The Spy Who Outplayed Nixon | The Rise of China’s Intelligence Machine | 4

0:00Audible subscribers can listen to all episodes of The Spy Who ad-free right now. Join Audible today by downloading the Audible app. I'm James Bond novelist Charlie Higson, and this is The Spy Who, an Audible original. Hiding in plain sight, Chinese super spy Larry Chin infiltrated the very heart of US intelligence for 37 years. His breach would set in motion China's meteoric rise to global power and shape the course of geopolitics today. But this wasn't just one spy. It marked the beginning of something much larger, the explosive expansion of China's intelligence machine. A machine that would embed itself far beyond the shadows of the Cold War.

0:53In today's episode, we're going to pull back the curtain on decades of espionage. And for this, I'm joined by investigative journalist Bethany Allen. Bethany has spent 10 years exposing the world of Chinese intelligence, and what she's uncovered will make you rethink how power moves through the world. Today, we're going deep. The history, the tradecraft, and what Beijing's spy game actually looks like right now.

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2:42No purchase necessary for legal residents of the 50 U.S. states in D.C., Puerto Rico, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Spain who are 21 and older. Sweepstakes end July 19, 2026. Void where prohibited. Prize awarded if a corner kick goal is scored. For entry details and official rules, visit oneverycorner.com. Welcome, Bethany. Thank you so much for joining me. Can we just start with your own experiences? Because you've had your own run-in with the Chinese government, haven't you? Can you tell us about that? Sure. So I've worked on China-related issues for almost 20 years, about 12 of those as a journalist.

3:16In 2018, I was hired by Agence France-Presse to be their China correspondent. I waited six months for a journalist visa and then heard informally or unofficially, but officially, via China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that I would not be granted a journalist visa. And to quote them, they said to AFP, if you want to hire for this position, put forward a different name. So I was not permitted to return to China, very specifically because of something related to the work that I had been doing. Right. So you say return to China. You had been in China before. Yes. I lived there for a total of four years from 2008 to 2012 and then with some other shorter stints here and there.

4:01And what sort of work were you doing in China at that time? During those years, two of the years, I was studying Chinese full time at Peking University and then also attending the Hopkins Nanjing Center, which is a graduate level program that's co-hosted by Nanjing University and Johns Hopkins in Nanjing. And I was studying Chinese politics and society. And then the other two years, I was working at a university. So what had you done that triggered the Chinese to ban your visa? Yeah, well, you know, if the Chinese government were the kind of government that was transparent about that, then we would be dealing with an entirely different kind of government.

4:35However, I have a good guess because I was able to get visas to China in 2015 and 2016. So between 2016 and 2018, I did something that got me on some list somewhere. And presumably, you know, the main thing I did during those two years was I wrote a series of investigative stories about the Chinese government's covert interference in the United States. And that ranged from transnational repression, from its efforts to co-opt Chinese student groups and use Chinese embassies and consulates to kind of create astroturf pro-China demonstrations, to political interference, to funding of organizations that promulgated pro-China opinions.

5:19So kind of a range. But it was the first series in the U.S. that took this question, is the Chinese government interfering in our political rights on U.S. soil? It was the first investigative series in the U.S. that did that. Were you the first journalist not to be granted a visa? Certainly not. The Chinese government has a long history of doing this. Basically, all journalists were kicked out of China from 1949 to 1978. Then they started letting in some. There was another big round of kicking out journalists after the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, then gradually opened up again. And then there was a long period where there were no visa denials, more than 10 years under Hu Jintao primarily.

5:59And then in 2013 or 2014, it's notable. So Melissa Chan, who was China correspondent for Al Jazeera, she was kicked out of China. Her visa was pulled. We read that as kind of a canary in the coal mine of what Xi Jinping was going to be like as a leader. And indeed, that turned out to be quite accurate. There were a few more journalists who were essentially kicked out of China in the years following that. Then there was me in the unusual situation of being kicked out without actually physically being there. And then, of course, there was March 2020, COVID era, when the Chinese government expelled around 18 journalists with U.S.

6:33publications, and there has been extremely limited press access ever since then. So how was that for you? How unsettling was that to be personally singled out like that? I didn't find it unsettling. I found it extremely sad. I mean, heartbreaking is the word. I had dedicated my entire adult life to China, not because I hated it, but because I loved it. I loved the people. I loved the culture and the history. And I was so interested in the political system. And I have always worked really hard to try to uncover facts and show what Chinese people really feel, what they're really experiencing. And that was what had led me to publish my investigative series at Foreign Policy magazine in the first place, because Chinese people in America were saying, we don't feel free.

7:15We feel like the Chinese government is constricting what we can do, even on U.S. soil. And that is kind of what led me down that path of seeking how the Chinese government could do that inside the United States. And so to have access to that country taken away was really, really sad. And it took me a long time to not cry when I thought about it. It still affects me. I still wish I could go. It has severely limited my career opportunities. So I've just had to be very creative. But I'm far from alone. I'm far from alone in that situation. And I'm not personally in danger. I just want to emphasize that because Chinese people who have exiled themselves or feel they can't go back to China are in a very, very different situation.

7:53So I don't want to exaggerate, you know, the sadness of my situation. And you're living in Taiwan now. Yes. So, I mean, what does the situation feel like there day to day? Well, day to day, Taiwan feels like a completely normal country. And it's interesting because, you know, when there are Chinese military drills or, you know, some other saber rattling from China, friends and family will email me and be like, oh, my goodness, are you safe? Should you come back home? And the thing is that living inside of Taiwan, day-to-day life, feels completely normal and completely safe. I think it's because Taiwanese people have lived with threats from China for their entire lives, you know, 75 years at this point.

8:32And China's never actually invaded. And so, you know, it's kind of like a boy cries wolf situation. But on the other hand, since 2022, the threats from China have gotten more immediate and more pressing and feel more tangible. So more Taiwanese people that I talk to, they're thinking about, they'll talk about, well, you know, should we have an exit plan in case we need to leave? So people do talk about that, but life feels normal here. Okay, Bethany, well, let's talk about Larry Chin for a minute. I mean, how typical is he as an example of Chinese Cold War espionage? Well, he was certainly a very high-placed example.

9:07He's kind of the ideal. He's espionage gold. You have someone who's so highly placed, who's able to pass information to you for years and years and years. That's really what you want. So how typical is he? Well, certainly China didn't have a lot of him running around. It's hard for any country to have someone as highly placed and as reliable as him. But if you want to view him as a type, Cold War espionage was aimed very often at having moles inside the government. This is what we think of as traditional espionage. espionage. So certainly the Chinese government in that period would also seek to have those kinds of people placed in high ranks with access to sensitive information.

9:46And so what was China's main incentive there to spy on the U.S.? What did they want? Well, they wanted technology, certainly. They wanted insider political information. And not all of this has to be classified, right? Like if you want to know how a government thinks or if you want to identify people to pursue for further operations, you need information about their personalities, about their vices, about their beliefs, and having people close to them, you can send that along. Having access to very sensitive political information, such as ongoing decision-making processes in the government, for example, what they're planning on doing in relation to your home government, that is very highly sought information.

10:24And that's what he at times had access to. So how was China viewed globally at that point in the 70s and the 80s? And how was espionage going to help China assert itself on the world stage? Well, in the 70s and 80s, it's important to think about what was happening in the communist bloc in the 50s and to some extent in the 60s. China and Russia were very close. And that's very intimidating. You know, just look at them on a map. That's a big chunk of the world. To have these two, you know, enormous countries basically allied, more or less, closely marching in step against Western powers. That's really intimidating.

10:58But for a variety of ideological and geopolitical reasons from the mid-50s to the mid-60s, there was a process known as the Sino-Soviet split when China and Russia were no longer close and, in fact, in some ways treated each other as adversaries. And so Chinese espionage, particularly beginning in the 70s, didn't just target the U.S. as a top country and Europe, but also Russia. There was actually quite a lot of, you know, Russia-China spy wars going on during this time. But if you want to talk about what China wanted to accomplish through espionage from, you know, both targeting the U.S., also targeting Russia.

11:33They wanted technology and they wanted to improve their geopolitical situation. And talking about Larry Utaichin, that's exactly what he did in the 1970s. He had a not small role in the opening of diplomatic relations, in fact, between the U.S. and China. Well, let's talk now about the big Chinese coup during that period, which is all thanks to Larry Chin, who, as a reminder, handed over Nixon's game plan to the Chinese authorities ahead of crucial negotiations, which led to the Shanghai Communique being signed. I mean, is that right? That's right. So because Mao Zedong was privy to internal deliberations in the Nixon government, he was able to push harder for certain concessions because he knew where he could push.

12:18He knew where the weak spots were. And so he helped China come away with a stronger hand. Now, of course, Nixon's visit was in 1972. That was the first time a U.S. president had ever visited the People's Republic of China, which was established in 1949. The Shanghai Communique was also written during this time. And the Shanghai Communique, among other things, the really important sticking point that it addresses is the status of Taiwan. The U.S. says, and this wording is really important, the U.S. acknowledges China's position on Taiwan. The U.S. side doesn't say we agree with China's position that Taiwan is part of China, just that we acknowledge it.

12:55But on the Chinese side, the Chinese translation of the word acknowledge, which is chengren, is stronger. In English, acknowledge can mean, I hear what you're saying. It can also mean, I agree with what you're saying. I acknowledge that as correct. And on the Chinese translation, it's closer to the, I agree with what you're saying. And so this is kind of how they threaded that needle of how can we come closer while having such a fundamental disagreement over the status of Taiwan. Qin's arrest and subsequent death in 1986 might have looked like a setback for Beijing. But the real crisis was yet to come.

13:28A few years later, in 1989, the Chinese government wasn't fighting American counterintelligence. It was fighting for its own survival.

14:00It's 1989. The Chinese regime is in crisis. Pro-democracy protests sweep Beijing and are crushed in Tiananmen Square. What follows is a new doctrine of control. From this moment on, intelligence wouldn't just protect the regime, it would become central to its expansion. So Bethany, what was at stake for the Chinese government at that moment? In 1989, what was at stake was the future of the Chinese Communist Party. Its very legitimacy and its very position was extremely fragile. And so there was this huge national movement, the pro-democracy movement, with weeks of sit-ins, not just at Tiananmen in Beijing, but in cities around China.

14:42And the party eventually perceived it as kind of a make-or-break moment. You know, how we deal with this protest movement is going to determine what happens in the future. And how in the end they chose to deal with it was by sending in the tanks. And that set the direction that China would take. There was kind of what people call a social contract that became the way that society functioned going forward. It was this kind of agreement. You have freedom to pursue prosperity. We will give you economic freedom. as long as you shut up about politics. And that set the stage for China's dramatic economic growth and its total economic transformation over the next 25 years.

15:27I mean, one of the consequences of opening up economic growth in China was that it allowed its people to migrate. How important was that in what was going on? Oh, I mean, it's massively important. After 1989, a lot of people wanted to leave China. They were like, I was part of the movement. I'll go to jail if I stay, I need to leave. Or people who wanted to seek freedom in democratic countries. And the Chinese government made the decision to allow them to leave. Now, they did obviously put some people in jail. But generally speaking, if you're sort of a normal young person, a normal university graduate, you could leave.

16:02And that was really the first big exodus from China in the modern era after 1949. And that is when things really began to change. If we're talking now about espionage, about China's capabilities abroad, you could say that that was really the moment that things really began to change because you have so many Chinese people going out into the world now. There's something like 60 million Chinese people outside of China. That's a larger population than most countries on Earth. That means it's easier for Chinese agents to also go out into the world. It means there's a larger population of people abroad to try to co-opt.

16:41And it also means that there's a larger population of Chinese people abroad to fear. And the Chinese government has always, and especially in the last 40 years, wanted to keep tight tabs on its diaspora populations abroad because those are some of the populations it fears the most. So the Chinese intelligence services, they're not just directed at, say, America, they are directed at the Chinese in America. Yes. And, you know, it depends on how broadly you want to speak of the Chinese intelligence services. So the Ministry of State Security is China's premier intelligence agency. It's kind of a mix between the FBI and the CIA in that it operates both domestically in China as part of its machine of repression, your political intelligence, kind of your KGB service.

17:25And then also it operates as a foreign intelligence service as well. So it holds both repressive functions domestically and internationally and intelligence functions. And those are often difficult to separate. But there's other elements of the Chinese government and party systems that at times also function in certain ways like intelligence. Some people suggest that the United Front Work Department, which is a bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, which is basically tasked abroad with trying to co-opt and control the Chinese diaspora, often can function like an intelligence service because it's collecting information on people.

18:04And then, you know, I talked about, you know, Chinese people going out. It wasn't always just for seeking political freedom. Also during this time, the 90s and especially the 2000s, you get a lot of Chinese people going abroad to earn money, to start businesses, to join businesses. They go as part of Chinese businesses already established that are opening up international arms. And so you have Chinese business people abroad who then have access to a lot of industrial technology, intellectual property that China wants as well. It's very interesting because, you know, when we talk about spying, one of the things I do is write James Bond books.

18:39And a lot of people have the idea of that's what spies do. And you can understand how espionage works if two countries are at war. You want to know what tactics they're using, where they might be moving troops to. But this idea of espionage between countries that aren't at war with each other, it is what is espionage? What are they trying to find out? Is it mainly business, economics? How much is the Chinese intelligence services trying to sort of infiltrate the government and find out about government thinking? I mean, these days, it's really all of the above. You know, there's still that Cold War style spy games, you know, trying to get people highly placed double agents and trying to co-opt people who have access to sensitive information.

19:20That absolutely still happens. In addition to that, you get other kinds of operations that are aimed, again, at very traditional classified military secrets or very, very sensitive political decisions. But you also get so much more now. The rise of hacking because of the rise of the Internet, political influence and interference operations, transnational repression and other forms of softer espionage have really flowered during this time. But the biggest growth market for Chinese espionage in the past, let's say, 25 years is industrial espionage. Because the Chinese government has viewed the power of China as being very, very intricately linked to Chinese economic growth in general, but also Chinese economic dominance in specific industries globally.

20:08You know, a very, you can call it a mercantilist approach. You can call it a state capitalist approach. But whatever it is, it's something that's sort of hybrid, and it's something that Western governments do not do. Western governments have not, in the modern era, on a vast scale, used their intelligence arms or similar networks to try to get company secrets, bring them back, and then give them to their own companies. That sounds like some kind of combination of imperialism and mercantilism and spying. That is what the Chinese government does. And then it also has incentivized bottom-up actors.

20:46It is well understood in China that if you're working with foreign partners, you can use various means to take their technology and use it for your own Chinese company. And this happens in many kinds of ways, some of which are not intelligence-related. So, for example, foreign companies that want to invest in China have to have a Chinese partner in a joint venture. Many Chinese partners in joint ventures have engaged in something called forced technology transfer, which is where that foreign company has to hand over their sensitive technology or their IP to the Chinese company. And then they can have their joint venture.

21:16And then, oh, guess what happens in so many occasions? The Chinese company will just take that and run with it, leaving the foreign company, you know, empty handed. So that's the ethos. And so you have then actors from China who are out in the world who basically do that in other ways as well. And you could call that industrial espionage, but it's a different use of the term. It's non-state actors, but they have state support or state permission to do it. They know that the Chinese government is not going to fight them or hand them over to the U.S. The Chinese government is going to have their back if push comes to shove.

21:49And I guess all of this has led to a sort of slightly racially tinged paranoia. This idea that all of the Chinese people in the world are spies. They're all against us. They're all spying on us, be they students, businessmen, politicians, whatever. And America realized that the Cold War model had changed. And a former FBI analyst coined the thousand grains of sand theory, which I know is very controversial. What did he mean by this? It's the idea that the Chinese government or the party views every Chinese person as a potential collector. and that every Chinese person, regardless of who they are, a student, a business person, a teacher, anyone could be used to bring back information to the Chinese government.

22:33You know, it's this idea that because there's so many of them, you know, I gave that number 60 million. Yeah. It's this idea that all of them can be kind of weaponized in favor of the Chinese government. Now, that is a theory that has obvious racial implications. And there's a former CIA analyst, Peter Mattis, who has done work to disprove that theory, not just say, well, that's racist, but to say it's also just not accurate. That is literally just not how the Chinese government views espionage. That is not their working model for how to collect. But, you know, to your point that there's a racial element here.

23:10Yes. And I think that this idea that any Chinese person is a potential Chinese spy, it's an idea that lives all the way through the present. In U.S. President Trump's first term, we saw a number of measures coming from the U.S. government that seemed to treat Chinese heritage or Chinese origin as a black mark on people. And we saw, for example, with the China Initiative, a targeting of often Chinese heritage researchers or Chinese origin researchers in the U.S. for things that ended up being basically, you know, paperwork errors. And in fact, one of these researchers who was targeted just recently committed suicide, very likely due to this years-long investigation into her work that never really revealed anything.

23:58So there's very human tragedies that can result from this kind of a misunderstanding of how China's espionage works. So, I mean, how do the intelligence agencies distinguish between normal professional activity and intelligence gathering? And how do you protect security without casting suspicion on entire communities? That's the million-dollar question, isn't it? How do you try to stop actual Chinese intelligence operations without victimizing innocent people, particularly people of Chinese heritage? You know, the answer to that is that you get highly trained professionals to do that work, people who understand really well what the signs are of actual espionage.

24:40And the key here, if you want to be really sure that what you're dealing with is something that is espionage and not normal exchange, is, is there a handler? Can you identify on the Chinese side that there is a government handler, a Ministry of State security handler, a liaison who is regularly meeting with this person that you are suspicious of. That is a crucial difference. And one big problem with the China initiative is that they were targeting normal university collaboration or collaboration that was being incentivized by the Chinese side, but there were no handlers involved, maybe abusing the open system, but not in a targeted way.

25:21So that's a key distinction that I like to give to people. When you're looking for claims of this, find the handler. So the Chinese government is no longer just running spies in the Cold War sense. It opened up to the world and used that openness to gather information at scale.

26:01Today, China is deeply embedded in global trade, technology and geopolitics. Allegations of espionage regularly make front page news. So Bethany, you've written extensively on contemporary Chinese espionage. Can you just talk about the Christine Fong story, which is a story that you broke? So Christine Fong was a young Chinese woman. she enrolled as a university student in a small university in the Bay Area in Northern California. Now, she was a nontraditional student, which means she was probably 26 or 27 when she enrolled. And at that university, she very swiftly became kind of a star. She appears to have founded the Chinese Students and Scholars Association there.