Trump’s World Order — Live from Davos, with Niall Ferguson

22 Jan 2026 · 56 min · 19 chapters

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Podcast Notes: The Prof G Pod with Scott Galloway - Episode: Trump’s World Order — Live from Davos, with Niall Ferguson

Episode Overview

  • Guest: Niall Ferguson, historian and public intellectual.
  • Location: Live from Davos, Switzerland.
  • Main Themes: Discussion on current geopolitical climate, Trump's foreign policy, and the implications for the US and global alliances.

Key Topics Discussed

  1. Trump’s Impact at Davos
  2. Trump successfully dominated discussions with provocative statements, particularly regarding Greenland, generating significant media attention.
  3. Ferguson comments on Trump’s strategic distractions, suggesting they often serve to deflect attention from more pressing issues (e.g., Iran).
  1. Geopolitical Context
  2. The conversation frames the current geopolitical moment as a return to "Cold War" dynamics rather than the anticipated "new world order."
  3. Ferguson posits that China has emerged as the central global rival, akin to the Soviet Union during the original Cold War.
  4. He emphasizes the importance of recognizing a "Cold War II" mentality among world powers.
  1. US Military Strategy and Alliances
  2. Ferguson defends Trump's military strategy, suggesting it is a necessary assertion of US power against authoritarian regimes.
  3. Discussion about the "realism" in Trump’s approach, particularly in Latin America (e.g., Venezuela), highlighting a shift from regime change to "regime alteration."
  4. The importance of NATO and US alliances are discussed, with Ferguson arguing that Trump’s rhetoric pushes European allies to increase their defense spending.
  1. Ukraine and the Ongoing Conflict
  2. Ferguson outlines the complexities of the war in Ukraine, suggesting that the war may end only through a fragile peace rather than a complete Ukrainian victory.
  3. Discussions on the necessity for the US to remain involved in supporting Ukraine, as European nations cannot fill the military aid gap.
  4. The conversation refutes the idea of Ukraine achieving complete sovereignty without significant external support, highlighting the ongoing challenges faced by Ukraine.
  1. Economic Implications
  2. Concerns about China's growing economic influence are raised, positioning it as a threat to Western economies.
  3. Ferguson argues that while Trump’s approach may seem abrasive, it is intended to force European allies to take their defense commitments seriously.
  1. Future Outlook
  2. Ferguson expresses skepticism about the long-term viability of the Iranian regime without external intervention, advocating for a more proactive approach from the US.
  3. The episode concludes with discussions about the historical parallels between current geopolitical tensions and past global conflicts.

Key Takeaways

  • Geopolitical Dynamics: The current global order mirrors the Cold War rather than presenting a new paradigm; recognition of this reality is crucial for US foreign policy.
  • US Alliances: Trump’s approach is both disruptive and strategic, aiming to enhance the defense capabilities of allies while maintaining US dominance.
  • Ukraine’s Position: Ukraine’s struggle against Russia underscores the necessity for continuous US support; peace negotiations will likely involve difficult compromises.
  • China's Threat: The rising influence of China poses a significant risk to Western economies and global security frameworks, necessitating a reevaluation of alliances and strategy.

Conclusion The discussion between Scott Galloway and Niall Ferguson provides a comprehensive analysis of the current geopolitical landscape, particularly regarding Trump's foreign policy and the implications of the US's role in a rapidly changing world. The emphasis on historical context and the importance of alliances highlights the complexities faced by global leaders today.

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

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Trump's Influence at Davos

1:44 to 2:25

Discussion on Trump's impact and the European audience's reaction.

“So we're here at Davos at the annual meeting.”

Strategic Distraction Tactics

2:25 to 4:19

Analyzing Trump's news-leading tactics as distractions from serious issues.

“Well, President Trump, as you know, is extremely good at leading the news, setting the agenda and being the number one topic of conversation.”

Military Strategy and Global Power

4:19 to 7:11

Exploring Trump's military strategies and the reassertion of U.S. power.

“But the message was, oh, I'm not going to take military action over Greenland.”

Cold War II: Understanding Geopolitics

7:11 to 9:05

Ferguson discusses the current geopolitical climate and alliances.

“far rather be talking about ukraine than greenland uh and i did manage to at least spend some of the time at the ukraine house today talking about what's happening there which we should come back to.”

Venezuela: Regime Alteration Vs. Change

9:05 to 10:40

Debate on the implications of U.S. actions in Venezuela and its future.

“So there's some overlap here and then some things we would disagree on.”

Risks of Historical Interventions

10:40 to 14:00

Discussing the potential pitfalls of U.S. interventions based on past experiences.

“I'm more worried about the rest of the Bond film.”

Historical Context of American Interventions

14:00 to 15:00

Explore past U.S. interventions and their messy outcomes.

“the movies back then never turned out that well.”

Trump's Disdain for Alliances

15:00 to 19:00

Discuss Trump's approach to U.S. alliances and NATO's significance.

“The reason the United States won the Cold War was its alliances.”

Global Economic Reconfiguration

21:38 to 25:40

Analyze the shifting global economic alliances and their implications.

“I think people from both sides of the aisle would acknowledge the point that the EU and NATO, or as it relates to NATO, have been unfairly free-riding off the largesse of U.S.”

Future of U.S. Global Influence

25:40 to 28:02

Consider the potential shifts in U.S. influence and foreign strategy.

“And the next president will doubtless be quite a different person from this president.”
Show all 19 chapters

Understanding Trump's Global Strategy

28:02 to 30:18

Explore the realities behind Trump's rhetoric and U.S. military strategy.

“But I'm not sure that that's really what we're seeing here.”

The Role of the U.S. in European Security

30:18 to 34:49

Discuss the U.S. nuclear deterrence and its impact on European security.

“pointed out that, you know, journalists took him literally, but not seriously, voters the other way.”

The Dynamics of U.S. Support for Ukraine

37:04 to 41:41

Analyze the complexities of American support and NATO's role in Ukraine.

“My sense is when I read the proposed peace plan that the U.S.”

The Realities of War Scenarios in Ukraine

41:41 to 42:00

Examine the potential outcomes for Ukraine in its ongoing war.

Negotiating with Russia: Challenges and Strategies

42:00 to 46:05

Explore the complexities of negotiating peace in Ukraine with insights on the Russian military situation and potential compromises.

“The Ukrainians already did take out most of the Russian oil refining capacity last year, and the Russians just kept shipping crude.”

The Future of Ukraine: Investment and Security

46:05 to 50:58

Discuss the potential for Ukraine's reconstruction and the importance of Western support and military technology in its future.

“That's an important point that is not, I think, widely understood.”

Geopolitical Implications and Historical Context

50:58 to 56:01

Analyze the geopolitical landscape and historical lessons that could inform future interventions and conflicts in the Middle East.

“They don't, of course, have the space or the security.”

The Case for Conservative Governance

56:01 to 56:48

Discussion on the current state of governance and the potential for conservative reforms.

“But institutionally, the incentives are terrible.”

Engaging with Diverse Perspectives

56:49 to 57:02

The value of engaging in dialogue despite differing opinions.

“It would be so boring if we agreed about everything, but we agree about football.”
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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00Scott Galloway:Support for the show comes from Harvey AI. As AI reshapes professional services, law firms and in-house teams are rethinking how complex work gets done. Harvey AI is an AI platform built specifically for legal practice, helping teams analyze documents, draft with precision and collaborate securely across matters. Today, more than half of the AM Law 100 use Harvey. Learn more at Harvey.ai.

0:51Scott Galloway:We'll be right back. with our magnet, and mix them with torrid vulcan. These might not seem like real instructions that someone could follow. And yet, some researchers are trying to recreate alchemists' work hundreds of years later. What they've found is that there's actually interesting science hidden away behind some of the bizarre metaphors in these old texts. That's this week on the Unexplainable Podcast.

1:27Scott Galloway:We're here with three or four-time guests, one of my favorite guests, and also I'm going to go out and live here and call you a friend. Yeah. Historian, public intellectual, and also people who know this about you, you're actually a pretty savvy entrepreneur. Anyways, Neil Ferguson, always good to see you. Great to be with you, Scott. So we're here at Davos at the annual meeting. By the way, how many Davos? I bet you've been to like 40 Davoses. Do you come here every year? Not every year. I've rather lost count. Yeah, but a lot. It feels like 20 years on and off. I would think you're very much an intellectual support animal for the Davos crowd.

2:06Scott Galloway:So, I'll just simply put, you obviously just saw President Trump's talk. Attack that from any angle you want or compliment it from any angle. What are your observations around what he said here and how you think the mostly European audience is reacting to it? And kind of set the table for us around this new world order or this new world vision, if you will. Well, President Trump, as you know, is extremely good at leading the news, setting the agenda and being the number one topic of conversation. And he's done that extremely well this year by raising the issue of his claim on Greenland, which is carefully calculated as an issue to cause the heads of European leaders to explode, not to mention Canadian leaders.

2:55So if the object of the exercise was to dominate the conversation at the World Economic Forum, mission accomplished. So that's, I think, the obvious thing to say first. Why? So why would he do that? I mean, there are a couple of reasons, most of which I think are missed in the conversation here. One is to distract us from something else. This is something that President Trump has a record of doing. We weren't talking about Iran immediately before the bombing of Fordow last June. And I think most people here have completely forgotten that the Iranian regime has just killed between 10 ,000 and 15 ,000 of its own people, that President Trump threatened to take action if they did that, and that the USS Lincoln Aircraft Carrier Group is not far away from the Persian Gulf.

3:44So one distinctly obvious point, in my view, is that this is Maskirovka, as the Russians say, is a huge distraction operation, which has ensured that the Europeans don't spend the week saying, please de-escalate in the Middle East, which is what they would be saying if we were still talking about Iran. So that's point number two. And the third point I would make is that, as usual, President Trump delivers the key message very, very carefully wrapped in so much riffing and joshing and trolling that you almost miss it. But the message was, oh, I'm not going to take military action over Greenland.

4:23Don't be silly. That was the message. The markets picked it up because the markets were a little bit unhappy yesterday about this escalation in U.S.-Europe tensions. And I think we now see, as usual, President Trump loves the brink. He likes to go up to the brink. And he saw how the markets reacted, which was pretty negatively.

4:40Scott Galloway:And as usual, back we go away from the brink. So I think a lot of people would say, would agree with your distraction thesis, but would say it's a distraction from the Epstein files, not from an impending attack on Iran. Do you believe that, in fact, it's a bit of a head fake? And there's some evidence to support this, that U.S. military forces are coordinating and choreographing around a potential military strike. You understand geopolitics as well as anyone. Where would you put the odds that there is something resembling some sort of a military strike impending on Iran? Certainly north of 40%.

5:17Yeah. I mean, I think that the president made a very clear threat to the Iranian regime. Yeah. I think the Iranian regime has, by the standards of totalitarian regimes, been astonishingly brutal towards its own people. It's hard to think of a single day of repression in any context in which more than 10 ,000 people have been murdered. But I also think that President Trump has a strategic concept to an extent that people underestimate here. We've already seen that in Venezuela. Venezuela was part of the Axis sphere of influence. By the Axis, I mean China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, the bad guys, the authoritarians who've been working together very overtly, not only in Ukraine, but elsewhere.

6:07And by decapitating the Venezuelan regime, which is only a couple of weeks ago, President Trump sent a very clear signal that he is capable of deploying lethal force in a way that nobody else is. The Chinese couldn't do this.

6:22Scott Galloway:The Russians certainly couldn't do this. Well, Putin's tried for 35 minutes, and Trump did it in 35, or 35 months, and Trump did it in 35 minutes. So Putin is approaching year five of a war against Ukraine that he thought would be over in a matter of days. The Chinese love to do demonstrations of their sea and air power in and around Taiwan, but could they actually fight, you know, a war? Well, none of their commanding officers has ever seen combat, whereas the United States has a great deal of combat experience. So I think part of what's going on here is a global reassertion of American power but that is ultimately directed at russia and china the unfinished business is still the negotiation of an end to the war in ukraine that that as president trump said today has proved much harder than he expected he acknowledges that but i don't think we should lose sight of that i'd far rather be talking about ukraine than greenland uh and i did manage to at least spend some of the time at the ukraine house today talking about what's happening there which we should come back to.

7:24But then ultimately, the big problem is China. And China is the real adversary in today's geopolitical moment. You use the phrase, new world order. It's not a phrase I've ever much liked, since I think George H.W. Bush gave it currency. What we're seeing is actually a familiar old world order of Cold War. We are in Cold War II. China has taken the place that the Soviet Union used to occupy. And that's the dominant strategic reality. And I don't think everybody here at Davos fully understands that even yet. And so there's a tendency here to misread Trump. They've been doing that for a decade. But I think also to misread the world and to think it's all about them.

8:08But it really isn't all about them. It's not about Europe, except insofar as Europe can't seem to help Ukraine effectively without the United States. And it's certainly not all about Denmark and Greenland. I think that is a very conscious distraction that President Trump has chosen. And there's an air, I think, of almost like-heartedness when you talk to members of the US delegation here. They know that they're driving the Europeans nuts, and they're quite enjoying it because they're the first American administration in my lifetime that has said out loud what many others have felt and said privately about the Europeans, that they're impossible.

8:49They're entitled. They're always striking moral attitudes. This international law, that international law. They don't pay their share of the costs of European security. And I think what's fascinating is to hear an American administration saying out loud what their predecessors used to say privately back in Washington about dealing with the Europeans.

9:09Scott Galloway:So there's some overlap here and then some things we would disagree on. So I think it's hard to argue that what I would argue the greatest performing organization in history is the U.S. military. And that what happened in Venezuela is a flex. I can't imagine it hasn't sent chills down the spine of every world leader. When Madeleine Albright, Secretary Albright said, our reach is far and our memory is long, has never been more apparent. Right. The issue is in kind of a double barrel question here. Our adventures or misadventures overseas are like a Bond film. They always start great. Bond films always nail the opening.

9:44Scott Galloway:And then they go on to be bad, mediocre, amazing films. And oftentimes, we start off, we nail the opening, and then things come off the rails. And already in Venezuela, we're talking about taking their oil. It hasn't been regime changed. Same regime is there. And it doesn't appear there'd be a quote unquote plan. First barrel of the question. Second, my sense is that you see this as sort of like bumping up against the EU. It's all, I wouldn't call it good fun, but shouldn't be taken seriously, but not literally or literally not seriously. Whereas I see that our power has come from not being 25 % of the world's GDP, but effectively being the leaders of an alliance that was 60 or 70%.

10:27Scott Galloway:And then we're rupturing that alliance. and ultimately we're going to be much weaker and unable to promote Western values around the world. Whereas my sense is you don't see the same level of rupture that I see. So let's start with Venezuela. I'm more worried about the rest of the Bond film. Tell me what you think the prospects are of a Venezuela post this unbelievable military operation. And two, I would argue that this rupture or this fraying of alliances is long-term very unhealthy for America and the West. Neil. Well, I think this was never intended in Venezuela to be regime change in the sense that there was regime change in Iraq in 2003.

11:11And President Trump very deliberately said the other day, we aren't going to make the mistake they made then of entirely dismantling the regime and then seeing the country descend into chaos, a chaos that the US owned. This is regime alteration. So it's an alteration. Obviously, it's meet the new boss, more or less the same as the old boss, because it's in effect Maduro's deputy. But the alteration is she doesn't report to Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and the Cubans anymore. She reports to President Trump and she better report the right things or she too could have a one-way ticket to a New York courthouse.

11:50So I think that's an important change, but it's not to be confused with regime change where the Americans say, and now you're going to hold elections and people we really like are going to win them. And then we have a stock market. We'd like to liberalize, et cetera. I mean, those days are long gone. And I think the Trump administration rather prides itself on not having an idealistic vision, but be entirely realistic. Stephen Miller was boasting about this the other day. We're the ultimate realists. And insofar as it takes Venezuela out of the Chinese camp and makes it essentially part of the Western sphere of American influence.

12:25That is an important alteration. What happens next? Well, I think the issue of the oil is mainly about denying it to China because part of the way that the world has worked lately is that the sanctions get imposed on bad actors and the Chinese essentially evade the sanctions and then get the oil at a discount. They're doing this with the Russians. They've done it with the Iranians for years. And I think part of the game here is to end that. So it's not a meaningless change that's happened. It's disappointing if, like, my friend Ricardo Hausman, like all my Venezuelan friends, pretty much, you really wanted to see the Chavistas gone and the opposition, the Democratic opposition in power.

13:02We may get there, but I think it was never going to happen in a hurry after the bad experiences of Iraq. Could Iraq be the wrong analogy? Yeah, not perfect. So what else could be said? When Trump's national security strategy was published in November, was it? Or was it early December? everybody was very preoccupied with what it said about Europe. I said, that's not the interesting thing. The interesting thing is the Trump corollary, because the Trump corollary was this allusion to the Roosevelt corollary of 1904, Theodore Roosevelt, I should say, which said, not only is the Monroe Doctrine true, that Europeans can't interfere in the Western Hemisphere and Latin America and the Caribbean, but also, we the United States reserve the right to change governments we don't like in this part of the world.

13:53So we're back to that world. And to go to your movie analogy, the movies back then never turned out that well. The United States intervened in, let's see, Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico, I'm sure I'm missing Dominican Republic, and it, you know, often ended up with, well, he may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch. or it ended up with, ah, the revolution, think Cuba, and then you're really looking at a mess. Can that be the story here? I think that's the downside risk for the Trump administration, that if they repeat the history of American interventions post-1904, then you either end up having a nasty regime that you kind of own, or you end up with another revolution against it.

14:43I think it'll be hard to avoid that, because Venezuela has been very deeply and seriously damaged by the Chavistas. It will take a while to repair, if indeed it can be repaired. Part two. Look, the standard view in this part of the world is alliances have been absolutely crucial. The reason the United States won the Cold War was its alliances. And many American secretaries of state have said this. It's almost a standard form for administrations up until this one. And what distinguished President Trump in both his first and second term is his disdain for allies and his view that they're essentially on the take, that they take advantage of the United States.

15:30And he set out to change that. Now, before you say this is terrible and crazy, and, you know, we all should prepare for the end of civilization, bear in mind that for 50 years, American presidents have said to the Europeans, hey, you know what? You guys really don't pay like enough, considering that you're as rich as we are pretty much. Why is it that we bear 60 or more percent of the cost of NATO? The first president to get the Europeans to act, to commit to a significant increase in their defense spending is President Trump. And that commitment that happened last year, I think was important, but it hasn't really translated into much meaningful rearmament so far, even in Germany, which has certainly voted the means.

16:17They've passed very significant fiscal measures, but rearmament is going at a snail's pace and certainly not fast enough to meaningfully alter the situation in Ukraine. So I think part of what we're seeing here is more pressure on the Europeans to make them think, gee, the Americans might really check out of NATO. They might really do that. We really need to get serious. Now, I don't think that President Trump will one day announce, I'm done with NATO, or for that matter, go to war with Denmark. This is all classic Trump bluff. The goal is to force the Europeans to take seriously their own rhetoric.

16:55Scott, for the last 10 years, I've heard European leaders here and elsewhere talk about strategic autonomy, how important it is that Europe should become a real superpower. But it was all talk. Macron was especially good at giving these speeches, but did the French defense spending meaningfully rise? No. So I think part of what we're seeing here is a deliberate and conscious effort to provoke the Europeans into getting real about defense spending and rearmament and really taking ownership of the crisis in Eastern Europe that began when Russia invaded or fully invaded Ukraine. So I'm not so sure that the goal here is to dismantle the alliances any more than it is to dismantle the alliances that the US has in Asia with Japan or with South Korea.

17:43Those countries, of course, didn't like having tariffs imposed on them, and it made them very nervous. But it's not like the US is about to tear up its defense alliances in Asia, especially when China poses an obvious threat to those countries. The truth is that America's allies don't have a better option. Mark Carney may think that he can go to China and make nice with Xi and this will somehow impress Donald Trump. But I don't think it does, because is Canada really going to join the Chinese Greater East Asian co-prosperity zone? What would that actually imply? Would it really be in Canada's interest to have Chinese Communist Party surveillance of their tech stack?

18:34I'm thinking no. So the truth is the United States can really treat its allies in an almost abusive way, knowing that they don't have anywhere else to go and that in the final analysis, if it makes them step up and make a bigger effort, particularly a bigger military effort, then it's probably worth trolling them at Davos for a week.

18:58Scott Galloway:We'll be right back.

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20:47Scott Galloway:Support for the show comes from Harvey AI. Law is craft, forged through repetition, sharpened by judgment, perfected in the details most people never see. Practice made perfect is Harvey's belief in relentless refinement, in turning complexity into clarity, pressure into precision, and experience into advantage. legal work isn't just about knowing law it's about applying it carefully consistently and under real stakes harvey is an ai platform built specifically for legal practice helping teams analyze large volumes of documents draft with precision and collaborate securely across complex matters it doesn't replace expertise it strengthens it making teams faster more exacting more certain today more than half of the am law 100 use harvey as part of their workflow learn more at harvey.ai

21:38Scott Galloway:I think people from both sides of the aisle would acknowledge the point that the EU and NATO, or as it relates to NATO, have been unfairly free-riding off the largesse of U.S. military spending. Where I think where we part company is, I actually thought Mark Carney's talk yesterday was the most powerful. And what I see is Canada, who was basically 75 % of their exports are coming to the US. And I feel like in so many words he said from that great movie Animal House, let's be honest, we fucked up, we trusted you. And I'm not as optimistic, Neil, that these other great economies don't have options outside of the U.S.

22:21Scott Galloway:And what I actively see is a lot of big economies purposefully and deliberately and maybe permanently or at least for a while reconfiguring their supply chain and their economic activity around and away from the U.S. And while China, who I think I agree with you, could accurately be described as our adversary, while their imports, the percentage of their exports has dropped from 17 % to 10 % in the U.S. Their exports into other countries has increased. China just registered its largest export trading surplus. It strikes me that the fraying or rupture of these alliances is benefiting China and hurting us.

23:06Scott Galloway:I haven't seen the uplift or the benefit of us kind of flexing our muscles other than what you talked about in terms of Venezuela, military might. and getting the EU off the couch in terms of military support, what I see or what I fear, and I'm not sure I sense the same fear from you, is that we're going to be less prosperous as nations spend a ton of time and energy trying to figure out a way to have the same type of incredible economic alliances that we've enjoyed for a long time. And I would say taken for granted. Your thoughts? Well, the difference is that the United States is, in a sense, a kind of empire of consumption.

23:43And the United States has run for many decades a current account deficit. The United States is a fantastic market to sell to for foreign companies. Even after the imposition of tariffs, it's still a fantastic market to sell to. The problem about China is it's not really a fantastic market to sell to, because what the Chinese are all about is selling you stuff. That's why they have a colossal trade service.

24:07Scott Galloway:Their imports have been flat. Their exports are up 40 % since COVID. And we're not too far from the most important European economy in Germany, as we sit here in Davos. And the Germans are having their lunch eaten. Their manufacturing sector is being hit extraordinarily hard by Chinese competition. And Chinese competition is now in multiple domains. You know this, Scott. The Chinese have not only made electric vehicles the market that they dominate, not only batteries, not only solar cells, but they're now doing stuff and chemicals in pharma that we never thought was possible. And so a huge swathe of the German economy is suddenly feeling a competitive blast from China that poses a really profound threat to the German economy's future prosperity.

24:54So it's not a good swap, because Xi Jinping really isn't offering you great market access in China, except if you want to come and have your technology stolen. Because market access in China is, remember, You come, you set it up, we clone it, and then we say bye. That's why I don't think there's a really great choice on the table here, no matter how disgruntled Europeans, Canadians, and Asians may feel with President Trump. Remember, President Trump is president for three more years. Probability is that his power wanes, as that tends to happen in a second term, particularly if the Republicans lose the midterms.

25:34And, you know, time passes and the gravitational forces of American politics do what they do. It's still the United States. And the next president will doubtless be quite a different person from this president. So would it really make sense to reorientate your entire strategy towards a one-party state run by an avowed Marxist-Leninist Maoist, a regime that doesn't have the rule of law, that routinely incarcerates and disappears people that fall foul of it. A regime that has labor camps, indeed concentration camps in Xinjiang, etc. I mean, we can all say that the United States has its faults. But you take it from me.

26:20You would not want to live in a world in which China was the dominant power and in which you had to have a subservient relationship to Beijing. That would be a much inferior world, even to the world of Donald Trump's extraordinary and egotistical style of American leadership.

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26:41Scott Galloway:When I look at this, I don't know what to call it, new framework, I don't want to use the term new world order, it feels to me more less Monroe Doctrine and more, well, maybe it is part of the Monroe Doctrine, but spheres of influence. And I worry that we're withdrawing from, I think the most valuable companies in the world, Apple and Alphabet, are basically operating systems upon which everything else is built and they get a tax for everything and they set the tone. I have Elizabeth American economics, policy, rule of law, mostly democracy. It's kind of been the operating system for the majority of the West.

27:16Scott Galloway:And now people are deciding maybe they'll try and find their own operating system or shifting off of it. and we're moving to these spheres of influence where we have these regional superpowers, China and Asia, the U.S. and the Americas, I don't know, they fight it out in Europe. You're not worried or you don't see it as kind of a withdrawal. You see it as flexing, which will ultimately potentially increase U.S. dominance and kind of get the Europeans in line and to stop, quite frankly, bitching and moaning and live up to their rhetoric that music has to match the words. I see it as a withdrawal to a smaller America around spheres of influence that will embolden Russia and China in their spheres.

27:55Scott Galloway:You don't see that. Well, it's conceivable. I guess this is sort of Gideon Rachman's view that in the end, Trump's just another strong man who wants to carve up the world with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. But I'm not sure that that's really what we're seeing here. I mean, last I heard, Indo-Pacific command is still by far the most important of the military commands of the United States. And its role in life is to deter China from seeking to establish itself as in control of Taiwan or extending its power in the South China Sea. It's a real and formidable force. And I don't think if you spoke to Admiral Sam Paparo, the commander of Indo-Pacific Command, he would say, yeah, we're just winding this up because we're all going to the Western Hemisphere.

28:42I think we have to distinguish here between rhetoric and reality. the rhetoric of the trump administration particularly trump 2.0 is quite consciously borrowed from mckinley and roosevelt it's a sort of circa 1900 vibe i don't know who gives trump this stuff because for sure he's not sitting there reading biographies of theodore roosevelt somebody thinks it's a good idea maybe it's jd i don't know somebody thinks it's a good idea to make these allusions to an America before the New Deal, an America which was an America still on the rise as a power, not even really regarded as a great power by the rest of the world.

29:22So this rhetoric has clearly some appeal to members of the administration, maybe to voters. I don't know how many voters have heard of the Roosevelt corollary. Not many, I suspect. But the reality remains that the United States is a global power with military capabilities throughout the world. And the international trading system doesn't look remotely like spheres of influence. If you look at Hyun Song-Shin's work on the networks of trade, of supply chains and interlocking balance sheets, it's still a very, very extraordinarily complex global trading system. And when President Trump uses a 19th century tool like tariffs, all that happens is that the supply chains get reconfigured and the Chinese goods get to America with two stops along the way rather than just the one of 2018.

30:11So I think we need to just take Trump seriously, but not literally. This was the key insight that Selena Zito had way back in the 2016 campaign when she pointed out that, you know, journalists took him literally, but not seriously, voters the other way. So we don't, I think, need to take the national security strategy literally as a document. We just need to look at what the US does. And what it does is to maintain military superiority in all of the major zones of the world, including Europe. So here's the thing that the Europeans never want to face. that throughout the period since 1945, certainly from 1947, 1948, 1949, they have relied on the US for their nuclear security.

31:00Nuclear deterrence is not really provided by the French Foster Frap, certainly not by a British Trident. It's an American public good that is made available to Europeans. It's not included in the NATO budget. It's America's strategic force that says the Russians can't have Central or Western Europe. And if they try to have it, they risk obliteration. That's been the position really since the late 40s, and that has been the position despite the end of the Cold War. Now, nobody likes talking about this in Europe, because strategic autonomy, if it were to be meaningful, would mean that the Europeans would need a proper nuclear arsenal, which they can't remotely afford, and I don't think they would have the political will to build.

31:45So what is the alternative, really? There isn't one. The United States is the thing that deters Russia. And as China is now in the midst of building a huge nuclear arsenal that will at some point be as big as the Russians, you really need the United States. Otherwise, you're completely at the mercy of the great Eurasian autocracies, which I don't think even the most Trump-phobic European liberal could regard as a good outcome. another thing that's important when we get to reality is that geopolitics doesn't change that much because the world's geography is pretty constant over time and whether you're looking at now uh or if or if you want to uh look at the 1940s or if you want to go back to the early 1900s there are really two great geopolitical formations this goes back to the uh the early theorists of geopolitics, Mackinder and Spikeman.

32:41There's the great Eurasian land mass, which has historically been dominated by large authoritarian empires. And then there are the Rimlands, which are kind of Western Europe, British Isles, the Americas, and then Japan, the Asian equivalents. That's geopolitics. Nightmare scenario, the great Eurasian authoritarian regimes dominate the whole Eurasian landmass, and you're just left in the United States with the Western Hemisphere. That would not be a good outcome. It wouldn't have been a good outcome if Hitler had won World War II, which is why, of course, the United States ended up fighting Germany.

33:25So I think you can't change that. You can act in a way that makes the probability of China plus Russia plus Iran plus North Korea winning, or you can work to stop them winning. And I think the Trump administration is doing a better job of stopping them winning than its predecessor did. A Biden administration was really quite unsuccessful in checking the formation of this axis. Indeed, I would say that the axis didn't really exist in 2020, but it was fully in existence by the end of joe biden's term so whatever we hear when president trump is riffing as he was earlier today or whatever we read in his truth social account which shouldn't really be called that it should be called truthy social because kind of truthy in the way stephen kolber used to talk about truthiness is truthy social about half of what he says he kind of means and about half.

34:22He's just shooting the shit. If we shouldn't get too fixated on what Trump says, we should be much, much more focused on what the United States does. And what it does seems to me a pretty strong advertisement for American allies staying with America and not contemplating the possibility of joining those lovable guys, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Supreme Leader Khamenei, Kim Jong-un. I mean, is that the club we want to be associated with? Not me.

34:57Scott Galloway:We'll be right back.

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35:46Scott Galloway:We are going to play Truth or Daredevil. What? Oh boy. Fantastic. You guys go hard, man. Daredevil Born Again, official podcast Tuesdays. And stream season two of Marvel Television's Daredevil Born Again on Disney+.

36:16Scott Galloway:turning complexity into clarity, pressure into precision, and experience into advantage. Legal work isn't just about knowing the law. It's about applying it carefully, consistently, and under real stakes. Harvey is an AI platform built specifically for legal practice, helping teams analyze large volumes of documents, draft with precision, and collaborate securely across complex matters. It doesn't replace expertise, it strengthens it, making teams faster, more exacting, and more certain. Today, more than half of the AMLA 100 use Harvey as part of their workflow. Learn more at Harvey.ai.

37:03Scott Galloway:So let's talk about what America actually does, and let's use that as a bridge to talking about Ukraine. My sense is when I read the proposed peace plan that the U.S. outlined, to me, it sounded like just scheduling the next war. It sounded to me or what the president actually has done is given comfort to our enemy Russia while withdrawing. I would argue that NATO right now is a Ukrainian army. If NATO's mission is to repel an invasion of Europe by Russia, it is effectively the Ukrainian people are in the Ukrainian army is is in fact NATO. And it feels as if America has withdrawn a lot of at least vibe support from Ukraine.

37:38Scott Galloway:And then I would argue the EU has stepped up. You don't agree with that? Well, let's be clear. The European Union cannot, without American support, provide the assistance that Ukraine needs to survive. the war is uh dragging on towards its fifth year this is going to be harder and harder for ukraine to sustain uh there is a manpower problem at the front uh there's an air defense problem in the cities uh although the ukrainians have been heroic uh and also tremendously innovative in the drone warfare and technology, the Russians have more or less managed to keep pace with that so that the Ukrainians have an edge on quality, but the Russians have an edge on quantity.

38:33The Europeans, when American aid was first cut off back at the end of Biden's presidency, could not fill the gap. That was immediately obvious because the minute the American aid stopped, you'll remember that the house cut it off then ukraine started to lose the united states isn't supplying much aid since president trump was sworn in but it's still playing an important part in technology service to air missiles yeah it's it's important to recognize that if that went then the europeans would not be able to make up the difference europeans have handed a lot of weapons as well as money to Ukraine.

39:13They have not built an awful lot of weapons anew. The Danes are in especially weak positions because they've given pretty much all of their military hardware to Ukraine. They don't have actually much defense capability at all at this point. So until the Europeans do serious rearmament, and I especially mean until the Germans do serious rearmament, Ukraine needs the United States to remain engaged or it risks losing the war. I was down at the Ukrainian house earlier today. And there's a fantastic video. You must go and see it. An AI-generated video imagining Russian drone strikes on Paris, on Brussels, and brilliantly on Davos.

39:54And the Ukrainian point, which I wholly agree with, is that Europeans just find it really hard to believe what you said earlier, that Ukraine is, in fact, fighting for Europe. They just can't imagine that the Russians would ever do to their cities what the Russians are doing to all the major Ukrainian cities every night, to the point that Kiev, at this point, has almost no heating and electricity in really large parts of town. I mean, there are people I know whose apartments have no heat. In midwinter, and it's bitterly cold there. So I think we don't, and the Europeans as well, don't fully understand how fragile the situation is, how overstretched Ukraine is, how hard it is to sustain this war, and how desperately we need the war to stop.

40:45Peace, in the sense of the Russians all leave and Ukraine gets the Donbass back, maybe even the Crimea, this is a total fantasy. That is not how wars like this end. There are two scenarios. Scenario one, Ukraine loses. Finally, they just can't sustain defense anymore. morale crumbles. This is how these wars typically end. The line is very long. The Ukrainians don't have as many men. There's a scenario in which they lose. And the Russians, after all the slaughter of the past four years, are able to advance further into Ukraine. That can't be ruled out as a scenario. It's actually the most likely scenario in a historical framework.

41:26Or there's a compromise peace that stops the war and gives Ukraine some breathing space. That is the better outcome, obviously. There is no third possibility. There's no possibility where Ukraine wins.

41:40Scott Galloway:Oh, press pause. The third possibility, we arm them with Tomahawk missiles and the requisite infrastructure and technology to start taking out more of Russia's oil infrastructure, which results in a compromise peace, which isn't as onerous or as one-sided as the current envision compromise base. I think that greatly understates how strong the Russian war economy remains. So you don't think... Just let me finish, Scott. I'm sorry, go ahead, Neil. The Ukrainians already did take out most of the Russian oil refining capacity last year, and the Russians just kept shipping crude. I thought it was 13%.

42:14No, it got up to 40%. And higher, the Ukrainians actually don't need the tomahawks that much because their own deep strikes with drones are highly successful and have been incredibly effective, except that Russia's big and it has enormous capacity, particularly when it comes to exporting hydrocarbons. You blow up the refineries, they just then ship the crude. And the sanctions regime has failed doubly. It hasn't succeeded in stopping the Russians shipping crude in the so-called ghost fleet. And it also hasn't stopped the Europeans and others trading with Russia through third countries. I mean, European countries export a suspiciously large amount of stuff to Kazakhstan and Tatarstan and Kyrgyzstan.

42:58It all goes on to Russia. So under these circumstances, there isn't really a way in which the military balance can decisively be shifted against Russia. The Russians have been held, and it's been an incredibly impressive success. They've been held. They've barely advanced, despite casualties on a monthly level, that the US suffered in a year in Vietnam at the height of the war. They haven't gained much ground. In fact, somebody told me the other day, calculated that a snail would have got further in the direction of Pogrovsk than the Russians did last year. So that's pretty good. But I'm not sure there's much more that can be done with Ukraine's capability.

43:41I think greater economic pressure on Russia is still needed to get Putin to the negotiating table. But you also need a deal that he can take, that he can accept. We're talking here, Scott, about a compromise piece. That's the nature of the beast. And for that to happen, Putin is going to have to say, I achieved my victory. He's going to have to be able to sell something to his people to justify all the slaughter. I think that probably involves him abandoning his original goal, which was to take the whole of Ukraine and turn it into another Belarus. I think we've pretty much told him that's impossible.

44:19And we've also, I think, pretty much told him, you're not going to destroy NATO either. But I think we have to give him some territorial win to end this war. And that is why I think the 28-point plan, the original version, was not a bad starting point for negotiation in that the Russians were prepared to talk about it. And the fact that the Russians were prepared to talk about it so much so that they even claimed authorship of it meant that you were getting somewhere. This was why the involvement of Jared Kushner was so important. He is a highly skilled negotiator. Steve Witkoff on his own was not getting very far.

44:58Bring Jared in and you start getting results. We've seen that in the Middle East. I think we begin to see it with Ukraine. It's tough. But I don't think the Europeans have helped at all. In fact, what happened was that after that 28-point plan did the rounds, the Europeans said, no, no, no, this is far too good for Russia. We insist on changes. And they insisted on changes that, for example, left the Ukrainian army even bigger. And of course, the Russians said no. I mean, I can understand some of the American frustration.

45:27Scott Galloway:It wasn't the original 28-point plan. Doesn't it feel like it was written by Lavrov? It felt like a Russian peace plan. It wasn't written by Lavrov. It may have been written by another Russian or co-authored. It certainly wasn't written by American diplomats, but I think it's fair to say that it was agreed between Russians, Ukrainians, Witkoff, Kushner. I think that's what happened. The Ukrainians were actually ready because they desperately need a break. They need a ceasefire. And then the Europeans were the ones who said, no, no, no, we need to make it much, much tougher. And that killed the negotiation.

46:05That's an important point that is not, I think, widely understood. and I think I can speak with some authority on this. So we have to recognize that this piece won't be pretty. It will involve almost certainly territorial sessions. The language of that's important. In the original plan, it wasn't that the Russians acquired de jure ownership of Donbass. It was de facto. The language here matters a lot because if you can put it that way, then you haven't permanently ceded the land to Russia. it's a temporary state of affairs and it recognizes roughly where the line of contact is so i think this is the only way the war can end well it can end really badly if we hold out for the perfect peace that will satisfy the men in brussels and uh in berlin if we hold out for a really good peace we could end up with a ukrainian defeat and that that is a nightmare scenario for europe which is why i can't really understand the lack of realism here that this is a time when you have to get...

47:08Scott Galloway:So I just want to press pause because you have six more minutes and you've said a lot there. Just under the auspices of realism, you don't worry that if Putin is allowed to quote-unquote claim a victory here and not end this with something resembling a black eye, that all we're doing is scheduling with this peace the next war, that eventually it's the rest of Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Lithuania. Of course, if we did nothing after such a ceasefire or peace, then we only deserve another war. But if you get the breathing space, you can start the reconstruction of Ukraine. The Ukrainians are our military power.

47:38Scott Galloway:Who's going to invest in a Ukraine where we feel like Russia is just going to rearm and then invade again? I'll invest in Ukraine. They have the best defense technology companies in the world. We'll take their drones, but will anyone invest in the civilian infrastructure, thinking that Russia's just going to rearm and take the rest in another war in five or seven years? Have I been to South Korea? So South Korea is interesting because it's a complete heap of rubble in 1953. And it has a neighbor who is clearly as dangerous as neighbors get. And yet, here we are. So it's one of the... So you think the West and the US might be willing to participate in that type of 55th parallel or whatever it's called that would guarantee some sort of security such that people would be willing to invest and Ukraine would have some sense of autonomy and self-governance?

48:22Yes. And I've said from the outset, I've said it to President Zelensky, your best outcome is to be South Korea. Your worst outcome is to be South Vietnam. That is the nature of the relationship you have. The United States has supported you, but you need to lock in what you've got and then build it, rebuild it. And then you'll be able to show because on the other side of the line, there'll be continued Putinism, kleptocracy, criminality, poverty. And on the Western side, there'll be the European South Korea, which I think is not an unrealistic vision given the talent there is in Ukraine, given what they've shown themselves capable of, incredible courage, incredible innovative energy.

49:05I'm a passionate supporter of Ukraine's bid for freedom, passionate supporter. I do not want to see it fail because Europeans set too high a bar in these negotiations. I believe if you can get a breathing space, two things will happen. First, Ukraine can begin to rebuild. It now has a formidable army, the biggest in Europe, and it has shown itself to have formidable military technology. Now take that and scale it in Germany. If the Germans today, Friedrich Merz, are you listening? Did Operation Warp Speed for rearmament instead of what they are doing, which is going through the usual incredibly slow bureaucracy of procurement.

49:46If they just did, okay, Gigafactory in Brandenburg, we take Ukrainian drone designs, and we don't just do 3 million a year, we do 20 million a year. How about that, Putin? Now, if the Germans did that, and they could do it, they have the manufacturing infrastructure, they have the workforce, they have a crying need for it, since the days of selling automobiles to the Chinese are over, they did that, that would be a game changer, unlike Tomahawk missiles. Because if the Russians saw German rearmament really happening, that would be the clearest sign, A, that Putin had made a huge strategic blunder, B, that Ukraine had a future.

50:27So I think there are ways to solve this problem. They just require far more energy on the European side, far more commitment, and above all, something of what we still see in the United States, an ability when the chips are down to cut through the bureaucracy and do things really fast. So I just wish we could have sort of Elon Muskian rearmament, you know, the SpaceX approach. You could scale what the Ukrainians do. You know what's really tragic is they have fantastic technology. They cannot scale it. They don't, of course, have the space or the security. They're trying to build drones in a war zone under daily bombardment.

51:05If you did all that stuff at scale in Germany, A, you would create meaningful deterrence. B, this is the beauty of the thing. You'd actually see German economic recovery. And that's like a win-win if ever there was one.

51:19Scott Galloway:So I'm getting a bit of a red light here. So I just really crisply, you said something that really resonated. And my sense is there's this historic opportunity to defend a strait, replace, whatever the term, defeat the Islamic Republic. And I'm really hoping, I've never seen a greater case for greater ROI than limited, whatever you want to call it, strikes on civilian suppression centers and kind of tip over the regime, if you will. Regime alteration. That's what we have to hope is coming. It will transform the security of the Middle East. It will transform life for Iranians. And I believe it will be a huge contribution towards a peaceful end to Cold War II because it will signal that whatever Chinese project produced the relationships with Russia, Iran, and North Korea It was not a realistic geopolitical project.

52:13That's my hope.

52:14Scott Galloway:What do you think the chances are that the regime holds if there is an intervention, a coordinated intervention, say U.S. and Israel, whatever it might be, intelligence, limited strikes? What do you think is the likelihood that the regime survives without Western military intervention? Very high indeed, like 90 percent, because they've crushed the protests brutally. And the regime's repressive apparatus showed no sign of cracking. So if there's no intervention, that regime lasts. I mean, it's like the Soviets had a little bit of a revolt in 1962. They utterly crushed it. 1962 was pretty early in the Cold War.

52:47In fact, a dangerous time in the Cold War. So, no, we need to, if we want to get rid of the Islamic Republic, which has been a source of mischief and mayhem and murder since 1979, President Trump has to do what I think he is going to do.

53:02Scott Galloway:Yeah, your lips to his ears. And the most important thing we haven't covered, but we'll have to cover it quickly, Scotland's group draw in the World Cup, Neil. We're in with Morocco and Brazil. Is that right? I mean, come on. Anyways, Scotland, what are our chances, Neil? Henry Kissinger was a great football soccer fan. One of his great maxims was every success is an admission ticket to the next crisis. And after Scotland heroically won their qualifying game in one of the greatest football games I've ever watched. Got one of the best players in the world right now. It was a fantastic thing. I said to my sons, by the way, every success is admission ticket to the Knicks crisis.

53:41And then the draw came when they said, Dad, we know what you mean. So we got Haiti to beat. And otherwise, I think we just have to do damage limitation against Brazil and Morocco. Yeah, it's too bad. But, you know, I think it was a glorious, glorious, glorious game. We'll all remember Scott McTominay's goal as long as we live.

53:58Scott Galloway:That was one of the greatest matches in football history. And are you back in London? I spend quite a bit of my time in Oxford more than in London. and between Oxford and Stanford, I'm always just permanently jet-lagged, never bored. Yeah, it's a rough commute. It is. And just give me 30 seconds, and I talk about this a lot. I would say the difference between Europe and the U.S. is U.S. is still the best place to make money, Europe the best place to spend it, and the difference between the U.K. and the U.S. is you're the ones that stayed. The risk gene has been starched out of the U.K. gene pool, and it's been very damaging.

54:32Scott Galloway:How would you, as someone who's bi, not bi-coastal, but bi-country, how would you try to summarize the big difference between the UK and the US and what could the UK learn from it? I'm a dual citizen and I look at both and think a lot about this. I think if you take AI or quantum, take the cutting edge of technology, the UK is clearly a source of real talent. What's the problem? is not the lack of talent or entrepreneurship. It's the capital markets are utterly unfriendly to scaling a really dynamic company, which is why Demis Hassabis and Mustafa Saleman and others have all ended up in the United States because you have a brilliant company.

55:18I mean, DeepMind's the most important AI company in the end. It's a much more important, historically innovative company, but it's a British company that ended up being acquired by Google because there was no other way to scale it. So I don't think these are cultural problems. They're institutional problems. And you can see these as, in a sense, Britain reverting to its 1970s bad habits, which Margaret Thatcher temporarily cured Britain of. If you could bring Margaret Thatcher back to life and redo Thatcherism, then I think there would be a chance, at least, of revitalizing Britain's capital markets, which, you know, are potentially extraordinarily broad and deep.

55:59I mean, very liquid. But institutionally, the incentives are terrible. You know, the way like pension funds deploy capital in Britain would make you weep. So I think there are fixes here that the next, and I hope it will be a conservative government, can address. I want Kemi Badenoch to be Black Thatcher and to do all the things again that we, the hard way we had to do starting in 1979.

56:25Scott Galloway:Neil Ferguson, historian and public intellectual. I love having you on. I disagree with most of everything you say, Neil, and yet I learned so much. And you really do open my mind, and I'd like to think a lot of our listeners' minds, to you just have this unbelievable ability to thread history with economics and logic, even if you get to a place that kind of sends chills down my spine. I just love speaking to you. I really appreciate your time and appreciate how, quite frankly, unfiltered, you are. That's really refreshing. It would be so boring if we agreed about everything, but we agree about football.

56:59Scott Galloway:There we go. That's dialogue. All right. Thanks again, Neil. Good to see you. My pleasure.

57:23Scott Galloway:people never see. Practice made perfect is Harvey's belief in relentless refinement, in turning complexity into clarity, pressure into precision, and experience into advantage. Legal work isn't just about knowing the law, it's about applying it carefully, consistently, and under real stakes. Harvey is an AI platform built specifically for legal practice, helping teams analyze large volumes of documents, draft with precision, and collaborate securely across complex matters. It doesn't replace expertise, it strengthens it, making teams faster, more exacting, more certain. Today, more than half of the AMLA 100 use Harvey as part of their workflow.

57:57Scott Galloway:Learn more at Harvey.ai.

From the publisher

Live from Davos, Scott Galloway and historian Niall Ferguson examine why today’s geopolitical moment looks less like a “new world order” and more like a return to Cold War power politics.

They discuss Trump’s foreign policy tactics, China as the central global rival, the limits of alliance politics, and why Ukraine’s war may only end through a fragile and imperfect peace.
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