Titan: A Golden Case in Indian Retail - [Business Breakdowns, EP. 105]

5 Apr 2023 · 1 h 4 min

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Podcast Summary: Titan: A Golden Case in Indian Retail - [Business Breakdowns, EP. 105]

Overview In this episode, hosts Matt Reustle and Zack Fuss explore Titan, India's largest jewelry business, which began as a watchmaker in 1984 through a joint venture between the Tata Group and the Tamil Nadu state government. Today, Titan generates approximately $4 billion in revenue, primarily from its jewelry lines, especially Tanishq.

Guest

  • Saurabh Mukherjea - Founder and Chief Investment Officer of Marcellus Investment Managers.

Key Topics Discussed

  1. Company Origins and Evolution
  2. Initial Focus: Started as a watchmaker but faced challenges in the European market during the early 2000s.
  3. Strategic Shift: A pivot towards jewelry, especially diamonds, which significantly increased profitability.
  1. Market Context
  2. Gold Demand: Significant cultural attachment to gold in India, with about $100 billion spent annually on jewelry.
  3. Major Competitors: Titan and Malabar dominate the market, with both bringing in substantial revenues.
  1. Store Economics and Expansion
  2. Store Format: Tanishq operates various store models (Coco, L2, Fofo) with high profitability metrics.
  3. Average Revenue: Typical Coco stores achieve annual gross sales of around $17 million with a pre-tax return on capital employed (ROCE) of approximately 60%.
  1. Inventory Management and Artisans
  2. Efficient Inventory Control: Titan utilizes advanced systems for inventory management, reducing waste and optimizing stock levels across stores.
  3. Artisan Support: The company has invested in modernizing artisan working conditions, improving product quality and design.
  1. Marketing Strategies
  2. Customer Attraction: Strong focus on local marketing and leveraging franchisee connections with the community.
  3. Brand Trust: Innovations like the caratometer to ensure purity and aggressive marketing targeting affluent women.
  1. Segments of Jewelry Market
  2. Target Markets: Divided into middle-class, premium, and wedding jewelry, with tailored strategies for each segment.
  3. E-commerce: The acquisition of Carrot Lane enhances Titan's online presence and caters to younger demographics.
  1. Capital Allocation Philosophy
  2. Organic Growth Focus: Majority of retained capital is reinvested into the business, with a small portion allocated for experimental ventures.
  1. Competitive Advantages
  2. Talent Acquisition: Ability to attract top talent, resulting in lower employee attrition compared to competitors.
  3. Commitment to Aesthetics: High standards in product design and retail experience differentiate Titan from traditional jewelers.
  1. Risks and Challenges
  2. Regulatory Risks: Potential government interventions affecting gold importation and tariffs.
  3. Market Volatility: Sensitivity to global economic trends and competition from local jewelers.
  1. Future Growth Prospects
  2. Projected Growth: Anticipated revenue growth of 13-14% driven by expanding wedding jewelry market and increased participation of women in the workforce.
  3. Saree Business Expansion: New ventures into the saree market align with Titan’s growth strategy.

Conclusion The episode captures Titan's remarkable transformation from a struggling watchmaker to a leading jewelry brand, emphasizing its operational efficiency, effective marketing strategies, and deep understanding of the Indian consumer landscape. The discussion underscores lessons in navigating complex markets and the importance of long-term strategic investments.

Listening Information To hear more insights and detailed discussions, tune into the full episode [here](www.joincolossus.com).

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Follow-Up For further insights and discussions on business strategies, sign up for Colossus Weekly and follow on Twitter:

  • @JoinColossus
  • @ReustleMatt
  • @zbfuss

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Transcript

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0:02This is Business Breakdowns. Business Breakdowns is a series of conversations with investors and operators diving deep into a single business. For each business, we explore its history, its business model, its competitive advantages, and what makes it tick. We believe every business has lessons and secrets that investors and operators can learn from. And we are here to bring them to you. To find more episodes of Breakdowns, check out joincolossus .com. All opinions expressed by hosts and podcast guests are solely their own opinions. Hosts, podcast guests, their employers or affiliates may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.

0:44This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. This is Dom Cook, and today we're breaking down India's largest jewelry business, Titan. Titan began life as a watchmaker in 1984 through a joint venture between India's biggest conglomerate, Tatar Group, and the Tamil Nadu state government. While the watch business was initially successful, a troubled foray into Europe left it on the brink of survival by the early 2000s. A strategic pivot to focus on jewellery proved a masterstroke in the business has since gone from strength to strength.

1:15Today, the vast majority of its $4 billion in revenue come from its collection of jewellery brands, and Tanishq in particular. As of today, Titan has a market value close to $30 billion. To break down the business, I'm joined by Saurabh Mokhaji, the founder and chief investment officer of Marcellus Investment Managers. We cover the importance of jewelry to the Indian consumer, the intricacies of retailing across India, and how Titan stands head and shoulders above its competitors in terms of profitability. We also explore other products in retailing that may lend themselves to their jewelry playbook.

1:46Please enjoy this breakdown of Titan. Saurabh, thank you for joining us to break down Titan. It's not a business I was familiar with, but the more I read, the more interested I become. So I'm thrilled to have you walk us through this business. Can you start by explaining what Titan is, what it sells, where it operates, and some measures of its scale? Before I get into Titan, I'll just set the scene and talk about the gold market in India, because it is an unusual market, especially for listeners in the Western Hemisphere. India has a love affair with gold, which is of epic proportions. The official gold market, as per the government, is around $50 billion a year.

2:19but there's also a massive what we call a black gold market. There's a smuggled gold bought using black money. Nobody quite knows how big it is, but having lived in the country for 15 years now, I've spoken to hundreds of jewelers, I reckon the black gold market, the unofficial market is as big as the official market. So you're looking at a country which basically spends $100 billion a year on buying jewelry, half of it formal, half of it informal, and that's the market in which Titan operates. Gold status in India is underpinned by lots of things. The first is Bitcoin skepticism of the formal financial system.

2:52The second is a sort of experience born out of generations of seeing senior edge. Basically, the government lets inflation rip, undermines the value of currency. And therefore, a lot of families prefer to save through gold rather than coming into the formal financial system. If you look at the data published by the Indian Central Bank, they reckon that Indian families' stock of gold, the balance sheet that households have of gold, is almost as big as that of financial assets in India. So we're looking at a big market in the world's fifth largest economy. We're looking at a massive pool of savings, an annual flow officially of $50 billion, perhaps unofficially another $50 billion.

3:29That's the market in which Titan operates. It's the largest player in the market, or I should say joint largest. There are two large players in this market, Titan and Malabar. Between them this year, the year that's going to end in March 2023, 23, they'll do around $8 billion between the two of them. 4 billion Titan, 4 billion Malabar. They're the largest players. And then there's a sort of distant number three, a player called Kalyan Jewelers. Kalyan is one third the size of the market leaders. These large, large organized jewelers account for a third of the market dom. Two thirds of small jewelers, independent jewelers, common top chains.

4:05Titan stands head and shoulders above everybody on profitability. So Titan in the year that's going to end in March 23, we'll do around $400 million of profits. That's two -thirds more than its nearest rival, Kalyan. And the main reason for that is at the gross margin level, Titan is twice as profitable as anybody else in this market. It's obviously a huge jeweler, this business, but it's not just a jeweler, as I understand it. They also have a few other lines of business, but predominantly their income and their profit is from jewelry. So maybe we can flesh out A, what are the other lines of the business that the Tizing Company incorporates?

4:36And then also what the market cap is and the top headline numbers in terms of revenue and profits? It's very much an 80 -20 business. 80 % is Tanishq, the jewelry business that drives 90 % of the profits. In terms of revenue, out of the 4 billion of revenue, the jewelry business drives 80 % of that. But in terms of profitability, it drives 90%. The remaining 20 % of revenues, half of the remaining 20 % of revenues is watches. That's the business actually Titan started out with in 1984. Till 2003, that was very much the mainstay of the company. They're still the largest watch manufacturer in India.

5:11They account for a staggering 65 % market share in the watches industry in India. 80 % top line is jewelry, 10 % watches. 5 % is an online jewelry business that they acquired in 2016. And that's grown at a galloping rate of 50 % per annum since they acquired it. It's called Carrot Lane. I reckon this is probably the most exciting aspect of Titan's future. And the remaining 5 % is bits and bobs. They do a little bit of accessories, handbags, wallets, sunglasses. They also have incredibly aerospace business supplying. It's called Teal Titan Engineering, and they supply parts to the aerospace industry.

5:49But that's, I reckon, only 2 % to 3 % of revenues. You started with how important the gold market is to India, specifically Indians buying gold for savings and investment purposes or also for cosmetics, wearing them because they're pleasing? By and large, I would still say that the bulk of the demand arises from the savings and investment angle because otherwise the sheer quantum of spending, we're looking at $50 billion officially, unofficially, another 50. I don't think we can justify $100 billion a year on the aesthetic merits of gold. So there is a heavy savings angle embedded in it. If you ask me, one of the reasons Titan has been so successful is they've been able to cater to that savings angle, but also focus on the fact that as Indian women become professionally active and earn money in the workplace, in the last two decades, one of the big reasons of Titan's success has been the introduction of diamond -studded jewelry.

6:42So this is a market they've created, they dominate diamond -studded jewelry, and this drives their inordinate levels of profitability. Titan does a pre -tax roki of around 35 % of nobody else in Indian retail gets remotely close to this. and big reason for that is these guys have pioneered diamond jewelry retailing in India and that piece links into the rise of the Indian working woman well -educated earning plenty of money and thus titans created a vector of growth that no other jewelers managed on a four billion dollar top line you're doing 400 million dollars off bat your gross margins are twice that of your rivals your rookies at 35 are almost again twice that of your rivals and big reason for that is understanding the jewelry doesn't just have to be a savings vehicle.

7:23It has an aesthetic angle as well. Yeah, I'm really interested to dive into those metrics of how they've been able to grow head and shoulders above their rivals, particularly from a profitability angle. So let's now go back in time. If we rewind, you said they started with watchers, they've developed into a massive jeweler. Can you give us some sense of where they start? I think they began as a JV between Tata, which is a huge conglomerate and a government entity, which is not a usual starting place. So maybe take us back to the mid 80s, and then take us through from there to now. I'll go through the 40 -year journey.

7:52Zerkesis Desai, in 1975, he joins Tata Press. 1977, he and his lieutenants figured out that watches would be a good thing to get into because in that era, only the government made watches in India. And believe it or not, in the entire decade of the 70s, the government -owned company made 1 million watches at the rate of 100 ,000 a year. So these guys figured out that watches would be a good thing to get into. The bad news was, at that time, India was a socialist country till 1991. So at that time, the government told Tata Sons that, look, watches can only be made by SMEs, small businesses, or the government itself.

8:26So 1982, in a famous meeting, in two minutes, the Tata Sons people were dismissed by the government of India when they went to request for a watch license. Luckily for Titan, the state of Tamil Nadu is down south. It is one of our most industrialized states. Tamil Nadu had a development corporation arm called TITCO Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation. They had a watch's license. So, 1983, they reached out to Tata Sons and says, look, you guys want to put the capital in. We have the license. Why don't we team up? And thus, in 1984, Titan was born as a JV between Tata Sons and Tidko, Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation.

9:04To this day, these two are the largest shareholders. Tata Sons owns 25%. Tidko owns around 28%. And 84 is when the company is born. Titan is born. That first 20 -year period is fairly tumultuous. The first half of that 20 -year period is a happy half. 84 to 94, Titan creates history. They launch a quartz watches business. I was in school then, I remember. It was only the most affluent kids in class had Titan quartz watches and they were the envy of everybody. We had never seen anything like it in India. We were used to wound up watches in India at that juncture. Titan took India by storm. The first watch hit the market in 87.

9:41by 89 they were doing a million watches a year i remember tilt a decade back the entire decade had one million watches by 89 titan was doing a million watches but then 92 93 they made a sort of fateful decision to enter watch retailing in europe and then also decided to enter jewelry retailing in europe so 93 to 03 is a lost decade for titan they basically go into europe they make a mess out of it. I reckon they probably burned through the best part of $150 million of cash in that decade that wiped out their profits for a decade. Is that just because they couldn't compete? Or was it quality? Was it price?

10:20Three issues. So firstly, it was a crowded market. If you go to a H Samuel type shop in the UK, there's plenty of choice. Why would you want to buy Indian jewelry or Indian watches? It's neither cheap like Chinese stuff, nor is it high luxury quotient like the Swiss. There was no really marketing proposition. Second was getting stuff from India to Europe on time. The jewellery would say, I need stock on Thursday and Titan would deliver two Thursdays hence. And it wasn't their fault. Indian customs officers in that era were notoriously venal. So combination of lack of a product proposition and logistical delays hampered them and they burned a lot of cash in the marketing.

11:00And inevitably, if you then ship stuff to Europe and it doesn't sell, your inventory is sitting there idle. So your working capital burns up your balance sheet. So 93 to 2003, the shares went nowhere. By 2003, 20 years into their creation, they were making no money. And debt equity was seven times. Zerksis Desai retires at this point. Bhaskar Bhatt, who had joined 20 years prior, takes off. What happens next is just epic. Titan takes off like a rocket in 2003. So in the 20 years from 2003, the shares go up 1 ,200 from making no money in 2003, they now make $400 million a pat. Central to this is a board meeting in 2004, where McKinsey presents a report on the jewelry business's future.

11:46McKinsey, thankfully for us today, McKinsey says this is a business worth backing. The legendary Ratan Tata of Tata Sons agrees. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation officer says his wife likes the jewelry store in Chennai. Tanish stays on. And since then, they haven't looked back. that 2003 to 2023 is basically about the watches business gradually fading into the background and Tanish coming into the foreground as a $4 billion top -line business with 35 % rookie, $400 million a pat, and a market cap of $30 billion. That's roughly the reported history, Dom. I mean, even today, I saw a stat somewhere saying that Titan's the fifth largest integrated watchmaker in the world.

12:26We talk about this business having faded, but their volume, their output is still incredibly high. And I guess that speaks to the scale of India more generally. You mentioned the meteoric rise of its jewelry business over that 20 years or 20 -ish percent annual growth rate in revenue. How would you break the factors behind that down? Was it the market growing? Was it them taking share from these small independents that we talked about at the outset? How would you split it down? So let's take the last 10 years, FI 12 to 22. Titans grow in revenues at 13 % in the last decade. 13 % in local currency, by the way, this is local currency maths.

12:57Out of that 13%, 8 % would be the rise in jewelry prices. So typical CAGR on jewelry prices anywhere in the world would be around 8%. So 8 % is the jewelry price rise. 5 % therefore is volume growth. Out of that 5 % volume growth, 2 % is volume growth in the gold market overall in India. So the gold market overall in India is clipping around at 2%. You could say if you really wanted to be cynical about it, that's broadly population growth in India. net population growth in India is 1 .7%. The gold market volume growth stays abreast with net population growth. And the final 3 % is market share gains by Titan.

13:32So this is the demise of the small local jeweler whose designs aren't up to the scratch, who's probably doing at least half of his revenues in black without paying tax. And these guys are basically being squeezed out by the enforcement authorities by modernization of the economy. They control 8 % market share in the jewelry market today from basically nothing 20 years ago. I think it's probably right if we look at the financials from the ground up and really through the stores where they sell. And we're going to focus mainly on Tanishq here, which is the jewelry business, given that that's where the majority of the value accrues within this business.

14:04So maybe you can start by painting a picture of what a typical Tanishq store looks like and walk us through the unique economics of one of those stores. There's 400 Tanishq stores in India. So I'll take you through the three types of store models that they use. And in a way, almost all of these have been pioneered by Titans. The first and simplest model is company -owned and company -operated. So that's the first model we'll go through. But let me just quickly list the model, then we'll go through them one by one. So first is Coco, company -owned, company -operated. The second type of model is company -owned, the franchisee owns the real estate.

14:36The company owns the inventory, we call it L2. In the L2 model, the company owns the inventory, Titan owns the inventory, but the franchisee owns the real estate. And the third type of model called L3 is Fofo, franchisee owned, franchisee operated. So let's start with Coco, it's the simplest model. Pretty much 95 % of the stores are 3 ,500 square feet. This is sort of comparable to what you would see in a shopping mall in the UK, a typical H Samuel type store, perhaps a little bigger than an H Samuel type store, 3 ,500 square feet. The bulk of their stores are 3 ,500 square feet. and in a company -owned company operated in a cocoa store, they will do around $17 million a year in gross jewelry sales.

15:15So if you want to translate it into per square feet level, you're doing around $5 ,000 per square feet per annum of gross sales. Now Titan gets paid a making charge. So they charge their customers as a percentage of the gross jewelry price. The making charge Titan gets is 30%. This is the highest in Indian jewelry retail. No other jeweler gets close to this figure. we'll discuss later on why that is. So therefore, at a net revenue level, you take $17 million, you take 30 % of that, you get to around $5 million of net revenues per annum per store. You knock off rents and operating expenses, staff salaries, and so on, you get an EBIT of $4 million, $4 million per year per cocoa store.

15:57Now, capital employed for such a store tends to be around $6 to $7 million. The bulk of this is working capital, the setup of the store is less than half a mil. So $6 to $7 million is the CapEx. So the pre -tax Roki Titan makes, the pre -tax Roki at the store level would be around 60%. So these are astonishingly lucrative store. This is the simplest business model, Coco. Now let's jump to L2, where the franchisee owns the store and spends on the CapEx, but Titan blocks the working capital. So here, the way the spoils are shared is Titan says, look, I will take three -fourth of the making charges.

16:32I will take three -fourth of that 30 % making charge. And because Titan is simply putting up the working capital, its capital employed is modest here. It ends up again with a 60 % Rokey. So Cocoa model, 60 % Rokey, second type of model where the franchisee owns the store and spends on CapEx, but Titan blocks the working capital. This too is a 60 % Rokey. And then the final model, Fofo, franchisee owned, franchisee operated, the franchisee puts up the entire $6 million of capital, both the CapEx and the working capital, Titan takes one third of the making charge. But because there is no capital employed at all for Titan, our reckoning is they make around 90 % Rokis in this final model.

17:14So they have up to 400 stores, the split is roughly 120 Coco stores, 120 Fofo stores, and the rest are that L2 model. On a blend we reckon in jewelry, they make a pre -tax Rokie of around 70%. So the The jewelry business, which is 80 % of top line and 90 % of pat is incredibly profitable, 70 % Roki. The watchers business and carrot lane still don't make so much money. So the overall consolidated pre -tax Roki comes in at 35%. But as I was saying, nobody else in India gets even close to 35%. But the overall economics are astonishing. And by the way, in all of this, the franchisee is also laughing all the way to the bank.

17:52Our reckoning is a franchisee takes away 30 to 40 % Rokis comfortably. The franchisee's own economics are extremely attractive. If we look at some trends on that, both on the return on capital employed, but also what type of stores they are opening on a year -by -year basis, what does that look like? Are they looking for more Fofo stores to open, given that that's the highest margin? And also, how is the return profile changing? Let me first cover up the Rokie story. The main development on the Rokie side has been basically government intervention. So one of the challenges in this lovely business model, and if you ask me, this is the biggest risk with the business model.

18:28As India gets richer, the country obviously is buying larger and larger amounts of jewelry. And every, say, once a decade, we go through a current account challenge, where, say, because of developments in the Western world or the oil price shooting through, the current account deficit rises and the rupee comes under the pump. So this happened in 2013. 2013, the rupee dropped from 45 to the dollar to 55 in the space of four or five months. and what the government did then was they imposed an import tariff on gold where gold tariffs went up from 2 to 10 percent and the government says that gold on lease has to be stopped.

19:02So Titan doesn't buy the gold outright, they typically go to a bank and say lend me the gold and I will return it to you in due course. This is the cheapest way to finance the business. So the government ended up banning in 2013 gold on lease. So 2013, tough year, firstly flows of gold into India from abroad stopped, reduced because of the import tariff. And secondly, gold on lease was stopped. A year later, the government dropped another bomb. The government ended up saying that, look, you can tighten, you can do gold on lease. But hey, you're doing this thing called golden harvest. We're going to put a break on that.

19:36So golden harvest, this was a Titan innovation, was brilliant. Basically, in golden harvest, say you're buying jewelry worth $1 ,200. And the way you do it is every month you as the customer would pay Titan $100. Over the first 11 months, you pay Titan $1 ,100. On the 12th month, you don't have to pay anything. Titan would give you $1 ,200 worth of jewelry. Effectively, you as a customer got one month free, so to speak. So the XRR for the customer was 18%. Customers loved it, especially women loved it. And this was super helpful for Titan because effectively the customer was financing and giving the business.

20:11So it's one of the cleverest things I've seen. You get the float and you get the customer. So the government said in 2014, hey, this cannot be more than 25 % of your net worth. For the customer's net worth? Titan's net worth. So from Titan's perspective, their most effective way of financing the business with customer's money was taken away in 2014. Thankfully, the government said, you can do gold on lease. So Titan remodeled the business and just imagine the amount of skill involved, you're flying a plane, growing a business at around 20 -25 % pad compounding, and you change the engines. So Titan remodeled the business over the next couple of years.

20:47They moved to entirely gold on lease. They didn't put up any balance sheet money, they went to gold on lease. And they said to deal with the impact of the payable days being reduced, the payable days fell by, I would say, a good 20 -25 days. The payable days fell, the capital employed went up. So Rokhi drops. To mitigate the Rokhi drop, Titan made two strategic calls in 2014 -15. Firstly, they said we will ramp up the wedding jewelry business. Now the wedding jewelry business, Dom, is half of India's jewelry market. It's higher margin because you might have heard about something called the big fat Indian wedding.

21:21A lot of money gets. Titan was almost non -existent in that market. They invested in design and specific types of store formats for wedding jewelry. So from nowhere in the wedding market, they've now become 2 % of the wedding market. That's higher margin that supported the Roki. And the second thing they did was they said we will refocus even further on diamond studded jewelry, diamond studded jewelry, which are higher margin. So by doing this, it's the stem to drop in Roki. But before the adverse government interventions of 2013 -2014, Titan at the consolidated level was doing 60 -70 % Rokis.

21:54that has dropped in the last six, seven years to 35%. But the management's intervention to bring in more solidity to the operating margins through wedding jewelry and diamond -studded jewelry has supported that. So that's been the big story on the ROC trend in the last decade. Now, this links to what sort of stores they want. As you can imagine, Fofo, from a perspective of Rokey expansion, is brilliant. Effectively, what Fofo does is you're getting the local entrepreneur putting up $6 million and you're getting the ROC upside of that. And because of the sheer power of the Titan brand, I've met at least 100 people in the last decade or so who would give an arm and a leg to become a Titan 4 -4 franchisee.

22:36So every year, Titan grows to account by around 10%. They're 400 stores. So every year, they're opening 40 stores. So 40 multiplied by $6 million, $240 million, Indian entrepreneurs are basically putting to work for Titan. And I, as a shareholder, am benefiting from that. I can imagine that those returns that they're generating, competition regulation is always going to be a problem for them because people want a slice of that pie. Can we spend some time on gold on lease? And I think just the business's relationship to gold in general. Can you explain to us gold on lease in a bit more detail so I understand what's going on there?

23:08The long -term data dom doesn't suggest any link between gold prices and Titan's fortunes. For example, FI 12 to 14, gold prices were falling, Tanishq's growth rate fell but there are long periods of time where Tanishq's growth rate was booming so for example 2017 -18 -19 Tanishq's growth rates were at 20 -25 percent the gold price was flat so there is no long -term correlation the reason for that and this is a strategic call that took place in that 2014 -2015 difficult period is Titan said rather than buying gold on the balance sheet and effectively doing a prop book around gold we will entirely move to a gold on lease model, where we will pay an Indian bank effectively 3 % interest rate, but the gold price will be a complete pass through.

23:54So Titan leases the gold, gives it to artisans to work on it and embellish it, and then passes it on to the customer. Titan's balance sheet does not take any hit from gold. Gold does not sit on Titan's balance sheet as an inventory item. The downside is, if the gold price zooms up, the shareholder doesn't get the benefit. But the upside is, the cost of financing this inventory is 3 % per annum. Other jewelers in India, every other jeweler barring Titan, borrows at 12 % interest rate, takes the gold on the balance sheet and tries to ride the speculative curve on that. It works in some years, it doesn't work in some years.

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24:29Titan's point is that's not our competitive advantage. Our competitive advantage is to add value to that jewelry. And then one other question that's been lingering in my mind since the beginning is, if the majority of people are buying gold for savings, investment purposes as customers, what's the point in making nice looking jewelry when you could just be selling gold bars in various increments to people? So that's what most jewelers do. If you go to a typical small jewel in India, 50 -60 % of the business is just gold bars. And as you rightly inferred, there's very little value added in that.

25:00But the way the small jeweler sees it is he sort of gets a carry on the price of gold. And historically, there's also some scope to sell 22 carat gold at the price of 24 carat gold. So that's the typical jewelry model. Titan's part of view is we're not here to be bullion sellers. There is no comparative advantage therein. Our skill is design, marketing, inventory management, smart technology around this whole setup. The way you talked about the business and how they're not taking the gold onto their balance sheet makes me think a bit more about the balance sheet more generally. How much debt do they have at this point?

25:32I think you said in the early 2000s, they were significantly in debt. Where do they stand now? And any other financing arrangements with suppliers or franchises that is interesting to know about the business? So in terms of specific numbers, they have around $700 million of debt on their books. So debt equity would be around 0 .3 times. Out of that $700 million of debt on their books, $600 million is gold on loan. Leaving aside gold on loan, they actually have a mere $100 million of gold on loan. So debt equity, if you take the $700 million of debt, which includes primarily gold on loan, that would be a debt equity of around 0 .3 times.

26:07Titan's rivals will operate at one, one and a half times debt equity. and this is a double whammy. Not only is the rival carrying more debt, Titan's interest rate on that debt is 3%, the rival's is 12%. And you can imagine the devastation this causes to the rivals. So one way to look at it is pat to EBITDA conversion. Titan's pat to EBITDA conversion would be around the 60 -70 % mark. Titan's rival's pat to EBITDA conversion would be 30 -40 % because a lot of the EBITDA is getting leached out in paying interest costs. All right, let's get to the good bit of how they've been able to build this wonderful business model, and particularly from the financial perspective.

26:43And let's start at the operational level. So have they been able to build such capital efficient retailing business? It's a huge country. And I think an important piece to note is that Tanishq spans the country, whereas a lot of other their main competitors are in more specific regions of India. So how do they manage inventory? How do they keep costs under control at the store level? As you rightly said, Tom, they have 400 outlets, and genuinely are pan -India, most of the other jewelers tend to have a regional franchise rather than a pan -India franchise. Now, as soon as you say, I want to be pan -India, you have to deal with India's regional variations.

27:17So what gets worn in a Tamil wedding in South India is utterly different from what gets worn in a Punjabi wedding in Delhi. So the way Titan's gone about it actually is fascinating. So let me sort of break the story in three parts. As I said, till 2002, 2003, the jewelry business was on fire. Nobody even knew whether it would survive. 2002 to 2010 was basically just getting the foundations built. And the first layer of foundations they built was they said that unlike other jewelers who get job work done by local artisans, and they pay the artisan very little, the artisan uses old fashioned tools, works in poor lighting, and has high wastage in the process.

27:58Titan inverted that paradigm completely on its head. 2003 to 2010 was putting the artisans in nice air -conditioned halls, modern lighting, modern machinery given by Titan. And Titan focused on those eight years in reducing wastage in the making of jewelry, increasing the design quotient. They have 100 designers. I don't think any other jeweler would have more than 50. These guys have 100 designers from what's called the National Institute of Fashion Technology and the National Institute of Design. So they said, we'll amp up the design quotient, train the, we call them carigars. The artisans are called carigers.

28:30We'll get the modern machinery, reduce wastage, and we'll also reduce cycle time. Most other jewelers, the artisans take 30 -35 days to get the stuff made into the store. In Titan's case, the cycle time is six days. So the first layer of innovating in the back office of a jewelry industry. 2010, they hired Elie Goldratt's firm from Israel. This is the Theory of Constraints People, the famous book called The Goal. They tell the Israelis, can you help us reduce inventory. 2010 through to 2015, they worked with Goldratt and inventory dates are reduced from 125 to 75. And the last six, seven years have been about using technology to manage what goes where in a very smart way.

29:15So I'll try to explain it as best as we understand. This is in a way the secret sauce. They don't give it away. We've spent six, seven years talking to hundreds of store managers to understand this. So at any point in time, Titan has 100 ,000 schools but a given store will only have 7 ,000. And a big part of management skill at the headquarters level and at the regional level is figuring out which 7 ,000 schools will go to which store. As best as we can figure out, roughly 60 % of the schools are common across stores. This is purely by eyeballing going to various parts of India and seeing 60 % of the schools seem to be common to all parts of the country.

29:5230 % of the schools are specific to a region and sometimes dorms, these are specific even to a part of a city. And they seem to be using software to figure out what will sell where. You know, if it's an office district with a working woman, a certain type of design will be made available. And if it's, say, an agricultural area, a different type of design. So 60 % common to all shops, the 30 % specific and 10 % experimental. So at any point in time, 10 % of the schools in a shop seem to be there for experimental purposes. If they sell, they are replenished rapidly. If they don't sell, they are taken out of circulation.

30:29This ability to manage 400 stores, 100 ,000 schools pan India, but 7 ,000 at the shop level, 60 % common, 30 % using software specific to a store, and 10 % experimental, 100 designers working away. This setup is very specific to Titan. I think the last seven, eight years, they've nailed it so thoroughly, it's going to be difficult for other jewelers to catch up with this. Yeah, they seem to have developed serious process power over the years. Logistically, are the artisans based in a specific part of the country? And how do they move the inventory around the country? Is it kind of central hubs that they then move out?

31:07We've talked to this founder of Shiprocket on a previous podcast of ours, and he just talked about just the challenge of generally of moving things around the country. simple things that we take for granted like postcodes often aren't available in India to find the right place for delivery, all that kind of stuff. So how do they do it at such scale? 20, 25 years ago, they used to have one big sort of artisan center. They still have it. It's in the outskirts of Bangalore. This was their first big artisan center where they sort of innovated and created this modern working place for artisans. Subsequently, they seem to have created four different hubs, basically four different regional hubs for artisans to work in.

31:41The second innovation which has I think kicked into very high gear in the last 10 years is getting contract manufacturers. We reckon their contract manufacturers are at it for Titan in their hundreds. We don't have the exact figure. It's certainly north of 200, perhaps even pushing 400. Contract manufacturers who work exclusively for Titan, some of them actually are our clients. So we've got a good amount of insight for them. So Titan gives them the designs and it gives them a delivery time and date and the contract manufacturer design delivers there. And the third innovation which kicked in courtesy Ellie Goldratt and the theory of constraints people is, even through a given day, schools can move from one store in one neighborhood to another store in the neighborhood.

32:21And this seems to be driven by technology. So if they believe that South Bombay stores will need more of a certain type of jewelry, and Central Bombay stores will need less of it, through the day they will transport it. And behind it all, an auto replenishment model from what we've seen, two days of turnaround time for the fastest moving items. And we've talked about moving products into stores and out of stores. What about customers? How are they attracting customers to the stores? Is that centralized or is that on franchise owners, for example, as well to come up with their own marketing campaigns at a local level or is it more national and where are they marketing?

32:54So one of the reasons we think POFO works so well for Titan is effectively your franchise is a bit of a local grandee. In that part of town or in that city in India, this is a person of sort of respect and stature and therefore the affluent people in that neighborhood, trust that person. Plus, because the franchisee owns the store, he has an incentive to do whatever publicity he wants to do in the local media. That is on his own strength, that won't be centrally supported. What Titan does at a Pan India level for its whole business, including Fofo, including Coco for everybody, what Titan is saying is, I'm going to present my proposition around three pillars.

33:32First is purity. So regardless of how affluent you are, whether you one diamond started a gold jewelry they innovated in 1996 with something called the caratometer basically think of it is a small x -ray machine with a blue light which tells you whether the gold is pure or whether it's full of gunk so this was a breakthrough they pioneered it this was i think one of the pivotal moments in tanishk's evolution so every tanishk store has a caratometer and titan has a promise that if you come in with jewelry which is 18 carat or better if it turns out that if it's not 22 carat, at Titan's cost, they will make it 22 carat.

34:07You'll simply pay for the making charge. Even if it wasn't bought from Titan in the first place. So if you bought it from a local independent, you can bring it there and they'll say, we'll make this more pure for you, but only at the incremental cost. That's right. Absolutely. And this was a key breakthrough in 2003. In Titan's renaissance, this was a critical insight. They don't just have the carotometer there and put people off by saying, I'm sorry, your jewelry is in pure. Give them the solution. So this is the first proposition. In a way, purity delivered to you, the Indian customer. The second is around design.

34:37So much of their marketing in mass media is around affluent women spending on jewelry as a part of sort of social stature and prestige. And this piece is heavily around diamond -starred jewelry, which is a high -margin item. We reckon on diamond -starred, they're making 50 % making charges. Because unlike gold, diamonds are not commoditized because there isn't a standard diamond at a certain heritage. So in diamonds, the Titan brand becomes even more powerful. And we reckon the way they monetize it by having a super high making charge on diamond jewelry. And that in turn justifies high glamour, high profile publicity in mass media, at airports, and so on.

35:17So India is leading the film stars and models will be fronting these expensive campaigns. But if you have 70 -80 % ROIs, you can more than justify. So that's the second premise. And the third premise that they've built in this post -2014, post -2015 era, when remember the government came after them in 2013 -14, tighten for your wedding. Till 2014, the local jeweler was the go -to person for the wedding because often the mother would call the shots in the wedding. She would be comfortable with the local jeweler. He would design the trousseau. And these are expensive trousseaus. As India gets more affluent, many middle -class weddings in India, the trousseau can easily be $10 ,000.

35:55So local jeweler had the run of the land there and Titan's chipped away at this over the last six, seven years by coming up with more regional designs. Because wedding jewelry is very region specific, Titan has attacked this piece by regionalizing the designs. And as we get into the wedding season, we have a wedding season in India, which is sort of four months of heavy duty weddings. I think just the month of December, India had the best part of half a million weddings, the month of December alone. So as we approach the wedding season, Titan launches a campaign which shows Marathi weddings, Punjabi weddings, Tamil weddings, and each ethnic community has a specific wedding proposition.

36:31So at the Titan level, this is what you're getting. You're getting purity, carotometer, almost now legendary status in Indian families that this is the place you go to get your jewelry vetted. If you're an Indian woman on the ascent, you're earning more money. You're getting diamond -star jewelry, which film stars are wearing. And thirdly, you're going to get married. Do you really want your mother to make the call? or do you want to make the call yourself and go with Titan? Titan has the best jewelry designs for that year with a refresh cycle every six months. And have they done the diamond piece and the wedding piece both through Tanishq, the main brand, or have they done it through new brands that they've launched?

37:08Last five, six years, we've seen Tanishq sort of splitting the business into sort of much like a wealth manager does on an airline does. So the main Tanishq brand is now basically affluent middle -class women. for the premium jewelry segment, they've got a brand called Zoya. And then for the wedding market, they've got a separate brand called Riva. Zoya stores are completely separate from Tanish stores. Riva is a separate part of the store. So if you go in and you say you want to buy wedding jewelry, you're ushered away to a quieter plant, you're offered nutritious fruit juices, so that you can spend even more on jewelry.

37:43The segmentation of the jewelry market, not just by region, but by economic spending power has been very cleverly done. And in the midst of that, the purchase of Carrot Lane in 2016 has given them a fidgetal proposition. Carrot Lane jewelry is significantly cheaper. It's a quarter of the price of Tanish jewelry. And it's everyday wear for the modern woman. Smaller stores, an online proposition. And Carrot Lane, in a way, is the kind of entry -level product. So my 13 -year -old daughter is very keen on Carrot Lane and keeps dragging me in the direction of that store. So you've got Riva at the extreme elite end, Carrot Lane at the entry level, and in between is the Tanish proposition and one notch above is the Zoya proposition.

38:23Yeah, they're really building a cradle -to -grave proposition for getting young people in a certain brand level and then getting them to go up the brands as they become older and hopefully more affluent. It brings up a really interesting point about e -commerce. You said Carrot Lane is more of an online proposition than maybe some of the other brands. We've talked basically exclusively about physical locations here in terms of distribution. Where does e -commerce figure into this? This is a massive retailer. We haven't touched on e -commerce yet, which I think is just a fascinating anecdote in itself.

38:48When they bought Carolyn in 2017, they bought a 70 % stake. They let the entrepreneur who built it, which one continues to own a third of it. We were a little nonplussed because we couldn't quite understand how will you buy, say, $1 ,000 worth of jewelry online, right? We couldn't quite get their heads around it. And as I've seen with most successful Indian companies, really clever companies tend to be very tight -lipped about what they're doing. What we have seen in the last six years is actually extremely clever evolution of Carrot Lane, where I reckon that's Titan's Sardi strategy, Tanira, is actually now feeding off Carrot Lane.

39:22So just to sort of get some basic numbers off the table, Carrot Lane is only 1 20th the size of Titan's main jewelry business. But it's growing twice as fast. Carrot Lane is growing at 50 % per annum. It's been growing like that for four years now. And where Carrot Lane has nailed e -commerce in a more comprehensive way than almost most other venture capital funded e -commerce companies is, they've got the design and the price absolutely nailed perfectly. So the price point is 20 ,000 rupees. So that would be around $400. designs are for office wear for social evening wear as i said entry -level product there's a 15 day return policy you can buy it wear it you don't like it you can return it which is astonishing than indian jewelry you can imagine right you can get a lot done in 15 days yeah i was gonna say and even more interesting right second area where they've been very clever is you don't have to go to the store if you want you can video purchase live video call with a jewelry advisor at the other end of the line.

40:21You can try at home, you choose online, you watch a video online, you can buy at home, return it in 15 days. Again, this degree of sophistication in online purchase, no other jeweler has been able to offer. And the last bit is again, back to theory of constraints and school counts. They have tidied up their inventory big time. Carrot Lane operates on only 4 ,000 schools. They started with 8 ,000, 9 ,000. But over the last three, four years, we've seen them tightening up their schools as they've figured out using technology, what sells when the school is very tight and inventory day is actually a third less than Tanishq's so the carrot lane inventory cycle is even tighter so the result of all this is you've got a jewelry brand which is at the moment looks small compared to Tanishq because it's only doing 200 million dollars compared to Tanishq say 4 billion but it's making a profit between 15 to 20 million dollars at the EBIT level and that in Indian terms is unheard of we haven't seen Indian e -commerce companies making money.

41:20Titan paid, say, $100 million for this six years ago. If this were listed as a separate company, it would be easily a billion dollars valuation. So in six, seven years, they've got 10x their money by taking a brand which is now growing at 50%, profitable. But most interestingly, Dom, this is the brand which I think gives Titan an ability to tap into the youth of India. The median Indian is 28 years old, currently in feet straight into the heart of that dynamic. Yeah, there are a number of countries in the world that would kill for a 28 -year -old medium average age. It brings up a question about capital allocation more broadly.

41:56How does Taitans management think about the allocation of surplus capital they've got, whether they decide to buy businesses like Carolein or do they pay dividend? Can you talk us through their philosophy on that? So perhaps just worth backing up a little bit to sort of Tata Sons here. So Tata Sons, in a way, is the kind of Indian version of Bakusha Hathaway. This are largest conglomerate. They don't publish their unlisted empire numbers. It's an unlisted empire because they've got over 100 businesses of which less than a fifth are actually listed. But I reckon Tata Sons is easily, overall worth of Tata Sons will be easily in excess of $200 billion.

42:31And what's distinguished this bunch of families, the Tatas are a bunch of different joint families. What's distinguished them is the ability to take very long -term bets. if you think about it from 83 to 2003 titan didn't really make too much money but they kept at it and in the last 20 years they've been rewarded by 1200x this is sort of symptomatic of tata they do this consistently and that philosophy has seeped into titan so titan's capital allocation sort of take it step by step the simplest layer is a dividend payout so you start with a pre -tax rookie of 35 percent you pay a quarter of that as a dividend so quarter of that goes as a dividend So from pre -tax rookie of 35%, you pay taxes, you're down to 27.

43:12You strip out the dividend, you got 21 % of capital employed left. Out of that 21%, ongoing organic growth of the business will take away 17 -18%. So bulk of the retained capital goes in financing organic growth. But you're left with around 2 % and if in some years, 4 % of capital employed as a surplus. This 2 % to 4 % gets used for experimentation. So Carrot Lane was an experiment. I think paying $100 million for it in 2016, they wouldn't tell the market, but I reckon it was an experiment. It's worked out for them. So they have an innovation and incubation philosophy where if they identify a new initiative, a CEO will be chosen.

43:49The CEO will be told to create a business plan. And then whatever monies are required, the titan CFO is supposed to go and get that money. The CEO is told, you build the business plan, you're committed to it, now go forth and build out. So this is how in 2018, they launched the Sadi business. first attempt by any organized player to formalize what I think is a $20 billion sector. So you pay out a quarter as pat, bulk of the rest you use to finance organic growth, between 2 % to 4 % of capital employed each year goes into financing experiments. Some of the experiments don't work. So if you ask me, I don't think that experiment in wallets and sunglasses has really gone anywhere.

44:28But those that work, carrot lane, give you exponential returns. And on the blend, you end up building a business where the profit engine is actually growing year upon year. Fascinating. You see tartare everywhere. There's a steel plant near me in England that is tartare -owned. And so it's kind of amazing to see that they're also big into jewelry in India. You've eloquently described a number of them, but are there any other competitive advantages that you'd point us to within the Titan business? So I think let's discuss three aspects which we haven't touched upon. First is this talent and HR piece.

45:01I think one of their advantages across industries, not just jewelry, across industries is the ability to get premium Indian talents, not just say people from the prestigious IITs and IIMs, but even at the shop floor, at the store level, the sorts of staff they will attract to work at their stores will be a notch above what typical local jeweler will be able to attract. The result is attrition will be 4 -5 % in Titan, whereas other Indian retailers will have 30 -40 -50 % attrition. So the ability to make considered calls on human resources, whether at the senior management level, so bringing in engineers from India as government -owned watchmaking company in the 80s to launch Titan was, I thought, a masterstroke.

45:42Most people would frown upon government -owned company employees. These guys realized the government employees have special skills. They went and lifted a whole team of watchmakers from the government -owned company. And then, as I said, to the modern day, if I go to the carrot lane near my house, I can see that the staff are better trained and they're trained to do rapid sell -throughs of 20 ,000 rupees or $400 per item jewelry. So, the HR piece is, I think, very distinctive to Tata. even TCS their IT services business has this in spade loads the second is I think a commitment to aesthetics so this is where the Steve Jobs figure as success is I deserves a lot of credit so at the very outset Titans advertisements would have say Mozart symphonies as the background score and a focus on putting on the table a product that looked beautiful very visibly beautiful even to someone who wasn't really a watch aficionado so if you go to a Titan store today whether you go to a watch store, Helios is the upper end of the watch stores, or you go to a jewelry store, the retail experience is superior to what you'll get elsewhere in the country.

46:44So there's a commitment to aesthetics at the product level and at the shop level. And the final layer is this ability to melt the traditional and modern. You're taking jewelry, which is an ancient purchase in India, but the technology that's underpinning it is cutting edge. So we talked about theory of constraints. In the last couple of years, we've seen them bring sales force into play. They're not going to give us easy visibility on how Salesforce will help them reduce working capital cycle. But I reckon they would have thought through quite cleverly how Salesforce allows them to ramp up their business.

47:15This whole online jewelry proposition, trying on jewelry by ordering, but also something called the endless aisle. Basically, it's like a fantasy for a jewelry buyer. You can sort of window shop as much jewelry as you want on your phone or on your iPad for years on end. And this ability to take a traditional product, melt modern technology, bring in great people from C -suite to the shop floor, very difficult for other companies to do this on a continent -wide scale as we have to do in India. It's come through this conversation and from my reading beforehand, brand strength and trust just came up time and time again.

47:51And I know India tends to be a pretty low trust society. There are a few brands that they really cling on to, but generally, you're skeptical of most brands and people. How did they, in the early 2000s, build a storied brand in what's generally a pretty short period of time? You know, you look at most of the big brands in the world, they tend to have been around for 50, 60 plus years. The last 20 years, I think is really where the brand story kicks in, where they are very cleverly bringing in, especially in their marketing campaigns, they're very cleverly bringing in traditional Indian themes, such as a mother's love for a daughter, but also they're bringing in a degree of cultural fison.

48:28This can be sometimes controversial. They're bringing a degree of cultural fison, for example, same -sex weddings. And you can imagine, right, in a country like India, when you're experimenting like that, it creates marketing campaigns which are very high profile. They tend to get blowbacks from time to time, but it doesn't seem to thwart them. The Tanish marketing campaigns consistently make a mark. And as we were discussing by, as you rightly put it, by having a jewellery proposition which is cradle to grave. For youngsters like my daughter, they've got Carrot Lane going. And then for older women, they've got Zoya as a premium product and the assault on the wedding market through Riva.

49:03So very cleverly segmented branding strategy, but consistent ability to use traditional themes to create frisson in living rooms of our country. I haven't seen other brands being as experimental or as bold in their advertising as Titan's jewelry proposition has been in the last 20 years. Yeah, it's quite striking. It tends to be the bigger the business gets, the more conservative they become in their branding and their marketing in public. So it's interesting to hear. I guess it won't be too much of a surprise to people listening that this business, given what you've said, is very highly rated by the market.

49:38I think it was on 70 times earnings at the moment. So the question I've got at this point is where does future growth come from? If you're thinking about it from an investor, they've grown up 20 % a year for two decades, which is phenomenal. Can they keep that rate that high? Can it go even higher? And where might it come from? Just to sort of give you a sense of how tough the ask is, and I'll get into the growth drivers, operating cash flow over the last five, six years has compounded at 25%. This is a sort of signature of, again, great Indian compounders that I've seen, that operating cash flow will compound significantly faster than PAT.

50:11PAT in turn will compound significantly faster than revenues. Now, can you sustain 25 % cash compounding, say for the next 20 years. If you can, then obviously the company's worth way more than the current market cap. So let me start with sort of in rank order of where I think the main drivers are. The biggest driver I reckon is the wedding market. As I said, wedding is half of jewelry spent in India. Although Titan's overall share of market is 8%, in weddings there are mere 2%. They are focused on separate designs every wedding season for separate ethnic groups. But I think the biggest driver for their success will be the decision maker on wedding jewelry is changing.

50:49The mother no longer calls the shots. It's the daughter. And the daughter has an affinity for the Titan brand that the mother didn't. So I think the median age of India being 28 and the demographic driver of Titan's ascent in the wedding market, I think will be considerable here. The second driver, in a way, is actually a very interesting macro driver. What we've seen in the last decade, Dom, is that every level of the education ladder, more women are studying than men. So from kindergarten through to university, more women are studying than men and women's pass rates are significantly higher.

51:22So what it looks like to us is a decade hence, Indian women will be dominating the workforce and that cannot be bad news for a brand whose primary consumer is the woman. The third aspect is the diaspora. So if you take the Indian diaspora, the world over, you're looking at an economy, say the size of California, which is the diaspora is the size of California. The Tanishq in the last 20 years has been very successful in the diaspora. So specifically the Middle East is a big market, Southeast Asia, they've done well. Increasingly, they seem to be doing well in the United States as well. So if the diaspora continues to flourish, the Titan brand is the diaspora's way of connecting with jewelry that they like and a brand that they trust.

52:04So our reckoning is if you combine these three drivers, the wedding jewelry, the rise of tighten in the wedding jewelry market, the more general rise of Indian women in the workplace and their earning power. And then thirdly, the diaspora and their desire to buy things from back home in India. You're looking at a business where we reckon revenue growth at the 13 -14 % level should be doable for an extended period of time. Secondly, if you can do 13 -14 % revenue growth, keep your efficiencies going using the sorts of tech innovations we discussed. That compounding around the 20 % mark and then free cash flow compounding at the 25 % mark by squeezing inventory days even further.

52:42Our model very much is focused on that. Keep looking at the efficiencies both at the operating margin level and at the working capital level to understand how long this free cash flow engine can run. Market share isn't a challenge. They only have 8 % of the Indian jewelry markets. 65 % of the market is local mom and pop jewelers who are on the slide because of the formalization of the Indian economy. Yeah, there's plenty of runway there. And it seemed like you mentioned earlier, their Sari business, which is one of the new business lines that they're growing, seems to be doing quite nicely at the moment.

53:13It seems to be a very similar playbook of, it's a very fragmented market of suppliers at the moment, they can come in and kind of run the same playbook that they did with Tanish. That's the bull case for the business. Is that about right? That's right. I think you nailed the bull on the head there. 2016, they did an offsite. And this is a critical offsite. 2016, they did offsite. They'd just come out of that sort of bruising encounter with the Indian authorities through 2013 -14 on tariffs and ban on gold and lease. And they said, what new drivers can we create, which will not be as vulnerable to these sorts of government interventions?

53:45I reckon in that 2016 offsite, Saadis was identified as a big initiative because $20 billion market dominated by mom and pop players. The regional chains in Saadis don't make more than say $10 million a pat. And therefore, they felt this was a business ripe for disruption. They've got 34 stores. They don't reveal profitability. They're saying they don't make money. But we visited a lot of these stores. Our analysts have spent a lot of time. We reckon at the store level, they're already profitable in some of the earlier stores. And there's two sort of drivers here, which is Tanishq -like in their operation.

54:20First is Titan's focusing on hand -woven expensive saris. They're focusing on the most premium saris. So you're looking at price points of $300 and upwards. These handwoven saris are made by artisans. Titan knows how to manage the artisan ecosystem better than anybody else. Secondly, because the supply chain here is complex, you've got 34 stores and you've got, say, 10 ,000 artisans sitting in their homes. You need technology to link up that supply chain. Titan understands how to link up complex supply chains better than most. And thirdly, you need demand prediction. because even within a given city, Saudi demand varies from one part of town to another.

55:00One part of town might want North Indian Saudis, another part might want South Indian Saudis, etc. So Saudi demand varies across geography and across time. So you need demand prediction software and we think they understand that better than most and I think whatever deficiencies they might have had, Carrot Lane would have rectified that. So $20 billion business at its infancy, we reckon this could also be part of the juice up on that 25 % free cash flow compounding. Made me think as you're describing that we shouldn't take for granted that people know what a sari is. Can you just explain exactly what they are selling what the item of clothing is?

55:33I think that's the hardest question. Sari is traditional Indian wear. So what the kimono is to the Japanese, sari is to Indians. At its most basic, it is a highly ornate piece of fabric with lots of handiwork on it. An entry -level saree can be $10 and the sorts of saris Titan is making a $300, $400, $500. They're worn at weddings and festive occasions and other sort of occasions where you want to exhibit happiness and status in class. You did very well. So one of the things that's been a recurring theme in this conversation is the government and regulation generally, which makes me think of the risks.

56:11We've talked about the bull case. Clearly, this is a very impressive business. What risks does the business face? What are you particularly wary about as you sit here today? I think as we've discussed, the first is current accounts deficit problem, rupee under pressure, knee -jerk reaction from the government would be to impose duties on gold, make gold difficult to purchase, etc. So that's something we try to factor into our valuations, that there is a risk involved. All rosy projections have to be discounted appropriately to factor in this regulatory risk. The second element is actually the general prosperity of India.

56:45As we've discussed over the last hour, you're focusing on affluent Indians, I would say upper middle class Indians. So if nominal GDP in India is growing at 10, 11%, Titan is focusing on a strata of Indian society whose incomes are growing at 14, 15%. Now, that strata of Indian society is linked to the global economy. A lot of these people work in, say, banking and financial services, IT services, the export economy. And therefore, if there's a global slowdown, this strata of Indian society, the affluent strata also suffers. So ironically, even though this sounds like a very Indian company, a big growth driver is global GDP growth.

57:23If you go through an extended global downturn, it will unquestionably impact affluent Indians and then onto Titan. The third piece I worry about is the watches business. Honestly, this is the business which has confounded me. They've grown watches volume at 4 -5 % over the last decade. It's incredible. I still scratch my head to understand how on earth can you grow watches volume in this day and age of mobile phones. And they've grown watches revenue at 10%. Now, you could say that's nominal GDP growth, but that itself is remarkable. This piece, it's difficult to see who will go into these. The best part of 3000 World of Titan stores, watch stores and buy watches in the years to come.

58:00Again, young country, 28 median age. I'm not so sure how many youngsters will buy this. So this part of the business, I think will struggle to grow. And at some stage, we'll have to see how Titan deals with the capital employed over there. Can they shift the balance sheet without causing pain to shareholders is something that we lose a little bit of sleep on. Would they ever consider spinning it off or selling it to someone, do you think? It'll be tough to do. Who exactly want to buy it? I'm not so sure. But I'm sure that these are intelligent, thoughtful business people. They would have found a solution.

58:32The most logical reuse would be they have a brand called fast track and accessories brand, the sunglasses and watch wallets and belts and bags and so on. The most logical would be some sort of fusion between getting the fast track business and the watches business together and seeing if you can use the fact that the Indian youth want accessories, fashionable accessories, and can you sort of recycle the watches business around that. This is the part of the business which is struggling not for any fault of Titan. It's struggling because watches in the industry is an industry which is stagnated. But as I said, they've done wonderfully well over the last decade to grow revenues at 10%.

59:09It just feels like they're defying gravity in this part of the business. Yeah, Afain does a pretty good job of telling the time these days. So we always finish these conversations with the same question, which is what have you learned as an investor studying Titan's business? Let me start with the most obvious piece of what we've discussed, right? Everybody says retail is detail in every country that I've lived in. And yet, when I see retailers, especially in India, they seem to try to take one solution and slam it across the country, whether it is foreign retailers who come to India or indeed domestic retailers.

59:40What Titan has done is demonstrated that if you want to succeed on a large scale in India, you have to basically operate 10 different business models for the country. So the jewelry business sounds like one business, but as we've discussed, it's stratified by income group. It's stratified by region. It's got different Cocoa for business models. So if you did a sort of matrix on it, you're actually looking at 30, 40 different businesses being run in a fairly complex operation, glued together by great people and great technology. That is tough to pull off. But unfortunately, that's the ask if you want to succeed in Indian retail.

1:00:15And this is, for me, it's been a sort of living lesson in watching how a great retailer is built, because that allows you to benchmark other retailers who aspire to succeed in India, but won't have anything like this quality of people or technology. The second is the HR piece. Hire bright people, hire good people, hire them young, give them early responsibility, mentor them, and they'll basically let them become great business leaders. So 2014, from what we can gather, they did a board meet and identified 100 leaders for the future. Each of those 100 leaders were mentored by senior people in the Tata Sons empire.

1:00:51The entire leadership of Titan today is part of that initiative of 2014 to groom the next generation leaders. Very difficult for other businesses to do this. You're investing really heavily in talent, identifying those people and mentoring them over, say, a decadal period to become the leader of a business. Titan seems to have done this really well. and other Tata businesses, TCS is similar. And perhaps the biggest lesson from people like me who are building businesses in India is when we see the house of Tata, when we see the sort of Tata son's empire, what they have done over say 100 years now is very interesting.

1:01:24They seem to take initiatives again and again, which involves giving back heavily to society, even though the business might not be firing then. And then in the decades that follow, the giving back to society yields a multifold return to the business. So the example for Titan would be 1988, JRD Tata, the then head of Tata's sons, called in Zerksis Desai to Mumbai for a catch up and told him that, look, you're building a great business here, but what are you doing for the community? So Zerksis said that, look, we are doing a hospital and a school. JRD Tata apparently got very angry and said, you're building this sort of five -star island of prosperity in the midst of poverty.

1:02:03And on JRD Tata's orders, Zuxis went off and built a township outside Bangalore, where the artisans, both the watchmakers and the jewelry makers now sit. There's schools, there's free hospitals, free schooling. And the core of the artisan community that fires up Titan's business operates out of that ecosystem. Now, that was the best part of 40 years ago, Dom. To this day, no other jewelry maker has been able to do anything remotely comparable. And this aspect of how Tata Sons operates intrigues me. And playing this infinite game with this family, this extended group of families has done, I think is the biggest lesson I take away.

1:02:39Give back to society. In a booming country like India, society will repay you handsomely in the decades to come. Yeah, optimized for the long term. That's a wonderful closing story to share with us. And particularly, you know, given this business struggled for 20 years, essentially, and then has really ripped for the last 20 years. Thank you so much for sharing this fascinating company with us. As I said at the outset, it's not a business I come across, but there are so many lessons within it that I've loved learning about, and I'm very excited to share it with the world. So Dom, thank you for inviting me.

1:03:07Just by way of disclaimer for Indian law, I have to give you this. My parents own this stock. I own this stock through Marcellus' portfolios, and Marcellus' 10 ,000 clients also own this stock. And it's a privilege to be on Business Breakdown. Thanks again for this opportunity. It's our pleasure. Thank you so much. To find more episodes of Breakdowns ranging from Costco to Visa to Moderna, or to sign up for our weekly summary, check out joincolossus .com. That's J -O -I -N -C -O -L -O -S -S -U -S dot com.

From the publisher

Today we’re breaking down India’s largest jewelry business, Titan. Titan began life as a watchmaker in 1984 through a joint venture between India’s biggest conglomerate, Tata Group, and the Tamilnadu state government. Today, the vast majority of its $4 billion in revenue come from its collection of jewelry brands, and Tanishq in particular.
To break down the business, I’m joined by Saurabh Mukherjea, the founder and Chief Investment Officer of Marcellus Investment Managers. We cover the importance of jewelry to Indian consumers, the intricacies of retailing across India, and how Titan stands head and shoulders above its competitors in terms of profitability. Please enjoy this breakdown of Titan.

For the full show notes, transcript, and links to the best content to learn more, check out the episode page here.

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Show Notes
(00:02:45) - (First question) - What Titan is, where it operates, and its size and scale
(00:06:50) - The bulk of the demand when it comes to Indians buying gold 
(00:08:24) - Getting their start in watches in the 80s and evolving into what Titan is today 
(00:14:52) - What a typical Tanishq store looks like and overview of store economics
(00:18:58) - How their return profile is changing and what types of stores they want to open
(00:23:51) - What gold on lease is and the implications of it for their business model 
(00:25:33) - Why make jewelry when they could just be selling gold for savings purposes
(00:27:36) - Managing inventory and keeping costs under control at the store level
(00:31:54) - Whether or not they have artisans spread out across the country and difficulties of shipping and freight at their current scale in India 
(00:33:38) - How they’re attracting customers to stores and store-level marketing strategies
(00:37:57) - Splitting their business into middle class, premium, and wedding jewelry 
(00:39:22) - Where e-commerce figures into the scope of their business
(00:42:47) - Thoughts and philosophy on allocating surplus capital and acquisitions 
(00:45:38) - Additional competitive advantages Titan has
(00:48:42) - Building brand trust in a low trust economy in such a short time period 
(00:50:22) - Where future growth will come from and if they can sustain their current growth rate
(00:54:04) - The bull case for their business and what a Saree is
(00:57:03) - Risks the business faces as they look out at the future 
(01:00:12) - What he’s learned as an investor studying Titan’s business

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