The West's Forgotten War and the New Russia | Mark Galeotti

22:43Again, Ukrainians are not putting figures out, except occasionally President Zelensky has given some figures, which frankly, even the more Ukraine sympathetic analysts I have spoken to within UK and other governments do not regard those figures as credible. And it's not a criticism of him. I mean, clearly this is an existential conflict for Ukraine and sometimes you have to keep certain information secret. Well, also we're going to have a chance to talk about the other

23:08Demetri Kofinas:war, which is the propaganda war. Right now we're discussing the kinetic war, but the propaganda war is as important, if not more important. So look, we know that Ukraine has suffered, obviously far fewer casualties than the Russians, despite those people who claim that somehow Ukraine has absorbed more. It hasn't. But nonetheless, proportionate to its remaining population, actually, it may well be that Ukraine is suffering a higher casualty rate. But in part, that's precisely because there's been this massive exodus of millions of refugees who have headed to Europe and indeed beyond, mainly, but not entirely, women and children.

23:43And as a result, in order to feed the war effort, we see that Ukraine is increasingly adopting a model of recruitment that frankly looks a lot like press gagging, the so-called busification, whereby officers from the local military commissariat will stop people on the streets, grab them, throw them into buses and drive them off. And we often get, you can see all sorts of videos on the net of crowds actually mobilizing to try and stop these potential soldiers from being dragged away. So it is a difficult situation. And as regards the economy, well, in many ways, the economy is on life support. It is actually being funded predominantly by the Europeans.

24:27And the Europeans essentially are covering the cost of the civil side of the Ukrainian government. and a large proportion of its defense expenditures too. So, yes, there's all sorts of dynamism still to be found, ranging from the coffee shops that still exist on the street corners up to these tremendously successful corporations which have emerged to actually provide drones and missiles and other necessary kit for the Ukrainian military. But in some ways, it's operating within a rather artificial economy. And it's very hard, therefore, to judge precisely what would happen if, God forbid, suddenly that external assistance was withdrawn, but it certainly wouldn't be pretty.

25:11Demetri Kofinas:How would you describe the state of Western support for the war? And how does that vary between country to country, not just between Europe and the United States, but within Europe itself? Yeah. I mean, obviously, one has to touch on Europe versus the United States first, which is actually that the United States essentially is no longer really providing concrete military assistance, though it is still providing intelligence. And that is absolutely crucial, targeting packages, which are central to the Ukrainian long-range strikes deep into Russia. It's questionable. What kind of assistance was it providing before we got to where we are now?

25:45Demetri Kofinas:Help me understand how significant the change has been under this administration. The change has been pretty significant. I mean, originally we actually had direct military assistance, in other words, stuff being given to the Ukrainians, all sorts of different pieces of kit, as well as preferential access to being able to buy things, not just for the Ukrainians, but for other countries, primarily Europeans, who wanted to buy kit for Ukraine. Now, what we find is essentially that there isn't any more of that kind of direct aid. There is still the Pearl system, which again allows, for example, European countries to buy a certain amount of kit to give to the Ukrainians.

26:23But essentially, why would America not want to just simply sell military equipment? But there actually, it does look as if the priority access has been dramatically weakened so that in a way, Europeans have to get in line. And we're seeing this, for example, with Patriot interceptor missiles, where actually now the priority is for the United States to restock its magazines because of the Gulf War, but also its Gulf allies who have been shooting off vast numbers of these interceptors. So that means that there's just not that many for others to be bought. So that's the Europe versus America situation.

27:00Europe, I mean, there is, we have to say, a lot of money being spent. And a lot of it is precisely just in terms of financial assistance to keep the Ukrainian system afloat. It's getting harder and harder to provide military assistance. Again, in the early days of the war, what happened is a lot of militaries essentially just emptied their storage of, frankly, rather dated systems that they either were planning to replace or had already sort of phased out in existence and were sort of sitting, beginning to gently rot in storage meadows around. So you had a lot of, frankly, second order kit being provided, but obviously, from Ukraine's point of view, everything was gratefully accepted.

27:43Then you had a certain amount of more advanced equipment, things like two tanks and so forth, which are being provided, but which was beginning to make European militaries feel rather uncomfortable because they were worrying about how far they were actually giving up their own stocks. I mean, Britain basically, for example, handed over almost all its self-revelled artillery. And so now we have a situation in which European countries, which are after all committed to increasing their defence expenditures up to 3.5 % as part of a sort of common NATO agreement, 3.5 % of GDP. On the one hand, trying to buy stuff for their own militaries, but also trying to source things for the Ukrainians.

28:25And I suspect that actually the former too often tends to get priority. And in terms of the variation, I mean, it is pretty massive. There are countries, particularly for example, Scandinavian countries or the Baltic countries, which clearly the Baltic countries are much smaller with smaller budgets, but nonetheless have given much more in terms of military aid as well as financial. And other countries, and I wouldn't want to point the finger at countries like, say, Spain. But anyway, and there are other countries which have been much, much less generous in what they provide. But that's also in part because if you're on the Mediterranean tier of Europe, there is a real debate about where does the genuine security threat come from?

29:07If you're Estonia, you have no doubt that Russia is the potential threat, and therefore the longer Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, the happier you are. If you are Spain or Italy or indeed Greece, actually you see the real threat as coming from the Middle East, North African region. And actually, I've talked to people within the various military structures there who actually are quite peeved. they feel that NATO is ignoring their security concerns just to look at the eastern flank. So it's not just simply whether they're impoverished or whether they're mean, it is also that actually they had different concerns.

29:48Demetri Kofinas:So where is their agreement among the most important actors in this war, the most important European nation states and the United States on what would be described as a Russia strategy? Yeah. I mean, I think the honest answer is there isn't a Russia strategy. There is a Ukraine war strategy, which for many is one and the same, but I would suggest actually we should be much more directly disaggregating. I mean, in terms of the war, there is essentially an agreement to continue with the status quo. I don't think there's any real enthusiasm for increasing the level of commitment, whether we're talking about financial commitment or whether we're talking about boots on the ground or anything like that.

30:35But on the other hand, I don't think there's anyone who is seriously suggesting any kind of scaling down the commitment. So, I mean, actually, the irony is that at the moment, Russia, Ukraine, and Europe are all really just sort of running in neutral. They're continuing their main line, hoping in effect that it's the other side that breaks first. But of course, in Europe, it's worth noting that we have a certain amount of political churn, likely. I mean, if one thinks of the three key European countries, France, Germany, and Britain, Britain has just got a new prime minister who is saying all the right things about supporting Ukraine, but he also has all kinds of other ambitions about building a social care service and such, which is going to cost money, and he's going to have to find that money somewhere.

31:28So there are some concerns about what other money will be available for defence in Ukraine. In France, President Macron is pretty much embattled, and there are elections coming up next year. And essentially, it's quite likely that there will be a change of government. And if that change of government is for the far right movement of Mrs. Le Pen, well, she's very Ukraine sceptic. And likewise, in Germany, Chancellor Mertz is equally in battles and you've got the rise of the right-wing AFD movement, which again is not very happy about the idea of supporting Ukraine. So unfortunately, it may well be that in the next 12 months, we see a certain amount of questioning of the support for Russia amongst those three countries.

32:12And if they start to look wobbly, Other countries, frankly, are probably more lukewarm anyway, like Italy, they might well seize on that as an excuse. Say, well, we can't make up the shortfall, so we too should start to pull back.

32:28Demetri Kofinas:So it seems to me that going back to this question of strategy, if we're just focusing on the Ukraine-Russia war strategy, it seems that the strategy on the part of the Europeans is more domestically geared. In other words, the strategy for the war itself seems to be defined increasingly by Ukraine. And the focus in Europe is how do we support Ukraine? And then how do we convince our population to continue to support Ukraine? How do we find the funds to continue to support Ukraine? And Ukraine's strategy seems to be essentially, how do we apply enough pressure on Putin and incremental pressure now increasingly attacks into Russia to force him to the negotiating table?

33:05Demetri Kofinas:And how do we do so in a way that won't alienate the Europeans, that convinces them also of both the importance of the war and also our own importance as a long-term geostrategic ally on Europe's Eastern flank? And that is kind of what the strategy looks like. Fill in any kind of missing gaps for me or correct anything that I've misidentified there. No, I think you've actually done a very good job of summarizing the current situation. I think the only point I would make is a little element of nuance is from the Ukrainians' point of view, and maybe I'm going to put this a little bit too starkly, they don't trust Europe.

33:42They are tremendously grateful for all the assistance that has been provided. But the point is, Zelensky's job is not just simply to be a war leader, but in many ways also to be a cheerleader. He has to constantly struggle to make sure that Western countries continue at the very least with their current level of support. And hopefully, from his point of view, he would like to push it even further. So even if one looks at the current campaign of deep strikes in Russia, it was pushed by a whole variety of different reasons and timing likewise. Part of it, though, was precisely at a crucial point to try and convince both Donald Trump and the Europeans that, in fact, Ukraine was resurgent, that in some ways it was a winner and therefore deserve to be backed.

34:34So in some ways, there is always this distorting factor, this sense of not just how can we make sure that we don't alienate Europe, but also how do we keep Europe engaged? And how do we essentially not let the Europeans off the hook? And that's really quite a challenge. And in some ways, I think it's becoming an increasing challenge because the longer the war goes on, on one level, it just gets normalized. But in some ways, people to accept that, well, there's going to be a certain amount of their budget that they're going to be paying to keep Ukraine going. End of story. But on the other hand, it also begins to run the risk of essentially coming off the front pages.

35:13This was something that, again, speaking to Ukrainians, they were very worried about when the whole Gulf conflict emerged, because suddenly Ukraine was no longer big news. Another drone hitting a school or whatever, which once upon the time would have been front page news and keep people engaged and outraged, now was related to two column entries on page seven because there was other big stuff happening. So that is a key struggle for Ukraine, it has to be said.

35:41Demetri Kofinas:Yeah. I'm actually glad that you brought up the media aspect of the story because while it may be a backstory in Europe, it's really become a non-story in the US. And that's been in no small part due to this administration and the strident tone that it's taken from the outset, not just against Europe, but against Ukraine. And I still don't really understand what exactly this administration wants from Ukraine. I mean, Trump came into office, energized to do a deal with Russia. He even had that infamous meeting with Zelensky in the Oval Office where he dressed him down in front of the cameras. And oddly enough now, it feels like since then, relations with Kiev have actually improved somewhat.

36:19Demetri Kofinas:So what exactly is US policy vis-a-vis Ukraine at the moment? And how does it fit into US grand strategy? I mean, what is your mind on this? Yeah. I mean, I think everyone would love to know the answer to that question. I mean, seriously, it is clear that essentially the White House first and foremost would like this whole problem to go away. It's not a problem. I mean, although sometimes the White House relishes a crisis because it gives the opportunity for sort of grand heroic action and such like, because this hasn't proven amenable to the kind of quick fixes that I think Trump had in mind when he first came into office.

37:02I think he did think that he would be able to very quickly solve this. I don't think it was just his rhetoric. He did think so. And that therefore he could kind of gain all the kudos for being the man who resolved the crisis that previous Democrat administrations hadn't. Well, that didn't work out. And therefore, in some ways, it's become, in many ways, I would say, geopolitical inconvenience. Now, in that context, again, early Trump seemed to feel that the best route to a quick resolution was to bully Ukraine into accepting an ugly deal with Russia. And I think that was part of the thinking behind that Oval Office mugging.

37:44Since then, it's been demonstrated, A, that Ukrainians aren't willing to accept this, B, that the Europeans have been actually backing the Ukrainians in this front. But C, also that in fact, Ukraine isn't without cards, to use Trump's own rhetoric. And therefore, I think in some ways, what we see is a White House that feels a little bit rootless in this context, because likewise, it's not in a position to bully the Russians into making a deal on Kiev's terms. Russia is too strong and Trump still has this odd genuflection towards Putin. I think not necessarily just Putin. I think it comes down to it.

38:27Trump likes strong men. And again, that was part of how Zanetsky managed to sell himself after all. So I think in that context, really, again, there isn't, to my knowledge and opinion, a clear US strategy other than just simply, well, at the moment, it's not really costing us anything. At the moment, it's not really demanding anything from us. At the moment, we don't need anything from the Russians that the Russians could demand anything for. So let's just outsource this to Europe and see what happens.

39:02Demetri Kofinas:So I don't want to sound naive here, but I genuinely don't know the answer to this question. I don't really understand the extent of the antagonism toward Europe coming out of Washington. I understand the desire for burden sharing. I understand the desire to offload as much cost as possible to the Europeans. That makes total sense to me. What I don't understand is the antagonism. Do you think that's part of a strategic effort to force the Europeans to take on more and more of the burden of their own security and the burden of funding this war? Help me really understand why relations between the Europeans and Washington has become so contentious?

39:42Demetri Kofinas:Do you think it's largely political or is there a calculus here to get the Europeans to do more? Look, I'm no Trump whisperer. I mean, so this is just my own personal opinion, but don't regard you or your listeners shouldn't regard it as one that is rooted in deep insider DC knowledge. But I mean, my sense is that first of all, for this administration, the personal is political and vice versa. I think Trump himself has this notion of Europe that he's key questions, it's moral values and so forth. Secondly, he feels that it has been for a long time freeloading off the United States, which he has a bit of grounds for saying so.

40:26I mean, certainly in terms of defense and security, Europe has just allowed itself just a shelter under the American security umbrella without really paying enough attention to it itself. And he also feels that the Europeans don't know their place. Again, I think he has this very, frankly, 19th century notion of the world, which is something that he shares with Putin, interestingly, which is one of the reasons why the two men can actually engage, which is essentially that there are a handful of serious players in the world scene. And everyone else, the only question is, whose sphere of influence do they fall in?

41:03And from his point of view, Europe is part of America's sphere of influence, and those damn Europeans ought to realize that. How dare they snigger at him and his fashion and redevelopment choices? How dare they not immediately accept when he says that they should be doing X, Y, and Z? How dare they criticize the human rights record of his administration? How dare they not support his war in the Gulf? I mean, all of these, I think, provide personal animus that then gets manifest in political. But also, this is part of a much, much longer trend. Yes, it's almost caricature, but nonetheless, it is part of America pivoting away from Europe.

41:46Europe is no longer the linchpin of the world. And speaking as a European, I'm not sure if I should regret that or be delighted. But America is pivoting towards Asia, and it's pivoting more towards, I think, global issues. Well, in the sense of - It doesn't seem that it is. Well, threat wise, America does not really regard Russia as a threat so much as China.

42:07Demetri Kofinas:But it's pivoting into the Middle East. It is ostensibly pivoting into the Middle East. It's giving, there has been lip service allocated toward the Asian theater, but look at where the resources are being spent. This administration, you're absolutely right. But in some ways, I think it follows conflict and again, follows personal relationships. But broadly speaking, America over the years has been firstly signaling that it's dissatisfied with picking up the tap for securing Europe. Secondly, that actually it feels that Europe is not seriously under threat. If we're talking about the European Union, obviously not Ukraine.

42:42And then thirdly, saying that actually it does need to reallocate attention and resources tend to follow attention to elsewhere in the world. So, I mean, what we're getting is something that was handled on a much, much more diplomatic level by previous administrations, now looking like some kind of dramatic shift, but in fact, just simply being a sort of an exaggeration and acceleration, I would say, of an existing process. But when it comes down to it, this is an imperial White House. And what Trump happens to feel, who he thinks is his friend and who he thinks is his enemy and who he thinks is just simply an

43:22Demetri Kofinas:insufficiently servile lackey that matters. Have you read Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan's book, Regime Change? I haven't yet. I haven't yet. It's sitting on the shelf along with far too many others. It's not sitting on my shelf yet because I'd rather have it sent to me for free, an agreed upon interview, which I would much prefer, though I would read it anyway. A very wise move. It seems fantastic. And they've given just wonderful interviews. There was one recently with Ezra Klein and Maggie Haberman and another one with Tim Dillon, believe it or not, who actually was just surprised me just how good of an interviewer he was in that conversation.

43:55Demetri Kofinas:We'll put a pin in that for now. Maybe we'll revisit some of the palace intrigue later. One last question before I pivot to Putin. Do you think that we will look back in time and whether or not we agree that there was a strategic effort to get the Europeans to burden share by antagonizing them, that Trump and the way that he approached the Europeans was ultimately necessary to get them to take on more and more of the responsibility for their own security. I wish I could disagree, to be brutally honest, but I think it did take something particularly shocking. I mean, look, I was at the Munich Security Conference where Vice President J.D.

44:37Vance famously gave this very, again, very combative speech, essentially taking the Europeans to task for, as he saw it there, their failure to uphold basic values and such like. And it was a fascinating case study in European responses that almost went through that kind of classic arc of grief, through bargaining and denial, through to acceptance, just in the course of one weekend. And I think it really did signal to Europeans, not that they were now, they had to consider themselves to be the lackeys of the United States or anything like that, of course not. But nonetheless, that things were changing.

45:22That the old hope that you can just mollify Washington by saying, yes, yes, we really need to address this and we take this terribly seriously and then do precious little. Actually, we're not going to work with this particular administration.

45:37Demetri Kofinas:I agree with you. And I think that the inertia evident in large European capitals to invest in their collective defense proportionate to the threat that they face is evidence for that. Mark, I want you to put on your Putin analyst hat for a moment, because I have a lot of questions I want to ask you about him. Let's start with his decision-making. What is the logic under which Putin operates? Help us understand what you think motivates him and the forces driving his decision-making. Well, I think the first point I'd make is to actually underscore something that you just said, the logic by which he operates in that you will get some people who say, oh, Putin is just a lunatic and a power hungry megalomaniac or whatever.

46:21I mean, he's clearly not a nice chap by any means, but he is a rational actor. However, like all rational actors, his decisions will be shaped by often incomplete or inaccurate information, by prejudices and crass misunderstandings of realities and by his own kind of needs at the moment. First and foremost, what does Putin care about? Putin cares about Vladimir Putin and his own actual survival, his political survival, and the ease of his life.

46:58Demetri Kofinas:Oh, that's a really interesting point, that very last one. I've never heard anyone actually put it that way, but that tracks. Well, I mean, this is not a workaholic. I mean, he does what he needs to do. He's not like one of the totally pointless leaders like Leonid Brezhnev in his later years. But nonetheless, it's known that he gets up very late. He does his swim, has breakfast before he does a bit of work. He summons everyone to him on his timeframe and such like. He doesn't travel much these days because he frankly can't be bothered. Why bother going to go and meet the Ahoy polloi. You are in control of this country.

47:32You don't need to win any real elections. I think one has to realize the extent to which there are those leaders who are clearly driven and who need to produce and to create and to build something. And there are those leaders who actually just think the purpose of being a leader is to enjoy yourself. And I think Putin is much more on the latter. Yes, he does want to see a strong, united, sovereign Russia, but he's not an ideologist by any means. He doesn't have some kind of grand, greater vision of the world. He seizes whatever rationalization is convenient. So I think his logic, therefore, is driven very much exactly by the needs of survival.

48:19And particularly because, and this is something that I've been thinking about in some ways. Look, I've been watching this guy since before he was president. I've spoken to people who have engaged with him personally and such like. And I do think that if there's one fundamental driving principle in Putin and his character, it is insecurity. This is a man who has gone through his entire life desperately looking to find security, whether it was when he was running with street gangs as a kid in the still war rubbled ruins of what was then Leningrad. He joined the KGB because he wanted to be sword and shield of the Communist Party, but because it seemed to be the biggest gang in town.

49:00And since then, he's constantly, I think, prioritized security over everything else. Now, the trouble is he stumbled into this war in February 2022, certain it was going to be a quick and easy operation. Again, totally wrong. But in hindsight, now that we have a better sense of what he was being told by his own people, his security agencies and so forth, actually, that makes, I mean, I don't want to say it makes sense, but one can understand the logic behind it. But now he's stuck in this war. And again, I think from his point of view, he's desperate to ensure that he survives it as best as possible.

49:41And the only question is, what does he think is going to be the best route to that kind of survival? Who and what is informing his perception of how this war is going? Well, look, institutionally, one can point to various things. We know, for example, that part of his routine, the first thing he does when he starts his working day, he gets three briefing books. One from the Federal Security Service, the Domestic Security Agency, on what's going on inside the country. one from the Foreign Intelligence Service on what's happening in the world, and one from the Federal Protection Service, which is like his kind of Praetorian Guard, on what's happening within the elite.

50:18And in some ways, they shape his vision of the day. So, you know, all the other people are going to come in and breed him and so forth. He's already, in some ways, got his assumptions ready. He clearly listens to people like his Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin. But these guys, I think we have to realise they are not Putin's friends. They're not the people who Putin trusts. They are Putin's staff. I've often drawn the comparison that essentially Prime Minister Mishustin is basically the head butler of the Putin country estate. His job is to make everything run smoothly for the interests of the master of the house.

50:54The people who Putin actually seems to listen to most assiduously and trusts the most are his long-term old friends. These are people who he was in the KGB with, or he was in Leningrad with, or in the St. Petersburg City Administration with back in the 1990s. And these on the whole are not within government. Now, after all, if you are a confidant of Putin's, if you're one of his mates, why bother getting a tedious, demanding government job when you could just become phenomenally rich by him handing you some state corporation, some sweetheart contracts and whatever else. On the whole, these are very wealthy.

51:35You could almost call them autogarques. I don't like that term. I think it's no longer really that valid. But anyway, these are rich guys who, on the whole, don't give interviews. They don't talk widely about how they feel. But for them, they all need to keep Putin there. He is their protector, their krisha, their roof in Russian parlance, and he's their meal ticket. I mean, we know that, for example, back in 2008, when Putin sort of stepped away from the presidency to become prime minister just to get around term limits, though he was still running the show, he clearly was contemplating not returning to the presidency.

52:11And one of the key factors convincing him to come back seems to have been these guys, for whom actually the prospect of Putin no longer being president was terrifying. And these people, as I say, they are not specialists. They are not professionals. They are driven by their own passions and prejudices. And you end up with Putin in this echo chamber of people who are more likely to tell him what he wants to hear rather than what he needs to hear. We certainly know that people who actually do try and stand up to him, like his former lead negotiator with the Ukrainians, Dmitry Kozak, actually get frozen out.

52:49And Kozak himself left the presidential administration clearly thinking, wow, there's no point to my

52:54Demetri Kofinas:being here. So Mark, I have so many more questions that I want to ask you. I'm going to move the second hour of this conversation onto the premium feed. Let me give our listeners an idea of where this conversation is going. First, I want to wrap up this line of questions. Specifically, Basically, I want to understand what Putin needs in order to arrive at a negotiated settlement that ends this war. And I want to understand, though I know it's a big question to ask, how Putin holds and exercises power and what this can tell us about potential lines of succession, should he pass away unexpectedly or should he even be forced to step down?

53:31Demetri Kofinas:I would also like to discuss how the war in Ukraine has led to innovations on the battlefield, be those technological or tactical, and how this has increased the fitness of the Russian army and the likelihood, as has been reported, that Putin may attempt to challenge Article 5 through a limited ground incursion or step up in hybrid warfare against a NATO country in the next few years, as well as how the war has influenced the larger geostrategic picture and rivalry between the US and China, and how events there interact with other theaters like the Middle East and Asia. And I want to make sure that we end with a discussion about what post-war Russia looks like, because at some point this war will end.

54:16Demetri Kofinas:And whether there's any reasonable hope at the conclusion of this conflict that the West can reconcile its relationship with Russia, or if its increased dependency on China is going to deepen this pre-existing path dependency in ways that survive even Putin's time in office. For anyone new to the program, Hidden Forces is listener supported. We don't accept advertisers or commercial sponsors. The entire show is funded from top to bottom by listeners like you. If you want access to the second hour of today's conversation with Mark, head over to hiddenforces.io slash subscribe and sign up to one of our three content tiers.

54:55Demetri Kofinas:All subscribers gain access to our premium feed, which you can use to listen to the rest of today's conversation on your mobile device using your favorite podcast app, just like you're listening to this episode right now. Mark, stick around. We're going to move the second hour of our conversation onto the premium feed. If you want to listen in on the rest of today's conversation, head over to hiddenforces.io slash subscribe and join our premium feed. If you want to join in on the conversation and become a member of the Hidden Forces Genius community, you can also do that through our subscriber page.

55:32Demetri Kofinas:Today's episode was produced by me and edited by Stylianos Nicolaou. For more episodes, you can check out our website at hiddenforces.io. You can follow me on Twitter at Kofinas, and you can email me at info at hiddenforces.io. As always, thanks for listening. We'll see you next time.