Recaps, Downrounds and Cap Table Engineering: What Really Happens When Your Growth Plan Fails with Steven Finn

21 Aug 2025 · 1 h

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Consumer VC Podcast Episode Summary Episode Title: Recaps, Downrounds, and Cap Table Engineering: What Really Happens When Your Growth Plan Fails Guest: Steven Finn, Partner at Siddhi Capital Host: Mike Gelb

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Overview In this episode, Mike Gelb interviews Steven Finn to discuss the harsh realities faced by startups when growth plans fail, including the implications of down rounds, recaps, and cap table engineering. Steven shares valuable insights based on his extensive experience navigating challenging fundraising environments and highlights critical strategies for founders and investors.

Key Themes and Discussions

  1. Fundraising Challenges
  2. Current Climate: Fundraising has become significantly harder, with investors more cautious and valuations resetting.
  3. Overcapitalization: Often leads to a “death spiral,” where companies struggle to meet inflated expectations.
  4. Investor Psychology: Founders may feel complacent after raising significant capital, which can lead to poor decision-making.
  1. Debt vs. Equity
  2. Debt Considerations: Debt can be a viable option if it’s backed by tangible assets or predictable revenue (e.g., purchase orders).
  3. Predatory Capital: Both debt and equity can be predatory, depending on the terms. Founders should be cautious about terms that can lead to unfavorable outcomes.
  1. Cap Table Dynamics
  2. Liquidation Preferences: High liquidation preferences can create significant overhangs, complicating future fundraising and restructuring.
  3. Distressed Situations: Companies often find it challenging to recover from a down round due to distorted cap tables.
  1. Founder Strategies
  2. Mindset Shift: Founders should focus on raising the minimum necessary to sustain operations and avoid foolish rounds that lead to unrealistic valuations.
  3. Importance of Margins: Understanding that margins are equivalent to runway, founders should prioritize achieving profitability early on.
  1. Navigating Distress
  2. Recognizing Distress Early: Founders need to be aware of the signs of distress and maintain open communication with investors about the company’s performance and cash needs.
  3. Coachable Founders: Determining whether a founder is coachable often revolves around their ability to confront harsh realities and adapt their strategies accordingly.

Timestamps and Discussion Points

  • 00:00 - Intro
  • 01:00 - Fundraising Environment Challenges: Discussion on why fundraising feels tougher than ever.
  • 04:50 - Approach to Capital Raising: The debate between raising minimal amounts vs. ensuring sufficient cash reserves.
  • 07:00 - Debt vs. Equity: Analyzing the implications of choosing between debt and equity.
  • 12:00 - Ugly Equity Deals: The risks associated with unattractive equity arrangements during down rounds.
  • 16:30 - Mega Fund Influence: Insights on how mega funds distort valuations and the implications for startups.
  • 23:00 - Rethinking Portfolio Strategies: Adjusting strategies in light of current market conditions and investor behavior.
  • 39:50 - Stigma of Down Rounds: Understanding public perception and reality concerning down rounds.
  • 46:00 - Importance of Margins: A reminder that margins are crucial for sustaining operational runway.
  • 50:00 - Protecting Against Distress: Strategies for founders to shield themselves during financial restructuring.
  • 56:00 - Coachable vs. Uncoachable Founders: Identifying traits of adaptable leaders in challenging times.
  • 58:00 - Book Recommendations: Steven shares his professional inspirations.

Key Takeaways

  • Fundraising Mindset: Adopt a proactive approach to fundraising, focusing on runway rather than just capital raised.
  • Sound Financial Management: Founders should prioritize sustainable growth strategies over rapid expansion.
  • Cap Table Awareness: Understand the consequences of liquidation preferences and aim for a clean cap table for future funding rounds.
  • Resilience and Adaptability: Founders must maintain an open mindset and be willing to pivot their strategies in response to market conditions.

Sponsorship Acknowledgment Thank you to Glimpse for sponsoring this episode, an AI-powered platform for managing deductions for consumer brands.

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For more insights from the Consumer VC podcast and updates from Mike Gelb, visit [The Consumer VC](http://www.theconsumervc.com) and follow him on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/MikeGelb).

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Transcript

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0:28I affectionately call it a death spiral. And it changes everything and it's different every time. They're going to lose their ass very often. Founders' ability. Like the number one rule of CEO in a startup is don't die.

0:41Hi, I'm Mike Gelb and this is Consumer VC, where we talk about what it takes to invest in and build scalable consumer businesses. If you're enjoying the show, make sure to hit that subscribe button so you don't miss future episodes and sign up for the newsletter at theconsumervc.com. I share a weekly roundup of the latest consumer fundraisers, launches, and you'll be the first to know when a new episode drops too. Now, what really happens when a startup goes from raising big rounds of capital to fighting for survival? Well, that's what we're diving into today. Our guest is Steven Finn, who's a partner and one of the co-founders at City Capital.

1:21Steven's been in the room for some of the toughest conversations around down rounds, recaps, and cap table restructuring. We cover what to do when growth stalls, how to think about debt versus equity, and how founders can protect themselves in a restructure. If you want the unfiltered truth about what happens when things go wrong in venture, this episode is for you. But before we get into today's episode, I want to tell you about our episode sponsor, Glimpse. Glimpse is an AI-powered end-to-end deductions management service focused on recovering revenue from KEHI, UNFI, Amazon, and Target for consumer brands.

1:57They centralize deductions with backups, they fully handle disputing on your behalf, and they streamline the accounting process. And without further ado, here's Stephen. Stephen, thanks so much for joining me today. How are you? I am great. Thanks for having me. Always a pleasure. Oh, please. Thank you so much for coming on and for taking the time. Really appreciate it. So I know you have a fair bit of experience with down rounds, recaps, and cap table engineering. So we're going to talk about really when things go wrong on this episode and how to handle it. Sure. So cool. So I know you've been in the room when brands go from celebrating rounds to survival mode.

2:38What's really happening when the growth plan stops working? Yeah, I mean, there's usually a bunch of people in the room who all think that the growth clan stops working for different reasons. And it usually takes too long to figure out that there's a problem, which is the kind of first issue. But yeah, I mean, what happens most often, I would say, is fundraising is truly a slog. It's probably worse than it's ever been. It's the same on our end going out at the institutional LPs, by the way. and I think often startups and rightfully so see closing around as a finish line instead of a starting line and it's the the wrong attitude to close your round with and then they get kind of you know cash in the bank a little bit complacent and depending on how much they've raised or what they're intending to do with it once things start to not go perfectly to plan depending on how much cushion has been built into the plan it's i affectionately call it a death spiral yeah that makes that makes a lot of sense do you think that there should be a mind shift overall within consumer brands in let's actually try to raise the minimum of the minimal amount of capital for uh for for our product rather than we need cash we need to make sure we always have cash on hand we need to make sure we have a lot of capital like what what do you think the mind is, I mean, now I know it's kind of different in this market as it was to a few years ago.

4:05So maybe that mind shift should happen, but would kind of love like your take on it. Yeah, it kind of cuts both ways, right? We see what happens when companies way overcapitalize, right? And that can often turn into a disaster. We see what happens when companies way undercapitalize. I call it basically paying the hand to mouth tax, right? When you never have enough money to do anything. You're always making relatively short-term decisions that feel cheap in the moment and wind up being expensive down the line. I think the best way to think about how to raise money is to think about it in terms of runway to execute the plan.

4:41The more runway you have, the better. So when we see companies that are raising gigantic rounds and then hiring into a place or marketing into a place where they're now deploying that money way faster. That's not what I'm talking about.

5:02Investors like to see enough runway to make something make sense. If you approach an investor who could be a small part of a round and you have two or three months in the bank and asking them for money would get you to four or five, that's a lot less attractive than if the same amount of money would get you to 18 months. I think it's better to be fundraising earlier and doing it from more of a position of strength so that you have more runway while doing it so that the next investor feels like they're bolting on month 18 instead of month three and they're going to be back at the table in 60 days.

5:34So it's less about amount and more about timing, really the earlier the better. Okay. No, that's really helpful. What tends to be the reason why a company maybe is not performing as well? Is it For example, like, and I know that this is a broad question, but I know that you have a lot of experience, obviously, in food and beverage. Is it that, like, what tends to be the reasons, for example, maybe velocities have slowed? Could it also be that they've spent so much money on, or that when they first got into the store, they actually did a lot of discounting? And then when they actually try to sell a full price, it actually didn't work?

6:13Like, what are some of the reasons why, in your mind, the growth has slowed? And how does this also backtrack into how you think about evaluating brands? What type of numbers, metrics you all like to see to make to kind of not that growth can slow. Growth, of course, can slow, but to maybe hedge against that, that, OK, this is actually a promising company. So let me start by telling you about me. Right. City Capital, we invest really in two buckets. One is consumer food and beverage brands, and one is kind of food tech B2B ingredients, things like that. I really run the food tech ingredients side of what we do, so I spend a lot less of my time dealing with brands than the rest of my team, who might be better suited to answer questions about velocity and discounts and things like that.

7:03But what I tend to see as sort of a generalist fundraising comment is money should be raised to pour fuel on a fire that exists, not to find the fire. Right. So when in our world, when we're investing in consumer brands are kind of blurry line in the sand. And I say blurry because it means different things for different categories, different margin profiles, all that. Right. Is product market fit. Right. If you really know that you have a product that people love and you can get repeat customers and you're of a scale where making small but efficient operational changes will have a meaningful impact on the bottom line and you're just seeking now to acquire more customers because you have a really good sense of who is going to stick around and what the return on that acquisition will be, that's when we get excited.

7:54earlier than that, we generally find it's a shot in the dark. And the problem that you're describing, I'd say, happens most often when brands go chase every door and when they view, right? Thinking again about starting line and finish line, right? Getting into the retailer is not the finish line. You got to get your stuff off the shelf. Otherwise, you're going to wind up discounting it. You're going to wind up hurting your margins. You're going to wind up getting kicked out. And it's a lot harder to get into a retailer the second time. That makes sense. That makes sense. Well, I mean, for fuel to the fire, when you say venture dollars should be used as fuel to the fire, where should those venture dollars go?

8:37Like, for example, should that money be used for inventory? Should that money be used for marketing? When does it make sense to actually use debt versus equity to actually fuel what you currently have going? Starting from the end of it, it makes sense to use debt when you can get debt. And those who are underwriting debt deals don't like to do very risky things. So I think the availability of debt to produce inventory or to do anything like that is... Well, I kind of feel like the debt markets really have also come downstream in that there's now a lot more kind of options to actually get debt when you're smaller.

9:17I think that the problem is, of course, like the APR is extraordinarily high, right? Which obviously that balances out the risk, right? But it does seem like there are opportunities if you want to - That's fair. There's stuff like revenue-based financing. I agree. There are options. Many are predatory, right? But I think sometimes doing it in equity super early in a depressed market can also feel that way. It's just about sort of a blended cost of capital. I think if you can get reasonable debt, maybe is a better way to put it, because you have some genuine collateral or reason to back it up. If you have POs and you can get debt on the inventory that you know is going to sell, that makes sense.

10:08If you're taking on revenue-based financing loans to go buy a bunch of D2C customers that'll perform unpredictably, that's when I start to have a problem with it. I think that when you're doing just like on the D2C thread, if you're focused on when should you raise equity dollars for D2C, it's when you have something that's genuinely repeatable. And D2C is all over the place and ebbs and flows every day. And we've seen most of our D2C brands transition to being kind of retail first. But just speaking from an early stage, pure play D to C perspective, right, you need to figure out at some level of scalability what your acquisition costs are going to be and what your lifetime values are going to be.

10:51And that's all kind of table stakes. The really important thing for understanding debt versus equity is understanding what the payback period on acquiring a customer is. Where if you like lifetime values are great, but if it takes 15 years for them to materialize, you're putting out a lot of cash up front to wait for all that to come around. So it's about how fast can I return the cash to the coffers? And the faster I can do that, the more likely debt can successfully underwrite that. No, that's a fair point. I mean, I think it's really kind of understanding what your inventory cycle is, right?

11:25Yes. Which is maybe the exact same thing. But understanding, you know, what a turnaround time. I mean, B2B, it's a bit more predictable, if that's fair to say, even though there is still unpredictability within B2B for sure. But you have POs kind of coming in. And also, it's probably easier to get a lender when you also have POs. It's not that there is worth it. It's about, yeah, lenders in B2B are about creditworthiness of your counterparty. Right. Exactly. You can usually finance BS. Totally. Totally. And I think that what's, you know, interesting is even when the rate is really, really high, there's and, you know, certainly can be considered predatory or is predatory.

12:10There is actually also this balance, too, where it's, OK, but if we also raise more equity, right, long term, then we're going to raise our money. Some of the equity deals we've seen could also be seen as just as predatory. I think your willingness to take on predatory debt in that way should be a function of really how confident you are you can sell it through with the speed you think you can sell it through and then gross margins. Right. Because when you're going to raise equity money, most of the time in consumer, it boils down to some level of revenue multiple. Right. And that revenue multiple gets impacted by the market.

12:49It gets impacted by the growth rate. Right. The higher the faster you're growing, the more likely you are to use this year's projection as the base for your revenue multiple instead of last year's actuals. Right. There's a little bit of wiggle room around what you're multiplying. And if you can use debt without leading money to increase revenue meaningfully in a way that you understand is kind of temporary, but that you'll have margins that you can then claw back when you have the money to support it, I think that's a decent place to be. What are equity deals that you believe are predatory? Everything's worth what someone's willing to pay for it.

13:27It also always takes two to tango, right? Yep, 100%. So I don't blame anybody for their crazy term sheet. Most of the time, equity deals that make me say, oh, wow, that's kind of intense, are from insiders in companies that have both completely failed to meet expectations and tapped out the vast majority of their insiders. So what winds up happening is someone raises their hand and says, I can fund this, but nobody's coming on a free ride with me. So usually it comes from a recap or some type of restructuring. That's when I've been, yeah, the most intense, weirdest terms for sure is when people are coming in mad as opposed to coming in looking for a good deal in a net new company.

14:14Got it. Got it. Yeah. So usually that first fundraiser, the first round of capital that's in, normally you might not have some of the kind of terms that you believe are predatory. It's more so when the brand already maybe has raised some money, but then are kind of within dire straits. That's when kind of, and it really is maybe a distressed asset. That's when that's what it really is. I always say that everything should look the same on the way up, but everything looks wildly different on the way back down. Right. And that depends on the circumstances. Right. So on the way up, if you're arguing about anything beyond valuation, I think that's weird.

14:55Right. You're usually like pretty straightforward docs, NVCA, right. The relatively standard looking equity around safes, notes, right. All of those on the way up while you're very excited about a new company should be pretty clean and pretty fair. But when the shit hits the fan, it changes everything and it's different every time. Do you think when a company fundraises, which term do you think is stressed as the most important, but maybe actually isn't the most important? Or one that you think is not important that founders should actually be thinking a lot more about? I'm generally not fussed on structure at all.

15:36I don't care if it's an equity round or a note or a safe for the most part. I think they all can be written to get both sides to the same place. So when I see investors that only do equity rounds or whatever, I always think that that's kind of nonsense. In terms of like actual terms, I mean, liquidation preferences can sometimes get pretty brutal when they exceed like two. Really? Yes. Yes. But like, and I guess that's a good one. That is an example of what I might view as predatory on the way up that someone comes in net new and puts a 2x pref on it. I usually don't like that, but it's usually unless you get to extreme downside cases, it's not going to be the thing that makes it so nobody gets paid.

16:24Yeah, I mean, that's what I think is interesting because, you know, because I look at obviously just like you, all the fundraisers that happened, you know, daily. And of course, you don't know the rest of the terms, but you look at a company and you look at a wild valuation that is, you know, there. But hey, maybe they agreed to a 3x press, right? in terms of the company because they wanted to optimize that valuation. Or maybe there's a put-run. I've seen deals that are wildly overpriced on paper but are done by almost debt-like investors who are seeking to get a return. So I've seen one that was like it started with a 1.5x liquidation preference.

17:05The liquidation preference ticked up over five years, and at the end of five years, they could put it for the value of the 3x pref. And that made sense because the company was super profitable. The round was relatively small. And the bet really from the company was we will have enough cash in five years to pay this out 3x. And the bet from the investor was much more like we're targeting 15 % IRR debt deal. And that worked for everybody, but the sticker price was relatively insane. Right. Right. No, that's that's a great example. Yeah. Well, I know that you've seen obviously companies raise like 20 million, 40 million plus, but then they end up restructuring.

17:47Right. What typically when this happens, what's typically the underlying issue? When companies way overcapitalize, and you know when you see it, right? A company that's not too far along raises$100 million to go take over the world. It comes from SoftBank or Andreessen or something like that. Right. One of these kind of mega funds that's designed to build a portfolio that either dies or takes the whole market. What winds up happening is let's say a company is doing a couple million in sales, right? They're worth maybe four or five tops X their top line, right? I think we're kind of seeing deals done right now in the two to four-ish revenue multiple range.

18:28And that, like I said, what you're multiplying depends on your growth rate and a lot of other things and founders' previous success. But if you're worth, let's say you're doing, extreme example, three million top line in some kind of sexy category and SoftBank comes in with 100 million. It would not work if they came in with 100 million on 15 million pre. So that's not the deal that gets done. So you wind up needing to ratchet up valuation so that you can account for dilution and make it seem like a more normal venture round, even though it's way too big. So you now have a valuation that is set way too relatively high for the actual, you know, where the company sits and a whole pile of money that's supposed to help offset that.

19:18Right. And allow the company to achieve outsized growth or outsized distribution or whatever it may be to grow into that valuation. It just doesn't work that often. Right. It works sometimes. And it's honestly structurally not designed to always work. Right. These mega funds know when they're doing that, that they're going to lose their ass very often. But in the ones where they get to take the whole market, it pays off. Right. So they're structurally designed to do that. And when it doesn't work, they are great at cutting and running. The big guys. Right. They know if they way overcapitalize something and it's not a hit, not to way overcapitalize it twice.

19:54They move on to the next shiny object. Right. So you wind up with a company that's raised way too much money. It has a giant valuation. It also has a giant liquidation preference stack, right? That company that was worth 15 million, even if you set the valuation to 300, right? And you bring in 100 million and now you're 400 million post money. When that gets reset, there's still$100 million of liquidation preference there, right? So if I'm coming in and resetting that and I'm saying this is worth$1 pre-money, it's actually$100 ,001 before I see my second dollar, right? So that's when the structure of the cap table gets so broken that without being completely rethought from the ground up, it's going to be a real problem, right?

20:36And if you don't take off immediately after raising one of these mega fund rounds, you wind up with a valuation that you can never hit expectations, right? So new money that's approaching this is always then approaching a down round with a weird cap table, and there's always going to be scars on this thing. That makes it harder to raise the next round, even if you're coming back to industry insiders and away from the megafunds or whatever it may be. Every investor wants, you know, when those megafunds come in, they're looking to 5 plus X that deal, right? So now they've invested in you at a 400 million post-money valuation.

21:09That means they're setting$2 billion exit aspirations for you, or it didn't work, right? So that causes all of that$100 million to go into excessive hiring, really getting out there, really focused on increasing revenue, often at the expense of good revenue, at the expense of margins. Companies wind up doing product line extensions to leverage the space they already have into spaces where they don't belong. And then it's hard to shed all that. Right. When when someone decides it's not working and we're running out of money and we need to raise more, the burn is way too high for anybody new, particularly from the industry, to come look at it.

21:47So that that's when I think the really aggressive recaps come in. The mega funds need to get really recapped out. The expectations need to be completely reset. And when the expectations are reset, you need to be looking at the liquidation preferences and all the way back down. So it's just the unraveling death spiral. No, that's that's that makes sense in terms of the five year old death. I feel like the mega funds, you know, putting all that money into a company that maybe shouldn't, that maybe is way too early to receive that money or really doesn't have the traction or the, not that they don't have the growth, but they don't quite have the markers there where it actually makes sense to actually deploy that much money so quickly.

22:26It's really kind of an option bet, right? It's just an option bet to make sure that you're early and that you're in for, even though the price is high, but, you know, you're in early. It's just kind of an option. So if it doesn't work, let's move on to the next company. That's what makes it easy to walk away from. When our main fund does a relatively big deal for us, we are in it. And we're going to fight to make it work. We're not going to cut and run. It's just a different model. So let's say you invest in a fund at the Series A level, right? Right. And the company raises a massive Series B.

23:07Does that make you nervous? Yes. Yes, it does. For all the reasons I just laid out, right, it is I my friend Rob Go from NextView Ventures did a great post on LinkedIn about what he called, I think, the great re-risking. Right. And that's what happens when you raise too much money at too high evaluation and set those crazy expectations in the stratosphere that you've re-risked the company completely. Right. Typically, as you're going from seed to A to B, you're you're stepping through stages of de-risking the company on a path to a normal exit. When you change what the outcome needs to be to be considered a success, you're stepping backwards in risk profile.

23:51And that's where it really scares the crap out of us. Yeah, that makes sense. That makes sense. Well, how also does it change cap table dynamics and also preference when that does happen? And when a company, you know, raises a reasonable series A and then massive series B, and then let's say it doesn't really quite go as well. How does that kind of restructuring come together? Yeah, and we've had a number of CPGs that followed this model and a number of tech companies too, right, where they raised normal looking rounds in maybe 2019, 2020, and then maybe a stupid one in 2021 or early 2022. And they're still really working through that, I'd say.

24:30Right. So generally, the first thing that needs to change for this to work at all is a reimagining of expectations. Right. When when that big Series B you're describing happens, those Series B investors still want to 5x. As it stops going well, we get to a point where those Series B investors are focused on recovering their money, right? When you get to that stage of acceptance of where the thing is at and the vibe changes from we need to knock this out of the park to holy shit, we need to get our cash back. That's when you can start making these adjustments, right? So I think without that, the Series B investor better have a lot more money to keep funneling in because nobody's going to go in behind a crazy valuation and a bunch of missed numbers.

25:20And that's why I think it becomes more risky is you really put this thing on a pedestal such that it has to hit its numbers perfectly or it's a disaster. It unravels from there, like I said, kind of differently every time. What it really depends on as you start thinking about how do I recap this? How do I get this to a place where expectations are now reduced to normal and where outcomes can be logical for the next money to get their return and all the old money to get full or partial recovery? The things you really have to consider are whose signatures do I need to get a deal through? So that's kind of the first step in terms of whose signatures do you need?

25:59Yeah, it's really three at once, right? It's who's around the table externally who could be interested, who's around the table internally who would put up a little bit to save the old. And the math there is really if the shit has hit the fan, can I put up$1 now to fully recover my old$5? That math works out if you've written off the old in your mind and then the new one gets good returns. Does that make sense? Yes. And then the third thing is really about what signatures do I need. And then from there, my goal always is to create a cap table and a round that reflects where the business actually is and almost retroactively looks like it always looked like it reflected where the business actually is.

26:45Right. So if a company raises a$500 million Series B to throw a stupid number out there, but they should have raised a much smaller one, we're going to have to eliminate that liquidation preference. Right. And and then they're going to have too much stock and we're going to have to offset that by dramatically expanding the option pool for the team. Right. So now you get to a place where this company has, you know, 10 or 15 million in liquidation preference overhang and a team that owns approximately what it would have if that last round never happened. And those are the kinds of levers that you start to pull, in my opinion, to create that alignment around where you are today.

27:22And just walk me through expanding the option pool. Is there a reason why you do that? Because you obviously want the team to still be motivated to actually to actually run the company. and so they have obviously more equity since when you join a startup, you really are, obviously you have a salary, but typically it's because in terms of where your income is going to get, it is going to really be meaningful. It's probably going to be more on the equity side. So is it to kind of keep all employees motivated and obviously happy? Yes. It's also to avoid debt equity, right? The equity on your cap table should be owned by those who are pushing the company forward.

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28:04So if you have a mega fund series B investor who shows up with 100 million, owns 40 % of your company, and then vanishes off the face of the earth, they are dead equity. They are not helping, right? So they are not helping because they own too much and because they create way too much of a liquidation preference overhang. So the way to deal with that is to basically get them to accept that this is a loser and that there's a path to partial recovery, eliminate their liquidation preference and bounce them down into common stock, and then dilute them by expanding the option pool for those who are showing up every day.

28:40Now you have maybe, but it's key if you need their signature, which you almost always do, to be presenting a story that can get them to partial or complete recovery at 1x, right? And if you can tell that story, you can really wiggle around the rest of it. How do you tell an investor that they're debt equity? You ask them to put up more money, and when they say no, you tell them they're debt equity. You convince someone that they're debt equity by convincing them that in the absence of a round, they are at a zero and that they are standing in the way of a round. So you have to basically work on the psychology that gets them to believe that 0.2x is better than zero, and here is a path to 0.2x that actually genuinely make sense got it right you prove to them that the thing they created is unfundable right right right and also and also i mean with also being unfundable they actually also refused to to keep funding it yeah sorry it's cutting os olsen and that's that's a huge problem with the megafunds right it's it feels great when andreason cuts you a big check it feels really shitty when you have a bunch of conversations about why they're not following on with potentially net new money.

29:52Right. Right. That's the double-edged sword. Do you think as well we're also in a period where there's, obviously there's always pressure on companies. I'm not saying that there isn't, especially ones that are venture-backed in terms of growth. But do you think there's a new pressure also because venture's going through a little bit of a liquidity crisis, if that's fair to say, with LPs not really getting returns, a lot of private companies, right, that on paper are quite big, but at the same time, you know, haven't gone public, you haven't gotten these exits or haven't gotten these acquisitions.

30:31Some of the acquisitions have been blocked. How does this kind of relate into, does this relate at all in terms of liquidity when it comes to either restructuring or losing confidence in a company and you want and and wanting to get your money out yes um the way i described to rlps in our most recent update letter how we have to operate now is we have to operate from a place of financing risk first right and we have to do that differently than we ever have before because we're now in a market where even the best performing companies don't necessarily get that next round lined up, right? It's kind of that bad, right?

31:17So if that's the case, that means that we probably need to have more concentrated portfolios because we need to be willing to put more money up for things that are working in the absence of it from the outside world, right? We just need to be able to do that. But it also means that we're generally, and I hate to say it's sad but true, right? But we need to be looking for things that are taking smaller swings, right? That have less of a cash need to get over a smaller hump because we don't believe that the money's out there. All of that is driven by what you're saying, right, which is institutional LPs are now a couple of years behind on getting the returns they've been promised, even if they're still there on paper.

31:59Often they're not. Funds are having a hard time raising their next fund. So I think VC is taking it a little slower to both try to have their companies perform better in their current funds, but also to try to buy some time into what might be a better market. Right. And that leaves us in a place where there's just less cash available. So what do you say? Finance risk first. I was just taking notes. Yeah. You mean concentrated portfolios. So you're not investing in as many companies and you're investing in less companies, but but but having but having more but also at the same time, having more ownership in those companies.

32:41Yeah. But I would say that the first question that we need to answer for ourselves in any net new investment now is how many dollars does this company need before it does not need dollars anymore? And where do we expect those to come from? Right. That is not a conversation that we had anywhere near as specifically in 2019 when we were in a world where the great performers were going to be able to raise the next round from the outside world and we didn't have to worry about them. Do you, so, and also, so, by interest first, you obviously have contrary portfolios, you have more share in these companies, but it's the less amount of, but it's, but you aren't investing in as many companies.

33:20The return profile, let's say more looks like a growth equity PE return profile rather than a typical VC profile, if that's fair to say, and that it's less risky. You don't have maybe have as many outliers or the outliers aren't nearly as, you know, big. We're not targeting 100x in any deal, right? If you were targeting 100x in consumer food, you'd be nuts. We need to do investments that mostly work and we're kind of gunning for triples. Makes sense. Yeah, no, totally. And so and in terms of and in terms of I know that one of the questions that you just said that you ask is how much more money would this company need after a round?

34:03Is the goal that you be? Well, when you invest, are you thinking, can this be the last equity round this company raises? The trade-off is that when you are the last equity round the company raises, you're likely to get a lower return multiple, right? Because those future raises after you can accelerate valuation, can allow the thing to grow bigger, right? So it's not, is this the last equity round? I led a series B in a company a year and a half ago, right? And it was like a 25-ish million dollar series B. and we looked around the existing cap table at a bunch of very excited faces who were happily joining us in this round and many were reserving money for future rounds as we did as well right so this was not the last round there will be one or two more rounds in this company but we have a like around the table was almost enough money to get the whole thing across the line to profitability and then you take it from there.

35:06If we said, we're raising$25 million now and the company needs$30 million more over the course of the next few years to get to profitable and then take it from there, maybe we looked around the cap table and saw that 22 of the 30 were already there, that this guy's holding that much and that guy's holding that much and we're holding another four or five or whatever. We saw a very clear path without needing to go find the magical series C lead to getting the company all the way through where it needs to get. Not that that was the last money in. That makes sense. That makes sense. Back to, I guess, on the restructuring side too, where, first of all, how do you communicate restructuring to the board and investors?

35:47But typically, who kind of starts the conversation of restructuring that, hey, things aren't going? I try to. You try to. Okay. So it's typically coming from the investor side. Has it ever come from the actual founder or operators that are part of the board? Yes. The closer you get to cash out date, the more everybody gets creative. I pride myself on trying to see it far enough away that you can figure out while there's still enough cash in the bank to get a deal done. In terms of far enough cash in the bank, what's typically your timeline or how do you evaluate that? I mean, we're seeing companies have a very hard time raising money with six or even nine months of runway in the bank.

36:35So if you don't have real line of sight into where the next round's coming from, if it's not coming from insiders with six months left, it's time to start talking about how to compel your insiders to be your next round or it may just all explode. Do you, I mean, I'm sure you also get situations where an insider might say, okay, we can maybe do a recap. We'll put a little bit of money in, but maybe it's not meaningful. But we want to just put money in just to make sure externally it shows we haven't lost confidence. We can say, you know, maybe it's 100K, maybe it's 50K. Maybe it's just, you know, not that much money.

37:10Does that, has that worked? Does that ever work? We've been that guy. It works when somebody's holding the bag, right? So if nobody's holding the bag and burns 200K a month and the last lead says, I'm going to put in 100K, it does not work. But if some confident insider has put up an inside term sheet or something or put up enough money that we've now bought past a year of runway and the noteworthy members of the cap table kick in a couple of bucks for positive signaling, it buys some time. It's usually pretty transparent. Got it. But to get someone externally then to come in, has that, when the insiders are only putting up a little bit of money, not maybe meaningful enough, does that typically work?

37:51Or the optic's just so bad that it probably won't? It depends on, like back to my comments earlier about runway. Outside investors, we have a rule at Citi that, of course, we violate all the time, but we really try not to, that we do not add a net new company to our portfolio without it having 18 months of runway. at least. We don't want to add something that has six months of runway and then in two months be worrying about where the next check's going to come from. The company needs to have some time to spread its wings and figure out its thing and execute its plan. So that's our perspective as outsiders.

38:25I think others share that perspective. So we do not, if we have enough cash to invest in this company three months of runway, we would like those to be months 17 through 19, not months one through four. So if insiders can put enough money together such that we can come in from the outside and be that impactful runway extension, it's great. If they're kicking in three days runway expecting us to buy a couple months, it never works out. Got it. That's, yeah, that makes sense. That makes sense. Are down rounds still considered a scarlet letter or is that changing? I never view them as a scarlet letter.

39:04It depends on how they're executed, right? So like A shitty recap would be the thing I described earlier. Companies raised$100 million. I'm just going to come in$1 million pre without adjusting for the past, and now I still need$102 million exit to 2x. It's not a scarlet letter. It's just a bad deal. But I think we've all now lived through such a ridiculous boom bust, maybe boom, but mostly bust cycle that everybody understands that the world looked different three, four years ago. And if you can kind of elegantly craft a deal that is lower price, but logical for today's situation without bringing the baggage of the past into it, I have no problem with that.

39:50And I like to write this. has your, has how you invest, has that changed in terms of how you were investing three or four years ago? Because obviously the market overall was very different and changing. And so I'm kind of, was, was just very different towards, towards now in terms of the market was at a, an all time high when it comes to valuations, right? If that's fair to say. Yeah. And now of course, except of course, maybe if you're AI, but if you're not an AI. In our world, if GLP is, if your GLP is. Yes. Oh, that's fair. That's fair. That's fair. Yeah. Yeah. No, that makes sense. Totally.

40:23So how has has your process or how you think about valuations, has that changed at all when it comes to three or four years ago to now? Less in considering valuations and more in considering long term fundraising plans for individual companies. Right. It's we just really can't bank on the next guy being there. And that changes how we think about everything. Right. If you look at early deals we did in, for example, cultivated meat, we did those alongside very, very deep pockets who came in with very little conviction and looking for option value, as you said earlier. Right. So now when they don't materialize and, you know, not to make Andreessen my punching bag, but Andreessen leads a series A in a cultivated meat company and puts in 25 or 30 million and is maybe has access to all the money that the company would ever need to get to the finish line.

41:20That's less exciting than it's ever been today and was super exciting in 2021 because we've seen how it plays out when things don't beat expectations. So I guess, Ed, this makes sense. It seems like you're constantly having to also look over your shoulder or at least look over your shoulder a little bit in terms of, okay, what are the Series B, Series C players kind of doing? And what kind of metrics do they need in order to get comfortable? And how much maybe runway a company needs that, okay, when we actually look at companies now to invest in, we need to make sure that they're going to obviously have plenty of runway.

41:58because it's not going to kind of pull together. That's actually a really bad signal if they're running out of cash really quick. Yeah, and they also just need to be businesses more than they ever have before, right? Margin is runway. Every margin dollar you have is an equity dollar you don't have to raise, right? And that is a bigger focus than it's ever been. I mean, we've always been pretty gross margin obsessed. It's really what is the difference between a business and not a business, in my opinion. and it's just now more impossible than it's ever been to scale into margins. So things that don't have good margins out of the gate and need to raise money to scale into them are going to have a hard time ever doing that.

42:42What about EBITDA? When do you think that a company in consumer should be your close to breakeven or EBITDA positive? And you can even, if you want to break it down by different categories, for example, that's that's fine as well yeah it definitely depends and it's like we'd like to see really solid gross margins i'd say depending on category that could range anywhere from kind of 40 to 80 90 net gross margins um we probably spend less time in the categories that are closer to 40 right when i say that our blurry line in the sand is product market fit that is later in a cold chain beverage that it is in a high margin d2c friendly powder business right because you have fewer options for distribution uh and it's super expensive to do that distribution you're shipping heavy things cold right there's lots of extra expenses around it um profitability I mean, if you're doing 100 plus million and you're not doing it profitably, there's probably some problem there with likely your margin.

43:56And maybe you are in the wrong places and grew too fast and, you know, prematurely scaled. But, yeah, it's really very different by category. I think it's some we've seen businesses profitable at a million in sales. we've seen businesses unprofitable at 300 million in sales it's uh yeah it's it's one answer how how also when you let's say you have a distressed asset a company isn't you know doing so well and how do you bring how do you think if there might be an opportunity to still sell this asset right and and how do you go about maybe this is more like an investment banker uh uh question. But how do you kind of bring that company to market to see, okay, let's figure out if there actually is a suitable company that might be interested in buying this?

44:52And how do you actually even market or promote the value that the company have in order to kind of bring together these two parties? I think the first step is probably not to go out with something like That is to take the step back and try to adjust it into something that looks less distressed. So kind of first do like a recap, for example. Yeah. When we see companies that are either recapping or selling and they're not quite sure yet, I tell you right now, they're not selling. Okay. Okay. That's helpful. Yeah. So getting that recap in place, getting whether it's a right size team or right size product portfolio and really building a company that's capable of doubling down on what works instead of just constantly shooting for the moon.

45:39That's what makes it attractive. Bankers are good to bounce thoughts off of and figure out, you know, are there potential acquirers? What does this market look like now? What do comps look like now? but frankly at the end of the day they're all going to tell you they can sell their your thing and then some can and most can't at least in our experience everyone is very positively inclined on the way in and then it turns out it's a tough market so it's really if you know who your perspective universe of acquirers are you should go talk to them if you don't you probably have a problem in and of itself.

46:23So yeah, I think bankers are a very useful resource in understanding if there's a market for something, but take their yes with a little bit of a great result, if that makes sense. Yes, it does. It does. But also I think the insight at least here is firstly a recap, first actually structure the business where it becomes, where then you know that what evaluation they kind of give in terms of, or what that acquisition price is, which I know is negotiation, but whatever that ballpark is, that you're able to actually fulfill that in that you have a much more clean cap cap. Yeah, I think that's right for everyone involved, right?

47:03Why would a founder push to sell something for 80 million with a$100 million prep stack? What do they get out of that? Nothing, right? You have a serious misalignment problem if you try to sell the distressed thing with the weird cap table while it's distressed and with a weird cap table, right? Because you need the same signatures that you need to do the recap to do the exit, except now there's no hope. Yeah. Do you have any favorite in terms of selling distressed assets, a distressed asset in consumer and they're actually able to pull it around and turn it into an incredible brand? I haven't seen much of it.

47:51There's a couple of roll-ups that will take in distressed brands and roll shared services over them. I think that's a conceptually good model. I think that can work. I think it's always hard to know when you're trying to catch a falling knife if it's fallen too far. And I've seen very little of those roll-ups being able to successfully raise the money they need to actually leverage the shared services. So they need to raise money too because they're bolting on unprofitable assets. Right. And it's not, that's a tough sell. we've passed on a couple of them. Yeah, I can imagine. I also feel like with roll-ups, yes, you can maybe stream on operations better and obviously get margins a lot tighter for a lot of your companies.

48:48Maybe you're switching suppliers, so you're all using the same supplier, and then you're actually able to get scale from that way or whatnot. At the same time, you still have to obviously sell and marketing, and that costs money to do so, and that's all still individual, right? It's not like you can really spread or share those costs where you have some type of economies of scale in that way. There are in the back end, there are in operations, there are in accounting, right? There's plenty of synergies and plenty of reasons why it should work, but you're 100 % right. That's not where the bulk of the cash to grow is going.

49:23And without that cash to grow, you're where you are. Totally. What are some smart ways founders... What are... Are there smart ways for founders to protect themselves early so they aren't wiped out in a restructure?

49:43Yeah, I mean, don't raise stupid rounds is a good one. Right? Don't raise aspirational rounds because you think it's the finish line and you get to post all over your LinkedIn, right? That's the number one thing founders do to shoot themselves in the foot is accept stupid terms and stupid rounds. So I think back to what I said earlier, raise the money you need for the timeline that makes sense and really focus on raising the money that allows you to pour fuel on the fire that exists and not go hire everyone in the world and go to every door and all that. So that's all important. trying to keep control of the board with the common is helpful it's not that helpful because at the end of the day typically we see preferred board members getting outsized control and there's all kinds of you know even if there's a board that's six common seats and one preferred there's plenty of important decisions that need a preferred director's approval right so that's just like it's a start but it doesn't get you all the way um it's really be super important to the company right the founders that are not super important to the company or screw it up or piss off investors are easy to get rid of from like in a recap situation right and it happens all the time where we're gonna bring in cash and we're gonna bring in the new guns to to run with the cash if you think that's you be more important but i mean if you are the founder who is completely indispensable you will always have the negotiating leverage no that's that's fair because of course then you're irreplaceable and so um yeah that makes an irreplaceable right that means that any recap whether or not your signature is actually required you should be thought of as a required signature right and those whose signatures are required to get something done get their pound of flesh every time or nothing gets done yeah that makes got it um how how do you know when someone is still coachable like a founder is coachable even when their original plan has collapse oh you know when you see it it's a that's a tough one um but i mean it's from a fundraising perspective i am usually screaming early and often that we need to know where the next dollar is coming from and if there's three to six months left in the bank and we still don't know and don't have good insight into where because the founder thinks it's going to be no problem I've probably lost hope in that founder's ability like the number one rule of CEO in a startup is don't die right like don't run out of cats it's your job to not die right so if you can't look that in the face you're not coachable enough for me and that is what it is but yeah I think that that's that's a big one for me on the fundraising side in terms of execution that that einstein quote of insanity is the definition of insanity is uh doing the same thing over again and expecting different results right you know who's who uh then it it's usually obvious pretty early how i mean because i'd imagine that some of the reason why retail businesses raise big rounds is let's say they're doing really well in a region or maybe they're the natural channel and then and then one of the big conventional um retailers comes and says we're gonna put you out of every store blah blah how do you and maybe this might be more of a question to melissa but how how do you all and then of course it's really tempting right because you have a natural retailer that is interested in you wants to go national so you then and then of course you're you're pitching that to investors investors get very excited and so you were able to kind of close this big round.

53:44And then even though you have the money and maybe you actually did support the natural relapse, the product didn't work in that sort for whatever reason. Maybe your prices were too high. Maybe it just didn't make sense. In that example, the big conventional retailer who wants to take you in, I would look at their set for your thing. And if it doesn't exist, you're a question mark. And if it exists at a way lower price, you're a question mark. They don't know how it's going to go. I think that that's just important to note. Yeah, no, for sure. For sure. I would say, how do you think about when you do have those companies, and maybe it's kind of that example of they raise a Series A with you, and then maybe they raise a massive Series B, and that's the reason why they raise a massive Series B.

54:33How do you think about what the growth journey maybe should look like for a retail business that will be successful in terms of growing slower? Is there a certain amount, for example, of number of stores that they should be in that, again, gives you an idea of, okay, now we should kind of, and Velocity is looking good, now we should expand, but we shouldn't expand too rapidly. How do you think about it from, for example? It's more about the types of stores that they work in than the number of stores, right? And the demographics around it and what kind of marketing they're doing around actually driving traffic to those stores to get it.

55:10You know, we have one of our best performing companies is a company called Circle, right? They have a water bottle with a pod that is the flavor pod. And it maybe behaves differently at different kinds of retailers because in some place you need to buy the bottle to get into the ecosystem. And some retailers have massive water bottle businesses up against Stanley and Obala and other kinds of normal looking water bottles. And some retailers don't sell any water bottles. Right. So that's what they have to then figure out is where should they be? Right. Should it be in the places that sell the water bottles?

55:53Should they be the only water bottle in the place that doesn't sell the water bottles? Or should they only be a replenishment thing in those? Right. So that's when you're something like that, it's a complicated undertaking. Right. But for most kind of normal grocery products, it's just about where do you sit in your set and does your set move? And if your set moves around your prices, you should seek to be in those doors. But, yeah, different for every kind of category. That's great. That's great. What's my final question is what's one book that's inspired you personally and one book that's inspired you professionally?

56:37I would say the lean startup back in the day inspired me personally just to like be a hacker and try shit and see where it goes and, you know, not put all eggs in one basket. in terms of professionally, this essentialism, I forgot who wrote it. Greg something new. Yeah, that really, we have an incredibly erratic business, right? We have deal flow that falls from the sky. We have companies that we need to deal with on a regular basis. And just even the picture on the cover of a circle with a bunch of arrows coming out of it, instead of exerting all that effort to actually move the circle. That one was huge for me in terms of just really focusing on what matters.

57:29It's very, very easy to be distracted in our line of work. Yes, I can only imagine because, of course, you have your LPs. You have, of course, obviously the founders that you're serving. You have new prospects, new prospective businesses that are coming to you looking for investment that you're doing analysis for. You also might have companies that actually might need recap or help in that regard. So there's a lot of things that you're kind of juggling on all of it. And the time sucks or not always where the time should go. Some of our best performers are the ones that we've put the least time into because they know how to do it.

58:12Right. And some of the places where we put the most time, it winds up all being for nothing. Right. And then that's that's my my one kind of call out curse that I have is I see a situation and I try to figure out the deal I'd still do in that situation. Many of those scenarios I should just let die. Well, that's a great point in that you spend a lot of time with recaps, thinking about recaps and obviously how to do it. Does it even make sense to kind of spend time with those companies doing that instead of focusing and giving more time to the companies that actually are growing and winning? it's gotta be a balance i don't think it's that different than doing a company the first time right many possibly even most will fail but when it works it was all worth it great answer great answer steven thank you so much for your time this is a lot of fun yeah thank you anytime thank you and there you have it it was awesome having steven on the show thank you so much for listening and please subscribe on whichever platform you're listening on So you are kept in the loop of the latest episodes.

59:25And check out the newsletter at theconsumervc.com. Thank you, Glymphs, for sponsoring this episode. And thanks for listening.

From the publisher

Glimpse is the all-in-one, AI-powered deductions management platform for CPG brands—automating deduction capture, classification, disputes, and accounting. Recover more revenue while saving time – ⁠https://www.tryglimpse.com


When fundraising stalls, valuations reset, and the cap table gets messy—what really happens next?


In this episode, Mike sits down with Steven Finn, Partner at Siddhi Capital, to break down the tough realities of down rounds, recaps, and cap table engineering. Steven has been in the room when brands shift from celebration to survival—and shares what founders and investors need to know when things don’t go as planned:


✅ Why overcapitalization often leads to a “death spiral”

✅ When to use equity vs. debt—and why both can be predatory

✅ How mega funds create distorted valuations (and walk away fast)

✅ The psychology of “dead equity” and how to reset expectations

✅ Why insiders matter most in distressed situations

✅ How to keep founders aligned (and motivated) during a recap

✅ Why margins = runway, and why that matters more than ever

✅ What smart founders can do early to avoid being wiped out


👉 If you’re a founder, investor, or operator navigating today’s tougher fundraising environment, this episode is essential listening.


Timestamps

00:00 Intro

01:00 Why Fundraising Feels Harder Than Ever

04:50 Fuel on the Fire vs. Finding the Fire

07:00 Debt vs. Equity (and Predatory Capital)

12:00 When Equity Deals Get Ugly

16:30 The Mega Fund Trap & Overcapitalization

23:00 How Huge Rounds Re-Risk Companies

27:00 Recaps, Option Pools & Dead Equity

30:00 Why Venture is Now “Financing Risk First”

34:30 Rethinking Portfolio Strategy

39:50 Are Down Rounds Still a Scarlet Letter?

43:00 Why Margins = Runway

46:00 Selling Distressed Assets (and Why It’s So Hard)

50:00 How Founders Can Protect Themselves Early

53:00 Spotting Coachable vs. Uncoachable Founders

56:00 Growing in Retail Without Growing Too Fast

58:00 Steven’s Book Recommendations


📬 Subscribe for more founder stories & venture insights: 👉 The Consumer VC Newsletter - https://www.theconsumervc.com/

Follow Mike Gelb:

Twitter / IG / TikTok → @mikegelb / @consumervc

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