How to Navigate the Shifting International Order

27:00And that's what binds us. And my final point is that, you see, I think foreign policy is based on three pillars. It's values, interests, and power. Now, American values have shifted a little bit, sort of right from left. Interests have shifted probably from pure geopolitics to some financial interest, as we can see in the foreign policy. We have to be realistic about that. And then finally, the way in which America projects power is different. And now we need to work on these three elements and see where we find, you know, common landing zones and just stay calm about it, you know, be more Finnish.

27:37When you look at Ukraine, how do you see those shifting elements, the values, interest and power reshaping U.S. policy? Well, I'm actually quite optimistic of what I see on the Ukraine side, in the sense that, you know, a year ago, if someone would have told me that we're in a place where we basically have five documents around which a comprehensive peace plan could be agreed, and that the Russians and the Ukrainians are now for the first time since the beginning of the war sitting around the same negotiating table, and especially military to military, I would have taken it. And so I like to kind of divide it into two.

28:15On the peace process, So the 20-point plan, the security guarantees, and the prosperity package, I think we're moving in the right direction. And America has been instrumental on this. Yes, the negotiating tactics are sometimes tough, but I think they're getting resolved. But my second point is more substantive, and this is especially for our American audience. We in Finland, we know Russia, right? We have our intelligence. We see what's happening. And let's just reflect. Let's be honest about what's going on. Three points. Point number one, Putin has failed in all of his strategic aims in this war.

28:56He tried to Russify Ukraine. It is going to become a member of the European Union. He tried to prevent the enlargement of NATO. He got Finland and Sweden and doubled NATO's border with Russia. And he tried to keep our defense expenditure and therefore capabilities down. And we've now lifted to 5%. So from a strategic perspective, total failure. Second, militarily. This is what people don't understand. In the beginning of the war, 12 years ago, right in the beginning of the war, they got 12 % of Ukraine's territory, including the Crimean Peninsula. Since then, in 12 years, 8%. In the past two years, one percentage point of Ukrainian territory.

29:40They are not winning the war. On the contrary, they're losing the war. Why? Because in December, 34 ,000 Russian soldiers were killed, 80 % of them actually with Russian drones, with virtually no collateral damage. The worst days, there was one Ukrainian soldier killed to 25 Russian soldiers. And for the first time, Russia is not able to recruit as many soldiers as are dying on the battlefield. And how much are they advancing? You know, we're talking about millimeters per day. So we're talking basically about a military strategy, which is not working. And then finally, thirdly, on the economic side, Russia is not doing well because of the sanctions and other things.

30:27Zero growth. They have no reserves left. Interest rate, 16%. Inflation in double digits. So basically, Putin cannot afford to end this war because of the economic and social and political consequences in Russia, not because he wants to advance, because he's not advancing. So that's why I feel that we need to continue to put more pressure on Russia as we move along. And these are the types of messages that we keep also discussing with President Trump and the administration. And look, Putin is letting President Trump down time after time. He lies about his dutcher being bombed he sends ballistic missiles and he breaks the ceasefire that he promised to the u.s president so now the good news is and this is my final point the united states ukraine and europe are now on the same page and now we need to increase the pressure to end this war how would you articulate a theory of victory for for the ukrainian side i mean your points about the struggles of russia are quite persuasive but i think ukrainian policymakers and supporters of Ukraine have struggled to lay out clearly what a Ukrainian theory would be.

31:40How would you articulate that? You know, I can't speak for the Ukrainians. They are the ones who define victory. And of course, peace agreements, usually they're good, bad, or a compromise. And I think we're looking at a compromise here. I mean, the only thing I would ask the Ukrainians probably to do is to, if you want comparisons from history, which are a little bit dangerous. But the reason that Finland is one of the top supporters of Ukraine is the sort of emotional affinity we feel to what they are going through, because we had a similar experience in the winter war, which albeit lasted only 105 days in these types of conditions that we have outside here, minus 20 and more, and in the war of continuation, which was then longer.

32:28And what did we end up with? So we lost the war on the battlefield, or we could not have continued because we were so small and they were so big. So we lost 10 % of our territory, including the areas where my grandparents and my father was born. On top of that, our top leaders were indicted as war criminals and had to go to jail in a justice system which was led by the Soviets at the time. Thirdly, our military was limited. Fourth, we paid war compensation, 300 million US dollars at the value at that time. We're the only country in the world, as far as I know, that have paid back their war compensation.

33:12And then finally, we had to let out a peninsula 30 kilometers from Helsinki called Porkkala for 50 years, but it was given back in 1956. So we were only limited and we didn't get much And then you have to ask the question What will Ukraine get as a result of this peace? Number one, it will become a member of the European Union It is going to happen Number two, it's going to get probably the biggest reconstruction package In the history of at least modern warfare Number three, it will get security guarantees from the United States and that's huge and of course also from european countries and and the coalition of the wailing and then the question comes to territory the theory of victory and here i cannot give you an answer the only answer i can give you that finland will never ever de juure approve any illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory to Russia.

34:19The cost of war is horrendous. But at the end of the day, I think that we don't need a theory of victory, because there is a theory of defeat. And that lies east of Ukraine in Russia. As you look at the ongoing negotiations, when you look at Russian demands, what would be a bridge too far and make this a settlement that's not worth taking? Well, again, this is up to the Ukrainians to decide. But two worries that I have. One is Donbass. At the rate at which Russia is moving, it would take them a minimum of two years to get Donbass, a minimum. And we're talking 20 kilometers, right? So they're not advancing.

35:01But the second one is that this war is too big for Putin to fail, and therefore he will not sign a peace agreement or he will not honor a peace agreement. And I, of course, think that the latter is the more serious one and the fundamental one that we have to deal with. And the only one who can put serious pressure on Putin and Russia, of course, is Trump. What are your worries about Russian hostility towards Finland or other NATO members in the wake of war in Ukraine? Do you see a threat there? I'm not worried about that. I think that's, to be honest, of course, we are prepared for all kinds of scenarios, but that's a lot of noise.

35:33You know, that noise quite often comes from people who probably don't have the depth of understanding of Russian geopolitical or military strategy. And, you know, the more I talk with my friends in the Southern Caucasus, in Armenia and Azerbaijan or in Georgia, or the more I talk to my friends in Central Asia, the more convinced I am that they are more worried than we should be. Remember that Russia should not test Article 5, certainly not in Finland or anywhere else for that matter. We have seen the basic military failure of Russia in Ukraine. So for them to go ahead and test Article 5 is just not in the cards or scenarios that I look at very closely or seriously, at least.

36:25And you think Putin gets that? I think so. I've met Putin a few times. I think he's a rational individual. He has his revisionist theory of history, which he bases a lot of his thinking on, for instance, on Ukraine, which I fundamentally disagree with. He also has this sort of dream of Ruskimir, Great Russia, which means one country, one language, one religion, and one leader. Himself, he still sees and has said many times that the biggest tragedy in recent history is the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 15 independent states that emerged out of there. so it's sort of this geopolitical fantasy that he lives with that that does still worry me but that that doesn't sort of uh you know reach out to my border how have you understood the durability of chinese support for for the russian war in ukraine over the last few years it would have struck me that china had a good opportunity to improve its relationship with uh with much of europe had it been a little bit more subtle about its role in the war in Ukraine.

37:40How have you understood the Chinese policy here? Well, I had a state visit to Beijing in October 2024, so about eight months into my term as president of Finland. I had a chance to spend the better part of three hours in the presence of President Xi Jinping. My prime minister was in Beijing just last week. obviously Keir Starmer the prime minister of the United Kingdom was there and also the prime minister of Canada so there is a very strong relationship emerging from Europeans and others who are you know reaching out to China I think at the beginning of the war China sat on the fence and and was a little bit baffled that you know why did Putin do this why didn't he tell us about it But once that fence sitting sort of transitioned, it became then pretty much, I would say, a vassal type of a relationship where Russia is completely dependent on China.

38:43And of course, China's argument is that we don't sell the military material. And I get that. But there are elements that can be used for military equipment. and the financial support from trade or buying energy, oil and gas is, of course, quite substantive. But we'll see. I think the Chinese are also starting to get tired of seeing this, you know, military failure by Putin. So we'll see what happens. How do you view China's global ambitions? And to the extent you see it this way, do you see those as a threat to your own interest and to transatlantic interest? There's obviously a kind of consensus in the United States that China is really the foremost challenge right now.

39:27Where do you differ from the American view of this, if at all? Well, I mean, as I say in my piece and elsewhere, I think the world order is changing. It changes every so often. After World War I, it took two decades for it to change. After World War II, it took four decades for the Cold War to end. And then after the Cold War ended, it took three decades for this new transition to begin. and the transition quite often has a few key players. After the Cold War, we did live a unipolar moment, which was obviously led by the United States and China was far behind. Just to put it in context, the size of the Chinese economy and the Russian economy in 1990 were equal.

40:11Now China is over 10 times bigger than Russia. So there are obvious reasons why the United States sees its hegemonic role threatened by a superpower like China from an economic perspective, from a demographic perspective, from a technological perspective, et cetera, et cetera. I actually think that China is playing its cards quite well right now. It's very much seen as the stable, patient superpower in name. It has forged a lot of interdependency relationships through the Belt and Road Initiative and the five or six other similar type of initiatives that have to do with development and technology and security.

40:57But obviously, it wants to be at least a regional superpower, which it is. And then the question is, how far will it go? It also believes in its system of governance, which is not obviously a liberal democracy, but it is probably not as centralized as we believe either. There's a different concept of society. We in the West, we come from a very individualistic background. We focus on the individual, whereas in China, it's more about the collective and society. And China is now able to provide its citizens with the basic goods that keep the system churning. The 5 % annual growth rates have created a wealth machine and a distribution of wealth where people have emerged from poverty to the middle class.

41:48And the question is, can we do this in the US? Can we do it in Europe sustainably in the long term? But my basic point is that China and the US are the two superpowers. And then they're going to have a whole bunch of middle powers that come into this game and play probably a rather multi-vectoral foreign policy, the likes of India or Turkey. I mentioned earlier South Africa, Brazil, you know, put Nigeria into the mix, Indonesia, and you look at the Gulf states. So there are many others. So that's why we're living in this really, you know, world of disorder where a lot of power vacuums emerge and then someone keeps on filling them.

42:27And I think it'll take about five years for things to settle. And I hope to have a new world order by 2030. You noted at Davos that whereas you and other middle powers used to talk about de-risking from China, you're now talking about de-risking from elsewhere, with the elsewhere being quite clear in context what you were talking about. As you look to China for economic engagement, for other kinds of engagement, what are the risks and how do you manage those from a middle powers perspective? Well, again, let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater. I'm not advocating de-risking from the United States.

43:01I'm advocating interdependence. That's why we have just sold 11 icebreakers to the United States. They need them desperately. We have eight. The US basically has zero. Russia has 40. So you need to work on where you have mutual dependencies. And I think the language that Europe still uses is de-risking from China. A fun fact, the Biden administration started to use the same term of de-risking when Europe did that the first time around. So I think that these power relations are right now shifting. I don't believe that you can kind of snap off value chains and dependencies just like that. They are tit for tat, and you actually need them.

43:45China has a lot of cards right now, but obviously Europe has a lot of cards as well. And I like this triangle of mutual dependence, China, US, and Europe. I do remember writing a Financial Times column, it must have been in 2016, which I rather provocatively called, Europe is the new Africa for China. And my argument was that the way in which China was mining raw materials in Africa, they were mining technology in Europe. And I called for risk management and checking out. Now, of course, we live in a new world and we'll see. But you'll start seeing Europe taking much more responsibility for its own raw materials.

44:27And obviously, we're a little bit edgy on technology because our approach is different. But this doesn't mean that you close the door completely. That picture of Europe as, in some ways, balancing between America and China is quite striking. That's an interesting sense of where things are going. It is. And what I also see now is Europe starting to work. Obviously, we had a free trade agreement with Mercosur in Latin America. We have a free trade agreement with India. I'm not seeing a free trade agreement with China, but there are some issues that are linked to intellectual property and others that you'll probably start seeing some deals coming between Europe and China as well.

45:10And this is, I think, a natural inclination for entities or states to do that if you feel a little bit uncomfortable with, say, tariffs coming from the United States, you start looking elsewhere. But the jury is still out for how long this will last. The other element you focus on in the Foreign Affairs essay is, of course, the global south. And you describe this kind of triangular contest among the east, the west, and the south. How do you see that unfolding in the years ahead, especially at a moment where it does not strike me that a lot of the Western powers are spending a ton of time thinking about this, and China certainly is.

45:47Yeah. So my basic argument in the piece and also in the book is to say that we have the global West led by the United States that is the champion of the liberal world order that it created after World War II. Well, now we can ask the question whether the United States still wants to take that role or not. Probably right now we could say that not so much. Then you have the global east led by China, followed by the likes of Russia, which believes probably in a more multipolar world and feels that the international system that was created after World War II was created in the image of the West and the US, and it's not necessarily wrong enough.

46:26And my argument is that if it's this battle between multipolarity and multilateralism, the ones who are going to decide the direction in which we go is going to be the global south. So, you know, what does India think? What does South Africa think? What does Brazil think? And they are the ones who are then going to huddle around and say, well, you know, as a matter of fact, a rules-based world order would be better. But that, for me, for the West, entails two things, which both have to do with humbleness or humility. One is values-based realism, which is the instrument. So stay true to your values, democracy, freedom, fundamental rights, human rights, rule of law, protection of minorities.

47:08but be realistic that you cannot solve all the world's problem just with Sweden. It has to be broader than that. So if you want to deal with climate change, if you want to solve trade issues, if you want to solve conflicts, technology, et cetera, you need to cooperate with countries who don't look like you, who don't smell like you, who don't think like you, and who don't share your basic values. And the other instrument that needs to be used from the Western perspective is what I call dignified foreign policy. And that means that you treat other countries with dignity in this sort of post-colonial world, if you will.

47:44I actually think that it's an instrument that works. I mean, having been doing foreign policy, both on the academic side, civil service side, and then in politics, I have never met anyone who is aggressive and arrogant that I would want to follow, right? Unless I'm really, really forced to do that. So that's why I think that if the West now drives a more dignified foreign policy with the global South, I think we might get there. And I think India is the case in point here. It bodes poorly for how this new order is going to develop that you have a US administration that I think would disagree with some of those basic theories of how power works and where we've seen a rift with India of all countries in the last year.

48:29Yeah, but again, the pendulum there oscillates. President Trump has a different type of conducting foreign policy, and he does it quite strongly. And he uses economic power as coercion, almost like an instrument of war with tariffs, for instance. And to a certain extent, you could argue that from his perspective, he gets results. How long-lasting these results then are, I think the jury is still out on that. As a free trader, I believe in win-win and mutual benefits. I believe in interdependence and in broad value chains. I believe that manufacturing per se will, at the end of the day, not create the type of labor that we might be thinking of in terms of heavy industry that will be done by robots.

49:20I happen to think that the next frontier is already here, and that's artificial intelligence. And that will then create different types of past dependencies and avenues of economic growth. So we'll see how this sort of laboratory of tariffs pans out for the US. We just don't know yet. I've had super interesting conversations with someone like Jameson Greer, who I respect a lot, who thinks about these things deeply. He writes about them deeply. This is the US trade representative. Exactly. And, you know, there's a case to be made short term or otherwise that tariffs for a country like the US works, but whether they work long term, we just don't know yet.

50:05You are close to singular in the world today in that you can write high minded essays in elite journals and advocate multilateralism. And yet you have at the same time been one of the really the most effective leaders when it comes to diplomacy with President Trump, other than having been a professional level golfer earlier in your life. I'm curious what you see as the formula for conducting diplomacy with Trump and where you've seen others go wrong when you think this goes poorly. What do people miss? Well, again, I don't want to inflate my own role. I'm inherently a curious person. Studying in the United States from 1989 to 1993 genuinely changed my life.

50:43I wanted to become a golf professional, I realized I wasn't good enough. So I got into international relations and I haven't looked back since. So I think I have a basic understanding of what it means to be American, whether you are from Greenville, South Carolina, or whether you are from San Francisco, California, or whether you're from New York. And I have a lot of respect. I mean, I was a huge fan of the papers. When I heard of the Hamilton musical, I rushed to go and see it just because of my academic quench and interest for it. So my take is quite pragmatic. I think diplomacy and foreign policy always works on two levels.

51:27One is your traditional state-to-state level. That's where history, geography, values, interests, culture come into play. And I firmly believe that there needs to be a close bond between Europe and the United States, because we have that value base, we have that connection, which has a little bit of nostalgia, but essentially, it's really also about values and interests. And the other part is then the personal connection, right? So you don't have to agree on everything, but you can get cordially along with people. And I come from a small country, so I have no illusions about my impact. If I have a conversation with the president of the United States, who's the most powerful person in the world, it's great, but I have no illusions that I have an impact on him, right?

52:22President Trump is actually quite curious. He asks a lot of questions and he engages. He's very different one-to-one or in smaller groups and what you see in general. And then, of course, because of the situation that we have the experience with the Russians or Soviets, the war in Ukraine is one of the key issues for President Trump. If he sometimes listens to a couple of the ideas that I have about it, that's great. But I have no illusions of my impact and the curiosity just to come back with it. For me, it helps a lot. I mean, I wrote the book over four years when I was pretty much in academia, had to do some touch-ups when I became president for rather obvious reasons.

53:04But it helps me to frame thinking. And the reason I write to Foreign Affairs, and I actually do the writing myself, is that it helps me to then condense my ideas and come to different paths. And I think foreign policy is always an iteration. And right now we are in 2026. And as we can see in the month of January, a lot of things happening. I have to imagine that when you were golfing in college you did not know that your uh your your golf prowess might someday save the transatlantic relationship but we should all be all should be be grateful that you're a great golfer no well you know my dad used to say when I was young that you know Alex don't worry even if you don't become a professional golf will be useful for you one day and I said yeah sure dad that's just your way of saying that start studying son.

53:51And sure enough, dad was right on this one. But I did stop golf pretty much cold turkey for 35 years. So I should be really thankful that Trump got me back into it. Now I'm kind of gung ho again. I'm a born again golfer. I got new clubs. Okay. Trump gave me the clubs and they're really nice. So I, you know, I really enjoy the game again. Wonky question that I've been so fascinated to get your take on as we read these reports of you texting back and forth with Trump and other leaders. This is a relatively new feature of international diplomacy. I have to say, as a former staffer, it's kind of horrifying to imagine your bosses texting without supervision.

54:30But it's been a part of how you've conducted diplomacy. You were part of this now infamous exchange about Trump not getting the Nobel Prize, the Nobel Peace Prize that he had with you and your Norwegian counterpart. How does the fact of leaders texting directly and interacting directly in this way change the way diplomacy is carried out and how does that shape global politics to your mind? Well, it becomes probably faster paced because obviously, I mean, most of us are on our phones a lot, except when we are in, you know, spaces or places where we're discussing confidential matters and classified matters, and we put them aside.

55:06So we're able to respond. And of course, a lot of us have now different types of chats with different types of names where we exchange information. But, you know, the fact that I'm able to send a text message directly to President Trump or to his staff, which then shows it to President Trump, is, of course, an asset. At the same time, it's an asset for him as well to be able to knock out something. And we have very direct messages and phone calls with President Trump and with many other leaders as well. For me, coming from a small country, information is power. So if I'm able to relay information, using my own rational mind and common sense to President Trump, or I can relay information from President Trump to European leaders to Zelensky, then I make myself useful.

55:58And my staff, they're actually happy that I do this as long as I inform them. So they're okay about it. We share a lot of information and suddenly it becomes a web. So my national security advisor, or my foreign policy advisors or defense advisors then react to different types of messages with their colleagues on their level. And this gives you skin in the game. It's a new modern way of doing foreign policy, but sometimes I guess you have to be a little bit careful type of language that you use because you never know, it might end up in the public. Let me close at a somewhat higher level. There's a line in your foreign affairs piece that is really striking.

56:39You write, the next five to 10 years will likely determine the world order for decades to come. As you look ahead 10 years, what does failure look like and what does success look like in that world order? For me, failure looks like a multipolarity on steroids, where we see foreign policy as a zero-sum game of deals, transactions, and spheres of interest. That, to me, essentially leads to conflict. And containing conflict just by pure interest is never a lasting recipe. The best case scenario is multilateralism and some kind of reformed United Nations, WTO, IMF, World Bank, where you see a lot more agency given to players who were not considered to be the big powers after World War II.

57:32And then we start focusing more again on the substantive solution of things such as climate change or conflicts or energy or technology. And we get around the same table again and behave towards each other in a more peaceful rather than belligerent matter. We're not there yet, but we're working towards it. Let us end on that hopeful note. And I should say, I hope you're also giving all of your fellow European leaders their own cold plunge pool so they can get some of the cool that you seem to have. But President Stubb, thank you so much for the great piece and for taking the time today. We will look forward to having you back on our pages before too long.

58:16Thank you very much. And thanks for Foreign Affairs, which together with The Economist, The Financial Times, The New York Times, and many others are pretty much my weekly reading list. I really enjoy it. It keeps my mind churning. Very happy to hear that. We appreciate it.

58:37Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show at foreignaffairs.com. This episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Elise Burr, Rachel Powell, and Connish Klerur. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Irina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts. And if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.

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