In short
Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist at Urenco (FDO) in Amsterdam, steals ultra-centrifuge designs and funnels uranium-enrichment know-how to Pakistan, then expands the network to Iran. The episode follows Fritz Wehrmann’s suspicions, Dutch security (BVD) monitoring, Pakistan’s stalled procurement, Khan’s takeover of enrichment at Kahuta, and later Khan’s 1987 Iran deal.
Guest backgrounds
No real podcast guests appear in the transcript; it’s a dramatized narrative with named historical figures (e.g., Fritz Viermann/Wehrmann, A.Q. Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, President Zia-ul-Haq, CIA/State Department officials, Iranian officials, Buhari Sayed Abu Tahir).
Key claims
Khan provides weapons-grade enrichment capability; his network uses front companies and “component” loopholes to evade export controls; Western intelligence initially prefers surveillance over arrest; Iran seeks nuclear weapons after Iraq’s chemical attacks.
Notable examples
“Brain Box” G2 centrifuge documentation translation; Khan’s home holding centrifuge components; Basel trade-fair questioning by BVD; Pakistan crates stored at Sehalla; CIA satellite showing Kahuta expansion and anti-aircraft batteries; Khan’s Tehran sales pitch and Dubai handoff of bomb-core casting instructions.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOThe Suspicious Call
0:20 to 2:29
Fritz Viermann calls to report concerns about a colleague, Dr. Khan.
“Fritz Viermann steps out of the brick factory building he works in and into the drizzling rain.”
Khan's Background and Motivation
5:17 to 7:20
Khan expresses his fears over India's nuclear capabilities.
“A few months before Fritz Wehrmann's phone call.”
Khan's Secret Operations
7:20 to 12:46
Khan navigates the delicate situation of acquiring nuclear technology.
“It's clear he wants to change the subject.”
Suspicion and Secrets at Home
12:46 to 14:00
Viermann confronts Khan about suspicious components found at his house.
“But it's a risk he's prepared to take to protect his country.”
Suspicious Conversations at the Table
14:00 to 15:06
Discussion about classified documents and centrifuge components raises tensions.
“And another time, at this very table, he saw documents that should never have left the brain box at Al Mello.”
Surveillance at the Nuclex Exhibition
15:06 to 18:30
BVD officers surveil A.Q. Khan at a nuclear industry exhibition, raising suspicions.
“Engineers, salesmen and buyers from across the nuclear industry are here and so are two surveillance officers from the Dutch security service, BVD.”
Concerns Over Espionage
18:30 to 20:02
BVD officers discuss Khan's strange behavior and potential espionage activities.
“tackles the problem without causing reputational harm to industry.”
Khan's Visit to the Warehouse
20:02 to 22:20
Khan inspects a warehouse of nuclear materials, revealing delays in program progress.
“Now he's in the office of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.”
Meeting with Prime Minister Bhutto
22:20 to 25:24
Khan urges Bhutto to take control of the nuclear program to avoid mismanagement.
“It's ten months since Prime Minister Bhutto put Khan in charge of Pakistan's secret uranium enrichment program.”
Khan's Control Over the Uranium Program
25:24 to 27:00
Khan is appointed to lead a new uranium enrichment program under Prime Minister Bhutto.
“but also anxious to absolve themselves from their potential use.”
Show all 15 chapters
Crisis Meeting with Generals
27:00 to 28:00
Khan defends his actions amidst international scrutiny and outlines future plans.
“They stockpile nuclear weapons by the tens of thousands.”
The State Department's Dilemma
28:00 to 30:00
Explore the complexities of U.S. policy toward Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.
“They want a reason not to act against us.”
Khan's Arrival in Iran
30:00 to 33:40
Witness Khan's strategic visit to Iran amidst the Iran-Iraq war.
“The State Department official breaks the silence.”
The Nuclear Sales Pitch
33:40 to 36:20
Learn about the illicit nuclear technology Khan offers to Iran.
“He's now a proliferator of the world's most dangerous weapon.”
Khan's Growing Ambitions
36:20 to 37:40
Discover how Khan's dealings transform him into a nuclear entrepreneur.
“Shortly after, Khan Research Laboratories, Kahuta, Pakistan.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00Audible subscribers can listen to all episodes of The Spy Who ad-free right now. Join Audible today by downloading the Audible app.
0:191974, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Fritz Viermann steps out of the brick factory building he works in and into the drizzling rain. He unfurls his umbrella and hurries towards the nearby bridge over the canal. He looks back to check no one's following him. Then he checks again. Wehrmann works for a company called FDO. It designs components for ultra-centrifuges that enrich uranium. These advanced centrifuges are mainly used for nuclear power, but they can also produce uranium for nuclear weapons. And that's why FDO's designs are classified. Wehrmann reaches a street with a smattering of shops and approaches a phone booth.
1:03He checks he's not being tailed once more, then steps inside.
1:10He calls a number he's jotted down on a scrap of paper. A secretary answers. Director's office, Yurenko. Yurenko is FTO's biggest customer, a nuclear technology consortium founded by the British, German and Dutch governments. I need to speak to the director. He's busy right now. I must speak with him. It's very important. Well, he's unavailable. I can take a message. The Eman isn't sure what to do. He's not even sure he should be making this call. But if his hunch is right, the world is in danger. Sir, are you still there? Yes. Yes, I... I work at FDO as a technical photographer and... Shall I ask the director to call you there?
1:53No, no. Listen, I am concerned about a colleague of mine. Dr Abdul Qadir Khan. He does things, things I don't think he should. I don't follow. Veerman gulps. She's going to make him say it. Say what was, until now, only a private thought. I don't know how else to put this, but I think Abdul's a spy. A spy? Yes, for Pakistan. A spy for Pakistan? Yes. You must tell the director this. Veerman hangs up. His emotions now are a sea of relief and horror at what he's just done. Khan is his friend, one of his only friends, and the only FDO scientist who treats him with respect. Wehrman wonders if he misread the situation.
2:43He hopes not, but he also hopes he has. Because if Khan is a spy, then he's stealing advanced nuclear technology. Technology that could make atomic bombs. And if that happens, the risk of nuclear war will become even greater.
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3:52This is Foul Play, an unbelievable tale of sports, spies and family secrets. Listen now wherever you get your podcasts or early and ad-free on Audible.
4:09I'm Raza Jaffrey and this is The Spy Who, an Audible original. Beneath the veneer of the everyday lurks the realm of the spy. It's a dank, murky world full of dark corners, sinister motives and corrupted morals. A place of paranoia and infiltration, sabotage and manipulation. In this series, we tell Abdul Khadir Khan, the Pakistani scientist spy who sold nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Libya and more. In his homeland, A.Q. Khan became a national hero. the man who gave Pakistan the bomb. Elsewhere, he's seen as one of the most dangerous men who ever lived and devious enough to leave Western intelligence struggling to shut down his atomic bazaar.
5:00What you're about to hear are dramatized reconstructions of events based on the information that's been made public. But remember, in the shadow realm of the spy, the full story is rarely clear. You're listening to The Spy Who Sold Nuclear Secrets to Iran. This is Episode 1, The Seeds of Revenge.
5:25A few months before Fritz Wehrmann's phone call. May 1974, Amsterdam. A.Q. Khan wanders a canal side with Wehrmann, their work colleagues, and on their way to get lunch. Wehrman's an awkward man, shunned as a child because of his German mother and still living with his parents despite being in his 30s He's an outsider, just like Khan Khan came to Europe from Pakistan a decade ago He planned to study metallurgy, then go back But fate intervened He completed his studies, married a Dutch woman and took a job at FDO He and Wehrman met on his first day at FDO and they bonded over a shared interest in photography.
6:11Now, they often spend their lunch breaks together, chatting. But today, Khan is anything but happy. And that's because India's just tested its first nuclear weapon. How can the world stand by and allow this to happen? I fear for my country. Nobody there is safe now. It's not good, but India is saying it's a peaceful test to deterrent. Peaceful? Indian liars, they hate Pakistan. They want to destroy us. Surely not. The newspapers say the test was more about sending China a message. You don't know the Indians like I do. You don't know what India is capable of. After partition, my family and millions of other Muslims like us were driven from our homes.
6:55Villages were burned. Women abducted. Train loads of ordinary citizens massacred. I understand, but no, no, you do not understand. And when I left India for Pakistan, their border guards robbed me of the pen my brother gave me for no reason. It wasn't valuable. It was only of sentimental value. The Hindus are crooks. They cannot be trusted with a nuclear bomb. But every nation wants security. And what of Pakistan's security? Veerman doesn't reply. It's clear he wants to change the subject. But as they walk in silence, Khan feels inspiration dawn. Maybe he, the scientist with access to advanced nuclear technology, is the answer to Pakistan's security.
7:45Five months later, Al Mello, the Eastern Netherlands. Khan follows his manager through the Urenco's uranium enrichment plant toward a small metal structure set apart from the main facility. It's a secure office area known as the Brain Box. The Brain Box holds highly classified designs, such as details of the G2, a new centrifuge that can enrich uranium to weapons grade. Khan isn't cleared to be in here, but his manager seems unconcerned. He pulls several box files from a shelf. This is the documentation for the G2, but it's all in German. I need them translated as quickly as possible. Kahn is one of the few scientists involved with Yarenko, who knows both Dutch and German.
8:33And his manager is willing to bend the rules to get the G2's documentation translated faster. Kahn gets to work, translating the documents page by page. But he realizes this is also an opportunity to learn all about Europe's latest top secret centrifuge. Bismillah. He takes a sheaf of paper and begins making additional notes in his mother tongue, Urdu. A passing colleague stops and peers at the script on the page. What's that you're writing? What language is that? Khan looks up. It's Urdu. It's a letter to my family in Pakistan. I'm so busy I rarely have time to write to them. So I thought I'd skip lunch, do it now.
9:18Khan smiles at the colleague. One thing he's learned in Europe is that a smile is often all it takes to gain someone's trust. The colleague smiles back and walks away.
9:36Two months later, Islamabad, Pakistan. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, strides down the corridor towards his office. An aide keeps pace beside him. Your next meeting is with Dr. Abdul-Hadir Khan. Butto slows slightly. The scientist from Amsterdam? Yes, sir. The one who wrote to you, claiming he can help our nuclear program. So he checked out. Yes, our people in Europe confirmed he's genuine. Butto enters a meeting room. Khan is sitting, but rises instantly on seeing Butto. Prime Minister, please sit. I understand you believe you could help Pakistan. I know I can. I work in the Dutch nuclear industry.
10:21I have access to the latest Centrivue technology, vital to weapons-grade uranium enrichment, and I have already taken detailed notes about that technology. Butto's interest sharpens. Two years ago, he started a secret nuclear weapons program following a decisive defeat in a 13-day war with India. But it's enormously costly for a nation where many go hungry. And progress is slow. Butto's interested in anything that can help. Khan sits forward in his chair. I wish to return to Pakistan and apply my knowledge to our program. Dr. Khan, I am grateful for your visit. But you must stay in Europe. But why?
11:02I understand more than your scientists here. And you can increase that knowledge by remaining in Amsterdam. You're in a unique position. The information you have access to could save us many years of work. Staying where you are is how you can best serve your country.
11:24One month later, January 1975. Brussels, Belgium. Inside Pakistan's embassy, Khan sits with Sadiq Bhatt. Officially, Bhatt is a Pakistani diplomat. Unofficially, he runs Pakistan's secret efforts to procure what it needs to make nuclear weapons. And now, he's also running Khan as a spy. The designs you are getting are extremely useful. But acquiring materials and equipment is just as critical. What I need are details of what is needed to build a uranium enrichment plant. A shopping list, if you like. It won't be straightforward. There are export controls. Nothing that a few front companies and false end-user certificates won't get around.
12:08Maybe. But my specifications will be exact. Centrifuges are precision instruments. A microscopic floor in metal thickness or a tiny vibration imbalance and the whole machine will fail. And orders with that level of precision will attract attention. We have been doing this for some time, Dr. Khan. We take care to work with suppliers who don't understand the end use and those who will look the other way for the right price. Khan knows this is risky. If Pakistan's front companies start placing precise orders based on Yurenko's designs, it could be traced back to him. But it's a risk he's prepared to take to protect his country.
13:06A couple of months later, spring 1975, the town of Zwannenberg on the outskirts of Amsterdam. In Kahn's house, Fritz Viermann sits at the dining table, finishing the last of his fried chicken. He smiles at Kahn's Dutch wife, Henny. That was excellent. Would you like more? There's plenty in the oven. Viermann is full, but he needs a moment alone with Kahn. He's spotted something in the corner of the room that shouldn't be there. Centrifuge components. Yes, please, I'd love some. It's been more than a year since Vierman called Yurenko about his fear that Khan might be a spy. Yurenko never called back, and Vierman convinced himself he was imagining things.
13:49But in recent months, he's noticed something amiss with his friend. He's often on the phone, speaking rapidly in Urdu. He once spotted him sealing rolls of film inside an envelope at work. And another time, at this very table, he saw documents that should never have left the brain box at Al Mello. He said nothing. But these parts, he can't ignore them. Abdul, why do you have centrifuge components here in your home? Them. Old pieces, discarded. I like them as souvenirs. Reminders of good work. I wonder what's keeping Henny. Khan gets up to go to the kitchen. but Vierman stops him. It's not the only thing.
14:33Last time I was here, I saw classified documents. My dear friend, I had permission. And he helps me with the translation. What are all these questions? Don't you trust me? And here she is with more food. Here, allow me to serve you. Vierman forces a smile as his plate is filled. He's made the opening move in a game of chicken but it's Kahn who's made him swerve.
15:05It's six months later and in Basel, Switzerland, the Nuclex exhibition is underway. Engineers, salesmen and buyers from across the nuclear industry are here and so are two surveillance officers from the Dutch security service, BVD. One of them hovers near a stand, browsing a brochure of vacuum pumps while watching his target, Dr. A.Q. Khan. He came to the BVD's attention after a Pakistani diplomat tried to order specialist metal foils from a Dutch supplier to the nuclear industry. The specifications led the BVD to Khan. Now he's a person of interest, someone under suspicion, but not formally accused of wrongdoing.
15:52Kahn is at an exhibitor stand, chatting to a sales rep. The BVD officer feigns interest in a display of industrial metals to get with an earshot of Kahn. The steel will need to be strong enough for use in ultra-centrifuge bellows. What strength to weight ratios can you deliver? Depends on the length of the tubes. What kind of RPMs are we talking about here? The BVD officer doesn't understand the details, but knows super-strong steel is needed to stop uranium-enriching centrifuges from breaking apart as they spin. He also knows that Khan doesn't handle procurement at FDO, so there's no reason to be asking suppliers these questions.
16:33If you needed to perform under that level of stress, we'd need precise specifications. But I can arrange a quote for you. Thank you. Perhaps we can arrange a meeting. Do you have a card? Khan takes the salesman's card and then moves on. The BVD officer hangs back for a moment, then follows.
16:58A few days later, The Hague, Netherlands. In a government office, a senior BVD officer is updating representatives from the Foreign Ministry and Economic Affairs Ministry on its investigation into Khan. We believe Dr. Khan may be engaged in espionage. Classified materials have been seen at his home. He displays an unusual level of curiosity well beyond his remit at FTO. And he's had repeated meetings with the welding company salesman already on our radar. At the Basel trade fair, he's sought out suppliers of highly sensitive components. The foreign ministry official interjects, what kind of components?
17:37Ultra-thin metal foil. We've also identified a failed attempt to purchase such foil by a mysterious buyer. The specifications exactly match the foil Khan developed for Yurenko. Then we need to arrest him. The economic affairs representative cuts in. An arrest would tell the world that a spy infiltrated one of our country's most sensitive industrial projects? A scandal like that could be disastrous for the science and technology industry. As would a rogue procurement network. A representative from the foreign ministry turns to the BVD officer. Did you consult the Americans? Yes. And? The CIA would prefer we continue watching Khan.
18:15They believe arresting him now would squander a chance to learn more about Pakistan's nuclear procurement network. So we let him carry on and hope for the best. We could have him promoted to a position where he no longer has access to sensitive information. The economics affairs official nods. I think that's a good solution. tackles the problem without causing reputational harm to industry. The foreign ministry official relents. He just hopes that Khan's not already got what he needs.
18:54Two months later, the village of Sehalla in Pakistan, 16 miles southeast of Islamabad. Outside a concrete warehouse, Khan shakes hands with the caretaker. His Dutch colleagues think Khan's in Pakistan visiting relatives with his wife and daughters. But he's also using the trip to see the progress being made using the equipment and information he's helped Pakistan acquire. The caretaker leads Khan inside the warehouse and turns on the light. This is where everything is stored? Khan looks around in silent disbelief. Dozens of shipping crates are stacked neatly against the walls. Some still have their seals intact.
19:35This is it? Yes, everything is here. Khan walks slowly between the crates. He knows what is inside. He knows what it could become. But he was expecting to see people already building a uranium enrichment plant. Why hasn't assembly begun? We're waiting for further instructions. Khan closes his eyes. He risked everything to give Pakistan all it needs to accelerate its nuclear program. But nothing's moving.
20:20January 1976, Islamabad. It's several days since E.H.U. Khan visited the warehouse. Now he's in the office of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Prime Minister, I visited the warehouse at Sihala. And? Nothing has been done. The equipment is still in shipping crates. Months have been lost. With respect, Prime Minister, the program is being mismanaged. Strong words. I have absolute faith in the director of the atomic program. Sir. He lacks the expertise required. He only has a master's degree. He's treating the nuclear program as a bureaucratic project. It is not. It's the most complex engineering challenge Pakistan has ever attempted.
21:02And one vital to our security. As you are aware, our efforts to build a plutonium reactor are being thwarted by the international community. Which is why I've been saying that uranium enrichment is the answer. We have uranium deposits here in Pakistan. and I can source the equipment needed without detection. The program's director is ignoring the solution that is staring him in the face. You seem very confident. With reason. I have the designs, the supplier lists and the experience. If you let me run this program, we will be enriching uranium to the levels needed for nuclear weapons in five years.
21:39You want me to fire the head of the nuclear program and put you in charge? Why not? I know more than him. But if you don't make use of me, I might as well go back to the Netherlands. I cannot simply sack the head of our nuclear program. But there may be another way. I'm listening. What if we started a separate uranium enrichment program? Headed by you. Two programs chasing the same end goal. I would need adequate funding. You will have it. I will also need total control of the program and its facilities. If you give me that, I will not disappoint. Pakistan will have its own bomb. I give you my word.
22:27September 1976. Kahuta, Pakistan. It's ten months since Prime Minister Bhutto put Khan in charge of Pakistan's secret uranium enrichment program. On getting the job, he immediately sent FDO his letter of resignation and got to work. Now, Khan is hiking the sub-Himalayan foothills. He is less than an hour from Islamabad, but a world away in terms of geography. Here, there are no paved roads, no power lines, and no signs of industry. Just a few goats and shepherds, sheltering in run-down shacks. Khan reaches the top of a ridge, gets out his binoculars, and surveys the area. In the valley below, there must be at least 100 acres of forested land, hidden by hills on all sides.
23:18This is it. Khan has spent weeks looking for somewhere to build his nuclear research laboratory. And Kahuta seems perfect. Close enough to the capital for power and supplies, but far enough to stay hidden.
23:40It's four months later, and in the alpine village of Haag, Switzerland, Kahn is dining at the home of Friedrich Tiner. Tiner's young sons, Marco and Urs, play nearby. Tiner is an engineer and export manager at Vacuum Apparata Technique, a manufacturer of vacuum tubes and valves for centrifuges. And Kahn wants to place an order. and told your company makes the best valves in Europe. We are precise. Reliable. Precision is everything. The flow must be exact. The valves Khan wants to buy are vital for Pakistan's nuclear program. They control the flow of gas into the centrifuges that enrich the uranium.
24:26And Tina is keen to sell. Khan's order is worth tens of thousands of dollars. But that money comes with risk. Khan wants to know if Tinna's willing to accept that risk. What about exporting them? Are you able to ship these valves to us? Tinna lowers his glass. Clearly aware that this deal could violate export controls on nuclear technology. I've been in touch with the Swiss authorities. I believe I've found a way around this. Yes. It is illegal to export centrifuges, but not the individual components used to make them. So exporting our valves is okay. Then we have a deal. As long as it's done discreetly.
25:07I'm a respected man and don't want trouble, but the way I see it, building a pistol doesn't make someone a murderer. Only pulling the trigger does. Khan is used to hearing similar justifications from the other suppliers he works with. They're willing to supply the parts and take the money, but also anxious to absolve themselves from their potential use. Khan smiles at Tina. Don't worry. We don't want to draw attention to this deal either.
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25:42Two years later, Pakistan army headquarters, Islamabad. Pakistan's senior generals are gathered around a large table for a crisis meeting. At the head of it sits President Muhammad Zia al-Haq, who deposed Butoh in a military coup. Next to him is Khan. A German TV documentary has just exposed how Khan stole Urenko's centrifuge designs to aid Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. And that's left Khan on the defensive. This is a smear campaign. They cannot accept that a Muslim country has mastered the science, so they invent lies about me. But this is bigger than Khan. There is growing instability in neighboring Afghanistan, and the Soviets are trying to increase their influence there.
26:29In response, the US has forged an uneasy friendship with Pakistan by offering economic aid. The revelations about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program jeopardizes that alliance. President Zia locks eyes with Khan. The Americans are threatening to withdraw economic aid. Britain is talking about tightening export controls to cut off our supplies. Let them. Who made these American and British bastards the God-given guardians of the world? They stockpile nuclear weapons by the tens of thousands. But if we pursue a modest program, we are called devils. Satans. President Zia raises a hand and indicates for one of the generals to speak.
27:14Dr. Khan, will this delay our nuclear program? No. We are on schedule. By 1981, we will be producing significant quantities of enriched uranium, even if there's a crackdown. Because of it. Please explain. The publicity has acted as an advertisement. Suppliers now know we are buying. They now come to us, begging us to buy from them. Believe me, I've worked with these people. They will sell their mothers for money. But President Zia remains concerned. America believes our program threatens Israel, and that may cause them to act. We need to convince them the program is peaceful. They won't believe us.
28:01Belief is not required. Only delay. The Americans want to keep us on side. They want a reason not to act against us. So, we give them a reason. We deny this is a weapons program. We tell them all we want to do is generate electricity. and I hope it gives us enough time for you to complete your work.
28:30Six months later, the State Department, Washington, D.C. In a meeting room on the seventh floor, officials from the State Department, military and CIA are discussing Pakistan's nuclear program. A CIA analyst stands by a projector and brings up a spy satellite picture. This is the latest image of Pakistan's nuclear research centre in Kahuta. It has grown considerably since our last meeting. There's new construction here. And here. And this is new. What we have here are French anti-aircraft missile batteries, indicating that this is definitely more than a nuclear energy programme. A military advisor leans in for a better look.
29:13That will make a pre-emptive strike much riskier. What's the current official line? All eyes turn to the State Department's representative. The White House wants to keep Pakistan on side, especially if the Soviet threat to Afghanistan comes to a head. So we should rule out any talk of military strikes. So we're looking at sanctions then. Realistically, sanctions are unlikely to change anything. Pakistan's program is driven by fear of Indian aggression. India already has nuclear weapons capability, so Pakistan feels it needs that too. And publicly they will, of course, continue to deny this is a weapons program.
29:48One of the CIA officials clears his throat. There is another option. We remove the man behind the program. Dr. A.Q. Khan. The room falls silent. The idea of assassinating Khan has been floated before, but it sits uncomfortably between them. The State Department official breaks the silence. Facts. The site expansion shows the ambition is clear. But what we are looking at is buildings. Uranium enrichment requires advanced technical knowledge and equipment. Does Pakistan really have access to that? The CIA analyst responds. Our view is that they don't, and they are decades away from developing a bomb.
30:28They may want India to believe otherwise, and the site and the anti-aircraft batteries may do the job of deterrence. But the agency view is that they have a long road ahead. We can continue to monitor the situation. There's no need to act now.
30:50Eight years later, January 1987. Tehran, Iran. Khan emerges from a private jet, wearing a tailored suit and clutching a briefcase. An Iranian delegation greets him on the tarmac and ushers him into the back of a waiting car. A small motorcade pulls away and races through the suburbs of Tehran. heading south to the surrounding countryside.
31:19An hour later, Khan arrives in Bachin, a military-industrial complex dedicated to weapons development. Khan is led into an Iranian intelligence safehouse. Inside, a large portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran's supreme leader, presides over the room. Khan nods to the image, then greets the Iranian officials who've been awaiting his arrival. Welcome, Dr. Khan. I trust your journey went smoothly. Very. Thank you for arranging it. The pleasantries continue, but everyone understands why Khan's here. Iran is wounded. It's been at war with Iraq for six years. And the Iraqi's use of chemical weapons has heightened the Iranian regime's interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.
32:08Iran hopes Khan can help with that, as does Pakistan. President Zia wants to build an alliance with Iran, against the US, India, and the Soviets, who are occupying Afghanistan. Khan opens his briefcase and removes a clutch of sales brochures. We can provide you with everything you need to enrich uranium. The official starts to read. Iran has uranium, but lacks the technology needed to enrich large amounts of weapons-grade material. P1 and P2 centrifuge components. High-strength rotor tubes. Electric drive equipment. And you are willing to sell this to us? Absolutely. And we offer more than technology.
32:53We offer expertise, too. Blueprints. Equipment. Assembly instructions. In short, everything you need. The official turns the pages slowly, as if unimpressed. But Khan knows it's a bluff. No one else will offer Iran this. This is technology no one wants you to have. America, Russia, Israel and India can threaten the Islamic world with their nuclear bombs. And they will do all they can to stop us having the same weapons. We offer protection for your people. The official points to the multi-million dollar prices listed in Khan's brochures. At some cost, we will need to discuss figures. But in principle, yes, we are interested in this offer, Dr.
33:42Khan. Khan smiles and rises to leave. He is no longer just a scientist. He's now a proliferator of the world's most dangerous weapon.
33:58A few months later, Dubai. In a modest 8th floor apartment, 28-year-old Buhari Sayed Abu Tahir watches his uncle show a delegation of Iranian nuclear scientists two centrifuges. Tahir is a slight, shy Sri Lankan with dark, curly black hair. And today he's assisting his uncle in closing the deal arranged by Khan. His uncle keeps talking as the Iranians inspect the devices. These centrifuges are manufactured using designs and components sourced from trusted suppliers in Europe and beyond. Tahir's uncle nods at the two German businessmen seated on the low sofa. Like his uncle, they are among Khan's most trusted associates.
34:41They've been secretly supplying Pakistan with nuclear technology for years. And now, Khan's brought them in on his lucrative deal with Iran. Tahir, pass me the file. It's Tahir's cue. He steps forward and presents the Iranians a document. Tahir's uncle smiles. This document, gentlemen, offers step-by-step details about how to cast uranium metal into hemispherical forms. Essentially, how to construct the core of a nuclear bomb. Now, please, take your time and decide what you wish to buy. Tahir? Yes, uncle. Please bring our guests refreshments. Tahir slips into the adjoining kitchen. He dislikes his uncle.
35:28He dominates his entire family. Tahir wanted to study accountancy in London. His uncle vetoed that and made him his assistant. Tahir returns from the kitchen with tea and sweet pastries to find his uncle and the Iranians discussing prices. Fine. The two centrifuges and technical documentation will cost 10 million US dollars. So, we are agreed then?
35:58After the Iranians leave carrying suitcases containing the nuclear secrets they've just bought, Tahir listens to his uncle and the Germans as they discuss how to share out the money. Most of it will go to the suppliers in Khan's network, but his uncle will pocket 2 million dollars, as will Khan. Tahir vows that whatever it takes, he needs to get close to Khan and make himself indispensable.
36:29Shortly after, Khan Research Laboratories, Kahuta, Pakistan. Khan paces his office, waiting for a call. Dr. Khan speaking. Ah, Farouk. Yes, that is good news. And everything went smoothly at the bank? Iranian friends were happy? Excellent. Khan smiles to himself. His deal with Iran isn't official government policy, but he's doing it with tacit approval, and he knows that President Zia will be delighted at how Khan is bringing Pakistan and Iran closer together. and no one in the know will care if he profits on the way. But now he's had a taste of how lucrative selling nuclear secrets can be. He wants more.
37:20Yesterday he was a civil servant on a modest salary. Now he's a millionaire businessman in charge of a secret global network of suppliers that stands ready to sell nuclear technology to whoever has pockets deep enough to pay.
37:42Follow The Spy Who on the Audible app or wherever you get your podcasts. You can listen to all episodes of The Spy Who ad-free by joining Audible. You have been listening to The Spy Who, an Audible original. Have you got a spy story you'd like us to tell? Email your ideas to thespywho at audible.com. A quick note about our dialogue. We can't know everything that was said or done behind closed doors Particularly far back in history But our scenes are written using the best available sources So even if a scene or conversation has been recreated for dramatic effect It's still based on biographical research We use many sources in our research for this season Including Catherine Collins and Douglas France books The Nuclear Jihadist and Fallout And Peddling Peril by David Albright The Spy Who is hosted by me, Raza Jaffrey It's a Yellow Ant production.
38:39This episode was written by Lizzie Enfield and researched by Louise Byrne, with thanks to Inna Bruce, Dee Cook, and Paula Richardson. The senior producer was Jay Priest. The sound designer was Joshua Morales. Music supervision by Scott Velasquez for Frist and Sing. For Yellow Ant, the story editor and executive producer was Tristan Donovan. For Audible, the executive producers were Estelle Doyle and Theodora Leloudis. Thank you.
From the publisher
At a secure lab in Amsterdam, scientists are working on tech that can enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. But when India tests a nuke, employee Dr. A.Q. Khan, turns spy to help Pakistan get the bomb too. And soon he’ll spread atomic weapons worldwide.
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