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18 Nov 2026 · 1h 1m · 28 chapters

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IL55: China Isn't Collapsing. It's Decaying ft. Logan Wright

In short

Logan Wright argues China isn’t “collapsing” but is structurally decaying due to a financial system that can’t recapitalize or reallocate credit effectively. He claims China’s investment/credit-led model has become path dependent: local-government incentives and bank lending keep funding insolvent projects, while credit growth has slowed sharply and fiscal capacity has eroded.

Guest background

Logan Wright is a partner at Rhodium Group, an independent research firm. His research focuses on China’s financial system and how it shapes outcomes in the Chinese economy. He spent two decades working in Beijing and Hong Kong and studied the financial system as part of his PhD.

Key claims

  1. Long-term plans conflict; policymaking is reactive rather than proactive.
  2. The 2008 stimulus was bank-funded, not fiscal-funded, creating incentives to keep rolling over bad investments.
  3. 2012–2016 financial reforms reduced funding-side risk but shifted it into credit risk, spreading defaults from shadow finance to property, then to local governments.
  4. Banking recapitalization is constrained by low profitability and limited retained earnings; debt write-down is politically and operationally difficult.
  5. Official GDP data are unreliable; Rhodium favors expenditure-side indicators and financial-system signals.

Notable examples

  • 2008 “4 trillion yuan” stimulus financed via banks.
  • Shadow banking expansion: about one-third of credit via shadow banks during a major credit surge.
  • Credit growth: ~18% (2003–2016) vs ~9% (2017–2024) vs ~5% recently.
  • Data anecdote: September 2024 local distress reports followed by stimulus while growth was reported “on target” at 5%.
  • Trade surplus surge and export-driven adjustment as domestic demand weakens.

Written by AI. May contain mistakes.

Chapters

0:00

Understanding Systemic Issues in China

Explore the unprofitable lending practices and the concept of economic decay in China.

“The system is very unprofitable because it lends it relatively low rates and relatively low net interest margins.”
2:00

Logan Wright's Journey in China

Logan shares his background and experiences in China, including his research focus.

“Okay, so you spent two decades working in Beijing and Hong Kong.”
4:25

China's Economic Perception vs. Reality

Discussion on the disparity between China's long-term planning and actual economic outcomes.

“And I assume there'll be a lot more of them.”
5:34

The Myth of Long-Term Thinking in China

Delve into the myth of China's long-term thinking and its implications on policy.

“We've had Susan Shirk on the show as well as Stephen Roach.”
7:01

Reactive vs. Proactive Policies

Explore how China's economic policymaking is more reactive than planned.

“Well, broadly speaking, I mean, I think that there is a lot of long-term planning in China, but the best way to understand it is that many of the long-term plans conflict with one another.”
8:34

The Impact of Credit Expansion

Understanding the significant credit expansion in China's economy and its consequences.

“about a third of that credit was basically extended by shadow banks.”
10:38

The Evolution of the Chinese Financial System

A historical overview of the development and structure of China's financial system.

“I mean, to me, there was a little bit of an irony because you say, you know, initially the thing that really characterized China's financial system was a lack of capital, right?”
14:00

China's Economic Growth Post-WTO

Learn about China's rapid economic growth after joining the WTO and the challenges they faced with credit control.

“And so you had very rapid growth in both nominal and real terms after WTO accession.”
15:00

Impact of the Global Financial Crisis

Explore how the global financial crisis affected China's economy and their response with a stimulus plan.

“There's an employment impact, especially in export-oriented factories.”
18:00

Stimulus Funding and Local Government Dynamics

Understand the differences between banking system funding and fiscal stimulus and how local governments responded.

“Like you, let's say potentials eight, you hit 14 % of the peak, you're going to hit five at the trough.”
Show all 28 chapters
21:00

Local Governments and Investment Incentives

Learn how local governments in China incentivize growth through tax structures and their impact on investment.

“sort of the some of the benefits of stability, the banking system.”
22:50

Symbiotic Relationships in China's Economy

Discover the interconnected interests between local governments, banks, and property developers in driving growth.

“And it was successful because local officials want to stand out relative to their peers.”
25:20

Deleveraging Attempts in 2017-2018

Examine the efforts made by China to deleverage its economy and the unintended consequences that followed.

“So the incentives are entirely aligned here.”
26:50

Transformations in China's Financial System

Learn about the fundamental changes in China's financial system from 2012 to 2016 and their implications.

“So, you know, between this is, I think, just still one of the most underappreciated aspects of China's development, especially in finance.”
28:00

Beijing's Concerns Over Financial Stability

Exploration of Beijing's actions to mitigate financial risks and credit access issues.

“And they thought they were going to have a U.S.-style financial crisis.”
29:04

The Cascade of Credit Risk in China

Analysis of how credit risk has emerged and spread throughout China's economy.

“Starts with peer-to-peer lending networks in 2018.”
31:08

The Decay of China's Economic System

Discussion on the structural issues leading to the decay of China's financial and fiscal systems.

“We're now at$74 trillion in banking system assets, about 60 % of global GDP.”
32:08

Comparing China's Situation to Japan

Comparison of China's economic challenges with Japan's historical economic issues.

“So I guess, is that the right analogy, and is there a process underway?”
33:58

Challenges in Recapitalizing the Banking System

Insights on why recapitalization of Chinese banks is complex and unlikely.

“Why can't the banking system be recapitalized out of foreign assets?”
35:52

The Dilemma of Local Governments and Debt

Examination of local governments' debt issues and the signaling problems in China's economy.

“So, you know, why declare the loss at all?”
38:12

Reliability of Chinese Economic Data

Critique of the reliability of China's economic data and its implications.

“Let's talk a little bit about that because you have a section of the book on Chinese data, the quality of it, the reliability.”
41:20

Discrepancies in Economic Indicators

Exploration of discrepancies between official GDP data and alternative economic indicators.

“You know, the inflation rate is negative.”
42:00

Analyzing China's GDP Data Discrepancies

Explore the nuances of China's GDP data and investment trends.

“But the bottom line is, you know, no one will be proven right at any point publishing an alternative series.”
45:10

China's Global Economic Influence

Discuss the implications of China's growth narrative on global trade.

“It's a little bit off to the side, but it relates to this issue of data, which is, you know, they have these ambitions in artificial intelligence.”
48:40

China's Export Growth and Domestic Challenges

Understand how China's domestic slowdown impacts its export strategies.

“What we're seeing right now, Robin Brooks has been writing a lot about this, is just a surge in exports, a surge in trade surpluses to basically everywhere aside from the U.S.”
53:10

Western Strategies in Response to China's Economic Model

Learn about strategies to contend with China's economic practices.

“And we could go into the reasons, and you do this quite well in the book, the reasons why it's difficult to rebalance toward consumption.”
56:00

China's Evolving Strategy and International Response

Explore how China's strategy has changed and the international reaction to these changes.

“But right now, the West is not using the leverage it has to sort of change Chinese behavior in the same way.”
58:30

Book Discussion: 'Broken China'

A discussion about Logan Wright's book, highlighting its insights and historical context.

“It's got great historical context, really crisp analysis of the current situation.”
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Transcript

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0:01Kevin Coldiron: So this is why the system is broken. The system is very unprofitable because it lends it relatively low rates and relatively low net interest margins. So you don't have, you can't really recapitalize except out of retained earnings. If you constrain the retained earnings too much, you can't keep growing. You can't keep the economy funded. And therefore you have to keep lending to the same insolvent enterprises. And that's decay. It's not crisis or collapse. It's decay.

0:31Kevin Coldiron: Welcome to Top Traders Unplugged. In markets, success doesn't come from predicting what happens next. It comes from being prepared for what you can't predict. In each episode, we go deep with some of the world's most thoughtful minds in investing, economics, and beyond to understand how they think, how they prepare, and how they decide, and the experiences that shaped how they see the world. No noise, no shortcuts, just real conversations to help you think better and invest with confidence.

1:04Logan Wright: Welcome everyone to Top Traders Unplugged. My name is Kevin Coldiron and I'm host of the Ideas Lab series where we talk with authors of new books that help us understand and navigate the global economy. Our guest today is Logan Wright. He's a partner at the independent research firm Rhodium Group, where his research focuses on China's financial system and how it shapes outcomes in the Chinese economy. And he's joining us today to talk about his new book called Broken China, How the Economic Miracle Shattered and What It Means for the World. Now, that's a narrative that's obviously very different than what we often hear on mainstream media.

1:44Logan Wright: And today we're going to dig in to why Logan believes China is facing a structural and long-term decline in economic performance. Logan, really appreciate you joining us. Thank you, and welcome to the show. Thanks, Kevin.

1:57Kevin Coldiron: Really appreciate it. Glad to be here.

2:00Logan Wright: Okay, so you spent two decades working in Beijing and Hong Kong. You studied the financial system as part of your PhD. Tell us a little bit about how you got interested in China. How did you come to study it as a student? And then, you know, I want to hear about your experience living and working there.

2:18Kevin Coldiron: Yeah, kind of a fit of absence of mind, to be perfectly honest. China is the first place I ever spent any significant time outside the country in a summer language program in 1999. and so basically after I graduated college, I just sort of moved to Beijing and tried to figure out how to make a living and ended up doing a bunch of different things, worked for a bunch of different startups into a company that was doing sort of commercial establishment, helping smaller businesses get set up in China, often from Australia, Israel, Europe, you know typically not even not even american firms and so met a lot of the business community found this sort of intersection fascinating and it's worth keeping in mind just how much china was changing so rapidly in the early 2000s in particular right after wto accession the amount of of foreign capital coming in the amount of interest and so it was this you know really dynamic environment, really intellectually open as well.

3:24Kevin Coldiron: And so when I finally was thinking about what to research more on a longer term basis, I wanted to find something that reflected the intersection of this dynamic business environment, the international marketplace, and China's political culture. And so very early, I settled on the exchange rate as this sort of indicator and enabler of China's financial and economic reform and something that you know really reflected the balance between state and market adjustment and you know as i started interviewing people in the central bank and the banking regulator and other financial technocrats who were very willing to talk to me you know at that point i mean i talked about this in the book where um people forget that in the 2000s you know the perception really was that china was becoming stronger precisely because it was opening up to the rest of the world and And the conversations I had were really unremarkable.

4:18Kevin Coldiron: I mean, many of these officials thought, well, it's interesting that foreign grad students are studying our system and want to know how it works. And I assume there'll be a lot more of them. So, you know, I spoke, you know, pretty, pretty bad Chinese and, you know, got through it and learned a lot. And so, you know, basically, I've I've done some version of that ever since in following the dissertation writing this. I worked for a small American fixed income and currency research firm in Beijing and then another one that was more focused on central bank policy. And I've been at Rhodium Group for the last 11 years as well.

4:56Kevin Coldiron: But that's sort of the origin of this. I've followed most of the twists and turns of China's central bank monetary policy decisions, but the broader economic trajectory over the last two decades. And it's been, I think, the underappreciated part, which I try to highlight in the book, is how much things changed and how abruptly the trajectory changed in the early 2010s and especially sort of toward the late 2010s in terms of China's potential growth and the capacity of its policymaking process to respond.

5:33Logan Wright: Yeah, it's interesting to hear that perspective. We've had Susan Shirk on the show as well as Stephen Roach. And those are people who've spent careers, obviously, in China. And they kind of tell the same story of this kind of going from openness and dialogue, debate to a very different kind of intellectual environment now, which is a shame. But then that's where we are. We have to deal with the world how it is. And I want to maybe start with kind of a high level observation that you make multiple times in the book, which is that, you know, there's this, I mean, you call it a myth that China thinks longer term than the West.

6:16Logan Wright: And I have to say, you kind of burst a little bit of a bubble for me because there's that famous quote by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, where, you know, Kissinger asks him what he thought of the French Revolution. He says, well, it's too early to tell. And that's always kind of rolled out as kind of an example of how China thinks longer term than the West. But of course, you say in the book, actually, Zhou Enlai was referring to the 1968 French student demonstrations, not the 1789 revolution. But more generally, presumably, you formed this view that China's thinking isn't longer term than the West based on your own personal experience.

6:56Logan Wright: So can you give us some, you know, some reasons or maybe a little bit of the backstory of how you came to that view?

7:03Kevin Coldiron: Sure. Well, broadly speaking, I mean, I think that there is a lot of long-term planning in China, but the best way to understand it is that many of the long-term plans conflict with one another. And you have revealed preferences in terms of which ones are more important, which sort of leads to the absence of an overall design. And that's just saying that politics is operable. It's not necessarily, you know, a really, you know, revolutionary or unconventional sort of conclusion in that regard. But that's really what's what happens. The other thing is that long-term plans as they are defined in China change quite a bit.

7:38Kevin Coldiron: And so it's not – if you look at the foundation of China's long-term explanation of their growth in political influence, it's supposed to be tied to the growth of the economy. and it's supposed to be tied to the growth of the economy's throw weight in international affairs and China is a source of domestic demand and it's sort of attractive power that they can use this for international influence. But I've studied the basic twists and turns of China's economic policymaking over the last two decades. Everything appears far more reactive than proactive. Everything, I mean, it was no, and I cite this in the book, it was in no one's long-term plan to have the largest single country credit expansion in over a century, adding around a third of global GDP in new credit in just eight years.

8:33Kevin Coldiron: And the last half of those eight years, most of that, about a third of that credit was basically extended by shadow banks. So this was completely out of control and out of regulatory, and knowingly so. I mean, these were political trade-offs that allowed certain developments of the shadow banking system to emerge, even at the cost of additional financial speculation. But it was no one's plan to have, you know, at one point, this huge equity market boom and bust. The irony was, like, I was in Beijing at that time, and people would come through on brokerage visits, you know, basically every month.

9:09Kevin Coldiron: And so I would typically be like a later visit. So, you know, I'm not that important. So people just like, if they can cram in coffee with me at the end of their trip. It's always interesting. And so I just get to ask, like, what are you hearing? And basically the two common points of the Beijing narrative that always came through in these sort of conversations was first, if something went wrong, we meant to do it. Second, this is actually part of a longer - It sounds like my kids, actually. Yeah, exactly. Like second, this is actually part of longer term reform. And the interesting thing was it was a different set of things that they were making explanations for virtually every month, let alone every year.

9:46Kevin Coldiron: So in reality, I mean, I think that it's far easier to explain the ups and downs and the cycles in China's economy through the lens of what's happened within the financial system, because this is an investment-led economy with weak operating cash flows in the state-owned and local government universe, which means if you can figure out what's happening to credit, you can typically figure out what's happening to activity. and what was happening to credit was certainly not any part of a long-term plan um in terms of how this adjusted and then so that's that's the the core kind of view that i would make like a the the constraint that china faces right now is basically of certain plans going awry and they are compensating in different ways sorry go ahead i know no no that's that it just you you know you

10:33Logan Wright: you were saying that no one had planned this massive credit expansion, but we did get it. And so, so let's talk about that because you, you really place, you did a great job of, I mean, the financial system is complicated, obviously, but I thought you did a great job of really kind of simplifying the essence of it. And so let's talk about this. I mean, to me, there was a little bit of an irony because you say, you know, initially the thing that really characterized China's financial system was a lack of capital, right? A constraint on private firms getting access to capital. And here we are, you know, a couple of decades later, and it's completely the opposite.

11:10Logan Wright: There's too much credit flowing and no discipline. So can you talk about that journey? What are the essential? Well, you know, tell us what the financial system looked like when you arrived in China and then talk us what, you know, what are the main actors now and how's it structured?

11:28Kevin Coldiron: Yeah, sure. So basically, you know, the brief history of the Chinese financial system is that the financial system started as just a collection of individual state banks that were basically budgetary authorities. They were dispensing loans, but this was kind of, you know, in line with budgetary plans. And so for a while it was a monobank, then there were four separate commercial banks. And then you had, you know, banks get very aggressive and local governments get very aggressive right after the 1992 southern tour from dung shaoping which really catalyzed this huge wave of local government investment also catalyzed a lot of inflation over 20 percent inflation and so quickly you know ju rongji comes in as head of the pboc he raises interest rates by 10 percentage points they rein in the financial system and its expansion and the net result is by the late 1990s after this austerity has come in because you have to control inflation And Chinese banks are sitting on trillions of yuan of non-performing loans, hundreds of billions more accurately.

12:33Kevin Coldiron: And so in 1999, and then you have the Asian financial crisis. And so China's in this position where they're facing capital outflows. Everyone thinks their banking system is basically insolvent because there's these de facto non-performing loans that are taking place. And so you need some solution. So they do a large banking system bailout and restructuring. But the idea of this bailout and restructuring is to bring in foreign capital, bring in foreign management, and therefore sort of legitimize the reform of the financial system. So between 98 and 2003, when you have the final sort of injections of capital take place, you have these write-offs of assets of about almost 20 % of the assets in the banking system at that point, effectively written off.

13:20Kevin Coldiron: The total cost of the bailout ends up being about 50 % of GDP, I mean, in terms of how it was shaken out. But the basic story was that China grew out of it. And so they were able to grow out of it because the economy was underinvested. Because for years, you started from such a low point of development in the late 1970s that virtually any new investment you put in place would have been profitable and productive because the capital stock was so low. And in certain areas, it still is low. And you could still make those investments and be more productive. So, you know, this is a, you know, this is not a straightforward diagnosis, but when I arrived, the story was the recapitalization and the restructuring the banking system.

13:59Kevin Coldiron: And that provided a certain degree of time and flexibility and interest and foreign capital and, you know, continued, you know, continued linkages between the China macro story and the rest of the world. And so you had very rapid growth in both nominal and real terms after WTO accession. The problem was, in fact, controlling credit. The problem was there was too many capital inflows from trade inflows from the trade surplus, capital inflows from foreign direct investment. The PBOC had to sort of tamp down appreciation of the exchange rate, but they still let it appreciate to a large extent. And then they were just trying to control credit and make sure that not too many loans went out the door.

14:43Kevin Coldiron: And they did that largely with quotas. So, you know, this sort of worked for a while. You know, credit was certainly not out of control. And there were a lot of central controls on credit. And then the global financial crisis hits. And China is sort of indirectly hit by the global financial crisis. Their exports are hit very significantly, but the domestic economy is not hit that aggressively. There's an employment impact, especially in export-oriented factories. But basically, China's part of the global response to the crisis where everyone looks around for about 10 % of GDP in stimulus. And in China's context, that means the 4 trillion yuan, quote unquote, stimulus plan in 2008, which was around 10 % of China's GDP at the time, a little bit more.

15:31Kevin Coldiron: So they're going to launch this stimulus effort, but the reality is they don't fund it with fiscal spending. They fund it with the banks. And that's the most important distinctions made. And it's not like a fatal – I mean, they could have corrected this at any point by just fiscalizing some of these loans. But the net result is that they release a lot of the controls over local governments that they had put in place before.

15:58Logan Wright: Given the relative insulation of the domestic economy from the rest of the world, as you said, they weren't as impacted by the GFC as other places. Why did they feel the need to do that level of stimulus? number one um and number two um why do it through the banking system as opposed to well maybe just actually explain to the listeners just what the why it's such a critical difference between funding the stimulus to the banking system as opposed to fiscal stimulus like in terms of the impact on

16:33Kevin Coldiron: the economy sure so basically the end borrowers are the same the end borrowers are these local state-owned enterprises that are implementing these projects. And there are many new companies and shell companies that were created, local government financing vehicles around this time. But if you fund it through fiscal resources, you're basically taking the debt on balance sheet and you're limiting it in terms of scope. What happened with the banks is that you relax these firm limits on credit growth that you would put in place. So it actually expands much faster because local governments sort of then move to the commanding heights of the economy.

17:10Kevin Coldiron: They basically can hold Beijing hostage. And why did they do this? Because Beijing wasn't sure exactly how widespread the global financial crisis was going to be. They thought at the time, our exports are going to be under pressure for a long period of time. And so we need to make sure that our domestic response is robust to ensure a certain degree of growth and a certain degree of employment. and therefore if we're going to make mistakes, we're going to make mistakes on the side of more credit and more investment rather than less. So even from the very early, and then this is about confidence as well.

17:46Kevin Coldiron: You hear, we want to restore confidence in policymaking. I recite in the book how I said to a relatively senior Chinese official at the time, why do you need the growth target to be 8 % in 2009? Like you, let's say potentials eight, you hit 14 % of the peak, you're going to hit five at the trough. You know, why not just say the target should be five rather than eight? And he said, I totally agree with you. But if we, you know, if we said it was five, everyone in the party would actually think that it's zero. And so this was about this sort of like confidence that China was going to get through this and that was going to sort of lead the world out of recession.

18:26Kevin Coldiron: And so the errors were deliberately on one side. And I think that's the key point is that when you relax those controls, it does a few things to China's political incentives. So one, it creates this sort of, you know, the financial system can then become a shock absorber for bad investments for the political system. So, you know, if you don't want to face bankruptcies or layoffs, you don't have to. You just roll over more credit and you just keep credit flowing out the door. And a second, you create this sort of path dependent model of growth. Growth is now strong, led by investment. So, yeah, others are talking, the World Bank's talking very aggressively with you about, you know, you should be rebalancing the economy.

19:08Kevin Coldiron: But growth is already pretty strong and credit funds that investment and it's working. and so why should you know we really listen to the the people talking about rebalancing i mean it creates this sort of powerful you know path dependent incentive um you can't show us this isn't working um at this point and and again local governments can then sort of play this sort of hostage politics where they say you need to keep funding these projects and the moment you keep funding these projects we'll start new ones and then you'll have to keep funding those and so the development of this process leads to this regulatory cat and mouse in which the regulators try to control overall credit with monetary tightening in some cases, with more credit quotas in some cases.

19:52Kevin Coldiron: And the local governments in the banks who have incentives in keeping this credit going, especially because local governments really drive the regulation of the banks, they basically create shadow channels and regulatory arbitrage, which makes it harder for Beijing to see what's actually happening. And so then Beijing's in a more difficult bind because these shadow channels actually look like they're kind of reformist institutions. They're, you know, really moving toward more market pricing of credit. And so the financial technocrats don't really want to shut them down. I recall being at a lecture I was giving at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in January 2013, back when such a thing could be done.

20:32Kevin Coldiron: And I mean, I'm sure it still could be done, just probably not by, you know, foreign interlopers like me. But the point I made was like, you were creating a relatively stable pace of non-performing loans with a relatively stably funded financial system. And now you have essentially a wealth inequality machine where you're offering higher and higher returns. You're not really sure where money is going and you're generating non-performing loans at an unpredictable rate, you know, while sacrificing sort of the some of the benefits of stability, the banking system. And the response that came back was, yes, we understand.

21:08Kevin Coldiron: But if we don't take this opportunity to reform the system, we'll never have another one. And so the intention, again, is to make certain kinds of errors, to err on one side. And again, there's these are understandable at the time, but they don't add up to a long term plan to do any of this. This adds up to a very reactive process in which you're managing this on the way through. And that's really where a lot of that discussion comes back.

21:36Logan Wright: Can you tell us a little bit about just the interaction between local governments and the companies in their areas and the investment-led growth model? Because I thought you did a really great job in the book of explaining essentially that local governments, again, correct me if I'm wrong, but they've got kind of two main sources of revenue. Number one is land, land sales. And number two is kind of like a gross receipts tax on the companies in their area. So gross receipts, basically the tax isn't based on income, it's based on sales, broadly speaking. So what I got from your book is that creates an incentive for them to really have high growth manufacturing companies in their area and not really worry about whether or not they're profitable because the tax isn't based on income, it's based on gross receipts.

22:35Logan Wright: And, you know, first of all, is that correct? And secondly, how does that structure lead or help drive this kind of overinvestment problem.

22:47Kevin Coldiron: Yep. You have already diagnosed it very well. So the tax incentives do this at that level. So important to understand for years of China's development, local government competition, competition among local officials to produce new investments, to produce new reform ideas, to produce new policy innovations, like these sort of laboratories, federalist type approach was very successful. And it was successful because local officials want to stand out relative to their peers. But in a world in which you're incentivized based on tax revenues, on generating output, as you say, for exactly those reasons, China charges a lot in value-added tax.

23:30Kevin Coldiron: They charge a lot in these turnover or business taxes, which were sort of faded into value-added taxes. They charge a lot in corporate enterprise income tax. They do not charge very much in domestic consumption taxes or individual income taxes. So value-added taxes hypothetically don't have to do this, but the share of value-added tax between central and local government is 50-50. And this has been adjusted several times over the years. So that encourages local governments to basically locate as much value-added within their jurisdiction as possible. So in other words, you not only want to build a manufacturer, you want to build the a company that's going to buy that manufacturer and use that as an input.

24:07Kevin Coldiron: And then you want to capture as much of that revenue as possible. That naturally leads to overcapacity. And the ultimate funding of all this investment without regard for where final demand is, is a local bank, essentially. So I'm incorrect when I say, when I characterize it as a gross receipts tax. It is. There used to be gross receipts taxes as well. So like they faded in. These used to be these kind of business taxes. But you're absolutely right. The incentives are the same. I mean, the incentive is to taxes on output. So no, you were correct in that regard. They phased out business taxes into value-added taxes, but there's still characteristics of both around 2014, 2015.

24:44Kevin Coldiron: I need to check. But this was true for most of this post-crisis period where the incentives were to generate output. And so as a result, you have an incentive to build without really being concerned about where final demand comes from because historically that hasn't been a problem.

25:01Logan Wright: The credit for these businesses are coming from largely state-owned banks located in those regions who, I don't know if the local government has a share in those, but there's a nexus there as well.

25:15Kevin Coldiron: City and county banks that essentially serve as secondary fiscal institutions for the local governments in which in most cases, the officials running the banks are directly from the local governments themselves. Gotcha. So the incentives are entirely aligned here. And it's a symbiotic relationship with property developers as well, because you want the property developers to buy land within your jurisdiction. And so therefore, you offer them incentives to do so. And therefore, land generates a lot of employment and generates a lot of output. And real estate development generates a lot of this activity.

25:46Kevin Coldiron: And so everybody wins for a while as long as it's moving all in the right direction. So anyone looking at this system, even if you're very cynical, looks at the series of interlocking interests along with a lot of gray income associated with all of this and looks at the system and says, there's no way this ever ends. Property prices will always go up. In fact, they'll have to support the property sector at every stage. And so this leads to these beliefs that ultimately property prices have to rise. It's a degree of cynicism about how the system was operating at that point, not just optimism about growth prospects as well.

26:28Logan Wright: So that kind of evolves or gets turbocharged after the financial crisis. And then you then talk about an attempt, I believe, in 2017, 2018, to kind of like deleverage the economy. me. So explain what happened there and then what were the unintended consequences?

26:51Kevin Coldiron: Sure. So, you know, between this is, I think, just still one of the most underappreciated aspects of China's development, especially in finance. I wrote about this first in a longer report in 2018 called Credit and Credibility. But the nature of the financial system changed fundamentally between 2012 and 2016, and almost no one noticed. In 2012, you had a stable deposit-funded system that made loans to state-owned enterprises that were relatively inefficient. You had steady inflows of deposits from trade surpluses. By 2016, the marginal growth in funding on liabilities was a non-deposit instrument, a wealth management product or some sort of asset-backed commercial paper type instrument.

27:37Kevin Coldiron: The marginal loan was basically outside of the formal banking system. It was to a property developer, a local government financing vehicle, or a third-party asset manager. And funding conditions were very – balance of payments conditions had been rocked by the stock market boom and bust, the currency depreciation. So suddenly banks are scrambling for funding in some months and flush in funding other months. Totally different system. Beijing was legitimately concerned that they had created this huge asset liability mismatch, that they were going to have short-term funding stress similar to what they had unlocked in 2013 with a different episode of interbank market stress.

28:15Kevin Coldiron: And they thought they were going to have a U.S.-style financial crisis. And so, therefore, they took steps basically to eliminate the funding side risk by bringing these wealth management products back on balance sheet, phasing out. And they did this with monetary tightening, and then they did this with regulatory instruments. And it was very skillful in terms of managing the overall fallout. But the net result was you basically swapped a liability side risk with a credit risk in terms of what happened on the asset side. Because the shadow banking system had become so large that when you cut off these sources of funding, even if you had solved your sort of short-term asset liability mismatch, you then had roughly half the borrowers in the economy that did not have access to credit.

29:03Kevin Coldiron: And so when you cut off access to credit, all of a sudden you start to see this cascade of credit risk that had previously been contained by this steady inflow of credit start to emerge. Starts with peer-to-peer lending networks in 2018. Spreads to smaller banks that are lending to non-bank financial institutions like Baoshang, Jinzhou in 2019. Goes to trust companies that are lending to property developers, these local government-owned sort of investment companies in 2020. There are protests on the streets of Shanghai in 2020 about losses in these trust companies. People really gloss over a lot of this.

29:40Kevin Coldiron: Property developers default in 2021. Individual mortgage loans come under pressure in 2022. By 2023, the entire local governments need a bailout in terms of an extension of some of their debt over time. So the credit risk starts spreading from the periphery to the center. And as it spreads to the center, credit demand starts collapsing because all of a sudden there's real default risk. Lenders don't want to lend to property developers that are facing this distress. And private firms don't want to borrow because they're looking at a deflationary environment in which there aren't really many opportunities for positive returns.

30:15Kevin Coldiron: So you start to see credit growth average 18 % from 2003 to 2016. It averages 9 % from 2017 to 2024. We're now at 5%. And the point is that Beijing manages this economy through the extension of credit via state-owned banks in aggregate and through allocation of fiscal resources. At the same time as this credit growth slows and the property sector starts weakening, you see this erosion of China's fiscal capacity because all of this investment that depends upon credit that funds the fiscal revenues that are fed back through land sales, all of a sudden that just starts to erode China's fiscal revenues at the same time.

30:56Kevin Coldiron: So fiscal revenues have been basically flat if you include land sales since 2019, and the deficits have expanded. So this is why the system is broken. it is an explanation not a prediction about where china goes but you can't use the fiscal system you can't use the financial system to respond to the same pressures and you don't have other policy tools that are effective because the last mile of fiscal policy however you were trying to stimulate demand is still clogged with debt and if you cannot write down the bad loans in the financial system because the system is just too large. We're now at$74 trillion in banking system assets, about 60 % of global GDP.

31:40Kevin Coldiron: The system is very unprofitable because it lends it relatively low rates and relatively low net interest margins. So you can't really recapitalize except out of retained earnings. If you constrain the retained earnings too much, you can't keep growing. You can't keep the economy funded. And therefore, you have to keep lending to the same insolvent enterprises and that's decay it's not crisis or collapse it's decay and this is why like to me

32:07Logan Wright: the early years of japan the kind of extend and pretend era and then i think my understanding of that um what eventually happened in japan is you know he created this you know richard kuh um called it the balance sheet recession, and that over time, balance sheets got repaired as people and companies paid down debt, but that took many, many years to happen. So I guess, is that the right analogy, and is there a process underway? I guess you say you can't really pay down debt out of retained earnings if your firms are fundamentally at very, very low profit margins. Maybe that's the difference between Chinese firms and Japanese firms.

32:56Kevin Coldiron: I was going to highlight exactly that. I mean, the Japanese firms were still operating cash flow positive, right? So that made sense. Like that's critical to Richard Kuh's argument. It made sense for these firms to continue operating rather than close up shop. They just, you know, it just made monetary policy ineffective because they didn't want to borrow. So credit demand was weak. Hence, you needed to use fiscal policy. I spend a lot of time in Japan talking about exactly this because this is where Chinese economists sort of go to talk to the Japanese about their experience as well. And it's very, very interesting.

33:27Kevin Coldiron: So I think the difference is that in China, you can't necessarily use fiscal policy. You have much greater fiscal policy constraints than monetary policy constraints. The only – because the last mile of fiscal policy is the implementation problem. So you could create new companies that hypothetically aren't indebted, But this is just a macro problem. Essentially, you can get the central bank to allocate credit through particular channels to particular firms, but there's only so much you can do that in a targeted manner. You certainly can't do it as a broader sort of counter cyclical support for the economy overall because you have so many of these entities that are that are constrained.

34:06Logan Wright: Why can't the banking system be recapitalized out of foreign assets? So you've had China had these massive current account surpluses year after year, decade after decade. So they build up this stock of foreign assets. um why can't that be used to you know to basically recapitalize the uh the banking system well for

34:38Kevin Coldiron: foreign lending for foreign lending that is happening like you you are seeing for cdb and exim they occasionally get um for their overseas loans they occasionally get foreign exchange related uh recapitalizations but for domestic banks it doesn't really matter um you've already basically created when you've acquired foreign assets through foreign exchange intervention, you've already created domestic money. And the problem is that it's the domestic assets that are impaired. So basically pledging the foreign assets doesn't make any sense. You have to basically create the domestic money to buy them from the central bank balance sheet.

35:15Kevin Coldiron: So if you're creating the domestic money, that's actually the recapitalization you need. It's not about the foreign assets. They did it last time that way because it was a signal that the capital would not be spent down. It was a signal that you would have limits to how quickly the foreign assets be converted. It was a signal to foreign investors that the banks would stay capitalized to a certain level. That's why they did it with foreign assets at that point. But otherwise, it's kind of, the foreign assets offer you no real benefit relative to recapitalization. The bigger question is, why don't they recapitalize the banks?

35:55Kevin Coldiron: and the answer is externally it's too big you'd have to get into a discussion with and only a few banks you know probably can get external capital at this point and they're probably not the most impaired at this stage so you really don't want to start a discussion with the international marketplace and whether the npl ratio is really five percent or fifteen percent because that still involves trillions of dollars of write-offs and no one really wants to participate in that Second, if you're going to do it domestically, a good bank, bad bank restructuring, you still have to fund the bad bank. So, you know, why declare the loss at all?

36:31Kevin Coldiron: Why not? If the whole purpose is just to improve credit transmission in the domestic economy, just try to improve credit transmission in the domestic economy. And how are they doing that? Well, structural lending tools, the central bank. And we've been doing this basically since 2014. So we've been in this kind of predicament where a banking system recapitalization is highly unlikely. And this is why decay is much easier because actually, you know, executing on the banking system recapitalization, it's not clear what it gets you in terms of flow. It's not clear who it benefits. And meanwhile, you're taking this huge fiscal cost or you're declaring a huge fiscal cost.

37:08Kevin Coldiron: You're also saying that there's a huge problem with your growth model, which you don't want to say externally. um so i think that's why it just doesn't happen that's why you know the decay continues and instead like two months ago you had a uh 300 billion yuan um banking system recapitalization uh 400 350 um so 54 billion dollars um as it you know and it's basically going to have this very marginal effect on you know overall credit growth so you'll get these incremental kind of recapitalizations of the major banks the other issue is you don't really know where the bad assets are. Local governments aren't going to tell you.

37:44Kevin Coldiron: They don't have any incentive to. They have an incentive to tell you where all the bad assets are the moment you say that you're going to pay for all of them. Otherwise, the ambiguity persists. And so Beijing wants to put pressure on local governments to reduce debt on their own. But the moment they do that too much, it slows the economy too much because it slows local government investment. Then they have to turn around and provide temporary bailouts. But the more in which they actually clarify those bailouts, the more debt emerges. And so, you know, this is the dilemma that they've been in for about a decade.

38:15Kevin Coldiron: So it's very much a signaling problem. And it's important to understand that statistics and audit results and things like this are signaling mechanisms in Chinese politics to a greater extent that they're, you know, accurate sort of reflections of where financial conditions are.

38:37Logan Wright: Let's talk a little bit about that because you have a section of the book on Chinese data, the quality of it, the reliability. And so maybe just tell us, I mean, you say Chinese headline economic data is highly problematic. And you also, which is interesting because as I was reading the book, I'm like, oh, good. I can't wait to ask him what data he uses. But really, what I got from what you wrote is that, well, there aren't really alternative set of indicators. So I guess the question is, I still get asked, what data do you use and how they got themselves in the situation where they really don't have reliable economic data?

39:27Kevin Coldiron: Yeah, I mean, okay, so there's many ways I can start this, but the most straightforward argument that I can make and it's discussed in the book is that the GDP data in – first, that Beijing does not behave as if they believe their own data. they respond to different economic signals beyond what they actually publish and this is most evident and the the book starts with this anecdote in september 2024 where xi jinping goes to gansu province discovers that local government officials are not being paid a lot of things are breaking down social services not being offered bus routes being canceled um you know and he goes back and There's an initial report that sort of cautions for everybody should strive to hit the growth target this year, signaling a certain level of distress.

40:18Kevin Coldiron: And there's instantly a wave of attempted stimulus. Press conferences, PBOC cuts rates, announces a facility to prop up the equity market. Gains the equity market is still not given back at this point from that time. The Politburo calls for extraordinary support for the economy. I mean, things look like there's a 10 trillion yuan local government debt swap. Things look like they are panicking, right? But what is growth? Growth is exactly on target at 5%. Right. Right. So this makes no sense. You can either say either Beijing is completely unaware of conditions in its own economy or the data do not reflect that.

40:56Kevin Coldiron: And it's quite obvious that that's the second, that Beijing is aware of conditions within its own economy and the data do not reflect those conditions. The most straightforward statistical case against the GDP data in particular is that they were far too stable to be reliable between 2014 and 2019. And since 2022, they are far too high and strong to be reliable, given the adjustment in the property sector. uh simply put we have never seen an economy that is investment dependent have five percent real growth over three years with three years of deflation i i mean i it boggles the mind everyone who looks at this system from a monetary policy perspective from you know a global financial regulatory perspective says the government bond yield is one and a half percent you know it's one and a half percent.

41:45Kevin Coldiron: The policy interest rate is 1.25. Growth is not five. It's just, it's not possible. The inflation rate is negative. You know, the inflation rate is negative. CPI is one. It's different with the war right now, but growth is not positive. So there's different questions that you can ask about this. But the bottom line is, you know, no one will be proven right at any point publishing an alternative series. The big debate is really whether the production side GDP data should have any bearing on expenditure side indicators of GDP. And so you have to make a bet that it's really the, and there's all sorts of inconsistencies on the production side GDP data between the individual components that are published as well.

42:29Kevin Coldiron: But you have to make a bet, and we have at Rhodium, that it's the expenditure side components that are probably telling you more about what's happening in the economy. And if you make a good faith effort to estimate those, based on priors and add them up, they deliver this extraordinary discrepancy with China's official expenditure side GDP data as well as the production side. But it is a picture that is far more consistent with a sharp drop in investment over the last four years from the collapse in property sector, widening trade imbalances and deflationary pressure. Simply put, if China was really growing at 5%, we would not be seeing the kind of trade pushback against Beijing that we are seeing today.

43:08Logan Wright: Yeah. I mean, I'm kind of a data nerd, so there's so many questions I could ask about this. But I want to clarify something because in the book, you say you aren't convinced there's a quote-unquote alternative set of books where the Chinese actually have a good view of what's going on. But then, yeah, from what you said earlier, you were suggesting, well, they do kind of have a view. And so is that, is their view more anecdotal, qualitative, or do they, are they accessing data that we don't have?

43:43Kevin Coldiron: I think they have a few series like of rural unemployment conditions and like all sort of reporting from Xinhua, but there's no second set of SNA compliant tables for national accounts. I mean, like the data that they're working from is the data that we're seeing because that is a extraordinarily Herculean effort to gather and compile those. And no one's doing it twice. I mean, like that's throughout the system. It's just not credible to say that that's happening twice. What is credible is to say that the inputs into that process are probably too smooth. And so there are probably input-output problems with how they manage that overall.

44:23Kevin Coldiron: But no, my view would be, yeah, Beijing has many different sources of news, but their reactions are qualitative in nature. They have some indicators. The data that we find most useful is the data from the financial system. Because again, this is just a deductive view of how the economy works, which is that this is an investment-led economy. We haven't seen these huge sources of operating cash flow. If credit slows, investment virtually has to slow. It's not funded by some other source of profitability or funded by some other source of funding elsewhere in the system. So when we see the slowdown in credit, we imply, and that's sort of been confirmed in recent years, even within some of the official fixed asset investment data, that there's a very sharp decline in investment.

45:09Logan Wright: I want to go on to talk a little bit about China's impact on the rest of the world, the trade imbalances. But before that, just a question. It's a little bit off to the side, but it relates to this issue of data, which is, you know, they have these ambitions in artificial intelligence. And artificial intelligence is all about quality of data, right? You need to run good models. You need to have good data. So is there a mismatch there? is you're operating an economy where you're saying a lot of the data can't be trusted. So what does that say about the AI models that are being trained or operated on that?

45:49Kevin Coldiron: Or am I, I don't know, maybe I'm missing some piece there. Honestly, I'm not sure. I mean, I think that throughout the AI development, there's been issues with censorship and what they actually incorporate into Chinese AI models and the answers that you get out of it. But I think it's all been sort of post hoc in terms of regulating the responses after they come through rather than changing the internal logic of them. I mean, I think that this is sort of an authority bias issue, as I discuss in the book. It's less that you're operating with deliberately distorted data. It's more that you're operating with a different narrative of where the economy is.

46:25Kevin Coldiron: And so, you know, Beijing probably wants to propagate that narrative with its own models. But honestly, I don't know. I don't know how that might implicate things.

46:33Logan Wright: Yeah, and you make a really good point in the book where you talk about the importance of keeping the high-growth narrative alive. And you said one thing that really resonated with me, that they used a narrative of their own prosperity to encourage other countries to sell raw materials and resources to China based on the belief that they're going to be a long-term, reliable buyer. And that resonated to me. you know, just we were talking earlier. I mean, I live in New Zealand part of the year, very close to Australia. Those are two countries that, you know, are especially Australia, but also New Zealand on a much smaller scale selling raw materials there.

47:11Logan Wright: And there's a real belief here, especially since the second Trump administration that the U.S. is not reliable, not trustworthy. Let's, you know, we're better off, you know, better off with China. You know, they're big, they're growing. We can sell as much as we want there. Yeah, there's risks. but that really resonated because I hear people talking about that.

47:32Kevin Coldiron: Yeah, I think that the, you know, part of the reason for this narrative is it's strategic. It offers diplomatic benefits. If you want to push back against countries de-risking and developing alternative supply chains, you want a domestic economy that everyone thinks is growing. If you want to push back against sanctions and export controls, you want to say, you should still trade with us even if the U.S. cuts off our banks, right? And so that's really, I think, the perception of China's inevitable growth and inevitable rise in influence is the most important propaganda message that Beijing has.

48:08Kevin Coldiron: And it's not going to go away anytime soon at that point. And so what you see now is sort of redefining the economic success narrative away from GDP per se and toward different metrics like technological achievements. But the whole underlying logic of China is still becoming dominant in X, Y, and Z sectors, and these are the sectors for the future, and China is still going to grow faster than the rest of the world, these are still important tenets of Beijing's message.

48:43Logan Wright: What we're seeing right now, Robin Brooks has been writing a lot about this, is just a surge in exports, a surge in trade surpluses to basically everywhere aside from the U.S. I'm not really sure Europe, but essentially the developing world. And I'm guessing, or not guessing, I mean, that's from your view, just an indication of a doubling down on the investment export-led growth model, but also a reaction to the fact that, you know, with the pushback in the U.S. and Europe against these huge surge in exports, they've got to find other buyers. Tell us how you view that development.

49:31Kevin Coldiron: Absolutely. So, first, the pushback in Europe has been relatively modest so far, but it's really intensifying. And so you're starting to see greater possibility of European trade restrictions against China overall. The missing part of this story is that we think about the China shocks as the byproduct of trade and industrial policies, and they are. But the domestic slowdown is what's driving this. And it's the domestic economic slowdown that is producing deflationary pressures that are weakening the real exchange rate. When you are competing in emerging economies, you are competing on price. It's not really about advancements in technology.

50:10Kevin Coldiron: And so gaining market share basically depends upon lower and lower prices, which is what's happened. The real exchange rate is depreciated by about 20 % over the last four years, regardless of how the nominal exchange rate has responded. it. And so this is, again, related to this entire industrial ecosystem in China that used to find final demand in the construction of residential property buildings inside of China's borders itself. And suddenly this entire ecosystem needs to find demand elsewhere, but it still receives a certain proportion of credit from the state-owned system designed to prevent this further collapse and output.

50:52Kevin Coldiron: So you continue producing, but there's no domestic demand. So everything needs to find a demand abroad. And this is how you see the migration of China's export share from consumer electronics products, other downstream consumer products into upstream industrial sectors and starting to penetrate into export shares in European manufacturing bases as well.

51:16Logan Wright: And this is where we see - Sorry, Logan, isn't that just like a kind of a natural progression of emerging economies. You know, the U.S. went through this, I think, right? You know, you start by exporting commodities and then kind of low cost stuff, and then eventually you move up the value added chain. So is that any different than?

51:35Kevin Coldiron: A couple of things are different. First, your domestic demand isn't growing. So it'd be one thing if you're using this to basically strengthen your own domestic economy. But second, China's still competing at the low end as well. So there's not actually a huge movement up the value chain in terms of displacement because the political economy doesn't really allow those firms to go bankrupt. So the net result has just been an increase in global export share. Think about it this way. If China is an investment-driven economy relative to domestic consumption, they're about 26 % of global investment, about 12 % of global consumption.

52:07Kevin Coldiron: I mean, it's hard to know exactly what these aggregates mean, but that's roughly where the math will take you. How do they grow relative to the rest of the world? You can only grow as fast as your customer unless you're actually displacing the investment of your customer itself. And that's been what's happening. So as long as the domestic economy remains imbalanced, exposure to China in terms of the global trading system will require China to basically displace others' investments, which leads to a very different view of global imbalances. We used to think about global imbalances as temporary imbalances that we needed to adjust with policy to prevent larger financial crises or shocks, China views the expansion of global imbalances as a part of its growth strategy.

52:56Kevin Coldiron: And the only mechanism that they offer in terms of remedying global imbalances is to increase inbound investment from China itself. So it's a far more contentious kind of debate that we're having about how to resolve global imbalances at this point.

53:10Logan Wright: Yeah, that's fascinating. And we could go into the reasons, and you do this quite well in the book, the reasons why it's difficult to rebalance toward consumption. But I think we'll set that aside. People can read the book and look at that. But I don't want to talk about the very end where you talk about, okay, this is the world we're in. What does that mean for the Western response? And you talk about a de-risking strategy. So tell us about that. Because I think what you're saying is, hey, look, you need to frame the response in terms of or recognizing this kind of longer-term economic weakness.

53:53Logan Wright: So the response is, hey, how do we out-compete China in 30 years? It's more like that's the trajectory they're on. How do we contain the risks in the short term?

54:03Kevin Coldiron: That's exactly right. So we have a completely different economic challenge from China than we did just four to five years ago. And people just do not understand this. I think it's one of the arguments I try to make forcefully, not only in the book, but the foreign affairs piece that sort of previewed the book in July. And the point is the threat now is from deindustrialization beyond what we would consider red lines of resilience in our own industrial structures. It's a lot easier to defend industries before they go bankrupt rather than trying to rebuild them later on. It is not a long-term systemic rivalry with China in which they are going to overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world.

54:48Kevin Coldiron: And global GDP comparisons don't really matter, but that's kind of my point. It's very different. The challenges we face with China are basically the same. If China is 60 % of US GDP, 70 % of US GDP, 90 % of US GDP, they're not going to be 150 or 200. so you know in other words this is really about changing chinese behavior in terms of weaponization of supply chains and it's about conditions that can be deterred rather than china's inexorable rise in global influence so that is the argument of the book that we have a lot more capacity and leverage than what we are currently using and that you can effectively create asymmetric tools in which you can leverage global demand in the G7 far better if it's done collectively relative to China's constraints on supply.

55:39Kevin Coldiron: And the controls on demand become more salient over time and the controls on supply become less salient over time in a world in which China cannot generate domestic demand itself. And that's really what the implications of a broken Chinese model are, acknowledging that, again, this is a very, I mean, this is a very hopeful book. This is a book about many different futures are possible, including sort of a managed decoupling or sort of detente. But right now, the West is not using the leverage it has to sort of change Chinese behavior in the same way.

56:12Logan Wright: Yeah, and I appreciate you wrote, you had a really nice epilogue at the end because I think most of the book was written 2024, if I'm right. Late 2024, like early 2025, yeah. Yeah. So, you know, you have an epilogue kind of post-Liberation Day stuff. And, you know, I appreciate that because it was like, well, there was a chance for a kind of a coordinated response to this. And instead, you know, we ended up kind of attacking our allies as much as we did China. So it's been a very disappointing and fragmented, in my view, kind of almost incompetent approach. But as you say, the world doesn't stay the same.

56:55Logan Wright: It changes and there's an opportunity. But what I really liked about this book is how you frame the potential responses in a different way. And of course, you know, I suppose while I'll ask you this question, the final question, I mean, as you say, the threat we face from China now is different than it was four years ago. The amount of change we've seen in China have been enormous. So presumably, you can't rule out a change, you know, in China's own internal path.

57:24Kevin Coldiron: You're just saying we don't see it right now. That's exactly right. I mean, I think that, frankly, the faster that you see Beijing adjust its strategy, you know, the more open the possibilities potentially are. And there's no, just because you can't see the obvious, this is a book about how certain long-term plans have failed. It's a book also about how a trajectory that China was on in the early 2000s was altered dramatically in the 2010s. And so it's really a book about sort of contingent futures. But that is the argument of the epilogue as well, which is that the U.S. has made several missteps in a de-risking approach and sacrificed a lot of leverage, especially by creating a trade war with its allies.

58:09Kevin Coldiron: But China probably won't be able to leverage that more effectively itself. And it's showing up right now. China's had a very permissive international environment over the last 15 months. But they're starting to face much more pushback from the Europeans, from other developing economies than we have seen.

58:29Logan Wright: okay well that's a that's that's a good place to uh to wrap up um really enjoyable conversation thanks for writing the book and i think as you can tell if you're listening there's a lot of areas we haven't we haven't gotten into so appreciate you writing the book thanks for joining us and we wish you all the best thanks so much kevin really appreciate it and thanks for reading okay uh logan's book is called broken china how the economic miracle shattered and what it means for the world. You can tell I really enjoyed the book. It's got great historical context, really crisp analysis of the current situation.

59:04Logan Wright: I highly recommend it. And as always, we really just scratched the surface today of what you'll learn from it. So make sure you out and get a copy. And for all of us here at Top Traders Unplugged, thanks for listening and we'll see you next time.

59:18Kevin Coldiron: Thanks for listening to Top Traders Unplugged. If you feel you learned something of value from today's episode, the best way to stay updated is to go on over to your favorite podcast platform and follow the show so that you'll be sure to get all the new episodes as they're released. We have some amazing guests lined up for you and to ensure our show continues to grow, please leave us an honest rating and review. It only takes a minute and it's the best way to show us you love the podcast. We'll see you next time on Top Traders Unplugged. This podcast expresses the views of its hosts and the guests appearing on the podcast as of the date of its recording and such views are subject to change without notice.

59:52Kevin Coldiron: Top Traders Unplugged do not have any duty or obligation to update the information contained herein. Furthermore, Top Traders Unplugged make no representation to its accuracy, and it shall not be assumed that past investment performance is an indication of future results. Moreover, wherever there is a potential for profit, there is also the possibility of loss. This content is made available for educational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. The information contained in this podcast does not constitute and should not be construed as investment advice or an offer to sell or a solicitation to buy any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction.

1:00:21Kevin Coldiron: Certain information contained herein concerning economic trends and performance is based on or derived from information provided by independent third-party sources. Top Traders Unplugged may believe that the sources from which such information are obtained are reliable. However, Top Traders Unplugged cannot guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based. This podcast, including the information contained herein, may not be reproduced, copied, republished, or posted in whole or in part in any form without the prior written consent of Top Traders Unplugged.

1:00:51Thank you.

From the publisher

For decades, China's economic rise seemed unstoppable. But beneath the surface of its extraordinary growth, something has been quietly breaking down. Kevin Coldiron is joined by Logan Wright, author of Broken China, to uncover how the world's second-largest economy became trapped in a financial system that can no longer sustain its own ambitions. From the extraordinary credit expansion that followed the 2008 financial crisis to mounting debt, questionable growth figures and an increasingly desperate dependence on exports, Logan traces the unraveling of China's economic miracle. And as the consequences begin to spill across international borders, a troubling question emerges: what happens when the economic engine that helped transform the world begins to fail?

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Episode TimeStamps:

00:00 - Introduction and why China's economy faces decay rather than collapse

01:05 - Introducing Logan Wright and his book Broken China

07:03 - The myth of China's long-term economic planning

11:28 - How China's financial system fueled its economic miracle

16:33 - The 2008 stimulus that changed China's growth model

22:47 - Why local governments keep investing regardless of demand

26:51 - How China's deleveraging campaign exposed a growing debt crisis

32:56 - Why China's economic predicament differs from Japan's

38:37 - Can China's official economic data be trusted?

46:33 - Why China's growth narrative matters to the rest of the world

49:31 - How domestic economic weakness is driving China's export surge

54:03 - How the West should respond to a weaker China

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