

China’s “China Shock 2.0” shift from low-cost “widgets” to high-tech, state-directed manufacturing (EVs, solar, machine tools), and what that means for Europe/SE Asia and for geopolitics amid the Iran crisis (oil reserves, potential exporter gains).
Katie Martin, Financial Times markets columnist (London). Robert Armstrong, markets commentator (recently at FT Commodities Shindig in Lausanne; returning from Switzerland). Joe Leahy, FT reporter “man in Beijing,” contributor to the FT “China Shock 2” series.
China’s Made in China 2025 targets are being met; local governments are heavily subsidized (3–9x OECD norms) and incentivized to keep capacity running; this can export unemployment and intensify political backlash. China has solar production capacity around double global demand and large oil reserves that reduce exposure to Hormuz disruptions.
EVs in Beijing; Germany’s car/manufacturing equipment exposure; a Spanish dishwasher factory potentially taken over by Chinese battery firm HiTHIUM; Taiwan reportedly offered oil help by China; China’s oil strategy in the Iran/Strait of Hormuz context.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes.
Discussion on how China's economy is perceived and its technological advancements.
“But it's also made life much cheaper for all of us over the years as we load up on bargain goods that are made in China.”
Joe Leahy summarizes the key themes of the China Shock 2 series.
“I spotted you in the newsroom in London and I thought, aha, I'm going to kidnap Joe Leahy and make him talk about China.”
Discussion on China's advancements in high-tech industries post-COVID.
“Yeah, I mean, this is something that's been coming slowly and I think during COVID, people sort of lost touch with China for a while.”
Exploration of how China's production affects Europe and Southeast Asia.
“That was one of the first things I noticed.”
Analysis of China's strategic industrial policies and global market implications.
“That whole equation seems to be getting a little bit out of joint now.”
Discussion on the unique aspects of China's economic model compared to the West.
“technology is also a piece of surveillance technology that has a role to play in the great, great power battle between the United States and China.”
Examination of China's investments in green energy and its global implications.
“Do you hear that a lot that, oh, you know, this is very sneakily spying on the rest of the world using other sorts of technology?”
Discussion on China's energy production and the potential geopolitical consequences.
“The question is really, are they going to get to a sort of a middle income status and can they go beyond that?”
Learn about the implications of Chinese investments in Europe and local industry dynamics.
“And I guess we all buy Chinese cars now.”
Discover how China navigates its oil reserves and geopolitical challenges in relation to Iran.
“I want to pick your brains on where China is with regards to the situation in Iran.”
Understand the complexities of China's relationships with Iran and Gulf states amid energy tensions.
“did they see into a crystal ball and see that the Strait of Hormuz was going to be closed?”
Hear the hosts' predictions and thoughts on current events and market trends.
“We need to like this and the pervert glasses.”

Get the gist, explore an idea or ask about something said.
On Unhedged, what are the key points of this episode?
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.
0:00Katie Martin: Markets move fast. Get the insights you need in 10 minutes with Barclays Brief, a podcast from Barclays Investment Bank. Each week, our experts analyze market themes, helping you anticipate what's next. Listen to Barclays Brief wherever you get your podcasts.
0:21Rob Armstrong: Pushkin. When you think of China's role in the global economy, you might think of it as the place that makes low-value stuff for the world. It makes widgets, it makes the basics, and it does that quickly, cheaply and on a huge scale. And that makes it hard for other countries to make widgets and basics because we just can't beat China on price or speed. But it's also made life much cheaper for all of us over the years as we load up on bargain goods that are made in China. People who are very upset about this include a Mr Donald J Trump. But actually, that image of China is really out of date. In fact, China is absolutely crushing it as a superpower in super high tech industries, including electric vehicles and solar.
1:12Rob Armstrong: Today in the show, what does that mean for the rest of the world? And also, how might China emerge as the big winner from the war in Iran? This is Unhedged, the markets and finance podcast from the Financial Times and Pushkin. Katie Martin, a markets columnist at the FT in sunny but chilly London. With me, down the line from New York City, back from his jolly in Switzerland, we have a somewhat jet-lagged Robert Armstrong. Rob, say hi.
1:39Katie Martin: Hi. What time is it right now?
1:42Rob Armstrong: I don't know. Maybe you can check your cuckoo clock. Did you purchase a cuckoo clock while you were there? I'll take that as a no. But excitingly, with me in the studio here in London, I also have our man in Beijing, Joe Leahy. Joe, thanks for coming in. Thanks, Katie. I spotted you in the newsroom in London and I thought, aha, I'm going to kidnap Joe Leahy and make him talk about China.
2:06Katie Martin: Joe, I read the excellent China Shock 2 series that you and several colleagues put together. It is a tapestry of many threads. Can you kind of give us the summary? Yeah, thanks very much, Rob. So the series really describes how China's moving up into very high-tech industries and really hitting the economies of other producers such as Europe and Southeast Asia. and the reason we thought of doing this series was that we thought that the world really needs to wake up and take notice of this is one of the trends, perhaps one of the most important trends of the decade.
2:43Rob Armstrong: It's not about the widgets anymore, it's about the solar panels and all of that good stuff. What's the deal here? Yeah, I mean, this is something that's been coming slowly and I think during COVID, people sort of lost touch with China for a while. Right. And during that period, I mean, even before that, China had set its sights on these high-tech items. And it's not just solar panels and green stuff. It's machine tools as well. So very high-quality machine tools. You name it, China's actually producing it these days. And it's creating a shock for Europe and also for Southeast Asia and all countries that have an industrial base are being challenged.
3:24Rob Armstrong: How long have you been out there? How much has it changed since COVID? I've been there since the end of COVID. but I got there in 22 and was locked down for a while and even almost put in one of those COVID camps at one point, which, thank God, it didn't happen to me. But it's just going very fast, this process. I think when I arrived there, I was surprised, like most people, at the number of electric vehicles, beautiful, very high-quality electric vehicles on the streets of Beijing. Yeah, I hear Beijing and Shanghai are, like, quiet. Yeah, exactly. That was one of the first things I noticed. I used to go to China in the 90s and then the 2000s, and it was always very noisy with trucks and motorbikes like any city.
4:05And now it's just strangely quiet. It's kind of almost surreal.
4:08Rob Armstrong: It's just humming along on all those EVs. And so, as you say, it's getting good at the high-end stuff. Part of this series that you've just been involved in, this China Shock 2.0 series, is the rest of the world is waking up to this. What does it mean? How much should this bother Rob Armstrong and his ilk out in the States? Well, I think the States don't need to be bothered because they already got de-industrialized by China Shock 1.0. But I think the interesting thing is China, since they came out with this plan made in China 2025 in 2015, and they targeted all of these sectors from shipbuilding, trains, supercomputers, everything, and they're sort of gradually meeting those targets.
4:53and now square in their sights all of the industries that Europe traditionally has been very good at.
4:59Rob Armstrong: Germany, for example, its economy, its manufacturing base has been based around a couple of things. One of them is its car industry, which has sold cars all around like Europe and the UK and all over the place. But also German industry is very much about selling high-end stuff to China, like manufacturing equipment to China, heavy industrial stuff to China. That whole equation seems to be getting a little bit out of joint now. And it's kind of the same picture in Southeast Asia, if I'm not mistaken, right? Yeah, the Southeast Asia case is particularly interesting because these are developing economies that had hoped to continue down the path of industrial progress.
5:37But China's essentially doing everything. It's doing everything from textiles and shoes all the way to EV exports, power machinery, everything. So there's really nothing left for these countries to do and they're losing jobs.
5:51Katie Martin: If it is the case, Joe, that China is focusing on high value, but subsidized and state mandated production, and along with those EVs and machine tools, it is exporting to the rest of the world. It's essentially exporting unemployment to the rest of the world. Why doesn't this end in a terrible political conflict? In other words, can China expect the rest of the world to stand for this industrial policy? I mean, that's a great point, Robert. I think if you talk to European business leaders in China, this is something that they're constantly warning the Chinese about. They're like, this is unsustainable.
6:37Our politicians are not going to accept this on a long-term basis. Maybe European companies will transfer more jobs to China, but at some point politicians will react against it. I mean, we already have Trump in the US. I mean, what are we going to get in other countries? And same thing in Southeast Asia. They've been very good in the past at blocking imports that they don't want, but this is very pervasive and very hard to resist.
7:03Rob Armstrong: Rob, is this cutting through in the States or is there still a perception that China's just there for the widgets and putting the little screws in the iPhones?
7:11Katie Martin: Oh, I think it's absolutely coming through, though, of course, it has a powerful political overlay in the United States where people talk about how every bit of Chinese technology is also a piece of surveillance technology that has a role to play in the great, great power battle between the United States and China. And I actually have a question for Joe on this topic, which is there is a characterization of China's economy that says it's extremely different from other industrialized high tech economies in the world in that it's not competitive in the same sense. In other words, the targets set by and for the companies are not profit so much as market dominance, employment, creating security for China itself.
8:10Katie Martin: Is that an accurate characterization or are there kind of subtleties that broad brush myths? I think it's both. I mean, it is absolutely a different kind of economy from other market economies, if you like. We know that at the local government level, there's huge subsidies, and we go through that in our China 2.0 series. I think it's between three and nine times more subsidized than normal OECD economies. So the subsidies are huge, and also they set these targets, these growth targets, so the local officials need to meet those targets. So they're investing in production. If you produce in a certain area, that local government collects some of that value-added tax.
8:51So that's another incentive for local governments to set up production and not close it down. So you have all of this weird sort of nexus between local government, central government. Central government sets the targets, pumps money in through local government bonds. Local governments take this money, follow their production targets, and then they set up this production capacity and then don't let it shut down, even if it's not making money. So Michael Pettis calls Chinese companies competitive but not necessarily efficient. Right.
9:21Rob Armstrong: And what about that surveillance point? Do you hear that a lot that, oh, you know, this is very sneakily spying on the rest of the world using other sorts of technology? The very big Chinese companies do have a Communist Party representative on the board. So if the party says, OK, we need you to do something for us or, you know, the MSS, the Ministry of State Security says we need you to do something for us, they have to do it. Setting all that aside, and I know it's a big deal, this model, it might be kind of alien to us in the UK or the US, but it kind of works. Got to hand it to them. So China, I think I'm right in saying, accounts for a third of the spending in the entire world on green energy.
10:03Rob Armstrong: It's become an absolute superpower in green energy. Give us a sense of the scale of this thing. How quickly is it rolling this out? Yeah, I mean, it is enormous. And I was just looking before, I think China has production capacity for solar panels. It's double global demand at the moment. So this system, this is what it does. It's very good at producing, at actually producing production capacity, if you like.
10:29Katie Martin: Where are they putting the other half of the panels? Is there like a gigantic warehouse in central China full of unused solar panels? One of those ghost cities. in the ghost cities maybe there is one i think i've been looking for this where is this warehouse um so just just to answer your question it is an incredibly formidable system in that sense that just you know if they say they want to produce something they're going to produce it but the flip side of that is the waste and also uh you know the domestic demand is not there what are they going to do about the the domestic demand ultimately that's the question I wanted to ask you, if I may, Joe, does this system create the kind of prosperity that I'm sure the party also wants to see?
11:18Katie Martin: In other words, does it fulfill the economic side of the deal for the growing Chinese middle class or working class? So I think it has provided huge prosperity over the past 40 to 50 years. The question is really, are they going to get to a sort of a middle income status and can they go beyond that? And I think that's what the party now is trying to do with this going to high tech industries that were once, you know, the realm of Europe or the US. They're trying to go up the chain and they believe that there's going to be some sort of trickle down effect and they can double per capita income by 2035.
11:54But I think traditional economists don't really see a clear path from what they're doing now to that fully prosperous economy that you're talking about there, Rob.
12:05Rob Armstrong: So the solar panels that are not sitting in a massive warehouse somewhere in central China, where are they going? Because it's interesting, right, that the whole world is kind of beholden to Saudi Arabia because it produces an awful lot of oil. If you assume for now that China is the Saudi Arabia of green energy, does that give China long term a different sort of geopolitical clout? You know, I gather like there are parts of Pakistan, for example, that are just getting carpeted in this Chinese solar tech. And that must bring with it a certain diplomatic kind of, you know, relationship and a certain geopolitical power, or am I over-interpreting?
12:48I think it is, and especially with this crisis, we've seen a lot of demand for green energy products. I mean, for instance, in Australia, we've seen EV demand go through the roof just in the last year.
12:58Rob Armstrong: It must be all over Australia, surely. One thing you've got a lot of is sunshine. Yeah, I think on my father's roof, I'm not sure whether they're Chinese ones, but there's some solar panels on there. So it's definitely, it gives China a huge advantage in this area. And it goes beyond just the power that the solar panels produce themselves. You can also use them to produce green hydrogen, for instance, which in the future can be used as a green fuel for aviation and all kinds of things. So I think this is definitely giving China that geopolitical cloud. Now, the question for Europe and other places is, do we want to be dependent on China and we just give up on making our own solar panels and be dependent on China?
13:42Because the technology will evolve as well. You'll become dependent. Or should we have quotas, you know, take maybe 50 % from China and then buy the other 50 % from somewhere else?
13:52Rob Armstrong: Funnily enough, Joe, that was my next question. Like, yeah, what do we do? Did we just say, OK, because of its unique economic model, China has just built up an unassailable lead here? And I guess we all buy Chinese cars now. We all buy Chinese energy infrastructure now. It's a very tricky one for Europe, as you say, because the German car industry is such an important part of German manufacturing and German industrial base. But, for example, as part of this series, one of the things I was reading was there's effectively an abandoned dishwasher factory in Spain. This podcast loves dishwashers, as you may know.
14:29Rob Armstrong: And it closed... I like dishwashers. It's a whole thing, Joe. I'll fill you in later. And it closed, and that led to the loss of hundreds of jobs. And along comes a Chinese battery company called Hithium, which might take over this facility. And it's pushed there in part because Trump has stepped back from a lot of the kind of green energy initiatives that were started under Joe Biden. So all of a sudden, the US is not such a favorite place to do business anymore. Maybe they come into Europe instead. And look, that's a lot of jobs for people in and around this old dishwasher facility in Pamplona or in Spain, I believe.
15:07Rob Armstrong: And maybe a lot of that does involve buying not just Chinese stuff and goods, but Chinese know-how. Is Europe comfortable with that? Yeah, I think the key thing here, especially this Hithium case, is do you want to just buy stuff and bring it in and then you just become completely dependent? Or do you want to have Chinese companies come in and invest in Europe and set up this capacity in Europe? And I think a lot of people in Europe would argue, let's have the Chinese come in, invest here under certain rules. And there's the Industrial Accelerator Act that we mentioned in that piece as well, which is designed to get Chinese companies to come and invest, but also transfer a bit of technology, use local employees.
15:48There's a whole bunch of kind of rules around that, which is similar in a way to what China did to European companies and American companies when they first went to China.
15:58Rob Armstrong: I want to pick your brains on where China is with regards to the situation in Iran. So, you know, on paper, China is the world's biggest oil importer. So this should be like an unmitigated disaster, what's happened in Iran for China. But it went into this crisis with massive reserves of oil, like it's got oil coming out of its ears and only about 6 % of its energy consumption is exposed to problems in the Strait of Hormuz. So well played China. is there a world in which China emerges as somehow you know the winner as a result of this war not just because it's already got plenty of its own oil thanks very much not only because it can make the solar panels that everyone has finally like woken up to the fact that we need them but also because this gives China I guess a different sort of geopolitical clout across Asia which is as Rob and I were just talking about in the last podcast we recorded the other day, like emerging Asia is really under the cosh from this energy crisis.
17:03Rob Armstrong: So where does China fit into all of that stuff? Yeah, I think China could have, let's say, a good oil shock crisis out of this. If external demand suffers, as we've just been talking about, China's exports will go down. But because Chinese exports are so competitive, they can gain even more market share. And in the long run, they'll probably keep it. So China becomes even more powerful as an exporter and as a global manufacturer as a result of the crisis. If the crisis is too harsh, then even China's oil reserves will start to run out. And China will have to buy more oil from Russia. They'll have to use more coal because actually even though it's a huge green power, it's also still building coal thermal plants.
17:48And that's kind of its backbone. China has a lot of its own coal, and that's why it's not going to run out of energy as a result of this crisis.
17:57Rob Armstrong: Rob, do you think this was Donald Trump's plan that he would embark on a war of choice and the winner of it would end up being China?
18:04Katie Martin: I'm going to say that was not the main objective. Can you tell me, Joe, why did China so fortuitously build up its oil reserves? did they see into a crystal ball and see that the Strait of Hormuz was going to be closed? Or was it just national policy to develop these immense backup tanks of crude oil? Let's say, let's step back a bit. And the party's mentality has always been to prepare for the worst, basically. Even back in the Mao days, he situated factories way back in the western part of China to protect them against possible nuclear attack and all that. The party's always been a huge planner.
18:49Rob Armstrong: Rob, like we were saying, you're just back from the FT Commodities Shindig in Lausanne in Switzerland. What are people there saying about how China has played its hand into this Iranian crisis? Well, it was interesting in a way how China didn't come up.
19:07Katie Martin: That, I think, represents their preparation for this. So to your point, it was like, what's going to become of Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia? You know, there was more talk, Joe, I don't mean this personally. There was more talk about Australia's energy problems than there was about China's energy problems. So it was almost like China was conspicuous by absence in the discussions of the crisis. There was a little talk about how you gestured towards this earlier, Katie, about how China's reserves may allow them to strike deals with those emerging power, those emerging agent powers who basically don't have a national energy policy.
19:55Rob Armstrong: Are we seeing some of that already, Joe? Like, oh, hi, Vietnam. Yeah, no, sure. You can have some of our oil. There might be some terms and conditions attached to that. Is this happening yet? Well, China definitely wants it to happen. I don't know if you saw the one on Taiwan. China offered Taiwan a little bit of help with oil supply, which Taiwan politely refused. So Taiwan's going to wake up tomorrow and there's going to be a horse's head in their bed, basically.
20:19Katie Martin: Yeah, exactly. It's a possibility. But again, China has to take care of its own needs first and foremost, and they are very conservative on this front. And how much Russian oil do they really want? After a while, you don't want to be too dependent on Russia either. No. Yeah, you think it's not fun being dependent on China. Try being dependent on Russia. Europe just did a little experiment in that and it turned out badly.
20:46Rob Armstrong: Didn't work out. It worked out very well, didn't it? Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. I think the other interesting geopolitical thing in this for China is China's quite close, has been quite close to Iran, although I think there have been frictions between the two of them in more recent years. But China's also close to all of the Gulf states. It does a nice job of that. actually. It's a good point. So it's tricky, yeah. Because we've had stories about Chinese companies assisting Iran with the war. That probably doesn't go down well with Saudi Arabia, which provides tons of oil to China. So China has to play a pretty delicate game in all of this.
21:21Rob Armstrong: Playing a very delicate game. Joe, thank you for sharing your brain and your insight on this, because it's something that Rob and I know next to nothing about. We are going to be back in just one second with Longshot.
21:37Katie Martin: Today's markets move fast. Get the insights you need in 10 minutes with The Barclays Brief, a new podcast from Barclays Investment Bank. Through sharp dialogue and scenario-based analysis, our leading experts analyze key market themes each week. So whether you're managing a portfolio or leading a business, the Barclays Brief podcast can help you make smarter decisions today. Stay sharp, stay briefed, find Barclays Brief wherever you get your podcasts.
22:08Rob Armstrong: okie doke it is time for long short part of the show where we go long a thing we love or short a thing we hate rob i'll start with you what you got having just flown back and forth
22:18Katie Martin: from europe the best money you can spend in travel is paying for the exit row seat i am long that
22:24Rob Armstrong: baby fair enough joe what are you saying well since we have the trump she summit next next month actually i'm going to say that i'm short trump for the midterms and long xi for next year's party congress for a fourth term long xi jinping spoken like a true beijing correspondent i am again limit short prediction markets story today that france's weather forecasting service has filed a police complaint after detecting anomalies in its temperature gauges at an airport in paris which seems to have something to do with bets made on sodding polymarket So somebody made an absolute boatload of money from a bet on the temperature in Paris being 21 degrees C.
23:08Rob Armstrong: What are we doing here? Insider weather trading.
23:11Katie Martin: Dads and granddads the world over.
23:14Rob Armstrong: It's absolutely nuts. Fixing the weather market. This is stupid. It's corrosive. It's bad. We need to like this and the pervert glasses. These are things that we just need to ban. Joe Leahy, all the way from Beijing. Thank you so much for joining us. And Rob, back from sunny Lausanne. And it's lovely to have you back in New York. Listeners, we will be back in your ears on Tuesday. So listen up then. Unhedged is produced by Jake Harper and edited by Brian Erstad. Our executive producer is Jacob Goldstein. Cheryl Brumley is the FT's global head of audio. Special thanks to Laura Clark, Greta Cohn and Natalie Sadler.
23:51Rob Armstrong: FT premium subscribers can get the Unhedged newsletter for free. And a 30-day free trial is available to everyone else. just go to ft.com slash unhedged offer. I'm Katie Martin. Thanks for listening.
In the past decade China has transformed itself into a high-value producer of sophisticated goods, threatening jobs in Europe and the rest of Asia. Today on the show, the FT’s Beijing bureau chief Joe Leahy joins Katie Martin and Rob Armstrong to discuss his three-part series on China’s new economy. Also, they go short prediction markets, long exit rows and long Xi Jinping’s chances of re-election.
For a free 30-day trial to the Unhedged newsletter go to: https://www.ft.com/unhedgedoffer.
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