In short
Robert O’Brien, former Trump national security advisor (2019–2021), explains the logic behind Trump’s second-term foreign policy, especially toward China, Ukraine, Venezuela, alliances, India, and the Middle East.
Guest background
O’Brien served as Trump’s national security advisor (2019–2021) and stayed a defender of Trump’s foreign policy through the Biden years into Trump’s second term. He authored Foreign Affairs essays including “The Return of Peace Through Strength” (2024) and a follow-up praising Trump’s approach over the prior 10 months.
Key claims
- China policy is tougher but evolving: maintain stability with China while prioritizing other crises.
- The core China vulnerability is rare earths: Biden allegedly suspended progress, leaving China leverage; Trump is now pursuing extraction and especially refining/processing capacity.
- Tariffs were necessary, but China’s “weaponization” may backfire by forcing competitors to build capacity (O’Brien predicts within ~3 years).
- Export controls on advanced chips remain central; “legacy chips” may be allowed, but O’Brien prefers U.S. chips in Chinese military systems rather than Chinese chips in U.S. systems.
- Venezuela strikes are driven primarily by stopping fentanyl/cocaine flows, not ideology; Maduro is portrayed as enabling cartels.
- Ukraine: Trump’s earlier offer (de facto Crimea/Donbass recognition, NATO-like security without Article 5, sanctions relief) was rejected; O’Brien argues for stronger economic pressure on Russia (e.g., central bank, SWIFT, travel restrictions).
- Iran: negotiations are possible if Iran gives up nuclear weapons; O’Brien doubts they will.
Notable examples
- Rare earth deals/trips: Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Australia; focus on Greenland/Denmark.
- 5G: blocking Huawei in favor of non-Huawei networks (Italy, Australia, Japan, UK).
- India: O’Brien cites trade-negotiation timing disputes and Alaska sanctions as drivers of the Trump–Modi rift.
- Gaza: O’Brien credits Trump for securing hostage returns (20 Israelis) as a major success.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOContext of Trump's First Term
0:45 to 1:30
Discussion on Trump's first term and the continuity into his second term.
“on China, on Ukraine, on the Middle East, on Venezuela, and on much else.”
Interview with Robert O'Brien
1:30 to 2:15
Introduction of Robert O'Brien and discussion about his views on Trump's foreign policy.
“There's a lot to talk about, including your couple of essays in foreign affairs over the past couple of years.”
China Policy Shift
2:15 to 3:24
Analyzing the shift in Trump's approach to China in his second term.
“They carried on a number of our policies from the first term.”
Rare Earth Minerals and Supply Chains
3:24 to 5:14
Discussion on rare earth minerals and the implications for U.S. industry.
“And I think President Trump is trying very hard to rectify that situation.”
Trade Relations and Strategy
5:14 to 7:20
Exploring the complexities of U.S.-China trade relations and strategies for the future.
“And as long as the Chinese stay out of Taiwan and don't invade Taiwan and hopefully don't invade and take over Scarborough Shoal and invade the Philippines, I think we can probably get along with the Chinese.”
China's Technological Leverage
7:20 to 9:30
Examining China's use of technology and its implications for the U.S.
“Well, look, we needed a new supply chain for rare earths on both the extraction and the processing side.”
Impact of Export Controls
9:30 to 11:30
Discussing the impact of export controls on advanced technology in relation to China.
“And then you, again, in 2024, writing in your piece called The Return of Peace Through Strength on Trump's foreign policy, you criticized Biden for saying, you know, we're not looking to hurt China.”
Global 5G Strategy and Competition
11:30 to 14:00
Analyzing the global strategy around 5G and competition with Chinese technology.
“And again, I don't think the fundamentals of the relationship have changed dramatically.”
Navigating 5G and Global Communications
14:00 to 17:24
Discussion on the challenges of global 5G networks and China's role.
“Even in America, we were told, well, we'll encrypt around the Chinese.”
The Venezuela Strategy
17:24 to 21:46
Insights on the U.S. strategy in Venezuela and drug trafficking issues.
“either militarily or economically, to get into that sort of contest with China about trying to change out of the CCP.”
Show all 24 chapters
U.S. Alliances and Defense Spending
21:46 to 28:00
Exploration of the dynamics of U.S. alliances and defense commitments.
“Do you think it would be a mistake to turn this into a regime change operation?”
Comparative Work Cultures
28:00 to 29:16
Discussion on the disparities in work-life balance between American and German workers.
“And she doesn't get a day off the whole year.”
The U.S.-India Relationship Under Trump
30:21 to 35:48
Exploration of the evolving U.S.-India relationship during Trump's presidency.
“One of this is not an American alliance, but it's an incredibly important relationship and relation that I think many people would like to see grow into an alliance in the coming years.”
Misunderstanding Putin's Intentions
35:48 to 42:05
Analysis of Trump's approach to Putin and the broader implications for U.S. foreign policy.
“and also their stance in the trade negotiations.”
Putin's Misjudgment of Ukraine
42:05 to 44:35
Exploration of Putin's motivations in Ukraine and misconceptions about Ukrainian sentiment.
“And we had a lot of deals with the Russians.”
Economic Pressure on Russia
44:35 to 46:32
Discussion of potential economic strategies to pressure Russia regarding Ukraine.
“It's going to be nothing more of a vassal state to Beijing and Xi Jinping.”
Iran's Nuclear Negotiations
46:32 to 48:36
Analysis of the prospects for negotiations with Iran regarding their nuclear program.
“There were 12 days of Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities.”
Gaza Conflict and Peace Efforts
48:36 to 51:39
Examination of the Gaza conflict and the potential for peace negotiations under Trump.
“They believe that nuclear power gives them some staying power as a regime and sort of about regime survival and they're not going to give up their nukes.”
Two-State Solution Feasibility
51:39 to 54:06
Discussion on the viability of a two-state solution and Trump's role in it.
“There'd be a lot in it for him and his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize and also his desire to help broker a regional normalization with especially a relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia.”
Nuclear Testing and Global Power Dynamics
54:06 to 56:04
Insights into Trump's calls for nuclear testing and the implications for global security.
“Well, look, the first thing is, this is President Trump's idea, it's not my idea.”
Nuclear Strategy and Military Modernization
56:04 to 58:38
Explore the nuances of Trump's nuclear strategy and military upgrades.
“We can send a nuclear propelled torpedo that has a nuclear warhead on it, a double nuke and create a tsunami and take out the naval base of Norfolk or take out New York City, you know, that's pretty provocative.”
National Security Process Under Trump
58:38 to 1:03:12
Discuss the evolution of national security policymaking in Trump's administration.
“I trust our delivery system to work better and our warhead to work better than anything Chinese or Russian.”
Trump's Vision of International Order
1:03:12 to 1:06:36
Examine Trump's perspective on sovereignty and international relations.
“You mentioned Trump's understanding the levers of power.”
Affection for Canada
1:06:36 to 1:07:18
Reflect on the U.S.-Canada relationship and mutual respect.
“They're not like a cousin or brother that we have spats with, but we're going to get along from Canada.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00I'm Dan Kurtz-Felan, and this is The Foreign Affairs Interview. I think what's changed is that the president has had a full first term. And so this isn't a new president who doesn't know where the levers of power are. President Trump is very, very aware of where all his levers are. Robert O 'Brien served as Donald Trump's national security advisor from 2019 to 2021. O 'Brien's predecessors in that position left the administration to become some of the most vociferous critics of their former boss. O 'Brien, in contrast, remained a staunch defender of Trump's foreign policy through the Biden administration and into Trump's second term.
0:38And perhaps as a result, he can now help make sense of the thinking behind Trump's approach on key national security issues, drawing out the objectives and the assumptions driving policy on China, on Ukraine, on the Middle East, on Venezuela, and on much else. Shortly before the 2024 election, O 'Brien wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs called The Return of Peace Through Strength, Making the Case for Trump's Foreign Policy. Last week, he published a follow-up to that essay, giving Trump high marks for his approach to the world over the past 10 months. O 'Brien and I spoke on Monday, November 10th, about the second-term policy so far, about where he sees continuity and where he sees change from the first term, and about where Trump's foreign policy may be going from here.
1:27Ambassador O 'Brien, thank you for doing this. Great to be with you, Dan. Thank you. There's a lot to talk about, including your couple of essays in foreign affairs over the past couple of years. So let's get right into it. When I look back at your tenure as national security advisor from 2019 to 21 and really much of Trump's first term, the shift to a much tougher approach on China was a central feature of that period of American foreign policy and the Biden foreign policy, for that matter. Trump's second-term approach looks fairly different to most of us watching from outside the administration.
1:57And exactly what the strategy is this time, what the theory of the case is, is not entirely clear. How do you understand Trump's second-term China policy? And in what ways does it look different from what we saw first time around? The situation's changed. And unfortunately, we lost four years with Joe Biden. And look, the Biden folks did something. They carried on a number of our policies from the first term. And I always give them the credit for doing that. And, you know, I thought the Chips Act was a good start. I think the way it was executed didn't work out super well. But the idea of bringing manufacturing of high-end chips back to America was important.
2:32And so I think some good things were done. The real problem we had, though, is the rare earth mineral situation. You know, we were making great strides towards, you know, refining capacity and extraction capacity under the Trump administration. and that basically was all suspended because of environmental concerns in the Biden years. And so, again, we seeded even further the rare earth element monopoly to China and China has wielded that tool very effectively in the trade negotiations and the trade crisis. If automobile manufacturers don't have access to rare earth, put the defense part of it aside, if the auto industry doesn't have access to those rare earth elements, I mean, the American automobile industry shuts down.
3:21So the failure to develop alternate supply lines over the last four years, I think, was very difficult. And I think President Trump is trying very hard to rectify that situation. You've seen on the Osnab tour, the mineral deals with Malaysia, with Papua New Guinea, with Australia. A lot of those didn't get picked up, but the focus on Greenland and the work with Denmark, which is ongoing, to make sure we've got access to the rare earth minerals that we need is important. But then it goes beyond that. It's the issue. It's not just extracting the rare earth. Once you extract them, if you can't refine them and if you can't process them, and if the only country with capacity to do so is China, we're in the same boat.
4:06And so I think we need to now focus on a refining capacity and a processing capacity. That's tough because it's a very dirty business, right? I mean, some of the technology is 100 years old. It's difficult for the workers. It's difficult for the environment where the processing plant is located. The Chinese use Uyghur slaves, and so they don't care about their workers, and they pollute without concern in China. We're different from them. We're not going to enslave people to work in a rare earth manufacturing plant, a refining plant, and we're not going to destroy our environment. So it's a little harder for us, but I think we'll get there.
4:45I also think that President Trump's got a lot on his plate. He's got to rebuild the military. He's got to close the southern border. We've got a very difficult situation in Ukraine. We've had occupying us, the Gaza-Iran situation, Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, all in one big ball. And so putting a trade war or a Cold War with China on the plate is something I think everyone, including President Trump, wants to avoid. And as long as the Chinese stay out of Taiwan and don't invade Taiwan and hopefully don't invade and take over Scarborough Shoal and invade the Philippines, I think we can probably get along with the Chinese.
5:28And I think President Trump feels that he's got a good enough relationship with President Xi. And President Xi knows that Trump is mercurial enough that if he invades Taiwan, that there truly is strategic ambiguity now, again, restored. And so I think President Trump feels in his gut that Xi Jinping will not invade Taiwan and won't invade the Philippines while he's in office. and he can hopefully deal with some of the other problems we have and we'll be in a better position for the next president to do what needs to be done. That's fascinating. So it's almost an American version of hide and bite or a certain kind of detente.
6:05Keep things stable with China while we deal with other problems. Is that a fair way of characterizing it? I'm not sure it was a plan. I think that's just how it's evolving because of the situation around the world. And look, I think that is the benefit of China as well because Xi Jinping has got a difficult situation with his economy. It's overheated. They still have a terrible real estate bubble. He's got the problem of not having – while he's got rare earths and processing capability, he needs to bring most of them in from overseas. He needs to bring most of his oil and gas in from overseas, from Russia, and through the Gulf and the streets of Malacca.
6:44So I think both leaders are looking at this situation and don't want a conflagration with each other at this point. On the rarest point, listening to senior members in the second Trump administration, I'm not sure I've heard this from the president himself, but listening to Marco Rubio and others, they seemed almost taken aback by the ferocity and effectiveness of the Chinese response, the Chinese weaponization of the rarest supply chain and other related products. Do you think it was a mistake to go that aggressively on tariffs before shoring up our own vulnerabilities on rare earths? Well, look, we needed a new supply chain for rare earths on both the extraction and the processing side.
7:29There's no question about that, Dan. And I think we all knew it. The thing about the minerals is it's a relatively small portion of the trade between the countries. It's a billion dollars. And yet it's so important to the defense industry and the automotive industry that it gives the Chinese a lot of leverage. I think the Chinese are using 100-year-old technology very well to leverage it against our cutting-edge chip strategy. But at the same time, they may have overplayed their hand. And unless those export controls were designed to buy them a window to take Taiwan or to invade the Philippines, I think they've basically created a situation where there is going to be a competitor.
8:16and the idea that I think the Chinese have always in the past, whenever we've started to close in, the Japanese or others have started to close in on the rare earth issue. They've undercut the new companies and the new suppliers and dumped product and basically maintained their monopoly through a combination of dumping and it's overpricing when they eliminate their competitor. I think now governments realize, Australia, Japan, the U.S., at a minimum, realize that we'll probably have to do some tax incentives, some subsidies, and we're going to have to have a rarest industry. And as a Republican, I hate to talk about industrial policy or state-substitized industries, but we may have to have that for the rarest, given the Chinese have weaponized it in a way to try and maintain a monopoly.
9:05By the way, I think it's going to happen. I think it's going to happen within three years. And I think the Chinese are going to lose a lot of their bargaining power they had. So they played the card. They played it very ruthlessly and effectively. But they may have created a backlash more than they needed to. I want to linger on your fascinating point about the new approach to China and the reasons for it. It does seem like a pretty major change from Trump's first administration. You wrote a piece for foreign affairs in your last month's National Security Advisor, where you wrote, and I'm quoting you here, the Trump administration has spoken with candor and shown the spotlight of transparency on the CCP's true character and will continue to do so.
9:44And then you, again, in 2024, writing in your piece called The Return of Peace Through Strength on Trump's foreign policy, you criticized Biden for saying, you know, we're not looking to hurt China. And you called for seeing China as an adversary. I mean, is that still the fundamental reality of this relationship in your view, even if we need to put a pause on some of the tensions? Yeah, look, Dan, I think that's a fair characterization. I don't think the CCP has changed its stripes. I mean, it's still a Marxist, Leninist, totalitarian power. The way they're treating Christians, the way they're doing exit bans, especially on dual citizens of the US and China, the way they're still abusing the Uyghurs, the vast territorial claims that they had, not just on Taiwan, but against the Russians, against the Indians and other countries in the region.
10:34I mean, none of that has changed fundamentally, but I think we're in a situation where we've got a very big foreign policy plate and we have to rebuild the military. We have to get ourselves in a position of independence with rare earths. We need to restore energy dominance for the U.S. And I think all those things, militate for a pause and maybe the hard line approach. Again, I don't think the actual export controls and customs controls and sanctions have changed fundamentally since we left office, since Biden left office, and the current Trump administration, everything's still pretty much in place.
11:15It's just that the tariffs that we put in to deter the fentanyl trade and the tariffs that we put in place to protect American manufacturing have come down as a result of the truce. And they're supplying some rotors. So I think it's more of a trade dispute now. And again, I don't think the fundamentals of the relationship have changed dramatically. You note that one of the key American tools there is export controls on advanced technology, especially chips and chip making equipment and other parts of that supply chain. Your former deputy, Matt Pottinger, one of the key architects of the hardline approach on China, has been fairly critical of the decision to give China access to a greater number of chips or more advanced chips.
11:59Do you see that as a major concession in the trade war? That was a big part, of course, of the interaction between Trump and Xi a couple of weeks ago. Listen, so I still talk with Matt regularly, and I'm a big fan of his, and he's a super smart guy in China, no question about it. And he played a key role in the first administration, both as my deputy and as the president's deputy national security advisor. And look, I don't think there was anyone who was more hawkish on China than I was. I brought Matt in as deputy and hired him and got that policy going. But we have had a little divergence on this issue.
12:36And the divergence that we've had is on this issue of legacy chips because the chip making is moving so fast. And when I was in office, I mean, four years ago, five years ago, five nanometer chips were the cutting edge. We're now down to two nanometer, and the companies are talking about one and a half nanometer chips. And some people are talking about using atoms and putting circuit boards on atoms. It's just beyond my comprehension having a political science degree and not a real science degree. So it's moving very quickly. And so things that were cutting edge a few years ago, we are now starting to call commodity or legacy chips.
13:16Now, it's important for us to have, for our industry and for our defense manufacturing folks to have access to those chips. And certainly the Chinese want them. But as long as they're not the cutting edge chips, what my feeling is, I'm going to be very careful how to say this, I'd rather have U.S. chips in Chinese military platforms than Chinese chips in American military platforms. And I'll just leave it at that. I'd much rather have the tech stack around the world for AI and for machine learning and for quantum being made with American chips and American design chips than Chinese chips. When I came into office, you remember this, Dan, Huawei was about to take over the 5G industry in the whole world.
14:00There was 100 % monopoly. Even in America, we were told, well, we'll encrypt around the Chinese. Yeah, they'll get all the 5G communications. They'll store it all. They'll have access to every communication in the world. But we'll encrypt around it. We'll just let them have that. And we said no. And everyone said that it was a fool's errand and we wouldn't be able to stop it. We started with Italy and Australia and Japan, and the UK came along. And pretty soon the free world, for the most part, had a non-Walway 5G network or platforms. But the funny thing is, Dan, was I didn't have an American product to sell.
14:37I was basically an unpaid spokesman for Nokia and Ericsson selling Scandinavian cell phones and towers because we didn't have the product. I mean, Microsoft was working on a product, and we had some other American companies working on a product. But we weren't involved. So I was basically out flogging the Europeans' goods. We need to make sure that we don't find ourselves in that situation again. So I've had a little divergence with Matt. We don't fundamentally disagree on policy, but I think the issue of what constitutes a legacy chip and what constitutes a cutting-edge ship, we're probably a little farther apart.
15:19Matt, of course, wrote a controversial piece in our pages with Mike Gallagher, former congressman from Wisconsin, Republican, arguing that it should be American policy to weaken and eventually change the nature of government in China. Do you share that as an ultimate objective for our strategy, even if the short-term looks a little different? Yeah, you're taking me down memory lane. So Mike Gallagher is a great American. He was another good friend, and someone who I fundamentally agree on the issues with him, like I do with Matt. But, you know, look, as a baseline, you know, I grew up in the Reagan years, Dan, a little older than you.
15:54And, you know, we live in individual freedom and kind of free men and free markets and the striving for liberty among people. And so I'm always on the side of those seeking freedom and liberty who don't want the secret police knocking on their doors or burning their church down or arresting their pastors or imprisoning people because of their race or their religion. I mean, and all that's happening in China. So, you know, I personally think China would be a much better place if they had freedom. And the world would be – can you imagine how amazing the world would be right now if China was free and it had free people and weren't involved in trying to take over their neighbors and spent their time doing good instead of trying to build up in the military to defeat the United States.
16:42And we could have not just a golden age for America, but a golden age for the world. So it would be great if China was free. But look, I was also in the Bush administration and I saw, I spent years of my life working on a rule of law in Afghanistan. And it's very tough to change a regime. And I think we have to be modest as Americans about our ability to change regimes. We should always be the shining city on the hill. which always be the beacon of liberty and support democracy and personal freedom. But I think we've also got to be very modest in how we exercise our power to change regimes. And so as much as I'd like to see a free China, I don't think America can afford, either militarily or economically, to get into that sort of contest with China about trying to change out of the CCP.
17:33With apologies for bouncing around geographically, I want to jump to Venezuela because you mentioned regime change. The administration has, of course, started these strikes on boats, which are alleged to be drug smuggling boats in both the Caribbean and Pacific. It's made noises about striking targets in Venezuela and called for President Maduro to go. How do you understand the strategy in Venezuela? What do you think they're up to? Well, so this is a continuation of part of what we did in the first term. So when COVID hit, Dan, one of the first things that I took away from it on the national security side is we had very good intel.
18:10And Bill Barr and I went to the briefing room and disclosed it and said what we were going to do. We had very good intel that the cartels were going to try and stockpile cocaine and fentanyl in America and take advantage of COVID to do so. and then sell it for the next several years, having moved it all up when they thought our defenses were down. And so against Mark Esper's wishes, we didn't think the military should be involved in that. We got the Navy, we got the Coast. Secretary of Defense in the latter part of the first term. Correct. And he took a very narrow view of what the military should do.
18:46And certainly didn't get along well with the president, unfortunately. but Bill and Pompeo and the president, we all agreed that we've got to stop this cocaine and fentanyl coming into America. So we had some huge drug busts, massive, stopping them. And Bill Barwon would go even further. Bill Barwon would start using hellfires to take out processing plants in Mexico and in Colombia and Venezuela. We didn't get there at the time, but it was certainly something that was considered. I was concerned about the sovereignty issue of Mexico because even though the relationship can be sometimes difficult with the Mexicans, we're blessed to have them as a partner and ally.
19:32We don't want to turn the Mexican people against us. We've got a history of doing that, and we want to keep them on side and encourage them to bring the strength of their government to bear on the cartels. Very hard to do for the Mexicans. It's a life or death situation for the political leaders because you can be killed very easily by the cartels and it takes a lot of courage to fight them. But we need to bolster them. But the idea of really rationing up the war against the cartels to stop the 50 ,000 deaths a year that we're experiencing from fentanyl and from cocaine and other drugs was something that was important then and is important now.
20:11I think that's driven some of the China talks as well. I don't think the Chinese took it as seriously as President Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance, who's very engaged in this issue, given his background and what he's seen growing up in Appalachia. You know, the Chinese fentanyl precursors coming into Mexico, I think one of the reasons the Chinese may have agreed to take a harder line on that is they saw us taking out the drug boats. They don't want to see us taking out Chinese ships and aircraft. I really do think this is about the drugs and not about the Maduro regime. but unfortunately the Maduro regime has gotten so in bed with the drug traffickers that there's maybe, it's maybe a distinction without a difference, and I think he's playing a very dangerous game.
20:54I don't think the president went into office. I mean, Rick Grinnell went down and had a couple of good meetings with the Venezuelans, brought some hostages on. Things seem to be going pretty well, so I don't think it's just an ideological grift between Grinnell and Rubio. So I think that there was an effort to bring Venezuela on side when Maduro sided with the cartels and refused to take the trend of our immigrants back and give sanctuary to the cartels. I think that he really lost President Trump and certainly Marco Rubio. He probably had lost from the start. So I think he's put himself in a dangerous situation.
21:34I still don't think the policies of regime change, But I think the president's going to do whatever it takes to stop the drug imports. And if that means Maduro has to go, it means he has to go. But I truly believe this is driven by the drug situation. Do you think it would be a mistake to turn this into a regime change operation? You know, it may become a regime change operation as a result of taking out the drug cartels. I mean, so this is, I think, and I think we have to wait and see what's going to happen. And frankly, I don't advise foreign governments and I don't advise Maduro, but if I was Maduro, the guy's got like a billion dollars supposedly in cash stacked up.
22:14He had to pull Ghani and put him in a helicopter and get the heck out of Dodge with his cash and go live an ice life in Cuba. I'm sure we'd make some arrangements for him to go to Qatar or to Abu Dhabi or somewhere. He could take his money with him and get out and let Machado and the Venezuelan people have their country back. and bring the U.S. in to help them get rid of the cartels. And I think it's kind of like self-deportation, right? It's kind of self-regime change. I think Maduro would be much better off at this point. He and his family and his friends leaving for Moscow, Beijing, maybe cut a deal to go to one of the Gulf shakedoms, but it's time for him to leave then as well, I think.
22:56Going back to the China strategy conversation, One of the places where those of us in the foreign policy establishment or the blob, as it's sometimes called, get most exercised, is around the question of alliances. It's, of course, been a centerpiece of American global strategy for almost 80 years. It's, I think, pretty widely seen as a massive advantage that the U.S. has over its competitors, that we have this enormous network of alliances. Trump has taken a different approach, I think it's fair to say, that has, as you point out in your recent piece for Foreign Affairs, yielded. fairly substantial gains in defense spending, first and foremost among NATO allies, but also increasingly in East Asia and elsewhere.
23:37There is a kind of price to that over time. There'll be kind of less deference on the part of allies when it comes to American interests. And you do hear from lots of officials and allies governments, a kind of sense of abandonment by the US, a sense that they won't trust us in the same way. How do you weigh the upside of more defense spending against some of those concerns about reliability? And, you know, I think what's kind of hard to deny that there is a change in a sense of kind of American commitment, both among America, European and Asian allies over the last several months. Well, listen, Dan, I agree with you on the strength of our ally system and the advantage it gives America.
24:11I mean, we have countries and nations as allies that truly share our values. They're not rented ally like Pakistan or North Korea. I mean, the Chinese, I don't think, have an ally, right? I mean, they rent them when they need them. They go with belts and roads and suborn a corrupt leader in Africa to fill up his bank account in Geneva. And those aren't real alliances. I mean, when you look at our alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, for example, Indo-Pacific, our alliance with Japan, our alliance with Australia, Thailand, the Philippines. I mean, these are longstanding true alliances between democracies and countries that have had many, many shared experiences together.
24:54in war and peace. And so that's fundamentally different, as you point out, and the blob would point out. The only thing Ben Rhodes signed is the blob, but those alliances are important. But an alliance has to be a two-way street. And so when I talk about NATO, and I wrote about this before I was in the Trump administration, when I was a former Walker Romney guy and Bush guy who had no plans to go into the Trump administration. Not that I didn't want to, but didn't think I'd be asked. I wasn't part of this campaign. He was generous enough to ask me to come on board. First as hostage envoy, as a national security advisor, and now on the plan.
25:33But I wrote about this before joining the administration after the campaign, that every presidential candidate, I went back and looked at the little campaign brochures and pamphlets from every Republican and Democratic candidate going back to 1972, Nixon, McGovern, on through Carter, Ford, and Reagan, Carter. Every candidate on both sides had part of the platform, part of their pamphlets that Europe had to pay their fair share. Republican and Democrat, it was a bipartisan concern. And you remember it paid their fair share. No president ever got them to pay their fair share. and Trump took office in the defense.
26:17Even before he started rattling the cages, the defense for many countries started to grow up because they realized there was a new sheriff in town. This president who believed in America first was going to require the alliance to be a two-way street. I mean, I've compared, I think NATO's most effective alliance in the history of the world. The only alliance that may have been better or compared was the Roman-Latian alliance, right? when Rome did the fighting, but the Laysian people, the Italian people supplied the soldiers. But again, even that was a two-way street, right? Rome buried the brunt of the strategy and the cost of the wars, but the Laysians supplied the Latin soldiers, the people.
26:59And eventually we're doing citizenship in Rome, and it all worked out pretty well. But it's always a two-way street in my life. Up until Donald Trump, it was a massive one-way street. I mean, the Europeans couldn't defend themselves to any extent. The British Army, which was kind of the pride of Europe, was down to 55 ,000 soldiers, like much smaller, a third of the size of the U.S. Marine Corps, a fourth of the size of the U.S. Marine Corps. I mean, we were granted the entire burden. So I think President Trump is coming to revitalize the alliances. and granted there's going to be pushback for that because it's great not to have to spend on your own defense and have Uncle Sam take the burden for you but the world's changed with the rise of China with the Indo-Pacific commitments that we have with the rise of Russia and our debt I mean we're$50 trillion debt or whatever it is and we just can't, the American taxpayer can no longer bear the burden, the entire burden of defending the free world And I used to tell my German counterparts, I talked to a teacher in Tennessee who's working as a school teacher and then goes on the weekends to the Amazon Fulfillment House and works at an Amazon plant for two days a week or two and a half days a week.
Read the full transcript
28:18And she doesn't get a day off the whole year. And you've got a German birder taking the month of August off and driving a station wagon down to the south of France. And again, as a 48-weekend, work with the rest of the week, the rest of the year. Now, look, I'm all for the Germans doing that. That's great. And it's great for the German workers. But it's not fair that some schoolteacher in Tennessee is bearing the burden of that. You know, that just fundamentally isn't right. We'll be back after a short break.
28:51What if you could explore places in the news like a reporter does? I'm Nicholas Wood, a former journalist with the New York Times and BBC. And 16 years ago, I created the travel company Political Tours. Our small groups are led by top correspondents around the world. In the next few months, we're off to Mexico, followed by South Africa, Japan and the French presidential elections. Come and join us. Go to politicaltours.com. That's politicaltours.com. This September, Independent 20th Century presents more than 130 artists at the legendary Broyu building at 945 Madison Avenue. The show will fill four floors of the modernist landmark on Museum Mile.
29:34See why Art News Magazine calls Independent 20th Century a staple of the season and experience historic modern art from around the world and one of New York's most iconic spaces, September 24th to 27th. To learn more, visit independenthq.com. This July, save$10 on an all-access subscription to Foreign Affairs. Get exclusive access to thought-provoking analysis by the world's leading policymakers, scholars, and thinkers. Join the global conversation on the issues that matter most. Visit foreignaffairs.com slash July to subscribe. That's foreignaffairs.com slash J-U-L-Y.
30:16And now back to my conversation with Robert O 'Brien. One of this is not an American alliance, but it's an incredibly important relationship and relation that I think many people would like to see grow into an alliance in the coming years. Your successors, Ash Kieradvisor Jake Sullivan, wrote a piece advocating that in foreign affairs a few months ago. That's the relation with India. This has been, I think, one of the most perplexing developments, one of the surprising developments, frankly, in the Trump to foreign policy is the rift with Prime Minister Modi. They had a great relationship last time around.
30:47Strategically, it seems to make a lot of sense. How do you explain the India rift other than this kind of strange series of events and effective diplomacy by Pakistan and strong egos, strong personalities on both sides? What's driving this? Well, the first thing, I like Prime Minister Modi a lot. I spent a lot of time with him. He's one of the foreign leaders that as national security advisor, I spent time with both in America and India and also in summits in Bangkok and other places. is he's a great guy, very smart, very tough guy. And I wrote a piece last year when President Trump was first coming into office, in which I said, look, there's a lot of Trump and Modi.
31:27Modi's an India first guy. He's an Indian nationalist. He wants to bring manufacturing to India. And he's got the chance of a lifetime. He's got the chance of a generation. I've told this to Dr. Dushankar, his foreign minister, and Ajit Duval, who's his national security advisor, who has similar background to me. He was the hostage negotiator for hijacked planes back in the days of hijacking and got a lot of people free before he became national security advisors. So he and I have a lot in common. And I love those guys. We had a great trip to India. We had several great visits by Modi to America.
32:03We had the Howdy Modi event down in Houston at the basketball stadium, which was packed for President Trump and Prime Minister Modi. And look, the two of them got along very well. They used to compare who had the most Twitter followers and the most Facebook fans and all that sort of thing. And I think Modi has a once-in-generation chance with companies de-risking and de-leveraging China. You've got companies like Apple and Facebook and Google moving to India, manufacturing moving to India. This is an opportunity that India has that truly wants a lifetime for any leader. And so I think Modi wants to take advantage of that.
32:44And the alliance makes sense, the partnership makes sense between the U.S. and India. We're far away from each other. We've got no claims within each other's territories. We've got no rivalry. And yet we've got China butting up against both countries and, in India's case, brutally killing Indian soldiers on the border. I mean, you know, abusing their bodies and mutilating them and doing terrible things, throwing them into crevasses. I mean, just a terrible bully in the region. So when that happened to India, we were there for the Indians in a very quiet way and supplying them with the down jackets they needed and the down sleeping bags so their troops could stay in the mountains over the winter.
33:27We supplied them with intelligence. And so the relationship makes a lot of sense. Now, what the heck happened to that relationship? It was genuinely friendly between Trump and Modi. I mean, what happened? I think two things happened. I think the Indians have traditionally been very – well, one, they're very good negotiators. I mean, people don't realize how tough the Indians are when it comes to – they negotiate over everything. And they're very stubborn and they're very effective. They're smart. They're motivated. And they're tough negotiators. on trade, especially the Indians are probably the most in the whole world, are the slowest negotiators.
34:09I mean, they held up GATT rounds. They held up WTO rounds. There's one country holding up the entire world and just dragging out negotiations. And so when they showed up after Liberation Day to get their deal, and I think there was and is a deal in the making, I think that they had a year timeline, which they thought was fast. And they clearly didn't understand that we were talking about days, not a year. So that got everyone starting off on a very bad foot on the trade negotiations. And then, look, I think the president did something prior to Alaska that, again, this is just, I haven't talked to President Trump about this.
34:48This is my take on it. It's very easy to sanction China for buying Russian oil. When you take a country that we're as close to as India and say, look, you're buying You're not just buying Russian oil to survive like the Hungarians, but you're buying Russian oil and refining it and selling it to third parties. You can't do that, and we're going to sanction you. Basically, going into the summit in Alaska, President Trump did two big things. He deployed the National Guard into the streets of Washington, D.C., and he shot massive sanctions at a close strategic partner. I think both those were messages to Putin, kind of like Reagan firing the air traffic controllers.
35:29said, look, we're serious about this. We're willing to take heat from a friend to show our displeasure with what's going on in Ukraine, not just from China or not just from Iran or North Korea. We're willing to hit India. I think the Indians were taken aback by what happened. I think it was the dual nature of the Putin summit and also their stance in the trade negotiations. I think, you know, I'm not claiming any credit for this, but I put a tweet out saying, look, I tweeted a picture of Modi and Trump. I said, look, these guys are great friends. And the trade negotiators are getting back on track with the trade negotiations.
36:12You mentioned President Trump's meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska. This has been part of the rather dramatic saga of the administration's approach to Ukraine, at least as it looks from the outside over the course of the last 10 months. How do you understand the strategy? What is Trump's plan for ending the war as you see it? Well, look, I think he laid out the strategy pretty clearly early on. And I think he thought it would be resolved very quickly. And to be honest, you know, I thought that the war would be resolved very quickly, both before and after the election, President Trump's election.
36:45I thought this was going to be one of the easier things to resolve. To use a term from the Bush administration, I misunderstood Vladimir Putin and his commitment to the war. When you look at what President Trump basically offered him from the outset, and Trump was criticized for this heavily, we'll give you a du jour recognition of Crimea. Fine, Crimea is Russian, it has been forever. It got moved over to Ukraine in administrative action under Khrushchev and the Soviet Union. but Russia and Crimea have always been associated. All I'll give you is your recognition of that. And this is my understanding from public statements, right?
37:28We'll do a de facto recognition of the Donbass, Luhansk, and Donbass City control, at least the February 14th lines. And that will freeze that kind of like a North Korea situation. We will not allow Ukraine to join NATO, which you're concerned about. But we'll put NATO peacekeeping troops in. We'll put a Polish armored brigade or French or British air wing. I put serious security forces in Ukraine but not call it NATO and not call it an Article 5 situation. And then we'll rebuild Ukraine. And for Russia, I think the additional incentive was we'll remove all sanctions. You can return the world economy stopping Rhodesia and you can be part of the world economy again.
38:21I mean, so it was a very generous package for the Russians, you know, I thought. I thought it would be very difficult for Vladimir Putin to reject it. Yet he did, and he continues to war. What I'm saying now is that he'll fight to the last Dagestani or the last Chechen to take Ukraine back because you see very few, you know, Russian kids from St. Petersburg and Moscow being drafted or being conscripted into the fight, but he's putting the Dagestanis and the Chechens and the other Russian minorities through the meat grinder in Ukraine. He's using North Korean troops and not very good effect, but he's showing no inclination to end the war.
39:02So what I've come out and said, and Larry Kudlow's joined me in this, President Trump's economic advisor in the first term, put massive sanctions on the Russians. We've started, but we need to sanction the Russian Federation Central Bank I mean, we need to go, I'm calling it full road to use your sanctions. I mean, we use sanctions, but we don't use them effectively. We don't use them, we use them like Syriotum with sanctioning individuals and entities and banks and that sort of thing. We need to cut the Russians down to the world economy. We need to take them off the SWIFT system, maybe kick them out of the ITU, kick them off the mobile phone system, stop letting the Russian people travel freely to the West or Turkey or Cyprus.
39:44This war and the killing and the attacks on the Ukrainian civilians has put them outside of the civilized world. We need to treat them that way economically and culturally. And that might put enough pressure on Putin to end the war when his oligarchs can't go use their yachts in Turkey. They can't go to Dubai for vacation. And Russian oil sales drop from$10 million a day to$7 million. And that takes the cream that's keeping society afloat and then making the war easy for them. That takes it away. So we're never going to stop all Russian oil sales. I'm not that naive. It's a fungible commodity.
40:24But we can limit them and take the ability of Putin to ameliorate the economic crisis for his people. And northern Russia, take that away from him and make the war costly. I think it's time. You say that you misunderstood Putin. Do you think Trump misunderstood Putin as well? He seemed to have the expectation that Putin would take this deal and he didn't. And I would note that both of your predecessors as an extra security advisor in Trump's first term were quite struck and spoke out publicly about, you know, what H.R. McMaster called Putin's hold on Trump and John Bolton said something like, Putin thinks he can play Trump like a fiddle.
41:03So there does seem to be a pattern of this over both this term and the previous one. Yeah, well, Well, it's just disingenuous for Bolton to say that. I mean, you know, Trump didn't have a personal relationship with Putin. He was cordial with him. They had like one meeting in Finland. They've had a couple of phone calls. I was on the phone calls with Trump and Putin. There's no love between Trump and Putin. He's cordial. He gets along with them, as he should. I mean, Putin's got 2 ,500, you know, tactical notes pointed in Europe and 1 ,300, 1 ,250 strategic notes. and the delivery systems pointed at the United States.
41:38You want to have a relationship that you can talk to a foreign leader even if you're an adversary. So trying to conflate the ability to talk with a foreign leader and you've got some sort of sympathy for their cause is just ridiculous. And so I just don't think that's the case at all. And look, I like HR. He's a smart guy. And I think HR is taking a different tack than Bolton did. But look, I was with Trump for two years, three years if you count my time as an awesome boy. I didn't see any of that. And we had a lot of deals with the Russians. I dealt with Patrick all the time. That's just nonsense.
42:17But going back to the surprise, I don't think Putin has a hold on Trump. I think that a lot of smart people, including a lot of people who wanted the Ukrainians to make no concessions to the Russians, thought that Putin would take the deal that Trump offered. Because it was a good deal. But Putin obviously has motivations beyond getting a good deal. He obviously wants to reconstitute at least Ukraine into the Russian Empire. And what does he get from that? He gets land, of course, but he also gets demographics, which the Russians face a major demography problem. The problem Putin has is I don't think anyone's explained to him.
43:02So the Ukrainians don't want anything to do with the Russians. I mean, maybe the 10 % of Russian speakers who are over in Crimea and Donbass. You know, the last time I was in Crimea was in 2014 for the Postmate observing the election. And as a U.S. observer, no one in Western Ukraine wanted anything to do with the Russians. And the problem I've got with Zelensky is that at that time, a lot of Ukrainians were saying, let's just give the dynastomal hands back to Russia and get them out of our polity and not have them elect Russian speakers to our parliament. I mean, all the problems, all their corruption was coming from the east.
43:44But the Western Ukrainians, which is 90 % of the population, they're looking to Prague and Warsaw and Vienna as their home, not to Moscow. They don't have any affinity with them. And I don't think that anyone's explained to Putin that these guys aren't a Russian minority that want to be reunited with Mother Russia and are being held up by a couple of fascists, which the idea that these people somehow could be coerced into reuniting with Russia or want Putin to be their leader is just ridiculous. And so I don't know if Putin's just purposely blind to it or people aren't explaining to him the situation, but he needs to change his war aims pretty quickly because eventually Europe and the West are going to get fed up with it.
44:33It's going to be very bad for Russia. It's going to be nothing more of a vassal state to Beijing and Xi Jinping. Do you anticipate that President Trump will follow that path and escalate military support to Ukraine as well as economic and other kinds of pressure on Russia? Look, I think there's definitely going to be an escalation of economic pressure. He had put in a little love tap in the Alaska engagement when he overflown with F-35s and a B-2. I mean, that was not to honor you. Everyone saw smiles about that, honoring Putin. That was trying to prove that that's what just took out the Iranian – Operation Good Night Hammer, that just took out the Iranian facilities in Florida and the TANS and your presidential bunker out in Moscow could be taken out before you knew it.
45:24so i like i i but again that military escalation is always dangerous for the russians i'm always concerned about that because they do have you know they've got the potentially in the in the world and uh you always have to be cognizant and careful that when you're at the highest levels of of government and people may may take it take it lightly but uh i've never met one of my former colleagues who was national security advisor and had the back of nuclear codes in the safe in your office and had the briefings, it was never taking that anything other than with the utmost seriousness. And I think presidents are the same way.
45:59I think Biden did. I think Trump did. And Trump does. And so we've got to be careful with that. But I had careful going up the escalation ladder. You know, it's one thing for the Ukrainians and Russians to fight. It's another thing for Americans and Russians to fight. So we've got to be careful there. But on the economic front, Russia is entitled to be part of the Swiss system. They're not entitled to be part of the world banking system. And so, you know, I think those are the levers that could put a lot of pressure on Putin to settle this war. You mentioned the strikes on Iran in June. So let me take us to the Middle East before we close.
46:32There were 12 days of Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities. The United States joined for a couple of days. The Iranian program has not entirely gone away. The IEA reports that most of the highly enriched uranium is still in Iran, still has not been destroyed and still accessible. Do you see a return to negotiations with Iran and return to some kind of deal? Or is there some other path to really eradicating this problem for good? We thought the Iranians would come to the table in the first term with the maximum pressure campaign. And frankly, I thought they'd come to the table after the strikes.
47:10I think the Israelis wanted a few more data strikes to maybe ensure the regime was eliminated. I think that's Again, I don't think President Trump, like President Bush and like other presidents, you know, into the first Gulf War with Iraq. And I think there's a national reticence to get into a policy and regime change around the world. I think Trump shares that reticence as well. But at the same time, he said, and he said this in the first term, he said in the second term, we're not going to allow the Iranians to have their weapon. And these are the same people that have threatened to kill him and produce very slick videos of the assassination of President Trump on the golf course.
47:52So, I mean, the Iranians have no love lost for Trump. But the thing about President Trump is he's so willing to put the country first that even if it's to his personal benefit to take out the Iranian regime, if it's better for America to negotiate and have them actually give up their nuclear weapons voluntarily, at least kind of the way South Africa did or Libya did, then he's willing to do that. So I think the Iranians have an open partner for peace if they want to give up their weapons. I think, unfortunately, their mentality is a little more like Kim Jong-un, who said he would but didn't. And I think that's the problem, or Hamas giving up their weapons in Gaza.
48:34I think the Iranians are just very reticent. They believe that nuclear power gives them some staying power as a regime and sort of about regime survival and they're not going to give up their nukes. But they could negotiate and they could get a settlement with President Trump if they wanted to. I'm convinced of that, even though it wouldn't be necessarily Trump's personal interest. Gaza is, of course, another theater where there is a degree of ambiguity about where things stand and where Trump is going. There's, of course, a ceasefire that is holding somewhat tenuously right now, thanks at least in part to pressure from President Trump on Netanyahu last month.
49:15How do you see Trump pushing this from here? This 20-point plan talks about a fairly traditional approach, as I read it, to a two-state solution and a peace process. But where do you imagine this going? Well, look, I think the first thing that happened that President Trump did that was so incredibly useful and saved lives, and he's all about saving lives, is getting the hostages home. The 20 Israeli hostages. I'm actually surprised that the Hamas love Gobe because it was the ultimate leverage for Hamas to stay in power. And, you know, God bless President Trump and Marco Rubio, Steve Likov and Adam Boller and J.D.
49:50Vance, the whole team that got that deal done. I've been in touch with the families since October 7th. Even getting the remains home, Dan, is important. I mean, not so important for the Jewish religion, Dan and Barry, but just for the family to have closure and to allow their loved ones to rest in peace in Israel. And if they're IDF, like Hayter Golden, who came home, and I've been working on Hayter Golden's case since I was hostage on board for many years, to get him home and bury in an Israeli military cemetery in Jerusalem on that great holiday. They can go to their son's grave and Leah and her husband can go to the flowers in their son's grave.
50:32That's really important. So if nothing else comes with the Gaza ceasefire and the peace deal and the hostages and the remains being brought back to Israel, it's still a success. But, you know, there's the old saying that Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. I think they've got the opportunity here to actually build a new Gaza and to have a two-state solution and improve the future of their people. They have to give up their weapons. They have to give up the terrorism. And it's just been so ingrained for so many years, starting with Arafat and PLA and PLO. And PLA has been a little bit better, but with Hamas, I mean, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Jihad with Abu Nadal.
51:20I mean, it's been such a history of terrorism for so many years in Lebanon and all the Levant and in the Mediterranean. I mean, for them to let go of that and embrace peace and a new future is going to be tough. But if they do, I have no doubt the Palestinian people can be very successful, very prosperous. Do you see Trump as committed to the creation of a Palestinian state? There'd be a lot in it for him and his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize and also his desire to help broker a regional normalization with especially a relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia. How does he see a Palestinian state?
51:56Look, I think he'd be open to it. He certainly, to get the Abraham Accords done, at the time we were going to file negotiations, Israel was talking about annexing our extended sovereignty over parts of the West Bank. The UAE said, if that happens, we're out. We had to deliver a very tough message to Bibi Netanyahu. The night before he met with Trump at about 2 in the morning, I gave him that message over at Blair House. and he would do the right thing and decide not to be the Israeli leader who was going to walk away from peace. And, yeah, every Palestinian leader has walked away from peace, no Israeli leader has.
52:34And so even though the Israelis right now are pretty tough on the two-state solution, that's probably ultimately the only way to get to some, you know, end point. So I think Trump would be amenable to that. And, you know, there would have to be obviously security guarantees with Israel that I can have a Palestinian state that has an army or as an air force or a navy or even a very big paramilitary force, police force, there'd have to be a lot of guarantees. But I think ultimately that's the way this thing is. If it's going to be resolved and if the Palestinians do want to have peace, at some point they've got to say yes.
53:10They've been saying no since 1948 when the UN gave them half in Palestine. Will Trump put pressure on Netanyahu to that, do you think? I think if the Palestinians were willing to accept a two-state solution and recognize Israel and guarantee Israel's security? Yes, but again, after October 7th and the massacres that took place, I was at Kibbutz near Oz and the music festival site after the massacres. You can't ask the Israelis to forget what happened. So there really has to be a new Palestinian attitude and real security guarantees for Israel, not just fake ones. I'll point to some Belgian peacekeepers on the border of Gaza and say that everything's okay.
53:53One of the most prophetic elements, I would say, in the piece you wrote in 2024 called The Return of Peace Through Strength was your call to resume testing of nuclear weapons. Trump picked up this call recently ahead of his meeting with Xi Jinping. He called for testing on an equal basis with Russia and China. What do you understand that to mean? What do you think he has in mind? Well, look, the first thing is, this is President Trump's idea, it's not my idea. And a lot of people, including on Fox, have gone to my article where I said this could happen. And so it's my idea, President Trump's idea, 100 percent.
54:29But, you know, it's something we've talked about from time to time. Look, what we saw, Dan, in the first administration is the Russians cheating on every nuclear treaty, whether it was the INF Treaty, the Open Skies, New START. I mean, they're just blatantly abusing them. And the Chinese were still in kind of one of the Russian cover, not bound by any of the treaties, to build up a massive nuclear force, both conventional or both short-range and long-range, tactical and strategic. So we had it in that. And then what we saw with Trump coming into power, and again, this is not how you deal with President Trump, at least in my view already, strong American leader, President Reagan, President Bush.
55:16When the Chinese rolled out the new ICBM at their military parade in Beijing for the anniversary of the Second World War, which, by the way, the nationalists won and we helped them, the Russians and communists. The communists basically set out World War II and did very little against the Japanese. For them to take credit with this massive military parade with Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin as the VIPs, that was a little ridiculous. But when they rolled out the massive new ICBM, that was a shot across the bow. When President Putin, days before President Trump made the announcement on the testing, said Poseidon is now IOP in its operation phase, the Russian version of IOP.
56:04We can send a nuclear propelled torpedo that has a nuclear warhead on it, a double nuke and create a tsunami and take out the naval base of Norfolk or take out New York City, you know, that's pretty provocative. And so you're going to draw a response from President Trump. And he responded by saying, look, we have to start testing nukes again. And, you know, we've all talked about it. Hopefully it didn't have to go there. But, look, we can allow our adversaries to rattle the nuclear saber and put themselves in a position to blackmail us on the nuclear front. I think more important than testing is what President Trump is doing with the modernizing of the triad.
56:45We're going to probably build 100 plus B-21s. Huge. We're modernizing the old Minutemen with the Sentinel program. Northrop also has, and he's done a good job on that. And we're going to start cranking out Columbia-class submarines. So I think that sends a message. I'm just even more than testing. The nuclear want crowd has responded to calls for return to testing nuclear weapons with the argument that, first of all, we don't really need to. It doesn't gain us that much. And second, that returning to that kind of testing would advantage Russia and China more than it would us. Do you see that as wrong?
57:24Look, President Trump has said, we'll do the testing. And we don't have the money and program it for live testing you have from Congress. the Secretary of Energy has pointed that out. So there's a lot of testing we can do short of exploding a bomb in a drill hole in Nevada. We may get to the point where we have to do that to show that the physical material still works and it's still effective. So we may get there. But I think right now is testing delivery systems, doing computer testing. testing we can test a lot of the system without actually exploiting a nuke so I think we're going to do a lot of that but at some point the president has made it clear if these guys keep rattling the nuclear saber and threatening us with nuclear weapons we're going to have to go back to how it was and spin our own centrifuges and doing live tests Russia and China may do the same but Look, I trust an American-built missile, bomber, submarine, SLBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile, hypersonic missile that's got a nuclear warhead from us.
58:38I trust our delivery system to work better and our warhead to work better than anything Chinese or Russian. That's not to say that the Russians and Chinese are damn smart. They've got space programs. They know what they're doing. But I trust our kit more. Let me end on a couple of especially nerdy questions. One is about national security process. I mean, when I look back at the process you were running as national security advisor and Nat Ponter, deputy national security advisor, it looks fairly typical, you know, more or less typical, at least compared to where we are now. Now there seems to be nothing resembling the traditional askerty-making process.
59:14How do you see Trump II policymaking, and how does it differ from one which surely has implications for policy if that process is so different? Well, look, what I said the first day I was National Security Advisors, that I was going to re-implement the Brent Scowcroft model, which the Obama NSC did not really use. I mean, they had many State Department and many Pentagon and many Energy Department and many Commerce Department, Treasury, all over the EOB. I mean, they had so many people there. It was probably a fire hazard to get out of the building because they wanted all the power consolidated at the White House.
59:50I think that was the way to run a national security process. And I don't think it didn't empower the agencies and the departments of the federal government, which are supposed to. The Pentagon should be running war policy and defense policy. The State Department should be running the policy and the Commerce Department should be running commerce policy and export controls and the Treasury should be doing Treasury stuff. We shouldn't try to recreate all that over at the White House and run it from 16 out of Pennsylvania. And so my goal was to downsize the NNC, to streamline it, but then have a very effective policy process where we had regular deputy committee meetings every week, principal committee meetings every week.
1:00:31and if you were the principal and you weren't on travel or the funeral or in the hospital, you were going to be there or you were going to you couldn't send a deputy or an undersecretary and have your department have a send the policy and so we empowered the agencies and said you're going to run the policy in the departments but you've got to participate, you can't just have one half and not the other half so if you want a real Scowcroft model, you've got to participate. And I think Matt and I did that. The first couple of meetings, when the Pentagon sent over some colonel to a deputies committee meeting, Matt told them to sit on the back chairs of the situation room, and they could listen and take notes, but weren't going to speak.
1:01:18I think they got the message pretty quickly how it was going to work. And so we had a good process. I think what's changed is that The president has had a full first term, and so this isn't a new president who doesn't know where the levers of power are. President Trump is very, very aware of where all his levers are. He had a well-formulated policy that he was going to implement. And Marco Rubio, I spent time with Marco one-on-one talking about the roles he had to say in the sex state. He's an incredibly effective guy, and he's starting to be far more impressive in both roles. than I thought it would be.
1:01:59I thought very highly of him. I was very friendly with him as chairman of the intel committee, but you never know how someone was going to set in the SEC state job. But then to add the NSA job on top of it, I mean, they're both more than full-time positions. And Marco's holding up well so far. So the only person who's done that in the past is Henry Kissinger. And so he's got big shoes to fill, but right now he's filling them. And so I think the process is working better than people think. It's probably not as public, but they're vaccinating deputies, they're vaccinating PCCs and PCs and principal meetings.
1:02:38And so I think it's with Andy Baker and the other folks who are there, I think it's more normal than it may look because of the dual hat in a barco. And Marco spends half and half his day at Foggy Bottom and half his day at 6 ,900 Pennsylvania. He's not sleeping. The rest of the time is higher, first of all, with the president. He's working very hard. He's well-respected. He's got a good relationship with J.D. Vance and the other cabinet members. I think it's working better than people thought it would. You mentioned Trump's understanding the levers of power. That seems like the really striking change in both domestic and foreign policy from the first term.
1:03:19What do you think Trump learned? What is his sense of the power of the presidency that he didn't know last time around? Well, look, I think he understands that the American people elected him and that the bureaucracy and you can call the deep state or the permanent government or permanent Washington, they weren't elected to anything. And if they're going to stay out in the federal government, they've got to implement the policies of the president of the United States. which again they may not have his rhetoric but his policies are really pretty people don't understand this about Trump he's one of our least ideological presidents.
1:03:56I mean closing the southern border would not have been controversial even under Obama. Rebuilding the military would not have been controversial under any Republican president. Again our allies to be a fair share as I talked about before was a bipartisan goal. So So things that he's doing that people don't want to implement, he was elected by the American people to do that. He's confident in that mandate, and he's going to push it through. And a lot of the rubble don't play with this in the first term. And the outright resistance just isn't going to be tolerated now. And so, look, if people don't want to implement the role, the job of the policy of the president's lives are legal and lawful, and make it take off.
1:04:43They can go work at a think tank. You in your 2024 piece mocked the tendency of people in the foreign policy world to talk about the rules-based international order or the liberal international order. Trump certainly does not seem to be a fan of those concepts or that kind of language. Does he have a vision of the international system that you think all of this is leading to? Does he think about order in those terms? So Dan, that's a good question. I think what President Trump thinks about is democracy and sovereignty. And so when he goes to the UN and says, you're all great nations and you should pursue your own interests, he doesn't believe nations should be invading each other.
1:05:22He doesn't believe Russia should be invading Ukraine or China should be invading Taiwan or India or Venezuela should be threatening Guyana for that matter. I think he really believes in sovereignty and that the nation shouldn't interfere with the affairs of their neighbors. And I think that's the bedrock. And by the way, that's the whole Australian order. That's really the foundation of the West border. That's the foundation of the UN. And going back to the Treaty of West Australia, it's not controversial. It's just, it's not Davos. It's not the EU. It's not global governance. It's not Paris Peace Accord or Paris Climate Accords.
1:06:03And so I think that's a little controversial. I think the idea of this rules-based international order, which is based on Article 5 of the UN Charter and Article 50, the enforcement power, you don't invade your neighbor. That should be the foundation of the international order. Climate change treaties or trans rights in sports in the Olympics. Or Davos setting the agenda for the world. I think the idea is that every country has their own national interest and they're going to pursue them and they should do it pacifically and not use you know forces as the ultimate lever and you would include the u.s not invading canada on that list we're not going to be canada all right hey there'd be too many democrat voters if we took over canada if alberta wants to come on board that's great but uh well the canadians are good friends and then look I can't think of Canada and not think about the Canadians rescuing our diplomats in 1980 in Tehran.
1:07:11They're not like a cousin or brother that we have spats with, but we're going to get along from Canada. All right. Well, there's a lot more we can talk about in the world, but let's end on that note of affection for the Canadians. Ambassador O 'Brien, thank you so much for doing this and for your recent pieces. It's been fascinating, and we will look forward to more in the future. Thanks, Dan. It's a honor to be with you.
1:07:59And if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.
1:08:25We hope you enjoyed this episode of the Foreign Affairs interview. Don't forget to visit foreignaffairs.com slash spotlight to sign up for Dan Kurtz-Valen's free weekly newsletter featuring more of the clear-headed analysis that you enjoy here on the podcast. Sign up today at foreignaffairs.com slash spotlight.
From the publisher
Robert O’Brien served as Donald Trump’s national security adviser from 2019 to 2021. O’Brien’s predecessors in that position left the administration to become some of the most vociferous critics of their former boss. O’Brien, in contrast, remained a staunch defender of Trump’s foreign policy through the Biden administration and into Trump’s second term. And perhaps as a result, he can help make some sense of the thinking behind Trump’s approach on key national security issues, drawing out the objectives and assumptions driving policy on China, Ukraine, the Middle East, Venezuela, and much else.
Shortly before the 2024 election, O’Brien wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs called “The Return of Peace Through Strength: Making the Case for Trump’s Foreign Policy.” Last week, he published a follow-up to that essay, giving Trump high marks for his approach to the world over the past ten months. O’Brien and Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke on Monday, November 10, about the second-term policy so far, about where he sees continuity and where he sees change from the first term, and about where Trump’s foreign policy may be going from here.
You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.
