Iran’s show of strength

0:00This is The Guardian.

0:10Today, has Iran won the war?

0:30If you look at the pictures coming from Tehran, the streets completely packed with a procession estimated anywhere between hundreds of thousands and several million people, many of them waving the Iranian flag, you would believe the official line from the Islamic Republic. This is a show of strength and defiance. Proof that Iran won't be cowed. I'm just one dot on all those numbers you're seeing in from helicopters. is definitely very, very large. When I was in the mosque yesterday, it was absolutely rammed, packed, and people couldn't get into the mosque. There was clearly more than 56 ,000 there.

1:13The enormous crowds have gathered for a week-long funeral for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The 86-year-old had ruled as supreme leader for four decades until he and members of his family, including his daughter and grandchild, were killed in the first day of airstrikes of the US and Israel's war in Iran. In his final weeks, Khamenei presided over the killing of thousands of protesters. The country was bitterly divided. Many had hoped Trump would deliver on his promise to help them. On Thursday, Khamenei will be buried in Mashhad, the second biggest city in Iran where he was born. It's kind of two predominant emotions you come across, one of which is incredible remorse, his death.

1:59And the second emotion is one of anger and a desire for revenge. Flag saying, kill Trump. Kill the pedo. There's a lot of Epstein Island they talk about the whole time. And they say, he's a child molester. There's a kind of sense that they wanted to show the world that this was a message to the world, not just to themselves. One person said to me, you know, we may not have any missiles left, that we are the remaining missiles, by which they meant they are a kind of human shield for their country. But following a war that appears to have left the regime so confident and resilient, what exactly was achieved?

2:37And what will it mean for the ceasefire deal? From The Guardian, I'm Noshin Iqbal. Today in Focus, Iran after a war, a deal, and a funeral like no other.

2:57Patrick Winter, you're The Guardian's diplomatic editor and you're speaking to us from Tehran, where you're one of 300 foreign journalists invited by the regime to cover the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He was killed in February on the first day of the US and Israel's war in Iran. So why is the funeral only happening now? Largely because there's been a war going on and it's very difficult to conduct a war and put on a huge operation of a funeral of this kind at the same time. It's a distraction. And secondly, I think there's a real fear, and it remains a fear, that this funeral might be attacked and that if there was a gathering, a collection of all the kind of senior figures in the military, judiciary, political class, all in one place, that would be what would be described as a target-rich environment for Israel.

3:46It was really a security reasons. it's not kind of as absolutely chaotic as say two months ago I think there was more confidence in the regime than there was and I think there's been some kind of private understanding to the extent that it could be any understanding between Iran and America that America will not only not attack this funeral they'll make sure that Israel doesn't either. You said that there's a lot of security around various figures of the leadership but are they actually collectively on show in some ways. Yes, I mean, there was a complete long line of all the most senior figures in the military, the judiciary, and religion and politics in front of the caskets yesterday at morning prayers, including the three sons of Ali Khomeini who have not appeared in public.

4:34And they appeared together. There had been rumours that they had been killed. There was senior figures in the IRGC who haven't been seen for weeks and months. The one exception to all this is obviously the son, Mojabog. I mean, he's not attended any of these public events and he's whereabouts and health remains a mystery. He's sending out written messages quite frequently now but whether they're genuinely from him, there's been even no audio from him so it is slightly mysterious as to why they're holding him back so much. Obviously, the formal official explanation is security. But it is remarkable that almost every other single figure in Iranian public life has now appeared in public over the past 48 hours or so, and he hasn't.

5:23It's worth underlining, I guess, to listeners that, of course, he was appointed Iran's supreme leader after his father was assassinated. And as you said, he has suffered injuries, but to the extent of which we don't really know and not seen, as you've said. Patrick, You've told us about the hundreds of thousands, potentially millions of people who arrived in Tehran for this funeral. How much interaction have you been able to have with members of the public? Absolutely free to talk to anyone. And often they won't have quite big arguments. I mean, there was one discussion with a cleric in the streets today operating through a translator.

5:57And I don't know for the hell of it. I just started asking him about, you know, why do you still think you need to enrich uranium? What's the point of it? You know, think about all the damage he's doing to your country. He got quite heated and accused me of lying, and I just sat down asking questions, and we had to pull out of that conversation. It's almost the only conversation I've had where it's gone slightly wrong. I mean, afterwards, we all shook hands and it was fine, but there were people starting to throw water and get across. There is a kind of thirst for exchange and communication. People are incredibly friendly.

6:28Just going to shops, talk to people. If I hear the words, welcome to Iran again, I will go mad. they're very keen that we convey a real impression of what they regard iran is and there's lots of different opinions in tehran you meet people who say they didn't really have a great affection for the government or for i mean personally but they do feel an affection and love for their country and that's a different emotion and those people were out on the streets as well i should say that just about like two hours ago when i was on the march there was a woman who as i was walking sort was sidled up to me wearing the full tador and we were walking at the same time she was being very sort of surreptitious and she said there's still a revolution going on here it's not over and she said she wanted to talk more and then she realized that I'm surrounded by handlers and she just headed off.

7:19So even in the crowds you did actually get these dissenting voices and you would have expected that I mean there's thousands of them in Iran but actually they would have stayed away. And instead, what we see is this huge procession. Patrick, what does this show you about the strength of the Iranian regime? The media narrative from this is already that it has been a success. And that's why they've asked so many journalists to come is because they want to show the social cohesion and the anger inside this country. But it's more a question of what the balance of forces are, political forces are within Iran, within the government.

7:53And it's quite divided. And I think the big question about the political impact of this funeral and ceremonies is whether there's going to be a feeling in the government that they are now more secure, more legitimate, and therefore that they can take a tougher line with America and with Israel, and there'll be more uncompromising in the negotiations.

8:29Robert Malley, welcome to Today in Focus. Great being here. Thanks. You were a lead negotiator on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal known as the Obama deal or the JCPOA and were later named as the US's special envoy for Iran by President Biden. We've just heard from Patrick Winter, our diplomatic editor who's out in Tehran, talking to us about the scenes on the streets as people pour out for this funeral, five-day funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei. Iran and the U.S. do have the outlines of a deal. What can you tell me about what we know about it? I mean, what we know about it is obviously the text itself.

9:10But in essence, what it is, is an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which was something that the U.S. was desperate to see happen, for Iran to be able to sell its oil again and to, in this case, repatriate the funds from the sale of the oil and to agree to negotiate the rest. That's really what it is. We'll see whether the rest gets negotiated, if it's negotiated, whether a deal is achieved. But in essence, it boils down to something which is quite extraordinary when you think about it because the Strait of Hormones were open before the war began. And so essentially it was a negotiation and a deal to reopen it on terms that Iran could accept.

9:48and that the US was prepared to swallow. It does tell you something about the senselessness of this war, but that's where we are. And there's also another thing that's clearly missing, which is the nuclear issue, allegedly the very reason that the US began this war in the first place. What do you make of where that is now? Well, exactly. I mean, that's the point, is that the war was supposedly purportedly waged because of the nuclear threat that Iran represented, because of other issues as well, as we know. So it was a moving target of U.S. objectives all the way from regime change to addressing the nuclear issue.

10:24The nuclear issue is mentioned in the memorandum of understanding. There's some principles that are attached to how the negotiations are supposed to be led. But there's no finality and there's no detail and there's no assurance that the nuclear issue will be resolved in a way that's satisfactory to both sides. So the deal boils down to an agreement for economic reasons, for political reasons, to open the Strait of Hormuz and to kick those other issues a bit down the road. The negotiations on those issues are supposed to start in a week's time. But we'll have to see whether they could reach a deal or not.

10:57And the way the Memorandum of Understanding is drafted, it is very hard to see at this point how they're going to be able to bridge the gap between the two sides. And so it may well be that what you'll have in the end is a deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and then at best a series of transactions surrounding the nuclear issue that would allow Iran to make some concessions to the US and in return get greater sanctions relief. Well, given the lack of clarity on the nuclear issue, given the fact that the Strait of Hormuz still is under contention, something that wasn't before the war began. And given the fact that it seems to be a major strategic miscalculation on part of the US, does it feel to you like this is an Iranian victory?

11:44You know, I don't like this sort of arithmetic who won, who lost. between the U.S. and Iran, there's no doubt that given their relative expectations at the beginning of the war, Iran comes out with a stronger hand. And they could say that strategically, they withstood the strongest military in the world combined with the strongest military in the region, that they're still standing and that they could negotiate terms that were on paper more favorable to them than to the United States. The reason I hesitate about talking about who won and who lost is that deep, you know, Iran, it's hard to paint them as a victor when you look at the enormous economic damage that they have suffered as a result of this war, which is going to take them a very, very, very long time to recover from.

12:31And that regardless of what the sanctions relief they're being offered in the Memorandum of Understanding, none of it will compensate for the loss in human life and in material infrastructure that they've suffered. So yes, they won relative to the US, you know, when the dust settles and when they run in people and the Iranian government and regime are going to have to look at where things stand. They're going to find it very hard, as I said, to recover economically from the damage they suffered. And so to call them victors is only a relative term. In the broader sense, everyone has lost from this war.

13:16But as a diplomat who worked on the deal that was famously dunked on by Trump and then later ripped up by his administration in 2018, you know, even to a layperson, you know, it seems this current deal in its current form isn't any better. How do you compare the key differences between the two? So, you know, I'd say it's really we're in apples and oranges territory here. There's no real comparison to be made between the two. Now, one is a hundred, several hundred pages of detailed provisions on the steps that Iran would have to take to reduce its nuclear capacity, to agree to very strict supervision inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, something that took years to negotiate detailed sanctions relief from the U.S., from the United Nations, from Europe.

14:04The other is a page and a half of broad principles that previews what a nuclear deal might look like in very, very broad times, previews very broad and generous sanctions relief, but in essence doesn't delve into any of them in any detail whatsoever. So they really are not, you can't really compare the two. And this deal has broader implications in the region. When Iran was first attacked, it retaliated by sending a barrage of missiles and drones targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Amman. What impact has the deal had on U.S.-Gulf relations? How have those countries responded to it?

14:48Broadly speaking, I think they all thought this was a terrible idea because they knew in a way that perhaps the Trump administration didn't, that Iran would respond by attacking them and by trying to affect international commerce and the passage of the Strait of Hormuz. So they knew it was going to affect them. They argued against the war. The war took place anyway. And then it was waged in a way that didn't take into account their interests at all. And I just came back from a trip to the Gulf, and I can tell you, They all feel at some level that the U.S. didn't consult them about going into war and then didn't protect them from the impact of the war.

15:23The U.S. protected its own assets as best it could. It tried to protect Israel as best it could. Gulf countries came in third. Gulf countries made two wagers over the last, some of them, one wager over decades, the other one more recently. One wager was on the American security umbrella, the notion that to protect themselves against anyone, but in particular Iran, they would rely on American security guarantees. The umbrella protected some more than others and had quite a few holes in it. The other wager was more recent, which was that if we could improve our relations with Iran, try through economic means, diplomatic means, we may be able to protect ourselves from the Islamic Republic.

16:03Now, both wagers fell dramatically short. And yet, coming out of this war, they're going to have to redouble both bets. Both bets failed. Both bets are the only bets they're left with. On the one hand, they don't have an alternative to American military and security protection. And on the other hand, they have no alternative to their geography, which is they're neighbors of Iran. They can't afford to be in a situation of hostility, of open hostility with Iran, given what they've just experienced. So they're going to both try to get even closer to the U.S. security-wise, if possible, and try to restart conversations, dialogue with Iran.

16:40And we're seeing that including from countries like Saudi Arabia, like the United Arab Emirates. And then coming back to one of the points of this war, which affects all those Gulf countries, which is the Strait of Hormuz. We've talked about it a little bit. But as we said, it wasn't even a point of contention before this war began and now has become a defining aspect. It's been closed. It's been partially reopened. There's been naval escorts. There's been a toll proposed. What is the situation on the Strait right now as it stands? I mean, again, all I could go by is sort of press reports. It looks like it is reopened to some extent.

17:16But there's some, you know, obviously Iran, what Iran doesn't want, particularly now, is to give up a card that it has acquired as a result of the war. You know, the one from their perspective, you know, they always are looking for means of deterring attacks. The nuclear program has one deterrent, the missile program, the drone program. Perhaps the tool they found that is most effective and which they inherited as a result of the war was their ability to open or shut the Strait of Hormuz and therefore hold the global economy hostage. Even since the Memorandum of Understanding was reached, there have been a number of tit-for-tats over the Strait of Hormuz because the U.S.

17:52was trying to get some of the ships transiting along the Armani coast outside of Iranian control. And Iran obviously didn't want to give up that leverage, certainly in the middle of negotiations over the broader deal. So the Strait of Hormuz is living under the shadow of potential Iranian attacks to try to make sure that they maintain control and that they send the message that if they want to, they could close it again. That's their goal right now. Longer term, a number of countries are looking to see can they bypass the Strait of Hormuz so that they're less dependent on it and less subject to Iranian attacks.

18:28That's a longer term project right now. Again, what you hear from a number of Gulf countries is they dislike to their core the notion that Iran can assert any form of sovereignty, control, any form of payment, whether it's a toll or whether it's anything else. Either way, I think they also recognize that if that's the price to pay, in order to keep it open, they might swallow hard and do it, but they're going to fight as hard as they can to, A, prevent it, or if it occurs, to make sure that it's very limited and that whatever resources Iran derives from it are minimal and shared with other Gulf countries.

19:24Robert, from your longstanding expertise of Iran, what do you say the impact of this deal will be to the average Iranian person? I mean, is there a chance that the crippling sanctions that have been imposed on the country for decades, one of the most severe in the world, that they could finally come to an end? So, you know, what Iran is getting are two things. greater access to some of its own frozen assets, assets that have been frozen by the U.S. when it left the deal in 2018, and the ability to sell oil, at least for a period of two months, the period that has been allocated for these negotiations, which could be extended, the ability to sell this oil and to recover the proceeds from those sales.

20:04That's a significant amount of money. It's peanuts compared to what they lost economically. People are talking about a roughly 10 % drop in their GDP as a result of the war, hundreds of billions of dollars of cost in terms of what they've lost to infrastructure, anywhere between half a trillion and a trillion dollars. Whatever they're going to get at the result of the Memorandum of Understanding cannot compensate for the losses they incurred. So when I hear people complain about how much Iran is going to get out of it, I think they need to take a step back and realize that net-net, Iran is coming out of this having lost tremendously.

20:40Now, yes, the Iranian people will benefit to some extent. Again, they won't recover a fraction of what they lost. If the big deal that is described in the Memorandum of Understanding is reached, and that's a huge if, if you read the words, a lifting of all U.S. sanctions, something that has never been contemplated by any president, whether it's Obama, Biden, anyone else, which is all sanctions lifted, primary and secondary sanctions, so that basically the economic relations between the U.S. and Iran would be as it is between the U.S. and any other country. It's not clear what Iran would have to do in exchange other than its nuclear concessions.

21:17So it's a very strangely drafted deal, as I've said. But if that were to come to pass, if there was this grand bargain where the U.S. would lift all its sanctions, Iran would take whatever steps it needs to take for the U.S. to be satisfied, then of course that would have a dramatic impact on Iran's economy. But what is on the table now is important but modest. My guess is we're not going to see this grand deal. We may even see a breakdown, but the best case scenario, the best realistic case scenario is a series of smaller deals. You know, Iran says we're prepared to accept inspectors in exchange for more sanctions relief.

21:54We're prepared to turn over these 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, 60 % enriched uranium in exchange for more sanctions relief. So you may get a series of progressively more significant nuclear deals. And Iran, again, would benefit economically from that. But the grand bargain, that's something I think that's more in the world of dreams than of reality.

22:22Coming up, will this failed war torpedo Trump's chances in the midterms?

22:42England are still in the USA and so are we. Join me, Max Rushton, and a host of football experts as we overanalyse every game every day at the World Cup, including England's forthcoming quarterfinal against Norway. It's Haaland versus Gay, it's Herring versus Cod, it's Vikings versus agonising, tragic failure. The Guardian's World Cup Daily, available wherever you get your podcasts. Trump announced a$300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran without clarifying where that money would come from. What more do we know about that? And, you know, how far would it go to easing any of what Iran's been through?

23:18Yeah, so this is one of those promises which are way into the, well, I don't know, way into the future, but they're more imagination than reality. Maybe it will happen, maybe not, but it's all tied to this final deal, which, as I said, is pretty unlikely to come to pass. We're not doing anything. We're not putting up money. only if they're doing things right. If they're doing things right, if people want to invest, they can invest. But they had this... Now, in theory, I think what the U.S. had in mind was that Gulf countries would contribute to this fund because they're going to want to invest in Iran, and Iran is this country that has huge resources and a huge potential.

23:54And so it's a promise that the U.S. can make at no expense to itself, because it's not going to, in theory, it's not going to expend any of its own money, maybe some, but I don't think that was the thing. But it could promise other people's money on behalf of a deal that those other people had no hand in shaping. You know, none of them at this point has this idea in mind, the notion that the U.S. in negotiation with Iran could announce that other people are going to invest. Again, you know, if you need a caricature of what the Trump presidency is about, there you have it. And what about the argument that an injection of any kind of economic relief will effectively prove to be a lifeline for the Khamenei regime?

24:35I mean, the Khamenei regime, this Iranian Islamic Republic, has survived under tremendous economic pressure. The notion, and this is a very American, I don't know if it's a Western notion, which is, if you strangle an economy hard enough, long enough, then the regime will either collapse or surrender. I mean, look at Cuba, look at North Korea, look at Iran itself. It just doesn't work. It just doesn't work. I mean, you know, that's not the way regimes think. They don't think in this arithmetic way, you know, oh, we're suffering more. Now we're going to give up. Sometimes to the contrary, they think this shows that the U.S.