Are we due for a ‘pullback’? October 31, 2025

25:11And it's more a philosophical objection I have, or maybe it's a logical reason. It's that it makes sense when you say something like that. Like, I'm just going to get out. I'm going to wait for the dust to clear. Then I'm going to get back in. And like, you go, well, what's wrong with that, Andrew? It's like, well, nothing in principle, nothing in theory. The trouble is, is that the market might not react in the way that you think. this bad piece of news hits and then the next, we're recording this pre-market, right? The day after this all happened. Weistate could rally 20%. I mean, it probably won't, but it could rally 20%.

25:47So your penny sellers, all you've done is lock out, lock in a bigger loss than would otherwise be the case. The other more prescient point for me is that it just, it belies a fantasy view that there will be a point in the future where there is no uncertainty. You know, people do this with bear markets all the time. I'm going to sell and when everything, when the uncertainty is clear, then I'll buy back in. It's like, let me know, dude, when the uncertainty is gone because there will always be uncertainty, right? Even the uncertainty we can conceive of and also the unknown unknown that we can't conceive.

26:25Like it's right up until, you know, this time yesterday, this wasn't on the radar. This wasn't being discussed. There was no broker reports that said, oh, by the way, there is a chance that ASIC comes out tomorrow and raids the offices of like, what? No, it's completely out of left field. And so even if you find that you got to a situation where you feel as though the appropriate uncertainty has been minimized, you can't ever account for that as well. So it's something that I think the reactive trading to these kinds of conditions, And sensible though they may appear are often more or more often than not counterproductive in the grand scheme of things.

27:08There'll be exceptions to the rule, but I think that's my observation over a long period. That's right. And frankly, Matt, so here's the easiest one. Donald Trump, right? For all those people who said, oh, Donald Trump was going to do this and that, he did. He's been objectively, in my opinion, worse economically than I think most people expected given his first term. He was a bit of a loose cannon first term, but no real harm done. This already has gone absolutely bananas and done some stupid things, in my opinion, and other people can disagree. And, you know, we've talked about this before. The S &P 500 is up 17.5 % this year.

27:41And at the time of recording, it just closed at a record high. Now, people said, I will sell out because Donald Trump's going to do this and that and the other, and then I'll buy back in after the crash. Well, could it still crash? Yes, of course. I mean, this might be the high and it shows down 40 % by the end of the year. I don't know. But my point is, and your point, is trying to second guess what the sentiment might be, what the market might do. And it's also the orders of magnitude. And it's the sequential or compounding probability. So if Donald Trump is elected, if he does these things, if those things turn out badly, if other countries retaliate, if, if, if, if, if.

28:16And by the way, if investors have a similar view. Yeah. Yes, that's the main one, right? It's all the main one. You're right. It's like, you know, the sentiment in the short term is all that drives markets. That's what you just said with WiseTech. It's like, you know, and I've got to say I have no dog in this fight either, but to imagine that the value of WiseTech is 20 % wound up in whether or not a person continues as executive chair, I think it's pretty aggressive. I mean, it was true for Buffett. If Buffett dies in 1973 and, you know, John Smith takes over, we've never heard of Berkshire Hathaway.

28:46I mean, yes, probably 80 % of the current value now, 50 years later, is wrapped up in that. And at the time, it seems unlikely that that sort of response is genuine. And by the way, the first time around, exactly what happened, and the shares bounced back because we went, oh, no, he's back. It's okay. Everything's all right now. And so the soap opera is a soap opera, and it's annoying, and you'd rather not have it, all that kind of stuff, and we get the volatility. But it's just, as you say, mate, really worth pointing out. I tend to be with you, honestly. I'm not a contrarian by nature, but I do instinctively recoil at the extremes of other people's behavior in both directions, right?

29:24I've said many times, I love being an optimist in a room full of pessimists because I know historically the markets have always got better and I suspect they will continue to. Could be wrong, by the way. So whatever else is negative, it's like, oh, good, I get a chance to buy good prices. Whenever I was super optimistic, I'm like, well, I'm an optimist but you guys are kind of getting a bit carried away here, you know? And so it is that idea of just kind of mean reversion is too strong a term. But, you know, when the pendulum is a long way in one direction or the other, it's just likely by experience.

29:56I suspect, frankly, mathematically, but at least in my combined anecdotal experience, when the pendulum is swinging one way or the other, the further it swings out to one side, the better the chance it comes back rather than going, oh, my God, the pendulum's over there. The marker must be right. It's far more likely in my experience that the market's probably overreacted. And again, probabilistically, not every time, but more often than not, you're going to be right if you say, that's a bit much. Yes. So I agree, although I just hasten to make this comment in case people misinterpret what you're saying.

30:30It's not something that, well, I'll say this of you because I know this is true of you, and me too, by the way. It's not that you're saying this is an overreaction, therefore this is something that I can exploit and trade to my profit. Sorry, thank you. Yes. Yes. Which is a very different – and you're not saying that at all, right? And I'm not doing that at all. And I say maybe it is true for some people. They look for these, what they might consider irrational mispricings and they look to capitalise on it. But these are things that are really only in the domain of people who can do it full time, who have a huge amount of capital and can sort of play into the probabilities of, you know, oh, it works 53 % of the time.

31:09So if I do it 1 ,000 times, I'll get a slight edge. It's hard for, you know, us little retail investors at home to prosecute these things. So I just wanted to add that because it's the right instinct, right? Oh, okay, this isn't great, but it's an overreaction, but I can therefore buy it. Yeah. Because maybe the market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent is one saying. Another great saying is from Peter Lynch, and it's appropriate here, is that far more money has been lost by investors in trying to anticipate a correction than has been lost in the corrections that are combined.

31:44So it's all, I guess, what are we trying to say? Let's try and put a bow on this. It's just sort of like we make note of it because it's interesting. You don't often have, you know, near$30 billion companies suffer such massive falls and, you know, such a colourful founder slash chairman that sort of tends to attract a lot of headlines and the rest of it. And it's an interesting story. Oh, potential insider trading. Oh, isn't that interesting? I guess it's a call to sort of say, look, these things happen quite often, actually. And panic and or at the other end of it, speculation around these, like a financial speculation, is probably not something that in either case that is going to be worthwhile for you.

32:28um generally speaking if this is going to represent a bit of a turning point where things materially sour and uh from this point i mean the degree of loss is is you know whether it's down 20 from yesterday or it's going to slowly be bleed down to 28 the magnitude is appropriately not appropriately roughly the same and it's better off even if you end up realizing with the benefit of hindsight that you've lost more than you otherwise would have if you did just shoot first and ask questions later, at least you'll be making a more informed, calm decision away from the volatility of the market, which just is really not conducive to sensible decision making.

33:12And I know that sort of sounds like, well, why? But why even risk it? And the reason is, is because I don't know, and history will make me look silly in this particular instance, But there is a very non-zero chance, not even close to zero chance, that when we're talking about WiseTech in three months' time, that it's at an all-time record high. And again, I've got no dog in this fight. I'm not even trying to suggest. I'm just trying to say it is possible. And it's not like a one in a million chance kind of possible. And do you really want to take your savings and start speculating on these outcomes where it's just more appropriate to go, wow, these things sort of happen from time to time?

33:49I factor that in to my estimation of what is likely I'm going to experience as an investor. And I just make rational, calm decisions as is appropriate. It's also a question of degrees and directions, I think, mate. Because the – and I really – our listeners won't be surprised to hear this. And I hope we're preaching to the choir for the most part. But it's really easy to ask. we know psychologically humans feel the pain of loss about three times as strongly as the joy of a similar gain. So if you lose$10, it feels three times worse than making$10. It just does. So you have to know that. You have to get that in your head first.

34:34No, no, no. Losing$3 feels the same as winning$10. Because the pain is three times the size. So if you lose the same as you win, the pain is three times as bad. Not so much the loss is three times as bad. But it's exactly the same thing, right? Whichever way you put it, that math still absolutely nets out because that's the way it works. So if you – why do I say that? Because the people who are the sellers are starting with, but what if it falls further? Or what if it falls at all? And they start with a, how do I avoid the pain? And that is entirely rational. Well, entirely rational given our emotional state, which again is kind of an oxymoron.

35:14it's entirely reasonable to say i hate pain i i will avoid pain i mean yes obviously other than a few strange people amongst us that that's that's a perfectly rational thing to do if you don't like pain avoid it of course you would i like gain yeah i do but i hate pain more so i'm going to do everything i can to avoid the pain rather than try and maximize my gain that's entirely entirely entirely appropriate logical rational emotionally what again rational emotional is not the same I think you know what I'm saying. It's a very reasonable thing to do. It is logical if you have a view which says, my worldview is avoid pain.

35:49Not that I'm the slightest enjoying or anticipating to want more pain. But the problem with that is that we know that that's the emotional response. Now contrast that with the fact the market goes up over time. So I want to avoid pain, but I want to make long-term gain. and those are completely and utterly incompatible. I want my cake and I want to eat it as well. And again, and so that's why when people say, it's very, again, very reasonable. I'm not criticizing anyone for feeling or thinking this, which is, but what if it falls? Wouldn't I be able to take my money just in case the shares keep falling?

36:32Wouldn't I be able to sell just in case Donald Trump destroys the economy? Wouldn't it be better to do X, Y, Z just in case things fall? And the answer is yes, in the first instance. Yes, if it was going to fall, that would be bad. You should absolutely try and avoid that. Except when you then probabilistically say, here's the thing. First, it's not likely to happen. Secondly, if it happens, it's unlikely to cause you as much pain as you expect financially. Thirdly, the market tends to gain overtime rather than fall. So in the quest to avoid the pain, you end up missing out on the gain that is statistically likely to happen.

37:08and on a compound level happen phenomenally larger quotients than the losses you otherwise might suffer. And so that's where you've got to as an investor. If you can't do this, you probably shouldn't invest. I think it's probably fair to say, or at least that someone else do it for you, which is you have to say there will be times when the pain will be real. There will be times when your fears are absolutely justified. The bad stuff does actually happen. but over time if you are only trying to minimize pain rather than maximize gain you are going to get taken to the woodshed because you're going to you're going to miss out yes you'll miss out some occasional losses usually small sometimes large but you'll miss out many many many more gains and a much much larger gain in the process that's why you've got to make your peace with sometimes it'll suck that's once it's a feature not a bug i will say it's it's just part of how what you have to go through to get to the other side.

38:04Yeah. Yeah. I don't think anyone is struggling to get the point. Why I guess we hammer on about this kind of stuff is that it's very different in the moment when you've got real savings. And I mean something that's going to hurt. And I'm speaking very much from experience, right? Like it's like, oh, the market goes up and down and you don't need to worry about that stuff. and, you know, if you're right, six times out of ten, it's all good, bro. And we say this stuff, but those demons will come at night and it will test you. I think half the time we just say it because we're just like, it's a mantra to remind ourselves.

38:43We're telling ourselves, yeah, that's right. It's okay. It's well, it's well. Don't worry, Andrew. It's cool. It's cool. Yep. You are a genius. You are a brilliant capital allocator. The market's wrong. It's not you. It's the market. And, like, these are the head games. So Buffett always talks about you don't need to have a high IQ. You just, you do, how does he phrase it? You need to have the right temperament. And it's true. I mean, you know, ideally a few IQ points are not going to hurt you, but that's not the swing factor here, right? It's the panic factor. It's the greed factor. And it's just, yeah, just half of the battle, I think, is accepting it in anticipation and really internalizing it.

39:25And then when it happens, it's kind of like you're like totally expected this to happen. Does anyone go to the gym after not doing any exercise for two years and think that their muscles aren't going to hurt the next day? Like, yeah, but still, it's still worth it, right? Can I share with you the Buffett quote you alluded to? Because I just think it's lovely to be able to. Yes, I'm sure I appreciate it. I just think it's useful to kind of give it its glory because it's an extra context. Quote, the good news, this is Buffett, quote, the good news I can tell you is that to be a great investor, that you don't need to have a terrific IQ.

39:56If you've got 160 IQ, sell 30 points to somebody else because you don't need it in investing. What you do need is the right temperament. You need to be able to detach yourself from the views of others or the opinions of others. You need to be able to look at the fact about a business, about an industry, and evaluate a business unaffected by what other people think. That is very difficult for most people. Most people have sometimes a herd mentality which can, under certain circumstances, develop into delusional behaviour. So, end quote. It's just a nice, we've heard it all before, but that is, again, from Buffett's mouth directly, exactly the point you're trying to make.

40:38Can I now talk against Buffett's point, which is always going to be interesting? You're entitled to be wrong. No, I don't mean, like, let me say, he's right, right? Like, obviously he's right. But the trouble with Buffett quotes is he has these like little snappy sort of weirdicisms that are just like full of wisdom, right? But they very often get the wrong lesson is drawn from it. The classic one is because Buffett goes, rule number one of investing, don't lose money. Rule number two, see rule number one, you know. And people think that to mean, well, I must sell as soon as a share goes down.

41:14Or they take the wrong lesson from all of that. And I guess what you see people do, when I look in the mirror, I see people do this particularly, is when you go, something happens, whatever it happens to be, and the share price falls. And you go, well, I'm not the kind of panicky, flighty investor. I'm not going to, you know, I'm going to actually, I'm going to be a contrarian here. Everyone's selling. I'm going to buy. And that's what Buffett says. Buffett says when everyone panics, you should be greedy. When everyone's greedy, you should be fearful or whatever it is. And, you know, you say all of these things where the wisdom and the statement is true, but Buffett isn't saying do that regardless of the reality unfolding before your eyes.

42:02If it's been reported that the company has been up to its eyeballs in fraud and there's absolutely nothing there and you're going, oh, no, it's okay, I'm not going to panic. No, sometimes the, I mean, panicking is never a good idea. I'm not saying panic, but sometimes, oftentimes, it'll actually be, oh, no, an objective, objective rational interpretation of the facts is, I was just clearly wrong in my investment thesis and I should sell. And that's not at odds of what he was saying or what we've been saying. We're just saying don't sell as a knee-jerk kind of reaction. Don't sell just because you feel a bit uncomfortable.

42:43unstoppable sell if the facts change sell if the interpretation of the facts change absolutely just don't make it an entirely 100 emotional knee-jerk reaction decision that's that's the point here because you can get yourself in trouble convinced you can you can quote buffett all day long as you head to zero right and i've seen it happen again most commonly when i look in the mirror and that's buffett's point and i'll repeat this quote because he's not saying do it because other people are doing it or don't do it just to be contrarian. He's saying, quote, you need to be able to look at the facts about a business, about industry, and evaluate a business unaffected by what other people think, end quote.

43:22And so those last few words of do your work. If it's worth selling, sell. But don't talk to other people who are selling. Sell because you've done the work and you've decided this is not worth holding for one of whatever number of reasons. Yep. And one more thing and we'll move on to the next one. I always try and encourage this is to try and spend a lot of time, actually, before you hit that buy button. Ask yourself, what can go wrong and what would I do in the event of going wrong? You'll never imagine all of the possible ways things can go wrong, particularly if you try to be specific. But too often, once we get excited about a business, we only look at the positives.

44:00and we don't spend enough time thinking about the negatives and really internalizing them and also formulating a plan around what I would do. So, I mean, I've got investments in companies where they might have a bad quarter and I'm not doing stuff off. If it's just the normal ups and downs of the economy and a major, you know, client decided to defer some expenditure for one, like these are just business. That doesn't, it says bugger all about the long-term viability and value creation potential of a business. if it's kind of like oh you know that 400 million dollars we spent moving into the uk has resulted in absolutely zero sales and we're writing down all of our they're different things they're different calibers they're different qualitatively kind of different and you can think about some of these things in advance so when they do happen and they will happen a lot of the time you've at least you've at least got a plan right and that's far better than making it up 100 beautifully done Motley Fool Money.

44:57For more, subscribe to the free newsletter at fool.com.au forward slash listener. Mate, speaking of having a plan and speaking of maybe the other way around, we saw WiseTech shares crater. We saw Domino's shares jump at one point by the same amount, about 17%, on news that maybe a private equity mob was sniffing around and maybe having a go at the company. Now, the executive chair, Jack Cowan, has come out since and said, nope, nothing to it. You know what's funny, actually? And this is where comprehension matters. And I won't say this about Jack, but certainly the company's response. It was a strange old story.

45:41The report in the paper was Bain Capital are looking at sizing up dominoes for a potential acquisition. The article then went on to say, the AFI is not suggesting there's been any approach made whatsoever. The company comes out and says, that's incorrect, there's been no approach made. It's kind of like if you read the article, it's exactly what it says. Talking about wires crossed, right? And you want to be clear there hasn't been an approach made, that's fine. But the paper didn't actually say there was an approach, just that Bain were doing the numbers and prepared to bid maybe up to$4 billion, hence the intro, to buy Domino's.

46:15Basically because it was so bombed out, cradled out, and maybe cheap enough to buy, they're prepared to put their money where their mouth is and try and take the thing private. And it's the same in reverse. Jumping on something that's up 70 % just because they've been a report of something, I mean, we're probably wise to say you're selling in fear. Buying a grid is also a silly idea. Now, I own Domino's shares. Everyone knows that, I think, by now. But regardless of that, buying or selling just because there might possibly be a reported takeover, you're playing exactly the same game you talked about with trying to sell just in case.

46:47And in the event, by the way, if you'd done that, the shares were subsequently placed to a trading halt during the trading day, came back and fell 10 % out of that. They're still up 7 % for the day. But if you'd fought on the takeover of rumours, all of a sudden, three hours later, you're nursing a 10 % loss because you tried to play funny buggers and jump on something that was reported because maybe there was something to it. And again, if you want to play a lotto, knock yourself out. If you want to back the dog number five adapter or wherever they race the dogs these days, you're welcome to.

47:16But the idea of kind of trying to second guess how right the market is about some sort of speculation, it's like, well, maybe there's a deal and maybe it's worth something and maybe the market's right and maybe I should buy it just in case maybe the price goes higher. I mean, at that point, you know, put it on Reddit, the casino or something. Not that you should do that necessarily, but the silliness of just kind of trying to, trying to make a quick buck by jumping on the back of this thing. It just so happens so regularly. Your point is exactly right. Maybe WiseTech bounces back. maybe Domino's keeps falling maybe it goes back up again I don't know I don't care I mean look as a Domino's shareholder I'm always happier to have a higher price than a lower price but that idea of just it matters somehow because there's a room because maybe there's a thing for all of the we give the so-called smart money lots of credit sometimes right what's that we not you and I right oh the market must know this thing it's like really and they are as flawed as you and I and they are betting backwards and forwards and people go oh share price someone must know something So, well, maybe, but maybe it's just sentiment doing sentiment stuff.

48:18We've seen big rises and falls before. The WiseTech story on the downside, Domino's on the upside. It's exactly the same story. And by the way, so we were talking about, just coincidentally, about Domino's last week, right? And just sort of making the observation that, gosh, you know, from various metrics, from the standpoint of various metrics, it looks really cheap, right? And so what this rumor has done is really just make that same observation. I mean, private equity is not sniffing around because it's super expensive, right? Like they obviously feel as though there's value there. So it feels as though people need that validation from an outside unnamed sort of, you know, private equity.

49:00Oh, they think it's cheap. I'm like, well, no, it's not cheap because they think it's cheap. It's cheap because you have independently come to that conclusion by a calm, rational, objective analysis of the facts, right? And yes, with all the usual flaws of human judgment and, you know, incomplete information all around that. But it's sort of like if that's your view prior to yesterday's move, it's probably still your view today, right? And yes, it would feel nice that, okay, it feels like other people are starting to come to this conclusion. Great. That's really awesome. But it shouldn't be anything other than that, right?

49:36Like it's not in and of itself a tradable piece of information, I think is the point. That's right. And take any example you want. It's easiest to take the big highs and lows, but the market didn't know that dot-com stocks were worth a squillion dollars in 1999 and then know all of a sudden that they were worth 85 % less five years later or three years later what the numbers were. I mean, they were - One year later. I mean, they were objectively trading at those prices. But it doesn't take much history and a bit of logical thinking to go, hang on. If the market, if the so-called smart money was paying literally four times as much for some shares a year earlier and then the price today or 80 % less today than it was a year ago, same maths in the same direction.

50:26Was there something fundamental about the businesses themselves? that were suddenly worth a quarter of the price they were only a year ago? No, of course there wasn't. And yet we still kind of go to that. It's a bit like, you know, you say about economists and forecasts, right? It's like, so you were wrong then, you were wrong then, you were wrong then. We're still saying, ah, the share price is up. That must mean that someone knows something. Tell me what you think now, Mr. Economist. I say Mr. because 98 % that's the case. Tell me, Mr. Economist. I know you've been wrong like 99 % of the time in the past, but I'm really interested in what you think now.

50:59And like, who is the idiot in that equation? I mean, the market's actually more often right than economists, frankly. But those, the idea that somehow it's always, and the COVID crash is the same in the other direction, right? The COVID, shares were worth something on the, whatever, I can't remember the dates anymore, 28th of February, 26th of February, whatever it was, and then 35 % less a month than four days later. And then somehow, then subsequently back up the previous. So the market was right then, and then right then, and right then. It just takes, and I think, you know, again, Again, it's reasonable in terms of the emotional drive here.

51:31I say regularly, investing is absolutely the ability to overcome evolutionary urges. I think that's all it is, right? Investing well is the ability to overcome evolutionary urges. Do you say evolutionary or revolutionary? Evolutionary. Because it's that idea of, you know, well, I don't like uncertainty. And so if I can look over there and say, well, there's some people over there in the glass offices with the shiny suits who think this. and if I just kind of outsource my uncertainty to them and actually make it therefore certainty by saying, I don't know, but AMP says to buy or Macquarie is buying these shares or such and such forecaster, Mr.

52:07Doom has made his 84th recession recall in the last three years. If I just kind of hang my hat there and go, oh, okay, now I know. Well, now I can do something about it, right? And again, I'm not criticizing anyone for doing this because it is just entirely reasonable from a purely evolutionary emotional perspective just go i can i can resolve some stress in my life stress is not great i can resolve some stress in my life by outsourcing that idea go right okay that's out of the way then rather than actually living with the uncertainty of i don't know and i'll be wrong a lot and hopefully i'm going to be right more often and it's going to feel uncomfortable the whole way through but i'm going to do it it's it's hard right and it's not natural is it is not natural in any evolutionary sense not not revolutionary sense because we're not we're not the apes on the savannah don't put grain in silos for 40 years right they're not saving for their retirement they are not playing the odds of six times out of ten that won't be a lion because the other four times that you get killed it is it is entirely reasonable for people to feel this way it just requires us to have that really difficult conversation with ourselves which is i know you feel that way but let me rationally explain the circumstance and and that's that is the battle that is that is the entire internal battle that's your point about buffett and temperament um i've said about myself i am no genius in the slightest i'll listen well and truly know that by now if i have one advantage it is that i'm a pretty relaxed character and i can kind of make my peace with losses and that's not i'm not giving myself a rap but it i didn't do anything to earn it i mean that the other thing is we tell what they should do, I think a lot of the time, frankly, and Buffett didn't grow his own temperament.

53:47He just happened to have it. And so it's a little bit unfair at some level to say to someone, you shouldn't feel like this. Like, well, if you just do more than I do, then if I want to think for you to say, you should do this or should do that. If I'm born with a, I'm not very good at most things, but I am pretty good at rolling with the punches. And that's its own benefit as an investor. Know thyself. Know thyself is the first step of, well, life. It's broader than investing. That's right. But it really does apply to investing. And it's why I've often said that I used to be far more militant, the appropriate word on it, that how you invest, this is how you invest.

54:24Everything else, that's stupid. Only an idiot trades momentum. And why would you do it that way? And I was just the, you know, arrogance of youth. But actually the way you should invest is probably very different the way I invest. And I invest in a way that's different to how you invest. And it's like, who's right? Well, you've got to be right in the context of your temperament and your personality and your weaknesses, you know? So it's sort of like there are certain trading slash investing approaches that are just absolutely stupid for me to do given my emotional state and just the kind of person that I am.

55:01But someone else could be brilliant. And if they were to invest like me, we'd make an absolute dog's breakfast of it. So know thyself. Know thyself. Be honest with you. You're the easiest person to fool, right? And you're the easiest person to flatter as well. So you've got to really just understand who you are. And then you can go, look, I am the kind of person that tends to overreact. I tend to be a bit flighty. I tend to be a bit emotional. Okay, cool. Maybe I'm just going to be a passive ETF investor, right? That is a really, really, really good decision, right? Even if someone with an MBA and a PhD in advanced mathematics could prove to you on a piece of paper and a spreadsheet that there is a superior method.

55:39But it's like, well, not if I don't stick to it. That's right. Right? Like, it's actually, it might in theory be better, but not if I don't stick to it. The other point I wanted to make with all of these kinds of things, whether it's with WiseTech or with Domino's or any kind of stock, is that I think one of the big mistakes people make with investing is that they think that success is a series of lots of wins like this. I bought at$1. I sold at$1.30. Yeah, I bought at$2 and I sold out at$1.90. I didn't take much of a loss. But, oh, I also bought this thing over here for$10.93 and then I sold it a few years later for$26.80 or whatever.

56:16And I think that is not – well, I can hear contradicting myself. For me, that is not the right way to invest. And I'm very much with Munger in that the vast, vast, vast amount of money that you will make in this game is by sitting on your bum and doing nothing. that like think about even if you've got the kind of skills where you can at a reasonable frequency find 50 % trading opportunities that are there you're just going to be left in in the dust by someone who just quietly compounds away at 15 % per annum and you're going to have a far easier time of it I mean let's pick a really controversial stock that's been hyper volatile let's go with Tesla right all of the ups and downs and this and that you know if you've been tracking that from the sidelines, you'll know how diabolical that is.

57:07And the bears and the bulls always have these periods of time where they go, ha ha, I was right. You know, start of 2022, it was at 400 bucks. And then a year later, it was at$110. Like, ah, you idiots. Elon's a spastic, you know, a fool. Sorry.

57:26It's gone in five years. It's gone from$150 to$460, right? Now, again, it could be$2 tomorrow. I'm not trying to make any point on it other than there was someone who bought five years ago, shoved it in the bottom drawer, and if they just went into a coma for five years or went and lived in a bunker for five and came back, it was an incredible investment. Yet it has had, I can't even count this on the chart. It's got more than you can count in terms of 10%, 20 % correction. All over the joint. Whether that's WiseTech, whether that's Domino's, whether that's, you know, pick your favorite stock.

58:05In fact, that's one of my favorite exercises to do. I need to do it again, actually, is go and find the ASX or the NASDAQ's best performing company over whatever period, like 10 years that you can find. And you'll find, you know, NVIDIA, right? It's NVIDIA. And then do a chart where you plot the drawdowns, which is the drop from the subsequent high. So you have this, so it's hard to sort of do in an audio format, but you get all these bar charts sort of going down from a baseline of zero. And what you find, and this isn't the stock that went sideways. This isn't the stock that performed badly.

58:44This is the best performing stock. And all you see is there's two observations. 90-something percent of the time you are below a previous high. In other words, you're feeling bad about this because like, oh, I was at 200 and now I'm at 170, right? And the second observation is that those drawdowns are brutal. They're not like, oh, okay, I'm always within 5 % of the high and over time it's just gone up. It's like, no, you're mostly in the red from a previous high point and sometimes to a very, not sometimes, oftentimes to a very, very, very significant degree. But that's the, like, do you want to, what game are you going to play here?

59:25I'm going to play the game where I'm going to try and anticipate every single turning point and trade that. Good luck with that. That's super hard to do. It's virtually and practically impossible. Or I can just acknowledge that and roll with the punches and know that it's going to be hypervolatile as long as the big picture pieces are in play. Whether there's a recession, whether the president is tweeting out something stupid or not, you know, whether there happens to be a supply chain disruption. These are all transient, not nice, not positive, like negative for the business, real world cash flow impacts on all of this, but they're not structural.

59:59They don't change the long-term earnings capacity of the business. And it's the only North Star, as far as I'm concerned, if you're a long-term investor, that matters. It's not what is Tesla going to do next quarter? Is it going to meet its targets? Are analysts forecasts going to be right? It's like, no, is the company around in 10 years' time? And is it making materially more cars and more profit, maybe robots at that time as well, than it is today? And if the answer is yes, and the price is reasonable within your array of future scenarios, then buy it. Then buy it and then don't do anything unless that longer-term vision or that longer-term potential changes.

1:00:40That's simple but not easy. You're right. It's conceptually simple. I looked at the Tesla share price. So between 2014 and late 2019, those shares fell by about 25%. So five years, shares down 25%. Between 2021 and 2023, the shares fell 75%. Just picking two. Huge. This isn't a small cap, though. But it's a good example because it's one of the mega tech. That's why it's so interesting. Between the end of 2024 and March 2025, it dropped in half. So keep all that in your head, right? Between 20 - And then doubled. So here's the thing. Between the 2014 number I started with and today, the shares are up 30 times in value.

1:01:3730 times. So it went nowhere. went backwards over five years, then it dropped 75 % at one point, then dropped in half at another point. And despite all of that, I'm not a test of shout. I'm not a big Musk fan as an individual. He's done a great job with his businesses. Everyone knows that. But that business is still up 30 times in value in the last 11 years despite a period of five years of nothingness and then two really gut-wrenchingly awful falls. Also, no tax paid along the way there because you haven't realised the capital gain. The person, even if you somehow trade every pivot, which you just, I'm just going to say you're not going to, but even if you did, you know, I mean, you're bleeding out in tax along the way.

1:02:21So, like, the amount of money you get to put back in is always going to be less than what you took out, which means the share price has to do even better. And it's not like, like, if you absolutely nail it, then, yes, someone will make the point, well, if I'd done this and I'd done that, even with tax, I would have been better off. But yeah, there's a lot of ifs in that. Or I can make a very broad bet on the long-term future. And if I'm directionally right, I'm going to make a lot of money. It'll hurt like bugger on the way through, but at least. Exactly. Yep. Of course it does. Of course it's going to hurt.

1:02:52That's why we're not all horrible. That is why, right? It's because like you have to be a special kind of person to be able to go, ah, turns out my net wealth is down 30 % this week. You know, like what does Munger say? That if you're the kind of investor who can't deal with a 50 % drawdown with equanimity, you don't deserve to be a common shareholder and you deserve all the losses that you're going to get. Something brutally sharp that he slaps you across the face with. That's Munger. And it's like, whoa, Charlie, what do you really think? But he's right. He's 100 % right. It's like sometimes you've got to be really blunt with these kinds of things.

1:03:28It's kind of like even if you're good and even if you're right, you're going to experience that. And if you can't deal with it, again, know thyself. That's fine. Just don't be a direct investor because you're going to get taken out very quickly. Really good point. Mate, speaking of Tesla and highs, let's finish with, we don't do market predictions, prognostications. I very rarely have views on the whole markets because it's just unnecessary, not very useful and bloody hard to do. And yet. It is fun. And yet. It is fun. And yet. The US market has mentioned closed. We're recording this on Wednesday morning, the 29th of October.

1:04:03By the way, can I take a – this is absolutely stupid but fun. We talked about gold a couple of times, and I wrote an article last week about the gold price hitting an all-time high, and since then it's got nothing but down. And I'm like, dumb luck, but gee, I hope it keeps going because then I just look like I'm a genius. I wasn't predicting it would go down, by the way. It was just one of those type of ways I just happened to write about, no, no, the rally seems unreasonable. the market is at a record high as of 29th of October in the morning at the US market this is up 7.5 % I've already said that this year and there is some reasonable concerns by a lot of people about the market value and I am squarely on the fence partly because I don't know you can have a strong conviction about market level valuations because of all the things I say that about ETFs, thematic ETFs regularly, right?

1:04:58Even if you like lithium, trying to work out whether a lithium ETF is worth owning means you've got to look down all the work at all the companies and try and somehow put that together and say, is it therefore worth$100 a unit or not? When it comes to the market, with the S &P 500 with 500 companies, the Russell 3000 with, it's not quite 3 ,000 companies anymore, but 70 ,000 companies or the NASDAQ with 100 companies, to do that math requires you to have, generally speaking, and informed view or at least some sort of ability or preparedness to make a decision or try and make a call. So generally, I'm happy to leave these sort of things well alone.

1:05:33It's notable though that we are at record highs and multiples are pretty stretched. I'll share my fence sitting and then I'll let you jump in. And with zero conviction, I'm not for a second suggesting anybody trade some sort of index ETF on the basis of this. I own, do I own an S &P 500 ETF? I think I don't know. I own a US market, total market thing I own. On one hand, on those kind of PE basis, a cyclically adjusted PE basis, these things look high. They look historically high. And it's tempting to look at that and go, oh, it's expecting a lot of the market. We're talking about NASDAQ highs and dot-com highs and other things.

1:06:14Gee, that looks expensive. There's a lot going on there. This feels toppy to use the phrase. I hate using jargon. But, you know, it feels all these things. And so the inner value investor in me is like, oh, I don't know. The growth investor in me, and I'm neither in value nor growth. I'm just using the examples of the fun of kind of drawing different conclusions. Also wonders whether the market today is very different. And I know that John Templeton said the foremost dangerous words in investing at this time is different. But if you think about previous market, not highs, but previous market compositions, when the biggest companies in the world are exxon mobile and general electric and general motors and i don't know who else they would have been way back in the day ibm at some point or something um they were big capital intensive um conglomerates that were reasonably slow growing largely because they'd kind of think once you get to be the biggest companies in the world you tend to be at a stage of maturity and so you're in a situation where the big end of town is really capital intensive, slow growing, dominating the market by index weight.

1:07:24In other words, the size of those guys are so big that where they go, goes the market. And so it kind of made some sense that you said, well, hang on, at some point, you only pay a decent multiple of earnings because this is not steady state, but reasonably slow growing. Maybe there's something there, maybe there's not. If there is something there, there's a lot of capital to get there. And I look at the businesses of today, the so-called magnificence evidence, by the way, I hate that. The FANG was before that, there was something else before that, just a stupid labels, marketing labels for fund managers.

1:07:52But I look at that and think, well, hang on, if we take the top seven or 10 or 12 or five of the biggest S &P 500 companies, and let's blanket own some of these. I own Amazon, I own Google, I don't own Apple, I don't own Facebook, I don't own Netflix, I don't own NVIDIA. Who else are we missing in the top end? I'm not sure. Take that group and then think, well, hang on, most of those guys are growing at double digit rates percentage-wise a year. And if you've got the biggest end of the market growing at those sort of rates, then I'm not sure that historical PEs do count as much as we otherwise might have liked to think.

1:08:25If the growth rates were historical and the PEs were historical, you can do a like-for-like comparison. When you've got the big end of town growing at really, I mean, for Apple this morning, Apple was the fourth company to be worth$3 trillion, I think was the numbers. Four trillion. Thank you. Remember when we were wondering whether any company ever get to a trillion? Now there's four at$4 trillion. Yeah. And I think it's just worth keeping in mind. I don't have a view. I'm not trading anything on buying or selling. But I am mindful that the big end of town is growing faster than probably historically the top five companies ever have grown.

1:09:01Percentage-wise, I don't know. I'm going to make this up. If you go back to 1960, I reckon on any extended period of time, I'd be very surprised if there was any period where the biggest companies were growing anything like this sort of rate. Because by the time you got to be G. Sustain double-digit free cash flow growth rates. I mean, you're GE and that's fine and you're big in your conglomerate. You're eking out a little bit of growth here and there or you're ExxonMobil and, yes, you're finding some more oil. But by the time you get to that size, the growth is over. It's done. So, I'd love to hear your thoughts.

1:09:31I don't – if the market fell 25 % tomorrow, I wouldn't be surprised. No, because we're at all-time highs and that's always a risk, right? If it was 25 % higher, this one next year, would I be surprised? No. for the reason I just said, if these guys can continue to grow at these rates, and maybe they can't, but if they can, then I would say the market's cheap, but it's not expensive at all if they can deliver on the growth that these sort of prices would imply. So, yeah, I don't know, man. I'm very, very tired, so I'm not doing anything either way as a result, but it is worth talking about because other people are, and our listeners will be wondering, and, you know, is this the top?

1:10:05And I've had plenty of people on social media over the past few months, weeks, say to me, hey, maybe this, you know, of course we should sell. of course it's too high, of course it's this. I'm not sure. I'm really not sure. I'm not either. I'm not either. I mean, I'll caveat by saying I'm not doing anything differently. You know, I just said before, you know, more money has been lost in anticipation of the crash than the crash itself. Name a previous all-time market high where it was a good idea to sell. I mean, there isn't one because we happen to be at all-time. Now, maybe next month that will look a bit silly, but I suspect that that would be corrected over time as well.

1:10:38So you've got to be very, very careful with all of this. I mean, objectively speaking, if you want to compare average prices with average earnings, then yeah, we're up there, right? I mean, just objectively true on these metrics. And you mentioned before the term of mean reversion. And yeah, as a general rule, these multiples do tend to mean reverse. So maybe on a purely balance of probabilities sort of outlook, maybe the best way to say it is it's more future gains are going to be more difficult. Maybe let's put it that way. The rubber band is getting tighter and tighter and tighter, so every little inch we stretch it a bit further is going to be a bit harder to do.

1:11:16And maybe there's something to all of that. I do think the market is an unhelpful lens to look at. I don't. I'm a direct share market investor. I don't have any money in the market. I own individual securities and commodities. I don't own the market, right? So, oh, that's not – I do have a passive index fund for the NASDAQ, so, okay, maybe I do there in a small point. But generally speaking, what 99 % of listed companies around the world do is irrelevant to me. Not trying to be clever with words here. It really is. It doesn't say anything about a specific company that I'm holding. The broader point I would make, and I'm sorry to do this, but I – Oh, no.

1:12:07So we almost got through the whole podcast. Is it going to be central banking in Bitcoin? No, we can get there if you want. He said, sorry to do this. I thought, well. Everything leads back to it. I think this time, and this time it's different because actually this time it's exactly the same as every other period in time when history has lined up like this, is that I think, and we touched on this when we talked about gold. Normally gold moves in the opposite direction to risk assets. But gold is up, property is up, equities are up, bonds are up. Like everything is up. And I think there is something to be said with the view of it's the denominator, stupid.

1:12:55It is the money itself that is - That's the one of the trust sector I missed. I missed - I got central banks and Bitcoin. You missed that. Didn't get money printing. I should have got that one. See, I don't even have to make it a subjective view. It's because the very people who publish the data will tell you, if you look at aggregate inflation since COVID, it's like 30 % or 40%, I forget the number, of the amount of money that exists on planet Earth was created in the last five years. Like, you know, and J.P. Morgan, the world's largest bank, I believe, has now coined the phrase the debasement trade.

1:13:30Maybe it's coming out and calling it for what it is, which is when the money is starting to falter, any asset starts to look good. We've touched on this in previous episodes. I'm not going to go too far down the rabbit hole. But I think there's a dimension of this at the moment in a world where, let's just focus on the US because it's the gorilla in the room, where it is drowning in debt. It has no chance on earth to pay it back. There's no political reality where they default on their debt. They're going to print. They're going to print. They're going to devalue. They're going to inflate. And when that happens, if you're smart and we can easily criticise Wall Street and the big money management, they're not.

1:14:18There are a lot of things. There are a lot of things. But they're not dumb, right? Not well incentivised. And they're not well incentivised, right? Not well incentivised, sorry, yeah. So look, I would much rather own a overvalued but high quality stock or property, you know, as opposed to something that I know in real terms is probably going to bleed out at 5 % or 6 % over the coming. And we will see whether that view proves to be accurate or not. And barring some productivity miracle, mathematically, I don't know how you come to any other sort of conclusion. So if that is your view, and very obviously it is my view, I feel as though, and I think that's what a lot of, I don't want to name names, but I think a lot of the old guard missed that in their analysis.

1:15:07They start off with these multiples. Like I've been doing this for 40 years. Every time we've gotten to this stage, it ends badly. It's like, yes, but not in a regime where the money is failing at an accelerating rate. And that might be the X factor as to why it's an everything. Yeah, that's fair. That's fair. Because, you know, where else are you going to store your wealth? I've seen this on the pod before, mate, but I think I'm not as deep in the weeds as you are with this stuff, but it is very, very telling that shares and gold are up at the same time. And that is really, really, really unusual historically.

1:15:43Not unprecedented, but really unusual because generally speaking, one or the other tends to be the recipient of funds at the expense of the other for the reasons, right? And if you're looking for a store of value, if you're looking for a hedge against inflation, if you're looking for some sort of safety, if you're looking for whatever, you go to gold. If you're feeling great, you think your economy's going to grow, if you want to be on the go-go train, if you want to take advantage of improvements in the economy, you go to shares. And there'll always be people who have different views at the same time.

1:16:15There'll always be people who say, no, I think this is scary, I want gold, or I think this is great, I want shares. That's not unusual. But the weight of money tends to fall in one direction or the other, just again, because that's what crowds do, right? And so it's just really, really unusual to have gold riding so high at the same time as shares are riding that high. And I will only add to your point, mate, to not disagree, but the only thing I would add is that to some degree,

1:16:44I think you're right there is a but not invalidating what I just said sentiment is also part of the story and so even to the extent you are if you're 100 % right it doesn't necessarily always I'm going to say it doesn't it doesn't always explain all of the move and if you're wrong it doesn't explain all the move either just to add I didn't suggest that It's just more of a factor. 100%. And arguably probably, in my view, a reasonably dominant factor, but not the only factor and certainly not just myopically only. I would agree entirely. No, I didn't mean to imply you said anything otherwise. I just wanted to make the point that we need to be careful when we try and define or describe, again, not you personally, anyone, for those listening,

1:17:34don't assume that the results are due to an impassive thoughtful careful response to stimulus that is completely and always justified by the underlying circumstance even if it's wrong it's still not it can be rationally it can create it or contrived the the actual impact though is to some degree, to somewhere between a modest and a significant degree. And again, back to dot-com, right? The peak and the crash. It was telling us what people thought, not to show what was actually happening. And that's just, it's always worth adding those two things together because, and we just talk about WiseTech and Domino's, right?

1:18:15It's a lot of way to kind of bring the whole thing to a conclusion. There is a there there, you know? I'm sure the AFR report is not unsubstantiated. I'm sure there are private equity sniffing around Domino's. We know for a fact there are investigations into WiseTech. It's not to say that the facts are real. The size of the move may or may not be appropriate based on the fact that people know. And even if directionally true, whether it's too much or too little, it's something that will be absolutely a function of sentiment. Even if the underlying rationale is 100 % accurate, don't always assume, never assume that the size of any move in any direction is, you know, explained by the fundamentals, even if the fundamentals are real and even if they are contributing absolutely to the case you're making.

1:19:02It's just – it's a very, very, very hard thing to get your head around only because it's sort of like whenever we're talking about investments, which is what the whole point of this podcast is, we have to have a quantitative measure of it. Otherwise, it's all vibes, right? Up or down? Yeah, but up in what sense? By how much to what? Exactly, yes, that's right. I can't, you and I can't talk about, I don't know, woodwork without talking about centimetres at some point, right? So you just can't talk about shares. You can't talk about an economy without talking about money, as in the language that we use to quantify and describe it.

1:19:43And why it's so hard is because I think we just very naturally assume that it's just a, it is like the speed of light. or the mass of a proton, that it's a universal concept, when it's clearly not. It's like absolutely not that's the case. And that is always, well, no, since 1971 when Nixon defaulted for the US and moved them off the gold standard and basically defaulted on bondholder claims and the rest of it. We have slowly lurched from crisis to crisis where it wasn't, none of this stuff is a problem. It's like drinking. Let's get back to drinking. I have a beer after work. So what? Sue me.

1:20:24It's not the end of the world. Even your doctor is not going to have too much of a problem with that. But then you go to two beers and you fast forward and it's like, okay, Scott, you're drinking a case of beer every day. Like, well, it's never been a problem before. Like, no, but cirrhosis of the liver is in your future. It's going to come all the way right now. Now, I could have said that when you were just having a nice glass of wine with dinner and you're going, well, I've just had my physical. I'm at the peak of fitness. There's absolutely nothing wrong. No doctor out there is going to say that I'm being reckless with my body.

1:20:58It's like, no, but directionally you're going there. And it's just we are potentially at that point where it's kind of like it hasn't been much of a problem through to now because we've been able to the short-term benefits of some of these monetary and fiscal settings have actually been okay and had a certain short-term sugar hit sort of benefits. But each year that goes by, it's sort of like diminishing returns, diminishing returns. And now it's like, as I say, the world's most highly respected, largest financial banker saying, oh, you should buy gold and the other thing because of the debasement trade.

1:21:34It's like it's just notable. And I feel as though I don't want to prosecute it too hard. But history, again, I know I always say this every week, history is a guide, right? The last time when we really saw inflate really take off, like really become a massive problem was coincidentally in the 70s or not coincidentally at all. But interestingly enough, there were periods from the early 70s, like mid-1970 through to early 1973, the Dow Jones increased by 50%. Now, over the decade, it was a pretty lost decade, really, because of all of the inflation shenanigans and what Volcker ultimately had to do to kill it with high interest rates and the rest of it.

1:22:20But there were all these big run-ups in reaction to these inflationary impulses because I have to store my wealth somewhere. You know, I have to put it somewhere. And where am I going to put it? I'm not putting it in the money because every time I turn around, it buys me 10 % less than it did the other day. So anyway, I'm over-egging the pudding here, but I think that just because it hasn't happened for many decades, I wouldn't discount it on that view alone, particularly when you can point to very objective measures that just say, oh, there are incredible parallels with what's happening now and what happened in 1970 and what happened in this and this and this and this period.

1:23:03Like, you know. And for me, what does that say? It says I've got to put my money somewhere. I'm not putting it in. You said a bit before that you wrote an article on gold, right? I did too. My bottom line was do whatever you like, but just for goodness sake, don't put any long-term savings in bonds or cash. That was my bottom line. And for that reason, I want something that is going to be far more scarce than money because it's becoming increasingly less scarce every year. And one more thing, one more thing, one thing. I said this to you off air, and this is actually something that scares me quite a bit, is that the RBA, and you know, I'm not a fan of central banks in general, but the RBA has a mandate to look after employment and to look after price stability.

1:23:56That's it. That's what we need you guys to do. And they've definitely been saying it in the US, And now Bullock had an interview the other day where she said, well, we're watching the market. And if the market were to fall, that might prompt us to cut interest rates, which is, whoa, what on earth? I hate that. No, no, no. I hate that. It is not your job to support asset prices. None of the asset prices. She's not. Just the financialized part of the economy. Oh, my God. If traders make or lose money, if investors make or lose money. I don't want to say make or lose. If things are not necessarily lose money.

1:24:31If things are just volatile because something happened that wasn't expected, yes, this is a flow in the physical economy. We know there's a lot of wealth tied up in assets, and yes, there's probably some transfer mechanism, but the idea that somehow – it's like when they give guidance to the markets. I've got to help markets sort of understand what's going to happen. No, you don't. It's market's job to decide what they want to do based on what they know. It is not your job to pander to them and give them what they want just because they're financial markets. Care about the iron worker. Care about the nurse and the fiery and the teacher and the factory worker, whether some shiny bum somewhere.

1:25:05Care about not flooding the economy with your monopoly money every time that there's a wobble out there. It doesn't work. It does not work. That is the key point here. And it's like it's more the moral hazard. They used to call it the Fed, the Powell put. No, who was it? Who was it? The Bernanke put. The Bernanke put. In other words, don't worry. whenever the market gets in trouble, the central bank will save you. And they do, but it's kind of like it's not really feels good. It's sort of like, hey, I know you're having a bit of a comedown from your heroin high. Here's some more heroin, boys. Oh, thank you.

1:25:44And, like, that's the help that they are offering here because when you think about it, clicking on a mouse at a headquarters somewhere does not create more production. the economy. It doesn't create more jobs. It does nothing other than massively distort things. Anyway, my point is, is that that is why I think even if you're super cynical, it is rational to prefer admittedly by historical standards, overpriced assets, hopefully that they're actually of a certain quality underneath all of this, than it is to buy something which you know is going to be deflated. And in fact, if those assets as excessively priced as they might seem, if they are going to wobble, they're just going to print a bunch of money and prop it up anyway.

1:26:35That was, you don't even have to go back that far. Let's go to the GFC. Like the biggest collapse since the Great Depression. And what did they do? They just bailed out all the asset holders. And we didn't have any inflation in the economy at that point. And it's like, it's a bit of, it's not a conundrum at all when you understand it, but it was like, how come that didn't happen? It's like, it did happen, dude. It just happened in asset prices. There was massive asset price inflation. So we go, oh, thank goodness. Look at the GFC. Everything recovered there really quickly. Look at Australian house prices.

1:27:08Look at house prices. Even in the US where they suffered a massive subprime collapse, like, oh, it all bounced back. It's like, yeah, but at the cost of the eventual inflation that obviously came as a consequence of that. So anyway, back to the point here, are markets excessively priced? Yes. Should you sell and go to cash? Not for me. No way. Because they're going to bail you out. If you're an asset holder, they're going to bail you out. And if you're a factory worker or a nurse or someone who actually does stuff, you're not going to be bailed out. In fact, you're going to be carrying the can.

1:27:48Are you saying excessively valued then in passing? Did you actually mean excessively valued or are you saying just higher than? On a pure aggregate PE basis against historical standards, if I can caveat that way. I'm not trying to pigeonhole you. You said in passing, I was like, whoa, that sounds like a pretty, you know, that's notwithstanding the lack of alternatives. That sounds like an alarm bell kind of statement. Well, it is a statement of fact to say that the market's PE is at the upper end of its range. In fact, I'm going to double check this, but I want to say on a cyclically adjusted PE basis, pretty much where we were in 1999 before the dot-com bubble burst.

1:28:33Now, that statement of fact, that's just where does that mean that in a more wholesome, holistic viewpoint, the market is over. Well, that's the interesting part. That's what we're talking about. Ten in five years. I don't know. I don't know. But based on that very narrow definition, absolutely it's excessively valued. We will find out. Mic drop. We'll find out. Mic drop, yeah. Will we come back and talk to some listeners' questions on Sunday? Yeah, 100%. Until then, enjoy the first half of your weekend or your Thursday lunchtime. Until then. Cheers. The Motley Fool and people appearing in this program may have positions in the companies mentioned.

1:29:15General advice only. Please speak to your financial professional to understand how it may pertain to your situation. Subscribe to the free newsletter at fool.com.au forward slash listener. The Motley Fool operates under financial services license 400691.