In short
Masters in Business Podcast Summary
Episode Title
Building a Global Private Credit Firm and 'Trading' Planes with Victor Khosla
Host
Barry Ritholtz
Guest
Victor Khosla, Founder and CIO of Strategic Value Partners (SVP)
---
Episode Overview In this episode, Barry Ritholtz engages in an extensive discussion with Victor Khosla, an influential figure in the finance world, particularly in distressed debt investing. Khosla, who founded SVP in 2001, shares insights from his vast experience in the private equity and credit sectors, discussing the evolution of distressed debt, the impact of current market conditions, and the complexities of managing hard asset investments like real estate and aircraft.
---
Key Topics Discussed
- Victor Khosla's Background
- Education:
- Bachelor of Commerce with honors from Delhi University
- Master's in Economics from Vanderbilt
- MBA from the University of Chicago
- Career Path:
- Created distressed debt departments at Citibank and Merrill Lynch.
- Transitioned from proprietary trading to founding SVP.
- Distressed Debt Investing
- Market Evolution:
- Khosla highlights the emergence of a loan trading business in the early 1990s.
- The transition from buying distressed debt to taking control of companies through their debt emerged as a key strategy.
- Operational Involvement:
- SVP's model includes buying debt to take control of businesses and implementing operational transformations.
- Current Investment Landscape
- Impact of Rising Rates:
- Khosla discusses how increases in interest rates are affecting leveraged companies and causing operational distress.
- He notes an impending maturity wall in the next few years that could significantly impact the market.
- Opportunistic Investments:
- As a distressed debt investor, Khosla sees a robust pipeline of opportunities as companies face financial challenges.
- Diverse Asset Management
- Hard Assets:
- Khosla explains SVP's investments in various sectors, including infrastructure (toll roads, ferries), real estate, and aircraft.
- Discusses the management of aircraft investments during downturns and the strategic acquisition of planes during market disruptions like COVID-19.
- Global Expansion and Market Leadership
- Growth of SVP:
- Launched in 2001 with $110 million, SVP has grown to manage approximately $19 billion today.
- The firm operates extensively in Europe, where Khosla notes that there are more opportunities due to frequent economic challenges.
- Future Outlook
- Khosla expresses optimism about the future of distressed debt investing, emphasizing the importance of operational expertise in navigating upcoming challenges in the market.
---
Key Takeaways
- Distress as Opportunity: The investment landscape is currently rich with potential due to rising rates and financial stress in various sectors, particularly in leveraged companies.
- Operational Control: Khosla emphasizes the importance of actively managing businesses rather than merely trading debt, which involves improving operational efficiencies and strengthening management teams.
- Global Perspective: SVP's approach to investing in Europe is driven by a recognition of the frequent economic challenges that lead to investment opportunities.
- Education and Preparation: For those interested in entering the field of distressed debt or credit investing, Khosla advises hard work, adaptability, and the development of both analytical and interpersonal skills.
---
Conclusion This episode offers a deep dive into the complexities of distressed debt investing and the strategies employed by Victor Khosla at Strategic Value Partners. Through his experiences and insights, listeners gain a better understanding of the current financial landscape and the operational strategies needed for success in the investment world.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00I'm Hannah Fry, and as we rely more and more on artificial intelligence in every facet of our lives and businesses, I'm on a mission to find out how we can build the internet the internet. Learn more later in the podcast. Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts, radio, news. This is Masters in Business with Barry Ritholtz on Bloomberg Radio. This week on the podcast, yet another extra special guest. Victor Khosla, founder, CIO of the$19 billion Strategic Value Partners. Victor has had a fascinating career, stood up the distressed debt department at Citibank before doing the same thing at Merrill Lynch a few years later.
0:52He also spent time at Cerebus and More Capital before launching his own firm in 2001. They do everything from hard assets like real estate, infrastructure, aircraft, power plants, to private debt, event-driven opportunities. Europe accounts for anywhere between a third and a half of their investments. They have a number of businesses that they've taken over through the debt side of the equation, 15 businesses with over 90 ,000 employees. He's really just a fascinating person who has seen the distressed debt business from day one. He was there at the creation and has taken it to all sorts of really interesting places.
1:40I found this conversation to be absolutely fascinating. If you're at all interested in things like hard debt and what distressed asset buying is like and what it's like to take over a company, not through its equity, but through its defaulted debt. I think you'll find this to be an absolutely fascinating conversation. I know I did. With no further ado, my discussion with strategic value partners, Victor Kostla. Victor Kostla, welcome to Bloomberg. Thank you. Thanks for having me, Bob. So I skimped over a lot of your CV. We'll get to some more details in a little while. Let's just start with your educational background.
2:22Bachelor of Commerce with honors from Delhi University, a master's in economic from Vanderbilt, and then an MBA from the University of Chicago. So is it safe to say finance was always in the career plans? Oh, gosh, yes. From the beginning. Finance and business was always in the career plans. Running a$19 billion private equity opportunistic credit firm was not. Right? It isn't like that was the plan 40 years ago. You just tack into what was working and continue to build on it. Talk a little bit about your professional experience because I find it absolutely fascinating. You're relatively young in your career when you're at Citibank or was it Citigroup then?
3:11I can't keep track. And you essentially created their distressed debt department. Tell us about that experience. And what was that, 25, 30 years ago? Maybe more. It was more. It was 30 years ago. 1980s? Late 80s? Early 90s, right, when it happened. Yes, I worked in all the places, Barry, you described, right? The two places. I think what's really interesting is I was there at the beginning, at the creation of a loan trading business. Like it did not exist at Citi or most of Wall Street before the early 90s. It did not exist. This is totally novel. Bloomingdale's filed for bankruptcy. SCI-TV filed for bankruptcy.
3:59And for the first time, banks, which owned the debt, wanted to sell. So they're sitting on a lot of bad paper. Yeah. And they don't really know what it's worth. They don't know what to do with it. how do they come to you and Citi and say, hey, we're stuck with all this paper and we'd like to at least have a partial recovery? That was what really got it going. There was no price. You had to kind of analyze it to come up with a price. And at the same time, there were very few buyers, more and more sellers. So the pricing was really good where you could buy these loans, right? So was Citi acting as a middleman looking for buyers of distressed debt?
4:44Or did someone like yourself have the insight and say, hey, you know, at 100 cents on the dollar, this is junk, but at 15, 20 cents, there's some upside. At Citi and at Merrill, I ran a proprietary trading business. And proprietary trading is using the firm capital to kind of buy it and also to distribute it to syndicate it more broadly at the same time. But I think if I was to go back through my career, that moment in time, you know, when there is this big wave coming, because it was the start of the high yield market, the leverage loan market grew dramatically, you know, from 200 billion in the mid 90s to$5 trillion today, high yield and leverage loans, right?
5:34And these deals, which never used to trade in the secondary market, they started to change hands. I was there right at the beginning of that big wave. And what has happened to me career-wise is just riding that wave as it got bigger, as it got more complicated, as it became US and Europe, not just US, as it went from buying and selling distressed debt to going out and taking control of businesses, operating them and improving them, it was all set at that moment of time in the early 90s. So let's just stay in the early 90s at Citi for a few minutes. At the time, you're early in your career. You have some experience and an MBA.
6:28when you first started hearing that from banks that, hey, we got all this Bloomingdale debt. Tell us what went through your mind. Did you envision, oh, you know, there's a market for here and there's an opportunity? How did you look at this? And then how did you stand up that whole distressed debt department at Citi? Banks are wanting to sell. I have worked at Booz Allen and Hamilton. I'm a strategic planning guy. I get hired by Citibank in planning. I work for a really senior guy in the investment bank. This business is just starting. I write a business plan for it. Like a legitimate, like it's a freestanding entity.
7:11Like, you know, it's a business we should be - Like it's a startup. Yes, it's a business we should be bigger in, we should grow in. And there were a couple of people inside Citibank who were pioneers in trying to buy and sell loans. Right. I get folded right into that group after writing the business plan. And boy, we are off to the races. Now, you know, when you look at something like a Bloomingdale's, what you have to ask yourself is Bloomingdale's is restructuring. It's going through a bankruptcy. It's got the debt itself, which banks want to sell. you have to price it. And at this point in time, the bankruptcy processes, the restructuring processes weren't that well developed, right?
8:00You had to really say, hey, it's a two-year stint in bankruptcy. We're going to cut costs. We'll make this business much more efficient, right, as we do it. And then you say, what is the business worth? And at the time, they had a good name, a good brand, fantastic real estate locations. So there was some assets that were salvageable. The question was, do we continue as a going concern or do we just liquidate? You guys just said, hey, let's reorganize this because there's still value here. We're not just going to sell it off for parts. Exactly right. And by the way, most of the businesses we invest in, there's much more value even like today there's much more value in fixing it in transforming it and selling it for parts but because these are really good businesses which got levered they got leveraged through these leverage buyouts right but that valuation to be able to come up with the valuation to be then able to work in a restructuring process bankruptcy process and say hey, I think at the end of this, we are buying debt at 50 cents.
9:14It could be worth 80, 90 cents. It could take two to four years to kind of get there. That's how this business started. It was just not well understood. Even the fact that there was a bankruptcy process, which could be two years long or three years long, right? It was just not well understood in the early 90s. So I have so many questions for you about, because the 90s was such a fascinating era. So first, was this like a small side project at Citi, or did the higher-ups say, oh, Victor's onto something, let's put some capital into this and see where it goes? What was the initial reaction within Citi?
9:59By the way, don't get me wrong, please. It wasn't just Victor. It wasn't just Victor. Anytime we talk about Merrill or City or UBS or Morgan, we're always talking about big teams with a number of different people leading different departments. All that said, you wrote the business plan. How warmly was it embraced or was it, alright, give the kid a couple of bucks and let's see how far this goes? It started out with give the kids a couple of bucks. And then what happened was like literally in the first few weeks. So not long at all, like immediate success. Right. We are starting to get in the middle of some of these secondary sales of debt.
10:43It's almost like liftoff, right? Because the moment of time, you know, in those days, Barry, a lot of debt was owned by Japanese banks. I recall. European banks, right? Remember when everyone was terrified They were going to buy Rockefeller Center and they're going to take over everything. Around the late 80s, early 90s, that was peak Japan. And they spent the next 30 years wandering in the desert. Well, they've had a tough few decades. Right. Although they seem to be very much on the comeback. But so immediately this looks successful. Typically, 30 % of the market was owned by Japanese banks.
11:21Really? That's a giant number. In the early 90s, right? Wow. So now you have these restructurings, you have these bankruptcies, and the Japanese banks want to sell the debt. They drive it. Then the European banks want to sell because U.S. bankruptcy in those days was not as well understood, right? And then, boy, it was almost like bankruptcy filings, boom, debt for sale, boom, boom. And it just took off. And my recollection is that when foreign banks come into the U.S. and buy up a bunch of assets or debt or whatever it is, and when they start to run into trouble, back home, there's usually a change of leadership.
12:05And whoever the new owner of the foreign banks are tend to say, hey, I didn't buy that junk. You guys, just get rid of this. Whatever you can get for it, hit the bid. They're very aggressive sellers, or am I misremembering this? They are. They are aggressive sellers and foreign banks, foreign institutions tend to be more aggressive. But there's also a very, you know, there's also a very economic reason for it. Right. Because when you're in a restructuring, the debt you own has defaulted. Right. And the central bank which governs you, like the one in Japan or like the one in the United States, they make you take reserves, mark it down.
12:49Right. Right. So you write it down to zero. So whatever you get for it is practically found money. You've already taken the hit. So there's a very good economic reason why, you know, short, they're far away. They don't quite understand what's going on. It's a small part of their book, right? So the obvious reason, right? But then also the economic reason that, hey, I have it marked down. I have all these non-performing loans in my balance sheet. It's creating a drag. The way equity analysts look at my balance sheet, I should be selling. I should be getting out, right? And by the way, it continues to today.
13:30If you have a bankruptcy filing, you have a restructuring, right? They will sell the debt. They'll sell it at a price which is probably too low. But there's a very sound economic reason for the banks or the CLOs to want to sell. They have a very different set of priorities than a pure distressed debt buyer. Exactly right. Barry, can I tell you? Sure. Go back to one thought, though. I wanted to make sure it just came through. Early 90s was the start of the modern high-yield leverage buyout business done at scale. It was the start of the high-yield business exploding dramatically in size to where it is today and still growing dramatically.
14:19And it was the start of the secondary market to kind of buy and sell kind of pieces of debt. And what I was lucky enough to be in the early 90s was I was one of the first people in this business, right, overseeing a trading desk like I did at Merrill Lynch. So that was wide open white space. It was virgin snow. It was very new. How long did you stay at Citi before you left for other places? I was working at Citibank for a couple of years, working on kind of the secondary prop investing trading side. And then I was hired by Merrill to start the business. As our use of AI expands, how do we make sure it doesn't end up breaking the Internet?
15:10I'm Hannah Fry, host of The Exponential Era, a series that explores the real world impact of future network technology. And I sat down with two experts to discover how we can support the massive connectivity needs of AI. Find out what I learned at Bloomberg.com forward slash Nokia.
15:47Visit Bloomberg.com slash podcast offer to learn more. Previously, we were talking about your experience at the very beginning of the distressed debt industry, building the desk at Citi. You join Merrill Lynch in 93 and start building their distressed prop trading businesses, which became wildly successful. And you're there from 93 to 98, right in the middle of the 90s. Tell us a little bit about that experience. What was it like at Merrill in the 1990s? Merrill never really had very much of a proprietary culture, right, as a firm. It's just not in the 90s. It was very much a brokerage house with a growing, expanding investment bank.
16:36It wasn't really a proprietary investing trading culture, right, in those years. So what made them say, hey, let's go pull Victor out of City and set up a prop desk? The old-fashioned rationale, making money. They saw a little FOMO. They saw City. Hey, since when is City so big in distressed debt? They seem to be doing really well. We need to have a little bit of that for ourselves? Was it that simple? It was early. People could see the explosive growth taking place. And as somebody who was a well-known commodity, well-known player in that business already, they hired me to go run it. So when I started at Merrill, it was one of me.
17:26And they said, okay, Victor, here's$100 million. It's kind of where I started in 1993. Was that a lot of money back then? It was a lot of money back then. So in 19... Funny, isn't it? I know that sounds silly. It is. Because it's a little hard to put 34 years into context, or 30 years into context. But like$100 million today, that's a small account at a lot of shops. Back in the early 90s,$100 million was real cash. And what they did was they encouraged me. So I had a couple of very supportive people I worked with. You know, success begets more success. So we ended up getting the resources to hire a bigger and bigger team.
18:17Ended up setting up a business in London. We were literally one of the first people into Europe buying and selling debt, investing in debt in Europe. And then in 97, set up a business in Japan to buy debt from Japanese banks in Japan, right? So for me at Merrill, from that$100 million in 1993, by the time I left in early 98, we had about$2 billion of proprietary capital. And I had 40 people, four zero people working with me in New York, in London, in Tokyo. Merrill also had an office in Hong Kong as well. Were you buying debt out of Hong Kong also? I was not. I was starting to dabble in it. This was before the Thai crisis.
19:11Right? So it was before that. I was starting to look at it. Yeah. But it wasn't kind of the focus. It was really U.S., Europe, Japan. So$100 million to$2 billion in five years. That's a giant lift. That's a big expansion. Your next couple of stops along the way were at some pretty well-regarded firms. Cerebus Capital, you ran a joint venture doing Japanese debt with more. Tell us a little bit about your experiences away from the big brokerage firms and some of these more nimble independent shops. You know, the nimble independent shops had a lot more money than the$2 billion. Really? I never would have guessed that.
19:54What I was overseeing at Merrill Lynch, right? But you know what I found was, I think with Cerberus, you had a very strong, very well-known brand at that time. More Capital was much more institutional in how it worked. It had much more of a structure and process around it. And I worked with Cerberus. I worked with More Capital between them for a total of about four years. It was my first foray from working in a proprietary trading business, which is what I did at Merrill, to working on the buy side. Just the learning, what it takes to actually raise money, what it means to actually build a really strong infrastructure, a finance operations legal team.
20:47My first foray out of Merrill into the buy side and learning kind of all these different kind of skills. And those were four incredibly growth-oriented years for me. I can imagine. And for listeners who may not be familiar with the distinction between buy side and sell side, when you're at Citi or you're at Merrill, you're trading on behalf of either the firm's fund or on behalf of clients. and we call that the sell side because you have to sell that product to clients. The buy side is Cerebris or more have their own pile of assets from their limited partners and you're investing and trading on behalf of the firm itself.
21:32And so it's a little bit different in you're not dealing with the clients. That's somebody else's job. You're investing the money on behalf of of the firm. Ultimately, that leads you to say, hey, this buy side thing seems like a pretty good structure for making investments. What led you to say, I think I could launch my own shop and stand something up on behalf of myself instead of working for someone else? It takes a lot of confidence. A little bit of chutzpah. I was never lacking in that. But to be fair, you know, there's chutzpah and there's chutzpah. You built a great desk at Citi. You built a great desk at Merrill.
22:19You generated a lot of profits for Moore and Cerebus. So it wasn't a big leap of faith. It's not. Hey, can I do this? You obviously had a great track record. Yeah. So standing up your own firm was, why not be in charge? Why not run my own ship? In those days, there were 10, 15 people who were probably well-known in this business, and I was one of the 10, 15 people, right? By the way, when I think about kind of more capital, what a great firm, by the way, right? Legendary founder, just great track record, the whole thing. All that, but also just a great firm, right? But when I think about kind of why start something, you know, when I really cut through it, I really wanted to work for myself.
23:07Understandable. Right? So when we started Strategic Value Partners, more capital gave us$100 million to start. Oh, no kidding. So that's quite a vote of confidence. You're not, you know, if more is giving you that much, the same amount that you started with at Merrill. So the firm is now$19 billion. When you launched in 2001, what were you launching with? more as$100 ,000 plus how much additional capital did you raise? $10 million. Really? So they were 90 % of what you had? You know, we were launching the firm and the markets crash. In 2001, sure. You were early days of that. Yeah. Markets crash.
23:48And as a result of that crash in markets, we think we are going to launch with$300,$400 million. Right. And we launch with$110 million. At the same time, you launch into a, let's call it a target-rich field. There had to be a lot of opportunities. You know, the performance numbers, our returns were just kind of really great because it was a target-rich world, and that kind of set us up. When I think about those early years, right, and I think about kind of the firm we have become today. So let's start with what you began with. How many people did you launch with? You had two clients, it sounds like?
24:30Yes. A hundred and a ten? Yes. How big was the staff when you launched? It was eight people. Eight people. And today, you're a little bigger than that. We've got over 200 people. I mean, that's a substantial firm. Not only that, when you launched, it was primarily distressed debt. You've expanded into so many different areas. Tell us a little bit about that growth, especially the first few years, and what led you to opening another London office in 2004. When we started, we were focused on distressed debt and restructurings in 2001, 2002. That was the focus. What sort of companies was it? Was it a lot of the dot-coms that had imploded, or was it just generally across the economy?
25:16We were in the middle of a recession. WorldCom, if you remember, had kind of filed for bankruptcy. EES, there were a couple of big energy companies in trouble. Enron. Enron. So, you know, we were never a dot-com kind of person. And even today, we're really not a tech or a software-focused firm, right? We are very much in old economy businesses, service businesses, consumer brands. That's very much our focus as a firm. So in 2002, when we start, it's not the dot-com debris we are looking through. It's the recession and all the problems it's caused in all these old economy businesses. Really interesting.
26:00So you start with distressed debt. What's the next division you, for lack of a better word, opportunistic credit, lending money, taking control? What were the next businesses you added? When we did distressed debt, we were focused on buying debt and restructuring it into equity, being on kind of boards of directors trying to work with the businesses. But we were mostly had minority equity positions because when all you have is a hedge fund, Barry, you need liquidity, right? You can't do private equity long term. You're not locking stuff up for forever. No, really, you can't, right? So the early years were very much focused on this more liquid side of the world, the distressed debt side of the world.
26:52And by the way, we had success. That fund of we started with$110 million. By the time 2008 came around, we had about$5 billion. Really? That's a big number. We had some really good success, right, in those years doing what we do. But, you know, what we found was 2008 was a really good, you know, I talked - Target-rich environment? It was. In 1991, we were there, I was there on day one as the business of buying and selling secondary debt, investing in secondary debt took off. In 2008, there was another one of those really dramatic changes. So what we told ourselves was, hey, this is a really great target-rich environment, sure.
27:48But the business has changed. Our view was, hey, these distressed debt cycles, they only happen every two years out of 10. It's not like a business you can do every year. Right. It's a very it's a super cyclical business. So as a firm in 2008, we started to go down a different path. We said, OK, there are some really great businesses which have had a really rough time with bankruptcies, with restructurings. There's a lot of low hanging operational fruit. Let's go out and buy into these businesses and take control. And you're talking about doing this through debt, not equity. Exactly. But buying enough debt to own 51 % or more of the company, becoming a private equity investor, and then driving an operational transformation in the business.
28:53So it's so funny. Completely different. It's so funny you talk about this. I vividly remember having a conversation with a friend who was originally from Canada and relocated to the Grand Caymans. And the first time I learned, and this has got to be 10, 15 years ago, of an investor taking control of an asset through the debt, not the equity, was there's a giant Ritz-Carlton on the Grand Cayman. Oh, yes. And the owner was constantly floating notes. And during the financial crisis, he ran into trouble and a lot of big banks own that paper. And somebody very cleverly picked up a lot of that debt, pennies on the dollar, and ended up taking over that whole thing.
29:39It was eye-opening like, oh, you can control a company not just through equity, through debt. But you know, if you just take control, you could be the proverbial dog who chases that ice cream truck. What do you do when you catch it? Yes. You know, you need these operating skills to go out and improve and transform these businesses. Right. So what we started to do in 2008 was not just to take control, but to take control in a very hands on way. Right. We strengthen management. We build new business plans. We call them value creation plans in our world. And we try and drive fundamental change even sometimes in these businesses.
30:25So for us as a firm, we went from buying and investing in debt after 2008 to taking control of businesses. We went from a firm in 2004 even. We said, look, there's this great growing opportunity in Europe. We set up a London office and our London investment teams today are almost the same size as the U.S. teams. And what we also did over those years was we said, hey, look, there are all these real assets, airplanes, power plants, real estate, toll roads. Right. These are all going through these kind of restructurings, these kind of problems with their capital structure. So as a firm, starting in 2008, we went from our roots in value, in distressed debt, right?
31:21We went into control. We went into kind of real assets. And we started lending money to people, not direct lending, much more the higher risk, higher return lending, right? But as a firm, we've gone through this journey from 2008, that transformation. Really quite fascinating. Let's continue talking about some of these operating businesses, 90 ,000 employees, 15 different businesses. This is more than just buying the bad debt of a company that's hit a hard time. You are pretty much fully taking over and running and operating substantial companies. Tell us how this came about and how did SVP develop the expertise to effectively become operators and managers?
Read the full transcript
32:11When you have a company which kind of hits a really rough patch, you know, leverage buyouts, by definition, there's leverage. They hit a rough patch. They have really big financial problems. And when that happens, even really good businesses, Barry, shake. Right? You know, some of the businesses we are invested in, we own a toll road in Texas today, a toll road between Austin and San Antonio. We just bought Hornblower, which is we took majority control of it, which is a ferry business. The New York City Ferries. Oh, that's where I recognize that name. The Statue of Liberty Ferry, right? But all these businesses, these are good businesses.
32:59But they take on a lot of debt. there's no room for error. And everything shakes. You know, often we find some of the really good management teams, they get frustrated. Some of them leave, right? Because now you've got so much leverage. You've got a good business, but so much leverage and you can't figure out how you're going to pop your head up above the surface, right? So as a result of that, we find that when we are investing, sure, we have to recapitalize it so the leverage numbers go down dramatically. So let me ask you a question about what's just been going on over the past couple of years.
33:40If you're a leveraged company and that debt is what used to be LIBOR plus, it's no longer LIBOR now, it's the new measure, central banks raise interest 525 basis points. Suddenly, what was a manageable amount of debt might become unmanageable. How has the past few years of rapidly rising rates affected these leveraged businesses? It has been really tough for them, right? You know, you borrowed money when interest rates were zero, and you were paying all in 5%. Right. Now you're paying 10%, 12%. percent. Which is a lot of money. Right. And you are very levered. And by the way, these old economy businesses, they are not having that same growth like tech or software.
34:33Right. They're not AI. They're ferry businesses and toll roads. That's steady income, but you're not looking at double digit growth. So you can't really grow into your capital structure, right? so easily. You marry the two things together. Growth, but slow growth, modest growth in cash flow or EBITDA with much higher interest rates, like in terms of what you have to do. And by the way, remember, some of these businesses went through COVID where they had to take on even more debt to kind of tide over COVID, right? That was a double whammy, COVID and then the rate increase. And now what is happening is there are maturities coming due.
35:15There's a large maturity wall in 25, 26, 27. By the way, by our reckoning, there's almost 2 trillion of that 5 trillion of high yield matures in the next three and a half years. Really? So I heard an expression a debt trader used, survive till 25. You're suggesting, hey, 25 isn't good enough. You're going to have to get through 26 and 27. Exactly. It's creating issues. By the way, this is not like, oh, it's going to happen next year. It's happening already. It's been happening for the last 18 months. Well, given the high rates, that makes perfect sense. Our pace of investing has picked up substantially.
35:59Our pipeline has almost quadrupled over the last 18 months. This is is happening right now. Barry, don't get the wrong idea. I'm not trying to tell you there's some crash or something. We don't think there is. You seem to be enthusiastic about the opportunities ahead of you. Not that the world is coming to an end, but rather, hey, this is going to be a great period of time if you're an opportunistic distressed debt investor. Or if you're in a special situations, private equity investor. So let's talk about that. How do you define special situations? You know, we are in the business of trying to buy businesses at a good price.
36:38And then we're in the business of trying to improve them, sometimes even transform them operationally, right? Because they have been under-managed with everything I described. Right. To us, that's, you know, that combination, you can't really, if somebody is having an auction of a company and they have hired Goldman Sachs or Merrill Lynch to sell it, it's very hard to buy something at a really good price. Right. Right. You've got to be able to buy it, either you buy it through the debt, right where you buy it through by buying debt at a discount or you buy it bilaterally in a process without a process right the company has enough issues and there's a way to just negotiate a price bilaterally so so i think for us the opportunity set today is is to kind of buy it well, but that is just step one.
37:39Step two is to go strengthen the management team, build a new business plan, often to inject more capital into the business. Right, restructure it so it's not carrying all that debt. 14 of the 15 businesses we control have more employees today than when we took over. Wow, that's pretty impressive. Yeah, but I think it's, so this is not about just cutting. It's about kind of investing and looking to transform these businesses, which have been under-managed. And those together is what in our world, in our mind, constitute special situation private equity. Let's talk a little bit about hard assets.
38:21You mentioned infrastructure like ferry and toll roads. Let's talk about real estate, airplanes and power plants, I would think power plants would be very tied to the cost of energy plus whatever their costs are for modernizing and reducing pollutants and their output. Tell us about what you look at when you look at buying a power plant. You know, for us, about 60 % of what we do is corporate investing. So these industrial businesses, service businesses, right? Old economy, solid, ready, steady businesses that have run into a little trouble. Generally, very good market shares, right? 40%, 4-0 % of what we do are real assets.
39:15Oh, really? That much? That's giant. So give us some examples of, first of all, I'm fascinated by hard assets like airplanes. How do people get into trouble owning either a single plane or a fleet of planes? Can I tell you? Can we even start with infrastructure? Because Barry, the prevailing view would be infrastructure, toll roads, ferries, all these kinds of businesses, they are really, you've got a monopoly or a duopoly. They should be really strong. They should be good growers, and they should be steady, Eddie. And infrastructure today is bought by sovereign funds, big pension funds, with a view that it is very steady 7%, 8%, 9 % kind of returns, right?
40:10That's the prevailing view. Assuming you're purchasing it at the right price. Now, what has happened in infrastructure is there were a couple of very aggressive people who bought infrastructure, toll roads with 80-90 % debt. Not 40%, 50%. 80-90 % debt. No room for error there. And if you hit COVID or if you hit a financial recession, it's really hard to dig yourself out of 80, 90 percent debt, right? So what we saw was a whole class of toll roads, which are supposed to be core infrastructure, safe. A whole class of toll roads. The ferry business I'm kind of talking about, right? A waste to energy business in London we invested in called Cori.
41:06All these businesses ended up kind of crashing. Now, infra for us has never been distressed. There's no broad infrastructure distress cycle. But for us, it started about 10 years ago. We were one of the first ones who started to take apart infrastructure and say, hey, it's not like corporate, right? It's valued very differently than how you'd value a company. There's a whole, what it takes to operate it is really quite different. You need some really great government skills, by the way, to manage the agency which regulates you. A lot of complexity there. You're not just selling widgets. Yeah, it's different, right?
41:53And you've got to understand it. And we were one of the first people in our business to really drive into it. And I think we've been the biggest investors in our industry, in infra. So I got to ask, who the hell is buying a toll road with 90 % debt? I mean, it's one thing if you're buying your first house and you put 10 % down and finance the other 90 % because you're going to live there over the next 30 years and you got to live somewhere. But who would buy, like that just seems kind of reckless or am I? You know, it was viewed in the old days. It was viewed 15 years ago. It was viewed as such a safe asset class.
42:35Not only could, not everybody did it, okay? There were a few real outliers who did a lot of it, right? And they did it with 85 % debt, 80 % debt, 90 % debt. And by the way, most of the industry does not do this. You are very much confirming my long-held belief that there's no such thing as toxic assets, only toxic prices and toxic debt levels. It sounds like that's a key part of how you guys have grown. It is. It has been, right? But what's kind of interesting also is like, you know, that waste-to-energy business in London, right? When we bought it, they had a really great – I'll tell you this.
43:22Forgive me. I'll just digress into it. I'm fascinated. Right? So there's business, Corey, in London. So on the River Thames, you'll see these barges taking garbage. They take garbage from some of the richest boroughs in London. They take it to a plant called Riverside where they burn it, and they produce electricity for those same boroughs, right? This business, great business, by the way, right? Now, what they had done was they also had a landfill business. They also had a garbage collection business. And those businesses got them into real trouble. So the company itself got into a pickle, too much debt.
44:11and with this one really great core business and two other really troubled and so-so businesses, right? And what we ended up doing was when we kind of took control of the business, yes, we fixed and sold the two businesses which weren't so great. But at the same time, the core business, we invested in it. We hired a new chairman. We hired a new CEO and a management team. And by the way, the business itself had long-term, you know what makes infrastructure is when you have long-term contracts. They had long-term contracts for about 55 % of their output in Riverside. We increased that to 70%. We started to build a plan to expand the plant, to build a new data center next to the plant, right?
45:05Because they're so energy intensive. It is, because they produce electricity also. So you can create a data center kind of right next to it. So you can see the transformational work which is going on. It wasn't like, hey, we just bought it. It's great. And we subsequently ended up kind of selling it three, four years later, after we'd finished doing all that. And it was a very successful investment. But you can buy infrastructure. But if we just bought it and just put it on auto control, nothing would have happened. This isn't a passive investment. This is active management. I'm fascinated by some of the other hard assets.
45:46Tell us about what you do with aircraft. How do people over leverage themselves with either a jet or a fleet of jets and have to have a distressed buyer come in and take it over? We find that investing in aircraft, for us, two out of 10 years, we really lean in. It's not a steady state. Hey, we're going to invest X million every year. It's a very cyclical business. So, like take COVID, right? COVID happens, flying shuts down. Right, done. A couple of really large airlines. There's one called LATAM in Latin America. There's Aeromexico. A couple of large airlines end up kind of filing for bankruptcy.
46:36Now, they are in bankruptcy, and they have, like LATAM in those days had a fleet of 300-plus airplanes. Oh, really? That's a big fleet. Yeah. So, by the way, LATAM's a really big airline, right? Right. Mostly South America and Central America? and flying to the United States, right? They're the market leader in Latin America, right? But now they are, the people have given them the planes on these leases. They have leases with all these kind of financial guys, which is how they bought a lot of their airplanes. They're in bankruptcy. They want to redo the lease, recut the lease. And by the way, this is COVID.
47:24Lease pricing has collapsed. Right? So now all of a sudden, the leases aren't the person who's lent them the money on the lease. It's no longer worth that because lease prices have collapsed. And they are being reset right now because of the bankruptcy of LATAM. So for us, we ended up buying 23 of those airplanes from some of the leaseholders in LATAM. Buying the planes outright. Buying the planes. And then what do you do with that aircraft? We actually bought the debt. We foreclosed on the planes. So now we own the planes. Most of them we leased back to LATAM. Some of them, there were actually four very large A350s, which is like a wide body, large A350s.
48:22And we sold them to Lufthansa. We had to fix them. We parked them in the desert. We fixed them and we sold them. They can't sit for very long, though. They have to constantly be tended. So if you're going through a bankruptcy, you can't have a plane on the tarmac for 18 months. And so what's interesting to us about the airline business, when it's really active, like in those periods, right, somebody like us, we invested a few billion dollars buying airplanes in those two, three years. Oh, really? That's a lot of aircraft. We bought the aircraft. By the way, at this point, we've sold most of them, right?
49:00But we also ended up with a claim which became equity. So today, we are actually a very significant holder of equity in LATAM and Aeromexico. Really interesting. But what we find is this business of investing in aircraft, it's a very cyclical business for us because we have a very high rate of return expectation. So it's not an every year business. and what's really helpful for us as we do this, Barry, we own a company called Deucalion. Deucalion has 65 employees and they manage the aircraft for us. So when we take over the planes, if we have to park them in the desert, if we have to fix them, lease them, finance them, Deucalion gives us the arms and legs to kind of do it.
49:54You don't want to do this business just as a paper investor. You need those operating skills. And by the way, Decalion today manages 125 airplanes for third parties even away from us, right? So for us, having Decalion, it's a big piece of kind of what makes our airplane aircraft platform really work. Really interesting. Last hard asset, I have to ask you about real estate. Return to office has been only a part-way success, depending on the city you look at. It's 20%, 30%, 40%, 50 % vacancy rates. And what I mean by that is 50 % occupancy rates of already leased spaces, to say nothing of the vacancy rates that come up as leases expire and some anchor tenants move out.
50:50how are you looking at the world of commercial real estate these days, given the stress we see in the office space? There is a tsunami working its way through parts of the commercial real estate sector. Slow motion tsunami, isn't it? And it's around maturities of the debt, right? Where people are foreclosing, title of the property is passing over to lenders, right? So round numbers today. There's$8 trillion of commercial mortgage debt in the U.S. and Europe. $8 trillion U.S. and Europe that you think is going to eventually go bad. How much of that goes bad? 22 % of it is office. Oh, really? Yeah.
51:40So let's call that$2 trillion, almost$2 trillion? Yeah. A trillion here and a trillion in Europe? Exactly right, right? And to our point of view, a third of it is going to kind of go broke in this particular cycle. Away from kind of office, there are other sectors. So if you look at multifamily, right? Multifamily is generally a very stable asset class. But with these higher rates, people were buying multifamily at a 4 % cap rate. Today, public REITs, multifamily public REITs are 6 % or so cap rates. That means that prices have fallen 50%. Wow. Right? If you just take the four going to kind of six.
52:30Right. If you have to sell it or if you have to service the debt. Yes. Why does it always come back to too much debt, too much leverage invariably leads to a bad outcome? Am I overstating that? It seems that every one of these stories begins with, and they bought this with way too much debt, and here's what happened. Barry, I've made a career out of it. That's amazing. So I know I only have you for a limited amount of time. Before we move on from commercial real estate, a trillion in the US, a trillion in Europe, about a third is going to go bad. And it's a slow motion tsunami. In a way, that's almost encouraging because not to be glib, but$300 billion.
53:21It's not the financial crisis. It's not trillions and trillions and trillions of securitized debt blowing up. It almost sounds as if that's manageable over time. It's not systemic, right? So whether it is the corporate world, you know where I was describing all these maturities in a$5 trillion pool of high yield? Or this is not systemic. 2008, the banks were really levered, right? It became systemic, right? So I think, look, I tend to, economic growth is okay. It's not, it's much less than okay in Europe, but in the US, it's kind of okay, right? So I don't think one needs to kind of say, you know, that systemic stuff, which causes shocks across the economy, right?
54:18Look, we could be wrong, but we don't think that's in the cards. What's in the cards is just this very gnarly, all these kind of credit issues, which will keep biting for the next three years. And we'll just kind of work our way through them. Right. If you're in the wrong sector, you're going to get hurt. And if you've avoided that, it shouldn't have that spillover effect like we saw with securitized mortgage in 08, 09. if I'm hearing you correctly. So I also have to ask, I know you opened the London office in 2004. Did you ever expect that Europe would expand to just about half your assets? That seems to be really substantial.
55:02Tell us a little bit about what's going on in Europe, both their economy and the prospects for growth there, and what you're doing with your portfolio. Well, Europe is, if you just think about the broad market in high yield, 75 % U.S., 25 % Europe. For somebody like us, Europe is always just a much bigger part, a third, maybe even a half of our book. Why is that? Europe has more problems than the U.S. Right. And a lot of old industries and old businesses that might run into trouble. And every two years, there's a crisis there. Right. Right? Like the U.S. is fortress America. But when you look at Europe, right, whether it is Brexit, whether it is other Italian guys.
55:59The Greece debt. It's something every now that's going on. So you have frequent crises. You have economic growth, which is much slower than the United States, right? And by the way, they're suffering from some of the same high rates. And their inflation seems to be stickier and more stubborn than inflation rates here. It is, right? So you take all that kind of together. You know, what we find is Europe, when I think about it in the context of 20 years, we find that Europe just gives us more frequent opportunity, right? Just the way it's set up. And the second thing which makes Europe really interesting for us, we are really one of the market leaders.
56:54In Europe? In Europe. We are one of the acknowledged market leaders in Europe for what we do. And it's a world where there are much fewer people with the skills we have. In the US, there are more people. So you look at a market which is big, which gives you constant opportunity. You look at the marketplace positioning we have, right? You take that together. For us, Europe is much more interesting, which is why it always for us is a bigger piece of our portfolio than the market. That's really, really fascinating. Um, since we're talking about inflation and rates, um, you said something about a year ago that I very much agreed with.
57:40About a year ago, it was last summer, you said the Fed was behind the curve. Now it's 12 months later. Tell us a little bit about your, especially from your vantage at looking at debt and what the distress that's out there caused in part by 525 basis points of hikes in 18 months. Tell us a little bit about what you see from central banks here in the United States or elsewhere. You know, we are now on the other side of the, you know, we're now in the, we're trying to figure out how quickly do rates come down, how much and how quickly. So we're not really now, we're on the other side of the mountain, right?
58:25Right. And I think, and you've already seen it with Europe. Europe has already reduced, right? So I think our point of view would be these short-term rates, the 5.25%, 5.5 % Fed funds rate, it is going to be kind of coming down. And we can all debate, is it two cuts, three cuts, 50 basis points, 20? We can all debate that, but I think the path going forward is that what is different is just look at the 10-year, not so much the short-term Fed fund rate, right? The 10-year rate is 3.85%. It's not the 1.5 % or 2%. That era seems to be over. Yeah, that era is over. So the fact that rates are going to be higher now over the course of the next three, five years, I think that's the part we should all be just kind of focused on.
59:22Higher than zero, but isn't three, three and a half kind of normal or even reasonable? I mean, how do you contextualize the 10-year briefly kissed 5 % and then it's headed south since? If we end up at credit rates being in the three, three and a half percent range, 75 to 100 basis points below where they are now, what does that mean for distressed debt investing? What does that mean for the economy? It points to the fact that, you know, I think you were saying, Barry, live till 2025. Right. Survive to 25. Survive to 25. You get 3.5 % 10-year rates. Right. You add the usual 400, 500 basis point high yield spread.
1:00:13Right. You're borrowing at 8.5%. Which is not 12%. Which is not 12%. It's not four, but it's not four. So I think what all this kind of means is, look, things will improve slowly, right? As short-term rates kind of come in. But the problems which we've set up, they're here. You have a slower old world economy. You have maturities kind of coming up. you have to kind of default or you have to do some pretty unusual things to extend your maturities. Those problems with eight and a half percent rates, not four or five all in cost for a lender, for a borrower, those problems really now stay with us for a while.
1:01:06So not just to talk your book, but an opportunistic distressed den investor, these look like pretty good times coming up over the next few years. I do think they're good times, but I think, I don't think, but they're time, I'm talking my book now. They're really good times for somebody like us who can operate businesses, improve businesses. It's not just paper transactions. You are more hands-on than that. You know, most people in our industry, in my industry, are really focused on buying debt at 50, 60, 70 cents, trading it, having it kind of appreciate in price, and then trading out of it, right?
1:01:50That's so 1991. You've done that already. Now, this cycle, the one we are in, is not kind of that wholesale move down in prices. it's much more buying into these businesses through debt, sometimes through equity, transforming the businesses, operating them. That's the opportunity. It's not a trading opportunity in distressed debt, which is what we, we just don't think it's a trading opportunity now for the next three, four years. Really, really fascinating. I only have you for a few minutes more. So let me jump to some of my favorite questions that we ask all our guests, starting with, tell us what's keeping you entertained these days.
1:02:36What are you listening or watching? Podcasts, Netflix, what keeps you entertained? I like watching sports. Barry, before we - I know you're a big tennis fan. Yeah. I like watching Breakpoint. Oh, really? On Netflix? On Netflix. Sort of drive to survive, but for tennis. Exactly. I have that in my queue and I haven't started it yet. You know, I've been playing tennis for 50 years. Really? I should be better. You just need a good coach, that's all. But watching Breakpoint, at least for a while, transforms it for me. What's the worst part of your game? Backhand. Really? By the way, everybody who knows me, they are merciless.
1:03:18They hit at my backhand. Huh. I'm a lefty, but I've always played tennis righty. So the backhand has never been - Wow. How do you do that? You know, it's as a kid, they stick a baseball bat in your right hand. So I right lefty, I do everything else lefty. So the serve is my weakest part, but I find the backhand is easy because it's - It's natural. Right. It's almost natural. It's so crazy. Let's talk about your mentors who helped shape your career? I had a lot of support from people I worked for or worked with, right? At City and at Merrill when you were starting out. At City and at Merrill, right?
1:04:03And at Moore particularly, right? I had a lot of support like that. You know, a mentor, the word mentor means, I think also somebody who helps you grow, who helps you develop, who talks to you every few weeks or a month, officially, unofficially, right? You know, what I have found is the business I chose to be in was such a new emerging business where, you know, I kind of grew. There were no people with a decade's experience in that space. It wasn't like I had a, quote, mentors in the business, right? But what I found was, and by the way, every time you do something which is new and different and you're one of the first guys on the wave, right, it is you learn as you go.
1:04:51Sure. But having that support, right, from kind of all those different parts, I think that's kind of what I would say. That team approach of everybody kind of lifting everybody else. Let's talk about books. What are some of your favorites and what are you reading right now? I like historical fiction. So there's a guy, there's an English author, a guy called Khan Iggdalen. I don't know. He's written five, six books about the Roman Empire, the Caesars, right? He's written about Kublai Khan and the Khan dynasty out of Mongolia, right? Genghis, I love reading that sort of historical fiction. He just came out with a new book on Nero, the Roman Emperor, and it's a new series, right?
1:05:42Then I'm reading that. Huh, sounds really interesting. Our final two questions. What sort of advice would you give to a recent college grad interested in a career in distressed debt or credit investing? Be ready to work really hard, right? You know, the typical person we hire at SVP is we have two entry points, right? So we'll hire 26, 27-year-olds. So you should have gone to undergraduate school, couple of years at an investment bank with the$1 ,800 a week. Right. Two, three years at a private equity firm, right? And then you come work with us. And then the second entry point is you're that 27-year-old, you go to business school, and then you come work with us, right?
1:06:35So those are our two entry points. But when you look at kind of, you know, the people who are kind of coming in, by the time you're that 26, 27-year-old, you know, if you were in that class at Dartmouth or Yale or wherever, you are probably already that one in a hundred, maybe one in 500 kind of person to have made it that far, right? This is a tough, incredibly demanding profession. Just be ready for that. It is extraordinarily rewarding, right? And I don't mean financially, right? It's fun. You know, the people you work with, the culture of what you have, it is fun. Yeah, it's financially good too, but to position yourself to be in this world, right?
1:07:29Especially in a world like ours. Look, we're not looking for people who are just kind of, you know, paper investors. We want you to work with our portfolio companies, with our management teams. You've got to have the EQ. you've got to have the presence and the communication skills too, right? You look at kind of the training we need for somebody who can do that at age 30 or age 35, right? It's very much that sort of a growth track you've got to follow. Really quite fascinating. And our final question, what do you know about the world of investing today that you wish you knew back in the 1990s when you were first getting started?
1:08:13Oh, my gosh.
1:08:18Barry, I was in, when we got started, right, as a firm in 2001, somebody asked me and said, hey, Victor, what would you consider success in five years? And remember, this is when the world was young. Alts was really young, right? And I said, boy, if I could be running for 500 million in five years, wouldn't that be great, right? We went through 500 million in a year and a half, right? But I think what I've learned about investing, because, boy, when you do what I've done, you make mistakes. what I've learned about managing and growing people and developing people, right? It's like I have been in this laboratory of learning.
1:09:20So when I think about the person I was 25, 30 years ago, right? Running a proprietary desk at Merrill Lynch, right? To kind of the person I am today, right? In so many different ways, I couldn't even have told you. 25, 30 years ago, I couldn't even have told you what it would take to kind of be here. And I think you've just got to constantly be ready to learn, to evolve. You can't get stuck. And if anything, if my journey says anything, it is, you know, I've seen the evolution in the firm, sure, but I've seen the evolution in me, right? And I think if you were, if I was to give advice to somebody who goes down this journey, it is to have a lot of people around you who can, not just in your firm, but outside your firm.
1:10:19Some people you can trust, you can talk to, who can coach you, who can make you think, because you are in an evolutionary journey to grow up to be a leader in this business. Really quite fascinating. Thank you, Victor, for being so generous with your time. We have been speaking with Victor Khosla, founder and CIO of Strategic Value Partners. If you enjoy this conversation, well, check out any of the 500 or so discussions we've had over the past 10 years. You can find those at iTunes, Spotify, YouTube, wherever you find your favorite podcast. Be sure and check out my new podcast, At The Money, short conversations with experts about topics related to your money, earning it, spending it, and most importantly, investing it.
1:11:10At The Money, wherever you find your favorite podcast or in the Masters in Business podcast feed. I would be remiss if I did not thank the crack staff that helps put these conversations together each week. Meredith Frank is my audio engineer. Atika Valbron is my project manager. Sean Russo is my researcher. Anna Luke is my producer. Sage Bauman is the head of podcasts at Bloomberg. I'm Barry Ritholtz. You've been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. Thank you.
From the publisher
Barry Ritholtz speaks with Victor Khosla, Founder and CIO of Strategic Value Partners. Prior to establishing SVP in 2001, Victor served as President of Cerberus Capital and built and managed one of the top proprietary trading businesses at Merrill Lynch. He is a member of the Management Council at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and sits on the board of Pratham USA. On this episode, Victor discusses the state of investing, 'trading' planes, and what it takes to build a leading global private credit firm.
See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.


