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Podcast Summary: Rolls-Royce: Turbines and Tribulations - [Business Breakdowns, REPLAY]
Episode Overview
- Podcast Title: Business Breakdowns
- Episode Title: Rolls-Royce: Turbines and Tribulations
- Hosts: Matt Reustle and Zack Fuss
- Guest: Graeme Forster, Orbis Investments
- Release Date: [Insert Date]
- Episode Duration: Approximately 1 hour
This episode provides an in-depth analysis of Rolls-Royce, focusing not on the luxury automobiles that may first come to mind, but on their significant operations in the aerospace sector. Graeme Forster shares insights on the company's history, competitive positioning, and challenges in the aerospace market.
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Key Topics
- Introduction to Rolls-Royce
- Rolls-Royce is primarily a power business, focused on converting stored energy into kinetic energy, producing large engines including those for aircraft.
- The company has deep historical roots dating back to its founding in 1906 by Charles Rolls and Henry Royce.
- Historical Context
- Initially focused on automobiles, Rolls-Royce shifted to aircraft engines during World War I, establishing its aerospace division.
- The RB211 engine mismanagement led to nationalization in the 1970s and the separation of the car business.
- Current Business Segments
- Civil Aerospace (50% of revenue): Large engines for commercial and business aircraft.
- Power Systems (25% of revenue): Engines for marine, industrial applications, and energy generation/storage.
- Defense: Engines for military applications including submarines.
- Emerging Markets: Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) for nuclear energy.
- Competitive Position
- Rolls-Royce operates in a duopoly with General Electric in the aerospace engine market, holding significant shares in new orders and installed bases.
- Focuses on high-value, low-volume engineering, which requires scale and expertise.
- Service Agreements and Profitability
- Long-term service agreements (LTSAs) generate steady revenue based on engine hours flown, which can lead to high margins but require effective pricing strategies.
- The historical mismanagement of costs and pricing has hindered profitability.
- Market Dynamics and Challenges
- The aerospace market is currently facing under-supply issues post-COVID, with an increase in demand expected over the coming years.
- Rolls-Royce’s performance can be susceptible to economic downturns, as seen during pandemic disruptions.
- Future Opportunities in Nuclear Energy
- Rolls-Royce is exploring opportunities in the nuclear sector through SMRs, which could potentially address energy needs sustainably and efficiently.
- The UK government’s push for increased nuclear capacity may benefit Rolls-Royce significantly.
- Capital Allocation and Management Changes
- New management is focusing on operational efficiencies and cost-cutting measures, aiming to improve margins and free cash flow.
- The future ability to allocate capital effectively will be crucial for long-term business viability.
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Key Takeaways
- Crisis as Opportunity: The pandemic, while damaging, may provide a chance for Rolls-Royce to restructure and improve its operations.
- Importance of Engineering and Commercial Strategy: Balancing engineering excellence with commercial acumen is critical for profit maximization.
- Long-Term Contracts: The structure of service agreements provides steady revenue, but the pricing model must be refined to ensure profitability.
- Emerging Nuclear Business: Potentially transformative growth through the nuclear energy segment, positioning Rolls-Royce as a leader in a new market.
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Conclusion This episode of Business Breakdowns offers a sophisticated analysis of Rolls-Royce's operations, examining the intricacies of its business model, historical challenges, and future opportunities. Listeners gain insights into the delicate balance of engineering excellence and commercial strategy necessary for success in highly competitive and capital-intensive industries.
For more episodes and detailed insights, visit [Colossus](https://www.joincolossus.com).
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
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1:54This is Business Breakdowns. Business Breakdowns is a series of conversations with investors and operators diving deep into a single business. For each business, we explore its history, its business model, its competitive advantages, and what makes it tick. We believe every business has lessons and secrets that investors and operators can learn from, and we are here to bring them to you. To find more episodes of Breakdowns, check out joincollosses .com. All opinions expressed by hosts and podcast guests are solely their own opinions. Hosts, podcast guests, their employers or affiliates, main -aintained positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.
2:37This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Welcome back to Business Breakdowns. breakdowns today we are covering Rolls Royce. A fair warning to those expecting to hear about luxury automobiles, that division was split from this business in the 1970s. But, as we discuss the history of Rolls Royce on this episode, you will hear how the DNA of this company still ties together from its early 1900s origins. Our guest is Graham Forster from Orbis investments. Graham walks us through the core business of Rolls Royce in the aerospace market, the evolving duopoly of the wide body aircraft engine manufacturers, and the ups and downs of properly capturing the economic opportunity.
3:28We've talked about other duopolis in the aerospace market, HIKO transdime come to mind. The performance here has been different, particularly over the long term, you've seen more ups and downs, and I really appreciated Graham's intellectual honesty, discussing roles, and I expect you will too. Now on to the episode. All right, Graham, I am excited to have you here to talk Rolls Royce. I think this is a brand that pretty much everyone is familiar with, but the business that is a publicly traded entity might be a little different than the Rolls Royce that many people think of. So I thought we could just start there with a simple overview of Rolls Royce holdings, the publicly traded entity, what is that business today?
4:16Thanks, Matt. Given this is a British business, one of the few remaining high -quality global British businesses. It's nice to have a Brit. So thank you for inviting me on today. Amen. The company and its core, the way I think about it, is as a power business, So mainly converting stored energy into kinetic energy, right? It would be the fancy way of saying they make big engines effectively, such as airplane engines and the like. This core goes way back to their roots in the early 1900s, and that started with early motor engines. I think that people know about Rolls -Royce motor, the cars. They actually don't do that anymore, but they still have that consistent DNA that they have had for the last 120 years.
5:03I would characterize the culture as one of engineering excellence. So they tried to do a few things, do them exceptionally well. Henry Royce, one of the co -founders with Charles Rolls, was quoted as saying whatever is rightly done, however humble is noble. And that philosophy, I think, has really stood the test of time. The crown jewel in the non -car Rolls Royce of the one we're here to talk about today is really the civil aerospace business So that's engines for large commercial planes as well as business jets and they also make a bunch of other powertrain So marine trains industrial machinery Nuclear including military such as nuclear subs for the British Navy and they have some energy generation storage as well which is benefiting from increased need for power through electrification and data centers and the like.
6:01That's what they are, that's what they do now. And they've also got some great opportunities to develop new business lines going forward in very, very meaningful markets. One being using their expertise in nuclear, they're pushing into small modular reactors, so -called SMRs, which could play a meaningful role in the nuclear renaissance, which I think we're quite likely to see over the next few decades. You mentioned the auto business and it's my understanding that as you mentioned, they were once together as part of one single business. What led to that spin -off or that separation and then concentrating on the core markets that they're focused on today?
6:44You can go way back. The company was founded in 1906 by Charles Roles Henry Royce. They were very, very different people, very different backgrounds, but they were really linked by that passion for engineering, passion for motor vehicles at the time, which were really just getting going. Ford's Model T hit the market in 1908, so a couple of years after Rolls, Rolls was founded. Charles Rolls, Henry Rolls, were both fascinating characters. Rolls was from the money class, studied engineering at Cambridge, was a passionate race driver, And he was actually the second Brit to obtain a pilot's license and he was the first to fly across the channel and back So super adventurous also a very entrepreneurial he built a business importing French cars to sell in the UK But he ultimately wanted to partner with a British Carmaker, which is how he came across Henry Royce Royce's family were very very different very much working class his father actually died in the poor house when Henry was young and that shaped his character and if you don't know what the poor house is, thinks sort of Charles Dickinson sort of novels.
7:54But Henry Royce, he carried a lot of grit, a lot of drive and he became an exceptional engineer both mechanical and electrical and he had a completely obsessive personality by all accounts. He was obsessed mainly with quality and he reminds me a little bit of early Steve Jobs in some ways he was maniacal around delivering the best product essentially. So the two got together with Royce looking after the engineering side and roles looking after the business side. Sounds like it started with the automobile business. How soon thereafter did they start extending into aerospace and other fields of industrial engines?
8:38The initial core of we think of Rolls Royce. It was World War I, so 1914 when Royce became obsessed with building aircraft engines effectively to help the war effort. That was the birth of really Rolls Royce Aerospace and the Defense Division put together. Then in World War II, the company was one of the first to build the first jet engine. So gas turbines which generated their own thrust rather than using pistons to turn a propeller, a little bit similar technology to in the cars. And incidentally at that time in the Second World War, they shared their engine designs with the US, their jet engine designs.
9:17And that went to GE, which has been competing with Rolls Royce ever since, as two companies are really the dominant force in large -scale engines today. So the move into aerospace engines was very fruitful for the company. it brought an almost reward but also an almost risk. These are highly complex, high value and low volume engineering feats. So if you get it right then they should be highly profitable. But if something goes wrong you can put the whole company in peril and that's effectively what happened in the late 60s and the early 70s with the RB211 engine. That project was hugely mismanaged, massive cost overruns and pretty weak engine performance or at least weaker than predicted.
10:03And this led to a nationalization effectively. Rolls -Royce is still a key British asset with links to national defense, so they couldn't let it go. But as part of that nationalization, a car business, the original piece of that business was spun out, and that was sold off as Rolls -Royce motors. And then Rolls -Royce PLC, the large engine business that we're here to talk about today. So Rolls -Royce cars now sits actually within the BMW group. And that's a valuable and somewhat underappreciated asset, in my opinion, within BMW. And it's a bit of a tangled web of the story is how it got there, but it's very much a separate entity today.
10:40Thinking about the connective tissue between those two businesses, when I think about the auto manufacturing, it is the engine, which is such a major part of it, but it's also all of the finishes and the touches on the actual car itself, which bring it to an entirely different level of prestige comparing it to the aircraft engines, which I assume they are just doing the engines and nothing more, is it safe to say that everything that revolves around the brand and the expertise and the focus was really that engine that prestige is touched in terms of the automobiles is something completely separate from what I'm thinking about here.
11:21The culture, I think, is a connective tissue. And the culture was put for perfection. There were stories when from the early days, if you bought a Rolls Royce in 1910 or whatever, it was the most reliable engine, it was the most reliable car that came from the obsession around the quality and how everything comes together in this sort of perfect way. That is the connective tissue between Rolls Royce PLC today, which isn't designing the holistic, beautiful vehicle. It's still a very high value, low volume operation. The focus on quality has to be enormous because the risk of getting it wrong is just as high.
12:05I don't know what the culture is like within Nearoll's Royce Division, sitting as IBMW, given the success of that motor business, especially over the last of 20, 30 years, and the longevity of that brand, It's clear that they have the same obsession with quality across those two businesses. You said it well in terms of the culture and the importance of that perfection and they were just doing perhaps a little bit more and needed to perfect that than what's happening on the engine side of things. Bringing it back to the business today, you outlined that commercial engine business, the gen ended business, being the crown jewel.
12:42What does that actually look like in numerical terms, just in terms of the various segments that you touched on before? You can cut it a few ways, but I would say this four main value drivers within Rolls -Royce today. The key one people think about people talk about is civil aerospace, that's 50 % of their revenue. That's the large engines for wide body planes. It's big twin aisle passenger planes, you think long haul, you could be freight of course. So just the big planes, they make those large engines for. And within that division they also make small engines for business jets, which is also a very good business.
13:18So that's 50 % of the revenue. The other 50 % is split between power systems. Power systems are effectively large off highway engines as well. So you think about it. Rolls -Royce motor isn't sitting in there. That would be the highway piece that was taken out. They still got a lot of off highway business. That's marine, big boats, industrial, trains, etc. And then within that business they have energy production and storage, I think large scale turbines, same technology, large gas turbines to produce electricity and power very similar to the technology of a big jet passenger plane engine. They have generators, backup generators, battery storage, benefiting again from that boom in data centers.
14:04And the third, but this power systems would be 25 % and the other piece would be defense, which again, making very similar things, but focused on air land and sea applications. The most interesting piece of that is probably the nuclear sub -program where they make the power drive for submarines. If you're thinking about a submarine, what's the advantage? It's being able to submerge yourself for long periods of time. If you're running a gas propeller within the sub, you have to come up and get rid of all the waste gases that you're producing. With a nucleus up, you can stay submerged, for as long as you like.
14:38These things can power themselves for months and months and months and months on end. They have a sort of really good business in there. And then that's the springboard for the fourth value driver, which would be new markets. I mentioned SMRs, come from their expertise in nuclear through the submarine program. And that can extend way into the future, I think, in terms of these small modular reactors are effectively a piecemeal way to build a nuclear facility, but as the technology gets better, you can imagine you get microreactors, so reactors sitting within small boxes that effectively could be used in remote locations and in space applications.
15:16Thinking 30, 40, 50 years into the future, how you're going to bring power to the moon? If you're Elon Musk, how you're going to bring power to Mars? Microreactors are one of the ways you could do that. But on the advantage that they have in terms of producing these engines for multiple different industries, there's obviously overlap in terms of what's happening. But can you talk about how they maintain that advantage relative to new entrance or peers, what the key measurements are, whether it's engineering productivity, efficiency of these engines, anything that you can touch on just in terms of what makes these so special and give them the market positioning that they have today.
15:57They tend to have very strong market positions, especially in the bigger engines. The way I think about it is they tend to make very high value, low volume things, in which scale and share is really crucial for any cross -cycle profitability. So in large aerospace engines, for example, they only make 300 a year, and they've got a 50 % share of new orders in those wide -body planes, and 30 to 40 % share of the installed base, which is critical, and that's growing obviously with the share in new orders. I think it's quite telling that the early leaders, I think, General Electric, that example in the Second World War, where they got jet engine technology for the first time, and Rolls -Royce, and one or two others are still around after many, many decades.
16:45So it's a super stable industry. It's got good competition, but also attractive economics. If you can execute well, the structure of the market is a function of the fact that what they do is so difficult, so low volume, you need a lot of scale. So if you're the company that has the engineering ability to get those engines out first, you should be able to maintain that advantage over time. Other markets, they have a quite similar to that. As you go down into power systems, you're making these big engines for boats and industrial equipment. not quite as high market share, but a very similar dynamic.
17:19Maybe we can talk through these relationships that they have just in the sense of how the engines are sold to the airlines, what that looks like if they're being developed alongside a new aircraft program, some description of how they're recognizing revenue, and what that's actually like when you have such a small amount of volume being sold into the market, there's usually unique dynamics that are driving it. When they are developing these engines, they're usually developing with the airframe, with Boeing, with Abbas typically. What they're trying to do is build a product that will sell, so they're optimizing with the engine as part of the whole.
18:01The way that the ecosystem works is in working with, let's say, Abbas on a new plane, they will optimize for what they need to optimize for. And then the sale of the engine will be to the air frame. So there'll be selling the original equipment to Airbus effectively. That's roughly one third of the revenue for the engine. But it will be a much lower portion of the profit. So there's actually selling the engine to Airbus at a reasonably low margin. And then what they'll do is they'll come to an agreement with the underlying customer. And there are many, many more underlying customers than just the air framer's where there's only two.
18:45And those would be the airlines. So the airlines, when they purchase the planes from Airbus, they would come to an agreement, an aftermarket agreement, which is called a long -term service agreement with Rolls -Royce to service that engine over its life. So that's where the majority of the margin is made for Rolls -Royce, and that's the dynamic in terms of the sale. What is the lifecycle for an aircraft engine? It varies. Typically, it depends on the success of the overall program, but it could be up to 30 to 40 years for a single engine. The service agreements themselves are struck over maybe a 10 to 13 year time frame, so they're quite long dated as well.
19:27Is there ever a situation where they would lose the service agreement upon a renewal if the Rolls Royce engine was still in place? Very unlikely. Once you're working with a customer, with a service agreement in place, you're the one with all the infrastructure to do the maintenance, with all the infrastructure to look after that engine over its life in the most efficient way possible, and you're the one with all the data. So they're increasingly doing a lot more work with software to try to get all the data on all the components in real time. The service agreements with the airlines are very sticky.
20:03What typically happens is if nothing changes over the life of a contract, the airline will just have that service agreement over that period and then at the end there'll be a renewal and a negotiation on that renewal. If the airline changes anything, so for example, if the airlines are consolidating all the time, so if there's a merger, that might trigger another renegotiation. One long term service agreement, one LTSA could cover 20, 30, 40 planes in a fleet. If they want to add planes to that, it'll take planes out, then that might trigger a negotiation. So you get these points along the way within those 10, 12, 13 years where you'll kind of strike new terms.
20:43A 30 -year life of an engine was much longer than I expected to hear. I know with many aircraft parts, there's a lot of replacement that happens through the life cycle of the actual aircraft. Is it common to see engines replaced? It's common to see a lot of the components changed. All of the components of the engines will be changed over time or more or less or every five years, four or five years, the engine will go through a full service over a whole, which means the plane is grounded, the engine's taken off, it's brought into Rolls -Royce's facility, it's done a full strip down, full service, put back together, back on the wing and off you go again.
21:20A little bit like any big bit of kit. over time you're replacing a lot of different bits. So the age of the engine becomes a bit of a subjective thing because you've got so many new components on there. For me, the model is interesting in the sense that you can almost compare it to writing insurance. So Rolls -Royce gets paid a premium on these long -term service agreements and the way that they're paid is on hours flown. So if Louftanza has its aeroplane in the sky flying for every hour it's up there, Rolls -Roses getting a dollar amount. That's effectively getting, if you think of it in insurance terms, better premium to ensure the engines stay operational, to ensure those engines are serviced, and if anything goes wrong, Rolls -Roses will fix it.
22:08And it's interesting if you study the insurance industry and you strip back all the layers that typically take a margin along the value chain, you notice just that profitable insurance is. It's a hugely profitable industry, and usually you just see a piece of it. If you're an insurance company, then you've got to look at the broker, you've got to look at another layer, another layer. And across that value chain, there's a lot of profit. Why is insurance so profitable? It's because individuals or businesses can easily be swamped by costly tail events. So it's just super valuable. It's needed, and therefore it should be priced as such.
22:42And it is priced as such, which is why there's so much profit in the system. In that regard, given Rolls -Royce is doing something similar and it's essentially direct insurance. So you don't have all the layers here. It's just Rolls -Royce dealing with its customer direct. These long -term service agreements, they should be really, very good business through the cycle. And I think historically, they haven't been for Rolls and that's an interesting dynamic, but they're doing a lot today to make sure that becomes how it should be. GE, for example, have quite similar dynamics, and they've made a lot more of that structure in terms of their margin through time.
23:20In the insurance example, the tail event or the put that would come back to Rolls Royce would be there is some type of issue with the engine or some parts. And they are replacing that at no additional cost to the customer due to that maintenance contract, is that right? Exactly. Whatever is in that service contract, it's changing a little bit now, but historically these contracts were very bespoke to different airlines and they'd be very, very long and detailed and have a lot of conditions in them. But essentially it would cover the scheduled overhalls. It would cover various changes in parts which were scheduled outside of those overhalls.
24:00And it would cover the tail event. So if an engine went wrong, it all sits with rolls rice. It'll have things like caps in there and whatnot, but it would sit with the rolls rice and therefore the risk transferred to rolls rice is enormous. These are such big programs. It's been billions developing the engines and it's a huge part of their business. That was the reason why the bankruptcy happened in the late 60s and the early 70s. More recently they've had a lot of problems with their Trent 1000 engine for example. The incentive to get these engines right in terms of the engineering, the maintenance is enormous because of the way these contracts are written.
24:37Not to pound the insurance analogy into oblivion here, but you mentioned that these contracts should be profitable. Similar to insurance, it can be a great business, but it's not that easy to underwrite insurance due to various things. It could be geography, it could be how you're pricing it. There's a lot of different things which make insurance not the simplest business. Those that do it well do it incredibly well. When you think about those different components here with the contracts, whether it's the tail event, whether it's routine maintenance, whether it's component replacement, is there something specific there that has been driving the lack of profitability or lack of maximizing potential there?
25:17You could say it's just your pricing. Your assessment of the risk should go into the pricing itself. Now, in the past, I think Rolls -Royce have fallen over both on the pricing are not their own cost discipline after the pricing is set. When it comes to pricing, it's just really about getting the value that you should be getting given the service you're providing. I mean, the service they're providing is extraordinary. If they can keep those airplanes in the sky, flying around for their customers, then the airlines are super happy. That's their whole business and that's what they want. And if they can minimize the time when they're doing the overhalls and do that as efficiently as possible and then get the plane back in the air.
26:00That's hugely valuable for customers. It should be paid for the value that they bring historically because I think of their culture going right back to the early days 1906 with Henry Royce. Their culture is on engineering quality and engineering excellence and not so much on the commercial side. And I do wonder sometimes if you go way back to those early days, it was Charles Roles who was running the business side. Tragically, he died only 32 years old, six years after the business started. In an air show, he was doing all sort of air stunts in one. I think it was one of the right brothers planes.
26:39Something went wrong with it. And then, of course, there were lots of other people in the business thinking about the commercial side, but it really became Henry Royce's show. And so he drove the culture of that business and it was all about the engineering. And that's a wonderful thing. That's how they got them to where they are today in terms of that position in the industry and the great products They make but they've never really had that culture on a commercial side to drive the value that they deserve for the product that they're building Whereas if you look at a GE and the US a bit more commercially minded, they've managed to generate more profit and more margin from that business Both on the cost side and on the revenue side Under new management that they have now that's the direction they're aiming to go But I would say that pricing that insurance is absolutely critical Is that insurance dynamics similar across all of the other segments of the business?
27:29Is there anything materially different about those segments versus the aircraft business? Aircraft business isn't unique, but it's on one bookend. So if you think of the bookend between the actual generating profit on sale versus the profit in the aftermarket, the civil aerospace business sits on one end in terms of generating more than those other businesses in the aftermarket. You can run through power systems as a reasonable amount of aftermarket revenue, but it's not as extreme. Some are in the middle in terms of generating profit on the original sale and in the aftermarket. And then if you get to defense, typically defense tends to be more of a volume business in terms of the sales they make.
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28:09Of course, there's a service element there as well. I think that would be the spectrum. There's a trade -off from a margin perspective. You can operate with lower margin and offset that with higher volume, so gross profit is still growing. Is there any underlying data to suggest that there's market share gains, which are offsetting any of those lower profitability dynamics happening on the MRO side? There's always that dynamic of can you drive volume through market share? Yeah, there is always a trade off there. It's absolutely true, but I think when it comes to a market where you've got to do openly in wide body like you have today between Rose Royce and GE, there just is a level at which the market as a whole, I, all the customers want to see at least two thriving businesses in there with some level of price competition between them.
29:06Once you get to that type of market, I think it swings a little bit more towards optimizing your margin and optimizing for share. That is something that Rolls -Royce hasn't got right in the past. I was increasingly trying to do that going forward. The aerospace business is a fascinating ecosystem in terms of where the value capture happens. You have dual opales in certain spots and then you have the airlines which have historically not seen nearly as much value capture while a lot of the suppliers have at least found a way to balance and create those well -managed two -opolis. I'm curious on the customer front if Airbus or Boeing are releasing a new model aircraft.
29:49Are they selecting one engine provider? Do they ever mix and have a certain amount of the aircraft with a GE engine and the other percentage of the aircraft with Rolls Royce engines. The airframe makers are increasingly selecting for one provider, especially on wide body, where the volume is lower, I less scale. So the A350, for example, is exclusively using Rolls Royce XWB engine. The 330 Nio is exclusively on their trend 7 ,000. I think there are pros and cons of single sourcing. There's obvious ways that that falls over, but the big plus is scale, which lowers cost, plus you can optimize the aircraft holistically, and that's increasingly becoming more and more important.
30:38If you can work with an airframe early on on a specific new design and optimize both the engine and the F -RAM together for performance that can lead to very, very meaningful efficiency gains, just because the engine is such an important piece of the whole. If you've got two engines on it, then you're basically bolting on a slightly different engine onto an F -RAM and you can't run that holistic optimization as well. We've talked a little bit about the margin profile at a high level. Can you put some numbers on the business just in terms of whether it's buy segment or however you would lay it out, what the margins actually look like.
31:16They all sit in the high single digit for the very low end to, I would say mid -teen margins across all of their businesses. And I would argue that the efficiency of the whole of the whole choice is below it, should be. There's probably a few divisions in there that are reasonably efficient and operating at their margin capacity. you can take bits of power systems and compare them to something like a caterpillar or you could take Rolls Royce's Civil Aerospace Business and compare it to the GE Aviation which is now standalone. There are big margin differences between those. So in the Civil Aerospace which is probably the most important in terms of profit going forward and profit improvement going forward, it's sitting low -teen operating margins and they think and we think they can get to high -teen over the next five or six years through all of the things that they're doing to optimize on the revenue side, on the cost side.
32:11Where's GE out of curiosity? It's in the low 20s. Big difference. And when we originally invested in 2015, it was on that view that there's so much fat that could be cut in this business just because of that meaningful difference. Part of GE's margin is because they've got more scale through the narrow body business. They just produce more engines or be a smaller ones through the narrow body segment. but I don't think that accounts for anywhere near the difference with Rolls Royce today. We've alluded to the pricing of what they're doing. You mentioned cutting the fat. Is it excess labor costs?
32:48Obviously there's geographical dynamics in terms of where you upgrade and the cost associated with that. But is there anything else that stands out where this is a line item where it is just massively mismatched versus either competition or what you think should be reality. So when you management came in, this was a couple of years back. There've been a few management teams over the years. They had really tough period after GFC or not long after GFC, and that was where Trent 1000 started going wrong on the Boeing planes. And really the first meaningful engine blow -ups since the early 70s, always having little issues, but this was a meaningful problem they had with the blades wearing out too soon on the engines.
33:32There was a change of management then and they brought in the CEO or an East and he was already on the board of Rolls -Royce. He came in knowing that changes needed to be made and he was gradually making those changes, let's say from 2014, 15 on, then COVID hit that caused incredible disruption for this business. Most businesses, when they go through a downturn, they lose their earnings or earnings might go negative. They don't lose their revenue. Rolls -Royce lost their revenue because their revenue is based on flying hours and all the planes in the world more or less were grounded and so they lost their revenue stream and extraordinary period.
34:09That was a little bit of a double -edged sword for roles because on the one hand it was an absolute disaster and they needed to raise a whole bunch of capital to survive. On the other hand, turning around a business that is under performing to the degree it was under performing in terms of the margin profile is hard and War and East was found finding it very difficult because there are unions, because if you're going to a customer and saying, look, the margin profile on these long -term service agreements, it's just not sustainable for us. What does the customer do? They're not going to just say, okay, it's very difficult to come to different terms with customers.
34:48It's very difficult to change your cost structure in normal times. And what the crisis did is it gave Warren and the new CEO came in in 2022, two -fand, he came in from BP as more of a turnaround expert. Warren did a good job, was finding a difficulty to push the very tough changes through. Two -fand came into the business at a point where the platform was burning and therefore, if they didn't make the changes, the business wouldn't survive. So never waste a good crisis in other words. So what he's been doing is going through the cost structure line by line and that's not just people it's procurement and materials it is locations and consolidating some of those it's also on the revenue side having those tough negotiations with your customers to make sure that the insurance contracts are profitable taking out every opportunity to do that If it's increasing the time on wing, so if you can increase the time that the engine is on the wing of the plane, then that's positive in two ways.
35:55Number one is Grafier customers, the customers love that in the sense that they can fly more and you're getting more on the RTSA's because you're getting paid per flying hour. And you're extending the time to your next overhaul, which are very, very costly things, because you'll take the engine off the plane, bring it in, do the overhaul. So if you can extend that time on wing and you do that through the analysis of data and making sure that you're really tracking the performance of your engines in real time So you can pick up any problems early so they don't become a huge problem in the future My follow -up was question was going to be that I Assume you could only make that engine type to wing dynamic work by releasing or putting into production higher quality engines that are going to last longer.
36:38It does sound like there are things that you can do while an engine is actually in service to ensure that that's happening. Is that just a matter of, it's easier to fix a problem when it's small versus when it ultimately craps out? Yes. Now, if your engineering is poor to start with, there's not a lot you can do. Takes an awful lot because you have to do some fundamental redesigns within the engine while it's in use and that's an absolute nightmare and that's what happened with the Trent 1000. The story with the Trent 1000 is there was a bit of a change in spec for the engine and Rolls Royce. Again, wanting to design the best engine, being an engineering firm, wanting to keep the customer happy, they said, okay, we'll change the spec halfway through and that led to all sorts of issues and overruns and eventually a suboptimal engine.
37:22So now they're much more strict with luck. This is the best engine we have. This is how we're going to build it and you can't just go changing the spec halfway through that causes problems through the whole life of the engine. These things can go for a very long time. But it is both the XWB is performing very well, but they will have issues along the way with it. There's some evidence that in more dusty, hotter climates, it doesn't perform quite as well as they thought so. That means they can make some tweaks to those engines to help them perform a little bit better in those environments, etc.
37:50So you're always monitoring using the data and trying to pick things up early. Does the industry view Rolls Royce as having higher quality engines than GE. I think it depends on the program. Now I wouldn't say overall there's a view that one company is superior to the other, but they're always trying to push to have the next level of engine in terms of efficiency and quality. That's a bit of a double hedge sort. You can use the example of the wind energy industry. Any industry that makes these big machines is subject to this type of dynamic in the wind industry and that they make these big turbines, similar idea of massive bits of the kit and there's only a few players because these things are so expensive and so big.
38:34So if you think of a wind turbine, it's a massive blade that turns when the wind blows. The way the industry went was the company that could make the most efficient blade, the most efficient turbine, got all the orders. And we're still on this treadmill. There's this race. Every time a new turbine comes out, your back orders of your older turbines disappear. because everyone orders the new one because it's the most efficient. And it's the same for your competitors. So then you get this treadmill of trying to make the most efficient turbine and you're constantly putting in R &D, you're constantly putting in capital to get to the front end of that race so that you can get orders and win share and it's decimating your R &D you've put into previous models and it really hurts competition.
39:19So when you're on that treadmill, it's a very, very tough industry to be in and we've been in phases of that in the aerospace business, historically with engines. I think today it's much more stable because everyone recognizes this dynamic. Everyone wants to get to that next level of efficiency, but they're not working on it constantly and just bring out engines that are slightly better. They're waiting to the point where the technology is such they can bring out a meaningful, you better engine and then probably G and Rolls Royce are both work on something similar in concert. And then those will come out on the similar timeframe.
39:49then you can share that market, keep it competitive for customers and ultimately for consumers, but that's a much more healthy dynamic for the industry. What is that time frame between new models being released? You mentioned it seems like it's gotten longer, but any context there. I'm hoping it's gotten longer. You never know when the competitive juices kick in and the engineering juices kick in. There hasn't really been a point in the last 25, 30 years where they haven't been in development of a new engine. I would say this is the first period where they're not putting in a huge amount of R &D for the next generation.
40:26Some of the R &D went in five or six to seven years ago, pre the current management team went a little bit more on that treadmill. So there is a bank of R &D that's sitting there for the next generation, which probably comes out in the early 2030s, or at least they start in that production cycle in the early 2030s. So I think we're going to get get now 5 or 6 year period with a bit of a quiet time for R &D for the next program. It also you have to line it up with the air framers because the work on new engines will often sync with a new plane. If you look at the wide body market now, you've got the 350 from Airbus in the 787 from Boeing.
41:05They're both very good planes and they've got very reliable engines, customers love them. And Abus has no big desire to start working on the next generation that will come towards the back end of this decade, maybe early next decade. And then I think that's when you'll get some engine CapEx kicking up as well. Makes sense to have some synchronization between customer and supplier there. The CapEx and R &D intensity, can you frame that in terms of numbers, whether it's run rate or what you see in periods of time where it is elevated any context of that and generally tying it back to any free cash flow of the business in generate through cycles.
41:47In the many, many billions, the other reason you haven't seen many new entrances is it costs many, many billion to develop a new engine and if you want to do the whole R &D upfront to get to the point where you can actually build it, start the program up and you're in tens of billions plus for a high single digit margin business or low teens. Exactly. And then you'd have to break the market share. It's just pie in the sky for anyone who's thinking about getting into this industry. In terms of free cash flow, if you have a good engine program, the engineering is good. And you've priced your LTSAs in a way that's appropriate for the risks in any engine program going forward.
42:31and you've got your costs under control, then this can be quite a free cash flow of generative business. Because of the way the LTSA's work, you don't have to build lots of working capital as you grow because you're getting a lot of your revenue back up front. If you think about a single LTSA for a single engine, what happens is, as soon as that engine starts flying, you start getting some revenue in the door. And so you can think of that as negative working capital because you're not gonna spend on that engine until the overhaul comes in sort of 4 -5, it is significantly, you're spending a little bit over time.
43:04So you can grow without a build in working capital, which means you have free cash flow, conversions quite good. And if you price your contracts well, it can be a very, very free cash flow of generative business. But we haven't seen it. And I think there's still a lot of skepticism with Rolls Royce especially, because the history doesn't tell you that it's a free cash flow of generative business. The history tells you it's lumpy and things go wrong. and occasionally you have a crisis and they have to get bailed out. It is a bit of a game of trust with this business. On the top line side of the equation, sounds like it's fairly straightforward in terms of engine sales and then certain amount of miles flown, which I would imagine track to the industry fairly closely.
43:45But is there anything else you would add in there just in terms of top line growth and the cyclicality to it or any other major drivers. Very, very steady. So outside of pandemics. Yes. Besides that one big sudden stop, yes. That's right. The growth drivers are quite good. On the OECide, you could say, oh, it's quite lumpy, but I mean, they've got this big older books. So it's quite a predictable older book in terms of the original equipment sales. On the order book, you did mention with the wind turbines that back lock of orders can sometimes go away. I always find the order books to be so interesting across industries Some are much stronger in terms of the contractual nature than others, but how reliable is that?
44:28There has been some lumps historically. I would say going forward I would expect them to be very robust. There's a few underlying Secular dynamics behind that one is the number of people that fly every year tends to go up and a rate that's faster than GDP growth. The reason for that of course is that But most of the people in the world don't have passports less than 10 % of the people in China have a passport in India the same two massive populace nations. More and more people are entering that flying market. So you're getting a GDP plus growth rate in the industry as a base. But the most interesting thing I think in terms of today is that if you go from 2019 to today, the number of people flying is up as you'd expected to be up given population growth and wealth growth over that five year period.
45:18So a lot of growth in the demand for flying. But what's happened in that COVID period is there was a massive under supply because of all the supply chain disruptions and its disruption in production is a massive under supply. There's a hole in the supply of metal or planes into the industry. What that leaves you with is a very skewed supply demand environment today. There's a massive demand for new planes to come into because You've got all the planes rolling off the back end and you've got this hole in the period where they weren't produced. And what I think that leads to, you know, if you think of that structural GDP plus, you're gonna get GDP plus plus because under supply can't come all at once.
46:00You can't just fill that hole all at once. It's gradual and she have this nice gradual tailwind over the next sort of five, six, seven years on the original equipment side. So that backlog, I think, is very secure. And then on their long -term service agreement side, it's just flying hours. So if people are flying a bit more, they're flying really less. That doesn't really move up and down that much. If you have a big recession, it will move down a little bit and then recovers. But that's that GDP plus trend. Does Boeing's challenges have any impact on Rolls -Royce? Not really, because the challenges have been in the narrow -body segment.
46:37their wide -body segment, which is really critical for Rolls Royce in terms of its backlog effectively, Boeing have a pretty reliable play in the people like. Even if it had happened though to Boeing today in the wide -body segment, it might have an impact on Rolls Royce going forward, way into the future in terms of winning more business today, but the bulk of their free cash for today is on those existing stock of engines flying around the world. You've touched on it a few times, but this nuclear reactor business, which is this potential opportunity for them, is there any way to frame that actual size in terms of relative to the business or how big you think it could be just a time frame for that playing out?
47:22It's not something the role has really talked about in any kind of promotional way because they don't make any money today from that segment. I mean, they have some business in existing traditional nuclear facilities, but in terms of the small modular reactors, they don't really discuss it. I think personally it could be absolutely enormous in terms of the size of the market. If you just look at the UK, for example, the UK currently delivers roughly six gigawatts of nuclear power to the UK market today, six gigawatts. The UK government and many governments around the world are increasingly recognizing that their grids are strained.
48:04This is becoming very meaningful investment trend and political trend. Grids are strained and the more you put renewables into the system, the more they creak because of the intermittency of renewables. So you need good solid base load. What is that? It's coal, it's gas, it's nuclear. cause being phased out, so that leads you to gas and nuclear, and obviously nuclear is the one without the carbon footprint that's becoming an ever -increasing issue for everybody. So the UK government have a target by 2050 to get to 24 gigawatts of nuclear capacity versus six today. So a very meaningful step up.
48:44The most efficient way to get there is via small modular reactors. The difference between a small modular reactor and these big reactors that you see all around the world is the way that they're built. With a small modular reactor, you can build everything in a factory, in modules, literally think about create -sized modules that are very transportable. And you build each piece in the factory, then you transport it to site, then you put it together like a big jigsaw. That, if it's proven out on paper at the moment, is a much, much cheaper way to go and much more scalable. If you can get that to work on one or two, you can easily scale that up and it could become very, very efficient in terms of building a new capacity.
49:24If you need 18 gigawatt of energy just for the UK, that's 50 plus SMRs. That's just in the UK and they cost one half, two billion each versus 10 billion for the last runaway, horrific cost project in the UK in terms of the last nuclear build. So it could easily be a hundred billion market and that's just in the UK. and then scale that globally and you're into the trillions. So a huge, huge market. So the only question is what margin can you make on it, what market share can you get there? Obviously massive questions, but Rolls Royce are a leader in this. They've got a lot of the regulatory approval already in the UK.
50:02I think they should win a mandate in the UK to push this forward. Then they become very much opposed to child of the business and then hopefully it goes from there. Are there many competitors in that space today? Yes. People see the opportunity, anyone with any capacity to do this, Westinghouse, etc. All the ones you might think about are in the running. Even if you can snatch 10 % market share of a trillion dollar or a 10 trillion dollar market becomes absolutely enormous in terms of the revenue potential versus the current size of the business today.
50:37And it's to allocate capital. We've touched on some of the challenges that they've had in terms of getting the operational efficiency, but capital allocation, maybe there's not a significant opportunity to allocate free cash flow into various things, but how would you grade or assess the capital allocation of the business? Yeah, to be seen. The core of the business is engineering excellence and that is still the core. What's happened recently is new management has come in and started to improve the business operationally. I think the results are far tangible, but the jury is still out in terms of the degree to which you can squeeze out operation improvements and make this a resilient and enduring business for the long term for society and for shareholders.
51:25Capital allocation, because you've not been in a position to assess what they do with free cash flow because there's been no free cash flow. That's an open question, but if you listen to what management is saying, they want to achieve investment grade status. They think they'll get that this year. That requires certain leverage levels, which they should easily hit given their current free cash for level soon. It requires EBITDA margins above certain levels, which they should easily hit as well, given where they are today. Once they get that investment grade status, then I think they'll continue to bring down debt, but their free cash flow should be meaningful at that point.
52:02I suspect in a kind of three to four billion pound range per year over the next four to five years. So very substantial eight, nine percent pre -castral yield. On what hopefully is, at its core, a very, very good business and one that is on an improving path. In terms of assessing management's success with the operational improvement, are there certain milestones that you are looking for? Or is there a certain time period where you think it will result in a fair measurement of whether it's a full year, a certain amount of quarters where you're seeing a shift in the trend line that you think is something concrete happening, anything that you are using as a measuring stick to evaluate that particular thing?
52:49One of the things we like about new management is that they have put out very clear targets themselves. There's still a lot of skepticism from investors and I think the market isn't reflecting fully the possibility that the management hit those targets. What we like about the current setup is that they have set out their own KPIs right down to explaining what they're doing in each division on the cost side, on the revenue decides to drive value and to drive efficiency through the business. We're monitoring every quarter the results of the different divisions, but I think management, their own harshest critic in this regard.
53:32You think there's any risks that we haven't discussed? I think it's been a fairly balanced conversation to be honest, but is there anything that we didn't touch upon that stands out as a risk to you? The big risk, of course, is that some fault in one of their key products. I wouldn't have put pandemic on the list of risks five, six years ago, but that was obviously a big hit as well. The tail events, you never see them coming, and that one might be number one on the list. We wrap these conversations up talking about the lessons that you can potentially pull out from a particular company and apply elsewhere.
54:08Do you think there's lessons that stand out about roles, Royce from your investment process? So the one thing I would say is that we already knew, but it really does reiterate the life of this investment. We originally invested in 2015 on a turnaround thesis. You lived through turnarounds and you realized just how hard they are. And they're especially hard in normal times. So when we invested 2015, we were tracking the progress of all of the things they were trying to do to improve efficiency then, and it was going much more slowly than we'd hoped. And as I mentioned paradoxically, it's the crisis that looked awful for the company and from the lens of most investors at the time that provided that burning platform as the CEO described it at the time from which to make the tough but necessary decisions to turn the business around.
54:58That was in hindsight a great opportunity to earn this business. At the point when the market was absolutely terrified and it was only seeing the downside. So key lesson might be that sometimes it's good to look at crises through a different lens, I would say, one that focuses on whether it can trigger structural changes that can drive significant value out over time for the business. This has been a joy to learn about and I think we cover many companies that are several years past that turnaround or even decades past that turnaround and we're mostly analyzing a success story, their survivorship by involved here very much in the midst of something that's trying to go through that change.
55:39So appreciate the perspective and appreciate all the knowledge around the business and the industry. Thanks Matt. Much a lot of fun. Thank you. To find more episodes of breakdowns ranging from Costco to Visa to Moderna or to sign up for our weekly summary check out join Colossus .com. That's J -O -I -N -C -O -L -O -S -S -S -U -S .com.
From the publisher
Today, we are breaking down Rolls-Royce. A fair warning to those expecting to hear about luxury automobiles, that division was split from this business in the 1970s. But as we discuss the history of Rolls-Royce on this episode, you will hear how the DNA of this company still ties together from its early 1900s origins.
Our guest is Graeme Forster from Orbis Investments. Graeme walks us through the core business of Rolls-Royce in the aerospace market, the evolving duopoly of the wide-body aircraft engine manufacturers, and the ups and downs of properly capturing the economic opportunity. I really appreciated Graeme's intellectual honesty in discussing Rolls, and I expect you will, too. Please enjoy this Breakdown on Rolls-Royce
For the full show notes, transcript, and links to the best content to learn more, check out the episode page here.
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Business Breakdowns is a property of Colossus, LLC. For more episodes of Business Breakdowns, visit joincolossus.com/episodes.
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Editing and post-production work for this episode was provided by The Podcast Consultant (https://thepodcastconsultant.com).
Show Notes
(00:00:00) Learn About Finley
(00:04:54) Overview of Rolls-Royce
(00:08:35) History and Evolution of Rolls-Royce
(00:10:44) Rolls Royce's Aerospace and Defense Ventures
(00:11:57) Challenges and Nationalization
(00:14:43) Current Business Segments and Market Position
(00:20:57) Service Agreements and Profitability
(00:27:41) Engineering Excellence vs. Commercial Strategy
(00:31:26) The Aerospace Business Ecosystem
(00:33:11) Rolls-Royce's Margin Profile
(00:35:13) Challenges and Changes in Management
(00:37:28) Cost Structure and Revenue Optimization
(00:38:32) Engine Performance and Development
(00:40:04) Market Dynamics and Competition
(00:49:13) Future of Nuclear Reactors
(00:52:46) Capital Allocation and Management
(00:56:08) Lessons from breaking down Rolls-Royce




