Episode 61 - Mahmut Cengiz and the Iran Situation

0:03Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:Welcome to the NATO Deep Dive podcast. I'm your host, Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel, and in this episode, I speak with Dr. Mahmut Cengiz, Managing Editor for Counterterrorism at Homeland Security Today.

0:17Dr.

0:17Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:Cengiz is a longstanding member of the Homeland Security Today editorial board and is also an associate professor at the Shah School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. Mahmoud Cengiz, warm welcome back to NATO Deep Dive. Thanks for inviting me. It's great to have you here. So let's talk about the situation right now in the Persian Gulf and what Iran is doing. How would you characterize Iran's strategy in this conflict?

0:48Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:And so far, what we have seen in the region, Iran has used its forward defense strategy very effectively in the Middle East using more its proxies because it was giving plausible deniability for the regime. And so far, we have seen in Iraq, in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, so this active use of these praxis and the non-seductors. But more specifically for this war, so what we have seen so far, it is more asymmetric warfare and then heavily relying on drones, cyber and irregular tactics than a conventional war. So that's why here there is a deterrence by punishment and the cost imposition. So the Tahrir regime aims to seek to raise the cost of conflict.

1:41Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:So that's why so far we have seen missile strikes, disruption of shipping and energy pressure in a state of Hormuz. So in the Western countries, we have seen the rising gas prices and inflation. So it seems that it is like a successful strategy, this deterrence by punishment and the cost imposition by the regime.

2:05Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:So if we look at that a bit more, have we seen a fundamental shift in Iran's military doctrine compared to previous conflicts, particularly in its willingness to act more directly?

2:19Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Yeah, I think it's an evolution, not a complete break, because so far Iran's core doctrine is based on asymmetric warfare proxies, like your first question. and today they remain intact. And what has changed so far is how and when it applies direct force. And that's why historically we have seen Tahrir regime's avoiding direct state-to-state confrontation and relied heavily on praxis and now more risk acceptance and escalatory behavior. I think also we should talk about some notable events in the early days of the conflict and the decapitation of the Supreme Leader. because he's representing the Velayi Faki.

3:06Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:I think he was the most powerful figure of the regime, ideologically and religiously. So Iran is using episodic bursts of attacks and rather than continuous escalation. So it is focusing on infrastructure and the strategic target. So what I can say, yes, Iran hasn't abandoned its proxy-based strategy, but it has crossed a threshold and still managing escalation to avoid full-scale war.

3:36Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:So building on that, to what extent are Iran's missile and drone capabilities central to their strategy and what advantages do they give Iran?

3:47Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Yeah, they're absolutely central and they are like the backbone of Iran's strategy. And as we all know, the country lacks a modern air force. So missiles and drones substitute for air power. And these missiles and drones serve as equalizers, so strikes regional adversaries at long range and the U.S. bases and the Gulf infrastructure. So in terms of cost asymmetry, they are extremely cheap and compared to Western interceptors and missiles. And in terms of creating cost imposition and strategy, they are forcing adversaries to spend far more to defend than cheaper Iran's drones and missiles. And what about flexibility and scalability?

4:39Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:So Iran can launch from its own territory or via proxies. And then in the area of precision and reach so far, increasingly we have seen accuracy against the infrastructure and the military targets. And the missiles are mobile, hidden and underground, so they can give more survivability and resilience. So what about psychological and economic warfare? So these weapons create uncertainty and fear across the region. I think one final thing about their exportability, and they can be easily transferred. So I think what we can see here, missiles and drones aren't just tools. So they are like strategy for the Tehran regime.

5:32Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:And without needing a superiority, Tehran compete now with far stronger militaries.

5:40Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:I feel like you've answered it already, but perhaps it's worth refocusing again on it, is that in Iran, what we're seeing is that they seem to be deliberately trying to regionalize the conflict through multiple pressure points. And that is causing quite a lot of economic paralysis along with the infrastructure damage.

6:03Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Yeah, I think this is deliberate and central to Iran's strategy. And for example, horizontal escalation is a strategy that we have seen opening multiple fronts simultaneously by Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraq, so targeting U.S. assets and the military, and also in Syria as well. And in Yemen, we have seen the most recent involvement of Houthis in the war. Also in the state of Hormuz, this is a maritime domain area and a strategic area for the Tahrir regime. I think also distributing the cost of war and the regime believes if it suffers, the entire region should feel the pain, energy markets and the shipping lane.

6:50Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:So creating multiple pressure points on adversaries and forcing them to defend many fronts at advance. So I think also there is messaging. So any actor supporting its adversaries is potentially a target. So, yes, Iran is deliberately regionalizing the conflict, and by opening multiple fronts and pressure points, it turns a localized war into a region-wide problem, raising the cost for everyone.

7:19Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:Building on this, how much of Iran's military behavior is driven by regime survival rather than battlefield objectives?

7:30Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Yeah, I can say every large portion, arguably the dominant driver. So Iran's military doctrine is not purely about winning battles. And since its launch, the early days, it's fundamental about ensuring the survival of the Islamic Republic. So that's why we have seen the creation of IRGC in the region and aiming to protect the regime. So war is viewed as existential, not optional. and the Iranian leadership increasingly frames conflict as a struggle for state continuity and internal stability. And the regime uses external conflict to reinforce internal cohesion and justify repression. So I think also in terms of mosaic defense so far, that's why there was a question about the decapitation of the supermater, because according to this Mosaic defense, it reflects survival thinking.

8:28Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Iran's doctrine assumes leadership may be killed, infrastructure may be destroyed, but so it builds a decentralized system that keeps functioning under attack. So more importantly, Boleroen regime survival with national survival. So Tehran increasingly presents, for example, the regime equals to the state and that the state equals to the nation. So it's helping legitimizing sacrifices and mobilizing supports for the regime and, of course, framing opposition as existential threats.

9:07Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:Well, I'm glad you brought up the Mosaic Defense Strategy because that's such an important aspect. You also had previously spoken about the Houthis being utilized. Why did the Houthis join the conflict almost a month after it began? Why is it that it's taken that long?

9:27Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Houthis also played another active role right after October 7, Hamas terror attacks. And we also saw how Houthis were involved in targeting the commercial ships on the Red Sea. Again, if we go back our early argument about proxies and their roles in the Middle East. So you can see, for example, the division of labor within Iran's network and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, high-end deterrence versus Israel. And then for Iraqi militias, we have seen their involvement in attacks pressuring on U.S. forces. And Houthis is still keeping a very strategic position. So they are part of economic warfare via maritime disruption.

10:11Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:So, Houthis bring something unique in the region, threatening Red Sea shipping and the choke points. So, Iran and its partners so far avoid all fronts igniting at once, but this delay allowed initial assessment of the battlefield and the calibration of US and Israeli responses. So Houthis' involvement and entry was meant to show the conflict is not anymore localized and it's regional. and also in terms of avoiding early overwhelming and retaliation. And for Houthis, immediate entry could have triggered rapid US-led escalation in Yemen. So the waiting allowed a more crowded and complex battlefield, making retaliation harder.

10:59Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Also, in terms of maximizing strategic impact and the joining later, Houthis avoided being just another front, now instead became a decisive escalation moment, and then timing was increased, and the psychological and economic shock value. So what I can say, the Hutus did not enter late, and they entered on cue, and their delayed involvement reflects a coordinated escalation strategy, opening a new front at the most strategically valuable moment to maximize pressure and global trade, and they complicate the conflict.

11:36Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:We also had briefly spoken about Hezbollah, and we've seen that there's been conflict with Israel as well during this period. What state is Hezbollah in? Because they had suffered quite a few setbacks, leadership decapitation previously. But what would you say their position is right now?

12:00Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Hezbollah was another organization in the context of October 7 attacks. So the group paid huge cost because of its involvement to war right after October 7. For example, according to Global Terrorism Trans-Analysis Center data, Hezbollah conducted just two attacks until October 7 in 2023. But it happened, it was 294 after October 7 attacks in 2023. Then in 2024, the GTEC data recorded more than 1 ,600 Hezbollah attacks in the region. So Hezbollah was always one of the most active actors in the region. But as a result, the organization paid huge cost. Like you mentioned, decapitation of the leadership.

12:49Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Of course, the group has been weakened after October 7 attacks. But today, we cannot say that Hezbollah is bruised, but not broken. But they're holding back by choice, not weakness. So they remain Iran's most powerful card. And its full entry into the conflict would be a game-changing escalation. So materially, they are degraded, but far from defeated. So sustained strikes recently, what we have seen in the region, and clashes have reduced some capabilities and infrastructure. But Hezbollah still remains, retains a large missile and a rocket arsenal. And Hezbollah has not fully entered the war.

13:37Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Instead, engaging in limited and calibrated attacks in the region. I think also in terms of their strategy entering the war, internal and political constraints inside Lebanon, there is an economic collapse and then the political fragility limit appetite for war. So Hezbollah must balance regional role versus domestic backlash. So in terms of leadership and the command under pressure and the targeted killings and the surveillance have increased pressure on leadership structures. But what we can say, organization remains cohesive and functional today.

14:19Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:If we move away from the Persian Gulf and look at the global picture, Should we be worried about transnational repression increasing in the West and delivered through Iran, its proxies, organized criminal groups? Because it's something that Iran has definitely been engaging in for a while. But could the conflict intensify that?

14:46Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:Yes, there is a credible and a growing concern. And the states like Iran tend to expand efforts to monitor, intimidate, or silence diaspora communities. Like you mentioned before, the Tahrir regime is very familiar with this transnational repression. So we have seen how the regime collaborated with eastern organized crime groups in one case in the U.S. just to target a regime dissident. So this is an area the Tahrir regime is already experienced. And so far the likely targets included by the regime, dissidents and activists, and the journalists and the academics and the former officials or defectors, and what tactics they have used so far.

15:35Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:And we have seen their online harassment and their surveillance and their threats to family members back home and coercion through intermediaries or proxies. And occasionally, also we have seen the plots for attempted attacks, but they are very rare and they're very high risk. I think also, as discussed earlier, external repression is tied to internal stability concerns. So Tehran sees diaspora descent as security vulnerability. And I think also we should talk about the intelligence and the law enforcement pressure and the capacity. and the countries like the US and Europe are much more alert than before.

16:17Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:And that's why they have disrupted multiple plots in recent years.

16:24Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:Do you think that the football World Cup, the soccer World Cup that's going to be held jointly in the United States, Canada and Mexico could potentially be a vulnerable target for Iranian clandestine activities.

16:42Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:The FIFA World Cup 2026 is a high visibility and a symbolic target, which always increases risks. So, however, the threat is more likely indirect, deniable, and low-level, but not a major mass casualty attack. And we all know that mega events are inherently attractive targets, And then this World Cup offers massive global audience and the concentrated crowds and the political symbolism because it's especially being hosted in the US. So already some intelligence assessments and extremists and retaliatory threats linked to the Iran conflict. and the iran's interest would be strategic and not indiscriminate and because the doctrine iranian doctrine suggests it would avoid actions that trigger direct overwhelming retaliations so a large scale attack on world cup venue is unlikely so what could happen i think we can see some more plausible threat vectors so if iran were to act it would likely be true cyber operations I mean like the ticketing systems, infrastructure, media narratives, and the drone threats or attempted disruptions is another one, and already flagged by officials, as we all know about it, and the proxy or loan actor activity with a plausible deniability.

18:09Dr. Mahmut Cengiz:So what we can say, this World Cup is a high visibility and a symbolic target. So the risk is real, but not in the way people often think. And the greater concern is indirect and the deniable disruption. I think we should be worried about cyber drones or proxy activity rather than a large scale attack because Iran's strategy is to pressure and signal without triggering full-scale retaliation.

18:39Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:Well, thank you for clarifying that. And I'm glad you also brought up the cyber dynamic too, because that was something that was on my mind. I'm very grateful, Amit, to have you back on the podcast, third time, I think, and hopefully we'll have you again soon. So thank you for joining us. Thanks for having me. It's been our pleasure. Thank you for listening to this episode of NATO Deep Dive, brought to you by NATO's Defense Education Enhancement Program. My producers are Marcus Andropoulos, Victoria Jones, Eve Register, and Henry McCabe. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit deepportal.hq.nato.int forward slash deep dive.

19:27Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel:Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the NATO Deep Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.