In short
How China interprets a “disordered world” (uncertain U.S. commitments, Middle East/Western Hemisphere conflicts, Russia-North Korea ties, new middle-power alignments) as confirmation of Xi Jinping’s “great change unseen in a century,” and how Beijing plans to navigate it—especially regarding Taiwan, deterrence, and partner management.
Guest
Oriana Skylar Mastro, foreign-policy analyst and author of Foreign Affairs essays on Chinese strategy, China-Russia, China-North Korea, threats to Taiwan, and related U.S. foreign policy issues.
Key claims
- China’s strategy to become a great power has largely anticipated these disruptions; Trump-era volatility “confirms” prior Chinese expectations.
- Taiwan: China’s main driver is capability readiness; a 2.5–3 week “fait accompli” scenario is what China prepares for. Xi’s 2027 readiness order likely slips to 2028 due to command-and-control and logistics gaps.
- Gray-zone actions (e.g., blockade) are seen as battle-space preparation, not reunification.
- China lacks traditional alliances; it avoids “protecting” partners militarily, but Russia’s war and North Korea’s Russia ties reduce China’s leverage.
Notable examples
U.S. interventions in Iran/Venezuela/Ukraine; Xi’s 2027 readiness directive; Russia-North Korea battlefield experience in Ukraine; North Korea troop deployments and technology transfers (e.g., satellite tech); China’s UN voting patterns shifting toward Russia-aligned positions.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOChina's Global Strategy Amid Disruption
0:45 to 1:20
Discussion on how China views global turmoil and its implications for U.S. foreign policy.
“or new connections among anxious middle powers.”
Understanding Chinese Strategy
1:44 to 4:40
Oriana Skylar Mastro explains China's strategic mindset concerning the U.S.
“Now to my conversation with Oriana Schuyler-Mastro.”
China's Assessment of U.S. Power
4:40 to 7:40
Exploration of China's perceptions about U.S. power dynamics and military interventions.
“Do you think that China's net assessment, if you can put it that way, is correct?”
Taiwan's Strategic Importance
7:40 to 12:16
Analyzing the risk of Chinese military action in Taiwan and the implications for U.S. strategy.
“You know, that historically has been something in Chinese strategic thinking that is going to perpetuate the U.S.”
Future Scenarios in East Asia
12:16 to 14:01
Discussion on potential military strategies China may employ regarding Taiwan and U.S. responses.
“So I don't think it's the case that like there's a window of opportunity, right?”
Taiwan's Resistance to Chinese Rule
14:01 to 14:40
Exploration of Taiwan's resolve against potential Chinese takeover and the implications of military action.
“And I think, you know, the polls demonstrate that, that they're not ready to come to the table and say, oh, now that you've done a lot of exercises, now that there's these misinformation campaigns.”
Lessons from Global Conflicts
14:41 to 17:08
Discussion on what China might learn from recent wars and how it affects their military strategy.
“People often are like, well, they did this in Hong Kong.”
Impact of Trump on China's Strategy
17:09 to 19:28
Analysis of how Donald Trump's unpredictability may influence China's calculations regarding Taiwan.
“to mass produce them, and you want capabilities that are cheap and effective at bringing masks, these are things the Chinese knew before.”
US Policy and Status Quo in Taiwan
19:29 to 20:44
Examination of the US's historical approach to Taiwan and its implications for cross-strait relations.
“So if some of Trump's hard to comprehend decisions cut against Taiwanese interests, the uncertainty more than outweighs that to your mind.”
China's Ambivalent Alliances
20:45 to 24:30
Discussion on China's complex relationships with its partners amid global conflicts and their strategic implications.
“You know, you argue in that 2024 piece that China, while committed to its partnerships with Russia and to some degree North Korea, does see some downsides and costs to those.”
Show all 19 chapters
China's Diplomatic Balancing Act
24:31 to 28:00
Insight into China's diplomatic strategies and reluctance to engage deeply in international conflicts.
“There's been obviously lots of attention paid to the Xi-Putin relationship and the so-called no-limit partnership.”
China's Role in the Ukraine Conflict
28:00 to 32:54
Explore China's strategic interests in the Ukraine conflict and its hesitance to take a strong stance.
“And how expansive are the upsides from a European perspective there and from an American perspective?”
China's Role in the Ukraine Conflict
33:47 to 33:57
Explore China's strategic interests in the Ukraine conflict and its hesitance to take a strong stance.
China's Concerns Over North Korea-Russia Relations
33:57 to 39:24
Understand how the growing ties between North Korea and Russia complicate China's influence and strategy.
“And panicking and saying, wow, it really looks like these countries are coming together.”
U.S. Policy Options Towards North Korea
39:24 to 42:00
Examine potential U.S. strategies for dealing with North Korea amidst changing dynamics.
“in response to that growing closeness between Kim and Putin?”
Assessing American Deterrence Strategies
42:00 to 47:48
Explore the current state of American deterrence in Asia, focusing on North Korea and Taiwan.
“Koreans to develop these nuclear weapons?”
Challenges in the Taiwan Strait
47:48 to 54:08
Discuss the complexities and risks of military engagement in the Taiwan Strait.
“I think that would be a fundamental issue.”
The Future of U.S. Alliances in Asia
54:08 to 56:00
Examine the evolution of U.S. alliances in Asia and their impact on regional security.
“I mean, I'm sorry that, you know, that's what's going to happen.”
U.S.-China Rivalry and Strategic Dynamics
56:00 to 1:02:12
Explore the complexities of U.S.-China relations and the implications for global alliances.
“when China came after her and came after Japanese interests in a variety of ways.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00I'm Dan Kurtz-Falen, and this is the Foreign Affairs Interview. U.S.-China competition doesn't have to be a competition to the bottom. There is a world in which we are competing to be the best partners to countries in the developing world, to be the best supporters of development in the developing world, to be the best in terms of environmental protection or green energy. You know, in terms of what we compete on, there is a world in which we are both better countries because we have to compete with the other side. Like the rest of us, China's leaders are confronting a world in turmoil. They see uncertain American commitments to allies, even as many of those allies ramp up their own defense efforts.
0:42They see changing relationships, whether deepening ties between Russia and North Korea, or new connections among anxious middle powers. They see American military action in the Middle East and Western Hemisphere with effects on American power in China's own region. And yet, as Oriana Schuyler-Master sees it, far from surprising Chinese leaders, Such disruptions are being taken as confirmation of what Xi Jinping often refers to as great change unseen in a century. Master has written a series of essays for foreign affairs on how Beijing aims to shape and exploit that change. She joined me to discuss China's strategy for navigating this turmoil and what the United States should and should not do in response.
1:19Before we start, I wanted to flag a special offer for listeners who are not already subscribers to foreign affairs. For the month of July, new subscribers of the magazine save$10 on our annual subscription price. That gets you copies of our bi-monthly print issues, as well as access to daily essays on our website, to our newsletters, and more. You can find that offer at foreignaffairs.com slash July. That's foreignaffairs.com slash July. Now to my conversation with Oriana Schuyler-Mastro.
1:55Oriana, thank you so much for doing this. Yeah, thank you for having me. Your most recent piece for foreign affairs is on the intersection of the China, Russia, and North Korea challenges for U.S. foreign policy. But you've done fantastic essays over the years for the magazine on Chinese strategy more broadly, on China, Russia, on China, North Korea, on threats to Taiwan. So I want to start a little bit more broadly than that most recent piece. With your read of Chinese strategy more generally at this moment in history, the starting point for that seems to be the question of how China understands the second term of Trump's presidency and whether that represents a rupture or something else.
2:31What is your understanding of the Chinese understanding of this moment, how it sees this moment history? Well, you know, I think with Trump in office, also with all the ongoing conflicts with Iran, with Venezuela, with Ukraine now the past couple of years, there's a tendency to think that everything has completely changed. Emerging technology where we are with AI. People like to say, well, now the whole international system, everything's different. The character, nature of warfare, everything's different. So China must be just completely rethinking its strategy. But the bottom line is that China's strategy to become a great power was somewhat resistant to a lot of these changes because it predicted that most of these things would be occurring.
3:13It's not like, you know, in the 1990s when the Chinese decided that they wanted to leverage their economic power to become a military power, which I wrote about in Foreign Affairs, the stealth superpower, that they didn't predict that, for example, there'd be volatility in the U.S. system. They actually debated for many years how the United States would react once it recognized it was a declining power. Now, we might see the U.S. position differently, but the Chinese have a series of metrics to understand where they are vis-a-vis U.S. power. And they decided that the United States was going to become much more aggressive towards them when their economy was two-thirds the size of China's.
3:52And that happened in the first Trump administration. And then they predicted that the United States would become much more risk-acceptant in terms of use of force during this period of time. So these wars in Iran, Venezuela, they're just confirming the things that the Chinese already knew. And then, of course, to be a tech superpower, emerging tech, I mean, Xi Jinping has had these science and technology plans that put that at the forefront of their strategy for a long time. So, you know, it might change a little bit around the edges, like, okay, now they're going to be a little bit nicer. They're going to be a little bit more difficult.
4:22They're going to have a summit. They're not going to talk to us in terms of the tactics of the strategy. But the overall approach of trying to strengthen, you know, China at home to become more self-sufficient so it's not so reliant on the United States and its allies and partners to pursue its own vision of the international system, You know, that's been the same for 30 years. Do you think that China's net assessment, if you can put it that way, is correct? I mean, I know the statistic you noted on the size of the economy is purchasing power parity. People here often use, you know, nominal GDP comparisons.
4:52How do you assess the Chinese net assessment? So they did sort of recalibrate a couple of years ago when they were very optimistic they were going to overtake the United States in power. And then they recalibrate and they said, listen, you know, the United States and China are both going to be great powers on a different plane than everyone else. But we're never going to surpass the United States. We're kind of going to grow in parallel. And, you know, as I've written, the Chinese, from a far weaker resource position historically, have been able to compete with the United States. So it's not necessarily a game changer that they, quote unquote, don't overtake the United States.
5:25So I think that reassessment was important. But there is still a lot of confidence there in Beijing. Now, you know, you go to Washington, you go to other places, what, for 10 years, we've talked about demographics, we've talked about, you know, the overreach of the Chinese government, of the output of the economy. But at least from their perspective, you know, these are problems that they can manage over time. So I think when it comes to assessing their own role in the world, they are correct in their assessments of power. Sometimes where they misstep is the assessment of the causes of current challenges.
5:57And so their assessment of the international environment for themselves is that it's very difficult. They face a negative security environment in East Asia vis-a-vis their neighbors like Japan, Australia, the Philippines. You know, but they think that it's the fault of the United States that they have these security issues, not that they're behaving in any way that is causing the threat perceptions to grow. So the problem is if they would assess that they were the problem, they might recalibrate their strategy. But their view is like, listen, before we were really nice to everyone and people still talked about us as a problem.
6:30Now, you know, nobody likes us, but at least they do what we tell them to do, right? And I think they think that's working for them. And does that mean Trump and his use of force, his approach to alliances, his approach to international institutions, everything else just doesn't change that much in the Chinese view? Is that your view of it? So, you know, on the margins, in their view, like maybe this hastens the decline of the United States, all right, but the mechanisms through which that decline was going to happen, you know, weren't particularly clear. So the fact that you have now a populist leader that comes into power, rejects the international system, puts huge strain on the alliance structure that allows the United States to be a global military power.
7:09You know, it's not that the details of that were something that were predictable, mostly because Biden was doing the complete opposite. The Chinese were very concerned about the coalition building, you know, U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific and strengthened significantly under President Biden. So I don't mean to suggest that they, you know, have some sort of crystal ball and they're reading all of those things in terms of exactly how it's happening. But the bottom line is that, you know, the United States tendency to engage in four military interventions, of which President Trump is not the first president, right, to be to be using force abroad.
7:41You know, that historically has been something in Chinese strategic thinking that is going to perpetuate the U.S. decline, that it's extremely costly in the Chinese view. it does not achieve the U.S. objectives hardly ever again in the Chinese view and so because of that and now we've sort of accelerated it does tell them that we are in a dangerous period so people often ask me like are the Chinese more deterred or less deterred by the United States under this administration and I would say it's kind of a mixed bag because on one hand our capabilities are weakened right our posture in the Indo-Pacific you know the pages of foreign Affairs have written about the lack of munitions, lack of readiness, lack of focus to strengthen our posture.
8:22They're allies and partners. We can't get the access basing and overflight. We need to execute operations. That makes China very confident. On the other hand, you look at the resolve side and they're worried that we're becoming more risk accepted, that we're like, listen, you know, yes, this might be costly. Yes, we might lose, but we're doing it anyway. And that can be a very, you know, point of caution for the Chinese not to get in our crosshairs. And that's why I think you know, Xi Jinping was very happy about having a summit with President Trump to be like, listen, you know, focus your attention somewhere else and, you know, let us do our thing.
8:55What does that mean when it comes to the risk of Chinese use of force in the Taiwan Strait? And I would note that you wrote a piece in early 2021 before this was kind of one of the top tier issues in American national security debates about the risk that China might do something precipitous in Taiwan. How do you assess that risk now and how has it changed under Trump the second time around. So I don't know, Dan, if I ever told you this story. I always tell this story of that foreign affairs piece because originally, I don't know if you remember, you asked me to write about something different.
9:23And I said, hey, listen, I want to write this piece about U.S. strategy and how it should change given the fact that China is likely to use force over Taiwan. And you said to me, what are you talking about? China is not going to use force against Taiwan. I said, what are you talking about? Of course they are. And my biggest concern about writing that piece, which, as you you know, led to this huge debate. Numbers of people wrote response essays. My hugest concern was not that it was going to be controversial. My hugest concern is that my colleagues would judge me for writing something that everyone knew.
9:52Like that was like the most basic idea just to get in the prestigious pages of foreign affairs. So when I wrote that, I thought it was like a nothing murder. And then the response was like so intense. It really shows, I think the Taiwan issue is really like the divide in the China community. So where am I on this issue? As I wrote then, I still believe that the number one factor that is determining this Taiwan contingency, like when China is going to use force, whether China uses force, is the assessment of their own capabilities. The United States for a long time now has not been deterring China over Taiwan.
10:29It's no longer like we threaten to intervene and they're like, oh, well, now that the United States threatens to intervene, we can't do this. Because there's different types of contingencies, but the only one China's preparing for is this fait accompli, you know, quick seizure, two and a half weeks, three weeks. If they can't do that, you know, they're not going to do it, like short of something crazy like Taiwan declaring independence. And the United States, you know, can do very little in that short period of time. And, you know, there was the right strategy to try to strengthen Taiwan's capabilities, not for self-defense.
10:59You know, I hate that term, Taiwan has zero chance of defending itself. Let's all be clear. People are like, well, Ukraine did this against Russia. It's like, I go out for a run and someone's like, well, this Olympic runner could run a four minute mile. And you're like, great. That is information irrelevant to this situation. Taiwan cannot defend itself, but it can hold out long enough for the United States to get there. So if we get to that point, that would impose caution on China. Now, what has changed? Xi Jinping told the military to be ready by 2027. The biggest issues they had were in command and control and logistics, right?
11:34They got the equipment, they got the numbers of the equipment, they've been reforming the process, they do have problems recruiting college level personnel, but they've been doing more enhanced training. Xi Jinping, you know, looked at his troops, did what Putin should have done and said, you have a lot of stuff. I don't think you know how to use it. There's good information, flow to sheet, all that's in place. The command and control, she threw out the vast majority of the top leaders of the PLA over the past year, right? So we don't have people right now in place to be able to execute this campaign.
12:08But I do think, you know, 2027 was never a deadline. It was always a no earlier than date. But I think, you know, they're not going to have the command and control ready in time. And so it pushes it to 2028. So I don't think it's the case that like there's a window of opportunity, right? Like everyone's like Trump's going to sell out Taiwan. Trump's not going to do anything with Taiwan. Again, it's not really about U.S. intervention at this point. And they can never be sure if they're not ready to go, they're not going to go. And in their mind, it's not like Trump leaves. Someone else comes in and all of a sudden the United States has solved all of its problems.
12:38So they still have time to figure it out. But once that military is ready to go, in my mind, I continue to say there is no reason. It's very tempting. That's why that piece was called The Taiwan Temptation. If they can do it, they've waited 75 years. Why would they wait? And when I talk to people in Beijing, they say the exact same thing. So I don't think that mentality has changed much. If I remember my surprise at your point several years ago, and then the debate, or at least part of the debate that ensued in our pages and elsewhere after the piece was published. It was not just about the risk of, you know, aggressive Chinese action toward Taiwan, but also the kind of military operation that you foresaw.
13:17A lot of the response argued that it would be, you know, gray zone strategies or a blockade or something like that. You're still skeptical that that's how China would do it. Yeah, I mean, I think those things are going to happen, but I don't see them as reunification campaigns, right? I think China gets upset and they're like, you know, we're going to punish you for doing this thing, you know, and so we're going to do a two week blockade. But it's not going to be a reunification campaign because the blockade gives the United States the time to amass forces in the region so that if we do decide to fully support Taiwan, then the landing becomes very difficult.
13:52So it's kind of a very risky strategy. So all that gray zone stuff, I think, is prepping the battle space. Right. It is weakening the Taiwan military. weakening the resolve of the military. But I am assuming, and I think a lot of polling and other research supports this, but just to be clear about my assumption, you know, I am assuming that the people of Taiwan are not going to fully capitulate to Communist Party rule unless there is some use of force. And I think, you know, the polls demonstrate that, that they're not ready to come to the table and say, oh, now that you've done a lot of exercises, now that there's these misinformation campaigns.
14:29We would like to get rid of our government and our military and have you govern the island. So that's why I think it's highly unlikely that the Chinese are able to do this without use of force. It's very different from Hong Kong. People often are like, well, they did this in Hong Kong. They controlled Hong Kong at the time, right? They had infiltrated, penetrated. They militarily, physically, everything controlled Hong Kong. So they had a lot of different levers to use in that scenario that they don't have in Taiwan. Even if Beijing does not watch the war in Ukraine or the war in Iran and imagine itself as Russia in that scenario or as the United States, what is it learning about the changed nature of warfare as it watches those conflicts?
15:09Well, I think there's a lot of takeaways that they are getting from the recent wars, right? China had previously thought it was very important to have things like good intelligence, good command and control. But these wars just really highlight even more so that if you're going to do some joint operations, these require intelligence, air dominance. It requires that asymmetry against the United States that Ukraine had against Russia and that Iran has against the United States. So trying to focus on smaller, less expensive platforms that you can mass produce. And so you can bring that massive firepower in a more effective way and in a cheaper way against your adversary.
15:50Because in a war of attrition, it's not even so much which side is losing more people. It's also which side is losing their capability in terms of platforms. So I think that is definitely a lesson that have been learned. Now, there's some lessons that we're hoping the Chinese take away from these conflicts that they might not necessarily see the same parallels. Like with Ukraine, many people are hoping they take away the fact that wars may not end quickly, right because the contingency of taiwan the only one they're considering is one that in which they can do it in like three weeks but it didn't end quickly in ukraine because of industrial capacity issues ammunition issues and logistics and for the chinese the only one they're currently struggling with is still logistics the unmanned systems cheap drones decoys long-range weapons are still things that they're very focused on we're hoping that they learn from venezuela that it's not easy to just remove a top leader and put in a whole new political system.
16:46But again, that situation is very different from Taiwan, where China has been engaged in a lot of disinformation campaigns, has basically, you know, to a higher degree penetrated that political system in Taiwan. So they might have more confidence that they could do something with Taiwan like they did in Hong Kong, in which they have a governor or leader of their own that they put into place. But those are some lessons that we're hoping they take away from of these conflicts. But in the end, things like you need a lot of munitions, you need to be able to mass produce them, and you want capabilities that are cheap and effective at bringing masks, these are things the Chinese knew before.
17:19And even if they're more encouraged along those lines, they are farther ahead than the United States in sort of perfecting that way of war. To your mind, has anything that Donald Trump has done, especially on or since his visit to China in May changed China's calculus here. He has held up the most recent arms package, Taiwan. He's, you know, repeated framing that he presumably heard from Xi Jinping when they were meeting. Does that affect this calculus at all? I think it does affect the calculus in the short term. It's definitely a madman's sort of theory in that Beijing finds Donald Trump really hard to predict in terms of what he's going to do.
18:01They don't find him particularly rational in his decision making. And so if we go back to the theory of victory over Taiwan, that theory of victory is based on assumptions about what a rational U.S. president would do. Right. So the two and a half to three weeks, the scenario is such that China takes Taiwan. And the question is, you know, what is the United States really going to do at that point? If Taiwan has capitulated, if the United States hasn't, you know, engaged, are we then going to launch a full fledged war against the United States? That's an assumption of U.S. rationality of costs and benefits.
18:34Who knows? Maybe Donald Trump feels like Xi Jinping made him look bad. And Donald Trump has said that, right, that Xi Jinping wouldn't be so stupid to do that. It's also the case that in that two and a half to three weeks in which I've said the United States can't really do much to defend Taiwan, that is also based on a rational calculation, because of course, the United States can respond immediately. The U.S. president can decide to deploy our forces in Japan, in the Philippines, immediately to defend Taiwan. The problem is they're not survivable. Okay, so that's a nice way of saying that everybody would die because we don't have enough of them.
19:07So the assumption in Beijing, of course, is that a U.S. president wouldn't do that. But given that they're uncertain about how Donald Trump even makes decisions, let alone where those decisions come from, I do think they impose caution in Beijing, short of being pushed into a war by a full-on declaration of independence or something by President Lai. I find it highly unlikely, coupled with the fact that they're not ready yet, that China would use force against Taiwan during the Trump administration. So if some of Trump's hard to comprehend decisions cut against Taiwanese interests, the uncertainty more than outweighs that to your mind.
19:43Yes, I don't think the Chinese are like, you know what, I think Donald Trump is gonna sell out Taiwan and I'm putting all my eggs in that basket. I mean, I don't have a sense that they feel confident in their assessments of President Trump. I suppose it's a separate question what it does to kind of resolve on Taiwan, but that's a different issue. Both to the Chinese and to those on Taiwan, you know, I'm trying to enhance deterrence, you know, on both sides of the strait. And at least what I like to say in a more optimistic view is that the United States policy has remained the same, and that is to maintain the status quo across the strait.
20:16Now, throughout history, sometimes the United States pressures more the China side of the strait. Sometimes we pressure more the Taiwan side of the strait. You could argue during the Bush administration, we put a lot more pressure on Taiwan to tone down its activity than we put on Beijing. So it kind of goes back and forth on who we pressure. And right now, maybe we're pressuring Taiwan more than many people feel comfortable with. But I think the bottom line policy of the United States to maintain the status quo across the street has remained the same. The other thing that's been striking in watching China both over the last several months since the start of the most recent war in Iran, and then also watching China's policy towards Ukraine over the years, is it's slightly ambivalent to use a word I think you used in an essay in foreign affairs in 2024, attitude towards some of these partners that seem to be in this alignment of upheaval or autocracy or whatever term you want to apply to it.
21:12You know, you argue in that 2024 piece that China, while committed to its partnerships with Russia and to some degree North Korea, does see some downsides and costs to those. It's not a kind of straightforward alliance commitment in the way that the United States what it made before Donald Trump, I suppose. What is your reading of China's response to those wars when it comes to their partners? So there's a few things that have changed. But first, I just want to highlight what has not. And that is that China does not have traditional alliances like the United States. And there's many reasons for this that I also have discussed in foreign affairs, but largely because they feel like it's much more effective if they have good relations with everybody.
21:49Right. There's an othering that happens. If you are fully behind Iran, you're going to have problems with Israel. If you're fully behind North Korea, you're going to have problems with South Korea, Russia, and the European Union, the European Union, which is China's largest trading partner. So, so far, they've done a pretty good job of hanging out with the Indians, hanging out with the Pakistanis, you know, not choosing sides. And that has worked for them. And they feel like that's the way to move forward. The problem with these conflicts, I think, and the source of change stems less from China and more from their partners, because it has become painfully obvious that China has no ability and or desire to protect its partners from military intervention.
22:32The Chinese leadership had just met with President Maduro right before he was taken by U.S. forces. The Chinese have a very close relationship with Iran. It did not matter when the United States was making decisions about whether or not to use force against these countries. So one of the things that I'm looking for in terms of something that could drastically change in terms of Chinese strategy and then drastically change the international system is whether or not they start to feel that they do need the ability to project power beyond the region. Because to date, we've been talking about Chinese overseas basings for decades, but it has not come to fruition because there's a lot of reasons.
23:09China does not want to project military power far beyond its borders. It relies on political and economic power. But if partners say, listen, China, you know, being able to trade with you is not enough anymore. We need some source of protection. And the Chinese feel compelled to provide that protection. Then we might see a more active military abroad. Another aspect of this is that China has relied mainly on police training, law enforcement, cooperation with countries to protect its interests overseas. So the way it assessed threats to its interests in other countries was that that threat was going to come from within.
23:43The threat to their economic interests in Venezuela comes from instability in Venezuela. Now, all of a sudden, the threat comes from outside and the mechanisms that they have been using to protect their interests are no longer valid. And so I have heard whisperings in Beijing. It's not enough yet, you know, for me to send you an email saying, OK, we need a foreign affairs article on this. But but I hear whisperings that there is some discussion of, OK, we need to have some sort of deterrent and options. And I do think Russia is part of that. They think their relationship with Russia maybe enhances that deterrent against the United States for military intervention because Russia has those similar relationships and Russia could potentially intervene.
Read the full transcript
24:25But China doesn't have control over that tool. So it's not ideal. What is the Chinese theory of the Russia relationship and its value to Chinese strategy over the long term? There's been obviously lots of attention paid to the Xi-Putin relationship and the so-called no-limit partnership. Every time Putin visits Beijing, there's lots of energy put into kind of reading the tea leaves and statements and body language and everything that comes out. On the other hand, you know, when you look at the Europe-China relationship, the trade relationship, it does seem like China is paying some real costs with its largest trading partner, as you pointed out, for its ongoing support of Russia.
25:02I'm curious how you think about that in China's strategy over the long term. Well, it's interesting because I would have read it a bit differently. And I, as you know, I just got back from a year in Europe. And even though I speak three European languages, so I kind of can pretend that I'm much more open to the European ideas. Like once I open my mouth, everyone's like, wow, you are really American about these things. But one thing I say a lot in Europe, which is really sort of unpopular, if China felt like they had to choose between Europe and Russia, they would choose Europe every single time.
25:33Right. Every single time. It is so much more important to them, the economic relationship with Europe than what they get from Russia. Now, maybe historically, largely what they got from Russia is the sort of technology, equipment and know-how to modernize their military. And you can look at aspects of their surface fleet, aspects of their fighter force, bomber force, and you can clearly point those to Russia. There are still areas where they could improve a lot, thanks to the cooperation in particular in undersea warfare, if the Russians were more forthcoming about quieting technology, also in early warning systems.
26:11So there's still areas where cooperation could happen. But a lot of that has already happened. So what about on the nuclear on China's pretty significant nuclear buildup? Is Russia an important part of that or has it been in the past? So I don't think that Russia is a part of that from the Chinese perspective. And it is a part of it in terms of how the United States sees the buildup. But in a way, that's very negative for China, because in the United States, there's a lot of discussion about the three body problem, meaning that some people feel like the United States needs to have more nuclear weapons than China and Russia combined, given the nature of their military alignment, which would lead to a massive nuclear buildup in the United States, which makes China less comfortable about its deterrent.
26:52And so that's sort of like a bad news story from the China perspective of what their relationship with Russia might do. And so if the Europeans actually had some backbone to stand up to China in any significant way economically and said, listen, if you keep on supporting Russia and Ukraine, you know, we're not going to trade this with you and I don't trade that with you. That would really put China in a difficult position to make some decisions. I'm working on a book right now about China and Russia. And one of the things that you can see historically for both sides is the number one thing that pulls these countries apart is when they feel like the behavior of their partner is worsening their security situation.
27:29Right. And so you look back in the 50s, it's like the Soviet Union wants to taunt with the United States and Mao Zedong is shelling the offshore islands of Taiwan. And they're like, you're making this a lot more difficult for me to manage the United States. So it's OK for both to feel like the United States is the number one adversary that has happened historically. But if they feel like they have different ways of dealing with the United States, that could pull them apart. So if China came to that realization, I think they would tone down the relationship with Russia. It's just that the way I see it, they haven't really paid any significant costs in terms of the closeness that they have with Putin and with Russia.
28:06And how expansive are the upsides from a European perspective there and from an American perspective? Can you imagine China putting pressure on Russia to end the war, taking an active role in that, cutting off some of the dual-use technologies that have been fairly important to allowing Russia to continue the war effort? So on one hand, I've heard people say, oh, China really benefits from this war in Ukraine, and they wanted to go on and on and on. I don't really see any indication of that, right? I don't think the Chinese are happy about the war in Ukraine. I don't think they want to perpetuate the war in Ukraine.
28:36But to your question, you're kind of already alluding to it. They also don't want to put a lot of skin in the game. They love mediation diplomacy. So they love to be like, hey, guys, we're here. We'll host you in Beijing. We have a plan. They see it gets them, you know, a lot of political power to be the one to bring countries to the table, but they're not going to stick their neck out. Just the same way with the North Koreans, you know, they would love it if the North Koreans gave up nuclear weapons, but they're not going to stick their neck out because in the end they see that that kind of resolution would largely benefit the United States and they would be the ones paying the cost for the resolution, which they don't want.
29:11So I think they have been in the past different degrees of encouraging to the Russians to stop the war. But what I have talked to Chinese military officers, high level officers, and I've asked them about this. I've said, listen, you know, can you do something about Putin? Can you do something about Ukraine? They say to me, you know, we can't even control Kim Jong Un. You think we can control Vladimir Putin? You're insane. You know, so I think they're also trying to balance those things out. Do you see policy options for the U.S. when it comes to fanning tensions, kind of encouraging that divergence over, you know, maybe not the next year, but over the next 10 years?
29:50I think there are opportunities there. But in terms of strategy of dealing with China, this is obviously an oversimplification. But there's always the do we make things worse for China versus do we make things better for the United States? President Biden, for example, is very focused on enhancing U.S. power and U.S. resilience. Well, I would argue that President Trump in the first administration was focused on undercutting Chinese power. Right. So, you get the same thing, which is like a big difference in power, but you have different strategies of doing it. I think it's the same with this alliance framework.
30:22You can try to create tensions between the two. And I think one way of doing that is mainly the economic pressure from the Europeans. But there's also, if you want to sort of counterbalance what is happening there, the clearest way of doing that is to have better relationships between the United States and its allies and partners, which is not the direction that this administration is going. I don't mean to pin you down on a prediction here, but you would be your bet that 10 years from now, all of the hyperventilation about the no limits China-Russia partnership and whatever Russian vassalage to China will seem a little bit overheated.
31:00So I think that's the wrong way of looking at it. I mean, I think it is overheated in that, you know, these countries are not going to fight together. There's no mutual defense treaty. but you know i argue that that's because great powers do not form military alliances in that way it's not useful for us to compare it to the united states and japan or the united states and the uk because great powers tend to have non-aggression packs what they want from the other great power is please don't do anything while i'm off you know fighting and they also want help building up their own militaries and so china is better prepared to fight the united States because of its relationship with Russia.
31:38It's more the impact during peacetime, I would argue, than whatever Russia would do in wartime. And we see from Ukraine even the smallest amount of support, in this case, you know, China continued provision of dual-use technologies and continued trade and buying of oil from Russia, even the smallest amount of support can help that country prolong a conflict for a very long period of time. So on one hand, And I think it is overblown how sort of quote unquote close we think these two countries are. But it's completely understated the impact that just a little bit of friendship between these countries can have on the nature of a hypothetical war.
32:18We'll return after a short break.
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33:56As the Chinese have watched the growing relationship between the North Koreans and Putin, especially since North Korea, I think to many people's surprise, entered the war in 2024, entered the war in Ukraine, how has china understood that and how does it see it affecting both of those relationships its relation with russia and with north korea so china is not thrilled okay about the closeness between russia and north korea for a lot of reasons primarily because they feel like there's a lack of control that they have over north korea the closer north korea gets to russia they also see this discussion of, you know, the autocratic access, the autocratic alignment, the autocratic quad of countries like the United States, but also allies and partners in the region like Japan, Australia, looking at these dynamics and kind of getting really worried, right?
34:47And panicking and saying, wow, it really looks like these countries are coming together. We also need to come together. So the Chinese have tried to, you know, at least rhetorically and in their actions say like, we have no part of that, right? Russia and North Korea, these are sovereign entities, so they can do what they want to do. And then at least when I talk to Chinese government officials, they'll say, you know, we understand why they're doing it given the nature of their threat environments, but the Chinese don't want to be seen as supporting it. They don't feel like they're going to stop it.
35:18And I think one of my first foreign affairs pieces, like 10 years ago, I argued that Russia would not play a significant role in a North Korean contingency because the Chinese don't want them there. And so the Chinese would make sure that they stayed out. You know, I don't think that's true anymore. I think now in a Korea contingency, the Chinese would not really be in a position given the nature of the mutual defense agreement between the Russians and the North Koreans to say to Russia, we don't want you fighting in this war. So it definitely complicates the situation for China in terms of managing the Korean Peninsula and then also managing the U.S.
35:54allies in the region that might strengthen the connectivity between themselves because of what they see happening in the region. How much has Russian support for North Korea in return for both North Korean munitions and troops that have gone to fight against the Ukrainians, how much has that Russian support enhanced both North Korean capabilities, nuclear or conventional, And from China's perspective, especially, how much has that increased the risk of some kind of crisis on the Korean Peninsula? So I think it has significantly increased the likelihood of crisis on the Korean Peninsula through two mechanisms.
36:33One, which you alluded to, which is that the North Koreans, their military capabilities have been improving thanks to the relationship with the Russians in two ways. One, you have North Korean troops that are actually engaged in combat with Russia in the war in Ukraine. and initially you can look at some metrics initially they were doing very poorly you had higher casualties we can see now that they're getting this on the ground experience and that they are getting better i talked to a very senior u.s army officer a three-star about this in which they said that in many cases they feel like north korean troops now have more real world combined armed experience that is relevant to the Korean contingency than the U.S.
37:17Army does. So I don't want us to dismiss that kind of experience. And then those individuals are now going back to North Korea and they're training forces in North Korea. Then, of course, you do have the equipment and the technology transfer aspect of it. North Korea that sent, you know, thousands of troops to fight, they didn't do this out of the kindness of their own heart. There was a deal made in which North Korea not only gets this live operational environment where it can test its own weapons and its equipment, but that they also get some secured technology transfers in exchange. Advanced satellite technology from Russia, for example, would really help the North Koreans have better surveillance and targeting data.
37:58So as they become closer and closer together, the conventional capabilities of North Korea becomes more significant, increasing their confidence that they could execute some sort of limited offense against South Korea. And then the second thing has to do with that dynamic with China, which is as much as we've been complaining about China and its relationship with North Korea, and maybe, you know, rightfully so, the Chinese have been a constraining force for many years, right? They voted with the United States and the UN to put pressure on the North Koreans to give up their nuclear weapons. they have at times also supported sanctions against north korea to pressure them to behave themselves and now it's really a lot harder for china to play the bad guy because they're concerned about losing their influence with north korea north korea now has an alternative in the russians so this sole dependence on china that existed before with the north koreans that constrained kim's decision making in which you know the north koreans will add on beijing for the vast majority of energy, food, trade, you know, diplomatic protection, that has now been weakened.
39:05And we do see that the Chinese have now voted with the Russians in support of North Korea and the UN instead of pressuring them in recent votes. So I think the North Koreans are a little bit more unleashed. They're a little bit more confident. And that might lead to some more aggressive behavior of the future. And how have you read the shift in Chinese policy towards North Korea in response to that growing closeness between Kim and Putin? Do you see it as a meaningful change? They've obviously talked a little bit less about denuclearization. Xi Jinping made his first visit to Pyongyang not long ago in several years.
39:36Does that represent a meaningful change in Chinese strategy, or they're just trying to be a little bit more accommodating to make sure it maintains those ties in the face of that closeness? I don't think it's a fundamental change in the overall objective of Chinese strategy, which is just like, you know, make sure nothing happens of anything significant on the Korean Peninsula. But it is significant in terms of the approach and the tactics. I mean, Xi Jinping, it was so predictable. And this happened, I think, right after that foreign affairs piece on this relationship in which I said the Chinese are going to try to sort of improve their relationship with the North Koreans.
40:10And I had a series of articles the first time she went to visit with Kim, in which they had never met before. But when President Trump was willing to talk to Kim, again, the Chinese were like, whoa, whoa, whoa, we're being cut out of this. And immediately she said, let me go meet with Kim. So it was so predictable that the Chinese were going to then say, OK, now that they felt like they were losing that upper hand with the North Koreans, they were going to do a high level visit to sort of restate the relationship. And so, yeah, I think, you know, the tactic, it's the same thing in terms of what they're trying to achieve.
40:43But now that includes a much warmer approach to the North Koreans that existed previously. What do you think the U.S. response should be? There was a piece in the same issue that your most recent one appeared in by Victor Cha, arguing that it was time for the U.S. to give up on denuclearization and work toward what he called the cold peace with North Korea, in part to try to peel it off a bit from Moscow and Beijing. Do you see alternative approaches? Do you think that's roughly the way we're going about those? I do. You know, it's the same with ending the war in Ukraine. It's like we have to be pragmatic about these things.
41:17There's no situation that I see that we move forward with the North Koreans in which there isn't going to be some sort of agreement about, you know, at least initially end of war agreement and then trying to more contain the problem than make it go away in terms of denuclearization. With Ukraine, I just don't see a future in which the Russians stop fighting if they have to give up all the territory they gained through aggression. You know, we don't like, quote unquote, rewarding bad behavior. People will argue, and I'm sympathetic to this, that that will encourage other countries to behave similarly if they feel like there's benefits to doing so.
41:56But you could also look at it from a different perspective and say, like, was it really so great for the North Koreans to develop these nuclear weapons? I mean, yes, after 30 years of tensions and conflicts and threats of war and trying to starve them out, we agreed to stop trying to do that. But that's also like not a great pathway that another country would be like, you know what, that's what I want to do. So I'm not convinced that another country would be encouraged by, you know, what has occurred for Russia and Ukraine or what has occurred for North Korean denuclearization, even if in the end they don't lose everything for going down that path.
42:37So I think we do have to be more pragmatic about these issues or else they will continue to be, you know, security challenges for another three decades. As you look at the prospect of a more assertive or aggressive or risk-taking Kim in North Korea or changing Chinese policy, whether in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea or elsewhere. How do you assess the state of American deterrence? You noted the problem of, you know, weapons and troops and everything else being shifted to the Middle East and just the fact the U.S. military not having what it needs in the region. There's been obviously a lot of U.S.
43:14policy and rhetoric over the last year and a half that has cast some doubt on some of the alliance commitments that the U.S. has in Asia. There's talk about more limited, you know, U.S.-Korea military relationship. What does all that mean for deterrence in the face of some of these growing threats? So in the national security strategy, Korea wasn't mentioned. The defense strategy, I think it was mentioned just in the context of like South Korea has to spend more on its military. So it's definitely the case that unlike the first Trump administration, which I would argue the Korean Peninsula was the number one priority in the initial years of the administration, is not a priority now.
43:50But I don't think that U.S. deterrence in the Korean Peninsula situation has been significantly weakened because the nature of that war is just fundamentally different than a Taiwan contingency that, you know, you're projecting power over vast distances. It's mainly an air and sea battle. China is fighting from, you know, its own territory. The United States is, you know, fighting from thousands and thousands of miles away. And the Korean Peninsula, for the most part, the conventional capability is going to be brought to bear, right? The ground forces are the South Koreans that are right there, right, that are numerous and resolved and highly trained to do so, right?
44:31Taiwan just increased its conscription from three months to a year. The South Koreans have had conscription for, you know, time immemorial. So, you know, they're more ready. And then, of course, unlike a Taiwan situation, which you have no U.S. capability on the island of Taiwan, you have tens of thousands of U.S. troops in Korea. So the situation with a Korean war is not who would win. I mean, in any major exercise or war game I've been a part of, the United States and South Korea always win and they always win quickly. All right. We're talking like seven to 10 days. The problem with the Korea situation is how many people are dead by the end of it.
45:08Right. Like what can North Korea do to make that victory as painful as possible? And not only with the artillery, which I do think is overstated because people count pieces of artillery and not launchers. You know, it's like if you said, oh, this person has one gun, but a thousand bullets, they can kill a thousand people. You're like, well, it kind of takes some time to reload and gives up some time to take away those launchers. So I think it's a bit overblown, the artillery threat. But North Korea has nuclear weapons, right, that they could use. And that's why, you know, I've written that I think the Chinese that have a plan to secure 85 percent of North Korea nuclear weapons, if they got involved in the conflict in the first few days, We should not be deterring Chinese involvement in that war, even if it means less control over an end of war solution.
45:53So from that perspective, the deterrent for the United States and South Korea is really a cost in position one. While in Taiwan, it's more of a capability situation. So in that way, I think they're fundamentally different. And what's happening with Iran and Venezuela doesn't necessarily change that calculus. There'd still be a lot of people dead, and many people question whether the United States and South Korea, you know, at least the United States. South Korea, it's an existential threat, right? So whether the United States would be willing to continue fighting a war of that size. So I don't think the parallel is quite as dark as it is with how it impacts U.S.
46:28capabilities in the Taiwan situation. And the growing confidence with which the North Koreans could put a, you know, major American city in the continent of the United States at risk does not change the outcome of those war games meaningfully? So, you know, this is why the number one thing, and I think what has saved Kim the past couple of years, is that they have not successfully tested a three-stage ICBM that, you know, credibly could reach the United States. I think that would be a game changer if the United States felt like that nuclear threat extended to the continental United States. Now, because we have this extended deterrence in which we say to our allies and partners, listen, you don't need nuclear weapons because if nuclear weapons are used against you, we will respond with a nuclear weapon.
47:12Our allies and partners, when we say, oh, we feel more safe because we're not under threat. Obviously, Japan is. Obviously, the South Koreans are. And I'd like to reassure them that actually I think it's more likely that the United States would use nuclear weapons against North Korea in a response, given that they cannot touch us. right? So you shouldn't feel kind of insecure about the fact that the United States, oh, the United States is safe over there, so they're not going to get involved. I think it's actually because we're safe that we're more likely to execute on the extended deterrence promises that we've had.
47:43Now, if Kim starts testing again and goes that direction, I think it is a game changer if he successfully tests that capability. So my priority would not even be denuclearization, but in some sort of agreement about the status would be mainly about delivery systems, that he never develops the capability to deliver those nuclear weapons beyond, you know, the region. I think that would be a fundamental issue. I'm struck by your confidence that he couldn't put any targets in the country in the United States at risk. That doesn't seem to be the consensus among North Korea watchers at this point. So there's two things, right?
48:16Deterrence is about perception. And to be able to deter the United States, you have to show a credible like that people in the United States think that you can do this. And it's just it's never been successfully tested. And so while you might be like, oh, well, they're on their way. And maybe if they tried it, it could. I don't think you have the deterrent until there's a series of successful tests that says, yes, I have this reliable and credible capability. And then they start fielding, you know, significant numbers of ICBMs and that, you know, the United States does have defenses. We have the regional, like, you know, three-tiered missile defense against North Korea.
48:52And then, of course, we have defenses in the United States. And so it can be frustrating. And a lot of times what deterrence is, is, you know, we say to a country, like, you should be afraid of this, or you should care about these things. And they're like, well, we're not, we don't. And so that means that deterrence doesn't hold. And so I think the capability is one thing, perceptions are the other. So I'm not going to say that 100%, if they put a nuclear warhead on that missile, that it could not reach the United States. I'm just saying that they have not demonstrated the capability that they can do that yet.
49:24And so until that happens, the strategic environment is such that the United States can continue under the assumption that they can't. Is there anything that the United States could conceivably do in the next five years or could plausibly do in the next five years that would change the deterrence calculation in the Taiwan Strait? Oh, yeah. To focus on that riskier example, what would you be stressing? The thing about the Taiwan Strait that's very frustrating, as much as I talk about the likelihood of Chinese use of forces, is the way that I read it, I read it the way that a lot of my critics do, which is Xi Jinping is an extremely cautious leader that doesn't want to pay significant costs for the unification with Taiwan.
50:04We split because I see that the nature of the operational environment is that those costs don't exist, right? And that's the main problem. If the United States had the capability to, in a timely manner, sink the majority of an invading force, China wouldn't consider doing this. Now, what would we need to demonstrate that? Land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Number one, you have the masks. They're far enough away out of the Chinese threat ring so they can't be blown up. We don't have that capability. We were in a treaty till 2017 that made it so we couldn't develop it. And now we've been out of that treaty for nine years, right?
50:43So I'm always like, where are these capabilities? And there's a lot of reasons I'm given why we don't have them. But that, I think, would fundamentally solve the problem. What are the reasons you're given? So I think part of it is that the way the technology is developed, the services are relying more on pathways that they know. and that's why you've probably heard of like development of drones or unmanned systems like this is going to be the way to sink that invading force over Taiwan my own view is that that's just a way to lose the war more cheaply because unmanned systems don't solve any of the problems that I have spoken about when it comes to projecting power the Taiwan Strait right the air defenses over the Taiwan Strait are so robust that a U.S.
51:33aircraft you know can't get in there without being shot down. What is the difference for a drone? None. Right. The only difference is maybe we can produce more of them. So some of them can get through and they're not more capable of carrying extra munitions to bring more mass to target. But then the fundamental issue is where are you going to put them? Because access basin and overflight is extremely limited. That's the number one issue. And then no Pacific. So you're telling me you're going to build thousands of drones, where are you going to put them? Okay. And I will just say that anyone who thinks that you are putting them anywhere near Taiwan, you're crazy.
52:10Okay. Because our agreement with China is that there are no military installations on the Island of Taiwan. I think things like putting us troops or things like that on the Island of Taiwan, declarations of independence, say the U S nuclear deterrent extends to Taiwan. These are a hundred percent of war starts the next day type of scenario. So I don't think that's something that that we want to risk. If the Japanese fought alongside the United States from day one, not just logistical support, not just like, you know, once you guys get going, we'll support you. But they were willing to day one start the fighting, even if the United States isn't there in mass, that would be enough to deter China because they can bring that mass into theater in two days.
52:54You know, if it takes our submarines three weeks, it takes theirs, you know, two to three days. That would be a game changer. And I suppose that explains, sorry to interrupt you, but I suppose that explains the ferocity of the Chinese response when Prime Minister Takeuchi made statements about Japanese interests in Taiwan that had gone beyond what her predecessor said. Right. I mean, any Japanese involvement in the early stages, you know, in an offensive way in that conflict would be really difficult for the Chinese to deal with. So that's more of like a political move, things like more access basing and overflight.
53:26That's what the Biden administration was working on. The new bases in the Philippines, new points of access in the Southwest islands of Japan, just so you can bring more closer in to respond quickly. But the United States hasn't done a lot, at least in terms of air power, to build up those bases in the Philippines. Why? because people say they're not survivable. Why should we put money into these countries when for the Philippines, we don't know if they'll let us use it? And two, the Chinese can blow it up. My view is if we don't have more stuff close in, the war is lost. And so either if we build up the Philippines and we are about to fight World War III with China and the government of the Philippines says, we don't want you using your bases.
54:11My view is we're gonna use them. I mean, I'm sorry that, you know, that's what's going to happen. So I think the political reliability is irrelevant. And when it comes to survivability, the whole Chinese strategy is to not involve the United States. So a lot of these concerns that prevent us from building the forced posture we need in the Indo-Pacific says, listen, on day one, China is going to blow up all of our bases in the Philippines and Japan. And that just doesn't make any sense. First of all, I've never seen it from the Chinese side when you read about our campaigns over Taiwan that like day one they do that because in the United States is all in even if they take over Taiwan in two and a half weeks and we haven't brought the mask they've killed thousands of Americans once we show up even if it is a month or two later we're showing up so I kind of think about it like there's going to be a sanctuary period of a couple of weeks and if China assesses listen the United States has successfully prevented us from taking Taiwan, right?
55:08They try to take Taiwan. The United States is close enough with enough masks that we prevent them from landing. Then they have a decision to make. Do they go home or do they escalate and attack U.S. bases? And at that point, maybe the United States can pull forces farther away, but it's not gonna happen the first couple of weeks. So I think a lot of it has to do with like, there's different conflicts here that you can plan for a short war. It's not the case that if you can fight like a three-year war against China and win, you can fight a 30-day war and win, right? Like, I think people get that confused and think, oh, if I plan for the worst case scenario, it means I'm prepared for everything short of that.
55:47But that's not how military operations work. The other striking response to Japanese Prime Minister Takeuchi's statements about Taiwan came from the Trump administration. There was not a lot of support, rhetorical or otherwise, when China came after her and came after Japanese interests in a variety of ways. it has caused some to question the health of U.S. alliances emerging from Trump's second term. Where do you think the key U.S. alliances in Asia will be at that point? I think the initial reaction of many when they see U.S. allies and partners, you know, Australia and Japan and South Korea coming closer together is like this is this is a deterrent, right?
56:27This is a good thing. These countries are, you know, voicing opinions about, a security environment that maybe the Biden administration had hoped that they would have voiced, you know, a couple of years ago. So it seems like a win. But I worry that it's a sign of the atrophy of the alliance system such that the deterrence is weakened, right? If these leaders are going out and trying to make these public statements, they don't get the support from the United States. So China sees the wedge. China's number one strategic goal vis-a-vis the alliances has been to break them up, right? So if they had to choose between, oh, well, South Korea and Japan are closer, but they're completely alienated from the United States.
57:12I mean, that's a better situation for them than what existed before, which is the United States had strong relations with each of them individually, but they didn't coordinate. So I do worry that this is how the Chinese are gonna see it, that yes, the push in capitals in Asia to be more active on these security issues is a sign that their relationship with the United States is weakened. I was struck when Phil Gordon, a senior Biden administration official, was on the podcast a couple of months ago. He talked about deterrence as being a combination of trust and capabilities. So you could imagine capabilities going up quite a bit, but it depends on how you weighted against that decline in trust.
57:53And I suppose that'll be a question that we'll be exploring for several years. Let me just also say, though, I mean, capabilities going up. if you take out the aggregation with U.S. capabilities, right? Yes, maybe Japan's capabilities go up, Australia's capabilities go up, but if you take out the U.S. capabilities from that aggregation, you are in a far worse capabilities position than you were if those countries had done nothing but the United States was committed to the region. We started the conversation by talking about Beijing's strategy for this moment and the, as you see, a relative continuity with strategy as the Chinese have thought of it for several years.
58:29Do you think its strategy is working well? Like, does it have a good strategy for this moment of rupture or inflection point or whatever we call it? So I think it's a bit too early to say 100 % it's working well. The reason I say that is less one of an analytical conclusion and more one of wishful thinking, which is the United States tends to get its act together at the last possible minute. We are close to that last possible minute, but we're not there yet, right? So China's strategy has worked so far. The United States has recognized the challenge. And for a couple of years now, we've tried to come up with responses to the challenge.
59:09The United States is in a very strong position. You know, we still have the largest economy in the world. We're energy independent. You know, we tend to get in our own way. But if we wanted to, I still believe that we could get our act together in time to strengthen the international order, be leaders of this international system, strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and the rest of the world. And, you know, if all of a sudden there is that pushback of because of how strong China has become and because of how assertive they've become, there is more of a wake up call, like a Sputnik moment at some point in the United States, that's going to be very problematic for China.
59:51And that's why, as everyone is still a superpower, a big part of their strategy was to build power in ways that would not lead to that Sputnik moment. Or from their perspective, at the very least, when the United States really realized that they had to do something, it would be too late. So it's too soon to say that it's too late. I still think there's some runway here for the United States to do the right thing. I also just want to throw out the theoretical point that U.S.-China competition doesn't have to be a competition to the bottom. There is a world in which we are competing to be the best partners to countries in the developing world, to be the best supporters of development in the developing world, to be the best in terms of environmental protection or green energy.
1:00:33you know, in terms of what we compete on, there is a world in which we are both better countries because, you know, we have to compete with the other side. We're not in that world right now, but it's possible that we could get there with the right, right leaders, right strategy. So I haven't sort of given up hope yet that, you know, you look at 250 years of U.S. strategy, I would say that we've always, you know, we're constantly in turmoil at home, but that doesn't necessarily mean we don't do the right thing abroad. So it's the stealth superpower versus the procrastinating superpower. That's the competition we have.
1:01:10Right, exactly. And maybe, you know, it's like the tortoise and the hare, right? And, you know, the hare, we're kind of taking our nap, but maybe there's an alternative version in which we wake up like right in time, you know, to beat the tortoise. But the tortoise wins that race is my memory of the parable, right? Not only does the tortoise win that race, but if you look at every rising power that is in like Graham Allison's book of rising powers across history, over 80 % of the time they overtake the great power, either through war or peacefully. He focuses mainly on whether there's a war, but I recoded them just out of curiosity.
1:01:43And 80 % of the time it does happen that the rising power, that the tortoise wins, okay? But American exceptionalism, maybe this is that 20%, so. We will be the hare that wins. Oriana, thank you for the great pieces you've done for foreign affairs over the years. I'm sure there'll be more to come in coming months and years. And thanks again for doing this today. Yeah, thank you for having me.
1:02:10Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show at foreignaffairs.com. This episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Rose Kohler and Kanesh Therroer. Our audio engineer is Christopher Cook. Original music is by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Irina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts. And if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.
1:02:59We hope you enjoyed this episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview. Don't forget to visit foreignaffairs.com slash spotlight to sign up for Dan Kurtz-Valen's free weekly newsletter featuring more of the clear-headed analysis that you enjoy here on the podcast. Sign up today at foreignaffairs.com slash spotlight.
From the publisher
Like the rest of us, China’s leaders are confronting a world in turmoil. They see uncertain American commitments to allies, even as many of those allies ramp up their own defense efforts. They see changing relationships, whether deepening ties between Russia and North Korea or new connections among anxious middle powers. They see American military action in the Middle East and Western Hemisphere, with effects on American power in China’s own region.
And yet, as Oriana Skylar Mastro sees it, far from surprising Beijing, such disruptions are being taken as confirmation of what Chinese leader Xi Jinping often refers to as “great change unseen in a century.” Mastro has written a series of essays for Foreign Affairs on how Beijing aims to shape and exploit that change. She joined Dan Kurtz-Phelan to discuss China’s strategy for navigating this turmoil—and what the United States should, and should not, do in response.
You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.