In short
Business Breakdowns: Lululemon Athletica - Episode 120 Summary
Podcast Overview
- Title: Business Breakdowns
- Hosts: Matt Reustle and Zack Fuss
- Episode Title: Lululemon Athletica: The Athleisure Leader
- Guest: John Zolidis, President and Founder of Quo Vadis Capital
- Date: Episode 120
- Description: This episode dissects Lululemon Athletica, a prominent Canadian athleisure brand, exploring its growth, branding strategies, and future prospects.
Key Highlights
Lululemon Overview
- Founded: 1998 by Chip Wilson in Canada.
- Growth: Expanded from a single yoga class pop-up to a $45 billion apparel business.
- Market Position: A leader in athleisure, transforming workout apparel for both genders.
- Revenue: Approaching $10 billion, primarily through own stores and direct-to-consumer sales.
Branding and Community Engagement
- Unique Strategy: Unlike Nike and Adidas, Lululemon employs a grassroots approach, using local ambassadors instead of celebrity endorsements.
- Product Innovation: Focused on creating functional yet stylish athletic apparel, addressing consumers' needs.
Key Figures and Historical Context
- Chip Wilson: His entrepreneurial journey includes previous ventures and his vision for revolutionizing women's athletic wear.
- Management Changes: Post-2013 product recall challenges led to a shift in management, moving towards a more professional and stable leadership structure.
Growth Strategies
- Men’s Business Expansion: Aiming to double the men’s apparel segment, which currently lags behind women's offerings.
- International Growth: China presents significant opportunities, with plans to surpass Canadian revenue in the near future.
- Vertical Integration: Lululemon maintains a limited wholesale presence, focusing on direct sales channels, yielding higher gross margins.
Financial Insights
- Capital Expenditure: Increased spending on store openings and e-commerce infrastructure.
- Gross Margins: Approximately 55%, with a focus on improving operating margins through efficient management and growth strategies.
- Risks: Potential threats to growth include market saturation, increased competition, and the challenge of maintaining innovation.
Future Considerations
- Sustainability of Growth: The need for continuous product innovation and consumer engagement as the brand matures.
- Geopolitical Risks: Concerns about supply chain dependencies, particularly with Taiwanese suppliers.
Lessons Learned
- Importance of Leadership Transition: Recognizing when to transition from founder-led management to professional executives is crucial for sustaining growth.
- Staying Authentic: Maintaining brand authenticity and connection to core customers helps in navigating growth without losing focus on initial success.
- Adaptability to Market Changes: The ability to respond to new market trends and consumer preferences is vital for long-term viability.
Conclusion This episode of Business Breakdowns provides a comprehensive analysis of Lululemon's successful journey and underlying strategies. The discussion highlights both the brand's strengths and the challenges it faces as it seeks to expand further into the competitive athleisure market. With a solid foundation in community engagement and innovative product offerings, Lululemon is positioned to continue its growth trajectory while navigating potential risks.
For further insights, listeners can check out more episodes on [Business Breakdowns](https://www.joincolossus.com/episodes).
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:03This is Business Breakdowns. Business Breakdowns is a series of conversations with investors and operators diving deep into a single business. For each business, we explore its history, its business model, its competitive advantages, and what makes it tick. We believe every business has lessons and secrets that investors and operators can learn from. and we are here to bring them to you. To find more episodes of Breakdowns, check out joincolossus .com. All opinions expressed by hosts and podcast guests are solely their own opinions. Hosts, podcast guests, their employers or affiliates may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.
0:45This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. This is Zach Fuss, an investor at Irenic Capital. And today we're breaking down Lululemon Athletica. The Canadian company founded by Chip Wilson in 1998 has grown from a pop -up store in a yoga class to a $45 billion apparel business. Along the way, it pioneered the trend of athleisure and forever changed what women and men wear to work out in. To break down the business, I'm joined by John Zolidis, president and founder of Quo Vadis Capital. We explore the origins of Lululemon's direct consumer growth strategy, how it has remained relevant in an industry known for fleeting success, and how its business model compares to the apparel giants like Nike, Adidas, and Under Armour.
1:35Please enjoy this breakdown of Lululemon. All right, John, thank you for joining us to tell the story of Lululemon. And when we were talking about the business at a high level, there are a lot of things about Lulu that make it just beyond an apparel brand. And maybe just to start, if someone is not familiar with the business, what is it? How big is it? How does it make money? Lulu Lemon is a athletic apparel and now footwear brand and accessories brand that has a global reach. They're going to do close to $10 billion in revenues in the current year. And that's split through a couple of different channels.
2:13They operate their own stores. They have a direct -to -consumer business, which mostly goes over the internet. And then they also have a smaller wholesale channel. They sell men's apparel and women's apparel, but it's majority women's apparel. And it's majority North America with about 16%, 17 % of the business being outside the US. But with the outside North American business growing much faster than the North American business. $10 billion apparel business is not built overnight. How did they get from where they were 15, 20 years ago to where they are today. Growth does not seem to be slowing whatsoever, but just curious some of the chapters in their evolution.
2:51So it started in Canada as a yoga apparel specialist for women, and it expanded to more of an assortment business and then went public with the intention, I believe, to add men's, which originally was quite small. They continued to open up stores. You also simultaneously grew a internet business. And this business, Lululemon, grew up within the rise of internet and omnichannel retailing overall. But I think the key thing about Lululemon and what makes it most interesting is how they pursued a growth and branding strategy that's very different from what we've seen or what others have seen with the likes of Nike and Adidas.
3:34So if you think about Nike and Adidas, these are brands that utilize marquee athletes to create excitement and align them with the sports fan and excellence in sports performance. And Lululemon has never really done that. They've been a grassroots community -based branding mechanism that sought out local, not celebrities, but well -known people within the yoga or other sports businesses and enlisted these ambassadors, they call them, to help introduce their respective markets to the Lulu brand. And in this way, they grew stealthily and created a lot of excitement and attracted particularly the female customer before expanding more aggressively into men's and accessories.
4:30But that's been the secret of their success, in my opinion, is this combination of community grassroots approach from a branding standpoint, together with product innovation and solving for problems and creating very attractive, beautiful garments to use with a technical athletic approach that didn't really exist in the marketplace prior to Lululemon coming in and finding a way to help women feel fantastic while also giving them technically performing product. Because this is a company that you've been thinking about and evaluating since 2007. I'd love to hear just a little bit of your history studying the business and the tact you were taking and covering it in 15 years ago versus kind of the debates today around the investment case.
5:20So when this came public, it was a hot stock and business was incredibly strong. And so a hot stock plus incredibly strong business leads to pretty extreme valuation in most cases. But just to rewind a little bit, my history following this sector, which at this point, I would call this a specialty apparel retailer, extends back to about 1999. And a number of the companies that I followed initially in the specialty apparel sector were very streaky. So in some cases, they would do well for a period of time, but then collapsed spectacularly. And so when I looked at Lulu, my first thought was, how do we know that this company isn't like all of these previous other specialty retailers that have come before and ended up in tears?
6:06So as I was looking at it, those are the things that I'm guarding against. Because as an analyst, that's kind of the most embarrassing thing that you can do is get sucked into a growth story at a very high multiple and then get embarrassed when it falls apart. So I think my first approach was, can this company really be different from other companies in the space? What's so special about them? Do they have the operating structure? Do they have the management team? Are there other structural influences in the business? Why is this more sustainable than other previous examples of perhaps fashion companies?
6:39That's how I was looking at or framing at the time that have not been successful. And what's the most likely or probabilistic outcome relative to the valuation investors were paying for the stock? But at that time, this was a business trading, presumably at an incredibly aggressive multiple. You were able to frame an investment case with which you were comfortable with the estimates being below your expectations. What were some of the key questions you were considering at that time and how'd you go about addressing them? There were two things I was looking at. One was the shift from a Canadian business to a US business.
7:11Now, that's obviously changed in the ensuing years. But back when it originally came public, the majority of the business was in Canada and the majority of the growth was in the US. And the Canadian market and the US market have some very different dynamics from a retail standpoint. So most important of which is that the Canadian market has dramatically lower retail per capita, retail square footage per capita. So when you look at retail productivity and sales per square foot performance in Canada compared to the US, almost all concepts generate much higher sales productivity north of the border than they do south of the border.
7:44There are some other differences like the rents are higher, the Canadian consumer is a little bit different, the seasonality is a little bit different. But the most important thing is the difference in retail square footage per capita. And in a lot of cases, what we look for is, is there some reason why investors are misunderstanding the growth opportunity? And so I think if you take the business and you don't understand the difference between Canada and the US, and you look at the productivity in Canada, you think that, hey, this is going to be amazing in the US, but it's actually seeing a dilution in some of its metrics as it moves from this high productivity, high margin market to a lower productivity, lower margin market.
8:26And that dogged the stock, I think, for a little bit over several years. But simultaneously, you had this incredibly strong growth. So what we'd be looking for is to try to understand why is it generating such powerful same -store sales. And to do that, I visited stores a lot. I talked to the company. I looked at the customers. I visited trade shows. I tried to understand what's from a competitive standpoint? Are there new competitors coming into the market that are knocking off Lulu that are going to steal away the company's source of differentiation? Are they really going to be successful in all these new markets and try to wrap all that up in the context of a financial model, which tells us whether they're going to make or miss numbers?
9:06We can't really break down Lululemon, I don't think, without talking about its colorful founder, Chip Wilson. In many ways, he created an industry with athleisure, but he's definitely a divisive figure. He's said some things publicly, which have gotten the business in some hot water and probably has gotten himself in a fair amount of trouble as well. Walk us through Chip's founding story, the influence he had on the business over the past decades, or whatever timeline you think is most relevant to the story. We'll rewind to his first business, which he created prior to founding Lululemon, which was a company he called West Beach, which he started around 1980.
9:45And originally it was just men's shorts and expanded into a skate surf look, which he rightly was able to anticipate was going to grow quite large. And then after a period of time, pivoted into the snowboard area, which was much more attractive in terms of the length of the season, the average price point of the items that were involved, the size of the total market. This, he eventually sold off. He ran West Beach for about 18 years. His total compensation for it, after all the work he put into the taxes, paying off his partners, etc., left him with a small amount of cash, but certainly nothing exciting in terms of, let's go and retire on a desert island or what have you.
10:33And so in a yoga class, which he attended, he got the same sense that the yoga market might trend in the way that he had previously anticipated the skate, surf, and snowboard markets. And this together with his own personal frustration about finding athletic apparel that would be functional and attractive led him to think about how he could solve that problem specifically for women who are the majority participants in this new sport yoga. About that same time, he learned that there were these manufacturing machines developed in Japan that could create a flat seam, which is to say could combine two pieces of fabric without any pieces adding to the sides, which would create friction or would rub when you were wearing them, especially during athletic activities, such as running, triathlons, or in this case, yoga.
11:37And so he traveled to Japan and he spent nearly all of his money to purchase four of these machines for $40 ,000 each so that he could try to manufacture a yoga pant designed specifically for women using this new manufacturing technique. So I would say that this was actually his first innovation or the company's first innovation was trying to find a way to solve this problem. And he felt that he was also one of the few people that was trying to make technical athletic wear with a eye towards it also being attractive. And previous to this point, most athletic wear was worn by men and it was generally worn just to sweat in and throw into the washer dryer.
12:26And so the idea was that people generally wore their least attractive, oldest t -shirts, sweatshirts, old college, high school wear, what have you. The idea that athletic wear could be attractive, functional, and you might want to continue to wear it after you were done working out was pretty revolutionary. So that was really the birth of the athleisure, which at that point didn't really exist. And it coincided with the nascent yoga participation craze, which he saw or he thought would become something much, much bigger than it was. Of course, he was right. I don't know that he would claim that he had that visibility, but he certainly was able to notice that there was a trend and then find a way to capitalize on it.
13:14I'm going to ask you to speak to some of the statements he's made because they became a pretty big news story. And I'm unsure if they've made an impact on the business's performance itself. I don't think he intended to be as controversially as he ended up being. When he went out and spoke in the public, he didn't speak in a guarded, polished, managed, manicured way to a broad audience. He shot from the hip. He repeated whatever he was thinking. And so it was easy to take a lot of his comments out of context. If we want to get a little bit more specific, the most controversial comment, the one that's repeated the most frequently, was around a product call that happened in 2013, where the business had grown quite fast.
14:02It only had one supplier for its Luan fabric, which was a company called Eclat based off Taiwan. And based on the volumes they were trying to order and the needs that they had, some of the quality started to not meet their standards. This together with some customers buying perhaps smaller sizes, because they were trying to make Lululemon do something that Spanx at that time, which was also coming out, was known to do shapewear. Lululemon was not shapewear, but sometimes in cases, at least Chip alluded to this idea, that customers might want to wear this product for purposes other than just their athletic activities or looking good in the grocery store, if you will.
14:46And so he made the comment that when it's being worn for these purposes, which is not what it was intended for, it could become sheer and a see -through, and it was the customer's fault he intimidated for wearing this. Or he said, I think more accurately, customers' bodies weren't made for the product, something of that nature. So this was, of course, interpreted very negatively as if he was blaming his customer for his product's defects, which is something that you never want to do. And also that he was saying unfavorable things about women and women customers in general, which is obviously the polar opposite of the idea you want to get across for a brand such as Lululemon, which was probably 80 % women's product at that time.
15:30That was the biggest gaffe, if you will. And I know that he would have preferred to take that back. It did precipitate a lot of changes in the company that led to him eventually taking a lower profile role. But ultimately, I think he was really a visionary in terms of anticipating what people wanted, being relentless on innovation with product, and finding a way to create a brand that was using a strategy quite different from his competition. Since Chip has stepped down, there's definitely been a number of changes to management and presumably issues that have come of that. Can you highlight the transition?
16:13What ensued in those following years? And then where leadership of the company is today, in your view? The company went public in 2007. And at that time, I was already in the works to bring on Christine Day as CEO in 2008. She came from Starbucks, where she had a very good reputation for managing the expansion of many stores, which was one of Lululemon's strategies to grow. And the CFO at that time was a gentleman by the name of John Curry. So they ran the business together with Chip on the board until this 2013 event that I mentioned around the product recall. And this event was really the transformational moment in the business when it went from being a fast -growing but smaller, somewhat entrepreneurial business to a professionally run company.
17:05But that transition didn't happen overnight. The first thing that happened after 2013, after this product recall, is that Christine Day resigned from the board. She quit, I would call it, somewhat in a huff over what was happening. on over having to work with Chip and not getting the control that she wanted. And so she left. And then they brought in a gentleman by the name of Laurent Faudet -Vin, a French guy who came from Tom's, which was a footwear company. And I think that Laurent was in over his head. They were looking for somebody who could take this to the next level. I think they wanted to go outside the traditional management within retail and they found Laurent.
17:44But I think this was just a bit too much for him. Simultaneously, Advent, a private equity firm, came in and made a second investment in the business. Advent had been the original partner in 2005 when Chip sold about half of his ownership in the company that helped him get some outside advisors and ultimately led to the company going public. They exited in 2009 at an eight times profit. So this was actually unusual for them to come back in 2014. They bought half of Chip's remaining stake, which reduced him to about 15 % ownership in the business at that time. And they were, in my opinion, instrumental in finding the new professional management team, which is what we see with the company today.
18:29So in particular, they put Glenn Murphy, the former CEO of Gap on the board. And they found Stuart Hasselden, who was the former CFO of J .Crew, which had been a very successful company at that time. And then lastly, they brought on Calvin McDonald to replace Laurent Pau de Vont, who left after some issues internally at the company. Calvin came from Sephora. So now, this is really the first time, in my opinion, that now we've got a real professional, established management team that has a track record of history with a board structure, outside investors looking at the business correctly. And really, this set up the significant improvement in the business that we see continuing today.
19:10And so they successfully navigated what I'll call the see -through pants saga. They put in a management team to manage it to the expectations of a public company. And then presumably, after going after their core, you always worry about these fashion businesses. I think we've talked about Abercrombie & Fitch in the past being one of those where there's a ton of growth and all of a sudden, for whatever reason, the brand loses its panache and growth becomes more challenged. How are they able to continue to find new pockets of growth and areas of the market to expand into? So Abercrombie & Fitch is a perfect counterexample.
19:44But another one that I would talk about maybe listeners are less familiar with is Chico's, which was a hot growth women's apparel company for many years, which ultimately outgrew its potential store base and saw margins and sales collapse. In the case of Abercrombie & Fitch, It was riding something, what I would call the distressed, allegiant look and hyper -sexualized branding that was very successful for a long period of time. And what happens with these companies is that they kind of come public when things are going well. Investors assign a high multiple, but initially they're skeptical. And then after a few years of doing well, investors start to change their tune and they start to believe that the company is run by merchandising geniuses.
20:28the multiples expand, the store base continues to expand, and then competitors move in, they knock off the look, it becomes ubiquitous, the customer gets bored, the innovation doesn't really happen, and sales start to slow down, which normally is accompanied by inventories getting too high and thus sales slow, comps turn negative, margins collapse, everyone hates the company, stock gets destroyed. What's challenging about this is that this cycle can last 6, seven years. So it really takes a long time for it to be proven out whether something can be sustainable or not. I think what's different about Lulu is twofold.
21:10One, it's really a functional product. So it's less fashion than Abercrombie & Fitch or American Eagle or Aeropostale, which is bankrupt now, or Chico's Fast. And it's more about solving a need from a functional standpoint for the customer, which continues. And that is to look good and feel good while participating in athletic activities. And the second piece that I think's different or differentiates Lulu versus the other class of business that we just mentioned is that it really stands for something from a brand standpoint. If I think about Abercrombie or Aeropostale or Chico's, I think these are pure fashion brands and they may have stood for a particular lifestyle or a way of looking or way of feeling.
21:58But I think Lulu has a deeper brand value and message. And that is about self -empowerment. And I think the message of self -empowerment and community is a deeper, more resonating message and feeling that it conveys to its customers. And I think that's helped it to retain its allure together with innovation around the product. And then I guess a logical extension of that question is how you consider competition. So at the one end, you have these multinational, massive businesses like Nike, Adidas, to an extent Under Armour, although I know they've struggled. And then you've got a series of upstarts, which I'd call copycats, like Athleta, Biori on the men's side, Roan, Sweaty Betty on the women's side.
22:48I mean, people saw this opportunity and the growth. And despite that, Lululemon has sustained that 20, 30, 40 % top line. How is it that they're finding the ability to fend off the competition? Let's run through these different groups of competitors. So you have the established core athletic brands, which you mentioned already, Nike, Adidas, and Under Armour. And then there were a series of specialty apparel brands focused on women or women's yoga. And when I say specialty apparel, I mean companies that sell their own brand in a small store. And so you mentioned a few of those, Sweaty Betty. But there were also some like Lucy and Lorna Jane, which have disappeared or haven't really been able to take off.
23:36And then the third class of competitors would be wholesale brands that have a heritage in the women's performance athletic wear category like aloe yoga. And you mentioned Rhone for Men. That's one as well. And so each of these compete in a slightly different way and in a different channel and engage with the customer in a different way. If we go back to the first category, Nike, Audi, and Under Armour, the first thing to note about those brands is they're dominated by men's product. So I believe Nike, which again, also is dominated by footwear versus apparel, but certainly has a huge developed apparel business is about two thirds men's product versus Lulu, which is the mere opposite at two thirds women's product.
24:21And I also think that Adidas and Under Armour are very masculine in their branding and really about sports and achievement at a very high level, which I would contrast with the self -empowerment message and community message of Lululemon. That's not the reason why Lululemon is taking share from them, but they come to the market with a very different approach from a consumer standpoint. The other specialty apparel retailers that haven't done as well, for example, Lucy, Athleta, Lorna, Jane, Sweaty Betty, there, I think it's a question of merchandising. Are they being as successful, innovating, and bringing new styles to the customer, and then managing their inventory levels, promotions, and execution in the store versus Lulu?
25:14And then the third piece, the aloe or the wholesale brands that are selling through high -end department stores or in other specialty retail stores, those brands have grown. But I think Lulu, through its combination of community activations and store openings and community outreach, has really been able to capture the consumer in a much more significant and deeper way. And so I think you highlight an important facet of their business mix being woman -led versus male. How is that mix shift starting to evolve as they go after the male category? And how are they finding success in doing so? Well, I think they know that they need men to achieve their long -term goals.
25:58And they've stated outright that I believe that they're wanting to double men's and they're going to grow women's at a low double -digit rate. So the women's business is much bigger. As I mentioned, it's about two -thirds. and it's more mature, but they need men to round out their brand ambitions. And so they have a number of ways that they're doing that. One is by remodeling the stores or opening up new stores with a greater percentage of the store dedicated to men's product. Second is by introducing new men's items and innovating around the product franchises that they have with poor men. And then they'll also be pursuing their marketing strategy, which revolves around working with local fitness influencers and people who are really important within the community to get the message out that men's product is there.
26:49A very interesting stat that the company provided in its 2022 analyst day was the business's unaided awareness within different groups. And in 2022, according to the data that they had, Lululemon only had an 11 % unaided awareness with men in North America. I think that's really low. I think it must be higher than that. But this is data coming from an external source. And so even if it's double that, I still think it's pretty low. So there's a lot of opportunity for the company to increase awareness with men, expand its product assortment, open new stores, engage with men, and grow that business.
27:29Can you just give us a sense of how big that store footprint is and how quickly it's growing on a unit basis? Sure. They had 655 stores at the end of 2022. And the guidance for this year, the plan for this year is to open approximately 50 stores. And what that would mean is about 18 % to 20 % square footage growth. The new stores tend to be a bit larger than their legacy stores, many of which were quite small. So if they're successful in transitioning the mix towards men, I guess the other question I have is internationally, they successfully took what was a Canadian business and transferred it to the US.
28:07Then presumably they went after Europe and Asia. I know they've had success in Asia. What does the global opportunity look like for a business like this, given the cultural differences in the clothing that we wear? So the most interesting market to talk about is China. They do break out China versus rest of world, Canada and the United States. And I think in 2023 is going to be the first year where China is bigger than Canada. That said, it's still probably only going to be close to a billion dollars versus Canada in 2022 was $1 .1 billion. So maybe they will surpass Canada in 2023. Maybe it will take another year, but it's certainly growing much faster than Canada, which is a more mature market.
28:53And that also means it's much larger than all of the other international markets put together. That's the key place. The question is, can they continue to be successful growing in China? One thing I wondered when they originally went in is that I've seen other businesses go into China, and I think Nike had this issue, where there were fit problems, which is to say that the fit that's appropriate for the customer there isn't exactly the same fit that should be sold to the range of customers that live in the United States or North America. And it doesn't seem like Lula has had any problem whatsoever transitioning into that market from a fit standpoint, which is pretty impressive.
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29:32The brand has also been accepted in China, which also I think is impressive because it's actually a Canadian company instead of a US company. I think that reduces some of the risk that investors are concerned about from a geopolitical standpoint, but that remains to be seen. And one thing I don't know is how the margin structure looks like in Canada compared to the US. If we talk about Nike, I know for a fact that Nike charges the same or more for its footwear in China compared to the US, even though the product's being produced in China. So you can imagine that the margins are much higher. I'm not sure that that's what Lulu is doing.
30:14I do think the pricing is higher. I don't know what scale they need to get to, to prove that out. But at a billion dollars or knocking on a billion dollars, that's a really exciting number and implies that they can get a lot higher from there. And then lastly, I'll just mention that Nike is currently 10 times as big as Lulu in China. So Western brands have been accepted. The Chinese consumer is interested in exercising and dressing differently and differentiate themselves. The early embrace of Lululemon is certainly very encouraging. And the size of the market is quite enormous. So I think there's a very strong case that the international growth component, especially specifically China, is a real opportunity for the company and for investors.
31:02And then correct me if I'm wrong, isn't the largest supplier of Lulule Taiwanese? And does that raise any concerns for you as an investor? So there's a company called Aclat, which I believe trades on the Taiwanese market. And they are the supplier of, I believe, the Luan fabric and maybe some of the other fabrics that they use in their core products. I believe it is the largest supplier. Would that cause any trouble for them? That's a really difficult question to answer. I think most brands differentiated their supply chains during COVID, but I don't know where Lululemon is in that process. I don't think it matters in the short term.
31:39If there's some kind of geopolitical conflict, I think all bets are off and that will be the least of our problems. I believe that Nike, who's made a concentrated shift away from the wholesale channel, is now moving back a bit of their inventory towards some of these wholesalers. Lulu's taking a somewhat differentiated approach in their go -to -market strategy. How do you think about their relationship with the wholesale market? So you're right. So Nike has had a very public move towards the DTC, direct -to -consumer channel, and has cut off what it's called differentiated wholesale. It probably sold its shoes through 100 ,000 different doors in the United States.
32:16So it was really distributed in many, many different places. I think what differentiated Nike relative to other footwear companies in particular is that they're incredibly good at product segmentation. So you would not find the same products in Macy's versus Foot Locker versus DSW versus Dick's Sporting Goods. They would really have a different tier of products in each of these different channels based on the customer that's going there. And they were able to keep these apart without having inventory overages in one particular area affect their business with a different part of the wholesale customer base.
32:51What they may have miscalculated is the extent to which they can really go on their own and how much they need to be out there from a present standpoint. Lulu has taken a completely different approach, as you pointed out. They don't really have a wholesale business. They have a small wholesale business. You can find the product in select high -end fitness clubs and some department stores occasionally. But that is really not Lulu's strategy there. strategy is to be vertically integrated from the sense that they design and produce and source all their own product and then sell it through their own channels, which are stores and e -commerce or DTC.
33:31And so if I look at the margin differential, walking through the P &L of Lululemon versus Nike, I note that Lululemon has much higher gross margins, around 55%. My guess is that product mix is partially attributable to that. How do you think about what the margin profile of this business should look like given their go -to -market strategy, their pricing strategy, their global expansion, just to get a sense of where margins could go over time? So comparing to Nike has two challenges. One, Lulu is not really a footwear company. They've just launched footwear for women and they'll launch footwear for men next year.
34:04But I think footwear has got to be less than 5 % of sales if it's even seen that high. The second piece is the wholesale versus retail. So wholesale margins are typically lower and Nike is still primarily a wholesale business. So Lulu has very little wholesale. The other thing to note is that Lulu does break out its operating margins before corporate expenses by channel. And their DTC business, which is bigger than their store business, at least it was last year for the first time, has much higher realized margins. And if we look at it, compared to pre -pandemic, the DTC business was about 39 % of profits before any allocation of corporate overhead.
34:47And that rose to 60 % post -pandemic because of the acceleration of direct -to -consumer while stores were closed. Stores have since, of course, reopened and that business has recovered, but the DTC business hasn't given back anything. So the DTC component for Nike is much lower relative to Lululemon. So I think right now, the overall business in 2022 did a 22 % operating margin. And that was actually equivalent to where it was back in 2019. There is opportunity for the company to grow its operating margins. Part of that is going to come from leverage on corporate overhead, which is around 10 -11 % of sales, which is a bit high, in my opinion.
35:32But perhaps because of all the investments and the innovation that they need and the infrastructure that's in place, it's going to be permanently a bit higher than other comparable retailers. But there's opportunity to leverage that. And there's opportunity probably to get higher margins in some of these international markets. I would guess that outside of China, they may be at best breaking even in some of these international markets. It's difficult to go in with a small number of stores and generate a profit. So I think those stores are still a drag on the overall business, but they have the potential to be profit contributors and margin accretive over time, perhaps, or at least less of a margin drag.
36:09While China is really the story here for the international component and then leverage on the core, the other piece for the US. So if I look at the capital allocation of this business, produces very healthy amounts of free cash flow, but it also looks like it's gone from a business that was consistently deploying about $200 to $300 million in CapEx. And that's seemingly stepped up pretty meaningfully. Where's the incremental capital going? And then how do you track the return on that investment spend? So you're right. We're looking at about $650 million in CapEx this year, and I'm modeling about $700 million in the following year.
36:47And previously it was lower, but it's going to store openings. So that's the main place it's going. And it's also going to some infrastructure investments, especially around e -commerce and supporting that as well as innovation and sourcing. But they get fantastic returns. If we look at unit level economics for the business and just look at the stores, I'm estimating that the stores get about a 38%. We suggested ROIC. That is good, but not spectacular. But that said, I'm not giving them credit for any of the e -commerce. Normally, when I look at specialty apparel retailers, I would add back the e -commerce revenues.
37:27But in this case, since their e -commerce is so developed, we tend to look at those or I look at those separately. And the e -commerce business is incredibly productive from a return on invested capital standpoint. If we look at the overall business, I'm estimating they're running about a 24%. We suggested ROIC. And that would put them among the most productive businesses in the retail space from a capital return standpoint. And that is still sitting with pretty meaningful cash balance on the balance sheet over a billion dollars. And what you could argue is overcapitalized or certainly conservatively capitalized relative to some retailers that use leverage to amplify their returns.
38:07Yeah, I guess it's important to note that this business is effectively zero net debt, if not in net cash position. So clearly, they don't use leverage to fuel their returns. They don't have any financial debt. They do have leases. So I think it's important that we always mention that retailers have leases, which look like off balance sheet debt creates an obligation for them to pay those. And so I think there has been an accounting change that makes the leases a little bit more evident, but it's a form of debt. But excluding the leases, it's a debt -free company. It doesn't have any debt in its capital structure and is generating a lot of cash.
38:40And at the end of the first quarter, it had nearly a billion dollars. And presumably, given that they're a traffic driving retailer, the attractiveness of new site openings have probably been increasing given just the propensity of a lot of specialty retail to be vacating stores. Or is that not the case? So Lululemon is a high -end retailer. So it's going into the best spaces out there. It likes to be in street front locations. They also are in all the top malls. A lot of the growth is outside the US. So they have relatively high rent, which reflects the smaller size of the stores as well as the quality of the locations.
39:18I don't think they're having any trouble finding or getting leases. But when you're only going after the best marquee spaces, obviously, sometimes you have to wait until those spaces become available. And then I guess to ask another question about capital allocation, they had a very public, I guess it's probably too pejorative to call it a misallocation of capital, but the mirror acquisition is not panned out. How do you think about that acquisition in the context of the investment case? Great question. The mirror did not work out. As you pointed out, they have effectively written off the entire $500 million purchase price.
39:50And I think in speaking to them recently about this, their thinking was that they didn't have an option for the customer to engage with the brand through a digital channel. And they felt that Mirror could amplify or accelerate that engagement at a time when many people were forced to exercise at home. And so I think that was the intention. The Mirror, the hardware device was going to solve for this additional need to engage with the customer at their place of residence. So two things have happened. So one is the excitement around working out at home. The need to work at a home has diminished. And the desire to engage with these workers through these classes through this product just never was as high as what the company had baked into its original assumptions when they purchased the business.
40:45So they've pivoted and they're going to try to do this a little bit more through phones and tablets and computers and engage with the customer on these other kinds of devices, which most customers already have or are investing in. And they think they can engage with the customer at home in that manner. And they don't need something as flashy, to use a pun, as the mirror. As far as their future capital allocation, did they learn a lesson from this? I don't believe that growth via acquisition is really part of the core strategy. So I think it's highly unlikely that we'll see a repeat of this kind of deal.
41:25You could still see some tuck -in acquisitions in new markets or technology that helps the company engage with customer or helps them innovate in product. But I doubt you'll see any other acquisition, perhaps of this size, at least in the near term. I kind of look at the trajectory of the business. It's approaching the $10 billion in sales mark. To give context, after not, Nike is about five times the size of that, in excess of $50 billion. How do you think about, ultimately, if Lulu doesn't continue on this trajectory, where are the biggest risks to their growth today? Great question. The real issue is that to be successful as an apparel retailer, you have to keep innovating around the product assortment.
42:09Customer is really driven by novelty. And it's very difficult for specialty apparel retailers or apparel companies in general to maintain the level of excitement that happens when they're small or when they're new or when the brand is novel. When the brand becomes more mature and it's more widely distributed and more accepted and known, it gets just a little bit more challenging for the customer to find newness and drive incremental purchases. I think that's the biggest challenge is how can Lulu maintain this sense of delight and excitement with the customer while being already in the customer's closet?
42:49So far, they've been able, or at least recently, they're doing an incredible job. In the most recent quarter, they were just growing across all the different channels, all the geographies, men's, women's accessories, DTC and in the stores. And they're really proving that they're able to create that innovation, incremental excitement, expand into new categories, open up stores in new markets. So number one challenge is they have to maintain that level of innovation. Two, as the business gets bigger and more geographically diverse, execution is extremely important. There are different seasons, there's different seasonality, this creates complexity, the customer is always demanding more and more service, faster service, there's always new competitors coming in.
43:35And so they have to stay ahead of those new competitors in both their new and existing markets not getting knocked off. So there's a myriad of ways that the brand could get stale, innovation could slow, new markets might not be as accepting, new competitors could come in. But at the moment, the business just has such incredible momentum and they seem to really be executing extremely well. And our kind of customary question, which piggybacks on that answer, when you think about the Lululemon story from both an investor perspective and also management teams that are in the life cycle of building their businesses publicly, what are the key lessons that you take away and can be applied elsewhere?
44:15We addressed one of them already, which is the need for founder -led businesses to understand when it's the right moment to hand off to executives that have a skill set that they don't have. And I think we saw the example of Under Armour as a business where that did not occur and the business suffered. And Lululemon has, after going through a couple of iterations of its management team, found an excellent group that's performing quite well. Within the apparel business, I think Lululemon stands out because it's remained authentic to its core and it hasn't gotten distracted to try to be something that it's not.
44:58If I look at other specialty apparel businesses, frequently they veer away from whatever their initial success was and then they lose their core, what makes them special. And Lululemon has been able to avoid that. So even though it has expanded from an initial assortment around yoga, it has not really lost touch with its connection to the consumer about making fantastic, attractive, technical fabric that performs. And it's been able to still get into adjacent areas without too much trouble. So I think that's a lesson. It's just to follow whether or not companies are able to do that. John, thank you so much for breaking down Lululemon with us.
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From the publisher
This is Zack Fuss, an investor at Irenic Capital, and today we’re breaking down Lululemon Athletica. The Canadian company, founded by Chip Wilson in 1998, has grown from a pop-up store in a yoga class to a $45 billion apparel business. Along the way, it pioneered the trend of athleisure and forever changed what women and men wear to work out in.
To break down the business, I am joined by John Zolidis, president and founder of Quo Vadis Capital. We explore the origins of Lululemon’s direct to consumer growth strategy, how it has remained relevant in an industry known for fleeting success, and how its business model compares to apparel giants like Nike. Please enjoy this business breakdown of Lululemon.
For the full show notes, transcript, and links to the best content to learn more, check out the episode page here.
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Show Notes
(00:02:30) - (First question) - An overview of Lululemon
(00:03:27) - Lululemon's success lies in branding, innovation, and community involvement
(00:05:53) - Evaluating their growth story and investment potential
(00:09:57) - Chip Wilson’s history and influence
(00:16:53) - Management transitions, operational issues, and turnaround under new leadership
(00:20:01) - Lululemon's success lies in its functional product and strong brand message
(00:23:13) - Fending off competition through unique branding and customer engagement
(00:26:31) - Lulu aims to grow men's business to complement women's dominance and reach
(00:28:46) - China offers significant growth potential for Lululemon
(00:32:35) - Focusing on vertical integration and limited wholesale channels
(00:34:21) - Lulu's higher gross margins stem from product mix and DTC focus
(00:37:08) - Increased capital expenditure is primarily allocated to store openings
(00:40:18) - Mirror acquisition didn't meet expectations, unlikely to repeat such deals
(00:42:30) - Significant risks for Lululemon's future
(00:44:48) - Lessons learned from studying Lululemon




