CNX Resources: Hit the Gas - [Business Breakdowns, EP.152]

24:08It's not for me to judge people, I'm sure there's something I'm missing. I'll defend the tax advantage of the Master Limited Partnership on a nice, a base is makes those assets potentially worth more in that vehicle, but it did attract a lot of bad actors. Beyond that initial value addition, I would agree that it tended to get out of control there for sure. This is a beautiful thing about markets, isn't it? You get to have a little look at everything and pick the ones you like, pick the ones you don't. And of course, I could be wrong. So they got their own midstream assets, which is a really important part of their cost advantage.

24:37It keeps it very, very low. Below a dollar, I would say, for the operating costs. Now, because they built out a lot of their midstream and gathering infrastructure and compression infrastructure for the next five or six years, I would say, when you think about the CAPEX, it's really about drilling and completion. So it's about finding where they want to drill, drilling it, completing it and connecting it up to any end line, I think they say in the industry. So that drilling completion at CAPEX comes to, this is backward looking, so it's better now, it's backwardly, comes to, I would say, about maybe 45 cents per MCF if you divide it over the total recovery of the well.

25:11And I do that on a very conservative basis. A lot of them will do it over 30, 40 years. I do it over 20, 25 years, depending on what the well looks like. So it's quite a lot of elements of conservatism built into the way that I think about the unit economics. So let's pull that and all in cash cost, full cycle to maintain production levels, 580 BCFs for salex at 140, 140 in today's money. Now they can sell it in the market, or they have been selling it in the market at $2 .5, $3, $350 over the last few years. And actually I think that's around that area is a relatively reasonable clearing price for the marginal producer in the US, $350 maybe, $4 to keep supply online.

25:44That's anything that's upward pressure on that because the marginal wells are actually less productive in the marginal producers as a whole other tangent to go off on. It's an extraordinarily low gas price. In the UK, Europe, it's five times that and we're actually thankful for those prices. One of the wonderful things about investing in the US apart from the property rights, which are second to none globally. When you're in a property, you're in the mineral rights and it's up to you who you sell I'm onto or let produce them or sell a royalty or whatever. It's not like that in the UK. The crown owns it.

26:10I'm loads of other places. It's a disaster for private shelves, but in the US it's wonderful. I love it. I hope it never changes. And there's a lot of legal precedent to protect it. So the long way it lives. The other wonderful thing about extraction business in the US, gaseous -grase business, is it costs more to bring natural gas into the US on a liquefied, that this is not pipeline. No one's built a transatlantic or trans -Pacific pipeline yet, but it costs more on a per -MTF basis to liquefied down from, Let's say the South Pars field is one of the cheapest places to get it in the world and bring it over to the US Then it does to just consume it You're talking about $4 per MCF best case scenario for liquefying it down But you can buy it for three wholesale in the US and there's an abundance of it and you can buy as much as you want So it's this wonderful sealed microcosm of supply and demand where all the shale basins have been explored They've all been drilled to hell.

26:55We all know who the best operators are we all know who's got the best age ridge We all know who's got the most drilling locations less and we know that the only competition really comes from the Monteneye Chale in Canada, but they haven't got the pipelines to do it. I think you covered the unit economics Well there just in terms of all -in cost if I were to Separate and compare it relative to another operator in the Marcelleis Southwestern. I'm not sure exactly who's still operating there and large cabit EQT I think you mentioned the transportation cost was probably one of the biggest differentiators between CNX and those competitors and I think you mentioned it could be upwards of double that 50 to 60 cents that it costs them which is a large percentage of the overall production cost is that right as that's a key differentiator just in terms of making them one of the most cost -advanced producers as you might expect I've studied a lot of these you got to get the competitive battlefield to start saying well these guys very close to the but on left hand corner of the cost curve.

27:54So I would say on my calculations, because you had to do your own work here, you have to cut gross capex for maintenance capex, you have to figure out what they're capitalizing, which is actually opX, you have to figure out what the future costs are going to be, because they aren't necessarily what they're going to be in the past in terms of the contracts they've signed with the mystery. I would say EQT is probably second after CNX, and that's again primarily because the rice brothers came back in with the support of D, Shor, and other hedge fun, cut all the unnecessary costs out focused on drilling that most productive acreage and renegotiated with the midstream for a much, much lower cost, but they still have to give over an economic rent, so it is still much higher.

28:31And then range resources is also very good as well, but still much higher transportation costs. If you also remove those, there's a sort of engineering excellence at CNX, which is a sort of overlay, but of course it's not as big an advantage as the rest of it. It's not just the engineering excellence, they've actually got a new COO, Navney, who I spend the day in the field with, who's one of the most brilliant brains I've ever encountered in my life, just incredible breath, successful entrepreneur in his own right. Lives in Texas, but wanted to come and drill this acreage because it's so much fun.

28:57They've got this really amazing engineering culture. It's produced this tiny little marginal improvements, which over time have produced this wonderful embedded industrial knowledge, which has led to 5 % here, 10 % there, which all adds up, and gives them an extra layer of insulation. The drilling, from what I can see, is getting more and more productive. They're drilling longer and longer laterals. and they're real kicker, they're starting to make the utica extraordinarily productive and extraordinarily economic. There's a well -paded Morris 40, which further people can look up for C &X. They drilled a 21 ,000 -foot lateral in the Marseilles, and it peaked out at, I don't know, six or 700 MCF, six or 700 ,000 MCF for a month.

29:35That was the peak production. And they drilled a 16 ,000 -foot lateral utica right next to it, which is obviously much less than it should be less productive. It was just as productive as the Marseilles. So they're starting to commercialize the utica, which sits right below the micellas. So they've got all this gathering and transportation infrastructure sitting above it. They've got all the water they need. They've got their own water infrastructure as well, which is part of their cost advantage, bringing stuff in house when you know what your production's going to be. And then they've got this stacked plane.

30:01So they can start drilling this extra acreage, which they have the rights to with all their infrastructure above them. So what does that mean for the margin of return on capital? It's absolutely massive. It's all seeing there. They've told people about it in the conference call, but I suppose maybe people don't care about the long term as much as I did, but it's just very interesting. These stack plays, I think, are hard to overstate in terms of the value because you can put a price on a per acreage basis, but when you're considering that you're basically drilling into two layers of rock rather than just one layer, it makes any one specific metric hard to view as the end all be all, and it really does require a combination of all these things together.

30:38You reference before the drilling dynamics, the capital requirements that go into this for proving out the acreage, proving out the reserves, and while that gets allocated over the life of the well, I imagine most of those dollars are spent upfront, particularly with drilling out the well. So how do you think about those cash flow dynamics when it comes to one of these businesses, and getting comfortable with whether that cash has already been spent, or there's something else going on there, because it is somewhat of a mismatch in terms of, it's not the Berkshire Insurance float, which brings a lot of the cash in the door, and then you get to spread it out over many years.

31:17How do you think about that when it comes to being a producer? All the privacy playbooks for measuring, return on investment and stuff. So, when I think about a business, I always shrink it down to, what's the unit cost? You can separate the central stuff, which is normally not that big. If it was a retailer, I want to know, what you sell on Spasquareford, what's your property cost, all that stuff. When you put down another store, are you actually making money on an economic basis, or you just pushing your EPS up on an accounting basis. So if you look at the individual wells, because I've got 2 ,700 wells worth of data that I can go through and I can figure out and also what's the different areas.

31:47If you get the average one, again, backward looking, not the newer one, so it's conservative. You can do IRRs, you can do paybacks, but paybacks are less than two years. This is backward looking wells. You can do scenarioization at different strip pricing with really aggressive assumptions on basis, which is the cost they need to give away to the bigger pipelines. And I would say a 250 netback gas pricing. They're making an excess of 40 % IRRs. Absolutely astounding returns on capital. When I study businesses my sort of rough hurdle for something I want it to be able to earn a 15 % return on its capital and level.

32:18That normally suggests to me that it's got some sort of compessor advantage. Sometimes I'll find businesses that can do 20. Rarely will I find a business that can do 30. Normally a pharmaceutical company with a patent that's got 20 years left to 40 % sustainable IRRs on capital are amazing and something to be thoroughly studied to make sure they're not fraud basically when you're finding them. And so I spend a lot of time trying to figure out ways that this was a fraud and found one year. And it all comes back to that wonderful non -replicable acreage, the amazing engineering focus, the understanding of local economies of scale and the lack of leverage and lack of outsourcing of things like water, gathering and transportation infrastructure.

32:57We haven't talked about another key variable in that equation, which is the price of natural gas and what they're earning there And I could make the argument if they're getting 40 % returns You could push the pace even further even if it means that you're bringing down the price slightly and getting 35 % 30 % IRR is because of a lower price. So how do they manage the volatility that occurs in commodity markets and natural gas markets? And how do you frame that as an investor? or it's a very, very interesting sort of intellectual conversation, risk and uncertainty, or bridging the gap between those two.

33:31Let's say hypothetically speaking, they're the lowest cost producer of natural gas in the US. If that's the case, and the marginal producer, which is where it's going to fluctuate rationally, or logically, not rationally, there's nothing rational about these markets. In the short term, that is. In the long term, that needs to be. But if it's going to fluctuate around 3, 350, whatever it might be, then if you're the lowest cost producer with full cycle unit a cost of 140, in half cycle less than a dollar. Then why would you need to hedge? You don't need to hedge because you're profitable at all points in the cycle.

33:59Even now, people are struggling for oxygen at 150 gas, the ones that have an hedge, cancelling dividends, cancelling drilling contracts, shutting in wells, all that kind of stuff. So, next, it doesn't care because they're generating cash profits at all points in the cycle, even these current low points. The cost structure makes them incredibly de -risk. It means they survive, not only survive, but do okay in the bad times, and then they do extraordinarily really well in the good time. However, because Nick and the board and indeed the whole company have studied Buffett, what it means to compound over a long period of time is that the key to that is survival, right?

34:28And so you want to put survival not just as likely, you want to put it beyond all down. And so even though they have this incredible low cost structure, they have the most comprehensive hedging schedule. It swaps as well, which is the thing that everyone avoids because it's slightly more expensive, I would say, instead of these collars and they try and hedge it out, which I'm not sure are actually zero cost collars. the bankers never walk away without money in their pockets. And when they go down, there's a very expensive cost when you break through the collar, which was learned for a few producers.

34:56They've got these swaps, which are ed simple, maybe a little bit more expensive, but they're very clear. They counted their very little counterparty risk in this incredibly liquid market. And they hedge out, I think their father's one is five and a half years. So they've got this stepped hedging schedule. So they always go into the next year slightly more than 90 % hedged. And then it steps down and then by the time you get to year 5 or 6 it's down at sort of 10 20 % and so really for CNX the important thing is not the spot pricing which fluctuates wildly. It's the strip pricing which you can get by looking at the 9x Henry Hub piece every day which is normally at a slight premium over the long term to those spot prices and so you've got this incredibly low -cost production base.

35:33This massive, continuous acreage not had a dry well in years it's just where do we drill next? Where's the most productive? Well as opposed to where's the next well? Very predictable drilling schedule. Lots and lots of inventory. Really solid balance sheet, which we haven't talked about. They just kicked off the nearest maturity in other five years. So your average maturity is out by seven or eight years. Most of it's now in 2030s. And then you've got this demand profile. There's always going to be some demand there. It fluctuates five to 10 % and the price fluctuates a lot. But you're hedged.

35:59You know, what you're going to produce? What your costs are going to be? What you're going to get for it. So they've turned this incredibly, what people would consider on the outside to be this disaster of value, destruction, and volatility and leverage. They've turned it from that, which is what it used to be, into this annuity. It's absolutely remarkable. I've never seen anything like it, but it all comes back to sensible management, sensible use of leverage and liquidity, which is coming down. And indeed, the cordial in the crown, which is the non -refq glycology, the engineering excellence, alokos, all starts from there.

36:30You mentioned the annuity, I think, of something that's flat. Does the production profile, is there growth in terms of how much they're producing from year to year? Or are they really moderate about how they're actually growing production. I am wondering how much they think about that end market and if there is big demand, if the strip pricing goes up and they can produce more because they're able to hedge it out. Is that something they tend to react to? They don't at the moment. I would say because of that incredibly risk of this, we want to survive forever type mentality. They've got, I would say, internal targets about where they want leverage to get to.

37:06To be honest with you, there's also limitations on transportation in the area because if you look at, Henry Hopper is in Louisiana, right, which is where there was a ton of transportation infrastructure to start with. So if you look at Haynesville producers, they have very cheap transport because there's loads of pipelines. In the Marcellus, coal producing region, it was railroads. So you can't really produce this transport gas effectively through railroads. So there is actually a limitation to the amount of gas that can transport there. And I would say we've now got to a point where there's being consolidation and relatively sensible amount of production growth, where the pipelines are full.

37:37So as you said, there's this really interesting balance between the word that lowers cost. Why not we just hammer a load more volume in there because net will likely get more profits quicker out of the gas. But I would say that place the businesses at most of the management teams would probably be doing that. It's a sort of prisoner's dilemma type problem, isn't it? But because they want to survive and perhaps because they're waiting for a different administration that might want to drill, that might want to build pipelines, maybe they're not doing it yet. The mountain valley pipeline which EQT had a piece of think that's now been approved again and is being built and will be completed hopefully this year But that's really all that's been done in Appalachia.

38:14There's not much takeaway capacity as they call it And I suppose CNX are very cautious very measured They believe and as I do that what they have beneath the surface of the earth there is incredibly valuable And they're trying to maximize the MPV for shelves and sometimes that may mean defer gratification to avoid the risk of ruin Which is really smart when you consider the base rate of unsuccessful companies in this business This is not normal for me to be looking at these type of businesses. I want to buy things at less than liquidation value that people are going to need for a long period of time.

38:41And I never thought I'd think of this kind of business as that. But the management team would create something special I would say. On the point of takeaway capacity and the transportation and the pipelines, once you get beyond the gathering and processing pipes, how much competition is there for that takeaway capacity? Do they have to pay higher rates just to keep the same amount of capacity on those pipelines? is there anything unique about that? And then to your point, is there more coming to the region, how much of a risk is that, or a potential benefit? It does seem like transportation is a key piece to this.

39:16I'm curious about how much that swings from your ear. One of the points about this investment is, when I speak to people about it, I get lots of interesting reactions. Probably 60 % of it is about ideology, and they say you're part of our club, and I say no, don't like popping park clubs, I just like good investments. But maybe the other 40 % is they go, So yeah, and there's going to be loads of LNG capacity and there's going to be loads of new pipelines and solar and wind don't work. So we're going to need more gas and gas prices going to be $10 before you know it. I don't get into all that. I don't like a lot of forecasting, a lot of pan glossy and thinking.

39:44When I buy an investment, I want it really to make sense at the worst case scenario, which is really what we've been rumbling a lot for the last five or six years in the gas markets. It's just horrendously low prices globally unseen before in history on a real basis. and massive constraints in pipeline, particularly in that Appalachian region, because they've had to build a lot of pipeline quite quickly because they didn't have the existing stuff for it. So you've got this to the extent that the pipeline operators can monetize their investment. They are doing so maximally at the moment. And it's costing CNX who hedge their basis, by the way.

40:18It's a very important part of what they do because of that. And sometimes they buy it forward when it makes sense to do so on a counter -sick basis. But that's costing them, I don't know, 50 -60 cents at the moment, which is much, much more than, like I said, Haynesville where they've got abundant pipeline. But one of the things that I go back to is a lot of people who think about this industry, they've hopefully studied Standard Oil and John D. Rockefeller and what happened there. And one of the things you see when you study the regulation in this industry, especially with the national transportation stuff, the stuff that crosses state lines, it's just heppard with anti -monopolistic regulation.

40:49And whenever something crops up that looks anything like the Standard Oil monopoly control and influence positions, then there's always a pushback on you are charging too much economic rent. So I suppose one of the things I was worried about with these investments was the midstream bit. It seemed to me that was the Achilles heel because they are much less regulated than the ones that cross state boundaries, but the ones that cross state boundaries, which is where the main bottleneck is for the appellation gas, they're heavily regulated. And have been so the loads of legal precedent since the breakup was done in oil.

41:18So that's I'm less worried about. And it does screw customers over when they start screwing people over because that cost pass through just goes straight into the gas prices. So I'm less worried about that. I think the monopolistic invisible hand that's it was being kept out of that for a very long period of time and I don't see that changing. Could be wrong, of course, could be wrong, but it seems unlikely. You've touched on leverage and how they managed to balance sheet a few times. It was obviously an issue for many of the producers in several of the shale booms where too much leverage caught up to them in a bad commodity cycle and caused ruins.

41:51How do they approach the balance sheet? Are are their target leverage ratios or anything else unique that they do with the balance sheet. They have covenants which they're miles away from. It's interesting with them because their P &L makes no sense at all, because they've got all these tax losses and stuff. There's no issues with covenants because of the way they hedge, what the cash profit is going to be, which ultimately affects the leverage piece. They've got it to the extent now where they can buy back shares, which is really where most of the cash has been going. So they've managed to buy back more than a third of their equity over the last two and a half, three years, which is a really interesting capsule allocation piece.

42:22and if you think it's good value now, how much more value is it when half the shares have gone missing over the next two years? So leverage an issue, but with leverage it's all about structure isn't it? So they've just actually, as of today, refinanced their 2027 bond kicked it off to 2032, might be a bit longer than that, but they also keep an undrawn revolver, which could cover more than the next five years of maturities. So there's just this massive amount of liquidity there, but then they also have enormous liquidity in their cost structure. They only have one drilling rig, which is not on some gigantic long term contract and one completion script and they're half -cycle cash costs on 95 cents So there are a bit dax before they put anything back into the ground is about a billion dollars and their next Demissurity is 200 million which is in 2026.

43:05They've got this abundant undrawn revolver which is many times what they'll ever need in any Worst case scenario and then they've got this massive amount of play on their cash margins as well and they've got a hedge book So you know what they're going to get for the gas. So there's just layers and layers of conservatism in there because it's all with this really wonderful principle of, we don't want to make survival likely, we want to put it beyond all -down. And that's what I absolutely love here. And I assume you have other producers in the region which maybe aren't operated as cleanly, might have challenges, is acquisitions or whether it's full businesses or a certain amount of acreage.

43:42Is that a piece of the story here as well? How much are they adding to the reserve base, not in an organic way of just developing what they already have least, but in acquiring stakes or businesses elsewhere? If it hasn't happened yet, do you think that's a possibility in the future? I think it's a very small part of what they spend their time on. I think they are in the words of the late great Sam Zell who died last year. They are professional opportunists. So they have abundant liquidity, which provides an insulation from some of the unknown unknowns and the vicissitudes that happen in this sector, but it also provides you with capital when no one has none.

44:18That has proved to be a very valuable thing to have, the option to buy stuff when you need to, but I would say they plan along the lines of organic development of the land they've got, and when you look at their reserve report, they're adding to prove, develop, producing reserves, just organically whilst they're drawing down on them, they're adding to them quicker than they're drawing down on them. So you've got this same production profile and this really steady capital cost, but they just keep stacking up the producing reserve or more. That reserve report as well for SEC rules, it's restricted to a certain five year window of what they've sent their independent engineers to go and look at.

44:50So I would say they've got coming back to my original point that they're not an EMP company. They're a P company means that they don't have to really worry too much about the complexities of buying other businesses. But I think they're smart caps, allocators, they understand that prices what you pay values, what you get and sometimes maybe once every five or ten years you get a real fat pitch and you've got to swing when you get it. But I would say it's not part of their everyday thinking. When I spoke to them about land acquisition, it's really in a very refreshing way all about unitized productivity.

45:19So you speak to them and they say, well really what happens is we get on site and we figure out that we could take these three wells an extra 5 ,000 feet. We just had that extra three acres. So then they give it to the landmen and they say, can we just have these extra three acres? And then that travels the IRR of the well. That kind of thing, just smart. And actually, that land is of no use to anybody else because no one's got any gathering or transportation infrastructure in the area. No one's got any wells in the area. It's only really valuable to see an X. Means they can get a really low price for it, which is part of why they get the higher IRR.

45:48So it's very, very selective and opportunistic on that side as well. It sounds like the income statement has a lot of unique things in it which might make earnings a challenging thing to use as a valuation profile or they require a lot of adjustments but how do you even approach this from a valuation standpoint whether it's looking at the reserve base, looking at the earnings or cashflow profile, how do you approach this one? It's all about the decline rate of the existing wells and the production on indeed decline rates of the new wells. You can never pinpoint the value of something, right? You can only come up with a range of values.

46:23Let's just take somewhere in the middle of the range of what I think is going to happen. I think that if things continue as they are, which is the US gas market, bumbling along the bottom of what is the worst type of history for it, if that continues, they'll just continue with this subsistence production profile of 580 BCF plus or minus 10 % if they slow things down, if there's bad weather or if it's too cold or whatever, these things happen. So if you've got 580 BCF, what you get over time is over the next year, the capital intensity, they're going to have built out all their midstream and processing and pipeline capacity that they need for their production profile.

46:55So the CapEx is going to drop off 20 % or so and then at the same time you're going to think about the mature wells They're in hyperbolic decline every year you go through you have to bring less wells online or less production online to keep your production stable So not only do you get this long -term CapEx piece that drops out but either capital intensity Falls off as well to maintain the same production but at the same time you're proved developed producing Gas reserves profile keeps going up And then of course you've got to layer on top of that stack to play the Uticae which there are any just starting to touch which as I explained before leads to very very high marginal return of on captain.

47:29So in my mind you've got this wonderful three or four tailwinds which mean the marginal return on captain from an already wonderful starting point of 40 % better and better and better and it gets easier and easier and easier or lower caps on the density to maintain the production of 580 BCR which is not much work for them because it's well it's a lot of works they do well but it's one drilling rig of one completion crew. So I sort of think of them bumbling on this really subsistence level of production of this vast resources they've got with a lower and lower capital intensity just because of the simple arithmetic reality of the decline rate in the wells they've got.

48:01What stand out as the main risks? The main risks really come from for me human intervention. So you've already seen what the issue with pipeline capacity is done to the gas price in the region and the cost of transporting the gas. So that's as usual, government intervention has produced a sub -optimal outcome for a lot of consumers and a lot of business owners and a lot of acting debt holders. And of course, the US government is a very powerful, very wealthy organization and they can do unsustainable things for long periods of time. They can outlast me and my investors. So if they say, actually, there's some ginormous carbon tax, which is perhaps not within two standard deviations of what I think had happened, but it's a tail risk here that they could make 40 % IRR into a 10 % or a 5 % IRR quite quickly.

48:45The main pieces come from the sort of curveballs of human intervention. Whenever I examine the nuts and bolts of what we need and how we live and how we maintain our quality of life and all these really in terms of the mazloves hierarchy of needs, the very bottom layer, how we keep that solid. I think the demand profile for natural gas is great and the position that CNX occupies in the lowest cost country in the world is really solid. It's more the overlay, the regulation and the way that humans can get involved for my myopic political reasons. I have no control over that. Nobody knows how it's going to play out.

49:14And I've been very surprised at the extent to which the amount of money for length of time money has disappeared into various things that didn't make any economic sense to start with, let alone now, where things have changed. As always, the issue is humans. Very well said. And it dovetails nicely into our closing question, which is lessons. And oftentimes these lessons say something about the humans managing the business or something along those lines. But what do you think the key lessons are for you as an investor that you might be able to apply elsewhere when you think about CNN? Well, I can give some sort of quite broad pieces.

49:47I suppose they come from pushback when I speak to prospective investors or current investors. It's this idea that cyclicality is a bad thing. It's a very myopic way to think. So if you imagine there are certain types of products where sometimes it's difficult to discern cyclicality from structural decline. But if you know there's a really solid relationship between per capita demand and GDP per capita in a country or whatever it might be, there's this really solid relationship going back over a period of time. You can pull it apart and you can understand that actually, yeah, we need to heat our homes when it's cold and we need to cook our meals so that they don't make a zile and we need to fertilize our crops, our yields are two or three times what they were without.

50:28When you pull something down and you see this wonderful solid and growing demand base for something. then the noise of cyclicality shouldn't really mean anything to you. It's exactly that noise. And if other people see that noise as signal and act upon it, like it's some sort of thing to be extrapolated, that gives you opportunity. So volatility is not risk if your business is structured in the right way and your investment is price correctly. It's actually opportunity when I speak to some people about this particular investment and I've got a lot of other cyclical business that proves themselves to be wonderful over long periods of time to say there's a difference between volatility and risk if it's handled correctly.

51:04And actually, if you're long term, if you're truly long term, and you can understand the demand drivers of a business, then volatility and cyclicality, I should say, can be opportunity for you. But you've got to do your homework. I love that. That's a new lesson, but I think it's perfect. And we switch back between businesses with reoccurring revenue streams into the most cyclical of industries, into commodity industries, which are obviously cyclical, but they bring their own issues. So this has been fun. I love that wisdom to close it out. It's been an absolute pleasure, James. Thank you for joining us here.

51:34No worries. I've enjoyed it. To find more episodes of Breakdowns ranging from Costco to Visa to Moderna or to sign up for our weekly summary, check out joinclosses .com. That's J -O -I -N -C -O -L -O -S -S -U -S .com.