In short
1A Podcast Episode Notes: The 2026 Munich Security Conference
Episode Overview
- Title: The 2026 Munich Security Conference
- Description: A discussion on the annual Munich Security Conference, focusing on the shifting dynamics between the U.S. and Europe in terms of national security and foreign policy.
Key Themes
- Comparison of Years: The tone of the Munich Security Conference in 2026 was markedly different from 2025, where U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's speech was critical of European leaders. In 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s address had a more conciliatory tone but still carried significant implications for U.S.-Europe relations.
- Shift in U.S. Policy: The U.S. is perceived as changing its approach to international politics, moving away from prioritizing global cooperation and towards a more nationalistic, interest-based strategy.
Key Figures
- Marco Rubio: U.S. Secretary of State, advocating for reform in international cooperation and emphasizing the need to align U.S. interests with those of Europe.
- J.D. Vance: Former Vice President whose 2025 speech criticized European leaders.
- European Leaders: Including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who expressed a desire for collaboration but also voiced concerns over U.S. domestic policies and ideology.
Panel Participants
- Alex Ward: National security reporter for The Wall Street Journal.
- Felicia Schwartz: Diplomatic correspondent at Politico.
- David Rennie: Geopolitics editor at The Economist.
Discussion Points
- Tone and Reception of U.S. Messages
- Public vs. Private Sentiments: While leaders publicly welcomed U.S. engagement, private discussions revealed skepticism about U.S. domestic policies, notably the MAGA ideology influencing European politics.
- Metaphors Used: European leaders likened the U.S.-Europe relationship to an "abusive marriage," indicating a complicated emotional backdrop to their diplomacy.
- U.S.-Europe Relationship Dynamics
- De-risking Strategy: The notion of "de-risking" reflected concerns about reliance on the U.S. amid fears of American unilateralism and changing allegiances.
- Rubio's Speech: Mixed reception; while it praised shared values, it also hinted at structural changes in the international order that could disadvantage Europe.
- Future Considerations for Europe
- Military Preparedness: Discussions around European nations increasing their defense spending and capabilities due to uncertainty about U.S. reliability.
- Nuclear Deterrence: Conversations about the potential need for a European nuclear capability to counter threats from Russia.
- Implications of Current U.S. Policy
- Reaction to U.S. Leadership: European officials expressed concerns about the U.S. forming alliances with right-wing leaders in Europe, diverging from the traditional U.S. stance on democratic values.
- Internal Pressures: Policymakers in Europe are aware of domestic public sentiment regarding the reliability of the U.S. as an ally, indicating a potential shift in how Europe approaches defense and foreign policy.
Key Takeaways
- The Munich Security Conference highlighted significant tensions and a reevaluation of the U.S.-Europe relationship amidst shifting political ideologies.
- European leaders are grappling with the implications of U.S. foreign policy, particularly under the Trump administration, and are considering strategies for greater autonomy in defense and diplomatic matters.
- The evolving nature of U.S. politics, including the influence of populism and right-wing ideologies, poses challenges for traditional alliances and international cooperation.
Conclusion The discussions at the 2026 Munich Security Conference reflect a critical juncture in U.S.-Europe relations, with both sides needing to navigate complex political landscapes and reassess shared values and strategic interests moving forward. The outcome of U.S. midterms and future elections will be crucial in determining the trajectory of these alliances.
Next Steps: Continued monitoring of U.S.-Europe relations, defense policies, and evolving political sentiments within both regions will be essential in understanding the future of international cooperation.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOKey Themes from the Conference
1:45 to 4:05
Discussion of key messages from U.S. leaders at the conference.
“We'll hear from our guests and from you right after this short break.”
European Leaders' Perspectives
4:05 to 6:43
Panelists share insights on the tone and reactions of European leaders.
“So that's kind of where everything started.”
Reactions to Rubio's Speech
6:43 to 9:48
Analysis of the implications of Secretary Rubio's speech at the conference.
“So behind closed doors, you know, I saw on the record interviewed the Finnish president, big Atlanticist, off the record saw some other European leaders, including people who are traditionally very pro-American.”
The Aftermath of the Conference
9:48 to 11:52
Discussion on Secretary Rubio's meetings with European leaders post-conference.
“And the Greenland moment wasn't just a Trumpian blip.”
Perceptions of U.S. Reliability
11:52 to 14:00
An exploration of how European leaders view the U.S. as an ally.
“And just Orban, for example, in Ukraine, for example, has been such a kind of difficult person to deal with.”
Episode Discussion
14:00 to 28:00
“And so there is a total, call it incoherence or call it hypocrisy, depending on how angry you are about this.”
The Impact of Biden's Foreign Policy
28:00 to 29:58
Explore how Biden's foreign policies have shifted U.S. relationships with Europe.
“relationship with European allies back to how they were a few years ago?”
Concerns Over Institutions and Populism
29:58 to 31:06
Discuss concerns about institutions and the rise of populism in Europe and the U.S.
“But I think they also kind of understand that the American public has changed a lot.”
Future Political Developments
31:06 to 31:38
Speculate on future political shifts in Europe and their implications for the U.S.
“I'd say the French election is coming up next year.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:07European leaders, national security policymakers and reporters convened at a historic hotel in Munich, Germany over the weekend. They gathered for the annual national security pilgrimage known as the Munich Security Conference. The summit, normally a wonkish affair, made more headlines than usual last year. That's when newly inaugurated Vice President J.D. Vance delivered a brow-beaning speech to his European counterparts. The threat that I worry the most about vis-a-vis Europe is not Russia, it's not China, It's not any other external actor. And what I worry about is the threat from within, the retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values, values shared with the United States of America.
0:51This year, the message from the U.S. at least sounded more pleasant. Secretary of State Marco Rubio attended the conference to deliver this message. We can no longer place the so-called global order above the vital interests of our people and our nations. We do not need to abandon the system of international cooperation we authored. And we don't need to dismantle the global institutions of the old order that together we built. But these must be reformed. These must be rebuilt. What should we make of this year's Munich Security Conference? After two months of the Trump administration throwing around the U.S.'s weight in the Western Hemisphere, in Venezuela, the Caribbean, and toward Greenland, what's the state of the alliance between Europe and the U.S.?
1:34And how much does a gathering like this matter, especially as the U.S. appears to be fundamentally changing how rules-based international politics work? I'm Jen White. You're listening to the 1A Podcast. We'll hear from our guests and from you right after this short break.
1:53Let's get right into the conversation with our panel. Joining us in studio is Alex Ward. He's a national security reporter covering the White House and State Department for The Wall Street Journal. Alex, welcome back. Thanks for having me. Also with us from Washington, D.C. is Felicia Schwartz. She's diplomatic correspondent at Politico. Felicia, great to have you back. Thanks so much for having me. And joining us from London is David Rennie. He's geopolitics editor at The Economist. He writes their column, The Telegram. David, welcome back to you as well. Hello. Felicia, I'll start with you. What was the tone at this Munich Security Conference from European leaders, especially given recent events like the U.S.'s capture, a Venezuelist president, and our president's renewed pressure on acquiring Greenland?
2:37I think some of them behind the scenes were definitely more critical than they were in public, but you did have world leaders like Keir Starmer and the Finnish president, Alexander Stubb, and others basically saying they wanted to work with the U.S., but also doing things like denouncing the MAGA ideology and the ways that the U.S. is trying to spread it throughout Europe. So I think that there was kind of a balance between we're happy you're here, we want to do business with you, but a lot of hand-wringing behind the scenes. People were using this very wonky term de-risking to talk about the U.S.-Europe relationship.
3:21That's basically something we usually use to talk about China and the U.S. uncoupling the economies and that kind of thing. So I think that this was a real—I think the Greenland episode loomed really large. So the tone was definitely a bit different this year. Alex, what was your read? It was ironic that over Valentine's Day weekend, there was a lot of couples counseling between the U.S. and Europe. I mean, I was astonished by how many people used the metaphor of an abused spouse. When it came to Europe and how the Trump administration had been treating traditional allies. It was not – I don't know if it was sort of like word of mouth or anything or if that's how everyone – that's what everyone thought of.
4:02But it was said by a lot of people. So that's kind of where everything started. And then you have the Rubio speech, which as we noted, you know, had a nicer tone than Vance's speech last year but was very much – generally the same message. And even though it received a standing ovation throughout that day, people were initially going, wasn't that a great speech? And then went, wait a minute. Actually, it was kind of a – it was still a slap in the face but with a velvet glove. So in this – so it was not a particularly happy conference. Well, speaking in Munich, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the U.S.
4:39has claimed a leadership in the world was being challenged and that potentially it had already, quote, squandered that leadership. In the era of great power rivalry, even the United States will not be powerful enough to go it alone. Dear friends, being a part of NATO is not only Europe's competitive advantage, it's also the United States' competitive advantage. And the European Union's foreign policy chief, Kaya Callas, debated the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Mike Waltz, on stage about the state of the world order. She said, quote, it's true that those who have the power have had different rules, but even in the jungle, animals cooperate.
5:24And so you are better off when you work with others. David, what did you hear from Europe's top leaders that sounded different from past conferences or even past international summits like Davos or the Group of Seven meetings? So I think even a few months ago, you could talk to European officials who'd say, look, let's get real here. We don't have the nuclear weapons, the satellites, the airlift, all kinds of very sort of expensive bits of kit that America has. So in the real world, we have to just basically suck it up. We don't like what's being done to us, the tariffs, the bullying, the rhetoric, but we have no choice.
6:00There was a shift. And I think that Alex and Felicia are right that Greenland played an enormous role in that. That spectacle of Donald Trump standing up just a month ago in Davos and saying that he needs to own a piece of what is basically European territory, part of Denmark's kingdom. That felt to people like an act of hostility that even if he's now backed down, can't be forgotten. I think people were talking about him as a mob boss. Alex is right, people are using these kind of, you know, it was like a kind of an extended family that's grieving because the rich, powerful old man says, I want your wife.
6:36Give me your wife. I won't take no for an answer. And even if they've now backed down, how do you recover from that? So behind closed doors, you know, I saw on the record interviewed the Finnish president, big Atlanticist, off the record saw some other European leaders, including people who are traditionally very pro-American. They are now, as Alex and Felicia say, talking about we need to hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. And that means a world in which America abandons us or is even a hostile power. Just an absolutely dramatic shift. Let's hear more of Secretary Rubio's speech. He attended the conference as the Trump administration's highest ranking representative, and he gave a speech on Saturday describing the quote, liberal delusion that happened in the West after it won the Cold War against the Soviet Union.
7:23That every nation would now be a liberal democracy, that the ties formed by trade and by commerce alone would now replace nationhood, that the rules-based global order, an overused term, would now replace the national interest, and that we would now live in a world without borders where everyone became a citizen of the world. them. Alex, you talked about the initial reaction to Secretary Rubio's speech and then the assessment after the words had sunk in a bit. What do you think Rubio was trying to accomplish with this speech? I think it was his first speech of 2028, to be honest, because when you looked at it and when you listened to it, he had something for everybody.
8:06The MAGA crowd, which is a little skeptical of Marco Rubio, he can point to, I talked about Western civilization and Christianity and really gave it to the Europeans. And then there were sections of the speech that were pretty traditional for the elites and the establishment foreign policy types about how Europe and the U.S. belong together. It was a smorgasbord of little tidbits for Rubio. However, I should quickly note his historical inaccuracies there. He's talking about the rules-based order, which is very briefly kind of the rules set up after 1945 by the U.S. and allies in order to ensure no great war would happen again.
8:42And he's basically saying that somehow states subordinated their national interests to this idea. That's not the case. The notion of the rules-based order was states can't really achieve their interests. And you can't really achieve your interests in a world at war. So it's best to have this cooperation in the background and work together to achieve things in actual pursuit of the national interest. So what he's actually doing in the speech is trying – is the U.S. – you know, the call is coming from inside the house. the creator of that rules-based system is now saying it doesn't work for us in the U.S.
9:16and we're willing to blow it up. Maybe we might rebuild it. Maybe we might revive it. But you guys have to come along with this blow-up. Otherwise, we're going to go our separate ways. It's a pretty traumatic message for Rubio to deliver. And while Vance gave it last year, there was a question in Munich about, OK, is that just Vance? Is that a blip? They just got here. Maybe that's where his head's at, but maybe their minds will change. And for Rubio to deliver it, who's, you know, arguably the more powerful foreign policy voice in the administration, what he's basically telling Europeans is this is real.
9:48This is what we think of stuff. And the Greenland moment wasn't just a Trumpian blip. This is our policy. So now, as everyone's been noting, there's this question of de-risking and this sense that, you know, the U.S. and Europe have always worked together. But now that, you know, if the U.S. was a lion, it finally bit its partner. And then you don't really have that same relationship anymore. Well, Felicia, on Monday after the conference, Secretary Rubio met with two far-right European prime ministers, Victor Orban of Hungary and Robert Fizzo of Slovakia. He told Orban that the U.S. and Hungary now have a, quote, golden age in their relationship.
10:24What do these two meetings say to you, especially when contrasted with Rubio's speech in Munich? I think that's exactly what we heard from, you know, when I was doing the postmortem of the speech and the postmortem of the conference. that several officials, some French officials, others, pointed us to these meetings and they said, Rubio said some nice things, but look at his action. He's going straight from this conference to visit with these two leaders who are, they're often spoilers in the EU and NATO. They're more pro-Russia. And so that the US is forging alliances with these, or closer alliances, I should say, with these countries that have long been a challenge for the international systems that, you know, like just to build on what Alex said as well, like the whole irony here is the U.S.
11:12was the one to really write the rules of this system to its benefit. And now the U.S. is basically saying, well, we're going to, our new interpretation of our benefit is to kind of burn it all down. So yeah, I think those trips really communicated a lot about what the U.S. wants. There's a big emphasis in the kind of MAGA, foreign policy movement, to export right-wing ideology in Europe. The speech that rattled the conference last year was all about European civilizational decline and how the US and the Trump administration can be a partner in helping them to kind of right that ship. So I think that these trips really spoke volumes.
11:52And just Orban, for example, in Ukraine, for example, has been such a kind of difficult person to deal with. Hungary still purchases Russian oil. There's a lot of challenges there. so that he's calling this a golden age and not really using this opportunity to pressure him, at least, you know, not as far as we can tell. I think that's a real letdown to a lot of the folks who were convening at this conference and wanting to see the U.S. match its words about Europe and the U.S. belonging together with its deeds. David, I think there's an important broader context that many people in NATO now see the U.S.
12:30as an unreliable ally. There's a recent Politico poll which showed a majority of Canadians and German respondents said the U.S. was not reliable. So did a plurality of French and British respondents. What is your read on whether or not policymakers in Europe have a finger on the pulse of everyday Europeans about how they're feeling about the relationship with the U.S. and whether there may be some internal pressures to put some distance between these countries and the U.S.? I think to some extent, yes. But actually, I was in a room where a big European leader was asked, you know, are you worried that taking a pragmatic line with Donald Trump is, you know, going to get you into trouble domestically?
13:15And he said, look, you know, that's just rhetoric. We're actually dealing with some big problems here. I think actually, to get to sort of Felicia's point about the message that people were taking away from that, the fact that Marco Rubio left Munich went straight to Hungary and Slovakia, led by two right-wing populists who are amongst the most pro-Russian, anti-EU, Eurosceptic leaders in Europe. I think what a lot of leaders were saying, to your point about the unreliability of America, is at some level, and maybe many of your listeners are saying this right now, Europe spent too little. It was a free rider.
13:50It was complacent. It took the peace dividend. It let America do all the defending of Europe against Russia. and you know at some level Donald Trump is not the first American president to tell Europe to get its act together Barack Obama, very different man delivered the same message more politely to Europe so that message makes sense and the leaders that you meet in Munich they will admit behind closed doors they do need to spend more on defense they are now spending more on defense and they do need to get more serious about defending themselves against Russia and they hear that message from America but that exact same Trump administration that's saying get tougher on Russia defend yourselves then goes and says how fond it is of the leaders in Europe who are the least interested in defending themselves against Russia, who are pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian.
14:35And so there is a total, call it incoherence or call it hypocrisy, depending on how angry you are about this. And one of the things that came up again and again in Munich was real dismay verging on deep suspicion of the Trump administration's absolute refusal to put pressure on Russia in the context of the peace talks in Ukraine. Why again and again, now for many months, have we seen all the pressure being put on Ukraine's President Zelensky, who came to Munich, very little, almost none put on Russia. No criticism of Russia for bombing civilians, for bombing the energy infrastructure. Donald Trump continuously taking Russia's side.
15:15And that message contributes to all of the other factors we've talked about, Greenland and the MAGA culture war rhetoric we hear, that there is just a deep, deep suspicion that America is not just impatient with Europe and frustrated with Europe, but is changing sides. Russia is now more appealing to Donald Trump than the Europeans. And that is a real dilemma for European leaders. Well, there was a sideline meeting and ongoing talks about Ukraine, ongoing peace talks. Secretary Rubio didn't attend that meeting, but he did meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Saturday. Alex, is there anything new in these peace talks that could represent progress?
15:56No. I mean, there are, and we should note that, you know, this week there's a meeting between the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine to continue those peace talks. But however, is this Kabuki theater? I mean, it's fine for them to get together. In fact, a deal does not happen unless they're all in the same room together. But there's no sign that they're actually heading to any sort of peace. And to David's point, you know, the Trump administration is really not doing anything to pressure the Russians to make a deal at this point. So if you are the Europeans or if you're Ukraine, you're looking at all the stuff that we've been discussing.
16:31You know, Rubio misses the meeting. He goes to Slovakia and Hungary. They're talking about taking Greenland. They're not pressuring Putin. You are wondering what is the U.S. worth it to you? right now? Is this a country that you can trust long-term? And on top of that, between the differences between Republicans and Democrats when it comes to Europe, is this now, you know, do you consider this a blip or do you consider this a long-term trajectory of U.S. politics? And we could have a larger conversation about that. And we will. We're going to take a quick break and then we'll do just that. Stay with us.
17:05Let's get back into the conversation with this message we got from Mike in Missouri, who says, two world wars were fought on European soil. Millions of lives were lost. The European Union was created to prevent another war among European nations. It's easy to understand why they are reluctant to prioritize re-weaponizing. Peace is hard. David, you spoke about previous U.S. presidents who have pressured Europe to be better prepared to defend itself against Russia. German Chancellor Mertz also emphasized the need for a united Europe, especially against Russia. He said in his speech on Friday that he and French President Emmanuel Macron discussed sharing nuclear weapons to deter any threats.
17:46Currently, France and the UK are the only countries in the region with nuclear weapons. But where do European governments land right now on this question of how they should defend themselves in general and especially against Russia? It's a fascinating question because you are hearing countries having previously sort of unimaginable conversations about maybe we need to develop a European nuclear deterrent, maybe other European countries need to look at getting their own nuclear weapons. You've seen some politicians in some of the Nordic Scandinavian countries talking about that, even Germany, although the Chancellor of Germany, Frederick Meads, pointed out that actually Germany is banned very strictly by legal promises it's made not to develop nukes.
18:26But what they're really all talking about is a level of distrust when the American government, which actually still says it will extend the nuclear umbrella to Europe and NATO. So, you know, Europeans don't need to worry about their own nuclear deterrent. People say they believe that for now, but what if it's not true in the future? And it takes a very long time to develop your own nuclear deterrent. I think it comes back again and again to this sense of threat from Russia and a real anxiety and disquiet and disbelief that the Trump administration does not seem to share that sense of alarm about Russia.
19:04We had actually a very interesting figure from America was the undersecretary for policy at the Pentagon, Elbridge Colby. He's a big thinker. He's a conservative sort of intellectual. He came with a stay calm message, which was America will do the nuclear work and the really highest end weapons, but Europe spends its money on being conventionally deterring Russia. So that was, you know, okay, that's an interesting calm message. But he then repeatedly said that the Russian threat is frankly manageable, that Europeans are too overexcited, they need to calm down, and they need to calm down about values and just focus on being better partners so that America sees an interest in being a NATO defense ally of America.
19:43Don't try and talk about sentiment or shared values or emotion or kind of history. Let's just do this on cold clinical interests. And so I thought that was a fascinating pitch because it was in some ways logical and reassuring, but it just comes up colliding again and again about the incoherence of the Trump administration's seeming fondness for Vladimir Putin and some of the most pro-Putin governments in Europe. That's where the kind of the Colby-style logic falls to pieces. Well, Felicia, there's also the question of security guarantees for Ukraine, including from European countries that take part in the Coalition of the Willing.
20:16And that's this group of 34 countries pushing for peace in Ukraine, including potential peacekeeping troops. What did you hear, if anything, at the conference about the extent to which that responsibility for those security guarantees would fall on European countries or on the U.S.? Europe has long wanted some involvement from the U.S. in this process. There are a lot of things that even, you know, the U.K. and France have volunteered to provide troops. But even if they do that, there are other things they need from the U.S., like intelligence, a lot of logistical support, other things. There's been a pretty broad frustration from the Ukrainians, from some of the Europeans, that the security guarantees between the U.S.
21:00and Ukraine have apparently been largely worked out. They're close to done. Zelensky has said publicly and privately, we're basically just waiting for the U.S. to sign. But what my reporting and others' reporting shows is that basically what the Trump team has made clear to Ukraine is that they don't want to sign the security guarantees unless, you know, it's part of a whole package to end the war. And I think for Ukraine and for Europe, that's really frustrating because they, you know, like we've said many times throughout this conversation, they don't really trust that Putin has a serious interest in ending the war.
21:33And they think that Russia needs to know that the West has Ukraine's back and that finalizing these guarantees will send a strong signal to Russia as they, you know, as Ukraine tries to kind of fight it out and, you know, deter Russia from attacking again. So I think that the U.S. in this process has committed, we don't really know the details yet, they haven't really come out, but they've committed to some extent to participate in this process. It's something that's being negotiated. And in these trilateral talks, you know, they're trying to get Russia to buy in on this. This is another thing, of course, I hear from European and Ukrainian sources that they're very skeptical that Russia has any real interest in doing this.
22:15But I think that is kind of one of these big questions looming over the future of the talks, which is, you know, is the U.S. really going to deliver? How much can Europe really do on its own? This is one of the most sensitive discussions for sure. Well, we heard from Rob who emails, with Trump acting like a bully toward all of Europe, they should completely shut the U.S. out, close the borders, send our citizens home, and halt all trade. This, of course, would be difficult on their own economies, but America would be brought to its knees. Maybe Trump would learn that a partnership includes everyone and not just him.
22:50Now, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave a speech at Davos a few weeks ago where he declared a rupture in the international order. This week, Chancellor Murs said the rules-based international order, which the U.S. and allies built after World War II, quote, no longer exists. He also referenced Vice President Vance's speech in 2025, saying there was a, quote, deep rift between Europe and the U.S. So, Alex, to get back to your earlier point, what evidence is there that the Trump administration's actions, what it's saying about our European allies, is leading to a true rupture with long-lasting consequences?
23:26I don't think we're there yet. I mean, I think it's interesting that Carney said rupture, but that Merz, the German chancellor, said rift. I mean, whether that was intentional or not, what it signals is that you've got the Canadians saying, you know, rupture means break. It is done. And, yes, Merz said, you know, it is over, but he's saying that there's a rift between the U.S. and Europe. I think Merz's general message, and he does not speak for everyone in Europe, but he's a pretty powerful guy. I think what he's saying basically is that when we talk about the rules-based order, what we're really talking about is that it is a U.S.-led rules-based order.
23:56I think that's the part that he's saying that part is done. The question then is, you know, it's not do we go from rules-based to chaos? No one wants that. It's now it's not that, you know, there's no the rules-based order. It is a order. So now what is the next one? And that is what the U.S. and Europeans are going to be discussing for quite some time. The U.S. pitch right now is basically it's what we want. You know, follow whatever the American interest is and, you know, do that. And if you guys in Europe can do that, if you get strong, then we can work together because it's an order based on mutual interest more so than values and threat perceptions.
24:34The Europeans are saying, hey, there has to be a sense of values. There has to be a sense of threat perception here because what I find interesting is that in the Vance speech and in the Rubio speech, they both – it is basically two years now or at least two speeches in which the U.S. is saying that we don't see the world the same way you do, Europe. In fact, the threats are not Russia and China. Van said that explicitly, including in the clip you played. The threat is you guys in Europe and your politics and the way you see the world. And that is a wholly different message, right? So this is no longer a U.S.-led order in which Europe kind of follows.
25:10It is now a, at least what the U.S. would like to see, a we do our stuff and hopefully you guys agree. And if not, we'll go our separate ways. So now we're having, we're in this meta debate of, okay, fine, that old thing is done. The post-World War II order, that is done. What is the, I guess, post-Trump order? That's the discussion now. Michael emails, as I listen to your discussion, I get agitated that everyone seems to treat the Trump administration as a normal U.S. administration. It seems as every move, big and small, made by the administration is designed for the benefit of one single person in his family.
Read the full transcript
25:45Everything is transactional. I wish it would always be mentioned that the Trump administration lies continually. President Trump is just over a year into his second term, and his party faces a pretty daunting task to hold on to Congress in the midterms this November. Former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Democratic Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez attended this conference. They focused on their party winning the midterms. California's Democratic governor, Gavin Newsom, was there, urged attendees to think beyond the current administration and President Trump's term. How did the possibility that President Trump could lose some power domestically factor into the European reaction to speeches from the administration, Alex?
26:26Quite intensely, actually. I mean, it was sort of the first event I've been to in a while in which, you know, Trump kind of didn't loom that much. It was very forward-looking, and there were about at least six potential Democratic presidential candidates. There were a lot of questions about what they would see. And there were direct questions from Europeans to Democrats who were having their own kind of marriage counseling. Like, are we good? Are we OK? Are we still friends? But you had Europeans asking Democrats and Republicans, so what do these midterms look like? What are the returns in Alaska or the polling in Alaska?
26:55What's it looking like in Georgia, North Carolina? And there's a sense, I think Europeans would say this, and I think they told us privately, you know, if the Democrats were to take even just one chamber, most likely the House, then Trump starts to be more lame duckier. And then we start focusing on the 2020 election and also because his agenda starts to halt at home. Now, does that mean if Democrats take the House that they can stop his foreign policy? Not really. Congress has kind of abdicated foreign policy work. And on top of that, Trump can basically do what he wants. And if the spotlight moves away from him because of the 2020 election, he might try to do something abroad to gain that spotlight back.
27:32But I think that there is now in Europe a sense that this too shall pass, that there's kind of a November deadline for Trump to go maximalist. But no one really knows what that looks like afterward. We've never had a moment of a lame duck Trump. So that will be new territory for everybody. Well, Felicia, there's the midterm elections and then there's the next presidential election here in the U.S. Do policymakers in Europe believe the next U.S. president, especially if it's someone who's not part of the current administration, could basically do a reset of the U.S. relationship with European allies back to how they were a few years ago?
28:07Or are we already far enough down this path that there's not going to be a full return? I think they definitely learned some lessons from the Biden interregnum. There were some things that Biden tried to come back and repair. There were a lot of things that he didn't. You know, some of his foreign policies, I'm thinking about his approach to China, for example. I mean, there were differences on the margins, but a lot was the same. And I think even with Biden, of course, he took a much more forceful approach to Ukraine, but there was a general feeling that, you know, it was all undergirded by this feeling that America does want to have a different role in the world.
28:48So I think that when I was speaking to European officials at the conference, and, you know, just in my general kind of day-to-day existence, I think there's a real understanding that the genie can't be put back in the bottle. I think depending on who you talk to, there is more hope about, you know, can we move past this very fractious period and get back to something that at least feels a little more normal? I think there's a lot of question about what would a President Rubio be like? What would a President Vance be like? Like, what are, you know, are there emphasis on, you know, civilizational erasure and all this other kind of Western values stuff?
29:27Is that to kind of bring Trump voters along with them? Is this what they really believe? I think there's a lot of diplomats have learned that Marco Rubio is not the great savior that they hoped he would be when he was named secretary of state. But is he a more, you know, is he a more kind of, he's at least comes from the foreign policy tradition in a way that Trump and his administration has not followed. So, and I think, of course, yeah, if there's a Democrat, I hope they think, I think they hope that they'll go back to the rules-based international order. But I think they also kind of understand that the American public has changed a lot.
30:02And that is reflected in these policies and why Trump and Trumpism and populism is resonating so much in the US. So I think there's some cautious optimism, but also some realism about the road ahead. Well, in just a couple of sentences as we wrap up here, I'd love to hear each of you share just one idea or thing you think we should watch related to this conference. David, I'll come to you first. I think that in addition to following the midterms obsessively, people are very concerned about the state of institutions and the rule of law. It came up a lot in Munich that, you know, some of these attacks on the European Union, there's a suspicion among European political leaders that this is about the European Union daring to try to regulate some of the giant tech companies and the extraordinary power we see now of some of the tech billionaires in Washington.
30:51One of the questions Europe wants to ask, as does every allies, does that change? In addition to elections, what happens to the role of kind of very, very wealthy men around the president? Will that remain the same or will things go back to more institutional order? Felicia, in just a couple of sentences? I'd say the French election is coming up next year. Keir Starmer is in peril. So there's other kind of populism shifts we might see in Europe that will have a big effect. Alex, I'll give you the last word. If the U.S. bombs Iran, which is potential, there's a potential that could lead to yet another refugee crisis in the region and maybe extends to Europe, which could once again exacerbate the politics in that continent and the relationship with the U.S.
31:36Well, more to watch in the coming months. That's Alex Ward. He's a national security reporter covering the White House and State Department for The Wall Street Journal. Also with us, Felicia Schwartz, diplomatic correspondent at Politico, and David Rennie, geopolitics editor at The Economist. He writes their column, The Telegram. Thanks to you all. Today's producer was Michael Falero. This program comes to you from WAMU, part of American University in Washington, distributed by NPR. I'm Jen White. Thanks for listening. And we'll talk again tomorrow. This is 1A.
From the publisher
The summit – normally a wonkish affair – made more headlines than usual last year. That’s when newly inaugurated Vice President J.D. Vance delivered a brow-beating speech to his European counterparts. But in 2026, the message from American officials at least sounded more pleasant.
What should we make of this year’s conference?
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