WAR UPDATE: Military Insider Gives Terrifying Prediction & Reveals How Unprepared America Truly Is

28:00And we get about 45 % or so of our hydrocarbons from the North Sea, although that's reducing. But Europe generally is extremely, extremely vulnerable. So what you've got is a situation which is that our energy infrastructure is being written down at a time when we have no chance of defending our skies against it. And again, this is why I was trying to actually make the point to people who are prepared to think about what this wall might look like, because the economic consequences of this would be profound. Mathematically, there's a really close relationship between the use of energy and GDP. It's extremely close.

28:40It's close to one. It's perhaps sort of 0.99 or something. So what that means is when you take energy out of the system, then you are going to have a consequent effect, which is similar in rough order of magnitude, on your economy. So if we take 10 % of the world's energy away, then surprise, surprise, don't be surprised if we get a global reduction in GDP of 10%. Now, that's getting close to a depression. Indeed, it's on the borderline of a depression. But going back to Europe, it wouldn't surprise me at all if we're in a situation where were such an attack to happen, then we would be in deep economic trouble.

29:17And I think that would lead to deep political trouble as well. But again, it is a scenario, and the point of the scenario was to help people really think about what such a war might mean, and really make sure that we've done the risk assessment. Now, I developed it as a scenario, because what I wanted people to think about was doing the risk assessment. At the moment, the Europeans' risk assessment of what they're doing, as far as I can see, is based on a guess. And the guess is we're going to keep firing long-range weapons into Russia, and we're going to guess that the Russians aren't going to respond.

29:55And I think that's a very dangerous guess. I mean, people say the Russians don't have red lines. And I keep saying to them, well, just a second, the Russian told us that if we tried to expand NATO into Georgia or to Ukraine, then it would result in a war and indeed all our clever thinkers told us the same thing and surprise surprise when we did do that a war happened so russia do have red lines so i think it's wrong to have that guess and the way that risk management works i'm not a great fan of risk management it's used by the financial sector to do risk analysis and as far as i can see it doesn't work for them but what they do do they say if you're thinking about a risk have a think about uh the the impact and the probability.

30:38Now, even if the probability is low of Russia doing what I've said, the impact is profound. So to me, that's a risk which you really need to work very, very hard to think through and to make sure that the population who you're exposing to that risk have been taken on board rather than just crack on without really thinking about it. So I think there needs to be in Europe a political debate about this and whether we're prepared to let our politicians lead us into a situation where we're exposed to this risk. And we've been here before in Europe, it was 2014, 1914, I should say, you know, the run, Barbara Tuckman's famous book, you know, The Guns of August, where we almost, we fell into the First World War.

31:28People thought it would be over in four months and four years later, Europe was devastated. So let's at least try to do the thinking this time round and decide that if we are going to do these things and to poke the bear for ready for a war, which we would lose anyway, let's at least have a public debate about that and see how the country feel about it and how the countries feel about it. Because I'm strongly of the view that actually if the country were exposed to what I'm talking about, the difference in terms of political support for it would be profound. I think the political support for it would fall away.

32:05It doesn't matter what the moral issue is. I happen to think that the moral playground lies with Russia. What happens is the issue of power. And Russia has the balance of power here and overwhelmingly. So my suspicion is if we were able to have that debate, and I think we should have that debate, then I don't think Europeans would continue to feel quite so rustified because they do. Home ownership has always been at the center of the American dream. It is an actual asset, a place people work their entire lives to build, a place of stability and security and real value. Right now, though, too many homeowners are stuck swiping credit cards to cover groceries.

32:44there's basically a survival tax of 20 % interest or more. So why keep handing your money to the banks when you could keep it for your family? Interest is what kills you. Our friends at American Financing have a better way. They're helping homeowners use their hard-earned equity, and they're supporting Americans looking to fulfill the dream of owning a home with mortgage rates currently in the fives. American Financing saves its customers an average of$800 a month. That's about 10 grand a year. It's not just a loan. It's a true financial reset. We recommend American financing. They're called America's home for home loans for a reason.

33:18So get out of credit card debt. I mean, it is just crazy to borrow money. No judgment, but it doesn't make any sense to borrow money at that rate. If you want out, call 800-685-5696. 800-685-5696 or visit AmericanFinancing.net slash Tucker. I think one disadvantage that the Europeans have is they don't understand how hated they are by the people planning these wars. I think it's true of all the wars the last hundred years. I think, at least in my country, the foreign policy strategists, the neocons who are driving all of this, truly hate Europe and would like to see it destroyed. The Israelis hate Europe.

34:01And Europeans can't seem to admit that to themselves. It's very obvious by the effects. So let's say that the Russians did lob a hypersonic missile into Rotterdam or into the UK. Everyone knows it's very obvious that Europe can't mount a conventional war against Russia. They would lose instantly. The one thing they do have, however, is nuclear weapons. So how much incentive would there be to use a nuclear weapon in response? It's a$64 ,000 question, and I actually cover that in the article. I think what we're talking about is that if either Britain or France, the two nations with nuclear weapons, chose to respond with nuclear weapons, that essentially is committing national suicide.

34:48Yes. I would expect the Russians to respond. Let's forget they've got nearly 5 ,500 nuclear weapons, just short of that. And I think Britain's got sort of, I think there might be 200 of those sorts of figures. I think that a prime minister or a president of France who was prepared to use nuclear weapons to support a conventional war, which we were likely to lose in the first place, I think that would be a very – it's a suicidal call to make, so I cannot see it happening. Really? Because they cheered the destruction of their own energy pipeline. They abetted the invasion of their country by, you know, North and Sub-Saharan Africa.

35:33Like, they're suicidal. That's what it seems as an observer. Yeah, I think it's suicidal by incompetence, but I would like to think that within the establishment, there are enough people who would, by this stage, especially if we were starting to go to war, have really started to think this through. I would also like to think that, and I'd be interested in your view on this, that there were Americans who were saying, this isn't very good. This isn't what we were thinking that we could help with the breakup of Russia. It's not happening. This war is starting to kick off. We need to get this to a close.

36:14And I don't know if that would happen, but I would like to think that actually there would be some voices in America. The sorts of people who would spring to mind for me would be people like J.D. Vance and Tulsi Gabbard is no longer there, but the voices of reason within the White House. I'm curious to see what Donald Trump's view as well. But I'm sure that Americans would not want to be doing anything which opened them to the possibility of a nuclear exchange with Russia. My sense is that Trump's views are irrelevant. I don't think he was for this war with Iran. He did it anyway. He's utterly controlled.

36:51So there's that. J.D. Vance is the only person I'm aware of in American national politics with any power at all, to the extent he has power, who would oppose this. But I don't see anyone other than J.D. Vance. I hope I'm wrong. Yeah, I hope you are too. I mean, there's no doubt that the voices of the independent media is starting to be heard. We've got a long, long way to go, but we're starting to be heard. But again, this is why I think this debate needs to happen now rather than later. I mean, Europeans haven't thought about this a lot. I mean, when the attacks were conducted on the Russian strategic bombing force, I thought that was an act of incredible strategic recklessness, because those bombers were out on the airfields on the pan, so they could be seen by satellites as part of the START treaty.

37:44So it was part of the treaty. and Russian nuclear doctrine is such that if their nuclear triad, an element of the nuclear triad is attacked, then their response is to respond with nuclear weapons. They chose not to do it, thank goodness. But we're playing with fire here and I think that the issue I think is not the nuclear response and I think it's a very open question. It's an open question not only for us, but for the Russians as well. I could imagine the Russians saying, yeah, actually, we've got people who are so incompetent in Western capitals that we perhaps don't want to respond this way, or they might do it in a more measured way.

38:26I mean, here's a very good question. What if the responses were not against Germany, France, and Britain, but against Germany? And what if the responses were such that they took out Germany's drone factories and Poland's drone factories, Would then Britain and Russia and France be prepared to sacrifice their nations and tens of millions of deaths to support Germany in that situation? Very, very good question. And I don't know what the answer is. But I mean, to me, the answer is let's at least think carefully about what we're trying to do with these long range weapons and fight attacks into Russia.

39:07And let's also think about diplomacy. I mean, the fact that we can have meetings where the West is talking about solutions to the Russia-Ukraine war and triumphantly exclude one of the belligerents and its diplomatic incompetence of the highest order I can see. we in the very difficult British and Irish relationships during the troubles in Ireland maintained diplomatic very very subtle diplomatic engagement throughout almost the whole of that war and thank goodness we did what we need I think is to at least think about this alternative pathway to peace I'm sure it's there I mean I've often thought that one of the biggest problems is NATO.

39:58NATO at the moment is a bit of a self-licking lollipop. But what I once said, NATO exists to confront a threat which is created by its own existence, yet doesn't have the power to confront the threat that its existence has created. So I think NATO, to my mind, is a key part of the problem here. What a beautiful formulation that is. NATO exists to confront the opposition it's created but doesn't have the power to successfully resist that. I mean, that's the truest thing I've heard today. It was in one of the Quincy Institute's responsible statecraft article about 18 months ago. I mean, it's so obvious, you know, and yet people think that NATO's omnipotent.

40:51So I think that understanding that actually the NATO guarantee is, I wouldn't say it's as little as paper, but it is much less comprehensive than people think, because it relies on military forces, which are, to my mind, nowhere near as battle-hardened as Russians are. The second best army in the world, I would say, at the moment in terms of battle-hardened is the Ukrainian army. The first is the Russian army. The Chinese will be watching extremely closely. So the idea that NATO, you know, can, with a disparate group of countries with different levels of forces, with different levels of equipment capabilities, can actually be brought together into a coalition to defeat the most battle-hardened army in the world, you know, it just doesn't stack up, does it?

41:41You need to be a military man to understand that. It doesn't stack up. Unfortunately, a lot of the military people don't understand this. They're not really interested, as far as I can see, in understanding Russia. I just find it profound. I've been listening to a couple. I was listening recently to one of our former chief of defense staff, and I said in a meeting in which we were at, I said, what do you think about talking to Russia? And his response was, yes, I think we probably should do that. But he said, but not Putin. I thought, well, that's just astonishing that anybody could say that. And it shows you the degree of Russophobia.

42:21I mean, in my service career, I spent a lot of the time in my service career preparing to fight the Russians. But when the Cold War came and Partnership for Peace was kicked off and we started to engage with the Russians, nobody, we were, most of us in my experience, were delighted that we could be in that position. So quite how we've got back to this situation of seeing Russia as the enemy is a good question. A lot of it is to do with not listening to Russia and not hearing Russia. Because when you listen to them and hear them, it's fairly obvious what they want. But people just don't seem to be able to do it.

42:57It's a bit like, I mean, I'm not a soccer player, but it's a bit like getting your team ready for a match and not bothering to study the opposition. Yes. I mean, how many football coaches would do that? How many American football coaches would do it? Everybody would be studying the opposition. And if we were studying the opposition, then that'd be a good start. We would then realize the challenge we've got, but we would also be in a much position to understand the opposition. Well, they're much more serious than we are and much more. It's not close. And so that right there gives you pause. Why would you ever get into a conflict with people who are at least as smart as you and much more committed?

43:37You wouldn't. So where you, after your military service spent 15 years in the energy sector, where's your qualified answer to this question? where is the west the u.s europe australia new zealand canada uh with energy right now i think um it's a very good question and i i my strong sense um this is intuitive with some analysis to support it but my strong sense is that we're um on the edge of a crisis and the reason I say that is if you take not 20 million barrels per day and let's just stay with oil for the moment not natural gas but just taking oil which is the critical resource for almost all of the others if you take 20 million barrels of oil out of the straight home modes in fact it's 13 then sooner or later that has to show up now what I was surprised with is how long it's taken.

44:38And of course, and when you start to see what's going on, you start to see what's happening. It takes, from the closure of the Strait Formos, it takes about two months for the ships, which are travelling at 12 knots, which is about the same speed as a bicycle, you know, to get to the United States and to places like Cushing. It takes about a month or so to get to Europe. So firstly, you've got all the ships which had left were still moving. The inventories, of course, were significant. There was a bit of an oil glut at the time. So those have been largely drawn down as far as I can see. The strategic petroleum reserves as well have largely been drawn down.

45:20I think Cushing is now, the American strategic petroleum reserve, I think is pretty low. A figure I have in my mind, you may know this better than me, is about 20%. That's right. And again, when you start to get to the dregs, you've got to think carefully about it. Even when the oil moves through pipelines, so from Cushing up to New England, it's traveling at between three and eight miles an hour. So that, of course, takes time. And of course, the oil in the pipeline, you need to have oil in the pipeline for the pipeline to work. So the oil in the pipeline isn't working. It's not working in Montreal.

45:54Last but by no means least is China. And what I don't think any of us understood was how China would respond to this. And I don't think we completely understand. But China reduced its demand by about 5 million barrels per day, which is a significant reduction. It's also home to the largest strategic petroleum reserve in the world. I think the figure I've got is 1.3 billion barrels per day. So it's a very significant reserve. I also suspect, I don't know, I suspect one of the ways that China was thinking about this was not just about self-interest, but I suspect the Chinese were thinking that as an exporting nation, they were thinking long and hard about the impact that the straight-up-and-must closure would have on the rest of the Far East, because there are other nations in the Far East which are much more vulnerable.

46:42Japan had a very big aura reserve. but places like taiwan you know the the 90 of the semiconductors are made in taiwan so places like taiwan were much more much more vulnerable so i suspect one of the reasons china may have done that is not just um uh not not just for tactical reasons but also for thinking about their export markets because um reduction in oil in these other places could have a significant significant an impact um i don't think anybody really knows um but one of the the other things to think about is that sorry i'll just finish i think i would would be surprised if we were not seeing consequences of this in august uh and i've certainly heard some very um good analysts who i i follow um talking about september as well i'm a great fan of an american geophysicist called art berman who's an exceptional um exceptional analyst the other thing though of course is that even when the straights formos open then there is a lag there's a lag on actually those um um the whole system getting going again it's a bit like sort of closing off your plumbing and your pipe in your pipes at home and then expect it to function perfectly now one of the interesting things is that when the um i can't remember what the ship's name was a ship like the container ship um blocked the suez canal and for every one day that that container ship blocked the suez canal um of there's a there's a very good uh merchant navy analyst called sam mccogliano who said it was about six days for the whole logistics system to recover so even if it's three days you could be talking for um you know as a minimum it would be the amount of time that the straits have been closed, it will take to recover.

48:31But it could be twice that, or it could be three times that. So I'm expecting and forecasting that we'll be looking at a significant recession starting in the autumn, and that could tip into recession in the new year. Quite where that recession will play in the globe is an open question. I mean, the country that's most insulated from it, surprise, surprise, is Russia. You know, Russia's an autarkic nation. It well understands the consequences of what's going on, I think. Although Putin's first degree is in law, his postgraduate work was in resource economics. So I would be astonished if they don't understand this.

49:15I know that the Chinese have been looking at their own energy situation for decades. there's good evidence to say that in 2003 when the americans with allies went into to iraq that the chinese thought that that was about oil and they began um uh increasing their um their um their own reserves so but but as for places like europe you know we're incredibly vulnerable so is a lot of the far east um so i'm afraid to say on places like africa and as an open question about the United States as well. The Trump line that the United States is an exporter of oil is true in as much as an exporter of refined products.

50:00But when it comes to crude, it's an importer of crude in tune of about 6.5 million barrels per day. And even if you've got access, you know, through, for example, Venezuela or Canada, oil is a fungible commodity. So you may have access, but the prices are going to go up. So I don't know what it's like over there in the States at the moment in terms of cost per barrel. It's up here. But if those costs were to increase significantly in the next two to three months, I would imagine that would not be the sort of run you'd want into the midterms. And I would be surprised if they don't increase significantly.

50:42And even if you open the straight-up or most, I would be surprised if the lag in the system is such that you're still not suffering from the consequences of those well into the midterms and probably into the new year. So oil, Brent crude was like priced in dollars, I think 71 last week. If you'd told me almost four months after the closure of the strait that it would be 71, I would never have believed that. How did that happen? Were you surprised by it that it's so low? Yes, very, very. I was just as surprised as you. and I think most of the analysts were, but I think a lot of it is to do with the lag.

51:21It's also this distinction between the futures markets and the actual delivery. I was talking to a Singaporean colleague last month and he said that, and I don't know whether this is still the case, that notwithstanding what Brent was at or what WTI was at, that in Singapore, they were buying crude for$200 a barrel. So, you know, the difference is the interesting one. and it's what people are actually paying for it. I mean, there may be a short-term lag, who knows? But that's the open question, the so-called crack spread between what you're paying or what you're forecasting to pay in the futures markets and what you're actually paying on the day.

52:01How does a country exist at$200 a barrel? Yeah, well, fortunately, Singapore is an extremely efficient country. Yes. So, you know, but that must be having political effects. I guess as well, it's quite a small country. I was so surprised when I had$200 a barrel, I didn't ask much more. But again, if we get up to those sorts of figures, I think back to 2007 and 2008, the great global financial crisis. I happened to be in Houston at part of that. And I remember vividly seeing the stock market red all over. I'll never forget it. I remember talking to an American who was working in the British consulate in Houston.

52:45He'd lost half his retirement savings in that crash. And again, it seems to me that if you were to get up to those sorts of figures, 150, and if you've got a global economy which is already not in trouble, but already very precarious, and it wouldn't surprise me if we have another great financial crash. I mean, who knows? We might see it. Was$150 an oil barrel, a function of that? To me, it seems impossible that it wasn't a function of that. People will talk about

53:24synthetic collateralized debt obligations in the housing market. I think a lot of it's to do with the Eurodollar areas, and how funding in the Eurodollar areas were actually tightening. But it seems impossible to me that actually that oil, that oil, which is the primary resource, wasn't playing into that. I mean, it's playing into things like Lufthansa, I think, canceled 20 ,000 flights about a couple of months ago. I don't know what bunker fuels are like. That's the fuel used for shifts. But when I was talking to somebody recently about those, those were doubled. So again, it's what people are actually paying rather than the futures market.

54:03And it's when those two come back into alignment, then we'll know probably more what's happening the the the problem i've said this before as well tucker is that when somebody danny davis so i think you know daniel davis said to me he said if you were the czar of the world uh what would you do about solving the energy crisis i said the problem is that the energy crisis nobody's in charge the whole of the energy markets are run by the market so there is no single entity can say well we need to do x y and z to sort this out You know, you can't just say, well, we need to actually run more tankers through the straights for most.

54:39Because if the shipping companies say, well, we don't like the look of that, thanks, we'll wait until it's ready. So there are a whole load of issues here which are really run by the market. And I think there's nobody who really understands the thing itself. And even if they did understand, there's nobody who can actually press a button and press five or six buttons to make the whole thing work again properly. That's right. And I'm hearing the same thing from other analysts. And, you know, I listen to this like a book. And I don't say that I've got the answers, but what I do say is that you take this amount of energy out of the system, it's bound to have economic consequences.

55:13It's a mathematical impossibility that it won't. And in a globalized economy, no nation can have real sovereignty. Of course, you can't act independently on behalf of your country because you're not in control of your country because you don't control its economy. So, yeah, no one kind of thought about that, obviously, in the post-war era. So let me just ask you a final question, which is how long are these two conflicts likely to continue? Do you see hope of resolution in Eastern Europe or in the Middle East? I think if I take the Middle East first, I've got a strong suspicion. I can't say for sure that as the continued closure of the straits comes home to the United States, and that as the midterms go, as I think it's almost impossible to avoid now badly, then I suspect that that will create a very different political atmosphere in the United States if you've got very significant price increases and you're seeing lots of damage being done to the global economy.

56:16So my suspicion is that that's the thing which might bring the Iran war to a closure. I can't say for sure. The interesting thing as well will be to see the extent to which, were the situation to be improved between the United States on the one hand and China and Russia on the other hand, both China and Russia could actually have a hand in helping to bring that war to a close. What's for sure is that unless the United States is willing to deploy significant land troops, and when I say significant, we're talking tens, hundreds of thousands, because nothing else is going to make a difference, then the war cannot be mum militarily.

57:03And we know, I don't think I'm overguessing to say that there's no political appetite in the United States to deploy land forces into the Iranian war. I think as regards to the Russia-Ukraine war, that's a more difficult one to call. My guess is that what Putin will be thinking about will be about the coming economic crisis in Europe. Because one of the things that he could be saying to himself is, okay, I could respond as the Europeans start to ratchet up pressure on me. But actually, I can see what's coming. So by the time this economic crisis hits Europe, and at that stage, the Europeans will be recognised finally that they simply can't afford the weapons because they're actually tipping into recession.

57:52I mean, arguably, Germany's already in recession. I think both Britain and France probably are on the edge of it. that suddenly they're in deep economic trouble. And the last thing they want to do is to actually invite their countries to invest 5 % of their GDP in fighting a war, which by this stage they'll hopefully rise, cannot be won. If that happens, then I would like to think that it could be brought to a close by the end of the year if the recession hits. That's likely sort of a weird way to think about it, perhaps. If it were to be diplomacy, a lot will depend, I think, on, again, it might depend on the midterms, it might depend on how the neocons see it, it might depend on the E3 and their policies.

58:41But sooner or later, people, I'm sure, are going to recognise that the war cannot be won. The one other thing that could bring it to a close would be a change in policy by Russia, because the alternative to striking Europe, and I still do not think that's off the table, even though it's in this scenario, the alternative could be a move on Kiev, an Arbor move on Kiev. And I think that would be done not for military reasons, but for political reasons. And if the Kiev government were to collapse, then I think at that stage, I think it would be game over. So Russia would never mention it, but I wouldn't be surprised if it's been something that they fought through as a possible course of action.

59:24I mean, Putin has got to be under domestic pressure. He doesn't rule as an absolute dictator. I mean, he's got constituencies in the GRU, the military. Lots of people would like his job. I mean, how much pressure is he under to respond with force, greater force, do you think? I think he's under significant pressure. but I actually took the time when the war kicked off to listen to Oliver Stone's interviews with Putin to get to know the man and I also took the time to actually read Philip Short's biography of him and then I came out of that thinking this is a man who's extremely strategic and whatever you think about him due to what you heard in the press this is a person who deserves significant respect.

1:00:16So if I had been thinking about this, I would say we need to think very carefully because this is a strategic leader who deserves significant respect. I think he is under pressure, but equally I think he's the sort of man who will be able to resist this pressure and do what he thinks best, which is what I think he's been doing until now. So although I often hear people say, oh, why hasn't Putin, I hear podcasters and people in the alternative media saying that Putin is not being affected, he should have responded by now. I have a strong intuition that supported by the general staff, and when I went to Afghanistan before I went there, I read the Russian general staff's analysis of their Afghan campaign.

1:01:03They did a 10-year campaign and got out in good order after 10 years. And the structures that they left there took two years before actually things started to become again. We got out after 20 years, much more money expended. Things were collapsing around as we got out. I was really impressed by what the Russian general staff. So I would think that actually he's going to be very well advised as well by the Russian general staff. So I would think he's the sort of man who will be able to hold his nerve. And I think he's the sort of man who will do what he thinks right strategically. So again, although I've pushed that scenario as one to think about, and I would think that he will have that on the table.

1:01:43And it wouldn't surprise me if that one way in which that, if I were to forecast how that scenario would play out, rather than to put a sort of worst case, I'd say if he were going to use weapons, the first thing he would do is he would ring up the White House and say, we are going to use weapons against the E3. Then having done that, he would then say, ring up Mertz, Macron and Burnham as it will be and say, we are going to use weapons against production facilities unless we have a clear response from you saying that you will stop providing Ukraine with these sorts of weapons. So that's what I would guess he would do because he would escalate.

1:02:24So it's a different type of escalation. but in terms of holding his nerve I would think he will hold his nerve for a bit but I think a lot will depend on firstly how the war continues to play out secondly the economic conditions and thirdly the extent to which the Russians become nervous that they are going to find large weapons fired into the middle of Russia which have been built in France, Germany or Britain and if they do start to think that is going to happen then I would expect Putin to respond but in a very measured way. That sounds exactly right to me. What a wise analysis. Thank you for taking the time to do this.

1:03:03It's a pleasure, Tucker. And keep up the good work. I think we in the independent media, it's important. So often I get to the podcast I've done with Danny and Glenn Deason and others, people saying, thank goodness, it lasts some common sense. And we really need this common sense because the danger otherwise is that we'll do a 1914, which is the last thing we need to do. yeah i spent 35 years in traditional media and the second i went to independent media i thought this is where all the smart people are i wondered where they were they're not in traditional media so thank you and you're a perfect example so thank you for doing this yeah pleasure pleasure thanks