


The episode explains how alleged warnings before the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks are shaping debate over Israeli intelligence and security failures and influencing the run-up to Benjamin Netanyahu’s upcoming election. It recounts unverified claims from Haaretz (warning allegedly relayed via UAE President MBZ), The Atlantic (Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel allegedly warning Israel), and The Wall Street Journal (multiple urgent Egyptian warnings), while noting Netanyahu denies all and is suing outlets.
John Donison, BBC foreign correspondent and former BBC Gaza/West Bank correspondent, based in East Jerusalem.
intelligence “groupthink” underestimated Hamas capability; warnings from “watchers” (young women monitoring surveillance) were ignored; a Jericho War document and unusual SIM activations were not acted on; Netanyahu’s response was delayed and reinforcements insufficient.
the Jericho War document; watchers reporting Hamas training; SIM-card activation warning; Netanyahu taking about three hours to reach headquarters.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes.
An overview of the Hamas-led attacks on October 7, 2023, and their aftermath.
“border fence and stormed Israeli kibbutz and the Nova Music Festival.”
Exploring how the attacks impact Israeli elections and Netanyahu's leadership.
“Today on The Global Story, why questions over October the 7th could decide the Israeli election.”
Discussion on reports about warnings received by Netanyahu before the attacks.
“Haaretz says it stands by its reporting and that the legal proceedings against it are an attempt to silence criticism.”
Insight into the Israeli elections and public opinion among first-time voters.
“Now, all of this is happening, as we mentioned before, a very closely contested election.”
In-depth analysis of the intelligence failures leading to the October 7th attacks.
“But there's also a feeling of great reflection.”
Learn about the early warnings issued by female soldiers regarding Hamas activity.
“They were also watching them detonating bombs near the fence, which they believe was to test the strength of Israel's so-called iron wall.”
Discover the alleged policy failures of Netanyahu's government leading up to the attacks.
“in the lead up to the October 7th attacks.”
Examine how Qatari funds contributed to Hamas's military capabilities.
“Was this actually an acknowledged system of fund transfer or was this something that went unacknowledged in the Israeli government?”
Analyze the failures in response and decision-making during the initial attack on October 7th.
“What balls is Netanyahu and the Israeli military accused of having dropped on that front?”
Investigate how Israeli intelligence missed critical warnings about Hamas's plans.
“Okay, well, that's the military response.”
Explore how Netanyahu's opponents are leveraging the attack's failures for political gain.
“So I guess it was a bit like, you know, the black swan event.”

Get the gist, explore an idea or ask about something said.
On The Global Story, what are the key points of this episode?
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.
0:00This BBC podcast is supported by ads outside the UK.
0:30Jon Donnison: goals or appetite for investing, Schwab has everything you need all in one place. Visit schwab.com to learn more. How many streaming subscriptions do you have? Is it the same for your business? Avoid it by having all your business on one platform. Try Odoo for free at odoo.com. That's O-D-O-O dot com. On the 7th of October 2023, thousands of Hamas-led attackers broke through the Gaza border fence and stormed Israeli kibbutz and the Nova Music Festival. Around 1 ,200 people were killed and a further 251 hostages were taken back to Gaza. In the three years since, Israel's military campaign in Gaza has killed at least 74 ,000 people.
1:18Jon Donnison: That's according to the Hamas-run health ministry, whose figures are considered reliable by the United Nations. And almost the A year after a shaky ceasefire between Israel and Hamas was reached, there's been little movement towards Hamas disarming, Israel withdrawing from Gaza, and a roadmap to lasting peace. In just three weeks' time, Benjamin Netanyahu faces voters for the first time since those attacks. From the BBC, I'm Tristan Redmond in London. Today on The Global Story, why questions over October the 7th could decide the Israeli election.
2:05Jon Donnison: Well, in the three years since the October the 7th attacks, there's been a steady drip, drip of reporting into whether there were failings in Israel's intelligence and security in the run-up to the attacks. We're going to get into some of those later with our correspondent John Donison in East Jerusalem. There was a kind of groupthink, if you like, within intelligence and the military that, look, Hamas might have these aspirations. They might want to have an operation like this, but they're just not capable. Before we get to John, I'm going to run you through how we got here, because in these final weeks of the election campaign, the government's opponents have seized on a flurry of reports as an opportunity to criticise the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who's running for re-election.
2:56Jon Donnison: It all began back on the 8th of September with an article published by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. The article alleged that Benjamin Netanyahu was warned in September 2023 of an imminent Hamas attack. Now, it claims the warning came from the President of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nayan, who's known as MBZ. Prime Minister Netanyahu has denied these reports. He's instructed lawyers to begin defamation proceedings against the newspaper Haaretz, as well as several other Israeli news outlets. Netanyahu says the report is, quote, part of a sinister plot, and his party Likud has accused Haaretz of blatant foreign interference in Israel's elections.
3:47Jon Donnison: Haaretz says it stands by its reporting and that the legal proceedings against it are an attempt to silence criticism. The story, according to Haaretz, goes something like this. In the months leading up to October 7th, the Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was frustrated at a lack of progress in negotiations with Israel. He asked a Palestinian go-between to convey to the Israelis that he was planning an attack against them. And he very specifically used the word earthquake. Now, Haaretz says the go-between took that message to the United Arab Emirates president, which is how MBZ ended up talking with Netanyahu, according to Haaretz.
4:33Jon Donnison: Netanyahu has strongly denied this he says that no such conversation took place between him and MBZ on the 26th of September there was a report in the news magazine The Atlantic this time about Egypt warning Israel now the magazine claimed that the then chief of Egyptian intelligence a man called Abbas Kamel had flown to Israel in September 2023 but it's not clear who he spoke to when he landed. The Atlantic reports it spoke to a former Israeli official, later briefed on the visit, and that the message was, if you don't change course, Gaza is going to blow up in your faces.
5:21Jon Donnison: Now, Benjamin Netanyahu's office said in response that the reporting was false and said that on October the 11th, 2023, Egypt officially denied that it had warned Israel of the October the 7th attack and that the claims have been, quote, recycled to manipulate the Israeli public. Two days later, on the 28th of September, there was even more. The Wall Street Journal, not a left-leaning newspaper, published a report with further detail on the alleged warnings from Egypt. The journal said that according to Arab government officials, there were three increasingly urgent warnings and that the final one came just days before the attack.
6:04Jon Donnison: Netanyahu strongly denied all claims that Egypt had warned Israel. He said that he, quote, did not meet or speak with Abbas Kamel and that no Israeli intelligence source conveyed an Egyptian warning to him. We should say that all of these reports in Haaretz, in The Atlantic, in The Wall Street Journal, are based on claims from unnamed sources and haven't been verified by the BBC. And Netanyahu, as I mentioned, is suing various Israeli news organizations. According to the Times of Israel, a legal filing says these reports are a total invention meant to fatally harm the security of the country and the prime minister while blatantly violating all journalistic ethics with the full knowledge that it is not true.
6:51Jon Donnison: Now, all of this is happening, as we mentioned before, a very closely contested election. But it's not the first time that the Israeli government has faced scrutiny over the decisions in the hours, days and weeks leading up to the attacks. I am just in a little cafe restaurant around the corner from our hotel in East Jerusalem. I often come here for a bit of breakfast. I might have a bit of lunch when we finish recording. But it is quite pleasant on what is a lovely Indian summer day. John Donison, our colleague, is a foreign correspondent for the BBC. He spent years living and working in the region.
7:28Jon Donnison: He was formerly the BBC's Gaza and West Bank correspondent. We caught up with him as commemorations for the third anniversary of the October 7th attacks were underway in the city. I think there's a, you know, quite a somber and reflective mood in Israel this week. I mean, it was a traumatic event. It changed the way Israelis think about the world, think about their lives. And one of the interesting things in this election is, you know, you've got a large number, I think it's about 600 ,000 18 to 24 year olds who are voting for the first time. and the opinion polls show that they are very right-wing, their views are hardened, they want tougher action in Gaza, tougher action against Iran, against Hezbollah and you have to remember that all of these people, a good chunk of them, they will have served in the military, they will have fought in some of these wars in the last three years.
8:27So the impact I suppose on Israel's character and its attitude towards its neighbours. But there's also a feeling of great reflection.
8:36Jon Donnison: It's quite unusual for a commemoration like that to be taking place at the same time as quite a frenetic electoral campaign that's going on. How significant and pivotal could this election be in the grand scheme of Israeli elections, John? I think it's hard to think of an election that has been as important as this one. Certainly not in the time I've been covering this part of the world. This comes at a time when you do feel that Israel is at a kind of turning point, you know, a potential turning point. So you've got, alongside the war in Gaza, in Lebanon, in Iran, you've got huge levels of violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.
9:18We've got a massive surge in settler violence towards Palestinian communities. And many people here They feel that is going to be the next big flashpoint in the region. But when you look at the complexities of this election coming up, a lot of it goes back to October the 7th.
9:37Jon Donnison: OK. Well, we're at three years now from the October the 7th attacks, John. How much scrutiny has Benjamin Netanyahu faced in those three years about who knew what and when around those attacks? Not enough, according to his opponents, because his opponents and much of the Israeli public have been calling really from the get-go that there needed to be a public inquiry, an independent investigation into what went wrong on October the 7th because the starting point from this is that this was arguably the single greatest failure of intelligence and security in Israel's history. Now, Prime Minister Netanyahu's argument has been that, look, when we're in a state of war, now is not the time to have a public inquiry.
10:29But his opponents, they have said they would launch a public inquiry from day one because they believe lessons need to be learned from the mistakes. And I think you can say that the failures around October the 7th from Israel's point of view can be divided into a number of categories. So there was the policy failure from the Israeli government in the years running up to October the 7th, where they basically took an option that they could mollify Hamas by improving economic situations in Gaza, by allowing more money to flow into the territory, by allowing more work permits out of Gaza for Palestinian workers to come and work in Israel from Gaza.
11:18with a belief that Hamas wasn't interested in another major conflict given numerous wars over the last few decades. The second area is the warnings that they got in the run-up to October 7th. Why weren't those warnings heeded? And then the third area is the failures actually on the day of the attack. Why was Israel's response, its military response to what happened, so I guess unsatisfactory and why were Israeli forces so easily overrun in those first few hours we've had some inquiries within the Israeli military and within Israeli intelligence and that has led to the resignation of very senior figures within those organizations but Prime Minister Netanyahu beyond saying we all bear some degree of responsibility for what happened not October the 7th, as, you know, the man in charge, he has resisted having the finger pointed directly at him.
12:18Jon Donnison: Yes, okay. Well, let's go through each of the categories under scrutiny that you mentioned above. The first one would be security and intelligence failures, John. Can you just lay out for us what the government has been, and the military have been accused of failing on this front well they have been accused of ignoring warnings so it was revealed that they had discovered in gaza a 40-page document entitled the jericho war document which detailed a large-scale cross-border operation attacking israel it didn't have a date but the planning for this operation had been underway since 2016 and this document was found more than a year before October the 7th but always the belief was that might be the aspiration of Hamas but they're just not capable we've got them under control our security on the border is too tight our military is too strong our surveillance is too strong then in the months leading up to October the 7th you had what are known as the kind of the watchers, these young women who are recruited to monitor surveillance cameras, monitoring Gaza.
13:39Very boring job, but they're watching to see if there's any unusual behaviour. My colleague, BBC, the BBC's Alice Cuddy, who's reported on these female Israeli soldiers, has just joined me. And in a moment... My colleague, Alice Cuddy, did a very good investigation into this.
13:53Jon Donnison: So some of them were saying they were actually seeing the training that Hamas was doing. they were watching them taking over model Israeli tanks on the other side of the fence. They were also watching them detonating bombs near the fence, which they believe was to test the strength of Israel's so-called iron wall. Basically, these women were reporting to their superiors, look, something's going on. We can see mass militants training. These young women say that they were reporting their concerns to their commanders on their bases and they're also filing them in a computer system where it would kind of be passed up the chain to intelligence and more senior officers who could then piece together the broader intelligence picture.
14:35And they warned their superiors, maybe partly through sexism, they were ignored. And those warnings may have reached the highest levels of the military, but nothing was done about it. Thank you to you, Alice Cuddy, thank you to you. And the IDF, in terms of a statement that we've got from the Israeli Defence Force says, The IDF is currently focused on eliminating the threat from the terrorist organisation Hamas. Questions of this kind will be looked into at a later stage. Then, much closer to October 7th, maybe in the 24 hours before, there was a warning that they had detected that a large number of Israeli SIM cards for mobile phones had suddenly been activated in the 24 hours running up to the attack on the morning of October 7th.
15:21that warning went back to the highest levels of the Israeli military. They were worried enough that on the night before October the 7th, senior commanders within the Israeli military cut short their holidays. It was a holiday weekend that weekend, and they headed down to the Gaza border. They sent two groups of special forces, I don't know their battalions, down to the border because there was a concern that something was coming. but they didn't do enough clearly because very very quickly those special forces and the military base down on the border with Gaza Nahalaz was overrun so there were clear warning signs that something was coming and I guess the question is why wasn't anything done about it
16:09this is one of the most powerful militaries in the world but a lot of the focus at that time was in the north, up on the border with Lebanon and in the West Bank. And I guess the truth of the matter is that there just weren't enough Israeli troops down on that border.
16:32Jon Donnison: Well, let's talk about the alleged policy failures that you mentioned of the Netanyahu government in the lead up to the October 7th attacks. What are the accusations on that front against Netanyahu? Well, the accusations there are that there was a war in Gaza in 2014, which I covered between Hamas and Israel. And there was a ceasefire in the end, but there was a lot of damage sustained to Gaza. It's a very asymmetric conflict. Israel's military is much more powerful. So a high number of casualties, lots of destruction in Gaza, not on the scale of this war, but nevertheless pretty bad. There was another short war in 2021, I think.
17:13Same sort of thing. But I think the view, the calculation from Prime Minister Netanyahu, who was in power for most of that time, not all of it, there was another government for a short period, was that, you know, Hamas were not interested in conflict. they were interested in improving the economic situation in Gaza. So a lot of money, millions and millions, hundreds of millions of dollars came in from the Qataris. And that was done with the assistance of the Israelis. They allowed that money to go in, literally in suitcases of cash going into Gaza. Until 2016, Udi Levy was head of economic warfare for the Mossad, Israel's spy agency.
17:58Jon Donnison: The Qataris have a special envoy that came every month with a private jet, entered Gaza with a suitcase, gave it to the Hamas, say hello and go back. That's it. That allowed for, you know, a beautiful Corniche road along the coast to be built in Gaza. It allowed the economic situation to improve. More workers were being allowed out of Gaza to work in Israel. And it was this belief that, look, if we can just improve the economic lives of people in Gaza, then we can keep Hamas calm. And that was obviously a complete miscalculation. Udi Levy has told the BBC's Panorama programme he advised Benjamin Netanyahu to target Hamas' finances to prevent the group's military build-up.
18:43Jon Donnison: We came many times and said to the Prime Minister, we believe that if you have a decision that we have to crash Hamas, I think that we have the tools, by using only the financial tools. And what was his response? We never got any answer to our proposal. Never. Never. Benjamin Netanyahu has denied wanting to build up Hamas and says he'd only allowed Qatari money into Gaza to prevent a humanitarian crisis. A lot of our listeners may not be aware that there was this arrangement between the Israeli government allowing the Qataris to give money to authorities in Gaza and money which in some instances made its way into the pockets of Hamas.
19:33Jon Donnison: Was this actually an acknowledged system of fund transfer or was this something that went unacknowledged in the Israeli government? No, it was acknowledged. You know, it's interesting since October the 7th, Qatar, which of course has been one of the big negotiators in trying to reach a ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel. But Qatar has been portrayed by the Israeli government as a supporter of terrorism. And they have, without doubt, funded Hamas. But they couldn't do that without Israel giving the nod to that happening. If Israel didn't want large quantities, suitcases full of money going into Gaza, it could have stopped it happening.
20:13Now, the money was supposedly for economic improvement in Gaza. But with hindsight now, you can see that a lot of that money undoubtedly went to building up Hamas's military capability, constructing the tunnels underneath Gaza. And that's kind of with the benefit of hindsight. But, you know, you might think that Israel's intelligence and its security might have recognized that that was a danger. And with the benefit of hindsight, it was a clear miscalculation.
20:42Jon Donnison: What about the on the day response, John, on October the 7th itself? What balls is Netanyahu and the Israeli military accused of having dropped on that front? Well, first of all, he has been accused of not responding personally quick enough. So there's been a lot of conversations about when he found out, when he got a phone call telling him that something was happening. And it was first thing that morning. But it took him, according to reports in Israeli media, three hours to get to the military of defence's headquarter in Tel Aviv. Now, Israel is a very small country. From where he stays, it would probably be a journey of about an hour.
21:22So it took a long time. And because the initial preparation had not been made for the possibility of an attack, then it took a very long time for reinforcements to get down to the southern border. And that's why you had these horrific stories of Israeli families living in some of the kibbutz on that border, being holed up in their safe rooms with the door locked for 12 hours before any help got there. And I don't know if you remember, but it was at least several days before they finally secured the area. You know, there were still Hamas fighters roaming around southern Israel, albeit in small numbers.
22:04There was a threat for several days. And as I keep saying, you know, this is one of the most powerful militaries in the world. And it had failed here to, one, stop it happening and then to deal with it when it did.
22:17Jon Donnison: How does Benjamin Netanyahu account for those three hours that it took to get to the military headquarters in Tel Aviv? Well, I think he would say, look, I was making phone calls. I was making decisions. I was coordinating our response. But the command center in the south for the Israeli military had been overrun. It had been overrun. So it was out of action. So the communication was very, very bad. people were acting like really on, you know, on their own initiative, rather than waiting for like a coordinated response, which took a long time to happen. Okay, well, that's the military response.
22:55Jon Donnison: What about the intelligence actions in the lead up to the attacks? Because, I mean, a lot of our listeners will know that Israel has some of the most sophisticated intelligence agencies in the world with incredibly highly developed surveillance systems in place. How surprising is it that the Mossad and the Shin Bet could have missed these attacks coming? Well, it's really, really surprising. And I think it's not that they didn't hear the warnings. It's that there was a kind of groupthink, if you like, within intelligence and the military that, look, Hamas might have these aspirations. They might want to have an operation like this, but they're just not capable.
23:39Look at the border wall and fence that goes all around Gaza. Look at the underground wall that they've built to make it tunneling under very, very difficult. The idea that you could have Hamas fighters arriving by sea and by paraglider, this would have been thought of as fanciful. The idea that the fence could be ruptured in so many places that within a matter of hours, you could have thousands of people flooding in from Gaza, many of them Hamas fighters, was kind of, oh, they'll never be able to do that. And then they did it. So I guess it was a bit like, you know, the black swan event. You know, you never believe there's a black swan until you actually see a black swan and it's happened.
24:28Jon Donnison: OK, well, the elections are approaching pretty fast at this stage, John. To what extent are these allegations of intelligence and security failings being used as political capital by Netanyahu's opponents in the campaign? Well, they absolutely are. And it's not just the failings that we've discussed. It's also the fact that when it comes to Gaza, we've got a ceasefire, but the conflict is not over. Hamas are still there, very much reduced. So there's also the accusation that, look, you failed to deal with the problem. There was no plan for what comes after the war. And that is an accusation being put, actually, not only from the center, but also from far-right ministers within Israel's government.
25:20They're saying, look, we've stopped too early. You know, Hamas is still there. and they say that the job needs to be finished. And then there's everything that led on from the war in Gaza. So, as I say, the war in Lebanon and then most importantly, perhaps, the unresolved conflict with Iran, a war which the ambitions that Prime Minister Netanyahu set out at the beginning of the war, kind of suggesting that it would all be over very quickly and the Iranian regime might fall very quickly. Well, that hasn't happened as well. Prime Minister Netanyahu, he sells himself as Mr. Security. He's the longest serving prime minister in Israel's history.
26:06And that has always been his thing. I am the only leader who can keep Israel and Israelis safe. And October the 7th, for his opponents, is a pretty good example of how that hasn't happened.
26:30Jon Donnison: John, thank you so much for talking us through this from the cafe in East Jerusalem It's been a pleasure as always I enjoy these lengthy chats
26:43Jon Donnison: That was the BBC's John Donison speaking to us from East Jerusalem Here at The Global Story We focus on one story each day where the world and America meet. But for the very latest news headlines, check out our sister show, The Global News Podcast. Our email is always theglobalstory at bbc.com. Now, Sharon in Toronto wrote to say that she'd prefer me to pronounce the letter Z in the UK style rather than Z in the US style. Now, Sharon, I am of confused transatlantic upbringing, which explains the inconsistency. Sometimes I say one, sometimes I say the other. But I made a special effort today to pronounce Zed in the Sharon style for you as requested.
27:28Jon Donnison: Today's episode was produced by Sam Chantaracic and edited by James Shield. It was mixed by Travis Evans. Our studio managers were Ben Andrews and Ricardo McCarthy. Our digital producer was Sam Gruet. Our senior news editor is China Collins, and I'm Tristan Redman. That's it from us for today. Thanks so much for listening. We'll be back again tomorrow. Cheerio.
Israel is marking three years since the 7 October attacks, in which around 1,200 people were killed by Hamas-led attackers and a further 251 hostages were taken back to Gaza.
The commemorations come in the final weeks of a pivotal election campaign. Benjamin Netanyahu’s record on national security is coming under immense scrutiny, amid reports that the government failed to act on warnings in the months leading up to the 2023 attacks – allegations that the prime minister has strongly denied.
Tristan Redman speaks to BBC correspondent Jon Donnison, who is in East Jerusalem.
Producer: Sam Chantarasak
Executive producer: James Shield
Sound engineer: Travis Evans
Senior news editor: China Collins
(Photo: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a memorial ceremony for the three year anniversary of the October 7 attack. Credit: Debbie Hill/Reuters)