In short
Business Breakdowns: Episode 237 - Amadeus: The IT Backbone of Travel
Episode Overview In this episode of Business Breakdowns, hosts Matt Reustle and Zack Fuss dissect Amadeus, a leading technology provider in the travel industry. The discussion features Ben Needham, a portfolio manager at Ninety One Asset Management, who provides insights into Amadeus's business model, market position, and future prospects.
Key Episode Themes
- Amadeus as a Dominant IT Player: Understanding its role in travel bookings and operations.
- Business Model: Examining revenue streams and profitability.
- Impact of AI: Exploring potential disruptions and advancements in the travel sector.
- Financial Strength: Analyzing Amadeus's balance sheet compared to competitors.
- Market Dynamics: Identifying growth opportunities and associated risks.
Detailed Breakdown
- Introduction to Amadeus
- Amadeus is described as the "gorilla of travel IT," facilitating travel bookings through its technology.
- The company dominates the market, especially in airline operations and hotel inventory management.
- Understanding Amadeus' Business Model
- Three Main Divisions:
- Distribution Business: Connects travel sellers with providers, holding over 50% market share.
- Air IT Business: Provides inventory, reservation, and departure control systems, processing over 2 billion passengers annually.
- Hotel IT Business: A newer segment that is growing rapidly, contributing about 10% to group profits.
- Market Position and Competitors
- Competition in Air IT: Amadeus leads with over 50% market share, followed by Sabre and smaller players.
- Historical Development: Founded in 1987 through the merger of several airlines’ distribution systems.
- Revenue Streams and Profitability
- Amadeus operates primarily on a transaction-based model.
- Revenue is linked to air travel volumes, with fees per booking:
- Air IT: Approximately 1 Euro per passenger.
- Distribution: Approximately 6 Euros per transaction.
- Impact of AI and Technology on Amadeus
- AI's role is viewed as a potential enhancement rather than a disrupter.
- Amadeus is well-positioned to integrate AI into its existing systems and maximize customer value.
- Financial Health and Capital Allocation
- Amadeus maintains a strong balance sheet with less than one times leverage.
- Cash generation is robust, with high margins and a good cash conversion rate.
- The company reinvests heavily in R&D and considers share buybacks.
- Risks and Challenges
- Key risks include competitive threats and potential disintermediation.
- Economic downturns affecting travel volumes could impact revenue but may also provide opportunities for market share gains.
- Future Prospects and Growth Opportunities
- Growth in hotel IT and expansion of air IT services through enhanced offerings like Nevio, which aims to modernize airline booking systems.
- Expected revenue growth rates:
- Air IT: 7-9% annually, supported by inflation-linked contracts.
- Hotel IT: 15-20% growth anticipated as it gains traction.
- Lessons Learned from Amadeus
- The importance of being a customer-friend while also being competitive in the industry.
- A business model that combines scalability and customer-centricity can drive long-term value creation.
Conclusion Ben Needham's insights highlight Amadeus's strategic positioning as a critical technology provider in the travel industry, its ability to adapt to technological advances like AI, and its robust financial management. The episode encapsulates how Amadeus has successfully navigated its historical challenges and is poised for future growth in the evolving travel landscape.
For Further Information To listen to the full episode or explore more, visit [Colossus](https://www.joincolossus.com).
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00This episode is brought to you by Portrait. It's the AI research system that I used to prepare for today's episode and for all Business Breakdowns episodes. Portrait was built by former buy-side investors, and they understand great investing isn't just about having more information from low-quality sources. It's about having the right information organized the right way. And if you listen to the show, you appreciate diligence consists of many things. Diving into the history of a business, framing the nuanced competitive dynamics, tracking key signposts around your thesis. And historically, that would take up material time that you do not have.
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1:45This is Business Breakdowns. Business Breakdowns is a series of conversations with investors and operators diving deep into a single business. For each business, we explore its history, its business model, its competitive advantages, and what makes it tick. We believe every business has lessons and secrets that investors and operators can learn from, and we are here to bring them to you. To find more episodes of Breakdowns, check out JoinColossus.com. All opinions expressed by hosts and podcast guests are solely their own opinions. Hosts, podcast guests, their employers or affiliates may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.
2:27This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. This is Matt Russell, and today we are breaking down the travel IT giant, Amadeus. If you have booked travel with a travel agent or done business travel and used your system, there's a very good chance that was done through Amadeus's plumbing. They are IT for travel, and it goes well beyond what you see or interact with as a consumer doing this within the airlines, within hotels, inventory management, all of the behind the scenes work that make these logistical engines actually flow.
3:13My guest is Ben Needham, Portfolio Manager at 91 Asset Management. And he joined to cover why Amadeus might have some misconceptions in the market, the business and how it's grown and captured such dominant market share over the years, and what that looks like in terms of a value proposition on all sides of the equation. We also get into the AI debate and what that might mean for Amadeus and what a strong balance sheet could represent for Amadeus relative to some of its peers. So a very interesting niche business, a lot to discuss here. And Ben was a great guest to cover it all. Please enjoy this breakdown of Amadeus.
3:56All right, Ben, I am excited to have you here to talk about Amadeus. And this was admittedly one that took some time for me to wrap my head around as I was doing some initial research on it. So easy place to start was just to get your overview, description, how you would paint the picture of this business to a listener who is vaguely familiar or not familiar at all with this name. Thanks for having me, Matt. I think the best way of summarizing the business is as the gorilla of travel IT, but a friendly gorilla, which is able to grow well ahead of a structurally growing market, i.e. travel. And importantly, this is in a low risk way, given its diversification across geography, and travel provider customer, and the inflation link nature of how the revenue model works.
4:46So what do they actually do? There are three main parts of the business to understand. Firstly, they have a distribution business which links up travel sellers with travel providers in the indirect travel channel. It essentially aggregates content from the travel providers, i.e. airlines, hotels, rail companies, and supplies that to a pre-fragmented global travel provider ecosystem. This includes corporate travel management companies, online travel agencies, bricks and mortar travel agencies, super apps, meta channels, and AI agency perhaps. If you're making a travel booking via a travel agent or your company is booking a business flight for you, there's a good chance Amadeus of the plumbing that enables it given they have over 50 % market share and distribution which is actually rising.
5:33Distribution perhaps only gets a lot of the investor focus as the biggest business by profits is actually now the air IT business. This is predominantly the inventory management, reservation management and departure control system for over 50 % of the airlines globally, processing over 2 billion passengers boarded per annum. When you're making a booking on say Luftanser, Amadeus will process that booking and when you're boarding a Luftanser plane, Amadeus will facilitate the information flow all the way to the travel gate. Then finally, Amadeus also enables travelers to make reservations in hotels via its scaling hotel customer reservation business.
6:08Amadeus, in effect, is uniquely positioned right the way across the travel ecosystem, enabling the flow of content, bookings, transactions, and ultimately travelers. It's interesting as an industry, I would have previously assumed that most airlines built this system internally or had some type of internal software that would do this for them. Can you frame a little bit the space as a whole, how Amadeus fits into this ecosystem, whether there's competitors, how the technology kind of evolved into a place where there's such a key player in the industry? The RIT part of Amadeus is a community-based platform.
6:48And what that means is they're able to share economies of scale with their customers. They can amortize more of their R &D spend across more customers as they grow. And that's why airlines, which are pretty cyclical businesses, pretty capital intensive, they outsource these types of operations to people who can do it better than themselves. And that's why typically when you look at the airline space today, or the travel IT space today, within that, just over 80 % of air IT is outsourced to the likes of Amadeus, and then only 20 % today is actually in-housed. That's the background to the air IT ecosystem of a business.
7:26When you think about the market shares, Amadeus has over 50 % market share within the AIRIT space. So it processes over 2 billion passengers boarded per annum of a market size of just over 4 billion ex-China. The second biggest company is Sabre, which is 600 to 700 million passengers boarded. And then the majority is mom and pop players and or in-house providers. I think I read an anecdote that Lufanza had pulled away from Amadeus back in the mid-2010s because of their industry power, but then quickly reversed that decision and signed up again with them. Shows an indication of core competency, focus, and understanding where you can outsource and make that effective for your own system as well.
8:16What is the origin story to Amadeus? How long have they been around? They've clearly built up this advantaged position in the market. What does that trace back to? The business has been around for a long time and the history is really important. So they're actually created by the airline customers. Distribution systems were created in the 60s and 70s. And that was to enable airlines to process bookings and get close their customers in effect. And this is before dot-com. In the 60s and 70s, the airspace was deregulated. There was globalization. And within that, more airlines were created and more agencies were also created.
9:01There was a problem with the way the distribution systems work because they're owned by the airlines, gave preference to their own inventory. That was anti-competitive. So then there was regulation that came in following that deregulation. The airlines decided to sell off their distribution systems, and they merged. And that's when Amadeus was actually formed, which was in 1987. And that was following the merger of the distribution systems between Lufthansa, SAS, Air France, and Iberia at the time. That forms a distribution business of Amadeus today. In the early 2000s, they created something called Altea, which was the AIR IT business.
9:39And that is the customer reservation system, the inventory control system, and the departure control system that sits behind the distribution system as a whole which enables the orderly processing of bookings and then since then they've created the hotel it business that was in the 2010s when i actually started covering the stock over a decade ago they didn't really have much revenue or free cash flow there and that business is going from strength to strength and they also bulked out parts of their air IT and that hotel IT business via M &A. Interesting to hear horizontal expansion across travel.
10:19I certainly love businesses that were born from an industry consortium founding something together and then spinning it out on their own. You often see quite a few success stories in that category, Visa being one of the most obvious ones. I think you've tapped into the segments of the business. Is that how they split out revenue by distribution, IT, and then in the hospitality category? Are those the three buckets? There's three main divisions. The main one in terms of profitability is now Air IT. 15 years ago, that was 20 %-ish of group profits. Now it's up to 50%. 35 % of group profits of the distribution business, even though that gets a lot of the limelight and a lot of the focus.
11:05And then 10 % is hotel IT and other, which is 10 % of group profits. So the hotel IT business is the most embryonic. It has the lowest margins because of that. They're scaling very quickly. There's a lot of investment to enable the scaling of that business. Air IT business is the most profitable, almost 70 % contribution profit margins, which are pretty formidable. And then the distribution business, its contribution margins are in between Hotel IT and Air IT. You mentioned on the air distribution side of things, some of their competitors. In Air IT, are those the same competitors? You mentioned Sabre, which is a name I came across quite a bit.
11:45Is there more competition in that space? Less? Does it look similar to distribution? The competition is broadly similar. So within the Air IT business, Amadeus had 50 % market share, and then there's Sabre, which is just under 20 % market share, and then smaller operators, the airlines themselves, who in-house the technology. And then if you look at the distribution business, it's a similar type of shape in that Amadeus have about 50 % of market share. And then there's Sabre, who's a clear number two, with about 30 % market share. And then there's also Travelport with 20 % market share today. It's important to note that Amadeus do have a lot more scale than the nearest competitors versus the likes of Travelport.
12:35they don't actually have a air IT business. They're just a distribution player. The advantage of having both is enormous. I have a sense of what's going on with the buying an airline ticket, accounting for that in terms of the transaction and how that's actually working through the system. In terms of IT, does it get into accounting? I think I read something about the dynamic pricing, which can always drive me crazy in terms of seeing what flight costs do from this week to the next week, but a little more in terms of different ways that Amadeus is serving their customers, whether it's value add versus housekeeping.
13:13Depending on which division we're talking about, they're doing slightly different things. The distribution business is a network business and they're playing a role of content aggregation where they're taking inventory from the airlines and that can be in traditional edifact form or NDC form. and they provide that inventory or supply that inventory to the travel agents. So that's serving the indirect channel. That indirect channel is approximately 1 billion bookings per annum. And then on the air IT side, they're doing the reservation management for the airline. They're doing the inventory control for the airline.
13:48They're doing the departure control system as well for the airline. They also have revenue optimization tools. They do have revenue accounting tools, fare optimizer tools. Really what they're trying to do there is enable their customers, their airlines, to generate more revenue per passenger, make smart offers to the passenger, which are personalized. Airline customers can benefit from those initiatives. And that's clearly key in an industry which, as I said before, is pretty cyclical, quite capital intensive and very competitive. Generating that revenue from, say, an ancillary income is really key.
14:21And Amadeus enable that to take place. when they are taking the inventory and bringing it to the travel agents they're not actually owning or having that risk sit on their balance sheet in any way is that correct just in terms of the process that's absolutely true they will create offers in the distribution channel via the global distribution system that they have and they'll basically package those offers up and provide them to the agencies, but there's nothing on balance sheet. AI is something that comes up when talking about any space, particularly within any IT system. What would you say are the implications of AI for Amadeus and for the broader travel vertical?
15:11There's been some industry discussions about the implications to Amadeus of the potential adoption of AI agents at the top of the travel search funnel. with question marks on whether this will disintermediate the distribution business. I think this is largely a storm in a teacup, and I actually think they're very well placed at the top of the funnel for travel search becomes AI agentic led. And I think this for a few reasons. Firstly, you need to remember they are the IT backbone for their customer. The customer reservation system or order management systems are mission critical, will still be required in an all-in AI travel world.
15:47And this part of Amadeus represents the majority of profit today, so 60 % plus of it. Secondly, would AI agents really want the hassle of setting up the infrastructure to aggregate and orchestrate industry content when players like Amadeus already do this in a very economical way, with economies of scale enabling a very low industry take rate? My personal view here is AI agents might do things to improve the top of the funnel search, thereby potentially competing with online travel agencies where the industry take rate is incidentally also much higher, but the agents will still need an aggregator to pull together disparate data from the travel ecosystem with many different technology standards at play between NDC and Edifact, for example.
16:28Thirdly, there's also an airline push to dynamic and real-time pricing, essentially enabling them to generate more revenue for booking. This will put more demand on AI agents to get the right offers to the customer. With the move to NDC, there's actually been a big increase in something called the look-to-book ratios on the airline websites, which can get expensive and Amadeus helped to solve this problem. Fourth, one could argue the great thing about AI will be more personalization alongside the use of dynamic pricing for the airline, which could lead to a snowball effect before they're offering an order management system, i.e.
16:59Nevio, as well as many other products. Fifth, a big part of indirect channel and distribution revenues is for corporate travel management companies, where the complexity of booking is high. This complexity likely means it'd be difficult for AI agents to totally displace corporate management businesses. And even if they are displaced, eventually the AI agents will need a content aggregator and or someone to orchestrate the data. And then finally, if agents really do lead to chronic disintermediation of the distribution business, then peers who are much more distribution heavy with a much smaller IT offering and a lot of operational financial leverage are in deep trouble.
17:36So Amadeus can arguably swoop up even more market share across all areas of their business, IT included. So all in, I feel pretty good about AI as it relates to the distribution business and the business model as a whole today. From a revenue perspective, how much of this is per booking based on the amount of air travel versus contracted revenue? What's reoccurring versus what's exposed to cyclicality? How do you frame that? How does the company frame that? How do you think about that? Amadeus is predominantly a transaction processing business. And the way the revenue model works is it's a bit akin to a visa.
18:12They take a cut of the ticket price. Every time there's a booking made via the indirect channel and it goes through the Amadeus plumbing, they'll take a booking fee from that. And every time that there's a booking that's placed in.com with the likes of Lufthansa, etc., they'll take a very small fee from that. And there's pros and cons to that. The con is when air travel volumes fall, like they did in the pandemic, Amadeus's revenues really drew down because of that. The pro of it and the positive for the channel's point of view is they become a variable cost for their airlines. So when volumes do fall, there's no cost for the airline.
18:51Their take rate from an industry point of view is very low. On the air IT side, the take rate is about one euro per passenger boarders. On the distribution side, the take rate is about€6. We think there's a big runway when we look at the ability for that to increase over time as they provide more value for their channel and their customers. There's an enormous untapped pricing opportunity we think over time as Amadeus can share in the value creation with its customers as it enables more revenue per passenger to come through for their airline customers. Do you have any sense that one euro and six euros per passenger, what the airline would theoretically generate from the passenger in terms of revenue?
19:37It depends if you're doing short haul or long haul flights. If you're doing long haul, ticket prices can be anything north of a thousand euros, less than one percent on both sides of the business. If you're doing short haul, traveling from London to Edinburgh, then maybe you're a slightly bigger part of the overall cost. that still we think the value proposition is a very good one from an industry point of view. How are those fees determined? Is it some specific rate per transaction? What's the pricing mechanics of Amita selling into the airlines that use them or whoever is the end customer? On the air IT side, typically they go 10 to 15 year contracts with the airline customer, and it's pretty modular how they sell their products.
20:25If they're using Amadeus for its passenger service system on the ARIT side, you'll be using the departure control system, the inventory management system and then also the reservation management system. You will be using those three modules. They're fixed price in nature, but they're inflation linked over time. That has some positives if you do enter a down cycle. Typically what happens in a down cycle, pandemics aside when there's channel weakness volumes actually go a little bit negative and not too negative because what the airlines do is they lower price amadeus don't suffer with lower ticket pricing because it's fixed price and it's linked to inflation so at times of in chupain the revenue streams and the free cashless streams are very defensive if we go to the distribution part of the business it is slightly different there's something called home bookings and then there's also something called away bookings.
21:19When you're doing home bookings via a travel agency the fees are pretty low. Most people when they're making airline bookings if they're only traveling locally they'll typically go direct.com. That's the reason those prices are low. If you're doing away bookings so if you're traveling from say the UK to Australia and Quantos want to get their inventory to an agent in the UK to enable them to sell more, Amadeus facilitate that process and they can therefore charge a higher price for enabling that. The distribution business, a key concern with it is that there's disintermediation and more people are booking via.com.
22:00But for those away bookings, the role that Amadeus play is a really important one to enable inventory to be sold in different countries. And that's why they can charge at a higher price for that. And actually, the distribution business, the majority of revenues today, not necessarily volumes, but the revenues today are derived from away bookings, which is a bit of a misconception that we think people have on the stock. I'm not sure they're quite aware of that revenue mix being predominantly away bookings. Can you talk me through the net fee model in distribution? How exactly does that work? That's actually a good question, Matt, and an important one in the context of the discussion we were just having.
22:40An important element of how the distribution business works is the airline will pay the distribution system company, who will then actually pay the travel seller. So in effect, this means that the gross fees, i.e. the 6 euros, which I mentioned earlier, are very different to the net fees, which are 3 euros. And therefore, the industry take rate is even lower than what I assumed. So again, this is actually a really important point that you're touching on. I think the interesting thing to pull out here is in the evolution to an NDC model, the industry participants first thought that this would be dilutive to the revenue per booking.
23:20But actually, it wouldn't be dilutive at all to the net fee per booking. And if you look at the contribution profit per unit that Amadeus has made over time, which in effect is a proxy net fee per booking derivative, then you can see that it's actually steadily increased over time, which is a good sign of system health. And as the NDC model is evolving, actually, the actual net fee model that they have in place, where the airline pays the distribution company who then pays the travel provider, i.e. the travel agent, it's actually still remained mostly the case, because the airline often does not want a direct relationship with the agency, because it creates more of a cumbersome process.
24:02So the move to NDC, in all likelihood, probably won't be diluted to the per revenue economics and definitely should not be diluted to the contribution profit per unit economics. And also I should add this evolution to NDC, it's a gradual process. The airlines have to be ready to service the channel with NDC and particularly for the full service carriers. Actually, the rollout has been pretty slow, so they ensure that the channel is ready for them to provide an efficient service in this NDC switch. You mentioned that there is a concern about disintermediation or maybe less use of agents, more direct bookings.
24:41Is there any data that shows that piece of the market has shrunk materially over time? Or where does it stand today just in terms of percentage of the market? And if you have historical reference, that would be notable too. I think approximately 25 % of bookings are done in the indirect channel. If you look at Amadeus's booking trends in the distribution business over time, typically they've grown slightly below global passenger volumes. That's because of the prolific growth in low-cost carriers, which are a cheap form of travel, and the fact that you go direct to.com typically when you're making those bookings.
25:22The other aspect here is there is something called direct connects. Sometimes agents are directly linking APIs with the airlines. That process typically only happens in the home markets where there's a lot of volume going through that channel. When the volume is a bit more fragmented and when you're having to include small inventory loads from airlines in a different country, it becomes very difficult to manage tons of APIs. And that's why you go through the distribution system that Amadeus, Sabre, Travelport provide, as opposed to disintermediating them and having direct connects. That's another aspect to think about.
26:01Should I assume that there's a lot of overlap in the distribution and Air IT customer base in terms of those that use one are usually using both? I think that's right. Having both an Air IT and distribution business is a commercial advantage for Amadeus and to a degree Sabre in that you have more revenue to spread across similar customers. So you can therefore charge lower prices, arguably, for one or the other. And the other aspect of this is there's a slight halo effect in terms of bookability. If you are the Air IT provider, as well as a distribution provider, you know that that inventory is live, it's real.
26:45The bookability, therefore, can be better for the channel if your distribution system and your Air IT system are the same. There's a commercial advantage and there's also a potential customer advantage in that you don't get catch data, which is wrong. And you go to buy an airline flight and it's actually not there, which can happen. On the hospitality business, you mentioned AirIT was a much smaller percentage of overall revenue years ago versus where it is today. That has been something that has taken up more revenue mix, positive mix shift seen from that business. Is the hospitality business a similar growth engine for them?
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27:24Is that a target market? I think you mentioned it's 10%, fairly small today, but would you expect that to be materially higher in the future? 10 % of group profits, 15 % of group revenues. They're providing similar services to what they are to their airlines in the air IT business. They've essentially created a customer reservation system, which is a community-based platform. They're trying to win more and more contracts with large-scale hotels. Similar to the RIT business, you can amortize that costs across more customers and you get an economy as a scale shared model. So more customers want to come to you and it becomes a self-fulfilling process as the RIT Altaire proposition has been over time.
28:06The good news is it's scaling very well. They won a landmark contract with Intercontinental Hotel group in 2015. Since then, they've recently won contracts with both Accor and Marriott and Ascot Limited. They really have established a scale position within that customer reservation proposition, and they are now the leading hotel IT company globally. Competition is very fragmented. Their nearest peer was Sabre. They actually were a full seller of their hotel IT business because they have balance sheet issues to address. One of the nearest competitors selling their business is great for our desks.
28:44They're retreating from the market. Do they take inventory in a similar way and bring it to travel agents? Is it a similar model in terms of that being a core piece of what they're doing in the hospitality business? So they do also do distribution, but that's only a smaller part really for the hotel business. It's mainly the reservation system, managing inventory and enabling their customers to generate more revenue per room. So if you go onto Intercontinental Hotel Group's website and you're making a booking in one of their hotels, you get offers. Do you want a marble bath? Do you want a PlayStation?
29:22And that wasn't there before. What they're doing is enabling their customer to generate more revenue per room and then Amadeus can share in that value creation with the channel. I'm sure they pushed the travel insurance option as well. Is that a piece of their offering? As part of their distribution business, they do have partnerships with travel insurance, but it's only a small part in the business. In terms of the revenue trajectory, do I assume this is volumes based on air travel, plus some pricing mechanism? You're seeing that as the top line growth rate. Is there anything else that goes into it?
29:59And what does revenue growth tend to look like in a mid-cycle or normalized environment? Typically, travel grows at one and a half to two times GDP. So if you look at the volume growth that they're able to achieve without winning new contracts, it's typically in the three to four and a half percent range. Now I'm being guarded with that geopolitical risk. I think you have to guard for that. American shutdowns recently, the war in the Middle East. In today's world, that's just pragmatic. Then there's inflation-linked contracts on all sides of the business. If global inflation rates were 2 % to 3%, you should see that come through in the top line.
30:37There is also an upselling process here in that with their air IT business, they're about to embark upon a potential massive structural growth change in that part of the business. Their airlines want to modernise their retailing platforms and new to order management systems away from legacy passenger service systems. Why the airlines want to do that is because they want to provide a better service for their passengers. So if there's disruption on their journey, they are able to reach out to their customers and tell them that there's going to be disruption and flight's going to be delayed actually before they get to the airport, which currently because of the cumbersome nature of how the tech stack works for airlines that's not possible but also they want to sell smarter they want to personalize the sales process to the customer in order to generate more ancillary income and basically drive higher revenue per booking if and as Amadeus can facilitate that transition they have a product called Nevio which is in its early innings it's got four customers currently signed up to it which are Finnair, Saudi, British Airways, Air France, KLM they're going to be able to charge a higher revenue per booking and we should see that come through in a better top line as well and it's also important to note that industry experts think that this transition to order management systems will be a mid-teen uplift in revenue per booking if they get it right and they can generate a five to 7 % revenue uplift per passenger with these new order management systems, which is what the early look is for the airlines that are using Nevio.
32:23Arguably, that's low-balling it, particularly in the context of only taking one euro per passenger boarded today. That's their current rent extraction in the RIT space. So could that be 50 % uplift? Could that be 100 % uplift in the next five to 10 years? Potentially, they deserve to share in that value creation with their customer. And then there's a market share dynamic. If you track the distribution business and the air IT business over time, they've constantly taken market share from their nearest competitors. That can give another 1%, 1.5 % to 2 % to the top line. When I take all that together, air traffic at 3 % to 4%, inflation that gets you to 5 % to 6%.
33:08Revenue per passenger in air IT can get you another couple of percent. That can get you 7 % to 8%. And then market share, I think, can get you to 8 % to 9%. I think it's a high single digit top line business. And within that, distribution should remain pretty turgid. Keep growing at 4 % to 5%. Grow volumes a little bit less than air traffic volumes, but with a little bit of price. And then hotel IT, because it's a lot more embryonic, and they're currently got Marriott, Accor, Ascot Limited, my greatest mom said platforms in the next year and a half to two years. and that business should grow at 15 % to 20 % probably for the next couple of years.
33:46There's a lot of growth opportunity ahead of it. Based on my own personal experiences and the amount of altercations that I see on my social media feed happening at airports dealing with the inventory systems, it certainly seems like that's an area that these airlines could benefit from upgrading. What does the timeline look like for something like that? And from an execution perspective, where does the confidence lie in their ability to execute on doing that efficiently? Is there time in history that they've done things like this where the execution has been on par with what's needed? I think they've executed very well.
34:24I mean, they just go about their business quietly, but brilliantly and very effectively. From a capital allocation point of view, we really admire that. If an airline is going to enter an air IT contract, they take it seriously because this is the central nervous system of their business. Managing the inventory, managing the reservation systems, managing the departure control systems, that needs to be done properly. And revenue is everything for these companies. Managing that effectively is just key. So the RFP processes take a long time. They can take years to get across the line. The reference contracts that they have on the Nevio side of the proposition, they're going to be really key.
35:05Listening to what British Airways say and Finair say on that Nevio proposition, they're already wired up to it and how it's actually benefiting the revenue per booking over time. That's going to be key. Obviously, the industry will listen to those companies and then you could get a snowball effect because you get FOMO. And it's commercially potentially going to really help these companies who are early adopters. It can take a long time, but I think it's a bit of push in terms of Amadeus selling the proposition properly to the airline customers and a bit of pull. They'll see actually some of the early benefits of those companies who are tapped into Navio.
35:40And then you can see a big growth phase play out. Altea has already been through this. Their original passenger service system, that's snowballed and scaled from the early 2000s, even to today. People are still actually signing up to their Altea proposition, which is their passenger service system, but the more legacy system that airlines hooked onto. And they've done a great job of that. And that's why they've got to over 50 % market share within the air IT space. Just a final point to note is balance sheet considerations are really key when airlines are negotiating with air technology companies.
36:16If you're very levered and if you're losing market share in an RFP process, that's a problem. It's an oligopoly within air IT, but the number two player is pretty levered. Mission critical things like those systems require some thinking around the financial positioning of your counterparts. Taking it down a level on the margin side of things, I have some understanding they are a network business connecting different parties here. What does that look like from a margin perspective? Where have they ranged historically? I know there's differences between the segments, but at a consolidated level and to the extent that the nuances to each segment is relevant, what would you point to there?
37:01The gross margins are very attractive. They're mid-70s and they've been pretty consistent through time, which is remarkable really, given how embryonic the hotel IT business is within that. They've been scaling that business for 10 years. There's been some dilution there from the scaling of that hotel IT business. EVA margins at high 20s, they've touched 30 % a few times. when you're processing an incremental booking for left answer or air france or processing an incremental booking on the distribution side of the business the incremental cost is next to nothing the business is very scalable that affords nice economics within the business they reinvest that when they are scaling and when there is growth and volume with the airlines that will reinvest it and so if you look at their r &d spend over time the r &d to sales has actually reached new highs more recently currently at the 22 % level which is very high if you look back 15 to 20 years ago that was actually 10%.
37:59They've been investing the Nevio proposition in their IT they've been investing in NDC within the distribution business there's a Microsoft partnership there's been a replatforming of the business to make it cloud enabled enable them to sell native products where the costs are going to be dramatically improved because of that despite all of that and despite an embryonic hotel IT business, they're still almost making peak margins at the 30 % level. The financial model is a good one and it's worth just noting as well, the cash conversion is good. So they have a negative working capital balance. They do capitalise customer implementation.
38:34So when they're doing a big IT project, if they're installing Nevio or installing their hotel IT proposition with the various customers, they take on that cost themselves. Then they capitalise that cost. they make up for it when the room bookings or the airline bookings come through on a 10 to 15 year view which is a nice thing for the value chain in that you're only actually spending once bookings are happening you're not actually spending the money as a hotel provider on that transition that's also why you need to be well capitalized and that is a big differentiator of them versus their competition i kind of bucket r &d into capital allocation in a similar vein to capex but But what do they do with excess capital in terms of distributions?
39:20How do you think about them beyond some of the operational needs from a capital allocation standpoint? First and foremost, they'll reinvest in their business organically and where they think their return on capital stacks up. You can see that, as I said, in the R &D spend over time. And an interesting stat there on the R &D spend is their R &D spend is actually equivalent to the total revenues of the number three player. within distribution, Travelport, and their R &D spend is equivalent to 50 % of the revenues of their second nearest competitor, which is Sabre. They're reinvesting a lot of capital to fortify and differentiate themselves versus their nearest competition.
39:59That's a really important point to make. They will also do inorganic spend, and I think their track record has been very good here. So they bought a business called Navitair in 2016. That was a passenger service system in the air it vertical for overweight low-cost carriers amadeus because of its history with air france and with lufthansa etc was overweight the full-scale carriers and the hybrid carriers and it had a the athletes portfolio which was the low-cost carriers navitair is a leading business there it's actually got ryanair as a major customer and they also bought a business called travel click in the hotel it space and that was to give them more penetration with the independent hotels.
40:41So doing exactly what they do with the likes of Accor, Marriott, Ascot Limited now, or soon to be, and Intercontinental Hotel Group in the independent channel. Those larger deals that they've done, we think, make a lot of strategic sense, and the return on capital has been good. Their capital structure is very good. Their leverage is less than one times today. They de-gear very quickly because they are very cash generative, with high margins and a very good cash conversion. They do have a sensible dividend policy. So pay out today about 30 % to 40 % of their free cash flow in a dividend, which steadily grows over time, pandemics aside.
41:19They're increasingly doing share buybacks. The multiple we think that they trade on is actually pretty low given the growth opportunity. They're starting to do share buybacks with their excess cash, which we think is a very sensible form of capital allocation. On the valuation point, I'm curious to hear how you'd frame it. Much of my research about the business beforehand, it's pretty clear they're in this funny spot where they're grouped in with a lot of the airlines or transportation stocks. Despite being more IT software-ish in nature, how do you approach valuation? How do you think the market approaches valuation in terms of there being a difference there.
42:03Any commentary around that would be interesting to hear. I absolutely agree with you on that observation. The stock's kind of in no man's land in that it's covered by airline analysts who are used to horrible cap intensity and cyclicality. And so I think it gets tarred with the wrong brush there. But then for tech analysts, it's almost not cool enough, not AI enough, even though they're doing quite a lot themselves with AI. I think because of the pandemic as well, the market is absolutely schizophrenic about the cyclicality, but the pandemic is the wrong anchor because in typical travel downturns, the volume headwinds in global traffic are not that bad.
42:41They're minus two, minus three percent is what you saw in the great financial crisis. And that's a very bad recession. For kind of those broad reasons, that contains the multiple that Amadeus trades on. When we think about valuation, the qualitative side of things is really important and we think Amadeus has an abundance of untapped pricing power which it can unleash over time is extremely well invested as well in that their R &D spend is approaching new highs and you could argue that they're about to embark in a harvesting phase where they've got their product propositions ready they're getting commercial gains with those new product propositions There's increasing evidence of that.
43:23And as those gains come through, the R &D spend can start to go down over time. They embark on this financial model attractive phase of their history. So we like it from that lens. The cash generation profile of the group is very good. Pandemics aside, the free cash flow for share trends have been in the high single digits. We think it can be better than that on a forward basis with buybacks, particularly at the share price and this high-teams multiple which it trades on today. And also because of the new propositions that are coming through, and we think Navio is a really interesting angle to the investment case.
43:58Free cashier yield today is at the 5 % to 6 % area, 5.5%. You've got a business which has that type of free cashier yield, which is supported, but can grow its free cashier per share, we think, at kind of low double digits on a risk-adjusted basis. The expected return is quite juicing. We'd be very disappointed if it was less than low double digits. Certainly, I have experienced as a former sell-side transportation analyst how any business that gets bucketed in there, management teams are not happy if they're not a traditional transportation business. And they're covered by those analysts. It seems to be guilty by association.
44:38On the risk front, you've detailed competition pretty well in terms of the incumbents. Do they face risks from new technology disintermediating them or some new evolution that would change their positioning? Has that over time popped up in different ways? This is a technology business. So the innovators dilemma is front of mind, I think, when you're looking at these types of companies. But I do think the really great thing about them is they are willing to reinvest. So when you look at industry changes that have taken place, like the evolution to the new distribution capability, which is basically the airlines try to take control of their own offers as opposed to going through the global distribution systems where the likes of Amadeus did the offers themselves for those airlines.
45:32Lamedaes have actually invested in their own proposition. They now have over 70 airlines hooked up to their NDC proposition. And because of their scale position within the channel, they're able to offer agents both the traditional form of providing inventory via the Edifact GDS type model, but also sell NDC into that channel as well. They're not actually losing share within NDC. They're holding their own. And within Air IT, there is a potential evolution to new order management systems or offer an order management systems. But they have a Neveo proposition, which they've invested in the last decade.
46:09So they're ready for that transition. And when airlines are making these transitions, it's so mission critical. And there's going to have to be smart bridging technology whilst these migrations take place from old passenger service systems to the new. so Amadeus can manage that at a low price for their airline customers. Technology risk is very large but I do think they manage it well. That is a reason that they reinvest so heavily in research and development spend over time and it's also why the gap's increasing between themselves and their peers. Their market position is so much greater now than their nearest two competitors that it's just becoming very hard for them to keep up if these technology evolutions do take place.
46:53It's a really big risk, potentially for their peers, but potentially not so much for them. Are there other risks that stand out to you? What would you highlight as a risk to the thesis or to the business that stands out the most? It would have to be something which was very left field, which was a technology evolution that was very hard to foreseen. That was always something that's hard to guard against that. But I think that's one of the risks. A big traffic downturn is a risk. If there was a war and traffic volumes crashed, obviously being a transaction processing business, being a derivative of traffic volumes, that's going to result in revenue headwinds.
47:34But then I could also spin that into a positive because if that happens, arguably they'll take even more market share because they're so well capitalized and you'll get bankruptcy with their competitors, you would actually take market share even quicker potentially in that scenario. The investment case for a long-term investor is hedged to a degree with that risk. This has been fascinating. We finished these conversations out with some of the lessons that you can take away. What's been your experience in having broader lessons that you can pull away from Amadeus and potentially apply elsewhere?
48:08The mark of a good business is whether you would hate to compete with that company in question, and I would hate to compete with Amadeus, but customers like to do business with you. And I think they're a channel friend, not a channel foe. When you find those two characteristics together, competitors hate you because you're good and customers love you for the same reason. That's a fantastic cocktail for value creation. I like it. That is a new one and I will certainly look for it elsewhere. Ben, this has been a pleasure. Thank you for joining us on Business Breakdowns. Thanks, Matt. To find more episodes of Breakdowns ranging from Costco to Visa to Moderna, or to sign up for our weekly summary, check out JoinColossus.com.
48:53That's J-O-I-N-C-O-L-O-S-S-U-S dot com.
From the publisher
Today we are breaking down Amadeus, the dominant infrastructure powering global travel bookings. If you've used a travel agent or corporate booking system, you've likely interacted with Amadeus's technology—though most of what they do happens behind the scenes in airline operations, hotel inventory management, and logistics coordination.
Ben Needham, portfolio manager at Ninety One Asset Management, explains how Amadeus built its market-leading position, common investor misconceptions about the business, and the company's value proposition across the travel ecosystem. We also explore AI's potential impact on the industry and how Amadeus's balance sheet strength positions it relative to competitors. Please enjoy this breakdown of Amadeus.
For the full show notes, transcript, and links to the best content to learn more, check out the episode page here.
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Show Notes
(00:00:00) Introduction to Amadeus
(00:02:49) Understanding Amadeus' Business Model
(00:04:11) Amadeus' Market Position and Competitors
(00:05:35) Historical Background of Amadeus
(00:07:25) Revenue Streams and Profitability
(00:10:50) Impact of AI and Technology on Amadeus
(00:13:07) Revenue Models and Pricing Mechanics
(00:22:35) Growth Opportunities and Market Dynamics
(00:25:47) Execution and Future Prospects
(00:30:01) Financial Health and Capital Allocation
(00:31:57) Valuation and Market Perception
(00:34:21) Risks and Challenges
(00:37:13) Lessons From Amadeus




