The Future of Palestine: A Conversation With Salam Fayyad

0:00I'm Dan Kurtz-Felen, and this is the Foreign Affairs Interview. What is amazing to me is that amidst this state of marginalization that has taken place ever since late February, when the Iran war started, is basically people lost sight, it seems to me, of the human condition in Gaza. A lot of haggle about what needs to happen first, whether it's Hamas disarming or not disarming, Israel withdrawing, not withdrawing. But what about that immediately needed intervention to begin to introduce improvements in the livelihood of people? So that, to me, is really catastrophic. In the nine months since the ceasefire ended full-on war in Gaza, the world's attention has in many ways moved on.

0:45That has been especially true since February with the start of a war elsewhere in the Middle East. But the situation in Gaza remains grim and unsettled, and the situation in the West Bank has become increasingly fraught. Meanwhile, the way forward for Palestinian politics remains murky, while the prospect of any durable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems more remote than ever. Salam Fayyad served as Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority from 2007 to 2013, after a long career at the International Monetary Fund. Fayyad is still considered in many capitals, including Washington, one of the most effective Palestinian leaders of recent decades.

1:22And he has, in the past few years, laid out a series of proposals, including in the pages of Foreign Affairs, for building a Palestinian state, delivering humane and effective governance in Gaza, and finding a viable way forward for the Palestinian cause. I spoke with Fayyad on July 15th at the Aspen Security Forum. Before we get started, a reminder for any listeners who are not yet subscribers to Foreign Affairs. For one more week, take advantage of our special promotion. New subscribers can save $10 on an annual subscription, which gets you our bi-monthly print issues, daily essays on our website, our newsletters, and more.

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2:12Salam, thank you for doing this. You've laid out in our pages on a couple of occasions, your vision and your strategy for Palestinian leadership for Gaza, for the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. But it's been a couple of years and a lot has happened since then. So it's wonderful to have a chance to talk to you. Great pleasure to be with you, Dan. Thank you. It's almost astonishing how much the Palestinian issue, whether Gaza or the West Bank or the future of the Palestinian movement more broadly, has fallen out of the global discussion since the Gaza ceasefire last year, and especially since the start of the war in Iran in February.

2:46So I thought it'd be useful to start by hearing your basic explanation, your understanding of where we are. Let's start with Gaza and go back to the ceasefire. What has happened in Gaza since, and where does the situation stand now as you see it? A lot has happened by way of getting ready to do something about Gaza, beginning with the ceasefire, which was, of course, a big deal when it happened after so many attempts at trying to get there. to finally get to the point where we had ceasefire was important in and of itself. Then, of course, border peace came into picture, and Trump's plan and the Security Council resolution that enshrined that.

3:25And there was a lot of activity. And then, of course, the Iran war happened. And when that happened, that produced a situation where the entire Palestinian issue, including Gaza, was shoved to the side and not much on it. You leave through the papers in the United States. It's rarely the case. After many, many months of Gaza being in the news, headlines and all, it virtually completely disappeared. Things didn't quite work out the way the Trump plan was promoted as intended to accomplish, and that was even before the war. Some difficulties actually were encountered because going back to the days when the deal was struck, it was obvious that the parties, namely Hamas and Israel, were not really on board with everything that was expected of them.

4:15Hamas, for example, question of disarmament, Israel question of withdrawal and all of that. But if you look at the situation since then, Israel raids never stopped. More than 1 ,000 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire went into effect. So whereas Whereas like a full-scale war in the way that was taking place in Gaza before the ceasefire kind of stopped, nevertheless violence is still there and a lot of people continue to lose life every day. So you have that going on. Not much happened by way of improving or beginning to improve on the livelihood of people, the human condition in Gaza, where a lot of people remain without shelter, not to mention food, water, electricity, basic necessities.

5:03And what is amazing to me is that amidst this state of marginalization that has taken place ever since late February, when the Iran war started, is basically people lost sight, it seems to me, of the human condition in Gaza. A lot of haggle about what needs to happen first, whether it's Hamas disarming or not disarming, Israel withdrawing, not withdrawing. But what about that immediately needed intervention to begin to introduce improvements in the livelihood of people? So that, to me, is really catastrophic. I mean, that's something that needs to be addressed very quickly. So marginalization, yes, pretty much as the situation in the West Bank was marginalized by what was going on in Gaza long before the U.S.-Israel-Iran war started in late February.

5:54So a lot of bad things happening in the West Bank and that was not really getting coverage obviously because of the depth of the crisis in Gaza and how more serious that was. But of course what was happening in West Bank, not only was it very destructive in terms of daily lives of Palestinians who resigned in West Bank, but in terms of the longer term prospects of ever really getting to a situation where Palestinians can at long last live as free people in a country of their own. When you look at the de facto annexation that has taken place, settlement activity, new settlements built, roads constructed, infrastructure, what have you, in the West Bank, by a government that is absolutely clear on its intent.

6:37You know, either you comply fully with what they expect you to do as a Palestinian, or you have no place in that area. Leave or die. So that literally is rhetoric that some Israeli officials on the current government have been using. Do you understand the escalation in settler violence as part of a, you know, more or less coordinated drive to get Palestinians out of the West Bank? I mean, how do you see that as part of this picture? You know, I was in government, was started to read this ugly head. I mean, there's a lot of hatred there in those acts of violence. And I think I was first to call them acts of terror.

7:12And some Israeli officials actually followed suit. That was back in, I believe, 2009, 2010, something like that. When, like, settlers started to torch, for example, places of worship, mosques and what have you, burning olive trees and whatnot and attacking Palestinians. The scale has gone up dramatically over the years, and particularly under the current government. It is almost like, by definition, the case that this is policy, it seems to me. Because settlers do what they do, these violent ones, the extremists. They're doing what they do with full protection with the real army. I mean, there's no question about that.

7:50And Israel knows how to stop these acts of terror, if it really actually wants to. So if that continues to go unabated, that cannot but lead one to the conclusion that it's happening because it represents policy. It is intended to drive Palestinians away from their land, as has happened in many areas in Jordan Valley, in the North and West Bank and all of that. You have similar situation going on in the Southern West Bank, in the Hebron area. So, when you listen to what Israeli officials are saying about their own vision for future of Israel and what have you, and see what's happening on the ground, how can you not conclude but that it's really policy?

8:29And it's really all ascribed to settlers who have these tendencies full of hate and all of that wanting to see Palestinians clear the lands for them to take it over. This settler terrorism, as per fact, is in fact being condoned by Israeli government. It's intended to intimidate. And it has taken the form now of going beyond, you know, torching places of worship and olive trees and what have you, to attacking people and killing them. And all of this goes on with impunity, unfortunately. Trump's leverage, Donald Trump's leverage, was a critical factor, if not the critical factor, in getting to the ceasefire last October, I believe.

9:09Yes, it was. Early October. Yes. It does not seem that Trump has used much leverage or his officials have used much leverage since then. Is that impression correct? And to the extent that you would like the U.S. to do more, how should it be using that leverage? President Trump has demonstrated that he actually can get Israel to do things if he thought they were important enough at certain points in time. There are many examples of this. As a matter of fact, going back to the first time when the U.S. in June of last year had the Iranian installations. and the missiles back and forth between Israel and Iran.

9:44And famously when he said, just cut it out in ways that, you know, at least publicly. This is the 12-day war last year. Yes, in a way that we, at least publicly, are not used to seeing U.S. presidents act like. There's no question, Mohammed, that confrontations took place and previous administrations, presidents were frustrated with Israeli actions here and there. But I don't recall ever having seen anything kind of play out publicly in the way that it did since Trump came on scene. He used that clearly to bring about the ceasefire, something which, if you look at the deal, it's actually virtually identical to the plan that former President Biden actually wrote out.

10:28The same one. The difference was, you know, Trump's intervention that made it possible. Since then, you know, now and then, President Trump showed signs of being able to influence Israeli actions using a lot of public diplomacy, if you will, statements, tweets, or what have you, things that he would issue and say, all suggested to me of his ability to actually make a difference in the way things are going. The extent to which that can happen, I think, is related to two things. Number one, whether or not he's of a certain view, that time has come for this issue to be resolved and getting there for behavior to begin to change in a way that is actually conducive to that change taking place.

11:12And secondly, the speed with which he can get out of, you know, the aftermath of the Iran war that he started in January, in February. So these two things we'll see. How do you understand the current status of Hamas? Israel has gone very aggressively after anyone involved in planning the October 7th attacks, but full disarmament hasn't happened. Hamas still seems to be one of the most important authorities in the half of Gaza that is not under Israeli occupation at that point. What do you understand about where Hamas is and how Hamas sees its own place at this point? You know, looking at it from afar, I mean, obviously I'm not close to what's going on and all reporting and what have you and reading between the lines, sometimes reading the lines themselves.

12:00It was always clear to me that, you know, Hamas was not really on board. They were kind of cajoled into through the mediators, you know, Turkey, Qatar, others, Egypt, of course, to move in the direction of accepting the Trump plan as a basis of moving forward. And they have several concerns, giving up governance in Gaza. Now, on the question of giving up governance in Gaza to a non-Hamas entity, at least as a matter of statements publicly made by Hamas officials, they all along since the early days of war expressed willingness to surrender governance in Gaza. Governance is a big word, and it includes, among other things, security and certainly arms.

12:44So if they were willing to give up governance to a non-Hamas entity or to a non-Hamas controlled entity, I'm not sure the extent to which they were willing to accept this argument, part of it, given the extent to which that is linked very much as a matter of constitution to who they are as an organization, their own ideology and all of that. So it was clear to me that they grudgingly kind of went along to make that happen. And the same thing can be said about Israel and Netanyahu and all of that. It's not that they were really keen to embrace everything that was in the plan and all of that. There was a lot of back and forth, if you recall, and getting the plan kind of right enough for it to pass.

13:26But getting beyond the initial phase of saying, yes, we agree, and against the backdrop of what we all know, or the reluctance on the part of Hamas to kind of accept it as it was. I'm not going to say anything about Israel here, but the same can be said about Israel. These issues tend to come back to hunt you when you put together a plan. You're keyed up and you're really focused completely on getting something over the hump. But unless you follow it up by something really concrete to kind of move forward, then those issues that in the first instance were stumbling blocks would rear their head again back into the realm of things that actually influence the trajectory of things in the most negative ways.

14:11And that's where we are now. Hamas, of course, when they present their reaction to a plan, they don't say, you know, as a matter of constitution, we can't accept this. What they say is, you know, we have a deal to which we are a party, yes, but the deal has not been respected by Israel. Israel continues to assassinate people. Israel continues to mount raids on Gaza. the humanitarian conditions, the human condition in Gaza has not improved in the least. So all of these things are happening and all of that. How do you expect us to hold our end of the bargain? When that's true, and I have a lot of sympathy with that, but is that really the underlying reason why they're not moving?

14:47I think to move forward, one needs to understand where Hamas is on this issue really, and try to address it. Among other things, I just mentioned to you what Hamas has said to kind of rationalize their reluctance to move forward in the question of governance. They said we're willing to actually deal with the question of disarmament in the context of an agreed-to Palestinian authority. Now, it seems to me that that's something important, something to try to capitalize on. If you are in the realm of diplomacy, you know, trying to, you look for an opening like this and see, what do you mean by this?

15:21Is there an opening here? That part of it happens to align with something that I've advocated for myself since the very beginning of the war, including in that piece, which you referenced at the outset in Foreign Affairs. Before we get to the Palestinian Authority, the PA piece of this, there's one other piece of Gaza governance that I'm curious to hear you take on. In the ceasefire plan and the aftermath, there's this kind of vision of technocratic, non-MOS, non-PA governance. Does that have any traction? Does that mean anything? To be quite honest with you, let me just, if I may, go back to the genesis of this.

15:52I mean, this goes back to the very early days of the war, shortly after October 7th. first time for me to hear about something like this as a possible idea in terms of what happens post-war in Gaza, post-war governance arrangement of Gaza. And the idea was precisely this, to have a committee of technocrats from Gaza, civil society types and what have you, who have no people with no faction affiliation, take over and become the address, political address for Gaza. Now, when I heard about this first, which was literally a few days after October 7th, No more than a week after October 7th. You know, I reacted to it in almost like a very angry way.

16:32The minute I heard about it. This was coming from Israeli officials, from international ones, from Americans. I first heard about it from a U.S. official, as a matter of fact. It's like asking my view. It's like, what do you think if something like this were to happen? And I remember it was October in 2023 when that happened. I mean, literally a few days after October 7th. I recall reacting to it angrily. And I was asked, why are we reacting to it this way? I said, well, the reason for this is simple. To me, this presumes that the day after in Gaza, on the day after in Gaza, Gaza will be Hamas-less or free of Hamas influence.

17:12And that's a tall order. It's impossible to achieve. And in the process of trying to get there, tens of thousands of Palestinians are going to get killed. There's no question, there's no way that I can begin to see this sensible way to get to the objective of addressing fundamentally right way the question of post-war governance in Gaza. The other reason why I didn't think it made sense, but this is fundamentally why I thought the idea was not a good idea. The other reason why is that obviously in the minds of those who are thinking about post-war governance in Gaza, they were thinking in political terms.

17:48They were thinking for a political alternative to Hamas in Gaza. Now, to me, it doesn't add up. You know, a committee of individuals, you put together a group of people like this, is not, by definition, a political entity. It is not going to be, nor is it going to be seen at the outset, as a political home for people to gravitate to in Gaza. So there was a problem with it also this way. But my bigger problem with it was what I just said to you, that it really presumed that Hamas was not going to be around the after in Gaza. And that assumption was flawed. So years later, after many rounds of negotiations that involved discussions among Palestinian factions, Arab mediation, Egyptian mediation, and what have you, people somehow gravitated back to the model of having a committee of technocrats from Gaza addressing the needs of Gaza to administer Gaza.

18:46the day after. Now, where are we on this? This goes back to October of last year. The committee is still sitting in Cairo, not able to even show up for a variety of reasons. I suppose that call with the U.S. official elicited the blueprint that you laid out in foreign affairs. And again, I think it was a couple of weeks after the attack. That involved bringing in some Hamas members, those who were not directly involved in planning the October 7th attacks, it also meant changing the nature of Palestinian authority leadership. How would you update that now, given what we do? Yeah, I will. But just one last word on the question of committee Anur.

19:25When it happened, after the ceasefire, Anur, I was supportive of it, because I'm a very pragmatic person. So I was supportive of it, even if I had all of the hesitation, and I had an alternative, which to this day, I believe, is far superior to anything that has been done so far, and could be the answer to the state of stalemate, if you will, that we are in right now. Because looking at the situation as it stands, not wishfully, but as it stands, there's no question that the Trump plan has told for a variety of reasons. Yes, the latest version of Gulf War is a factor of destruction, but also because of these structural issues that actually were there from the very beginning and stood in the way of smooth implementation.

20:08Not that any plan can be expected to be implemented smoothly. So, yeah, past the immediate anger and being taken aback by anyone thinking about the Committee of Technocrats taking over in Gaza, I thought to myself, why don't I just sit down and come up with an alternative? And that was basically what underlay the piece that you published for me in Foreign Affairs in late October of 2023. And the basic idea was there is political. This is something that's been with me for a long period of time, long before October 7th. And I honestly believe, had we put ourselves on a path of unity before, maybe October 7th would never have happened.

20:46Of Palestinian Union. Yeah. And to this day, I believe, unless that's really starting point of conversation moving forward for us Palestinians, we're never going to put ourselves on a path of empowerment that actually is built on the idea of assuming full agency in the act of our liberation. That's key to me. And I thought, OK, here we are. has just begun. How can we really do something that could bring this war to an end quickly before a lot of people are killed and all of that? We do the thing that's really overdone. Unify Palestinian polity, which came fractured in a very, very bad way in mid-2007 upon the violent takeover of power by Hamas in Gaza.

21:28You need to find a way for political accommodation. I mean, human nature is what it is. But in the end, people need to look for ways in which there is political accommodation. That's when you can lay the foundation for a stable equilibrium. So I thought, like it or not, here we are. We, like other people, do not think the same. We do not wear the same clothes. We do not think the same thing about our cause, how it's going to be resolved, what kind of ideology, what kind of organizing principles should guide us on the path of liberation and all that. Why should we be singled out among all peoples around the world for the expectation of when it comes to something as fundamental as how we think about the way to liberation, to be uniform in our own thinking and rule?

22:20Can we find a way in which somehow we can deal with this pluralism, if you will, in in an effective way, something that can serve our goals and objectives. And the answer to that question to me was a Palestinian Authority that after years of decline in its legitimacy and standing for a variety of reasons that I went into in that piece among many other contributions that I have made, that that Palestinian Authority needs to be re-integrated, needs to be made into something that's a product of national consensus. How do you do that? It was not a question of really picking and choosing a few people from Hamas or anything like that.

22:59It involved thinking about the entire structure of our body politic. There is the PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization. That's supposed to be a home for all Palestinians. But over time, it became home to a part of us, not all of us, particularly after the failure of Oslo to deliver on the promise of statehood and all of that. And we cannot ignore that. I mean, it's inconvenient for us not to be all subscribing to the platform of the one organization that's supposed to represent all of us. It's not inconvenient. It's a major problem. But we need to find a way to deal with it. And my suggestion was to try to actually make it inclusive.

23:42Find a way to really make it home for everybody again. And this involved coming up with ideas about bringing all people around the table at the level of the PLO, not the Palestinian Authority. There is a distinction. Palestinian Authority is an entity that came into being as a product of the Oslo Accords back in 1994. That's when it was created. But the PLO predated it. PLO is the umbrella organization for all of us. But it seems to be home for the majority of us, and progressively so, since the late 90s when Oslo felt to deliver on the promise of statehood. So my proposal, going back to October, actually even before, I wrote for Foreign Affairs going back to 2015, a similar piece, saying you bring Hamas to the upper echelon, the PLO.

24:30It has to be a part of this, but somehow there is a problem of platform. Hamas does not subscribe to the platform PLO and PLO, President Abbas and the executive committee PLO as it stood did not want to alter the platform that made it possible for them to enter the Oslo Accords and whatnot. So there is this problem. And that's about a commitment to nonviolence. It was about recognizing the right of the state of Israel to exist in peace and security. And second is actually commitment to nonviolence and all. And I think there are ways to deal with this. And I actually laid that out on more than one occasion.

25:03Going back to Gaza, the fundamental approach to try to deal with this issue was to actually bring Hamas into that PLO thing. And PLO is led by something called executive committee. And going back to early 2000s, in dialogue that took place, national dialogue that took place, with a view to finding a way to Hamas to be included, you know, this goes back to the days of our late president, Asar Alfa. And the person who led the PLO's delegation to those negotiations in Cairo was none other than current president Abbas himself. That dialogue created something called unified leadership framework. What is that unified leadership framework?

25:43Unified leadership framework is the executive committee of the PLO as it exists today, as it existed then, as continues to exist today. Plus the secretaries general of the factions that are not included in the PLO. So it's kind of broader umbrella. So the idea was to activate something that I did not invent myself. It was always there to dust it off and activate it and really get it to do something meaningful. What is the main mission? What is the main task of this body in the piece that I actually wrote for? To consent to a government that's not factional, to run Gaza and West Bank for transitional period, length of which to be agreed in negotiations, and to get on with it and send the government to Gaza immediately.

26:33This is a government for both Gaza and West Ham. It's agreed to by the PLO as expanded within this unified leadership framework. And the sole function for that body at this, at that juncture, at that point in time, all they need to do is to agree to a government of national consensus, to consent to a non-factional government, one that is not made up of Hamas or by Hamas, one that's not made up by any other faction. and just agree to it and let it run the affairs of Palestinian people, both in Gaza and the West Bank, for transitional period. And all of this to be underpinned by commitment to nonviolence and what have you.