taiwan is just the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War. Or how do you assess the risks there? And if you look back at that history, how does this fit into CCP thinking about its own legitimacy and its own future at this point? So I think the risks are very high. And I think they are increasing.

40:23I think there is a general sense in Beijing, and for that matter elsewhere in China, that the PLC does not have unlimited time to reunify Taiwan with the motherland, as they would put it, for two main reasons. which was presented to me very clearly last time I was in Beijing. What is the changes taking place on the island itself? The fact that younger Taiwanese feel much less Chinese than what their parents' generation would mention, the grandparents' generation, actually does, and that this is a real problem. I had one recently retired general pull me aside and said, you know, this is really the issue, right?

41:01If we do not act towards reunification before it is impossible to carry out for reasons that have to do with identity and general sentiment within the island, then we wouldn't be able to make this happen even if we used all the military force in the world. So that's one issue. The other issue, I think, is connected to CCP perceptions of China's international stature. And I get this more and more often played back that if you are going to be a predominant power within your region and you can't even reunify your own country, then you would never have the kind of position that Chinese now for a very long time have been striving towards.

41:44And I think both of those arguments, I think they are very bad arguments, but they are arguments that you hear fairly often in terms of saying that the idea of letting this go on forever is simply not acceptable from a Chinese point of view. And on the PRC side, those kinds of ideas worry me more than anything else because you see some of the parallels that are there, not just with regard to Taiwan, but with regard to China's overall position compared to some of the German thinking in 1914, which was that if war were to come, it might actually be better for Germany if it happened then than if it happened later.

42:30Because some, not all, but some German leaders had started to think that given the exceptional growth, strengthening that Germany had had in the past, you know, no tree grows into heaven. There were signs of stress, there were signs of retreat, particularly with regard to the German economy in 1914. There was the fear that other powers were strengthening themselves, particularly Russia, in ways that would make it more difficult for Germany to achieve its overall aims in Eastern Europe. And when the crisis then hit, you know, there are people within the German system who are saying, you know, maybe this is what they call the maximum moment.

43:10Maybe this is the best opportunity that we have for achieving our aim. So this is what I'm afraid of on the Chinese side. And many things I'm afraid of on the U.S. side as well in terms of triggering conflict. But on the Chinese side, these are the parallels. In my own search for optimism, one thing that seems different than in the pre-World War I period, at least in this particular moment in the U.S.-China dynamic, is that, as you point out in the piece in the book, both English and German policymakers before World War I thought that their position was eroding, that things were getting worse.

43:39And so they needed to act sooner rather than later. I think you detect a degree of optimism on both the Chinese and American side right now, the sense that they have the upper hand, that things are moving in their direction, and that there's in some ways some reassurance of that. I'm not sure that's true, Dan. I mean, I see some elements of that. They also see a lot of uncertainty and even fear, both on the US and on the Chinese side with regard to these kinds of issues, particularly somewhat more long term. But I think on the American side, the fear of an even more complete political dysfunction coming out of the divides within the country, a fear that the United States might be overtaken by other countries, particularly in terms of technological development, not shared by everyone, but I see some signs of that that are pretty strong.

44:27And on the Chinese side, likewise, I think you do find, particularly last time I was in China, some striking parallels that people are concerned that some of the power of the economic model that has carried China as far as it has now are actually starting to give way. And that the relative position of China in the future, especially regionally, might not be as strong as it is at the present. Now, none of these are reasons to go to war, and I think probably never will. But they do underpin a certain sense of reality that may play a role if the right crisis comes along. When you talk to both Chinese historians and people in Chinese policy circles about Taiwan and about the history of the Civil War and how we got to this point, where do you disagree on the history?

45:20Where are there kind of different pictures of what has happened in the past that in some ways contribute to dynamics now? I think there is very little in terms of the CCP version of the history of Taiwan that is actually historically correct. But that doesn't matter all that much, as long as it's very strongly held on the CCP side. So I think that's what we really should concentrate on. I mean, in reality, of course, Taiwan has never been a part of the People's Republic of China. It was a part of the Qing Empire, it was a part, very briefly, of the mainland-based Chinese Republic. And there has always been a strong sense in Taiwan of a certain separateness.

46:03But, I mean, nothing of that actually matters in terms of the public perception in China today, where, you know, the idea is very strongly held, including by people who are not particularly fond of the domestic directions that the Communist Party has moved in over the past decade and a half, We also believe very firmly that for China, Taiwan is unfinished business and that the emphasis is that this is not something that we can leave to later generations to deal with. But in reality, of course, particularly in terms of avoiding the dangers that we are talking about, that is exactly what they should be.

46:38Because there really isn't any kind of solution beyond military action than some version of the status quo. So, and of course, the clearer that's understood on all sides, including in Taipei, but also crucially in Washington, D.C., you know, the better it will be for all of us. That's what I meant with one of these pressure points where one tries to change only a relatively small aspect of what has come out of more recent history, and that that could have disastrous results. And I think there is a healthy realization of that among people who provide advice to leaders both sides of the Pacific and in Taipei as well.

47:19But it's not as clear as I would have liked to see. I mean, there are constantly people, you know this better than me, in Washington and elsewhere, who are playing around with some kind of resolution to the Taiwan situation that would benefit democracy on Taiwan or the interests of the United States more than the current situation. There isn't. Any attempt to change that in this kind of situation would be doubly dangerous. You cited the relationship between Russia and China, which has been developing extremely rapidly, I think surprisingly rapidly, over the last few years as one of the disquieting parallels between the pre-World War I period and now.

48:02You've done some of the most important work on the Sino-Soviet relationship going back to the 1940s or perhaps before. Have you been surprised by the extent of development and the relationship between Russia and China now? Yes, I have. I mean, by the speed of it and how totally the Russian leadership is willing to be subservient to China, first and foremost, on economic matters. I don't think we have another example from history, at least I can't think of all, where one great power so willingly hands away economic advantages to a near neighbor, even if that near neighbor is a de facto ally. So I think that is quite unique.

48:47I think from the Chinese perspective, likewise, I think China, and this I think is President Xi's own decision, China has been willing to move more quickly in terms of building the relationship with Russia than what I expected, given how often that relationship between the two countries have gone wrong in the past. And for him, I think this is a very important part of his legacy. I mean, he sees the two countries in ways that not everyone else in China does, as natural allies going forward. And he's willing to stake a significant part of what will remain after him on that situation continuing.

49:26So I think there are surprises here in both directions. But I think the answer to the question is yes. I mean, I'm surprised with the speed that this happened. And I can see some real reasons why over the slightly longer term, that particularly under a different leadership in one or both countries, that this relationship could get into some level of trouble. You argued in 2022 in our pages that this would be bad for China in the long run, that linking itself to at least this version of Russia would not be good for it. If you were making that case to Xi Jinping now, what would you tell him? I would make exactly the same argument.

50:01I think it is very, very bad for China. And I think there are, I mean, there is a certain short-term gratification of this, particularly with regard to access to Russian resources, which is the only thing that Russia has that China is interested in at the moment. And also showing to the rest of the world that China has a big ally that is willing to link with it. But in the longer term, I mean, there is no end of trouble with regard to this. And even after the current war in Ukraine is over, Russia is going to have a very difficult relationship to almost all of its neighbors. It's going to have a disastrous relationship to the European Union, which influences, to an extent that I don't think is quite understood in Beijing, China's relationship with Europe, which has been in freefall to an extent that has really surprised me over the past several months.

50:51So I think the long-term consequences of this for China are not good. I'm also worried, maybe so much immediately, and certainly not with regard to Ukraine, but thinking a little bit further, that it could pull China into conflicts in which China has very little interest. And where it also would, in an immediate sense, not really be able to steer Russian positions and Russian actions, in spite of the immense priority that China now has in terms of Russia's international affairs. So, as the United States has learned, that preponderance of power is not necessarily enough in itself to prevent allies, even quite close allies, to do things they shouldn't have done.

51:39And I think China is just about starting to think about that more long term. But I don't think they're quite there yet. And there are some real dangers with regard to that. What's a scenario where you can imagine Russia pulling China into a conflict if it's not Ukraine? Oh, I think there are many, many situations with regard to that. I mean, I think with regard to the Middle East, I think there are possibilities there for conflict that would involve Russia. I'm thinking about the Russian-Turkish relationship over time, which is filled with conflict and potential clashes. I also see Russian actions with a lot in North Korea as being really ominous.

52:19Not that Russia in itself is in a position or has an interest in starting a war on the Korean Peninsula, but that through some of their actions, including supplying North Koreans with stuff that they really, really shouldn't be having, You know, Russia plays a role that would lead, I think would is better than could here, to more tension on the peninsula and potentially war. On this latter point, it seemed to me, again coming out of my most recent visit to Beijing, that the Chinese are aware of this. But they can't really act on it very much, in part because of their own relationship with North Korea, which of course has been developing very quickly.

52:59But also because any kind of Chinese public displeasure over Russian actions with regard to North Korea is something that the North Koreans would see as a very negative aspect of southern North Korean relations. So these are the kinds of buying, you know, that it is so easy to get into when you have this kind of relationship with a power that in reality, and many people in Beijing would agree with me on this, is remarkably irresponsible when it comes to its own international affairs. and is now trying, not just because of Ukraine, but because of Putin's policies overall, to just hit back at the West in whatever way it can internationally, not thinking very much about the direction that these things could actually take.

53:46And certainly American policymakers have spent lots of time worrying about entanglement over the last several decades. I can imagine Chinese policymakers starting to grapple with that as well. Just on the American policy piece, though, it's been a fixation of American policymakers in the last few administrations, that there should be some opportunity to split or sow tension between Moscow and Beijing. There's, of course, the reverse Kissinger idea that we should make an ally of Moscow or at least tamp down tensions with Moscow in order to be able to focus on China. I think there are people in the Trump administration who think that way.

54:20There's also an argument, and we heard this on the podcast recently from Robert O 'Brien, Trump's first-term national security advisor, that it makes sense to establish a degree of calm in the US-China relationship so that the US can deal with their problems. Do you see policy opportunities here? Does that kind of overstate the degree of American influence here, and it's in some ways beyond our ability to really control one or another? So I think one has to be careful with calling them opportunities then. I mean, there are... Do I think that this country ought to improve its relations both with China and with Russia when that is possible?

54:55Absolutely, yes. Do I think that there is a possibility at the moment for some kind of reverse Kissinger with regard to Russia? Absolutely, no. I mean, I think when this war ends, and it will end at some point, the war in Ukraine, I think there will be a relatively slow process of resetting US, and for that matter, probably also Chinese-Russian relations. But I don't see that as being a possibility at the moment. I think if we were to try a way of reaching out to Russia as the war in Ukraine comes to an end, I think the end result of that would just be to encourage Russia further on the kind of behavior that Russia has shown already, and which is in many ways to the detriment both of China and ourselves.

55:46When it comes to China, I do register attempts to decrease tension, which I welcome. I think the Trump administration has acted well on a number of issues that have come up, whether it's a possibility of moving towards some kind of stabilization of relations with China. Whether it's going to last is very difficult to say. I mean, I think if you think about interest here in a sort of narrower sense, I think both of the two countries now have an incentive, a strong incentive, to reduce the tension between them, which probably would mean, both for Beijing and Washington, an ability to focus in on where the real conflicts between the two countries actually are, instead of having this spillover onto everything.

56:36But even if that were to happen as an outcome of this, I would welcome it. I mean, part of the problem in 1914 was this absolute conflation of everything in terms of resentments, in terms of fears, in terms of actual policy conflicts, in terms of strategic military doctrine that helped create a situation where war could become a reality. So any step we take away from that, I think, should be welcomed and seen as positive. We spend a lot of time assessing the China policy debate here in the United States. How do you assess the America policy debate in China as you interact with your Chinese colleagues?

57:13So I think there has been a lot of change in Chinese perceptions of the United States going back to the first Trump administration. I think at the moment, particularly of the re-election of President Trump, I think there has been a sense on the Chinese side of uncertainty, of drift in terms of U.S. foreign relations, maybe particularly the relationship with allies, including in the Eastern Asian region. A lack of certainty in what the United States might do in terms of a crisis. And some of this worries me. Some of this is incredibly exaggerated. I mean, the idea that we are now seeing some kind of acute power shift situation, which not everyone at the top levels in Beijing hold, but some people hold them pretty strongly, that this is in a way the culmination of a longer process of American decline.

58:03You know, I think one has to be very, very careful with those postulations because they're almost certainly wrong. But that doesn't mean, as in the case of Taiwan, we talked about earlier, that they are not strongly held on the Chinese side. So the idea that you find in this country, certainly among his supporters, but also a little further away, that President Trump is a strong foreign policy leader who is able to take U.S. international affairs in a new direction, more positive for the United States. I don't think that view overall is shared, certainly among Chinese policymakers. I think among Chinese population in general, there is a certain admiration for President Trump because he's seen as being decisive and he's seen as being a strong leader.

58:45There's always admiration in China for strong leaders. But among policymakers, I sense more danger than opportunity in terms of looking at this. And the danger then would be, from a Chinese perspective, that if a crisis comes along, even a crisis that is not of the Chinese making, the decision making of the current administration in the United States could be very difficult to foresee, very difficult to come up with a clear conclusion about what direction the White House would want to move in. And that's a danger, right? I mean, that could easily lead to conclusions on the Chinese side that might be erroneous in terms of both the president's policy overall and in terms of the general political situation in the United States.

59:28And that's something I'm trying to warn against when I deal with Chinese colleagues, is that one shouldn't have this idea that what is happening now in the United States is an overall sense that the United States would be less involved in terms of international crisis in Asia. Because I don't think it is true. And I think it's even, you know, it has some dangers in it in terms of the Chinese thinking. This is a conversation that we probably have to end on a note of warning and danger, despite my attempt to find some source of optimism. So we will stop there. Thank you so much for doing this. I noted in going back to your work that since I came to foreign affairs, you've done essentially one piece a year.

1:00:09So I think we're due for another one soon. It would be a pleasure, Dan. It's always a pleasure to discuss these things with you.

1:00:20Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show at foreignaffairs.com. This episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Rose Kohler and Kanesh Kleror. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Original music is by Robin Hilton. special thanks as well to Irina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts. And if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.

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