Hillary Clinton on the Psychology of Autocrats

0:05Welcome to the political scene from The New Yorker, a weekly discussion about the big questions in American politics. I'm Susan Glasser, and I'm joined as ever by my great colleagues Jane Mayer and Evan Osnos. Hi, Jane. Hey, Susan. Hey, Evan. Great to be back with you guys.

0:24All right. Well, today we're joined by two very special guests. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is here. She's joined by Karen Yarhi Milo, Dean of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, and her partner in both teaching a class at Columbia University and releasing a book out this week inside the Situation Room about how leaders make decisions in moments of crisis. And wow, do we have a lot of crises. This conversation could not be more timely. I promise we're going to get to it all from Jimmy Kimmel to Putin's war in Ukraine to the psychology of Donald Trump, Secretary Clinton and Dean Yarhin Milo.

1:05We are very glad to have you with us at such a moment. Thank you. Thank you. Great to be with you. Before we get going, I think we all agree this is a sort of a five alarm fire of a news week in Washington once again. So tell us what your reaction is to the extraordinary response by Donald Trump and by his advisors to the assassination of, you know, one of the leading MAGA political figures. It's pretty remarkable that we're canceling comedians. We now have Steve Bannon saying that the left has declared war on America. Donald Trump is now a wartime president, except the war, of course, is on the American opposition.

1:48What do you think of this? Well, I think they are taking a terrible crime, a horrible tragedy for that young man and his family and, of course, his friends and colleagues, and using it in order to crack down on opposition and do whatever they can to extend a sense of intimidation and chilling to the larger society. And I don't think it should surprise anyone who's read any kind of history of authoritarian regimes that it's, you know, death by a thousand cuts. Sometimes, though, there can be a great big gash that provides an opportunity to leap forward with oppression and domination. This is where they were always heading, Susan, in this second term to try to not just reshape politics, but reshape culture, which is extraordinarily influential with respect to any kind of political issue or outcome.

2:54So this is part of the playbook, and they are shamelessly exploiting a terrible criminal act and a personal tragedy. And I sympathize with everyone who is grieving over this young man's murder. Yet this is way beyond that now. So it sounds to me like you're not in favor of canceling Jimmy Kimmel. Look, Jimmy Kimmel and all of the late night comedians have certainly said a lot of things about me that I found, you know, painful, offensive, outraging. It never crossed my mind that I could call up and say, hey, get rid of this guy. And guess what? You're going to be operating on very fertile ground because all these companies are scared to death of you and your administration.

3:47So go after them. It's just beyond the realm of what anyone thought we would see in our country. And it's all at the behest of the president who wants to stifle and remove any opposition and certainly anyone who makes fun of him, which is kind of a occupational hazard if you're in politics, it seems to me, in a democracy. Now, if we are morphing into some as yet unnamed form of exceptionalist American autocracy, this is right down the alley of where they're heading. You know, it's interesting, Evan. We were talking right before Secretary Clinton came on. What's the theme that we could have for this conversation at such a moment?

4:36And we said, basically, it's the authoritarian playbook. That's the theme of this conversation. It is. And in a way, the book you both have written here is about countering the authoritarian playbook around the world and all of the insight and the preparation and the expertise that goes into that. That word really rises to the top. A question for you, Dean. You know, one of the clear takeaways here is this idea that if you don't have expertise in the room, that you're disadvantaged. Right now, this administration is pretty systematically expunging expertise from the government. When you look around the world, and we'd love to pin you both down on this question, I'm sure you get this, but when people ask you what keeps you up at night, what is the issue that we are most vulnerable to right now because of this transformation of the role of expertise in government?

5:29Yeah, so thank you. Look, we are at the moment, and this book is really about what happens in the situation where leaders have to make tough decisions. And today, there's so many of those decisions. If you look at Ukraine, if you look at what happens in the Middle East and the war in Gaza and the whole region, that can become even more unstable. Relations with China, where this is going, and so many more unique challenges in the moment. We haven't even talked about how AI and everything, that technology can affect crisis situations and decision making in the situation room. And we need good people.

6:09We need experts. We need policymakers that have a lot of experience being in those situations, have expertise that is specific to the region, to the country, to the topic. And we're not getting it right now. And we're seeing this even if you look at Steve Witkoff and the negotiations around the world and who is around him and the team of experts. Even if you think about the Middle East, where are we heading with this? What is this strategy, the long-term strategy for ending or solving the Arab-Israeli conflict? Who's working on those issues? So what we're trying to do in the book is to basically say, look, those decisions are very, very difficult.

6:48And we have a lot of empathy for the people in the room. and how to balance the emotions, the role of the advisors, the decisions about the used military force of diplomacy. And for that, we really need to remember that the academic community has a lot of expertise and we need to use it. And policymakers who've been career diplomats should be in the room, should be in the process. We need good processes. And during the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, if you look at the National Security Council, the work that was done back then to advance different policy options, and we don't have that to the same extent today.

7:27And we might be paying the price for not having the best policies and the best minds around the table. I'd love to ask Secretary Clinton a little bit about the price that we're paying. You know, it's interesting to me that of the photographs, the iconic picture of you guys in the Situation Room during the bin Laden operation was something that Trump loved. He thought it was the most powerful picture of what a presidency should be about. Yet that Situation Room is sitting empty most of the time. And the meetings, I guess, are taking place around his desk as people just flow into the Oval Office and the process seems to be whatever he's thinking or saying.

8:11What do you think is lost in that situation when those voices are no longer around the table in that room? And specifically, I also, it seems that you have made the argument for among the voices that should be in the room, in the situation, are women's voices. And what's lost when there are no women's voices in that room, but also no voices other than the sort of one. I'm curious, what's the impact on the country and the world when this happens? Well, Jane, I've thought about that a lot because I've said and I've written that the process we used leading up to President Obama's decision about the raid to go after who we thought was bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, was a very good example of thoughtful, smart presidential decision making.

9:02The people in the room did not agree, number one. And we didn't bring the president in until we'd had several meetings because, you know, even the smartest, most self-aware person with the president sitting at the head of the table is going to be kind of looking like, am I getting through to him? Is he buying what I'm selling? You know, instead, we sat around that table for hours and debated, was the intelligence actionable enough to take a step of any sort? If so, what should it be? Do we put a predator drone over it? Do we launch, you know, a Tomahawk missile? Do we do a raid? If so, how do we do it and avoid the potential of what happened in Iran?

9:47And Bob Gates was secretary of defense. So there was a lot of experience in the room, a lot of expertise in the room, and a lot of honest disagreement in the room. And to the president's credit, he did not ask for consensus. He said, I'm not coming in until you all agree. He said, basically, hash it out. Ask every question you can imagine and do something else. Red team the intelligence by people who were not on the bin Laden portfolio. Leo, bring in people who are Asia experts or African experts or whatever, bring them in and let them go through the intelligence so that, you know, we get the benefit of their questions as well.

10:29And then at the end, the president had each one of us tell him what our recommendation was. And I go through that detail because I do not think any of that is happening. I think that people are cut out of the process who know the language, know the culture, know the leaders involved. Karen mentioned Steve Whitcoff, the president's envoy. And let's remember, envoy for Russia, envoy for Iran, envoy for the Middle East, doesn't travel with any support, so far as I can see in the pictures, doesn't even have his own translator, relies on Putin's translator, for heaven's sakes. I mean, the whole idea of expertise is not just rejected, it's ridiculed.

11:09You know, we are going to operate from our gut. We know what should be done. And, of course, the biggest we is at the end of the day, the president. So from what I'm told about decision making, you want to get to Mar-a-Lago or Bedminster in order to have a meal with the president. You want to get into the Oval Office. You want to go golfing. You want to get your viewpoint directly into his ear. But then you've got to hang around, as a lot of these people do, because he'll listen to the next person. And maybe all of your maneuvering and flattery will no longer be sufficient. So this is like a medieval court.

11:48Who can court the king? Who can ingratiate him or herself with the king? And the way you do that is not by presenting expert advice or options or, heaven forbid, contradicting some other voice that's going into his head. You do it through flattery, you do it through insinuation, you do it through all of those courtier skills that you read about in, you know, Henry VIII or God, Henry I. I mean, you can go all the way back. If it weren't so serious, it would be ridiculous, but it's deadly serious. You know, the Situation Room is obviously a place, but it's also a metaphor. It's a metaphor for decision-making, decision making that is at the highest levels, often under crisis conditions.

12:38And it is a metaphor for how it operates. You know, it's a shorthand for saying, okay, when I traveled, sometimes we'd go into a tent set up in a hotel room so that you could keep away from surveillance and block out noise. We'd go for a walk, literally in the woods. We'd go into the limousine and turn on the radio. I mean, you always had to be aware that others were watching and listening. In this administration, you just have to figure out, you know, what's going through Trump's mind. That is such an important theme. And, you know, both of you have talked about that. You've been in the room and experienced what it's like to have to evaluate another leader face to face.

13:20Karen is an expert on psychology and the role of crisis decision making. I can't think of a more relevant expertise, frankly, right now. although in many ways it's the inverse of what we're used to expecting. Now the volatile factor is the United States of America, and it's not just other world leaders that we're evaluating, but our own president. We're going to take a quick break. When we come back, we'll talk more about the psychology of leaders, and especially one particular leader, Donald Trump. The political scene from The New Yorker will be back in just a moment.

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15:00Madam Secretary, last time you and I spoke, it was right before the Alaska-Russia summit, which I think is a very interesting case study of what we're talking about here, the explosion of process and the uncertainty about what America's foreign policy is right now. You made a bit of a splash, actually, on the eve of that Alaska summit with your statement, which I think was kind of misinterpreted or people didn't get the joke, you know, when you said you'd personally give President Trump, nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize if he managed to make peace without giving away any of Ukraine's territory, knowing full well that, of course, that wasn't going to happen.

15:35You can always hope, Susan. You can always hope. You know, maybe it's just me, but it was pretty clear to me that you didn't think it was going to happen. Six weeks later, this almost looks like a case study for one of your Columbia classes on the failure of coercive diplomacy and the undermining of America's credibility in the world. But, you know, how does it look to you, this Alaska summit? Well, it looks like a total failure. We teach in our class that if you're going to attempt coercive diplomacy, you first have to have credibility so that the threats you make, coupled with whatever reassurances you want to provide, are going to be seen as credible.

16:20So for resolve, for following through. And clearly, that's not something that, you know, President Trump enjoys. And it was poorly conceived, as I really go back and look at it. And so this was a last minute slapdash decision, which gave the Russians huge advantages coming to our territory, being received, a leader who has been indicted as a war criminal for the kidnapping of Ukrainian children. The whole thing was just absolutely outrageous. Now, if there had been some agreement, we would have all said, what a genius. I mean, you know, he acted impulsively, but he read Putin right. And the very fact that Putin was being received by him on this issue, maybe some progress could be made, which just goes to show you he has no idea who Putin really is.

17:18And I just want to say something and then let Karen explain it, because this is something that I've learned in working with Karen teaching this course. You know, the great benefit of the sort of psychological insights that we now have about how human beings, not just leaders, evaluate risks and gains is so pertinent to both what's happening between Russia and Ukraine, but also we believe what is helpful in explaining where Netanyahu is right now. And that's something called prospect theory. And if you just give Karen a minute, I'd love for her, for your listeners to explain this because I view this as a great insight.

17:59And I think that when you look at the three main personalities that are roiling the world right now. Put Xi Jinping aside for a minute, but you take Putin, Netanyahu, Trump. I think this is very informative. Look, in the class, we talk about the human element and how much the psychology of leaders is such a critical factor in understanding what we're seeing. And prospect theory is basically one element coming out of the work of Kahneman and Dversky that revolutionized the field of behavioral economics. And this is the idea of leaders are much more sensitive when they're in a domain of loss, and they're much more willing to run risks and to recoup losses compared to when they are in a domain of gains.

18:46So what we see with both Putin and with Netanyahu, especially post-October 7, and we'll get to this, is a great willingness to run risks that to us look not rational or extremely reckless. And from both of them, if you look at this psychology, it comes from the reference point in their mind of how much they lost. And for Putin is the loss of the Soviet empire. And that's a big drive for him. And that's why he's willing to run such risks in Ukraine and elsewhere. And for Benjamin Netanyahu, it's really interesting, right? Because before October 7, the reputation of Benjamin Netanyahu was that it's a lot of talk, but no action, that he's actually very risk averse.

19:30And after October 7 with the trauma, the loss, the humiliation, you see almost a very different Benjamin Netanyahu running risk. Even look recently with the attacks, the strikes in Doha, which was crossing of a major red line. And so what explains the change in Benjamin Netanyahu's behavior that all of a sudden is much more willing to run risks to that extent? And we talked about it in class, and it was a very interesting conversation about how he, after October 7th, something changed. And it's, again, it's a domain of loss and that willingness to run risks that explains a lot of the behavior.

20:07And we see the same thing that was put in, but we have a problem understanding that. We have a problem understanding the actors that we're dealing with because we tend to analyze them from a kind of rational actor perspective. We call this mirror imaging. We tend to assume that their intentions and their resolve and their willingness to run risk will mirror ours. And that's why we get surprised again and again and again. And it was true during the Cold War as well. We never thought that they would put missiles in Cuba. We didn't see Saddam's willingness to go into Kuwait. We didn't think about Putin actually running the risks by invading Ukraine in that way.

20:48And that's a problem that we are not taking the psychology of the other leader into account. And we have the significant blind spots as a result. And if you add the personal diplomacy into this, you magnify those biases. And it makes it much harder to even debate with the president because how can you as an intelligence analyst tell him you're wrong? If he's in the room thinking that he knows the guy and he can trust him and he looks at the intelligence analyst and he will tell them, well, I've been in the room. I know him. And this is not unique to Trump, but he just took it in a different level, which makes it extremely difficult.

21:27So that's just a theme in the class that, you know, international politics can be about great power competitions and capabilities and alliances and institutions. But at the end of the day, we're talking about people. We're talking about human beings and the psychology and how much that affects what we're seeing happening in the situation room and in foreign policy. I have to say, when I hear you speak about the losses and the importance of the psychology of the losses, I kind of wonder if we as a press corps and country maybe overlooked the effect on Trump of the loss in 2020 and the humiliation and the effect of the prosecutions of him.

22:09What do you think, Secretary? I think that that's an important insight. Look, you can go all the way back to his childhood and everything that happened there, read his, you know, niece's books, and you can get that kind of mentality. This is a guy, and I joked about it, but this is a guy who never got over not winning an Emmy. Every loss is a humiliation. Every loss is in his mind. Again, you know, I'm not a psychiatrist, but I'll go there anyway. Every loss is a defeat in his father's eyes. I mean, the whole thing is psychopathology on steroids. And we have failed to understand it for the very reasons Karen has talked about.

22:53You know, it's difficult. We kind of impute motives, analyses, understanding of other people to how we see the world. And whether you just are working on a one-on-one basis with somebody at the workplace or in a relationship or on the world stage, we have to do more to take the insights from psychology and apply them. So why is he still claiming there was no Russian interference? Because I got more votes than he did. Even though he ended up winning the Electoral College, he cannot let go of the fact that I got nearly three million more votes. That is what motivates this effort to rewrite history, to eliminate the factual evidence that everybody came to.

23:392020, humiliation on, you know, on a much larger stage. I'm glad you brought this up because this goes to this question of vengeance. And, you know, as a sort of theme of the post 2024 victory that we're looking at, that this is the basis in some ways of Trump's domestic policy, if not his foreign policy. Just last month, Stephen Miller, one of his closest advisors, was calling for your prosecution on the basis of some rewritten version of 2016 in which you were engaged in a quote-unquote sadistic conspiracy. This goes back to our first conversation about going after his domestic enemies after the assassination of Charlie Kirk.

24:21Have you seen any efforts to follow through on that? What does it mean when Stephen Miller says you should be prosecuted right now in 2025? Do you take that seriously? Well, I think you have to take everything they say seriously because they are literally on a witch hunt. I mean, they believe that by silencing critics, by rewriting history, and we're about to see that on a huge scale because they're going to try to rewrite the history of America for our 250th anniversary next year. They've already started. I mean, it was shocking when they directed the National Park Service to start removing references to slavery and take down the infamous, renowned portrait of the slave with the terrible scarring on his back.

25:06Why are they doing this? Because they can't win a fair fight. They can't win a fair fight in politics and they can't win a fair fight in history. So therefore, they have to silence voices. They have to prosecute people. They have to rewrite whatever they can because it's too painful for them to accept that their version of America is not supported by the majority of the American people. It is not supported by the facts, evidence or historical truth. And so they've got to eliminate that in order to feel comfortable. You know, Susan, getting back to the psychology, this creates cognitive dissonance in these guys.

25:47They are not mature enough. They're not emotionally stable enough in order to be dealing with different thoughts at the same time. I mean, part of the hallmark of somebody who tries to be fair minded to try to get to whatever the truth is, is sometimes you have to hold two different thoughts in your head at the same time. That is absolutely uncomfortable for these guys. And so their version of America, this white supremacy version of America filled with all kinds of vengeance and persecution complexes is what they are trying to impose on the rest of us. So, you know, they've got some kind of investigation going in the Justice Department about 2016.

26:30They already did that once with the guy that they appointed as a special prosecutor back whenever the first term Trump Durham, you know, and he like looked under every rug. He brought two failed prosecutions. He deposed me for a couple of hours. I mean, it was so pathetic. But they're back on that. And you know what? They do scare a lot of people. They intimidate institutions. And so it's working for them. And that's what's so frightening to me is that people are capitulating, complying. And so we don't know what the next act in this is. This question of psychology, which we've talked about so well now on the domestic side as well as on the foreign side, when you look across to a scene of the kind we had in Beijing recently where you've got the three leaders, you've got Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-un.

27:21When you try to look at them, we, as you say, we sometimes say, well, these are rational actors. They're not going to do something suicidal. They're not going to attack us. But Secretary Clinton, are you concerned that by the way that we are conducting policymaking, if we can use that term, that we are underestimating and perhaps misreading what's going on in that very complex and evolving relationship over there? Probably. I mean, I can't speak for the intelligence services inside, you know, the U.S. government right now. I know they got Xi Jinping wrong because I was there. And their view of him and his psychology and what kind of leader he would be really missed the intense focus on, once again, the domain of loss.

28:07They lost Taiwan. They want it back. They dominated centuries ago. The waters around China, you know, South China Sea and others, they want it back. So I think that when you look and don't forget to put Prime Minister Modi in there, when you look at the North Korean, Chinese and Russian leader all together in Beijing and also holding hands with the prime minister of India, who we worked very hard to support as a counterweight to Chinese influence in Asia. It should ring alarm bells because, you know, Vladimir Putin has been willing to sacrifice over a million Russian men, dead and injured, without the blink of an eye.