How Plaid Turned a Failed $5.3B Deal with Visa into Momentum | Zach Perret (Plaid)

14 Jul 2025 · 1 h 4 min

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In short

Podcast Notes: Grit Episode - How Plaid Turned a Failed $5.3B Deal with Visa into Momentum | Zach Perret (Plaid)

Episode Overview

  • Host: Joubin Mirzadegan
  • Guest: Zach Perret, co-founder and CEO of Plaid
  • Theme: The journey of Plaid from its inception to navigating a $5.3 billion acquisition deal with Visa and the lessons learned in the process.

Key Topics Discussed

  1. The Origins of Plaid
  2. Initial Concept: The idea emerged from the frustration consumers had with financial services post the 2008 financial crisis.
  3. Initial Failures: Zach and his co-founder built several consumer apps that didn't gain traction, leading to the creation of Plaid to provide a backend solution for connecting apps with bank data.
  1. The Visa Acquisition
  2. Timeline:
  3. January 2020: Visa announced plans to acquire Plaid for $5.3 billion.
  4. During COVID-19, as the deal progressed, Plaid's business began rapidly growing, leading to a reassessment of the acquisition.
  5. Ultimately, the deal fell through, but this experience provided Plaid with significant brand legitimacy.
  • Key Learnings:
  • Managing team emotions during the acquisition process was crucial; reactions varied from excitement to disappointment.
  • The deal's collapse brought about a collective resilience within Plaid, and the team rallied to focus on future growth.
  1. Transition from Startup to Staple
  2. Cultural Insights: Zach emphasized the importance of maintaining a culture of independence and innovation while scaling.
  3. Recruitment Philosophy:
  4. Zach discusses the necessity of recruiting even in challenging times, comparing it to being "too hungry to eat."
  5. The belief that every team member should be equipped with AI tools to enhance productivity and innovation.
  1. The Role of AI in Plaid’s Growth
  2. AI Integration: Emphasized the need for every employee to become an "applied AI engineer" and the importance of building leverage through technology.
  3. Investment in Talent: Zach noted that while hiring may not need to grow at the same pace due to increased efficiency from AI, it remains crucial to recruit talent that can contribute to the company’s vision.
  1. Long-Term Vision and Strategy
  2. Mission Focus: Zach remains determined to improve financial services and believes Plaid has only scratched the surface of its potential impact.
  3. Product Strategy: Transitioning from being merely a data plumbing service to providing robust analytical tools for financial services, addressing issues such as credit scoring and fraud.

Key Takeaways

  • Resilience is Key: Facing setbacks, such as the failed Visa acquisition, can lead to renewed focus and growth if the team comes together.
  • Recruitment is Essential: Prioritizing recruitment is crucial, especially during growth phases. The company needs to continually build capacity to meet future challenges.
  • Integration of Technology: Embracing AI is vital for scaling operations and improving efficiency without necessarily increasing headcount.
  • Cultural Foundations: The culture of an organization can dictate its success in navigating challenges; fostering open communication and emotional awareness helps maintain team morale.

Conclusion

  • Final Reflections: Zach Perret reflects on the journey of Plaid, emphasizing the excitement of tackling impossible challenges and the evolution of the company from a startup to a significant player in the fintech space.
  • Advice for Entrepreneurs: Survival is paramount; resilience, adaptability, and a focus on innovation are crucial for long-term success.

Links

  • Zach Perret: [X](https://x.com/zachperret), [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/zperret/)
  • Joubin Mirzadegan: [X](https://x.com/Joubinmir), [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/joubin-mirzadegan-66186854/), Email: [grit@kleinerperkins.com](mailto:grit@kleinerperkins.com)
  • Kleiner Perkins: [Website](https://www.kleinerperkins.com/)

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Transcript

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0:00Every job, I believe, will be AI-enabled or it will not exist in 12 months. The only good thing that I have to say is don't die. If we could survive for a year on$60 ,000 living in New York, that was a pretty good lesson that all we had to do was decide not to die and we'd keep going. There are times when you're pushing really hard, you have huge goals, then you also need to be recruiting. People will say like, hey, I'm going to cut back on the amount of recruiting that I'm doing in order to solve this challenge. We sold the company, a lot of press. We then unsold the company, a lot of press. We had this like interesting brand like association with Visa where to the world, Visa had said, we trust Plaid, ergo you should trust Plaid.

0:32We got a lot of the value of that transaction and still remained independent. I think the impact that we can have on the world is quite substantial, and I think we've only scratched the surface of that. In a lot of senses, I'm very pleased with where we are, but certainly not satisfied.

0:57Welcome to Grit. I'm Jubin, partner at Kleiner Perkins, a show where we go beyond the highlight reel and explore the personal and professional challenges of building history-making companies. Today on the show, we have Zach Perret, co-founder and CEO of Plaid. What started as a string of failed consumer apps became the backbone of modern fintech, powering products like Venmo and Robinhood. Zach and I go into excruciating detail about the visa acquisition of Plaid for almost$6 billion dollars, the subsequent up round during COVID to almost 13 billion, the subsequent down round to almost 6 billion, and now where they are today.

1:35Enjoy the episode. You know what I was thinking when I was coming in this morning? The biggest fraud in San Francisco is the weather in the summer. I've lived here almost my entire life. I don't know. Do you live in the city? In Noe Valley. Okay, in Noe Valley. And your office is here? Soma. And every year I'm like, it's not that bad. And then like this morning I was in Menlo yesterday at our office and then I'm up here today and it's like raining basically. For the last month, my wife and I rented a house in Healdsburg and I would just drive in every day. You're kidding. As annoying as that drive is, it was worth it because it feels like summer.

2:10And so you did it literally just to get the weather. Yeah. And how far is the drive from Healdsburg to? It's like an hour and a half. Okay. You didn't want to buy something there? I mean, no. I mean, yes, of course. I'd love to have a hostel, but no. So you drove every day from Healdsburg? Three days a week. Three days a week. And then you work from home on Friday or something? Yeah, exactly. And you did that literally just to get the weather? Yeah, it feels like summer there. I mean, 20 minutes north, south, or east of here is summer. Exactly. West here in the ocean. That's right. It's cold out there, too.

2:41That's right. That's right. Well, thank you for doing this. I was looking back at our notes on when the introduction happened. Oh my gosh. I'm so sorry that it's taken forever. It's fine. Like, it's almost like the anticipation has been building, you know? It was Brian Long. Okay. Two years ago. And part of me was like, okay, like, why has it taken us so long to schedule? And I realized I was like, oh, like a lot's been going on on your end. that's like, you probably weren't ready to talk about a lot of the stuff that has really going on. So anyway, I'm just thrilled to do it now. Thank you so much for having me.

3:21I'm excited to be here. I'll thank Brian for the introduction. How did you two meet? Oh my gosh. Brian and I met at a dinner. I think it was Enrique Dubugras puts together these like interesting people dinners every now and then. And I was at one of those and we kind of became friends and then and our wives became good friends. And so he's been kind of just a great person to bounce ideas off of. And it's been awesome to watch his entrepreneurial journey. And he's doing another one. He's doing another one. Enrique was here doing this with me, I don't know, five, six weeks ago. Nice. And what he has done is insane.

3:59Like what him and Pedro have done was insane. It's just crazy. It's just like, I respect and admire the way that they have run the business, then basically rerun the business all over again. It's pretty crazy. It's awesome to watch. They're a customer and we're a customer of theirs and it's been cool to see it. Yeah. Can I dive into a specific moment in time and then zoom back out and just talk about whatever we want to talk about? Is that okay? In media, let's do it. Okay. All right. So right before you and I were going to talk, this was 2021, right? COVID. Yeah, okay. Two years before we actually got introduced.

4:40In the middle of COVID. Yeah.

4:45You all had raised a bunch of money and Visa comes out and says, we're going to acquire you. Yeah. For$13 billion? Was that the headline? No, no. So it was January of 2020, right before COVID actually, where Visa was going to acquire Plaid for, I think it was$5.3 billion. It was just about$5 billion. Okay, yep. And then we were in kind of in that transaction for a year, ended up walking away after a year when exclusivity lapsed. And then we raised at$13 billion. So, yeah, it's weird. Was there like a gradient over time where your confidence started to erode? During that year. That like during that year that this was going to go through?

5:26Did it happen gradually or suddenly? Well, let me give you the whole story. So I sold the business in January of 2020. or signed the paperwork to sell the business in January of 2020. Had this like really hard all hands of the team because some people were really excited. Some people were really unhappy about it. Some people thought that the potential was greater, so on and so forth. Then we kind of fast forward a little bit and things were like stabilized. Then COVID hits. So that's March. Exactly. And then the market crashed. So like in April, we're looking at this transaction, which has a clause in it that says that Visa cannot get out of it in the case of a pandemic.

6:04Some lawyer had put pandemic in there, like not ever expecting it would happen, but it was in there. And ours was a kind of the dollar amount wouldn't change. The amount of equity given to employees, though, would change. So we knew the dollar amount of equity to be given to employees, but like the number of shares just went way up because Visa's stock price had crashed. And we looked at this thing saying, oh my gosh, we're geniuses. We have, you know, a significant transaction, fixed price, a portion of it is equity to the team. Everyone on the team's gonna own a huge portion of Visa. and it's going to be great.

6:35And then you fast forward a little bit more and our business just starts ripping. How much do you fast forward from that point? Like two more months. So basically COVID starts in March, April-ish, May-ish markets have crashed. And then kind of maybe even late May, June, July, markets start to go really fast. And then you look at our business, like July, August, we're just growing at the fastest pace that we've grown in a long time. And it was because people were stuck at home. They needed access to financial products. They needed access to their money. And we were the infrastructure that allowed them to get there.

7:14So at that point, we'd kind of, so from a deal timeline, you go through these different steps. So first you file the initial paperwork. Then the DOJ does a first request or the FTC will do a first request for information. And then after the first request, most transactions, they say, yeah, great, all good. Actually, usually they don't even do a first request, but if they do a first request after the first request, they say, yeah, great, good. Then we get a second request saying, hey, we want more information. We want to go deeper. How long from first to second? Three months, maybe. You had mentioned you had all hands at announcing the acquisition at the beginning of this process that you said was maybe difficult or contentious.

7:51like was it was it difficult and contentious or whatever word you used because half the people still dream the dream and thought you're leaving potential on the cutting room floor yeah exactly i mean it was it was certainly one of the most emotional all hands i've ever done um we you know we have this office in soma and we have these like gigantic stairs uh kind of going up a story and people didn't they're like super wide they're like you know like 40 feet wide um and people are like sitting on these stairs they're like hanging over the balcony over this kind of atrium area it's like packed and nobody knows what this is like do people know yet before you say anything so no one knew that morning and then about like about 20 minutes before the all hands the news started to leak and people started to like tweet about it and then it was like on our internal side so everybody like knew that we were announcing something something big.

8:44They didn't know exactly if the leaks were correct or not. We have this, we have this all hands. Um, I'm like standing in front of everyone. I like tell the story. And then you can see, just look on the faces of people. Some people are like bummed. Some people are confused. Some people are crying because they're happy. Um, uh, some people are just like beaming because, you know, early employees get a bunch of liquidity and, um, uh, and then like actually we actually had some of the visa execs come and talk to the team. Um, that was okay. Um, I would say that, we probably should have coached them a little bit more on exactly what to expect.

9:16I mean, like with all due respect, they're Visa execs, right? Well, look, I deeply respect them. Like they're great people. But they're like this different vibe than probably Platt employees. Different vibe. Yes, I will agree with that. And so then they left and like I did this like Q &A. It's just like all of this back and forth with the team kind of hearing what people say. And then basically after that, I did one on ones with like a zillion people just to talk about what they were thinking, what they were feeling. And that kind of string of one-on-ones continued for about two weeks. And for me, it was probably one of the most emotional times because our teams come with baggage.

9:53They come with all these thoughts in their heads and so forth. And so it's just about hearing people kind of where they were, what was going on. I could explain why I was excited, why I thought it was a really good thing. But ultimately, they each had their own reaction. We had a second all-hands at the end when we decided to walk away. And the response was equally emotional for people. And I would say the ratio was pretty similar, though the format was different because obviously it was during COVID, so we were remote. But a lot of people, despite the fact that we told them, don't spend the money in your head, they do exactly that.

10:21You can't help it. You think, oh, I'm going to have a couple hundred thousand dollars. I'm going to go buy a house. We come back and we say, hey, yeah, eventually. But the stock's not liquid yet. And we're going to stay as an independent company. And we'll try to do a secondary. And we did do a secondary, but you could buy a car and not a house. So it was just a totally different thing. So those were probably the two most emotional all hands I've ever dealt with. And Zach, pre all hands, pre you making the decision, were your execs looped in? Oh, yeah. Yeah, of course. So, okay, you have like, call it 12 to 15 key people.

10:57Seven. Seven. Okay. They're all like looped in. Was the split between them the same as the rest of the company? Or was it more unanimous one way or another? No, no. On the sale, it was quite split. It was basically 50-50. I guess there were eight of us and maybe four or five on the sell side and three or four on the don't sell. And then in the decision to walk away from the transaction, that was unanimous. Everyone agreed that we should walk away at that point. When you bring that decision to the team, how do you frame it? Like as the leader of this decision, ultimately it is your call. You're taking everybody's like input and then you like make a decision.

11:40But do you, do people know that because you're bringing the decision to them, that default that means that you already want to do this and you're hearing them out? Like, how do you balance that? I think it's cultural and it goes well beyond this kind of a decision. The culture of decision making that we have applaud is individuals own a decision. No groups. If I ever hear people saying, yeah, we are going to go decide this thing. I always clarify, sorry, which individual is going to decide this thing? And then that individual is responsible for going and finding all of the input, all the dissent, all the debate behind it.

12:16But ultimately, they make the call. So when I went to the leadership team and said, hey, look, this is an option on the table. And by the way, some of them had known for a while that Visa was circling. Sure. They got pulled into diligence. Yeah. And like some of them had, you know, one of them was the point person that had the relationship with Visa. So they'd known Visa for a very long time. So it wasn't all kind of in a given moment that I told each of them. But it was pretty clear when I brought them in. Hey, you know, I'd like to get your take. Why is this a good idea? Why is it a bad idea?

12:44We have some group discussions. I oftentimes will do a thing where I say, hey, you know, you person, can you take the other side of this? and can we talk about it and think about it? I don't remember the exact process I went through in that, but it was a lot of that kind of like back and forth. Let's get people's thoughts. Let's get people's input. But at the end of the day, it was pretty clear that I was going to make the decision. And I remember actually we had this exec team meeting in my house, actually in Noe Valley, as you were saying. And everyone was sitting there and kind of they gave their input.

13:16We had this probably like three or four hour discussion. And then I kicked everyone out and I said, I said, all right, great, I need a few hours to think about this. And then just went on a walk, thought about it, and then ultimately got to the final decision. And this was kind of clouded by, there's always negotiation backdrop, like, can we make the deal better, so on and so forth. That happens all the time. So that day, people leave, they spend the afternoon in your living room. You have, I imagine, quite spirited debate. And then you're like, all right. It was one of many debates. We've been talking about it for a couple weeks.

13:48But you knew you were gonna make that decision that day. Like you knew that this was the day that the decision was going to be made. Yeah. It's pretty intense. And then you start walking around and you're like, all right. And like, can you maybe just walk me through what those trade-offs are in your head? Of deciding to sell the company? Yeah. Like, yeah. How did you, your pros and cons list when you're going on your walk? Yeah, totally. I mean, I don't think it was at this point a pros and cons list. It was much more of a, the final decision came down to like, what do I think the best outcome in the long term for the mission the company is going to be?

14:25There's always like a bunch of pros and cons. But for me, it's like, how can we make Plaid into a thing that people 20 years from now are going to value, think is important, and we're going to improve the quality of financial services for everyone in the world? And Visa brought a lot of attributes to that. Obviously, they have a huge network. You know, we are constantly working with, partnering with, negotiating with the banks. And Visa is the world expert in doing that. They have a huge international presence. And I still believe that the business long term will be a very international business.

15:00They could bring a lot of capital. They could accelerate our growth in a bunch of ways. They have a huge brand. They bring a lot of security, kind of visibility. So many aspects of their consumer brand could be useful. So tons of positives. I think the negatives for us are, you know, one, I love building an independent business. And there's an argument that Plaid can, and frankly, I now very much believe will be a much larger company independently than as a part of Visa, because we can invest in the future in a way that, you know, a larger company won't necessarily be as incentivized to do on our terms.

15:35and so that was a big one. I mean, the cultural questions were a big one. The logistical questions were a big one. Are we going to move into Visa's office in the South Bay? Are we going to keep our office? Like there's all of these like tactical things. Ultimately, we were able to solve for a lot of those in the way that we approached the transaction by saying, you know, Plaid's going to run as an independent company. We have access to all Visa resources, but everybody at Plaid reports to me, it stays in an independent office. Like we can build our own independent culture, but we get to kind of like plug in via whatever set of APIs we create between the organizations, but we get to create the APIs that are not forced upon us.

16:08So we had this great acquisition theory. And actually, interestingly, for companies that we've bought as Plaid, we've run a very similar acquisition theory because I think it's the fastest way to maximize growth. But at the end of the day, the decision for me came down to how can we Plaid the biggest, the fastest in the long term and create the greatest amount of value for consumers and for our customers. the interesting thing is having gone through the arc of the transaction so we sold the company a lot of press we then unsold the company a lot of press we then raised a huge round a lot of press we had this like interesting brand like association with Visa where you know to the world Visa had said like hey stamp of approval you know like we trust Plaid ergo you should trust Plaid and of course then we later raised a bunch of money and we were able to build a bunch of infrastructure ourselves like we got a lot of the value of that transaction and still remained independent right um and so like i joke that if i could have written the hollywood script to like best accelerate the business i would have written a script like this obviously i'm not creative enough to write that hollywood script so it wasn't my idea going into it but it gave you legitimacy exactly the outcome was uh oddly like far better than we could have predicted when you're describing your what you're optimizing for, the way that I hear it is that there's probably the right side of your brain, which is like the very rational side of your brain, which is like, what is going to extend the mission of this company to its fullest potential?

17:42But then there's like the other side of the brain, which is like all of the emotions that are tangled up in it. What does my wife think? What are my kids going to think? What am I going to do with my time? Where's the office? Who's going to be a millionaire? Like, what am I going to do next? Right. Like all of those questions. Am I going to really show up in a suit to visa every day? Like these types of questions. They don't wear suits anymore. They don't wear suits anymore. As I've learned. And so, you know, like part of these decisions in my experience is like, yes, there's the rational side.

18:14And then there's like a bunch of like the emotional stuff. And so I wonder, do you have a philosophy around how do you incorporate both sides of your brain into that decision making process when it matters so much? because I have felt often that when I have to make decisions, not like this, I've never had to make a decision like this. The emotional side is where the input generally tends to come from, from other people. Like all of the input mechanisms that I get with these types of decisions tend to be very emotional in nature. I don't know. Yeah, I think my decision making style is probably a little odd.

18:52So I tend to be very much a default answer first person. And again, another part of applied decision-making culture is start with an answer. It doesn't matter if your answer is right or wrong, we start with an answer and then go debate and figure out if your answer is correct and then try to refute the answer that you've come up with in order to find a better one. And so my default answer this entire time was, of course, we shouldn't sell the company. Now, let me go refute that. Let me go figure out all the reasons that I'm wrong. And then you flip it. Okay, great. like I found enough reasons, I'm going to flip it.

19:21And I'm going to go figure out all the reasons that that next thing is wrong. And so for me, this, you can call it scientific method style decision-making or answer first decision-making. It helps me not have too much emotion that comes into it because generally like you already know the answer. Now you can react to the answer. You can use your emotions to map those to kind of like rational facts or underlying circumstances that might actually change the answer itself. But yeah, so it's very much hypothesis driven. Super interesting. And once the acquisition, you had mentioned, okay, acquisition goes through, you get press, then you spend that year going back and forth, nine months, you break it off.

20:07No, that's the, people ask me my biggest mistake. My biggest mistake was not putting a gigantic breakup fee. Yeah. Well, I mean, I guess if you had the pandemic exception clause or the breakup fee like at least you got one of the two you know then you redo the other all hands it's like probably groundhog's day for you like i can't believe this is happening again how did you feel like you know at the point that we decided to exit the transaction i felt frankly very bullish very excited i still feel very bullish um we we kind of or i kind of saw the writing in the wall and knew the signals call it four or five months before we could announce that we were going to exit from the transaction.

20:48And basically the entire leadership team knew three months before. But it's this very hard thing. I mean, there are these periods as a CEO where you know something and you desperately want to tell your team so your team can start to operationalize it, but you can't tell your team for one reason or another. In this case, I couldn't tell them. We were still under exclusivity. I couldn't tell the team we're going to walk away from the transaction the day the exclusivity lapsed. We did start to make decisions understanding that directionally, we wanted to invest in products that may be seen as competitive with Visa.

21:18Like we were going to start to relax some of those constraints that we put in the business. But, you know, it was this like big imbalance between what I knew and what I could tell everyone. And so being able to tell everyone, that was exciting for me. You know, I could express my emotion, my excitement, you know, the vision that I saw for the future of the company. And, you know, in some sense, I had to actually temper some of that excitement because there were people, as I said, that had spent the money in their head. And so you have to try to kind of not be too excited about this walkaway future when there are definitely going to be some people on our team that were sad about it.

21:53So, you know, my take was quite optimistic and remains quite optimistic. As I said, like we got so much of the value of the transaction and didn't do the transaction. Like we didn't, we get to run the company as an independent one. When you were communicating with the team, sorry, when you couldn't communicate with the team for those four or five months, how frustrating was the feeling watching your business it there's just no way it was operating like firing on all cylinders i don't know you're growing really fast so you think it was you think during the nine months it was still firing in the same level that it was before any of that started Yeah, I mean, it's interesting.

22:38Like, as with all startups, especially platform businesses, you do a bunch of work. And then at some point in the future, the work pays off. And like that, at some point, it could be six months and it could be two years. It could be three years, depending on the things you build. So clearly we built a set of good products. And then the market demand really increased for those products. So we were growing really fast during that period. I think the restrictions on the business during that period were largely around hiring. We did hire a lot of people, but it's hard to express to super entrepreneurial people the upside potential of a business if it clearly has a transaction hanging over it.

23:16So I would say we were a little restricted in who we could hire. We were a little restricted on the press that we could do. But I would say we were maybe not firing at 100%, but probably firing at 90, 95%. And then the underlying numbers of the business were just up and to the right. So felt pretty good about it. Yeah. And can you define like what was up into the right at that point? Our usage, our customer, like the new customers that we were signing, the revenue was up to the right. I mean, profit was up to the right. Like all the key metrics for the business were going right. And at that point, you're like, all right, geez, like did we like were all the people that said, let's not do this transaction right?

23:53Because in this six month interval, the business has taken off into a completely different trajectory. Maybe. I try hard to evaluate decisions based on the information that was available at the time. Yeah. Meaning, you know, if I had good data and all of the correct inputs and I made a decision, if I were to go back and have that same data, would I make that same decision again? So my take is, I think we made the right decision to sell the company at the time. I also think we made the right decision to walk away. The underlying facts changed. But I want to kind of give us, and again, culturally about decision-making, and we've talked about this a lot, like give the people on our team credit for making the right decision based on the facts that they had.

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24:34Yeah, I will let this go because I don't want to take the whole time on this, but it is very fascinating. But how agonizing was it before you made the call? Like, did you feel agonized? I don't know how else to ask that question. No, I mean, I think it's just a set of logical decisions. It's like a process that you go through. And for me, I think we try to, I certainly try to avoid emotion. in my decision making. Like emotion gives good signals. It gives good facts. It gives good inputs. But making decisions emotionally never gets you to a good point. Like who do you call in those moments? Like who are you like, all right, geez, like let me go through my Rolodex here of like people that have gone through this.

25:14I mean, the hard part is you can't really call that many people because it's a very confidential thing. And, you know, a lot of the business mentors or friends or folks that I would normally talk to, they work in the industry. So I can't really tell them anything. Definitely have, you know, a set of coaches and folks that I know and can talk to, you know, close friends, but for the most part, it's, it's an independent decision-making process. Yeah. So that all, the breakup happens, you rally the troops, get everybody going again. Is the business still like this is, is it at that point still going up into the right?

25:50Yeah. I mean, look, we had, we had an amazing growth trajectory from call it mid 2020 up until mid 2022. Then basically it was the Zerp era. So low interest rates, people stuck at home, people using FinTech like crazy. And then our customers growing incredibly well, a lot of new startups launching, lots of funding coming into the space. So like overall business is growing super well for that two year period, so mid 2020 to mid 2022. The second half of 2022, interest rates obviously came down and basically all of our customers didn't quite know how to handle a higher interest rate environment. So our interest rates went up.

26:30And our customers didn't quite know how to handle a higher interest rate environment. And so we saw a slower growth, still growing through that period, actually. So I feel really proud of the resiliency of that business, of our business, going through a really low to a moderately high interest rate environment quickly and still growing through it. But our customers had to retool. So our lenders that were used to making ZERP style loans now had to make higher interest loans. A lot of the investing companies that we worked with, they had to build products that were much more focused on savings and giving consumers the ability to buy treasuries and things like that, as opposed to just purely buying stocks because stocks weren't growing as well.

27:10So a lot of retooling that happened in our customer base, and that probably lasted about six months. And then back into 2023, we returned to normal growth, but on a much higher base. The cool part of all this is when we exit the transaction in 2021, we raised a big round of financing. At like double the visa price. More than double, yeah, exactly. Like$13 million? Yeah, so big step up in valuation, but most importantly, a lot of capital. So we took a lot of capital on the balance sheet. And we have, for the lifetime of Plaid, had this vision that first we're going to build, I call it data plumbing.

27:44My comps team hates it when I call it data plumbing, But the ability to link your bank account to an app, kind of a crucial thing. If you want to use anything in fintech, you need to link your bank account to an app. In doing so, we had a lot of users connect their accounts. We had a lot of data that was flowing through our system. But we always had this vision that some of the fundamental problems of financial services could be better solved by having a lot of this data in one place and then building great analytics on top of it. So fundamental problems in financial services, things like credit scoring.

28:12Nobody understands their credit score. it's not always responsive to the things that you think it should be responsive to. If you get a new job, your income goes way up, you're a better credit risk, but your credit score doesn't necessarily reflect that. So like credit scoring is a big problem. Second is fraud. Fraud is growing at a crazy rate right now. So financial fraud is growing at something like 20 to 25 % a year. We thought there was a huge opportunity to try to solve that. And then there's payments. How do we help people actually use their bank account to pay for things like they do in Europe and more broadly?

28:39And then there's this big basket of other challenges that are inherently broken in the financial system. Plaid V1 was focused on giving everyone access. So how do we help you link your bank account to an app that you want to use? That way you can do banking on the internet. You can have access to that loan you might want to apply it to. Plaid V2 is all about analytics and solving these underlying problems in financial services that have been persistent for decades. So fraud, credit scoring, so on and so forth. So we were able to take all this capital that we raised in 2021 and then deploy it into building out a pretty massive data platform so that we can start to build analytics-oriented products on top of it so that by the end of 2022 and into 2023 and then kind of mid-2024, we can start to launch these really awesome data analytics products.

29:25And so we feel fortunate that, you know, we had this opportunity to raise a bunch of capital, take our operating margin from being positive to now very negative and then back to positive again by investing in this kind of like replatforming, almost like a product strategy pivot. I would call it more of a product strategy upgrade for the business. It's amazing. I mean, the roller coaster is like, I mean, it's like there'll be books about this company one day. Like raises at 13. Everyone, I remember the headlines at the time. These guys are geniuses. You know, like look at overnight success. Exactly.

29:59Exactly. Right. All the headlines were, couldn't have been more positive. Right. And then we were going on to raise. And I mean, this is, it was like one of the hotter rounds that year. By the way, Platt has always had a hard time raising. It's always been a hard business to explain to people. But then all of a sudden, we were the one that everyone wanted to talk to. And so we got a great multiple on it. But all the VCs, they would come in, they were like, oh, I read the DOJ thing. Now I really understand your business. And I'm like, all right, if that's how you think about our business, then this will be a good conversation.

30:28That's like their internal partner memo. It's the DOJ thing. And then, crazy enough, you need to finance the business again. Take a down round, which is ironically an up round from the Visa price. but it was like 6 billion, right? Just like emotionally, people are just probably like, what is going on? Yeah. Yeah. I mean, as I said, we raised, like we were the bell of the ball. We raised - It was like a ZERP price. ZERP price, but like a very high ZERP price, like relative to all the other ZERP prices, it was a very good ZERP price that we were able to get. And we appreciate it. They put capital on the balance sheet and we were able to like really invest these new businesses.

31:07all of the metrics inside the business look way way way better than when we raised at that that period um but the underlying reality is market multiples have changed massively i mean you look at public companies they've they've gone down hugely since that period of time um private companies as well and so we ended up landing in what we think is a very rational valuation on top of a much much better business um but the market multiples have changed um and so that's why that's why obviously we had the step down in price. The interesting thing is, you know, we actually didn't need capital. I wouldn't have gone to raise capital, except that we had RSUs expiring, which means we need to flip the RSUs into shares so that our employees could retain that value.

31:47We ended up, you know, not adding much capital to the balance sheet at all in that transaction. And this is a way to get everybody a little bit more aligned on a current day valuation. Yeah, it does help to have a kind of a more recent mark to market so that when we're making an offer to a new executive, they can look and say, yeah, this is the price that was just paid by investors. And I understand that price. Yeah, exactly. You had mentioned that it was hard for people to grok plaid in the early days. Did you actually have a hard time fundraising? So in the early stages, we had a lot of trouble financing the business.

32:23The general view by VCs at the time was that not a lot of interesting products are going to be built in financial services because one, it's too regulated. And then two, the banks are going to build everything. Obviously, you know, we look at the Chime IPO that just happened. We look at like a lot of the huge public companies that are out there. There's a lot of space in fintech. We didn't even have the name fintech at the time. That started in like 2016, 2017. but the first time we went out to raise capital, we put together a round and it totally fell apart. So we ended up raising$60 ,000. That was the first round that we ever did.

33:00Then we did like a very small, I think we raised$250 ,000. Then we were finally able to raise a seed round. And at the seed round, it was interesting because we'd pitched all these investors like two or three times and they said no to us two or three times. And then one of the new investors that we hadn't happened to pitch before ended up leading that round, which is great. didn't have the negative history, I guess. And then at the Series A, it was still tough, but we ended up getting maybe two term sheets at the Series A. Series B was a lot easier because we had metrics. And then the Series C, that's actually when the KP Growth Fund invested.

33:33Right. When you did the 60K round and it fell apart, what do you mean it fell apart? Like, people just got cold feet? Sort of. So we went out to raise half a million bucks. I think it's like 500k on a on a four million dollar post or something like that. And we've talked to a bunch of angel investors like the funds weren't really interested because we were too early. We were also living in New York at the time. And so like the New York funds were really, really looking for like a lot more traction than we had. We didn't know all the West Coast funds yet. But we put together this group of angels led by these two guys that were like pretty prolific angel investors, one in LA and one in New York.

34:19And then we ran out and got a bunch of other like little smaller checks put together. So the 500K round, like a week before we were supposed to close, I think we'd actually signed the docs at this point, like a week before we were supposed to close, the lead investor in LA calls and he says, hey, look, I can't do it. Like, I just don't, I don't believe in the space. Like I don't believe in kind of financial services and this platform idea. So when he left and the other New York I left and then everybody else left. And we felt it was irresponsible not to call everyone and tell them what was happening.

34:48So we called each of the investors and we said, hey, look, here's what's happened. The lead investors decided to step out of the deal. We still love to have your capital, but we don't have the full round. Now, it actually logically makes sense for a lot of those investors to walk away at that point because investing 50K into a business that has no other investments, that's not necessarily a good risk. But there were these three guys who each kind of independently said, no, don't worry about it. Just take the investment. Like, let's see where it goes. So two that did a 25K investment, one that did a 10K investment.

35:20And so there was 60K invested in the company. And they kept us alive for 12 months. So talk about being really frugal. We were living in New York. Who's my co-founder? Who was living on a friend's couch. And I, who like moved in with my very recent girlfriend, not my wife, but my very recent girlfriend in order to like not have to pay rent. and we like somehow kept this company alive, us and then an intern for enough time to get to like a larger seed round. But the funny story about this is that there are three guys, all three of them are named Justin. And so we would like have this internal joke of, you know, hey, we're making this big decision.

35:58Like how would the Justins think about that? How would the Justins like think about how we're using their capital? But weirdly, because we had so little capital, it really built this like this culture of frugality, this culture of like figure out how to go through things. I mean, obviously the idea for this podcast is grit. Like whenever people ask me for startup advice, I have very little that I can say because I think that, you know, for the most part, like each startup journey is unique and like, I don't have generalized advice. The only good thing that I have to say is like, don't die. And like, if we could survive for a year on$60 ,000 living in New York and like building the business, like that was a pretty good lesson that all we had to do was decide not to die and we'd keep going.

36:34And so my take is for most founders, the answer is just decide you're not gonna die. Like that's the first step to building a great company. And then when it's very obvious that you're going to die, if you've decided that it's not going to die, you'll push through it and it'll be just fine. And the Justins now are... Oh, we dropped the price on that round, by the way. So I think they invested like 60K on two and a half. So it's you, your co-founder. Are you hands-on keyboard? Like were you coding at the time? Yeah, we both were. You were both coding. You have an intern doing a bunch of stuff for you, whatever that is.

37:01No, he was an engineer too. He was an engineer too, also coding. Yes. And how long did the three of you, the rat pack, like make it, make it through until you hired somebody. I think it was like a year that New York, a year. Well, I think it's probably six months in New York. And then we moved the business to San Francisco. Um, so basically in this year, we, um, raised a little more money than we, um, uh, were able to get, uh, kind of commitments to a seed round. Um, and so we moved, we decided to move the business from New York to San Francisco. This was in 2013, 2014. There just weren't a lot of engineers in New York that we could hire.

37:39New York just didn't have the engineering community it does now. So we moved it to San Francisco, mostly because we knew more people out there. We thought we could actually hire people well. There's this one moment actually where we'd gotten the seed round. It was like Spark Capital and GV and NEA had invested in our seed round. The money had just hit the bank. We rented an office. It was like a 15-person office because we thought we needed to hire people. we move in the next day our intern goes back to college like he and he had taken like a semester off he had like a summer he just like stayed with us for a really long time he actually ended up coming back full-time but he had to go back for one semester in order to graduate because his parents really wanted him to graduate and so we go from three people to two people but we just put you know like two million dollars in the bank and we're like sitting this empty office looking at each other saying like what how do we build a business now we have money like what do we do that.

38:26Oh my God. But you know, we figured it out. We recruited some people. You know, your wife now is a real one. If she was willing to put up with your shit for those, those early days. Exactly. Yes. Yes. What during that year of New York fundraise moved to San Francisco, what else are you really doing? Like, is it all product work? Like, are you just writing code and trying to get this thing, get a V.1 off the ground? Yeah, so we were very focused on building the platform. I was by far the worst engineer of the group. So I got assigned, like, Zach, you go build our website, you build the front end, like you can write the API docs, like all of the stuff that was not like particularly complex coding.

39:11And then, you know, me having had basically no sales experience, I just decided, all right, the best way to contribute is to go talk to customers. And so that was me just like for probably like a year chasing every fintech meetup, every, you know, people in finance want to build stuff, calling everyone that I knew, talking to like I remember, I think I called YNAB, you need a budget. It was a budgeting tool at the time. I think I called them like, I think I probably said them like 20 emails before they finally responded and said, hey, please leave us alone. But also like, OK, interesting idea what you're working on.

39:45So it was really just like chasing and trying to find customers. They're now a customer, by the way. And what we found is when we'd moved to California, there was this like budding group of people that were thinking about building new products in SF. And then we had this previous network in New York. So the biggest one from the previous network was Venmo. So kind of a friend of a friend introduced us to the head of engineering at Venmo. He said that he wanted to buy the product. That was like one of the big inspirations for actually building the product in the way that we did. It then took a year to go through not Venmo, but Venmo had been acquired by Braintree, which had been acquired by PayPal, which had been acquired by eBay.

40:21eBay's procurement process. It took a year to go through eBay's procurement process so that Venmo could use the product. I've learned a lot about how not to run bad procurement processes. So that took a long time. And then on the West Coast, we met the Robinhood guys when I think there were five people. And they were saying, hey, we need to do this kind of account onboarding. Can you build it? Like, yeah, that's what we're building for Venmo. Let's create the same thing for you. So yeah, my time was doing a bad job of engineering and then talking to customers. And did Venmo commit and then you decided, let's go build this business?

40:53No. Or were you kind of jamming with them on what you thought you wanted to build? Yeah, so prior to Plaid, we built this consumer app, this bad consumer app. And then Venmo kind of came to us and said, hey, can we license the backend to that? And we said, yeah, maybe. And so we were going back and forth with them on how this backend would work. We kind of knew what we wanted to build. And they said, well, maybe we'd be interested. And then I went and found other customers that were our first customers. And then kind of following that, Venmo saw that a couple of people were starting to use it.

41:18And they said, yeah, we'll commit to actually buying this product. The back end? The back end, yeah. Okay. And then it took basically a year for them to actually turn it on. But yeah, throughout that year, it was great, actually. We built the integration with them. They gave us a bunch of feedback on it. So in some weird sense, you know, we did have them as a... Like a design partner. A design partner. Yeah, exactly. But we couldn't actually call them a customer because we hadn't signed it. At what point did you decide, I'm not going to die? Like, this company is not going to run out of money.

41:46Like, was there something that catalyzed this, like, wall in your brain that you were never going to move backwards from? Like, okay, now Venmo is going to work with us. We have to deliver it. Or now the interns on our team, like, we have to go do it. Like, at what point were you like, no way is this thing going to collapse? It took a long time. Like, I think to be totally honest, I think that I still have a like a lot of fire in like the belly because I think that like Plaid, we need to be operating as if we still could die. And we need to be pushing at the proper pace in order to go have a big impact on this industry.

42:25If we're stagnant, you know, bad things will happen to us. So we need to be pushing really quickly. And I think that was partially solidified through kind of a series of things that happened to us. So initially the round falls apart. Okay, we're going to die. Fast forward a little bit, going into our series A,

42:47we had two term sheets. We accepted one term sheet, but then we got sued by a company that, it was a competitor, we got sued for patent infringement, but it was a company that that fund had previously invested in. We thought they had no relation to them. They may have had no relation, but somehow the word got to that company that they should sue us. for patent infringement. So we got sued for patent infringement. That first term sheet disappeared. And then we had to go scramble and find the second term sheet and get them to still invest. And that was NEA, who I still to this day say they saved the company by investing at that point.

43:21So that was another instance where we were going to die. Then, you know, fast forward, there's like another instance where we're going to die before our Series B. Then we get the Series B. And like probably like around the time we raised the Series C, we were like it was valued at like two and a half billion at that point. That was when I started to say like, okay, maybe the company's not going to die, but we still need to act like it might. We still need to have this thought in the back of our mind of like, if we are not moving at sufficient pace, if we're not sufficiently scrappy and thoughtful and hardworking, we're going to stagnate and then the business is going to die.

43:52So I don't think that that feeling has fully gone away. This might be a silly question, but is the only existential threat in your mind running out of money? no of course not i mean businesses die for many reasons um but i think the the existential thought of running out of money in the earliest phase was very clear to us certainly you know there's this um there's this book and i can't speak for the whole book because i read a long time ago and i don't remember all the details but i remember the title um the book the title of the book is called pleased but not satisfied um and i think that's how i'd probably describe my management philosophy is that i'm pretty pleased with what we've accomplished like i'm pretty pleased with the business that we've built so far.

44:34I'm pleased with the things that we're shipping. And there's a lot of things to celebrate, but I'm absolutely not satisfied because I think the opportunity ahead of us is so great. And I think the threats to the business in the longer term can be very real if we're not continuing to move at the pace that we need to move. And so, you know, I'm deeply motivated by the mission. I think the impact that we can have on the world is like quite substantial. And I think we've only scratched the surface of that. So, you know, in a lot of senses, I'm very pleased with where we are, but it's certainly not satisfied.

45:02And this like dissatisfaction, is that how you are with everything or is that specifically to Plaid? I think if you ask my wife, she might tell you that it's kind of the same where, you know, we like I run a lot, like I do marathons and so forth. And like, yeah, I'm happy with the times that I'm getting, but I'm absolutely not satisfied with the times that I'm getting. I think, yeah, I need, it's probably better for me to like learn to turn this off a little bit in personal and social situations, but you know, it's built in. I did my first triathlon, maybe my last, but I did the escape from Alcatraz here.

45:36And I had this weird feeling before, like leading up to it, like the swim was the thing that I was just dreading. Like I do not want to swim from Alcatraz to shore. And I kept telling myself like, once it's over, you're just going to be really happy, really proud. Like it's going to be over and you're going to feel great. And then after it was done, I did not feel like that. Like I felt like, man, I probably could have gone faster. I was waiting too long between the swim and the bike. Like, why did I take so long on the run? Am I going to have to do this again to get like, you know? And I was like, what the hell?

46:11Like, there's just no winning. What's the saying? The reward for good work is more work. Right. It's like a cake eating contest and the reward is more cake. Yeah, exactly. Exactly. can you talk about the PNC bank stuff? No. Okay. All right, fine. Okay. Sorry. Maybe offline, because I do want to know about it. I have a few things that I do want to ask you that hopefully you can talk about. The first is, you said you built a shitty app before you built Plaid. We built a bunch of them. What does that mean? So the initial idea for Plaid is we wanted to build something that helps consumers live a better financial life.

46:56This was 2012, like late 2012, early 2013, living in New York. And around that time, it was the tail end of the Occupy Wall Street protests. It was a period, and setting aside the politics of all of that, it was pretty clear that consumers were frustrated with financial services. It was a period after the 2008 financial crisis where people were mad at their banks. and we being kind of like naive entrepreneurs said, all right, well, we want to build a tool to help people feel better about their finances. Like we want to build a tool so people feel more protected by the financial system. The first thing that we tried to build was a budgeting tool.

47:37We had seen Mint and when at the time, I think it wasn't on mobile devices. So we were like, all right, let's build a mobile version of Mint or let's build a more accessible version of Mint. And we had a bunch of signups. People were excited about the product. And then we had a bunch of people first turn off the notifications when we started telling them that they spent too much money on coffee and then delete the app and never come back. So V1 of the first idea we had was terrible. We then pivoted and said, all right, well, what other tools can we build to help consumers better understand their money?

48:08We built one that was about helping people find cheaper places to spend. So, hey, you're in this grocery store. There's a grocery store down the street that's cheaper. We would tell people that. and then they would respond by saying, yeah, I know it's cheaper. It's kind of crappy. I don't want to go to that grocery store. So again, another one that failed, had a lot of users and then didn't go anywhere. And this is you and your same co-founder? My co-founder, yeah. And then eventually this intern that we brought up. I call him the intern. His name is Michael. He's a really wonderful engineer. I guess I should give him a real shout out.

48:36He's not an intern anymore. No, he joined Flat. He was full-time with us for a long time. He's like a stud engineer.

48:45So that was another one. And we built a tool to help you make recommendations on like, hey, you spent in these places, you might like to spend in those places. We built a tool that put a play button over your entire financial life. So you hit play and it was like this magnifying glass on a map that would move around and zoom in every time you spent money in a place. So you could hit play on your vacation and you would see all the places you spent money in your vacation. It was kind of cool. That's actually kind of cool. Yeah, there's like a bunch of these things that got real traction and then immediately no more traction and couldn't monetize in any way.

49:16And so basically the unifying backend to all this is what ended up becoming Plaid, which is how do we get data from the banks? How do we make the data into kind of a format that can actually be useful? And that was around the time that our friend Peyton from Venmo came and said, Hey, can we license the backend? That might be interesting. Did you and your co-founder decide together, like, all right, come hell or high water, we're just going to try winter stuff until we make something work? Because the alternative of going back to Bain and doing consulting is just untenable? Well, we both quit. So we both had no job.

49:48You know, I think I don't know how great co-founder relationships are forged, but ours was uniquely great. Like co-founder is as determined as I am, like as focused as I am. He's a much better engineer than me. I'm probably a better salesperson than him. But like it was a thing where like we were in the same boat. Like neither of us had family money to fall back on. Neither of us had any backup job offers. we kind of knew that if we didn't make this thing successful, then we had to go interview at Google and try to get a job. And neither of us wanted to do that, like vehemently. And so we were just in this same boat.

50:25Like we had no money. We had to make this thing successful. And it was fun. You know, you look back at the early years of starting a company and, you know, the most fun is often those moments that are actually also the toughest. You know, you're in the office. I remember I had this period of time where, and we pushed each other really hard. We pushed ourselves really hard. We pushed each other really hard. And it's a period of time where I would take photos of New York at 2 a.m. every day because I would be walking home and the city would be totally empty and I thought it was so beautiful. And I'd send them to my co-founder.

50:56He'd send me one back. And this was just the zeitgeist that we built into the culture of this two-person, then three-person startup. But there is a great bond that's formed by going through hardship. And I think we were fortunate to go through that hardship together. And now, despite the fact that he's left the business, he's off to new things. We're still really, really close friends. And so I got so lucky in that co-founder relationship. I think it is much lonelier to have no co-founder, certainly. But people step up. And we've had execs that have become really, really close, that have taken on a really important part of the business, both structurally, but also emotionally.

51:32They're people that I can talk to. So it's been great to see that evolution. I read a quote. everything you read online is obviously true but tell me if this is true or not that this was you describing after the deal collapsed that you said there was a month or two where I actually just don't remember what happened because I slept so little the 2am comment reminded me of that yeah is that true yeah yeah this has happened a couple times but there's a particularly long one. Basically, like the first quarter of 2021, I don't remember very well. But I have photos of what I've done. Like, you know, my wife will remind me what's happened.

52:16But like, I don't have any real memories in that period of time. And it was largely because I was sleeping so little because I was just like, it was like, that was, again, max emotional management, working with a team, talking to people saying, hey, look, I understand you're not going to get the cash to buy that house. We will do a secondary as soon as we can. And by the way, here's why you should be so excited. And just on repeat, talking to everyone, trying to make sure that everybody gets the message. And the great, the great outcome is that like the vast majority of the team stayed, um, uh, the best for the team, you know, got excited about the future.

52:46Um, but man, that was the hardest period I think I've ever worked. Like you would come home and you would lay in bed awake or like, there was no coming home. I like we were in COVID. So like I was in my office, um, and I I would be like on these Zooms all night. Then I would like finish kind of like well after dinner talking to people. Then I would do actual work. And then I would fall asleep at like 2 a.m. and then be back up at 7. And so it's just like. And you were just so delirious. Yeah. From this schedule. You don't remember. Well, I mean, delirious or not. I don't know how I was acting.

53:17Like someone else could tell me how I was acting in that period of time. But it is now just a blank spot in my memory. That's insane. And it's happened before besides that period too. Yeah. Yeah, we have a tendency to push with a lot of hours sometimes. Damn. Do you... I don't think that's healthy, by the way. I don't think that other entrepreneurs should do that. No, I don't think you're glorifying it. This is not fun. And is it because you just feel the need? What is your rationale in that moment? Look, I don't think I realized it at the time. You're just in overdrive. Yeah, exactly. So, I mean, and I would say that most entrepreneurs are like this.

53:58If a big challenge presents itself and it's a challenge that needs to be solved, like they'll go all out to solve it. In this case, it was just it was very clear what I needed to do. And I was in large part the only one that could do a lot of these things in those periods of time. And so the answer is just do it. and you know had I realized that it was would have impacted my memory or like that that that loss of sleep for that period of time maybe you'd have longer term health effects I probably wouldn't have done it or maybe would have been a little bit more thoughtful about how I structured my time yeah but you know the problem in front of you yeah I just don't I mean like maybe you would have done something differently but also like isn't this the like double-edged sword of a fire that burns in your belly like that fire sometimes gets really hot you know like it doesn't you don't get to really decide and choose.

54:46Like, yeah, you know, it's, it's the entrepreneur thing. I mean, I think, I think a lot of entrepreneurs probably can empathize. Yeah. Um, there's another quote that I read. Um, it said, I, uh, I'm too busy to recruit. It's kind of like saying I'm too hungry to eat. I love that. Can you describe it? Yeah. I say that to my team a lot. So, um, you know, there, there are times when, uh, you're pushing really hard, you have huge goals and, um, then you also need to be recruiting because you have goals that will manifest maybe the next quarter or the quarter after that. And people will say like, hey, I'm going to cut back on the amount of recruiting that I'm doing in order to solve this challenge.

55:24And from time to time, that's the right answer, but it's pretty rare that that is the actual right answer. And so the conversation I have with the team is like basically that, like, hey, saying that you're too busy to recruit is like saying you're too hungry to eat. You may be busy right now, but if you don't eat, you're going to die. And so you may be busy right now, but if you're not recruiting, if you're not building the capacity of the organization over time, then obviously you're not going to be able to achieve the next goals and the next goals after that. That was particularly important in a period of hypergrowth.

55:55Now I talk to the team about that, but I also talk to them about building leverage. So right now we're going through this big AI transition in our business. Every job, I believe, will be AI enabled or it will not exist in 12 months. And I've been saying this to the team, the horizon was a little longer, but I've been saying this to the team for about a year. And so, you know, the rationale of, oh, I don't have time to go learn the AI tools is exactly the same thing. Like you don't have the time to build the leverage that you need to be very successful at your job in the longterm. Well, that logic doesn't really check out.

56:25So we built all these tools and processes internally, but it's also a bit of an ethos just saying like, build yourself the leverage that you need in order to be successful in the longterm. When you were going through hyper growth, how much time were you spending on recruiting? Probably 40%. Okay. Maybe 50 % in some periods. More from time to time, but... That's a lot. 40, 50 probably. That's a lot. Yeah. That's a pretty consistent answer that I hear. And I think it doesn't really settle in how much that is unless you really think about half of your working day is recruiting. That's a lot. it is um but you have to find a way to love it like i love recruiting that was one of the most fun things that i get to do and i started out hating recruiting um and the reason i hated it is like i felt like i was selling myself i felt like um you know if a person didn't want to come work for us then like that was on them um i i felt nervous to ask questions i felt nervous to be direct with people give direct feedback in these interviews um i felt nervous to like push people hard because like you know i didn't i felt like i didn't deserve their time at that point Now it's fully flipped for me.

57:32I get to talk to the most interesting people in the world. I get to ask them hard questions. I get to have a great conversation with them. I think that most people, or certainly hope that most people that I'm interviewing, walk away thinking like, oh, that was a really interesting conversation, come offer or no offer. I'm really happy that I had that conversation. And it's become a game, right? So recruiting becomes a game. You get to effectively draft your ideal fantasy roster, except there's no limit to your roster size. So you can find as many great people as you want to. and you get to put them on your fantasy team.

58:01And then this fantasy team gets to go out and tackle challenges and become friends and all this stuff. Another great aspect of recruiting that, you know, I didn't quite realize until a little further in my founder journey, but like as a founder, you get to build the environment around you. Like you get to choose who you spend your days with. You get to recruit people that you're going to learn from and be inspired by. And, you know, in almost no other job do you get to have that level of world building where you can create this wonderful environment for yourself and of course for everyone else, but you get to choose who's in that environment.

58:36And that for me has been super rewarding. Like I'm really close friends with a lot of the people that we've hired over the years. And it's a unique thing that I get to do. That's a very like profound way of describing it. Like it's your world that you just get to design. You're like Pokemon going and catching them all.

58:57When you talk about getting leverage from AI as a person on your team or whatever, how do you think about that as a CEO? Like, how do you think about what are you doing today that's different from what you were doing two years ago, taking advantage of some of these tech? I talked to Chad GPT far too much. It's become my friend. I've built custom GPTs to do all sorts of different things. I built my own exec coach. Are you serious? Yeah. What did you feed? I went and pulled a bunch of snippets from a bunch of books that I was inspired by. I pulled stuff from autobiographies. I pulled a bunch of podcast transcripts and so forth.

59:38I fed them into this custom GPT. And I was like, hey, you are an exec coach. I gave it a certain set of parameters that I wanted to coach me on. And then I just talked to it every now and then. It helps me work through problems sometimes. It's not perfect by any stretch, but it gets you a unique view of it. But also at one point, there's this like, this guy that I'd never met, but I love his books, this guy named Josh Waitzkin. And he's like, you know, the exec coach to the most impressive people out there. He'll never be my exec coach, right? Playa's not a big enough business. Like I don't run like a trillion dollar hedge fund or something like that.

1:00:13But I fed a bunch of his stuff into it. And I was like, now you're the Josh Waitzkin exec coach. Like, please coach me. And it was kind of cool. Like, you know, having read his books, it feels like it got somewhat close. So those are some of the more fun things. But philosophically for the organization, it's just, it's making the clear statement, like, hey, everybody is an AI-enabled version of themselves. So to our engineering team, some companies historically had this concept of like an applied AI engineer. And we have the expectation that every engineer is an applied AI engineer. We originally tried the applied AI team, But then we were like, no, no, this needs to be everybody.

1:00:50And so it's just making really clear what the expectation is of everybody. Everybody should be innovating. Everybody should be learning and then setting aside dedicated time to go learn about it. So we do these AI days, both company wide and then as a team. And then we back those up with with hackathons where like we'll do AI day where we'll teach you a bunch of stuff. You have time to go learn. And then a month later, after you played with the tools, we'll do a hackathon where you go deep and build something. And we've massively increased the number of both AI days and the kind of training days and hackathons that we do this year.

1:01:17And I think we'll continue that into next year with the expectation that our workforce is going to be fundamentally different in how they do the work by the end of next year. If you were a betting man three years from now, does that hack count go up, down or flat? Up, probably. It doesn't go up at the pace that it might have in a different era. So, you know, seeing the increased efficiency coming out of our engineering team, we don't need to hire new engineers at the pace that we did before. But we will continue to hire engineers and we will continue to see the efficiency gains improve. So the net output of the organization will be as much, if not much greater than what it would have been had we hired at the pace that we did, call it, a couple years ago.

1:01:54I think a thousand people is quite a lean. It's like a pretty lean organization, given what you all are doing. We try to be fairly lean. Yeah. Do you buy this perspective that all organizations are going to be half the size down in headcount? Not, I can't speak for all organizations and I certainly can't speak for companies outside of Silicon Valley. Because, you know, I don't know how the insides of an accounting firm or a law firm work. And there I do think there will be meaningful job changes. But in our business, like, and in all of the other startups that I know, if you can do more, you're going to do more.

1:02:32and if you can afford to hire more people in order to do more and the leverage that you get out of those people is dramatically larger, you're going to just build more stuff. You're going to create more products. You're going to add more value for your customers. And so I think that the insatiable demand of doing more, building more, creating better products for customers and so forth, that'll continue. And I would expect that startup headcount will continue to grow. I can't speak for big companies, but certainly for us, if I can hire an engineer that's twice as efficient, that sounds great. That's a great deal.

1:03:01I should hire that engineer and then build products that generate far more value for the company. I appreciate you doing this. Thank you. Of course. And I'm sorry again for the delay. That's okay. Are you, speaking of hiring, where are you hiring? What are you hiring for? Any key roles that you want to shout out? I mean, we're hiring for basically everything in New York and San Francisco, especially engineering, go to market in both places. And we just opened a Raleigh office. So if you know any amazing salespeople in Raleigh, we're building a sales office there. Cool. When you hear the word grit, what do you think of?

1:03:39You know, I, this is maybe a weird answer to it, but like, I think of those periods of, you know, the hardest that you push, but also the most fun that you have, you know, impossible challenge in front of you. You know, I, and I think I speak for a lot of founders when I say it, like, that's the moment where you're the most alive. You see something that's that's that's totally impossible to do. And you're like, yeah, I'm gonna go figure out how to do it anyway. Great answer, Zach. Thank you. Thanks for having me. That's it for now. If you liked the episode, please leave us a review or go back into the archives where we've done more than 200 episodes with some fantastic folks.

1:04:15This podcast is a client of Perkins production, and I'm Juven. Thanks for listening.

1:04:25you

From the publisher

Zach Perret saw a fintech explosion coming—and built the rails before it arrived.

On this week’s Grit, the Plaid co-founder and CEO retraces his path from building tools for developers to linking the world’s largest banks, and how a failed $5.3B acquisition by Visa became a launchpad.

He unpacks the pressure of operating in a tightly regulated industry, why rebuilding trust after the deal collapse was harder than expected, and how Plaid is navigating the shift from startup to staple—while staying obsessed with the end user.

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