Iran’s Tenacious Regime and the Future of the Gulf

29:25They're far less of a problem. They have just as much oil to sell as Iran does. And so they are useful friends. They're predictable friends. Iran is an unpredictable friend, and its utility is only so much as you decide that you want to kind of have a spoiler in the Middle East. And so now Iran has really wrecked its relationships with its Arab neighbors. And those Arab neighbors are going to be much more cognizant of anything given to Iran that might help aid its missile program or its drone programs in particular, right? So you can imagine that even if China and Russia want to give Iran anything to help it build back its military, that you're going to have calls from Abu Dhabi and from Riyadh, if not direct visits, that are basically going to imply, hey, why don't you do that?

30:18Or why don't you not do that, rather? And instead of giving Iran those things, why don't you give us those things? Or how about we just invest in this part of your country, that part of your country, and you just pretend Iran doesn't exist? I think it's going to be very hard for Iran to repair those relations quick enough in order to rebuild through China's help. There is, of course, always the possibility that China sees value in Iran as something that consumes the energies of the United States, right? And so if China wants to split, let's say, America's attention from the South China Sea, then empowering Iran, building Iran back up in terms of a military power, helping facilitate its missile program or giving it air defense, any of those things, helping it build an air force, any of those things would, of course, I think be problematic from a US policy perspective and could lead to another conflict.

31:18or a worsening of conflicts if a conflict happens again. So Iran could be utilized, but I think it's a more difficult prospect for China or Russia to pursue right now, given tensions with the Arab states. We've been talking about politics at a pretty high level, which is to say governments. I want to flip that a little bit and talk about Iran's people. They're obviously in a very difficult situation On the one hand, the regime is brutal and extremely unpopular. On the other hand, their country is being bombed by two foreign powers. Been a lot of civilian deaths. I think 168 Iranians were killed when what seems like a U.S.

32:01missile hit a girls' school. How are Iranians enduring this war, and how do you think it will affect their relationship to the regime? Well, it's very difficult to say. I mean, one, you have to remember that Iran's internet is still out, right? Communications with the outside world are still very limited. So the amount that messages get out are pretty small. And it's very difficult, I think, to know how people are living through this moment. But I think at the very least, we can imagine what they're going through. and even if they want the regime to fall and they want it to collapse and they may have been happy about this war at the outset, they're having to endure sleepless nights where bombs are falling all around them.

32:53They're having to deal with, you know, civilian structures being hit, smoke in the air, sulfur in the air, you know, their kids crying in the other room when these things happen. And that's got to be, you know, discombobulating, I think, and very sort of difficult to live through, right? So, you know, psychologically, I think it's a very sort of challenging place for them to be in. And I think it'll be that much more challenging if, when it's all said and done, the regime still stands and still has the power to oppress the people. Because not only will they have endured all of that, it wouldn't have led to what they had hoped it would lead to, right?

33:36And that will be, I think, really gutting and disheartening for, at least for those Iranians that wanted to see the regime fall, which I think is, we don't have good polling, but probably a majority, if not a large majority. But you also have Iranians who support the regime, and they're not a small part of the country. Like even a generous view that let's say they're 30%, that's still a lot of people. That's around 30 million people that would support the regime. They are probably both suffering just as much as other Iranians, but also taking greater pleasure in Iran's retaliation and probably really hoping for the regime's survival, right?

34:21So when it's all said and done, I think if the regime stands, you'll have the supporters of the regime that will really feel empowered. They will feel that they have survived. They'll feel that there's a moral victory here. And the people who don't support the regime will be really discouraged and exhausted. And the social split, I think, will be that much more sharp between the two. And it could lead to lasting tensions. It could lead to unrest. It could lead to violence. It could lead to retaliation. You could have a regime sort of retaliatory campaign where they arrest people, kill people that they feel supported the war in some respects.

35:11It could be socially destabilized in a lot of ways. But I don't think there will be sort of a definitive kind of outcome. What I don't think you're going to see is sort of a rally around the flag kind of dynamic among those people who don't support the regime. They may lose trust with the United States. They may lose trust with Israel. They may even be angry at the United States and Israel, but they're not likely to back the regime as a result. Do you think that they might rise up as Trump has asked of them and try and take down the regime? without without some effort to uh by the u.s and israel to pave the way for them um by uh eliminating uh the the personnel that would be um that would take to the streets uh in counter protest operations i think it's really unlikely um for them to come out because remember they just came out in in January, and they got mowed down by these forces, right?

36:17And even though the US and Israel are hitting intelligence buildings, IRGC buildings, there's an element of the IRGC known as the Basij, which is a popular militia, which is sort of the regime's kind of main conduit for counter-protest operations, and they have bases all throughout, you know, urban spaces in Iran and neighborhoods, their bases are being hit too, but the people aren't dying. They're not going to work. They're not showing up. And so instead, they're just camping out in parking lots. They're going into civilian buildings. And every night, they are going down neighborhoods and chanting to the people, don't come out of your homes or else we'll crush you.

37:08They're also sending out text messages to Iranians saying, don't come out of your homes. So the Iranian people have no, no, I think, obvious pathway to a regime change. They can't just take to the streets and take over things. What would they take over? Who would lead them? Who would replace them, right? Which buildings would they take over? Which ones are important? They don't know. You know, they could all gather and take over, you know, a police department, and that just leaves them vulnerable to, you know, to regime forces because they're all concentrated. They know that they're leaderless.

37:44They know that they don't know how to get from A to Z, let's say, of Z's regime change. And so unless there were boots on the ground, let's say, maybe not in large numbers, but even in small numbers that were sort of leading them to what a regime change would be, as to say, seizing government buildings and institutions, seizing telecommunications, eliminating Basij and IRGC, and even police units and battalions that are used for crushing dissent. Unless that happens, I think it's really unlikely that Iranians come out on the streets, at least not in the midst of war while bombs are falling. And if they come out after the war, they're likely to get mowed down again, assuming the regime has retained that capacity to crush dissent.

38:35What do you think it would take to have regime change? Is it kind of, I think, as you're suggesting, U.S. boots on the ground or some other set of boots on the ground in order to provide more of the support protesters might need or in order to do the work of destroying the government themselves? I think there's three scenarios that are the most likely. One is external regime change, where you have a foreign military, the United States, Israel, that does exactly what I said, takes over government buildings, kills and captures important leaders, takes over telecommunications, takes control of main avenues and streets, and then starts to empower different people to take charge of the country.

39:19That's an extreme scenario, right? That's what we had in Iraq in 2003. That's what we had in Afghanistan in 2001. That's by no means a panacea, right? Just because you change the regime doesn't mean the regime's dead, as we've found out in Afghanistan. But it's the only way that I think an external party could do it. The other is that you have the regime itself or factions within the regime that turn against it, right? And in this scenario, you could see that there's elements of the security services, they could be IRGC, they could be police, they could be the regular military who decide, okay, listen, the people in charge are leading us down this ruinous road.

40:00We're in war after war. We're broke. We've appointed a new supreme leader who's not going to help us get out of this mess, but it's just going to double down on the policies that got us here. We need to take, you know, the law into our own hands. We have guns, we have organization, we have leaders, and we have training, and we know what to hit, what to take, and how to do it, right? And so you could have that. This would be a coup, right? But a coup based on factions of the security forces that want to back and be supported by a popular uprising, right? And this you can have at any time. Anytime there's people in the street, or even if this coup happens and they say, come out on the street, it can happen, right?

40:44It could have happened in January. It did not. It could happen tomorrow. It could happen two years from now or five years from now. That's always a possibility. But that takes ambitious, you know, at least mid-career officers who want to change their system from within and want to take that risk. And it also takes organization and some ability of luck, right? So you could have, like, let's say, a young officer's rebellion that could lead that kind of regime change. And then the third kind of regime change is just the regime change of time, right? And that's the one that I think is certain. The Islamic Republic is certain to fall at some point in history, whether that's 10 years from now, 50 years from now, 100 years from now, it will be gone.

41:30And I'm pretty confident about this, just because the majority of Iranians are moving so far away from what the Islamic Republic stands for and have been consistently over the last few decades. That, I think, is sort of the surest way of doing things. But that is a regime change through gradual reform, where gradually a new supreme leader, a new military commander relaxes these policies, changes those policies, amends these policies with the West and slowly disentangles the Islamic Republic from the mess that it's in now. But that could take a generation. It could take two. I don't know. But to me, those are the three sort of main possibilities.

42:14And then there's any number that exists within that spectrum. The last question I want to ask you as we think about the future of the Islamic Republic is about territorial fragmentation. Trump has said that Iran's map will, quote, probably not look the same after the war ends. I know he's flirted with generating a Kurdish insurgency. Obviously, Trump says a lot of things. But how serious do you think the risk of Iran breaking apart is? I think it's serious in the sense that there's obviously some talk within, let's say, the White House or within Israel of maybe generating ethnic insurgencies in order to weaken the regime even further.

43:00And the reason to do this, you can see a clear logic for it, it wouldn't be to overthrow the regime, because there's really no scenario where Kurdish militias who operate on the border of Iraq and Iran somehow march all the way from the mountains into Tehran and take over that city. It's just, it's not going to happen. They don't have the numbers. They don't have the social legitimacy outside of the Kurdish areas. They don't even necessarily have that legitimacy inside some Kurdish areas, right? So they are pretty small compared to what you would need in order to really topple the regime. But if the regime is weak and an ethnic insurgency is able to be ignited through, let's say, pouring weapons in, maybe training militia members, maybe giving them intelligence on IRGC positions and border guard positions, or even, let's say, inserting special forces, either Israeli or U.S., to help them kind of retake some of the territory in their areas, the one sure thing that's going to happen is it's going to instigate a fight with the central government.

44:15And so what you're going to have is an element of civil war, or at least a counterinsurgency war, that the government of Iran would be fighting against, let's say, a Kurdish insurgency. You had this in 1979. You had this before 1979, during the Cold War. You also had small ethnic insurgencies with the Turkmen population in northeastern Iran, and with the Baluch in southeastern Iran. These are different ethnic groups. But in all of those cases, the central government won. And the reason why the central government wins these fights is because even within these ethnic regions, the idea of ethnic nationalism is a really diffused and muddy idea.

45:05Because most of the Kurds, most of the Azeris, who are Turkic-speaking Iranians, most of the Turkmen, and even the Baluch or the Arabs who live in southern Iran, all share an affinity for some cultural aspects of Iranian culture, especially the Kurds and the Azeris, who are two of the larger sort of minorities. And so for them, the desire is not always necessarily to be not part of Iran, but rather to have a little more autonomy within their regions to teach their languages in schools and to do some of their sort of folk festivals and things like that without kind of central government pressure against them.

45:53And also to have a little more say in how the government works, because these are kind of, at least, especially the Kurdish areas, they're poor, they're impoverished, The central government doesn't give them much, so they have a lot to ask for. But I think the situation where you have, let's say, ethnic insurgencies that are distracting and maybe for a time fragmenting the Iranian state in order to weaken it, in order to make it so consumed with internal issues that it can't turn its attention to external influence, there is certainly, that is certainly a possibility, right? And you can see why some, let's say in Israel, might want to pursue that as a tactic or as a strategy, because above all for them, what really matters is Iran's external activities.

46:43They want to make sure that Iran is no longer working with proxies around Israel. And if Iran is consumed with its own problems, then from sort of a realist and very cold-hearted political calculation, that could be good for Israeli security. That was Afshan Ostevar, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. After the break, we'll speak with Sanam Vakil, Director of Chatham House's Middle East and North Africa program, on how the war is throwing the Gulf states into turmoil.

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48:56And now to my conversation with Sanam Vakil. Sanam, welcome to the Foreign Affairs interview. Thank you so much for having me, Daniel. And just to remind listeners, we're talking on Tuesday afternoon. But right now, the Arab Gulf is still experiencing an onslaught of attacks from Iranian forces. The UAE, for example, has faced over 1 ,000 drones and missile strikes. One of Bahrain's water desalinization plants was damaged. Still, so far, these states have done a decent job of intercepting Iranian projectiles, and the civilian casualties have been relatively minimal. How long can the Gulf manage to withstand Tehran's assault?

49:38That is a really good question. I think, first of all, it's worthwhile saying that the Gulf states collectively and independently lobbied President Trump to pursue other pathways. And really, they prioritized avoiding this war. I think they processed that they were going to be on the front lines. But of course, they're surprised by the persistence and the scale of Iran's assault. And it's also worthwhile remembering that these diplomatic efforts were supported by almost all countries across the Middle East. And in fact, many Gulf countries, and specifically Oman and Qatar, were sort of leading the mediation efforts that were underway.

50:30So, you know, how long can they go on? I think, you know, obviously the Gulf states are caught in a very difficult moment right now. Their reputation as safe havens for commerce, for trade, for tourism have all been compromised. They have borne the brunt of Iran's retaliatory attacks, and those attacks have far outweighed their expectations, including targets on infrastructure, ports, consular facilities. And their citizens, I think, are really bearing the brunt of these strikes with the noise and the interceptions taking place almost every day since the war began on February 28th. The Gulf states have shown an amazing amount of restraint as well as resilience.

51:21They are performing quite well from a defensive perspective. But the reality is they're worried about declining interceptors. And so they're trying to secure further stocks. They are worried that obviously the length of the war can disrupt their economies further. And we've seen Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar exert force majeure in terms of energy exports, for example. And the ripple effects of this war will continue long after the military dynamics come to an end. We've also seen Europe and the UK try to step up and offer more defense capability to support the Gulf states. And that's been very important because the Gulf states have also felt quite frustrated that the United States appeared to focus and prioritize Israel's defense and they left the Gulf quite exposed.

52:22So to be specific, they can hang on, but the implications are going to be far ranging. And they're deeply worried that at any moment, President Trump will call time on this war and leave them again holding the bag and bearing the consequences of perhaps leaving behind a weakened Islamic Republic, but one that is still standing. And the consequences of that system will be hard to manage. and alternatively a protracted war will also be very difficult for them. Got it. So thinking a little bit about what you were saying in terms of the amount of damage that they're taking and the relationship that might have with the United States, I want to start on that theme by asking, it seems as if part of Iran's calculation is that if they do inflict enough pain on the Gulf countries, the Gulf governments will lobby the United States into stopping the conflict.

53:20Do you think this strategy is going to be effective? Well, Iran has certainly tried to spread the cost of this war, this cost of Israel-Iranian war on Iran beyond Iran. They have wanted as many countries and citizens as possible to feel the weight of this war so it's not just borne by them. It's a reflection of their defense weakness and the fact that they don't have too many cards to play. I think the problem really is that certainly the costs are being borne globally. Gas prices are going up. We've seen a huge spike on Monday. We're seeing insurance and shipping costs go up. Obviously, tourism to the region is going down.

54:04There are going to be all sorts of economic cascades that we're not yet even seeing. But the reality is that Iran isn't just looking to end this war. It's looking to end this war with guarantees. The Gulf states could call President Trump and say, end this war. But, you know, no one is really talking about what those guarantees are. And the reality is that Gulf-Iranian relations after this war will be very broken. Normalization between Iran and the UAE and Saudi Arabia had progressed quite significantly from the time of the strikes on Saudi oil facilities and when Abu Dhabi was targeted in 2021.

54:50So things had progressed. There was no sort of resolution of mistrust. There were still, you know, differences and difficulties in the relationship. But after this onslaught, it's very hard to see how the Gulf states can return to the status quo ante with Iran. How long do you think it will take for the region to recover? I mean, that's the$10 billion question. Gulf states are slowing down energy production because of these strikes. This is just one sort of example that shows that there's not going to be a quick rebound. Why are they slowing down energy production? It's not just because their facilities are being targeted, but there is a backup in the Strait of Hormuz.

55:35There is just a small number of ships that are exiting the straits every day. And so Iraq, as well as other Gulf countries, have to slow down production because they, you know, they're nowhere for these ships to go and they can't offload the oil onto these ships. So I think what's important to sort of stress is that clearly there wasn't sufficient planning for the known unknowns or the unknown unknowns that were to come from what was expected to be a sort of quick and sort of decapitating war on Iran. So you were just talking about how this is going to complicate the Gulf's relationship with Iran and some of the normalization efforts that were happening there.

56:20Iran, of course, didn't launch this conflict. The United States and Israel did. And I know Gulf officials have expressed dismay both that Washington didn't give them a heads up and that U.S. officials didn't heed their warnings that an attack on Iran would spark a regional conflict. How do you think this might affect the Gulf's ties to the United States? Well, this is a tricky one, but important to unpack. On the one hand, of course, this showcases the limits of Gulf strategy and sort of managing or mitigating conflict in the region. They tried to directly lobby and encourage diplomacy. That clearly didn't work.

57:02They also tried to directly manage their ties with Iran, sending their officials to Tehran. They committed to not allowing their territory to be used for strikes. And, you know, effectively, that strategy also didn't work. Um, they have been completely brought in, um, in a, I think unprecedented way. They look incredibly vulnerable. And while they're marshalling, uh, an effective defense of operation and all, all of the states are, are performing very well, it showcases the fact that they're stuck effectively. Their geography is their destiny. and for so many years they've supported U.S. containment efforts of Iran.

57:51That failed. Then they tried the diplomatic outreach. That also didn't work. So what is on the horizon? I think in the short run, the Gulf states have no choice but to double down and shore up their defense-based relationships with the United States. What does that mean? They need to build up their defense capabilities and the U.S. is in the strongest position to do so. But beyond that, I fully expect the Gulf states to pursue a sort of portfolio approach. And for quite some time, they've been developing defense and security ties with other countries in the region or beyond. Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact with Pakistan, for example, and it's suggested that Turkey might enter into that relationship.

58:40The UAE has strengthened defense cooperation with South Korea and also with India. So I imagine that there will be many more of these mini lateral arrangements that are built to help bolster Gulf defense capabilities. And then secondly, I also think that there will be, and I hope that there will be greater GCC-wide alignment on integrated air defense as well. But what the Gulf states are very conscious of and want to be careful with, and this is why they haven't entered this war in an offensive way, they do not want to be seen to be supporting Israel's destabilizing regional behavior. And I think this nuance needs to be understood so that it is appreciated beyond the region.

59:29They see Iran as a destabilizing force across the Middle East, but they also see Israel as a destabilizing force in the Middle East and they feel very caught between. So that is the biggest challenge for the Gulf states, how to manage these two, you know, aggressive states that continue to destabilize in different ways. And ultimately they want to return to prioritizing their national interests, their economic diversification plans and their visions and build back that reputation as a safe haven for tourism, commerce, investment, and beyond. I was actually just thinking about Israel, and in part, a piece you wrote for us in October.

1:00:12It's a great article, and it's entitled, The Middle East That Israel Has Made. And it argued what you just said now, which is that Israel's increasing regional aggression is prompting neighboring states that once regarded Israel as a potential partner to view it as a dangerous and unpredictable actor. It seems like from what you said that this war is going to amplify that trend. I want to get your thoughts on what that might mean for, say, efforts to normalize ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia or to otherwise expand the Abraham Accords. I mean, I think the big sort of question after this war is where does that leave the Abraham Accords, particularly when the UAE was hit almost double compared to Israel.

1:00:59And that, you know, I've heard from Emirati officials as very shocking. You know, the nuance in threat perceptions, I think oftentimes is not appreciated outside of the Middle East, but I think it should be at least understood. It's not that states or leaders in the Middle East don't see benefits of normalizing with Israel. There's much to gain in terms of trade, defense cooperation, technological benefits and beyond. But particularly since October 7th, I think that Gulf states very much see Israel as having overextended itself militarily. In Gaza, obviously, there is a renewed campaign in Lebanon.

1:01:49And obviously, Gulf states do not support Hezbollah or Hamas or beyond that. But they see this increased military aggression as destabilizing. And those destabilizing military activities have blowback, politicized their populations, and create frustration and sort of tie leaders' hands more broadly. You know, Palestinian sovereignty, statehood, particularly since the war in Gaza, has become a political issue in the Middle East. And so normalization predicated on sidestepping conflicts, I don't think is going to be the way forward. I think Arab states are thinking much more broadly about conflict management, about regional security, about sovereignty.

1:02:42And, you know, maybe over the coming months, if not years, there will be broader discussions about how to provide security for all states in the region. You know, Qatar was struck last year by Iran and Israel, and that sort of punctured this view that they would be insulated from a country that they were, you know, managing diplomacy for and supporting peace negotiations on behalf of the United States as well. And I think there is a longer tale. This sort of debate began last year after the strikes on Qatar. There is this sort of sense that having American military bases in the region were meant to insulate the Gulf states from strikes and these kind of destabilizing activities.

1:03:33And, you know, I'm not suggesting by any means that they're going to force out the United States from the region. But there is just much more growing public awareness and discussion that these bases haven't protected the Gulf. The U.S. hasn't protected or insulated the Gulf from such strikes. And perhaps actually there's been increased blowback on the Gulf states as a result. We've been talking a little bit about things happening to the Gulf states, the pressure it's coming under from outside powers and the fact that they are in some sense trapped. I want to flip it around. Is there any leverage that the Gulf has over the United States or over Iran?

1:04:18Well, I mean, I think, first of all, we have to be abundantly clear that this isn't just happening to Iran. Of course, you know, we could say that the war that broke out on February 28th didn't really have the legal justification or no case was built for this war on Iran. And the Gulf states are aware of that. But, you know, Iran is has agency, has spent decades building up its nuclear program, has a asymmetrical ballistic missile program and drone program. And I think what has been the biggest issue for the region is its support for non-state actors across the Middle East. And so, you know, it's important to acknowledge Iran's role in all of this.

1:05:06And there's deep frustration across the Gulf, across, I think, the whole of the Middle East that Iran hasn't made the necessary concessions. I mean, in every round of negotiations, they're still negotiating to negotiate and wanting a framework and not understanding the immense pressure and the consequences, not just for themselves, but for the region writ large. Um, but certainly if you flip the deck around, um, certainly the Gulf States do have a degree of leverage on the United States or the Trump administration in particular. Um, the Gulf States supported president Trump's campaign more or less.

1:05:44They were quite keen, um, to have, uh, president Trump back. They felt like he favored the Gulf, um, and that, uh, deal-making and pragmatism and transactional, interest was something they could work with. And let's not forget that President Trump came to the Gulf last May, and he promised that the days of regime change and forever wars were over. And he did say that the US wasn't in favor of chaos anymore, but was in favor of commerce, and that the US was done with dealing with terrorism and that, you know, relationships would be built on technology. And the Gulf states bought into that. And then they paid in.

1:06:29They invested huge amounts of money in the United States, or at least committed to. So yes, they do have leverage. And in the broader geopolitical game that is playing out between the United States and China, obviously the Middle East is very much in play. China is an economic actor in the region. China has comprehensive strategic partnerships with five Middle Eastern states, many of whom are in the Gulf. And if the United States wants to turn the tables around and become the economic actor in the region, it needs to be much more of a stabilizer and not a sort of supporter of perpetual conflict.

1:07:11And for the Gulf states, the U.S. continues to underwrite Israeli campaigns in the region. And that is perceived to cause, you know, clearly destabilizing effects for them. So if you were advising Gulf governments to put you in that unfortunate position, what would you tell them to do right now when it comes to the United States and managing their relationship with Washington? Well, not unfortunate. It's also fortunate, actually, because I think that there is a lot of room to maybe have impact. I think, first of all, the number one thing I would say to GCC states is that obviously they need to have a much more pragmatic dialogue and mechanism to manage their own internal conflicts.

1:08:00Going into this war, there was a rift, if you will, between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over, you know, misinterpretation of things that had happened in Sudan and Yemen. And that had gone quite off the rails. And this war has actually at least led to one phone conversation that we publicly know of between Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, and Mohammed bin Zayed, the president of the UAE. So that's positive. But more broadly, there needs to be more dialogue, de-confliction, and an acknowledgement of what GCC security interests are. There's still divisions, of course, on how to align on policy.

1:08:47But I think that would be number one. Two, it would be about managing the panoply of regional conflicts, not just bilaterally, but multilaterally. The GCC as a mechanism can be more effective in prioritizing GCC interests. And I would start with Yemen, which to me is an acute crisis that we continue to not pay attention to. But more broadly beyond that, obviously, integrated air defense is an area where I I would suggest that Gulf states continue to make progress and maybe accelerate that progress. Working together more closely, sharing intelligence, I think is a useful way forward. We'll build trust over time.

1:09:33Obviously, they have to upgrade and integrate their systems, and that is costly. But I think after this war, perhaps that will be seen to be worth it. And then more broadly, I do believe that a portfolio approach to security, defense and economic ties definitely need to be pursued, meaning that if the Gulf feels certainly the U.S. remains, you know, primary security partner, continue to develop and double down on their relationships. You know, that's clearly number one. But, you know, in tandem to that, because obviously the United States and its domestic trajectory is is one that is also uncertain, requires them to develop relationships beyond the United States.

1:10:23The Gulf states collectively and individually are pursuing path of strategic autonomy. They want to assert themselves as middle powers. And they need to be much more assertive in managing regional conflicts and not just leaving everything to the Trump administration, A, but to the United States in general, B. Because clearly there are divergences in how conflicts should be managed. and Washington doesn't have the capacity or the interest. And ultimately, as I've written for you in the past, alongside my colleague, Dalia Dasake, it's time for the Middle East to manage the Middle East. You mentioned Yemen, and I want to actually talk about Yemen for a little bit because one of the things I've been surprised by is that the Houthis in Yemen have not joined in this conflict.

1:11:13Other Iranian proxy groups, specifically certain Iraqi militias, also haven't joined. I'm curious to get your sense as to why that is. Well, I mean, it's only a week and plus into this war. It's March 10th. It's 11 days, effectively. And this war, by all calculations, is certainly going to be longer than last summer's 12-day war. Early estimates were four to five weeks. President Trump is suggesting two weeks. We sort of have to see when the off ramps develop. But Iran's strategy has been to, you know, obviously hold some of its assets and responses back. And I think the Houthis are a part of the cards that it has in its back pocket.

1:12:03You know, there is a debate as to why the Houthis are not going all in. And I have that with my colleague at Chatham House, Farah al-Muslimi, who works on Yemen and knows the Houthis well. And he says, well, the Houthis have no stake in this war. They're not going to come out in support of Iran. They have to figure out what they would come out to advocate in support of themselves. There's no military activity in Gaza. So they might expose themselves unnecessarily. And unlike other proxy groups in the region, the Houthis have not been decapitated. Hezbollah has been decapitated. Some of the groups in Iraq have, of course, been pushed down.

1:12:45Iran has been decapitated. And so the Houthis are looking to retain their capabilities. So that would certainly expose them. I also think that, obviously, the Houthis are a check on Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the Gulf. holding the Houthi card back or using the Houthi card as leverage is much more about, you know, potential dialogue that might be taking place among the Gulf states in Iran, rather than the Houthis themselves. But, you know, if things escalate and we go beyond this sort of prognosis of weeks to something longer, I would imagine that there would be pressure on the Houthis to resume sort of strikes in the Red Sea and in the Bab al-Mandeb.

1:13:34And that would, of course, carry over the costs on energy and maritime security and shipping far beyond the Straits of Hormuz. So thinking about your points on escalation and then thinking about escalation on the Gulf side, one of the things that I understand to be true is that the UAE has substantial economic power when it comes to Iran, that Iran is in some ways dependent on the UAE for its economy to function. Why haven't we seen the UAE fully exercise that leverage yet? And are there other avenues the Gulf has that it can use to exercise influence over or put pressure on Iran? Well, the UAE is certainly Iran's economic lung.

1:14:19And since reconciliation or normalization began, the UAE has helped Iran by not just re-exporting, but, you know, by providing Iran with a lifeline under sanctions. I think a few days ago, there were suggestions that the UAE would try to sanction or freeze Iranian assets in the UAE. And of course, there's a huge Iranian population also there. I think part of the reason why that hasn't really proceeded is it would compromise, of course, the UAE as a safe haven at the same time. And that would set a precedent, I think, that the UAE wouldn't want to carry through. But certainly, there is leverage over a longer period of time.

1:15:03And it's, I think, an opportunity when this war ends where the Gulf can use its leverage, maybe not positive leverage in terms of development or investment, which was being used prior to this war, but negative leverage to hold back assets and to prevent Iran from accessing trade and its resources abroad. Can you just quickly tell listeners what the UAE's status as a safe haven means and why that's so important for the country? Well, the UAE has for a long time, I mean, been a place where investors from around the globe have engaged in commerce and economic activity and trade. The UAE hosts countries and individuals from all around the world, not just Iran, but from Russia, Ukraine, and many countries.

1:15:58And being able to do business in the UAE has been very important for the UAE's reputation as a global hub, a networked part of the order as well. But of course, It has drawn attention to maybe some dodgy activities that have taken place in the UAE. Sticking with the theme of escalation and the situation just getting worse, earlier on, Afshan and I were discussing the risk that the Iranian state might collapse, fracture, or at least be greatly weakened. I don't need to tell you that instances of state collapse in the Middle East have produced all kinds of disasters, refugee crises, drug crises, insurgencies.

1:16:41If this war does end with the Iranian state seriously diminished, what are the risks to the region? Well, I think that's what the Gulf states are most concerned with right now. They are facing a scenario where the United States will call time on this war. And it's the day after that they're much more concerned about. Um, they are worried that a weakened wounded, um, Islamic Republic could be left there to fester for quite some time, kind of like Saddam Hussein after the 1990 Gulf war. But there are other worse scenarios to consider a serious scenario, um, after the Arab spring or Libya scenario for the Arab spring.

1:17:22Um, so, uh, they're very concerned that they will be bearing the cost of, uh, the economic, um, price of this war where Iran will continue to be sanctioned, uh, not, um, offered any sort of lifeline, um, in terms of rehabilitation or trade or, or, or development, if you will. Um, and over time there will be internal unrest, um, across Iran that, um, could develop organically or could be instigated externally. So all of these scenarios, as the regime might struggle to survive or become enmeshed in internal fighting, will have spillover. Iran is a huge country with 90 million people and surrounded by, you know, many neighbors.

1:18:12And so the humanitarian economic crises will again be borne by the region. And using the Iraq analogy, of course, Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991 was sanctioned, militarily exposed and divided in no-fly zones. And, you know, that crisis was left to fester for quite some time. And the Gulf states had, you know, no ties with Iraq. They supported containment. But again, you know, they bore the price of the 2003 war, which they collectively lobbied against. Before we conclude, I want to turn to Iran itself. In February, you co-wrote this really great piece for us called Iran's Divided Opposition. And I encourage everyone to go read it.

1:19:01And you argued that the infighting among Iran's opposition factions, as well as their general lack of organization, makes it difficult for them to challenge the regime. Has the opposition taken any steps to overcome these barriers since the war began? I wish, I wish. But unfortunately, this war did not take into account the facts on the ground in Iran and the conditions in the diaspora. In a way, the war moved faster than the so-called Iranian opposition and the Iranian people were ready for. There has been some bridge building among Kurdish groups. Monarchical groups remain fierce and sort of steadfast in their support for Reza Pahlavi.

1:19:49The Mujahideen al-Khalq is marching to its own beat. Um, there, you know, might emerge, um, uh, a coalition of internal and external groups. That's ultimately what's needed. But I deeply worry that the emergence of some cohesive, uh, group, uh, is coming a bit late in the game. And, you know, this is all happening while the Islamic Republic is fighting for its very existence and still remains quite fierce, has a monopoly of violence. and sees this war as deeply existential. So it's going to do really anything it can to stay united and survive this onslaught. Sanam, thanks for joining me. Thank you so much for having me, Daniel.

1:20:43Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show at foreignaffairs.com. This episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview you was produced by Rachel Powell, Mary Kate Godfrey, Rose Kohler, and Connish Therruer. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Arena Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts. And if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.

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