SCOTUS Skeptical of Rastafarian Religious Damages Suit

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2:35They threw it away, handcuffed him to a chair, and shaved him bald. Damon Landor is a Rastafarian who had followed the Nazarite vow, forbidding him from cutting his hair for nearly two decades. When Landor was transferred to a new prison in Louisiana with just weeks left on his five-month sentence, he carried a copy of an appeals court decision that held that cutting a religious prisoner's dreadlocks violates federal law. But a prison guard threw the ruling into the trash, And despite Landor's pleas, he was handcuffed to a chair and held down while his knee-length dreadlocks were cut off. No one disputes the glaring violation of his religious rights, as Justice Amy Coney Barrett noted.

3:25Look, the facts of this case are egregious. So if on the facts we were looking for a case in which there should be money damages, this is it. But it's not just about the facts. It's about the law and whether Landor can sue the guards and prison officials for damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, better known as RELUPA. While the Supreme Court has repeatedly sided with religious litigants in recent years, a majority of the conservative justices, led by Justice Neil Gorsuch, appeared skeptical that Landor could sue individual corrections employees. The circuits are unanimously against you and have been for many, many, many years.

4:10So saying that something awful is going to happen, whatever's happened has happened, right? The conservatives questioned whether the prison guards had noticed that they could be found individually liable. But the liberals said the prison employees were on notice. Here are Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Sonia Sotomayor. If you're hired as a prison guard in Louisiana, you don't sit down, and I don't even know if Louisiana does, saying, oh, here's our agreement with the federal government, which probably goes on for, I don't know, how many pages. And you should look at it carefully because you're bound by it.

4:48Generally speaking, if you're a prison official, you know you're working in a prison and you're bound by law to pay damages if you violate the law, do you get an out because what? My guest is John Measer, a professor at Notre Dame Law School and director of the school's Religious Liberty Clinic. John, tell us about the law that Landor is suing under. That act, which shorthand is called RELUPA, was passed in 2000 in conjunction with an act that was passed a few years earlier, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. And both of them sort of target the same goal, which is to, as a matter of federal statutory law, to restore a more robust set of protections for religious exercise, which previously had been available under the U.S.

5:41Constitution. But then following a seminal case in 1990, Employment Division v. Smith. It sort of restricted some of those rights as a matter of constitutional law, and then Congress acted to restore them as a matter of statutory law. So explain what the problem is with him using this law. So RALUPA, the particular law at issue here, focuses on two areas of state and local government activity. One is in land use, you know, decisions about how you can use your property. And then the one relevant here is about religious exercise in jails and prisons. And so there's no doubt that the law, Rilupa, protects Mr.

6:21Landor's rights here. He's a state prisoner, and so therefore safeguards his right while incarcerated to exercise his religion. And the only question in this case is one of remedies. So the facts are egregious. I don't think anyone really doubts that while he was in prison, his rights were blatantly violated. He's a Rastafarian, which among other things requires him not to cut his hair. He actually had a judicial decision when he entered the prison that held the prison policy requiring, you know, they normally require forced shaving of all the inmates' hair. He had a decision saying that couldn't be enforced against Rastafarians like him, but the guards literally threw away that decision, handcuffed him to a chair and shaved his head anyway.

7:04So there's no doubt his rights were violated. And the question now is only what sort of remedies does Rulupa allow for him to address that violation? Justice Ketanji Brown-Jackson read from Rulupa and said it seems pretty clear. And five years ago, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the sister statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act permits money damages against federal officials. In that case, Muslims were allowed to sue over their inclusion on the FBI's no-fly list. So why doesn't that analysis work for the law here, Rilupa? Yeah, so the legal question at the heart is a pretty technical one of congressional power.

7:46So what both RFRA and Rilupa, what these laws allow is for someone who's been injured, whose rights have been violated to file a lawsuit in federal court against those who caused the violation. The statute, the words of the law, allow you in that lawsuit to get what is all appropriate relief. So then the whole question becomes, well, what does Congress mean by appropriate relief? One thing that's undisputed is appropriate relief certainly includes a judicial order that would prevent an ongoing violation of religious rights. So if the jail, so to speak, were continuing to threaten to violate Mr.

8:23Landor's rights, say they were shaving his head every week, you could get a court order telling them to stop doing that. The question, though, is, as you just touched on there, is what about one-time harms? What about harms that aren't ongoing, they're over now? How do you remedy those? Does the law allow you to get monetary damages, which would be the normal way in a lawsuit? If you've been harmed, the normal recourse in the law is you're able to get monetary damages, to get money to help in some way remedy or repair that harm. But the question here is, does Rilupa allow that? You're right. RFRA, the sister statute, was held to allow monetary damages.

8:59And the question of, well, does Rilupa allow the same, turns out a very particular idea of the congressional power issue here, which is Congress's use of its spending power. Does the spending clause require something more for a statute to authorize monetary damages? Does appropriate relief clearly enough convey that when a state accepts federal spending, it might open itself up or open its officers up to suits for money damages? Did it seem pretty apparent that most of the conservative justices thought that the statute shouldn't apply here? I don't know how clear it is, but I do think a number of justices certainly expressed skepticism about that.

9:45So there's a couple of different things going on. One is what does the statute mean? You know, what does appropriate relief mean in context of laws like this? And so that question is, does the statute itself, is it clear enough that it allows monetary damages? And then the other is, well, OK, even if it is, even if Congress did allow this, does the Constitution let Congress do that through a spending clause law like this? And several justices, I think, expressed some skepticism on one or both of those questions. But I think the skepticism all came back to a similar idea, which is spending clause legislation, right?

10:17It opens up money for state governments to take part in federal programs or to receive federal subsidies for different types of things here, jails and prisons. And the federal government can attach conditions to those. Sure, we'll help pay for your prison facilities if you agree to comply with X, Y and Z. And the court's concern with laws like this is that states are coming into that bargain with their eyes open, that they understand the conditions they're agreeing to. It's one of notice, one of clarity. So that's, I think, the driving concern here. I don't think it's so much about whether it would make sense to apply these substantive religious rights in prison.

10:55And everyone agrees, actually, that the prison and its officials are bound substantively to protect the rights that Relupin demands. But what some of the justices in the court were really struggling with was how clear was it? Were individuals who work within those prisons really on notice that by signing up to work in the prison, they might be sued for things like this? It seemed like a lot of the conservative justices didn't think that there was notice here. At one point, Chief Justice John Roberts said it's a legal fiction to say that a prison guard knows what he's signing up for here. But the liberals, particularly Justice Sotomayor, said when you sign up to work as a corrections official in a prison, doesn't that mean you're signing up to obey the law?

11:41And, you know, the act here was so obviously brutal. Right. And the guard just tossed the notice he got from Landor into the trash. I agree with that. And I think Mr. Landor has a very good argument here. Right. So it's, of course, true. as the chief justice pointed out, that there's something of a legal fiction here. But that's, you know, these legal fictions run throughout the law. We're all presumed to have knowledge and be aware of the contents of criminal law. You know, is any given person on the street actually aware of everything that's prohibited by federal or state criminal law? No, of course not, right?

12:16But ignorance of the law, even if actually true, we don't allow that ignorance of the law to be an excuse to defy it, right? And so, you know, Justice Sotomayor's point here, which is echoed throughout the argument by Mr. Landor's counsel, is that at least in this context, where we're talking about people who sign up to work in a prison or a jail, these officers, we all the time presume they understand their obligations under federal law, under constitutional law, under state law. And they understand that if they violate those obligations, these demands that they protect our rights, that they might be sued for it.

12:51And again, I don't think there's any doubt in the case. And I I think the state actually concedes that as a substantive matter, the state and its officers were bound to follow the demands of Rilupa. So then the only question as well, is it different that they need to also know they knew they had to follow Rilupa. They knew they could get sued under Rilupa. They knew they could be held subject to injunctive relief under Rilupa. Do they also need to know that they could be sued for money under Rilupa? Well, even if that's a separate question, I agree with Mr. Landor here. That's not a very hard one, because, again, as soon as you're understanding that you might be sued as an individual, the normal recourse is that if you're found to have violated the law, you might have to pay money damages.

13:36Coming up next, where might the justices come out in the case? This is Bloomberg. Support for the show comes from Public.com. If you're actively involved in your portfolio, you probably catch yourself repeating the same actions. Buying the dip, manually sweeping idle cash, putting on a hedge. On public, you can now create AI agents that handle all these tasks on your behalf. Just describe what you want to do in plain English. Like, if the VIX hits 25, buy a put option on the S &P 500. Or, if my cash balance goes above$20 ,000, move the excess into my direct index. You approve of the workflow and your agent handles the risk.

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16:39The court's three liberal justices seemed firmly on Landor's side, but the court's conservatives seemed skeptical. Justice Neil Gorsuch led the court's conservative bloc at oral arguments in pressing the attorneys for Damon Landor on whether corrections employees should be individually liable for contracts made between state institutions and the federal government under a religious liberty statute. Where did the defendant, the individual defendants, agree with the federal government to be bound? And what notice did they have? And I understand your point earlier to the chief that they're subject to state regulations.

17:23But Liberal Justice Ketanji Brown-Jackson said the statute was clear. So I guess I'm trying to understand how Congress could have said it any clearer. I mean, to the extent that we're puzzling over whether or not there's a clear statement in the statute, You know, it says a person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. If that doesn't refer to money damages being brought by an individual for a violation of RALUPA, what could Congress have meant by appropriate relief here? I've been talking to John Measer of Notre Dame Law School.

18:07Several justices pointed out that all the circuit courts and all the lower courts have ruled against Landor's position here. So why did the Supreme Court even take this case? I mean, there was no circuit split, and it doesn't seem like they took the case to reverse it. Yeah, I think there's a couple of reasons. So one, I think many of the justices' questions overstated the level of that agreement. And as I mentioned earlier, there's really two different legal questions in the case, which is what does the law mean? You know, when it says appropriate relief, what is appropriate relief in context?

18:44Will that be understood? And the second thing is, even if the law does allow money damages, can Congress do that in a law like this? So certain courts have arrived at similar conclusions, which is that Rulupa doesn't allow damages, but they've done it through different paths. And in fact, several courts have found that, no, in fact, the law is clear here that just like under RFRA, appropriate relief does, in fact, include damages as the normal expected remedy against an individual. And then, you know, some of them have then said, but as a constitutional matter, the court can't do that. They can't, through spending legislation, bind these sort of individual third parties who didn't, you know, agree to the funds or something like that.

19:21And then some courts have come out differently on those questions. So although it's true that damages aren't available generally in federal courts under Rilupa, I don't think there's a lot of agreement as to why. And then more to the point, this is an area where the Supreme Court is recently providing more guidance. So under RFRA, which you just mentioned in this recent case, Tanzan, you know, courts weren't necessarily getting that right either, that RFRA allowed monetary damages. The court came in and said, no, no, no, we look at RFRA, appropriate relief does include monetary damages against individuals as the normal recourse.

19:53That was a pretty recent decision. So now all around the country, courts are having to rethink their older precedent. Oh, is it still good law? Do I need to rethink it after Tanzan? And the court has stepped in to provide that clarity. Justice Sotomayor and some of the other liberal justices warned that ruling against Landor would potentially put dozens of other federal statutes at risk. Yeah, I certainly don't have a good read on just how many statutes might look like this or, you know, maybe relatedly just how many other interpretations of those statutes might be implicated. Either way, the court goes.

20:26But I guess I would say that, and I think all the justices acknowledge this, this would certainly not be the first time that the court had ruled that spending clause legislation allowed Congress to create a right of action for monetary damages against third parties or individuals. So that wouldn't be sort of groundbreaking. You know, the extent to which Congress can do that or the terms through which Congress must speak. I don't, again, I don't think there's great clarity in the law on that now. So ruling in either way in this case is going to help provide guidance. And I'm not sure that I have a strong sense of which side is right, that would be more disruptive to the law as it currently sits today.

21:07Were you surprised at the turn that this argument took? I don't know if I would say I'm surprised. I think initially, I think you started here, actually in our conversation that there's a really strong argument and I think good reason to believe that well if RFRA through the exact same language passed by Congress for the exact same reason to restore religious freedom if RFRA allows monetary damages it's very hard to understand how you know its sister statute Rilupa doesn't but I think I understand the complications in the case you know it's this it's this erudite question of what Congress must do when it acts through different enumerated powers.

21:47So, you know, RFRA is not spending clause legislation. RUPA is. They might require different things of Congress. So I do think the case is harder than it might appear at first blush. But I also would hope that the court would ultimately align the reading of the two statutes. And it would be at least a somewhat unusual result if RFRA and RUPA, these sister statutes, passed for the same purposes, allowed different remedies. And it would leave people like Mr. Landor without any recourse to remedy what all agree was an egregious violation of his rights. And it would leave no ability to hold the individuals who literally threw away a copy of a court decision to hold them accountable.

22:27And I think that would be regrettable, certainly. Yeah. And one of the justices, I don't remember which justice, asked at one point, what happened to the guards who did this? And the only answer was, well, the warden was transferred or left. So one wonders if there was any kind of punishment. Right. And, you know, here in Notre Dame, in our religious library clinic, we filed an amicus brief in the case on behalf of a variety of religious organizations which point this out, which point out the danger that if someone who's harmed can't get monetary damages, there might be very few and perhaps no options, no mechanisms available to hold these violators accountable.

23:02Because if it's a one-time thing and it's over and done with and the court can't issue an order not to do it because the violations already occurred, well, then what can you do, right? You can scold, you can reprimand the prison and the lower court did here, you know, so really just criticized in harsh language what had happened to Mr. Landlord. But beyond that, it's a very thin mechanism to hold these folks accountable. So, I mean, this court has, you know, repeatedly sided with religious litigants in recent years. I mean, you could go through a lot of cases, but there's the Christian football coach who got to pray at the 50-yard line after games, the Christian web designer who was allowed to refuse to work with same-sex couples, the Texas death row inmate who got to pray with his pastor.

23:50I mean, on and on. If the court doesn't find for the inmate here, the Rastafarian, is there a danger that people will say, well, when conservative Christians come before the court, their religious rights are vindicated, but this Rastafarian inmate, his are not? People will certainly say it, right? I think it's easy to predict that that would be, you know, one criticism of the decision if it were to go that way. You know, I don't think it would be accurate or fair. I think the court is serious and committed to protecting religious freedom. It's a right that, as you just mentioned, in a number of areas, the court has taken a lot of cases to ensure that it's not being diminished around the country.

24:40I think that's true even if they were to rule against Mr. Landor in this case. And again, I think if they were to do so, which would be regrettable, I don't think that would be the right decision. But if the court were to do so, I think it would not come from any different approach based on the religious background of the plaintiff, but rather based on some of these really difficult structural questions about congressional authority the court is grappling with. And, you know, I would just point out that those cases and this one provide, and the court knows this, significant protections for all religions, you know, whether any given claimant is Christian or not.

25:21And certainly not all of the plaintiffs in these prior cases have been Christian. There's one just this past term where the lead plaintiffs were Muslim families. So I don't think that would be an appropriate reading of the case now. I mean, do you have a feel for how it's going to come out or you don't? No, I don't have a feel. I mean, I think this kind of goes back to what we were saying. I think it's a complicated case. I think it was obvious to me that in the argument, a lot of the justices were really struggling with how to draw these lines and these concerns over notice and keeping Congress from overstepping its enumerated powers, which itself is a rights protecting idea typically.

25:54But with the recognition that here is a seminal piece of legislation to protect religious freedom, a piece of legislation the court has repeatedly been sure to safeguard and uphold. And I think there's real tensions with how best to weigh those competing sort of priorities of the court. Yeah, I have to say that the case was so egregious. I mean, you have a prison guard tossing a decision in the garbage, and then they forcibly hold him down and cut off his dreadlocks. I thought they took the case to reverse the court below and allow him to sue for damages, especially considering how this court is usually solicitous of religious litigants.