In short
How Y Combinator scaled after its first batch, what drove applicant growth, and the operational/community challenges of running YC—plus stories from demo day, office hours, and leadership transitions (including myths about firing Sam Altman).
Guests
Paul Graham, founder of Y Combinator; discussed YC’s growth, Hacker News, and YC’s internal practices. Carolyn (host, Paul’s wife) appears throughout, but the episode’s guest is Paul.
Key claims
- YC grew “organically” mainly because applicants and alumni told other founders; YC didn’t do deliberate marketing.
- Press mattered only insofar as it reached 22-year-old programmers; New York Times helped indirectly via parents (“tiger mom problem”).
- Hacker News was a major stress source (technical/community incidents).
- Visibility plus “wokeness” created intense negative press and “cancel mob” attacks.
- YC’s best work often involved helping failing startups with “inflection point” and “palliative care mode” office hours.
Notable examples
- Peter Thiel “part-time partner” Twitter mob (2015) and YC refusing to fire him for being openly Republican.
- Advice examples: Airbnb focusing on New York; “drive into an off a cliff” quote to SIFT Science.
- “Vertebrae” demo day pitching: five sentences as logical proof; practice to land lines.
- Myth-busting: Sam Altman wasn’t fired; YC and successors (Jeff then Gary) were chosen after Sam prioritized OpenAI.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOGrowth of Y Combinator
0:45 to 2:20
Paul shares insights on how Y Combinator grew organically without strategic marketing.
“and what happened once it had gotten airborne, what happened.”
Impact of Media and Community
2:20 to 4:11
The discussion covers the role of media and community in attracting applicants to Y Combinator.
“Do 22-year-old programmers know about you?”
Alumni Influence on Growth
4:11 to 6:03
Paul explains how alumni referrals contributed to the exponential growth of Y Combinator.
“There's this well-known thing that I got into.”
Challenges and Stressors of YC
6:03 to 8:00
The conversation turns to the challenges and stress Paul faced while running Y Combinator, including technical issues.
“And I remember also feeling like this was not an unfamiliar thing.”
The Role of Twitter and Early Speakers
8:00 to 10:00
They discuss the potential impact of Twitter on YC's growth and reminisce about notable speakers at their events.
“Who do you remember as some of your favorite speakers?”
Visibility and Cultural Shifts
10:00 to 12:05
The hosts reflect on how increased visibility of startups and cultural changes affected their experiences in Silicon Valley.
“When he said that, I didn't realize what he meant.”
Peter Thiel Controversy
12:05 to 14:00
They recount the controversy surrounding Peter Thiel's involvement with YC and the backlash it created.
“There was two things that happened, right?”
The Peter Thiel Controversy
14:00 to 17:31
Discussion on the backlash against Peter Thiel's political stance and its impact on Y Combinator.
“And we call these people part-time partners, right?”
Navigating Startup Challenges
17:32 to 20:35
Insights on the stress of managing startups and public perception during YC's growth.
“You know, the funny thing is, wokeness has now decreased so much.”
Transforming Startup Ideas
20:36 to 23:50
Exploration of how YC provides guidance to startup founders to refine their ideas.
“dealing with these really naughty problems, naughty, like K-N-O-T-T-Y, naughty, naughty, naughty.”
Show all 26 chapters
Crafting Effective Demo Day Pitches
23:51 to 28:00
Discussion on strategies for creating impactful Demo Day presentations for startups.
“Remember when you built the software that allowed startups to book office hours?”
Crafting Demo Day Presentations
28:00 to 29:41
Learn how Paul Graham guides startups in preparing their Demo Day presentations.
“Like you follow, if you agree with this step and this step and this step, they all follow from one and the other.”
The Value of YC Experience
29:41 to 31:15
Understand the significant learning experiences provided by Y Combinator.
“I was only in the green room during the breaks when the, when they were presenting, I would be out there taking notes.”
Inflection Point Office Hours
31:15 to 33:40
Explore the concept of inflection point office hours and their purpose.
“Do you remember that time dinner basically consisted of hot orange juice?”
Palliative Care for Startups
33:40 to 36:17
Discover the approach of offering support to startups in decline.
“If it seemed like they were doomed and they'd be better off just having jobs working for somebody else, we would have this thing we called palliative care mode where we would just be really nice to them.”
Reflections on Sam Altman's Journey
36:17 to 38:32
Delve into the early days and contributions of Sam Altman in Y Combinator.
“It probably set back hairstyles in Silicon Valley by 10 years.”
The Impact of Sam's Leadership
38:32 to 42:00
Examine the influence of Sam Altman on the future of Y Combinator.
“He was always around and he definitely was our go-to.”
The Impact of OpenAI on YC
42:00 to 44:30
Explore how OpenAI's growth affected Y Combinator and its leadership.
“I know you don't like us mentioning this.”
Transitioning YC Leadership
44:30 to 46:40
Discussion of the changes in leadership at Y Combinator and their implications.
“But the fact that you would even think you could start, you could even do this as a, you could be an AI thing as a nonprofit.”
Balancing Family and Career
46:40 to 49:10
Paul Graham shares his experience of balancing family life with professional demands.
“I think you found out that he works too hard.”
Surprising Trends in Startups
49:10 to 51:35
Discussion on the surprising trends in the startup ecosystem, particularly around young founders.
“It was well-suited to that, well-suited to having kids.”
The Role of AI in Startups
51:35 to 54:30
Insights on how AI is influencing startup ideas and business models.
“passing the Turing test all the time now.”
The Startup Landscape in America
54:30 to 56:01
Paul discusses his impressions of the evolving startup landscape during recent visits to America.
“All these companies were originally started to satisfy the founder's own needs.”
The Dilemma of Startups vs. Education
56:01 to 58:16
Discussion about whether young entrepreneurs should prioritize their startups or return to education.
“are you sure you wouldn't like to go back to college?”
The Resilience of Y Combinator
58:17 to 59:15
Exploration of Y Combinator's enduring strength and its comparison to Reddit's growth.
“Yeah, I was going to say, we're in trouble.”
Passion and Energy in Startup Advising
59:16 to 1:01:36
Paul discusses his enthusiasm for advising startups and the ideas they bring.
“And so everybody thought they had Reddit pigeonholed.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00Paul Graham:Carolyn, I'm really excited. It has taken a couple years, but we have Paul Graham back on the show for part two. Hi, Paul. Yay. Hey, Paul. Here I am. You'd think it would have been easier for me since I'm your wife, but here we are. The shoemaker's children. The shoemaker's children, exactly. Oh, I say that all the time. I say that all the time about YC, how shoeless, we're always shoeless. So we had a great conversation the last time, and we kind of had left off. We had talked a lot about the history of Y Combinator, and we talked a little bit about what you had been up to after Y Combinator, but we didn't get into the growth of Y Combinator and what happened once it had gotten airborne, what happened.
0:51Paul Graham:We had eight startups in that very first batch, and we always say we grew it organically, But let's talk about how we grew it. Well, we would just have an application deadline and people would apply and more and more people applied. We never did anything all that consciously to get more people to apply, right? I mean, we'd announced there was going to be an application deadline. We would do startup school every year. And I think that probably caused some people to apply. But other than that, we didn't have any sort of conscious effort at marketing. Oh, and I would write essays and people would read the essays and I would have this link.
1:31Entrusted in starting a startup, apply to Y Combinator, right? So that probably got more people to apply, but there was never any deliberate plan to grow it. We would just get more applications each time. How much overlap with Hacker News was there? Because I have to imagine, oh, I know for a fact, actually, that Hacker News was a huge source of applicants. Hacker News, I think I started it in like 2007. So for the first couple of years, it wasn't a factor.
1:58Paul Graham:Oh, OK. Yeah. And in fact, I think when we were first getting going, there was very little press. But then we were in The New York Times and that kind of got us out there. And, you know, honestly, the only kind of it for something like YC, what is something people don't realize? For something like YC, the only kind of out there that you care about is whether potential applicants know about you. Do 22-year-old programmers know about you? And so if you get an article about you in the New York Times and 22-year-old programmers aren't reading the New York Times, it might seem to you you've gotten a lot of publicity, but actually it didn't really help much.
2:39I think founders talk to – I think applicants would talk to one another. I think that was why we grew. Did that New York Times article have like a theme or a thesis other than just like, check out this new thing? Like, I don't, I don't, I probably read the article at some point, but I don't, I don't remember it. A hatchery for startups. Yeah, it was good, actually. It was, it described YC as this new phenomenon in the investment world, which at that point it was. So that was actually a pretty useful sort of good historical article.
3:11Paul Graham:And kudos to Jenny Aitli for getting it. No one else did. She claimed to understand early on what was going on. You were talking about how that's not the right demographic, right? Because you want 22-year-old programmers to know about YC. And we may talk about this a little bit later. But we also had the tiger mom problem, remember? Yeah. Adora actually was the first person to explain this, I think, to me in an articulate way. You also need the parents to know about it. And so maybe the Times article helped. And it's true that your parents would read the New York Times. Exactly. That was my point, yeah.
3:46You know, and in fact, early on, this is probably not true so much now because now startups are a more accepted thing to do. But back then in 2005, parents would freak out at the idea that their kids would leave school and like not get a job. It wouldn't seem like they were founders. It would merely seem like they were unemployed. And so once YC started to have a big brand, then the founders could say, look, mom, I'm not just working on my loser startup. I got into YC. There's this well-known thing that I got into. I think it helped a lot back in the day.
4:20Paul Graham:So what was the secret to our success then, in your opinion? I think we actually helped the startups a lot. And so they would tell one another. Like if we had sucked, it would be like, you know, your friends go to a restaurant, right? And if the food's really good, they tell you, hey, you should go to this restaurant. The food's really good. I think people who did YC would tell their friends, yeah, we did this thing. It was really good. They helped us a lot. They helped us get investment. Look how they incorporated our startup. They did all this like stuff for us. I think it was simply that it helped them a lot and they would tell their friends and then their friends would do it too.
5:01And then, you know, that's a recipe for exponential growth because then their friends do it. And then there's more people out there telling people that it helped them.
5:09Paul Graham:The alumni were critical, I think, in the growth of YC. Because young programmer types know one another. They went to school together. They hang out together, you know. So word spreads quickly. If you please that group, word spreads quickly. And back when we weren't space constrained, I mean, we used to have alumni come to the dinner sometimes, drop by, and they'd introduce the new startups to their investors. And it was just this really great community. Yeah. And sometimes become their customers. Along the way, I mean, there were so many ups. I mean, I wouldn't say there were dramatic ups and downs, but there were some crazy stories.
5:51Paul Graham:And Carolyn and I keep -
5:55We have forgotten. But I can remember feeling at the end of the day, Jesus, you couldn't make this shit up. And I remember also feeling like this was not an unfamiliar thing. Like stuff was – there was always disaster. Stuff was always breaking. You know? Like just Hacker News all the time. You forget. How many times did I have to run off and run to my office and deal with some disaster happening to Hacker News, right? That alone -
6:26Paul Graham:I hated Hacker News, I have to say. Me too. It was such an unbelievable source of stress. In retrospect, I think maybe that was a mistake. Maybe I shouldn't have done that because - Really? It really was more than half of the total stress of running YC. Oh. Oh, yeah. Well, wait, so do you mean technical, like technical dramatic things or community-based dramatic things? Or both? Both. Both. Yeah. Yeah, the community, yes. That actually - Experts running out of file space, you know, denial of service attacks, people getting into like terrible fights on the site. I mean, it was like, in retrospect, that was like a startup in itself.
7:11It was like I was running a startup at the same time as doing YC.
7:15Paul Graham:Do you think Twitter impacted our growth? Maybe. When did that come around? 2007? Something like that, yeah. I think it probably did a bit, yeah. People probably, because early on, especially all the users, you know, the users have gone through phases. In the beginning, it was like computer nerds, and then it was SJWs, and now it's like, you know, Trump supporters or bots pretending to be Trump supporters. They're hard to tell apart, right? And so that first phase, we forget now, but that first phase, it was pretty technical. Who were some of your favorite speakers? And I ask that because I remember the Twitter founders, all of them, you know, Ev Williams, Jack Dorsey, and Biz Stone, used to come to our dinners to be guest speakers.
8:01Paul Graham:And I used to love when they came. Who do you remember as some of your favorite speakers? You know, Zuck actually was a pretty good speaker because he was so young. He was so young when he started Facebook. He was probably still at that point, even though he was now famous, he was probably still younger than some of the founders in the batch. So they could really relate to him. I could sort of hear them all becoming more ambitious as they thought, okay, here's this guy. He's like, he's super famous and very rich, but he doesn't seem like he's a different species of animal from me. Like, well, I could, why can't I do what he did?
8:42You can sort of hear them all. And he was pretty candid. He was candid. Back in those early days, I mean, I hope this is still mostly true, but back in the early days, the speakers used to be completely candid. Nobody worried much about whether something they said would get out because even if it did get out, this was before cancel mobs were invented, right? What was going to happen? What was the first year? Do you guys remember the first time he came? The first time Zuck came? Yeah. Well, it was in California, obviously. It was pretty early on.
9:16Paul Graham:It must have been like 2007. Yeah. Seven or eight, I would think. Yeah, pretty early. I remember we met him at a restaurant in Palo Alto. Do you remember that, Paul? Well, this was before he had learned to imitate a normal person, right? Like early Zuck, you know, I mean, I don't know if Zuck publicly describes himself as being an Aspie, but he was doing a good imitation of it at any rate. And so he had this weird thing where if he didn't have anything to say, he wouldn't fill the gap with passing conversation. Yeah. He had no concept of small talk. If there wasn't anything he felt like saying at the moment, he would just go like this.
10:07and it was surprisingly disconcerting i didn't realize how important small talk was until i met the lack of it but he would just stare at you if there wasn't anything he's like i don't have any words i want to say why should i say words you know didn't ron set it up ron in fact warned me about this specifically he said all right you're gonna meet mark now i warn you there's gonna be some big gaps in the conversation, right? When he said that, I didn't realize what he meant. But then I felt it. I thought he's drawn imitation also. I just want to compliment you on that. I thought he said - It's kind of just like him.
10:43Yeah, I've got a lot of practice imitating Ron.
10:48Paul Graham:Zuck used to come and he would speak at our startup school events and that drew a lot of people. Yeah. He was a big draw. Startup world back then, people didn't care so much. Like outsiders didn't care so much about the startup world. This was before, like, you know, even now we think like if something big happens in the startup world, it's a news story. But why should it be? If something big happens in the hospitality industry or the mining industry, right? Or, you know, like the advertising industry, it's not automatically some kind of big story for everybody. It's only interesting to people who are in that industry, right?
11:26The trade press might write about it. And it was so weird to me when startups became something that the general public would be interested in. I mean, I understand why they're interested in the private lives of movie stars. Why would they be interested in the private lives of startup founders? But they started to be, and they still are. It's so weird. But back then, this was before they cared. This was before that phenomenon had started. And so we were just like our own little people working in the, you know, we were the computer club.
11:52Paul Graham:It was such happy times. And actually, it was still happy when they did start taking notice, but it became very unhappy once – I don't know when the turning point was. There was two things that happened, right? There was then – when the press started taking notice of Silicon Valley. And then almost at the same time, wokeness started, like in around 2012. Yes. And then, so they would be busting YC, you know, you'd have not YC, but just everybody in Silicon Valley, you felt like there was this mob, this incipient mob, ready to form at any moment, right? If you said or did the wrong thing, they would come and bust you and hound you.
12:36So that wasn't fun. That combination of being visible plus wokeness. I feel like if I look back on my history of YC, the thing that – not Hacker News, but what gave me the most heartburn in life was all the negative press around us and all the Twitter mobs that were based on lies. Yeah. Yeah.
13:00Paul Graham:We're all nervous laughter. Peter Thiel is secretly running the company. Oh, my gosh. Wait. Oh, are we – I think we have to tell that story, Peter Thiel's story. Sure. Sure. So Peter Thiel, oh my God. What year was this? What year was this? It was after Sam took over. But it was soon after Sam took over. Yes, it was. He was good friends with Peter Thiel. So 2015 or something. 2015. And he, didn't he say, hey, Peter, will you be a part-time partner? I put it in quotes because he like did one office hours or something. Okay. No, I'll tell you the whole story, right? Okay. So we had this thing. you probably still have something like it.
13:42We had this thing that I named mostly for alliterative purposes, part-time partners, which is people who weren't YC partners, but would come in and like for no money, they had no duties, they got paid nothing, they weren't really supposed to do anything, right? But experts in some aspect of the startup world would come in and they would do office hours with the startups, even though they weren't actual partners. And we call these people part-time partners, right? And we had them listed on the website. And so Peter Thiel at one point was a part-time partner. And I got into a fight on Twitter with somebody who I don't want to name because he's since apologized.
14:18I don't want to, I don't want to give him grief. But in the process of this fight, he was, he like picked up to, to, as if to throw at me like a brick, the fact that Peter Thiel was a part-time partner. And when were we going to get rid of Peter Thiel? Because Peter Thiel had committed what was in 2015 an unforgivable, like cancelable sin, which was to be openly Republican. And so there was this mob formed to try and force YC to fire Peter Thiel. And the story grew to the point where Peter Thiel was supposedly like not, I mean, part-time partners did nothing, right? Um, and the story was that Peter Thiel was like running YC, where, you know, he was like the head of the chairman of the board or something like that.
15:11Paul Graham:And like best friends with you, you'd met him once. Right. Yeah. The funny thing was, so, so there was the, all this mob telling YC we had to fire Peter Thiel. Right. Well, the funny thing was Peter Thiel, like in the previous year, had done like four office hours. And so Sam had been planning to fire him anyway. Fire in the sense of say, OK, you don't seem to be actually doing anything. Maybe we'll stop calling, stop listing you as a part-time partner. So Sam had been planning to fire him. And then there was this mob saying that we had to fire him for being a Republican. And so it seemed like it would be a really bad idea.
15:52What I told Sam about this was like, you do not want to be the one who sets a precedent in this sense. You do not want to be the company that like fires somebody for supporting the wrong one of two political parties. Right. You know, much as I just like Trump, you don't want to fire somebody for that. And so so Sam, even though he'd been planning to fire him, how now had to not fire him because that would have seemed like giving into the mob. Well, and to be clear, I think it was like, hey, Peter, come help some startups when you have time. And he literally didn't have time. He probably just didn't have time to do it.
16:26So I'm not even willing to say the guy was bad at being a part-time partner. I think he just was busy. So he wasn't coming around. So Sam was going to be like, hey, dude, this isn't working out. We're going to take you off the website. That was literally what it was going to be. and then it turned into this whole thing and it was like YC you have to fire this guy who's like like I said practically I think the the narrative was he's practically running YC well please like the guy was too busy to even be around it was so frustrating and by the way I and and I I um I'm happy to stand corrected if I'm wrong about this but like the whole partnership I I remember this day we were all sitting around that big table in 335 and everyone was like no this is like it It was emotional because we felt very attacked.
17:09And it's like, no way we're going to take them off the website just because these people are saying we have to. Like, that's messed up. Or more like the other way around. We're going to keep them on the website because they're telling us we have to take them off. Now that we're remembering what it felt like to have a cancel mob after us, and that probably happened 20 times, right? That was pretty stressful. You know, the funny thing is, wokeness has now decreased so much. I mean, on Twitter especially, but just in general, that people can't imagine the shit we went through. Like growing YC, like the years where we were really growing YC fast was also the exact same years that wokeness was really growing fast, right?
17:56And so, and you know why YC got so much shit? because we were the only like consumer brand in the venture business. You know, there's all these prestigious venture firms, but like ordinary people don't know their names. YC takes open applications from like essentially job applicants, people who are just graduating from college. So YC had to have like a consumer brand. We had to be known by everybody. We're not just like doing series A's, right? And so these people wanted to blame Silicon Valley. And since they were outsiders, they didn't know who the participants were. The only people they knew in Silicon Valley were YC.
18:33And so everything, like all the problems in the world were Silicon Valley's fault. The only person in Silicon Valley that they knew was me. So all the problems in the world were my fault. You know?
18:46Paul Graham:I know. Can you imagine? It's so unfair. So you remember how we started talking about this? Was it actually stressful? Yes. I'm thinking, you know, I bet we're forgetting something. It probably was pretty stressful because I remember feeling really beaten up all the time. And I'm trying – I think it was more stressful because of all of the attacks than the actual startup implosions. Actually doing the job was much less stress than being attacked for doing the job in the press, right? Exactly. There was still a lot of stress doing the job too. Yeah, yeah. There was a good deal of stress. Like, you know, there was a lot of fighting that we had to do behind the scenes on behalf of the startups because people were – people would maltreat the startups and then you have to go basically – it's like, you know, two kids have a fight and the parents go and talk to each other.
19:35If someone tried to maltreat the startups, we would have to go and talk to their investors and say, come on, this isn't right. They have to back off.
19:42Paul Graham:Paul did that all the time. Do you remember the Adgroks? Do you remember them? Well, Antonio wrote a book about this. This story will be preserved. because, yeah, they weren't a super, super successful startup. This is one of the weird things about YC. People imagine because the startups, because the famous successful startups like Airbnb and DoorDash and Coinbase are what become known later, they imagine that during the batch we were spending all our time talking to Airbnb and DoorDash and Coinbase. They said, no, actually, you know, Airbnb was probably in a batch of like 25 startups and they got one 25th of the time.
20:21At any given time, I was talking to some startup nobody's ever heard of now, right? And so the amount of trouble caused by startups is not remotely in proportion to how big they end up being. In fact, it's probably an inverse proportion. So you spend basically YC means you spend all of your time dealing with these really naughty problems, naughty, like K-N-O-T-T-Y, naughty, naughty, naughty. You spend all your time dealing with these contorted, miserable problems for companies that are never going to amount to much anyway. But it's the nature of the business.
20:56Paul Graham:I want to flip this conversation because I'm feeling very negative. I want to talk about so many of the positive things that happened. Do you remember giving any advice you gave to some of our most successful startups that really helped them? Do you remember? Airbnb. Airbnb, absolutely. They would have died without YC. I mean, they were dead when they showed up, though we didn't know it. But like telling them to focus on New York, like just focus on that one initial market because you need to get this ball rolling. You know, that ended up making all the difference for the company. And so that's the best case scenario when you can tell a startup something that makes them take off and then they become huge.
21:43That's the dream situation. That's not how it usually worked. Usually you would tell people something and they would ignore you and then they would fail. That was the usual situation. That was the median case.
21:58Paul Graham:What was that famous quote that you gave to some startup? You're like, thank God we fund, you know, 50 startups because you're driving into off a cliff right now. If you want to drive off a cliff, that's fine with me. I think they're actually doing pretty well still. Who'd you say that to? What was the company called? The founder's name was Brandon. And then I think he left. Oh, SIFT Science? No. Yeah, I think it was SIFT. Really? And I think they're quite successful. I didn't know you said that to them. Oh, gosh. That story was printed in a book, that book, The Launchpad. Yes. That will be preserved too.
Read the full transcript
22:38Paul Graham:Carolyn, were there any moments, this is a very naughty N-A-U-G-H-T-Y question, were there any emails that happened that Paul sent that you were like, oh, geez, oh, gosh? Well, probably, but no. Actually, I don't think I thought that. Like, oh, this is going to get us into legal trouble kind of emails. No, I never would say things that would go into legal troubles to make people mad. Yeah, just like, oh, that's really going to piss someone out. Oh, I'm sure that I was like, this is exactly like the harsh truth that this founder needs to hear. Like, I don't think I ever had the reaction like, oh, that's going to go over poorly.
23:20Okay, that's good. I think people sometimes just need sort of the unvarnished truth from someone who's like, look, this is what you need to hear. You know, I wanted them all to succeed. I wasn't going to be shooting them down.
23:31Paul Graham:Paul, no one worked harder than you. I swear, at helping startups who are failing. You would not give up on them. Other people would be like, whoa, just let that one go. And Paul would be like, no, I'm going to help them with a new idea. Or you would just work so hard. This time will be different. When did you start taking office hours? Remember when you built the software that allowed startups to book office hours? The booker. You built that, right? I wrote every bit of our software. Don't you realize, like, up until the point where I retired, I wrote every bit of our software except the JavaScript that did the up and down buttons on Hacker News, which PB wrote because I didn't know JavaScript.
24:18I wrote everything. If we had software, I wrote it. And I wrote every word on our website.
24:25Paul Graham:Yeah. Yeah. Our website was awesome. I loved our website. That's why my hair is white now. One of my memories of that era is how you would always – well, you would frequently help startups with their name. And I think – we might have talked about this in place. I still do that. No, no, no. I know. So my question for you is do you have a name you're particularly proud of where you're like, why don't you call yourselves this? And they're like, amazing. Imgix. I-M-G-I-X. Five letters. Carolyn has no idea who Imgix is. No, I do. I remember the name. What batch is it though? Oh God, I don't remember batches.
25:03Find, P-H-I-N-D. Oh, I remember that one.
25:06Paul Graham:I feel like if I had a dollar for every time you were at instant domain search with founders during an office hours. In the kitchen, right? Like right on your kitchen counter. Because you need them to stand around and look over your shoulder. So I do it right on the island in the kitchen. So many names, so many startups names have been found at that one corner of the island. So you're kind of famous for blowing up people's ideas, like taking their idea. In the good sense. In the good sense. In the good sense. Making them, here's how you can be the next Google. And you used to do this and some startups would take your advice, some others wouldn't.
25:44Paul Graham:Can you remember an instance of that? Because you'd come home and you'd be like, oh, wow, if you had been there, you wouldn't believe the idea we cooked up. Yeah. It's going to be the next Google. You know, I can't remember specific instances because I would do it so much. I mean, I would do it like maybe one third of the office hours I did. We would figure out how to make an idea much bigger. Yeah, it happened all the time and still does happen. Yeah. When I do office hours now, I still do that. And, you know, I see these startups right in the beginning of the batch sometimes. And so there's a lot of room to expand their idea.
26:23Paul Graham:I want to also talk about your, Matt, you know, you're really good at working. You were good at working with the startups on their demo day pitches. Tell the listeners about sort of what used to happen before demo day with the founders. I would write their demo day pitches. One of those little secrets. We would do this thing called vertebrae office hours where we would figure out what were the vertebrae of their Demo Day presentation. Because the thing about Demo Day is you're up there with 50 or now like 300 other startups. And so the investors are not going to remember anything about your presentation by the time they get to the end.
27:01They're brainily wiped clean. And so you really can only hope that they'll remember about five sentences worth of stuff in the very best case. And so you should decide in advance what those sentences will be. And those are the vertebrae of your Demo Day presentation. The rest is just filler, essentially. And so we would try and figure out what are the five sentences that everybody ought to remember about this startup that would cause someone to invest in them. There are five sentences with a specific purpose. So like, this is going to be a giant market. We are already solving the problem better than anybody else.
27:39It's ours to lose. And when we get there, there's network effects. And so that means it's winner takes all. Right? That's a pretty, you're already wanting to invest, don't you?
27:49Paul Graham:Yeah, sounds great. That's the thing. Demo day presentations shouldn't be like fast talking marketing speak. They should be almost like logical proofs of why this company is good to invest in. Like you follow, if you agree with this step and this step and this step, they all follow from one and the other. And the end result is the expected value is really high. That's a good demo day presentation. But I feel like you did more than just vertebrae. You would spend hours and hours and hours at YC and people would just come in. I would do the vertebrae with them and sit down and think, okay, this is what the core of your presentation should be.
28:30And then they would go off and make something that said what I said to say. And then I would sit there and they would practice before demo day. They would come to YC and take turns standing there projecting their slides and talking. And I would sit there in the audience, essentially, almost like a playwright saying, no, no, cut that. Right? Say that. that.
28:52Paul Graham:You were like a playwright. You'd be like, no, say this. Don't use that word. Say this. It was so, such specific information. Blow that part down. We were always trying to get people to talk slower. Oh gosh. Yes. Yeah. See, you remember. I can remember. Wasn't there somebody who wrote talk slower on their shoes so that when they looked down, it was like talk on one shoe and slower on the other or something like that. I think online, I think there's a recording of me sitting, talking to Brian Armstrong about his Demo Day presentation. I think that might be online on YouTube. Oh, that's pretty cool.
29:32Paul Graham:And then I think you'd sit, you'd be like a nervous parent sitting in the green room at Demo Day the whole time. No, no, no, I didn't sit in the green room. I was only in the green room during the breaks when the, when they were presenting, I would be out there taking notes. Um, and I would be wondering like, will they get this part right? Right. Cause I knew what was coming in all of their presentations, you know, I mean, there may be a few who didn't come into practice at YC. And so I wouldn't know what they were going to say, but 90 % of the time I knew what, what they were going to say. And what I was hoping, will they get this line right?
30:08Will it land? Yeah, will it land? And so I'd be sitting there over on the side, watching every presentation, seeing if it landed. There was a lot of stuff in retrospect. Yeah. Right? In addition to being attacked constantly in the press, there was all this actual stuff we were doing.
30:25Paul Graham:I used to say, and I've believed this, that even if your startup failed, I truly believe that anyone who came out of the YC program felt like it was a great experience and valuable for them. Well, you had to learn a lot. If you were even awake, you couldn't avoid learning a lot from the experience of trying to build something and get it in front of users and figure out how to make it grow and how to explain it to investors. And then we would do a post-batch survey. And I remember you saying, if all they complain about is the food on Tuesday nights, We're doing it right. Yes. We were always happy when they complained about the food because that meant there was nothing more substantial to complain about.
31:09So we were delighted. I mean, the food wasn't a deliberate canary in the coal mine, but it ended up effectively serving that purpose. I think the food's better now, though.
31:19Paul Graham:Yeah, it's all different now. Do you remember that time dinner basically consisted of hot orange juice? I knew you were going to say the chickpeas with the orange juice. well someone at one point we had this cook who was like adventurous in a bad way um and made this sort of orange flavored chickpea dish but the founders the founders took out all the solid bits of the stew and all that was left was this sort of hot orange cheese with a few it was orange chicken orange chicken carolyn which seems a little bit more normal and then the veggie the veggie option was same sauce orange chickpeas and the chickpeas were disgusting oh no i feel like paul you you you absolutely were like we've got something's broken here we've got to change there the complaints about the food are legit this time and we actually need to change something yeah no i mean the complaints about the food often were legit oh yeah yeah well you know this is um the The other thing that YC I think still does, but you guys did a lot, was inflection point office hours.
32:26So not just these vertebrae office hours, but inflection point office hours. And I'm sure there's some stories from those. I got to sit in on one of them, and it was really interesting. Well, inflection point was sort of an optimistic name for what was going to happen, right? This is when a startup is currently on a trajectory that will crash into the ground. and we're hoping. And inflection point is when a line bends in another direction, right? And so this is when the line's going down and we hope it's going to start going up. So inflection point office hours is when a startup was in terrible shape.
32:58We would get them together with like multiple partners and we'd sit there and figure out how do we save this thing?
33:04Paul Graham:But I'm going to interject in terrible shape, but had promising founders. Yes. Right. Because if they didn't seem like they had any hope, Should we talk about palliative care? I was just thinking, should we actually talk about this? Maybe it's time. Maybe it's okay. Okay. Because it was our thing. The new partners don't use this expression. Yeah. Do you know about this, Carolyn? Palliative care mode? Of course. Okay, okay. So if a startup was doing really badly and it seemed like they had hope, then we would bring them in and we'd say, all right, come on, let's figure out how to change things to make this startup succeed.
33:41If it seemed like they were doomed and they'd be better off just having jobs working for somebody else, we would have this thing we called palliative care mode where we would just be really nice to them. So at least as their startup was dying, they would be cheerful and happy about it. So no tough love. Just love. Yeah. No tough love. No. Yeah. We would do tough love if we thought it might work. Right. That's what I'm saying. Like you wouldn't bother with tough love for the palliative care startups. You just give them like gentle care. You just be really, really nice to them.
34:16Paul Graham:And gentle care. And so we knew. We knew which companies we hoped we could turn around and which ones we thought were doomed. And we were just going to be real nice to them. I love that you brought up inflection point office hours. That was such a fun thing that we did. I know. What else, Carolyn? What else do you remember? Well, I remember we all went to lunch. we probably had partnered lunch and we came back and we had inflection point office hours with adora and she probably talked all about i mean i know she already talked about her whole home joy journey on when we talked to her um but then there was a second one and i'm afraid i don't remember the name of that startup but when the founder walked in we had a 15 minute conversation first because you told him he looked like um a roman emperor i think you told him he looked like nero so we had this random tangent where we all talked about roman that's not the emperor you want to look like?
35:07Well, I think that's why it was somewhat controversial. And we're all like chuckling and the guy and the founder was chuckling. Then we're all started like Googling Roman emperors. And anyway, that was, I don't even remember the startup or how things turned out, but. Do you remember the meme that I only like to found, I only like to fund founders who look like Zuck? I do remember that meme.
35:28Paul Graham:I do remember that meme. That persisted for years in the press. I wouldn't be surprised if it's still out there. All because we once met this, because now you know me. I see something. If there's something unusual about their face, I notice it and even say something. And so we were once interviewing this guy who looked very much like Zuck, right? And we even funded him too. We did fund him. And then the company, I don't think they even made it to the end of YC. No. They had some co-founder dispute. Yeah. Wow. And so I, like a reporter said, there was a reporter like embedded in the batch, that batch, I think.
36:08And he asked like, can you be fooled by anyone? Well, and I jokingly, self-deprecatingly said, apparently I can be fooled by people who look like Zuck. And man, like for like five years afterwards, I was only funding founders who look like Zuck. It probably set back hairstyles in Silicon Valley by 10 years.
36:26Paul Graham:Do you also remember when someone asked you about like, what advice would you give? I'm bringing these foreign, I forget where they're from, founders over. What advice would you give to them? I said, like, make sure they speak fluent English, right? Honestly, that's the most important thing you could do. That persisted for years, like that you discriminated against anyone with an accent. Which the answer to that is, come to a demo day. Tell us if we actually discriminate against people with accents. Oh, my word. Oh, my God, yeah. And back to the demo day thing. Do you remember you used to work with people at demo day who had such thick accents that it was hard to understand them?
37:12Paul Graham:There was one founder. There was one founder that I eventually got to memorize her speech phonetically. like ABBA, the group ABBA used to do. You know how ABBA's original, their early songs sound like they're not native speakers, like they don't know the meanings of the words they're saying? That's because they didn't know the meanings of the words they were saying. They were just singing it as sounds. And there was one founder whose accent was so strong that she had to memorize her Demo Day presentation phonetically. It's amazing. I want to talk a little bit about Sam Altman too, today. Okay.
37:49As long as we're talking about famous lies everyone tells about YC, let's talk about the lie that we fired Sam.
37:56Paul Graham:Oh, we're going to do some myth busting. Well, let's first reminisce about Sam because Sam's like part of our history, you know, the whole time. And actually, Carolyn wouldn't be sitting there if it weren't for Sam because Carolyn was Sam's lawyer. That's right. That was how we met you. He wasn't seen me. He was Sam's lawyer because Sam was like the first startup that was so successful. He actually had a lawyer. That's right. So Sam, we had known for years and Sam was always in the picture, even when he was working on Looped. He would still come to dinner. He was always around. He was always around and he definitely was our go-to.
38:38Paul Graham:Like you need fundraising advice, go talk to Sam. Yeah. He was the best. Even then, I mean, now, my God, he's the God of fundraising. But even early on, he was like among the best fundraisers in Silicon Valley. Tell me what your opinion of him was in the very early days, in the first batch. Well, Sam, some people that YC has funded, I gradually realized were a big deal. With Sam, it was instant. Like Sam, like in the first minute of talking to him, I can remember thinking. I can remember what I thought at that time. I thought, okay, this must be what Bill Gates was like when he was 19 because Sam was 19 then.
39:20And I had always wondered, like Bill Gates ended up starting Microsoft when he was 19. What could he have been like? Because I certainly was not in a position to start Microsoft when I was 19. And then I met Sam and I'm like, okay, this is what one of these 19-year-olds is like, right? Um, he seemed, he seemed like he was 40, you know, just like this look 19. And so even that batch, like he was, he was the big dog, you know, he was the one who got Sequoia to invest in him. He was the one who raised serious money. Um, already he sort of acted like he was, if that, if that had been a high school class, he would have been the class president, you know, that's sort of what it was like.
40:04even during the batch. And then after that, he was always around, you know, we would go and visit, we'd go and visit looped and, or he would be around YC and then he became available. You know, he's like, I think he got bought, he got bought and he had to go and work for the acquirer for some time, but then, then he was free. Um, and so Sam being available at the same time, um, I was thinking of retiring. I thought the obvious choice, um, get Sam. And I was, right about one thing. I thought to myself, Sam gets whatever he wants in life. If the only way he can succeed is by making Y Combinator succeed, then Y Combinator cannot fail.
40:45And so it's not like I considered lots of options for who to be president, right? Like Sam was obviously it. And I even spent a year convincing him because at first he didn't want to do it. And the mistake that I made, the mistake that I made was that if Y Combinator is the only way Sam can succeed, right? Because he has gotten what he wanted. But what I didn't, what I should have said when I hired him or when I got him to replace me, what I should have said, by the way, I want you to take over YC. And also you could only do YC. You're not allowed to work on anything else. Well, he might have said no if you had phrased it that way.
41:25No, no. I think you would have taken it. I think at that point, because at that point, he didn't know what the other things he wanted to work on were. All these other schemes he cooked up were after taking over YC, right? So at that point, it was just like, and there's lots of room to become giant by taking over YC.
41:40Paul Graham:And some of his schemes were YC schemes. Carolyn's familiar with this. Yes. The basic universal basic income thing or rebuilding cities. There were all these side projects. Yeah. Yeah. One of which was OpenAI. OpenAI, right. I know you don't like us mentioning this. Oh, no, I don't mind that. It makes me sad because my heart's at YC. And I totally get Sam. And I totally get why he got distracted by other things he wanted to do. He was young and he had like a million ideas. And some of them are amazing. AI is actually a huge deal. It's a huge deal. Like who are we to sit here as armchair quarterbacking this piece of it?
42:32Like I'm, I'm glad, but I also, you know, it, at the time it made me sad. Okay. I'm going to circle back to the shoemakers, children, never having shoes. It does. It always feels that like the little bit, but it felt like that a lot at the time because Sam was so distracted by these other things that really, really interested him that it felt like we were like the barefoot child that didn't get very much love. That's how it felt, honestly. No, no, I know, I know, right? And like the myth, the myth out there is that like we fired Sam, right, from YC, right? And really all like if Sam had said, okay, this AI thing, I'll get somebody else to do this so I can focus entirely on YC, we would have been psyched.
43:18We would have He did pick. He picked OpenAI.
43:22Paul Graham:The truth was, also, he never thought the OpenAI thing would grow to the point where it was. And all of a sudden - You know how you can tell he never knew how big it was going to be? That he started it as a nonprofit. I mean, what a disaster that has been for him. I think there's people out there who think like Sam was pulling a fast one by starting it as a nonprofit. My God, his life would have been so much easier if he started as a for-profit company. And it's not like he needed it to be a nonprofit to get the money, Sam was the world's best fundraiser. Sam could easily have raised enough money to do it as a for-profit thing.
43:56It just, you know what it was, and this is actually quite revealing. Nobody knew then, because this was like 2015 or something when he started OpenAI, right? Nobody knew then that it would be worth spending so much on AI. Isn't that interesting? This was before there was anything that you could do with a million GPs, right? Now AI is so valuable, it's worth spending a vast amount of money on it. And therefore you have to raise more than you could possibly ever raise as a nonprofit. But the fact that you would even think you could start, you could even do this as a, you could be an AI thing as a nonprofit.
44:36It just shows you how small it seemed back then. You could fund it with donations, right? Ridiculous.
44:44Paul Graham:So OpenAI was getting bigger than he had imagined. YC was getting a little bit neglected. Press release goes out saying OpenAI is now a for-profit company and Sam's the CEO. And I remember thinking, okay, now we need to just have a heart-to-heart with Sam. And we had a heart-to-heart with Sam. We said, can't do both. We totally get that you want to work on AI. Do you agree that we need to find a successor? I remember saying that. And he was very fine about it. He said, I totally agree. And we worked on that. And we found Jeff, who was a partner at YC. And we both liked Jeff. Jeff was sort of the obvious choice, right?
45:27Because Jeff was already a YC partner. He was sort of established and legitimate and serious, you know. And he was the obvious person to take over then. But then he only did it for three years. and do you remember how bummed we were when he told us he wanted to quit like like we thought what you've only been doing it for three years right but i guess i mean he's older than me he wanted to retire yeah but then it turned out we could get gary and we never realized that was even possible but right because he was running initialized yeah gary like had one one i mean Jeff couldn't help this, but he had not done YC.
46:10And really, I think it's good if the president of YC has done YC, right? So they know what it feels like to be the founders, you know, trying to raise money or get growth or have Demo Day coming up. So Gary had done YC and was like popular with LPs. Like he was a known quantity to the LPs who trusted him because he made so much money for them and initialized. And he was like young and energetic, ready to spend too much time working on YC. I think you found out that he works too hard. So now, like, I don't know about you guys, but like, I feel like this is the best I've ever felt about YC. It used to be for like 10 years there, there was always some worry in the back of my mind, you know, some nagging worry and now it feels like don't you remember we had a we had an off we had a like board meeting and we were like wait a minute there didn't seem to be anything wrong you know that was so novel oh my god we have shoes yes we finally have shoes the shoemaker's children
47:14Paul Graham:finally got some shoes right paul carolyn you probably don't know this but earlier today paul tweeted that he was going going on the show and did anyone have any questions for him oh my God, how fun. I wonder if I should look at a couple. What do you guys think? Definitely. Can't hurt. We know that Twitter reply threads are full of fabulously valuable insights. Maybe there's some good questions in there. Okay. Well, there are 149 responses. So I'm going to just read a couple, Paul, and you can sort of choose. I'll read. Okay. One said, can you talk about how you balanced your desire to have a family and kids with the demands of your professional pursuits.
47:56Well, that was one of the reasons I retired in 2014 because we had had a second child, right? In 2012. And I was worried. I gave, I gave our first child a huge amount of attention and I was worried I wouldn't be able to do the same for the second one, right? Now that there were two, how was I going to do this? I didn't realize that you can't give your second child a lot of attention because anything you do with the second child, the first one wants to come along as well. So I was sort of, I didn't get that then yet. But I did want to make sure I could spend a lot of time. And it's funny, you know, when people get fired, they always say like, now they want to spend more time with their family.
48:35But that really was a big part of the motivation. I wanted to spend time with family, but I also just wanted to work on other things, you know, and that was the trouble with YC. If you're a YC partner, you can have side projects, But if you're president, it's like it takes up all your time and more. So the way I would combine it. But, you know, the thing is, YC was never 9 to 5. You didn't, like, go to this office and stay there all day long and then come home and, like, kiss your kids and then they go to bed. Right? And so I was often at home. I was often at home, like, hanging out, playing with the kids.
49:10It was well-suited to that, well-suited to having kids. And I want it to continue to be well-suited. for having kids, right? This is something like running a startup is not super compatible with having kids. I mean, people do it, but boy, they don't fit together nicely. I would like it if being a YC partner did fit together nicely with having kids. Yeah. All right. What else you got on that Twitter thread?
49:35Paul Graham:Okay. Here's a good one. How do you keep a sane mind in the crazy world we live in? Keep writing smart essays and stay relevant with my skills at the same time. How do I keep a sane mind? Well, it's important to be married to someone sane. Yeah. I mean, it sounds like a strange compliment to describe someone as sane, but the older you are, the more you realize that's actually a fairly unique quality, right? And so if you're married to someone, And as long as you don't both freak out at the same time, then there's always someone to calm the other one down, right? That's the advantage. So I recommend to everyone, marry someone sane.
50:27Paul Graham:Here's a good one. I'd love to know what you've been surprised about in the last few years that goes against your essays. You've spoken about vibe coding being surprising, for example. Yeah. Yeah. Well, everyone is surprised at the rate of progress in AI. I didn't think this would be happening in my lifetime. It didn't look in 2010 like we would have. I mean, it's, you know, we've gotten to the point where you have to go back and read the definition of the Turing test. We're that close. So, I mean, we have stuff that seems to me, maybe you'd have to really try hard to make it fail the Turing test.
51:05You know, at any given time, it's pretty much passing the Turing test with me. In fact, the weird thing is how normal this now seems. Because when I was a kid, I was like very interested in AI. And I would dream about this future where you'd have this computer that would pass the Turing test, you'd talk to it, it would be like talking to a person. And now you ask ChatGPT some boring question, it gives you the answer. And it's like, okay, it's so weird how we can adjust to everything. It just seems like not a big deal that we're like passing the Turing test all the time now. Has there been anything else that falsified?
51:41Well, I'm shocked at how young founders are. I don't like this trend at all. I don't like this weird thing where they like want to go start a startup instead of going to college. I don't like that at all. So when you say young, in this case, you mean like - 18. Yeah, like 17, 18 versus 22, 23. That's what you mean by young. Right. Like, I mean, Sam dropped out after two years, right? So Sam was 19 when he started the startup. Big difference between that and like not even going to college. So that's a bit shocking. I sort of wish I could put the brakes on that one. Maybe I can. Maybe I can. I'm thinking of writing an essay called Go to College that explains why it's a good idea to go to college.
52:24so what else has surprised me ai the youth of founders i'm surprised at valuations like demo day valuations are like 60 million dollars now right oh my gosh i don't think they're that high but yeah probably they are they are i've heard of multiple startups raising money at a 60 cap um that's 20 times the value the post money valuation of airbnb 20 times yeah Yeah. There's just so much money now. It's a demo day.
52:56Paul Graham:This is a related question. Which of your previous startup advice is different, if any, given AI? It hasn't changed things super much yet. I mean, it might get to the point where starting a startup is structurally different. At the moment, the main effect AI has had is it's a source of startup ideas. It's a source of things that founders work on. They work on some AI version of some product for some market, right? Or AI is the thing that gives them enough leverage to displace the incumbent. The world has changed enough because of AI. We haven't gotten to the point yet where you can't start certain startups or you can't start startups because as soon as you start them, the model companies set some AI founders to duplicate what you're doing.
53:45What were those German guys who would copy startups in the hope that you would buy them?
53:49Paul Graham:Oh, the Samwar brothers? Samwars, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, you know, now we have to worry about the Sams instead of the Samwars. Um, like, ha ha ha. Will, you know, the model companies start, like, sending out armies of, armies of AIs to, like, copy your startup? One day, maybe. One day, you know, that would be worrying. I sort of wonder what YC's model would be in that world. But here's something encouraging. You know what the best source of startup ideas is, your own needs, right? Think about it. This was Facebook, Google, Airbnb. All these companies were originally started to satisfy the founder's own needs.
54:43AIs don't have any needs. the AIs aren't like desperate to pay the rent in their apartment and there's this conference and they think okay let's rent out some airbeds on our floor right that's right AIs aren't desperate to know like what the other kids in their year at Harvard are up to so maybe maybe however good AI gets at being intelligent it won't replace all the human founders because it doesn't have the needs that lead to startup ideas. Isn't that interesting?
55:14Paul Graham:I have a question. Obviously, we live in England. We went back to America for a few weeks this summer in August, for the month of August, basically. What was your impression of the startup world? Well, every time we go back, there's more AI. A larger percentage of the companies are doing some AI idea and they're using AI to write a larger percentage of their code. And OpenAI is bigger. Every time we go back, it's like the same but more. The big surprise was something I already mentioned, how many super young founders there are. It seemed like I was constantly doing office hours that began with 15 minutes of, are you sure you wouldn't like to go back to college?
56:04It's funny. People imagine YC is determined to force all these people to do startups so we can make money out of them. And here I am constantly trying to talk them into ditching the startup and going back to school. What do they answer you when you say, please go back to college, you should go back? Are they just like, no, the time is now? Because that's what I'm imagining. No, it varies. It varies from one extreme to the other. There's sometimes people who are like, no, this is what I'm going to work on. Like that 16-year-old guy, Raghav, right? And he was probably right. Yeah. He was a very unusual guy.
56:42He was just meant to do this. You could see. And then there would be other people I'd talk to and they were like, yeah, we were sort of wondering if we should go back to school.
56:51Paul Graham:I think none of them will go back to school unless their startup fails, Paul. I hate – I thought that all the time. I'm like talking to our older son being like – Some of them should. He's trying to convince them to go back to school and they're not going to. Some of them should. And I wish the ones who should would. There are people working on this B2B thing where you have to, I mean, B2B, you have to be older, right? You have to be able to like sound, seem convincing. There are these women starting this startup who are 18 and like, they looked like they were 18. You know, they're going to have a hard time walking in trying to convince some CIO to purchase their, you know, purchase seat licenses for their thing.
57:29Whereas if they just did the same idea in a couple of years when they could seem older and more convincing, they could do the same thing and it would work better. Unless someone else does it. Yeah.
57:44Paul Graham:Yeah. That's always the risk. Other people are always doing it. That's true. They could work on it in the meantime. They just don't have to try and be a company. And there's other ideas. People say, sometimes, I'll tell you, sometimes people would say, oh, I feel like if I don't do it now, it'll be too late. like the AI revolution is happening now. And I said, you know what? People said that two years ago. Were they right? Is it too late now? They'd say, well, no, it's never too late. You know, if it ever is too late because of the AI revolution, if it's really too late to ever start any kind of startup, like we're all screwed.
58:20Think what that would have fun. Yeah, I was going to say, we're in trouble. You better get like a bunch of freeze dried food and a shotgun in a bunker somewhere. nervous laughter.
58:31Paul Graham:And we cannot end on that. You know how I feel about ending on a like really freaky note. How should we end C. Levy? How should we end on this? How should we end? We could talk about how fabulous YC is now. One reason it's interesting to talk about how well YC is doing is because YC is sort of like Reddit in the sense that You know, Reddit had a long period where it wasn't really progressing because the founder, because like Steve wasn't even there. Right. But it was such a powerful model that it didn't die. It kept growing anyway. And YC was kind of like that. There was like long periods where no one was paying that much attention to running it.
59:13Right. And because it was so fundamentally strong, it survived. And so everybody thought they had Reddit pigeonholed. You know, they thought, OK, it's like sort of a big deal, but not really. It's like a small sovereign state like Luxembourg or something in the sovereign state. But almost doesn't matter. Boy, all the Luxembourgers are going to be mad at me.
59:34Paul Graham:Catching strays. All 300 ,000 of them. We make it back to California and you in the kitchen all day long are having office hours with startups, much to my dismay when I'm trying to make lunch for the kids. Or when they see how messy our house is. Let's not tell our listeners about that. That's my little secret. It's my secret. Yes. So we come back. What makes you – because you have this infinite amount of enthusiasm and energy when it comes to advising startups. What do you get excited about when we come back and you re-engage with Y Combinator? Well, the reason I have so much energy is not because I'm benevolent and I have infinite desire to help them.
1:00:22I mean, I want to help them. But the thing that really makes me energetic is that I'm interested in their ideas. It's like imagine if you were into puzzles of some kind and people came and supplied you with a constant stream of new puzzles, right? That's what it's like. They're like, here's what we're working on. How can we get users? What could this idea be? They don't usually ask me that. I just tell them. And so that's why I have so much energy. That's why I always liked working on YC. That's the part I like. I don't like arguing with people who are trying to maltreat the startups.
1:01:01Paul Graham:That's Gary's job now. Yeah, yeah. Poor Gary. only someone who's done it knows what it's like. But I love, I don't think I would ever get bored of talking to founders about their ideas. Yeah. And YC, it's so energizing. YC's doing so well. It's really fun. And there's a sort of, a lot of startup mojo floating around YC that's not all that common in the English countryside. Exactly. It seems excitingly exotic. Well, I think this was a really fun conversation. We did some reminiscing, some predictions, some myth busting. There's something in it for everyone. Thank you for coming on again. It's always fun to talk to you.
1:01:53Paul Graham:Like you do every day. Yeah. I was going to say, I'll see you downstairs for supper. What are you cooking me? What do you want? Orange chicken. He's making you chicken. Orange juice chicken. Never. What do you want me to make? I would like something very healthy. Carolyn, I know this is probably way too much detail for you, but we have parsnips from our garden. Nice. And leeks from our garden. Oh, that's great. And so I was sort of thinking you could make something with parsnips and leeks. Yeah, sure. So let's get going. Okay. Sign off so you can get cooking. Bye, Carolyn. Bye, guys. Bye. Bye.
From the publisher
Paul Graham is back in the latest episode of The Social Radars. This time we focus on what was going on behind the scenes at Y Combinator back in the early years. If you really want to understand what YC is like and what made it that way, this is the episode for you.
