The Reeducation of Russia’s Military

26:52That's not usually how it works for the Russian army. Usually you get your exact orders down to the minute of where you're supposed to be. It's centrally planned, very rigid. So that is a change. And we're seeing that in some materials that I have seen that are Russian materials from field research in Ukraine. I've been able to look and see how they celebrate units that do this successfully. And they tell other units, hey, this unit over here did this mission planning thing, and it worked. And so then I can read in all of these journals that they're talking about training units in this way, to have accountability at the lower levels.

27:32They look at drones, they see how people are doing on the training field, and they say, nope, that right there was good, and that right there was bad, don't do that again. This is new for the Russian military. It's very new for them. So that's something I can see, like, oh, that's a change. But then again, simultaneously. There's so much variability on the Russian frontline. You have good commanders like that, like good in the sense of competent, who are willing to do that experimentation. And then you have bad commanders who are the same Soviet mold, punching their subordinates, to get them to comply with orders, taking money, taking care packages.

28:09That still exists. But my question as a researcher of this institution is, what is the percentage of change versus what is the percentage of the old school, very abusive category right now? And then who stays in when the war is over? Is it the reformers or is it the old school method of doing things? And until I see who's left, it's hard for me to make a prediction on how much of this is going to stick. But right now I see almost two systems kind of fighting against each other. And they're fighting with, to your point, within a political system that will allow certain types of adaptation, but will not allow certain types of critique.

28:51So it's a tricky place. We should not extrapolate from this that Vladimir Putin must have gotten a really good therapist or executive coach or something and suddenly become open to feedback. No, no. And we know this because, you know, he keeps General Grasimov in the job, who was the one that oversaw this invasion plan the way it was, and everybody was killed. You know, so he likes stability and he likes familiar faces. He doesn't necessarily prioritize results. How is Ukraine as a learning organization, the Ukrainian military? So that is their advantage that they had in the beginning. It's starting to erode a little bit now that we've seen the Russians switch into a slightly different gear.

29:27The Ukrainians are highly adaptive. They are a very horizontal organization in terms of how they share and disseminate information. They really have access to better technology, which allows them to share and disseminate. so having seen them it is very impressive what they do they are having a phenomenon over time where as they're having to pull in officers from the reserve or mobilize people who maybe had their military training in the 90s or even earlier that they are bringing that like old culture back into the military and there there's a generational split in the ukrainian military If you're maybe in your mid-30s and below versus mid-30s and above, you were trained pretty differently and you have a different worldview.

30:14That is playing out in the Ukrainian military right now where the senior levels kind of have a more traditional idea of what to do. And the younger ones are more technically savvy and have a different life experience. We'll be back after a short break.

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31:58And now, back to my conversation with Dara Massako. You write in the new piece that Russia started to close the technological edge with Ukraine. How do you see that balance now, whether it's in drones or other kinds of innovations? Well, the Russians, I think, were slow in the beginning to understand, you know, where the Ukrainians were going and some of the tactics that they were using. But they were able to catch up and they have a state-controlled defense industrial base that is incredibly responsive to top-down orders. and they've really been able to dial up their production in terms of numbers, but they've also made a lot of very challenging technological upgrades, whether that's to the Shahed drones, they call them Giron 1, Giron 2, there's Giron 3s in the works.

32:46They're becoming very challenging to intercept. The numbers alone and the decoys and the airs is becoming challenging for Ukraine's teams, the way that they operate. It's adapting and counter adapting. Both sides are doing it. Where Russia, I think, has the advantage, though, is that they can really just tinker around with their missile guidance packages, how they target Ukrainian sites. They're watching the West and they're thinking, okay, we just need to keep the foot on the gas for a little bit longer and the West will run out, retire out. To me, that's the advantage that Russia brings. And the willingness to sustain huge casualties for very, very minimal gains on the ground.

33:29Ukraine just simply can't one for one match that kind of loss. I mean, they shouldn't. I went back and read a great piece you wrote, I think in early 2022, not long after the war started for us called the Russian military's people problem. And in that piece, you described what you call the culture of indifference plaguing the Russian military and saw that as a, you know, a weakness in some sense. Has that in a grim and perverse way turned out to be a certain kind of strength for the Russian military? Yeah, it has. So I was motivated to write a piece on Russian resilience after the counteroffensive failed.

34:05Because in the West, we think of the concept of resilience as a positive thing, where you encounter a hardship, and you get through it, and you grow as a person. I'm paraphrasing and I'm being a little flip, but like, Like resilience is a positive thing for our military, for us as, you know, just our concept of it. Russian military is also very devoted to this idea of resilience, but it's not necessarily positive. It is defined as your ability to execute your combat task, no matter the difficulty of your situation. So they train them in this as officers or as conscripts. They know not to expect good treatment.

34:42They know not to expect relief. If they don't get treated kindly in Russian military service, the idea of trust up and down the chain is not a priority. It's your ability to execute your mission. And so this indifference, the cruelty, the hazing, the violence within the unit, that's still happening. And that hasn't changed. And so that's why we see the Russian military underperforming, given all the resources that they have as a state, why they perform the way that they do on the ground. But again, there's this resilience of they just endure through it and they know not to expect any better. I will say, though, from looking across this organization, as we've seen critiques mounting, Russia is aware of the PTSD problem for these guys when they come home, more so than they have been in other conflicts.

35:32I think they're genuinely concerned about it. I also note some pretty, as far as this system can be, direct critiques on why are we making so much progress with procurement and technical things? And none of you military psychologists are fixing this problem? Or why aren't our political officers getting more involved in some of these rampant discipline problems? So there are some voices within the House that are calling out this problem, but I don't see actually any impetus to fix it at this time, like because they're so focused on enduring and remaining in the task. There's people that know it's a problem.

36:12They're just not tackling it. And this has been an area where the Russian military historically has not prioritized. In the new piece, there is a pretty clear note of concern about what the coming months look like for Ukraine. You say that Ukraine is likely to face even greater destruction, whether that's from, you know, more numerous drone attacks or missiles getting through defenses and the front lines can vary around the front lines becoming almost impenetrable. And this willingness of the Russians to trade as many soldiers' lives as they need to for pretty incremental gains. If you're being pessimistic, what does that mean about where things will stand, say, six months from now in Ukraine?

36:46I think what Russia's priority right now to do is to envelop the rest of Donetsk and to go around that stronghold and hope that that is basically going to deal a blow to Ukraine in terms of, you know, we can't really keep going like this. But Russia has been hammering at this objective for 18 months, and they haven't been able to get that decisive breakthrough. So my concern is always as we enter the winter, the energy blackouts, the attacks on the cities, the infrastructure, Russia has sought in the past to depopulate cities using this mechanism. You know, Kharkiv bears the brunt a lot because it's so close.

37:30I worry about that aspect. The Ukrainians, they pull through it, but I just hate it that they have to keep pulling through living like this through the winter because it's almost like a frustration, right? Like Russia can't get what it wants on the ground. So it slings a bunch of missiles at hospitals and other targets they're not supposed to. I do think that as Ukraine continues to hit the oil and gas infrastructure in Russia, which is causing problems inside Russia for them, that we're going to see that energy retaliation again against the Ukrainian grid. So that's my big concern for Ukrainian civilians this winter.

38:05And if this piece proves too pessimistic, I mean, keeping in mind the cautions that you have offered since the beginning of the war about not being too certain, if this piece proves wrong and things don't go so badly, what might that look like? What's an optimistic scenario that's still plausible? Well, it's that Russia doesn't get what they want in the Donbass. They still cannot chip away at this. I think that's entirely likely that they just can't. And then they have nothing to show for 80 ,000 combat deaths this year. They have nothing to show for it. You know, the Russian population is incredibly apathetic about this, but they're also like, you know, just really, what's the plan to end this?

38:45I think that's the best case scenario is that the Kremlin is looking stupid because it doesn't even have the Donbass, which has been its main objective for a year and a half. It can't get there. And they'll try to compensate for it with images of attacks on Ukrainian cities. That's how typically they've done things when they stall out on the ground. Can you imagine some kind of serious willingness on Putin's part to negotiate an end of the war in that scenario? I think if both sides are frustrated and the Donbass is out of his reach, I can't get inside his head. I think that the response will probably be to cause harm and devastation across Ukrainian cities with missile strikes because he can't, again, he can't get what he wants on the ground, so he'll ruin the rest of it.

39:25I say this because I've seen the strikes in Kiev pick up. Usually, typically, Russia has not gone for the center of Kiev. Kiev is like an emotional, historical city. I don't think he wants to see it destroyed, but lately we've been seeing a lot more attacks. Lviv out in the west, a historical city as well, just got severely attacked a couple nights ago. So I think there's a possibility of lash out more than possibility for peace. There's been talk of Ukraine developing or receiving from the U.S. ability to strike greater distance into Russia, whether that's with tomahawk missiles or some kind of capability that the Ukrainians themselves are developing.

40:08Would that make a major difference in the war to your mind? Long-range strike will, yes, make a difference. The tomahawk debate, though, has been a puzzling one to me because tomahawks are fired from surface ships and submarines, mostly, almost entirely. Ukraine doesn't have a lot of those. It can be launched from the ground with a very large system that looks like a semi-truck. We don't have a lot of those. And I don't know that if it went to Ukraine, that it would survive very long. So the Tomahawk debate to me, it's not making a lot of sense from a launcher perspective. What would have made more sense to me is an argument about the JAZZA missile.

40:49These are air-launched missiles that can be mounted on F-16s. They also have a pretty decent range. That direction would make more sense to me just because they have an ability to launch it. The SM-6 missile is another one. That's our air defense missile, but it can also be used. It can be modified in the MK-70 in a land attack kind of way. That also makes sense because you can dual purpose it, right? So air defense, land attack. The Ukrainian indigenous capability, I think is really useful for them to have because it's theirs, right? It's theirs. They develop it. They don't have to ask for permission.

41:23They can use it. And that's technically plausible from a Ukrainian perspective. Well, they're working on it with the Flamingo and other things they've got in the pipeline. You know, it takes time to develop. So I don't, you know, is it anything that they can use for the rest of this year? Probably not. But they've been really successful, I think, with some of their long-range drone strikes. And, you know, with the bomber base attack and what we're seeing on the electrical grid and some of their big strikes on the air bases or ammunition depots. These things do, they do add up for Russia, but it's not a game changer right now.

41:56One of the lessons you focused on in the 2023 essay, what Russia got wrong, was the underestimation of both Ukrainian resolve and Western resolve. You know, the notion that Ukraine would kind of fold quickly, it wouldn't put up much resistance after a kind of early show of force by the Russians. Where do you think Ukrainian resolve is? Do you have concerns about the kind of political center holding, about mobilization concerns, creating dissension among the populace? Where do you see it? For me, the biggest concern is this continuing tension between the units at the front that are holding the line.

42:32They need manpower and they are not getting what they need. They're holding the best they can with drones, but drones can't do everything for them. I understand the sensitivity about not wanting to mobilize 18 to 25-year-olds in Ukraine, and now they're relaxing the borders so that some may be able to actually leave Ukraine. So to me, this is a real point of tension. It's not being resolved. It's not dramatically worsening months on month, but it's not getting better, and it hasn't been getting better since the previous essay two years ago. So Ukrainians are incredibly resilient people, but Russia is actively on the ground every day trying to like water, trying to get through cracks and break stone.

43:15So it's, it is challenging. How about Western resolve? I mean, obviously the Trump piece of this is extremely hard to predict or impossible to predict, but we've seen over the last several weeks, these escalating Russian hybrid attacks, I suppose you would call them, whether it's, you know, drones in Poland or fighter jets appearing in various places, or now drones in Denmark and elsewhere. Do you read that as an attempt by the Kremlin to further erode Western support and perhaps undercut some of the renewed European willingness to really stand by Ukraine? Well, actually, I think that by doing this, whether it's in Poland or Finland or Sweden, Denmark now, Norway, Germany, Poland, I mean, just pick your country.

43:59They're activating all of these antibodies against them. And now you have several European countries talking about, we really need to accelerate a drone wall or EW. We've now got Polish representatives in Ukraine learning from Ukrainian anti-air teams that shoot down drones. One could ask why that wasn't done three years ago, but it's better late than never. So whatever satisfaction that the Kremlin is getting from these drone incursions, I think ultimately they're going to pay a price for it because now they're just irritating everyone. And the more countries you get on the same page, that's when changes are made.

44:37If they hadn't irritated all of these, you know, seven or eight growing countries, then would they be coming together right now to develop these things? Maybe not. So, I mean, you don't want to ever see Russian drones in your airspace, but, you know, now they're going to develop countermeasures. One of the really fascinating elements in the new essay is your discussion of what this means beyond Ukraine, either for other governments, especially those that are supporting Russia, but also for warfare in the future. You write, quote, the same Russian adaptations that threaten Ukraine should be of concern to policymakers elsewhere.

45:09The Russian military will emerge from its evasion with extensive experience and a distinct vision of the future of combat. And it is sharing its experience with China, Iran, and North Korea. What is that vision and what exactly is happening to share it at this point. Well, they consider themselves right now a leader in drone warfare. I think they begrudgingly admit that Ukraine is up there with them now. But that is something that they are fully bringing on board to how they execute offensive operations in the future. They understand that the future is going to be heavily flooded with information of low quality, fake to good quality because there's sensors everywhere and they understand that humans are going to be increasingly overwhelmed as commanders trying to process this in real time.

45:57So they're trying to figure out how to use their limited means or tapping into what China's doing to bring AI into their force. When you look at this partnership between China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Russia's not the economic powerhouse. They are the powerhouse when it comes to combat experience. And we're seeing them, through my research on this project here, this learning, and others have written about this community of learning. They're not just sending equipment to China or purchasing equipment from China. They're bringing people over and they're teaching them how to do tactical medicine for mass casualty events.

46:36Now that should, you know, if you're a China watcher, that should get your attention. Why is China trying to figure out how to treat mass casualty events? They have no experience in this. Russia has a lot. Now, is it the best experience? No, but they're still teaching it nevertheless. They're teaching distributed logistics to Iran, North Korea, so that they can ride out future airstrikes if they ever get into a conflict with the United States. I mean, this learning is not just staying channelized in the war with Ukraine. It's disseminating to partners across the globe. It's going to be a huge factor if there's any conflict, even a limited one between Russia and NATO.

47:12And we're learning, NATO's learning, but I think where we are is not where we need to be. I think the learning needs to accelerate. How might those lessons be applied in a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean Peninsula? Is it possible to imagine that at this point? Yeah, I think the unmanned, you know, there's naval drones, the unmanned surface drones that we see Ukraine use effectively against Russia. You could easily see that being a factor. There's robotic mines. There's all sorts of the unmanned story here and how to integrate them with manned forces, I think is a really interesting angle and one that China is keenly interested in.

47:54And I did actually find in the course of my research that China has observers not in occupied Ukraine, but they're right on the other side of the border in Russian command posts, just sitting there observing and learning. And I note with sadness that we are not in Ukrainian command posts doing the same thing. You do make very clear in this piece that you believe that American and European policymakers and analysts and others should be studying the Russian studying or learning from the Russian learning. I think we would probably most of us tend to dismiss the Russian military as a learning organization, but you caution us against that.

48:31But what is the state of that kind of learning in the U.S. military and U.S. strategic circles at this point? And what should we take from the Russian endeavor here? There are little pockets of excellence, I think, either whether it's in Poland under a NATO umbrella or whether it's going on within the U.S. military services or within the intelligence community. People are learning some things in accordance to their mission set, but there's not a consolidated program, which I really think that we need at a central level in the Pentagon to unite all of these things together. My colleagues who go to Ukraine have a completely different understanding.

49:12I was there only once myself to see it, but there's a complete world of learning and the way that they see the Russians that we are not getting here because we are physically not there. And we're not having that data exchange with them in the way that I think we need to. So that would be my advice. And also, to the extent I've heard arguments that none of this is applicable to a war with China and Taiwan, that's wrong. That's really wrong. I know it's not a land war, but there's a lot that actually is directly applicable. Beyond the unmanned systems dimensions you were talking about, are there other lessons that you'd focus on?

49:47Yeah. I mean, everything from how do you handle mass casualty events, how do you prepare your officers for going into this kind of environment? How do you prepare people mentally for being on a drone-saturated environment where you're being watched as you're trying to survive? There's across all the major warfighting functions, really a lot to learn here. As you watch what's happening in American military and intelligence institutions, do you worry about both the kind of culture and just institutions, the mechanisms of learning and analysis and self-criticism being eroded to the point that we're just not able to do this effectively?

50:24I mean, you see what's happening to analytic bodies, but it's obviously much deeper than that. We actually are pretty good, I think, at learning now. Just speaking about the U.S. military, I think that we have a lot of good things going for us in terms of accountability to one another, transparency to one another when things go right, when they go wrong. After action reports, we're good at the mechanisms of learning. That I don't think is the issue. The issue is we don't, what I see the most, just as a Russian military expert and having interacted with Ukrainians and hearing their stories and interacting with our military and our defense policymakers, we don't know what we don't know because we're not there.

51:06And I think if they were there, they would realize concepts are entirely out of date. The way that we train people to just move through a battlefield is completely out of date. We're working on improving drone programs, counter drone techniques, but we're doing that kind of in a, not a total vacuum from Ukraine's experience, but not enough partnership in my perspective. So I would just advocate for a lot more lash up when Ukraine is in a position to do that. Before we close, I want to ask you more of a kind of process or perhaps epistemological question. It's been so hard, I think, for people to really understand what's going on on the battlefield and how to assess different developments.

51:49In some ways, it's harder because we can watch in real time drone strikes and Russian tanks blowing up and see this kind of incredible battlefield footage. But it's easy to kind of lose a sense of what's really happening. How do you do this work? How do you know what you know? You've talked about going to Ukraine and reading Russian military documents, but I'm fascinated to know what that process looks like. Well, you have to understand when you see these materials that everything that you're seeing from the Russians or from the Ukrainians, someone has made the decision to upload it to the internet.

52:22Something that they want you to see. And so you're looking at something with a lot of selection bias, and you're also staring at a problem through the end of a straw. And that's the mentality that you have to have. just because you see one Russian unit with the commanders punching his subordinates in the face, you can't say, oh, the Russian military is rotten top to bottom. You can say, okay, that's problematic here and we can extrapolate a little bit from it, but you can't make this blanket pronouncement that the Russians are uniformly trash. I can't as an analyst tell you how each unit is affected by the personnel rot situation.

53:01I have my suspicions, but you have to just be kind of humble about what you don't know. And the same for the Ukrainian side as well. I see it on the opposite side that the Ukrainians are amazing and they are amazing, but they face a lot of the same problems that any military would face in a complicated environment like this too. So it's really challenging and you have to constantly question your confidence level and what you know. And then most importantly, what's the negative space of what you don't? Tara, thank you so much for joining me today. And thank you for the fantastic essay. It's in our new issue, which is on the way to mailboxes and newsstands.

53:36And it's also online right now. So listeners can go read it on our website and we will look forward to more as these dynamics continue. Thank you.

53:51Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show at foreignaffairs.com. This episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Ben Metzner, Elise Burr and Connish Clareur. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Arena Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts. And if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.

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